Edison Electric Topics: EPRl '3-3239

Institute Feedwater heaters Project 1887-3

Heat exchangers Final Report
Electric Power Operation September 1983
Research lnstitute Maintenance
Reliability
Performance

Recommended Guidelines for the

Operation and Maintenance of
Feedwater Heaters

Prepared by
International Energy Associates Limited
Washington, D.C.
Recommended Guidelines for the
Operation and Maintenance of
Feedwater Heaters

CS-3239
Research Project 1887-3
Final Report, September 1983

Prepared by

INTERNATIONAL ENERGY ASSOCIATES LIMITED

600 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Principal Investigators
F. L. Wadsworth
T. J. Kielar

Subcontractor

POWERFECT, INC.
53 East Cedar Street
Livingston, New Jersey 07039

Principal Investigator
M. C. Catapano

Consultant
R. R. Noe

Prepared for

Edison Electric Institute

1111 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

and

Electric Power Research Institute

3412 Hillview Avenue
Palo Alto, California 94304

EPRl Project Manager

I. A. Diaz-Tous
Availability and Performance Program
Coal Combustion Systems Division
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Copyr~ghtd 1983 Electrlc Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved

NOTICE
This report was prepared by the organ~zat~on(s) named below as an account of work sponsored by the Electr~c
Power Research Institute, Inc. (EPRI) and the Ed~sonElectric Institute (EEI). Neither EPRI. EEI, members of EPRI,
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express or impl~ed,with respect to the use of any information, apparatus, method, or process d~sclosedin t h s
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use of, or for damages resulting from the use of, any ~nforrnaton,apparatus, method, or process disclosed in
t h ~ sreport.
Prepared by
Internatonal Energy Assoc~atesL~miled
Washington, D.C.
 ABSTRACT

Previous EPRI surveys, studies, and workshops have identified feedwater heater (FWH)
problems as having a significant impact on fossil plant performance and availabil-
ity. One of the root causes of these problems is the current lack of comprehensive
standards, guidelines and procedures for assisting utility personnel in the opera-
tion and maintenance of their FWH systems. The guidelines in this publication have
been developed to help correct the problem by providing utility personnel with ex-
planations of the principal failures experienced in the past, their symptoms, prac-
tical techniques to avoid or minimize the problems, and other recommendations for
improving operation, maintenance, and management of FWH systems. The guidelines are
essentially a collation of the experiences of those utilities and individuals who
have experienced some success in coping with FWH problems. Comments and suggestions
from users are solicited to help EPRI make future edition(s) of these guidelines
more complete and more beneficial tc the utilities.
 EPRI PERSPECTIVE

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

Failure of feedwater heaters (FWHs) has a significantly adverse effect on the avail-
ability and thermal efficiency of both fossil fueled and nuclear power plants, with
especially severe financial consequences for baseloaded units. EPRI Final Report
CS-1776, Failure Cause Analysis--Feedwater Heaters (April 1981), identifies six
major categories of FWH problems in fossil fueled plants and recommends approaches
to reducing their severity. EPRI Final Report CS-3184, Corrosion-Related Failures
in Feedwater Heaters (July 1983), provides further information into generic failure
modes of commonly used materials in FWHs and how to control them. A growing body
of knowledge on nuclear plant FWHs complements these findings with data on their
specific operating conditions.

Utility personnel need guidelines to assist them to apply this information to their
specific requirements for operation, maintenance, and repair or replacement of FWHs.
This final report for RP1887-3 addresses those needs. It will be complemented with
the results from RP1887-1, Recommended Design and Procurement Guidelines for Feed-
water Heaters in Large Power Generating Units; these results will be published later
this year.

PROJECT OBJECTIVE

The specific objective of this study was to prepare guidelines that utility person-
nel can apply to develop detailed procedures and policies to meet their specific
requirements for operation, maintenance, and replacement of closed FWHs.

PROJECT RESULTS

These guidelines contain four main sections. The first describes the general con-
figuration of closed FWHs. The second section addresses the six problem categories
identified by EPRI CS-1776 in terms of causes, symptoms, operating practices to
correct or minimize the causes and symptoms, and recommendations for alleviating
them. The analysis required to limit FWH and plant operations whenever one or more
FWHs are out of service is described in the third section, and the final section
gives a basis for assessing a repair or replacement decision for a FWH.
The scope of this publication is limited for several reasons. There is too much
detailed information available to include all that is pertinent. Detailed proce-
dures must be prepared for each plant depending on its equipment, configuration, and
operating requirements. Operators and maintenance personnel must obtain accurate
current information from vendors for this purpose.

This document will be of interest to utility engineers and plant operators who are
responsible for planning and conducting the operation, maintenance, and repair of
closed FWHs in all types of plants. This preliminary guide is promulgated with the
intention to improve it on the basis of user comments as'well as new developments.

Isidro A. ~iaz-TOUS, Project Manager

Coal Combustion Systems Division
 ACKNOWLEDGMENT

~t is a pleasure to acknowledge the valuable contribution provided to this work by

many individuals in the electric utility industry and in engineering and manufac-
turing firms, In addition to conducting two comprehensive reviews of drafts of this
document, the members of the EEI Prime Movers' Feedwater Beater Task Force provided
encouragement, examples of their experience, and constructive suggestions throughout
the effort. Special thanks are expressed to Tom Haynes of Duke Power Company who
served with dedication on the Task Force and spent numerous additional hours helping
the authors improve the substance of the guide while also contributing ideas to EPRI
for improvement to future editions.

vii
 CONTENTS

Section Page

1 GENERAL D E S C R I P T I O N O F CLOSED FEEDWATER HEATERS 1-1

1.1 General 1-1

1.2 Closed Feedwater Heaters 1-1

2 THE NEED F O R UNDERSTANDING THE KEY PROBLEMS 2-1

2.1 L e v e l C o n t r o l And D r a i n s C o o l e r Zone P r o b l e m s 2-1

2.1.1 O v e r v i e w Of M a j o r P r o b l e m A r e a s 2-1

2.1.2 Examples Of D r a i n s C o o l e r P r o b l e m s 2-14

2.1.3 Symptoms Of L e v e l C o n t r o l A n d D r a i n s C o o l e r
Zone Problems

2.1.4 O p e r a t i o n a l Practices T o A v o i d O r M i t i g a t e
Problems

2.1.5 Preventive A n d C o r r e c t i v e Maintenance

2.1.6 System Modification

2.2 Tube Vibration

2.2.1 Overview

2.2.2 Symptoms Of V i b r a t i o n P r o b l e m s

2.2.3 O p e r a t i n g A n d M a i n t e n a n c e Practices To A v o i d
O r M i t i g a t e V i b r a t i o n Damage

2.2.4 System Modification

2.3 Tube-Inlet Erosion

2.3.1 Overview

2.3.2 Design Considerations

2.3.3 Symptoms And D e t e c t i o n Of T u b e - I n l e t Erosion

2.3.4 O p e r a t i o n a l Practices T o A v o i d O r M i t i g a t e
Damage
Section Page

2.3.5 System M o d i f i c a t i o n s 2-46

2.3.6 Maintenance P r a c t i c e s 2-47

2.4 Water C h e m i s t r y And C o r r o s i o n 2-48

2.4.1 Overview 2-48

2.4.2 The Feedwater Heater Environment 2-51

2.4.3 D e t e c t i o n Of Water C h e m i s t r y - R e l a t e d
Problems

2.4.4 O p e r a t i o n s And Maintenance

2.4.5 C h e m i s t r y C o n s i d e r a t i o n s R e l a t e d To
D e s i g n And System M o d i f i c a t i o n s

2.5 Steam Impingement

2.5.1 Overview

2.5.2 Symptoms Of Impingement A t t a c k

2.5.3 O p e r a t i o n a l P r a c t i c e s To Avoid O r M i t i g a t e
Steam Impingement Damage

2.5.4 P r e v e n t i v e And C o r r e c t i v e Maintenance

2.5.5 System D e s i g n And M o d i f i c a t i o n s To Reduce

Impingement Damage

2.6 Problems A s s o c i a t e d With Tube P l u g g i n g

2.6.1 Overview

2.6.2 Tube-Plugging T e c h n i q u e s And L i m i t a t i o n s

2.6.3 P r i n c i p a l Problems And P o t e n t i a l S o l u t i o n s

2.7 Miscellaneous

2.7.1 The Tubesheet/Channel-Barrel T r a n s i t i o n

Radius

2.7.2 Welded V e r s u s B o l t e d P a r t i t i o n P l a t e s

2.7.3 Channel A c c e s s Cover

3 METHODICAL APPROACH TO OPERATION OF FEEDWATER HEATERS UNDER

DEGRADED CONDITIONS

3.1 Overview: The Need To Develop A Systems Approach

3.2 P r a c t i c a l Examples Of An Approach D e t e r m i n i n g

Operational Limitations
Section Page

4 THE REPAIR OR REPLACE DECISION PROCESS 4- 1

4.1 Overview 4- 1

4.2 C o s t s Of Repeated Feedwater Heater F a i l u r e s 4-2

4.3 Age C o n s i d e r a t i o n s 4-14

4.4 Mechanical. Design O f The Feedwater Heater 4-14

4.5 Construction Materials 4-14

4.6 Mechanical Condition 4-1 5

4.7 Regulatory And F i s c a l Climate 4-15

 ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure

1-1 Typical Two-Zone H o r i z o n t a l Feedwater Heater

(Condensing And Subcooling Zones)

1-2 T y p i c a l Three-Zone H o r i z o n t a l Feedwater Heater

(Desuperheating, Condensing, And Subcooling Zones)

1-3 T y p i c a l V e r t i c a l Feedwater Heater (High-Pressure,

Three-Zone, Head Down)

1-4 Typical Channel C o n f i g u r a t i o n s

2-1 Drains Cooler Shrouding Designs

2-2 Comparison Of Feedwater Heater Capacitance

2-3 B e l l y Band Modification To A V e r t i c a l Feedwater Heater S h e l l

2-4 Drains Cooling Zone Shroud Modification

2-5 Damage From F l a s h i n g A t The Entrance To The Drains Cooler Zone

2-6 V e r t i c a l Channel Down Feedwater Heater With Welded B l i s t e r

2-7 Feedwater Heater T e s t Sheet

2-8 Unit MW Load V s . Feedwater Heater S h e l l Operating P r e s s u r e

(Generic Example)

2-9 Feedwater Heater Water Level L i m i t s

2-10 High S h e l l Water Level With S i d e Drains O u t l e t

2-11 Low S h e l l Water Level With S i d e Drains O u t l e t

2-12 Level I n d i c a t i o n s Of A V e r t i c a l Channel Down Feedwater Heater

2-13 Example Of Data Used To Check Level Vs. Temperature

Performance

2-14 Tube V i b r a t i o n Damage A t The U-Bend

2-15 Tube Support B a f f l e s A t The U-Bend

2-16 Drains I n l e t B a f f l e Plate/Dam

Figure Page

2-17 S c a l l o p e d B a f f l e s And Supports 2-37

2-18 Tube-Inlet Erosion 2-42

2-19 Ammonia Attack Of Copper-Nickel Tubing 2-56

2-20 E x f o l i a t i o n Of Copper-Nickel Tubing 2-57

2-21 Tube F a i l u r e From S t r e s s Corrosion 2-58

2-22 A Continuous Vent O r i f i c e With S t a r t u p Bypass Valve 2-62

2-23 Steam Impingement D e s t r u c t i o n O f Tubes 2-67

2-24 Tube Damage From Steam Impingement 2-68

2-25 Impingement Attack On Small Impact P l a t e s 2-69

2-26 Impingement Erosion Of The Feedwater Heater S h e l l 2-70

2-27 F a l l e n Impact P l a t e Within The Feedwater Heater S h e l l 2-7 1

2-28 Damage To Tubes From A Loose Impact P l a t e 2-72

2-29 Frequency S p e c t r a Of Feedwater P r e s s u r e Noise 2-85

2-30 Example Of S i g n a l Trend For A Tube Leak I n A High-Pressure

Feedwatex Heater

2-31 C a t a s t r o p h i c F a i l u r e Of A Feedwater Heater Forging

2-32 Determination Of S t r e s s Concentration F a c t o r s For Various

Corner R a d i i O f A C y l i n W i c a l S h e l l

2-33 Welded P a r t i t i o n P l a t e

2-34 Bolted P a r t i t i o n P l a t e

2-35 Manway For Channel Access

3-1 B o i l e r Superheat L i m i t a t i o n s With Reduced Feedwater

Temperatures

3-2 Operating L i m i t s And G u i d e l i n e s For Case 1

3-3 Operating L i m i t s And G u i d e l i n e s For Case 2

4-1 I n s p e c t i o n O f High-Pressure H o r i z o n t a l Feedwater Heater

 TABLES

Table Page

2-1 P r o p e r t i e s Of Saturated Water Vapor And Liquid 2-3

2-2 Desired Capacitance For Typical Feedwater Heater Level

Control Systems

2-3 Tube Materials Used For Feedwater Heaters And Other

Heat Exchangers I n Power P l a n t Applications

2-4 Typical Control L i m i t s For V o l a t i l e (Zero S o l i d s )

Treated Units (Drum-Type B o i l e r s )

2-5 Typical Control L i m i t s For Low-Level Coordinated

Phosphate-Treated Units

4-1 Unit Chronology And Feedwater Heater Tube Material

4-2 Feedwater Heater Materials Information

4-3 A v a i l a b i l i t y And Performance Costs Associated With

Heater Outages

4-4 Performance Aspects Of Heater Trains And P o t e n t i a l

Overloads With Next Up-Stream Feedwater Heater Cut Out
 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

PURPOSE OF THE GUIDE

Feedwater heater (FWH) failures continue to have a significant adverse impact on
availability and thermal efficiency of power plants throughout the country. The
financial impact is particularly severe on baseloaded units. The Electric Power
Research Institute (EPRI) has sponsored a number of surveys, studies, and workshops
in efforts to define the causes of poor FWH performance and to initiate efforts to
assist utilities with needed improvements. During these activities, it has become
clear that the utility personnel responsible for the operation, maintenance, and
replacement of EWHS need more guidance in order to improve the functions for which
they are responsible. This guide was written for those individuals and for utility
management for the purpose of providing them the benefit of lessons learned from
many FWH experiences throughout the utility industry.

LIMITATIONS OF THE GUIDE

While it might seem desirable to have everything one needs to know about FWHs in
one comprehensive guide, the scope of this publication has been limited for several
reasons that are important to emphasize at the outset:

It is impossible to put a11 pertinent information in one publication

because there are so many different types and designs of FWHs and
feedwater systems in use that the detailed procedures for operation,
maintenance, and procurement must be tailored to the individual FWH and

.
to the individual plant environment.

For the same reason, it is essential that the operators and maintenance
personnel obtain from the vendors and use accurate, updated information
regarding their FWHs. In addition to vendor manuals, the utility should
have arrangement drawings of each FWH showing the details, dimensions,
and materials used for its internals, as well as all penetrations and
instrument connections. This EPRI guide should be helpful when used &
addition to the official documentation for the individual FWH, but
utility personnel should be cautioned not to rely on generic guides (or
even textbooks) in place of the official hardware-specific documentation.
The same limitation applies to operating and maintenance procedures.
Practices that experience has shown to be effective are recommended
throughout this guide. However, these recommendations are submitted for
the consideration of the utilities; they should be followed only when
properly approved and promulgated by the utility.
 It is recognized that this guide would be more complete with several
sections added. One such section should be devoted to detailed advice
concerning the "dos and don'ts' of FWH procurement, including the many
considerations needed in developing a good purchase specification.
Assistance in this area is badly needed by the utilities and is being
pursued in a separate EPRI project.

Recognizing the urgency to provide helpful guidance in operation and

maintenance areas, the intent was to promulgate this guide as a pre-
liminary or "first edition," with plans to improve and update it based
upon comments from the users and new developments in the FWH field.

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

With the above limitations in mind, the study team first reviewed the recent EPRI
reports and seminars devoted to FWH problems as well as their many references to
find practical items suited for the purpose of this guide. Material from these
sources was combined with the extensive personal experience that several of the
contributors had accumulated in the design, operation, and repair of FWHs.

Section 1 of this guideopresents a general description of closed FWHs and displays

several figures to identify the key components, many of which are discussed in more
detail in later sections. Section 2 addresses each of the six recognized major FWH
problem areas* by discussing causes of the problems, symptoms,, operational prac-
tices to avoid or minimize damage, and recommended maintenance to correct the prob-
lems. While the design of FWHs is well beyond the scope of this guide, good and
bad design features are mentioned where they are necessary for proper understanding
by utility personnel and where they may be of assistance in considering modifica-
tions (a form of corrective maintenance). Subsection 2.7 also addresses several
specific problems under the "miscellaneous" heading. These items do not fall neat-
ly into any of the six identified major problem areas, but they were considered of
sufficient value to include in this edition of the guide. Section 3 is devoted to
the type of analysis that should be utilized in considering reasonable limitations
to be imposed upon the feedwater system and the plant when one or more FWHs are
removed from service. Section 4 discusses the principal considerations that should
be involved when the utility is faced with the decision whether to continue the
maintenance of a problem FWH or to replace it. Several practical examples are used
to illustrate the wide variance in the cost of FWH outages and the specific factors
that determine those costs.

*Based upon EPRI's 1980-1981 survey as summarized in EPRI Report CS-1776, "Failure
Cause Analysis - Feedwater Heaters. "
A t t h e back of t h e g u i d e a r e c o p i e s o f t h e "User Feedback Form," which a r e p r o v i d e d
t o f a c i l i t a t e feedback from t h e u s e r s . They c a n b e f i l l e d o u t , removed, and m a i l e d
back t o EPRI t o h e l p f o c u s improvements f o r t h e n e x t e d i t i o n o f t h e g u i d e i n t h o s e
a r e a s t h a t a r e needed by t h e u t i l i t i e s . Any p h o t o g r a p h s , good p r o c e d u r e s , o r o t h e r
i t e m s t h a t m i g h t be of i n t e r e s t t o o t h e r s would a l s o be welcomed.
 Section 1

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF CLOSED FEEDWATER HEATERS

1.1 GENERAL
~ lmodern,
l l a r g e s t e a m power p l a n t s u s e a p r o c e s s o f r e g e n e r a t i v e f e e d w a t e r h e a t -
i n g t o i n c r e a s e t h e o v e r a l l c y c l e e f f i c i e n c y of t h e p l a n t and t o minimize induced
thermal s t r e s s e s i n the b o i l e r . T y p i c a l p l a n t s u t i l i z e two t y p e s o f f e e d w a t e r
h e a t e r s (FWHs): l o w - p r e s s u r e and h i g h - p r e s s u r e . Many a l s o have i n t e r m e d i a t e -
p r e s s u r e EWHs.

The l o w - p r e s s u r e (LP) EWHs b e g i n t h e p r o c e s s by h e a t i n g t h e s u b c o o l e d c o n d e n s a t e .

LP F W H s a r e o f t h e c l o s e d t y p e , u s i n g low-pressure t u r b i n e e x t r a c t i o n steam f o r
heating. I n newer p l a n t s , t h e y a r e o f t e n p l a c e d a t t h e t u r b i n e e x h a u s t t h r o a t
w i t h i n t h e condenser.

The i n t e r m e d i a t e - p r e s s u r e (IP) and h i g h - p r e s s u r e (HP) FWHs a r e l o c a t e d a t t h e d i s -

c h a r g e of t h e f e e d - b o o s t e r and t h e b o i l e r f e e d pumps, r e s p e c t i v e l y . They a r e a l -
ways o f t h e c l o s e d t y p e and a r e s i m i l a r i n b a s i c d e s i g n and f u n c t i o n .

Some p l a n t s a l s o have a d e a e r a t i n g EWH, which is of a n open t y p e and s e r v e s t o

remove d i s s o l v e d oxygen, a s w e l l a s t o h e a t t h e f e e d w a t e r . ~ e a e r a t i n gFWBs a r e
n o t w i t h i n t h e s c o p e of t h i s g u i d e .

1.2 CLOSED FEEDWATER HEATERS

Most I P and HP EWHs a r e o f t h e t h r e e - z o n e ( d e s u p e r h e a t i n g , c o n d e n s i n g , and d r a i n s
subcooling zones) design. LP FWHs a r e t y p i c a l l y o f t h e t h r e e - z o n e o r two-zone
(condensing and s u b c o o l i n g z o n e s ) d e s i g n . The m a j o r i t y o f FWHs i n u s e today a r e
of a h o r i z o n t a l configuration. (See F i g u r e 1-1 and 1-2.) However, some u t i l i t i e s
u s e v e r t i c a l c o n f i g u r a t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y f o r p l a n t s t h a t have l i m i t e d ( o r e x p e n s i v e )
f l o o r space. (See F i g u r e 1-3.) The major p a r t s o f t h e FWH a r e d i s c u s s e d below:

. Channel: The FWH c h a n n e l p r o v i d e s f o r t h e f e e d w a t e r i n l e t and o u t l e t

nozzles. There a r e four b a s i c channel c o n f i g u r a t i o n s . (See F i g u r e 1-4.)
Channels a r e d e s i g n e d t o minimize t h e e f f e c t s o f e r o s i o n on t h e t u b e s h e e t
and to p r o v i d e c o n v e n i e n t a c c e s s f o r t u b e s h e e t p l u g g i n g and o t h e r r e l a t e d
maintenance.
 OPTIONAL

HEATER SUPPORT

DRAINS SUBCOOLING ZONE BAFFLES INLET For T y p i c a l

ZONE BY-PASS
Channel Conf
urations)

F i g u r e 1-1. T y p i c a l Two-Zone H o r i z o n t a l Feedwater H e a t e r (Condensing and

Subcooling z o n e s )

Source: HE1 S t a n d a r d s For Closed Feedwater H e a t e r s , T h i r d E d i t i o n .

 OESUPEnHEATlNG SHELL FEEDWATER
ZONE SHROUD SKIRT OUTLET

DESUPERHEATING
TUBE SUPPORTS ZONE BAFFLES

(See Figure
For Typical
HEATER SUPPORl TIE RODS DRAINS SUBCOOLING FEEDWATER Channel Conf
AND SPACERS ZONE BAFFLES IN LET urations)

F i g u r e 1-2. Typical Three-Zone ~ o r i z o n t a lFeedwater Heater (Desuperheating,

Condensing, and Subcooling zones )

Source: HE1 Standards For Closed Feedwater Heaters, Third E d i t i o n .

 AIR 1CSE OFF

SAFETY VALVE
SUPPORT PLATES

CONDENSATE W E

OPGf GLILSS

DRAINS COOLING SECTION

Figure 1-3. T y p i c a l V e r t i c a l Feedwater Heater

(High-Pressure, Three-Zone, Head Down)

Source: Long I s l a n d L i g h t i n g Company.

 ATER OUTLET

PASS PARTITION MANWAY C

MANWAY COVER

TUSE SHEET
PARTITION

FEEDWATER INLET

COVER
ELLIPTICAL HEAD
I HE>IISPHERIC.\L HEAD

FEEDWATER OUTLET

PASS PARTITION
COVER

PASS PARTITION

TUBE SHEET FEEDWATER I N L ~

BOLTED RE-MOVABLECOVER
I !?iS;OV.ABLE COVER FULL OPESING

Figure 1-4. T y p i c a l Channel C o n f i g u r a t i o n s

Source: HE1 S t a n d a r d s For Closed Feedwater H e a t e r s ,

Third Edition.
 Desuperheating Zone: This is an enclosed portion at the outlet end of
the tube bundle. Its purpose is to maximize the outlet feedwater temper-
ature by transferring heat from the incoming superheated extraction
steam. An impingment plate is installed below the steam inlet nozzle to

.
prevent impingement damage to the tubes.

Condensing Zone: This is the largest zone in the FWH. Steam exiting the
desuperheating zone is condensed as it traverses through the condensing
zone. Also, any drains from higher pressure FWHs flow into the con-
densing zone through the drains inlet nozzle. An impingement plate is
installed just inside this nozzle to protect the tubes from these
flashing drains. The condensing zone is vented continuously to remove
non-condensibles. The vent system typically consists of one or more
perforated vent pipes installed along the length of the tube bundle.
(Many other designs are also used to accomplish this function.) Non-
condensibles collect in these pipes and then pass through shell vent
connections to the deaerator or the main condenser. An orifice, in-
stalled in the vent discharge, is sized to result in a flow rate equal to
0.5% of the total steam flow entering the FWH.

Drains Subcooling Zone: This zone is an enclosed portion of the inlet

end of the tube bundle. Its purpose is to maximize heat transfer from
the shellside condensate to the incoming feedwater before the condensate
exits. The condensate should be sub-cooled sufficiently to prevent
flashing as the condensate leaves the FWH shell through the drains outlet
nozzle.
 Section 2

THE NEED FOR UNDERSTANDING THE KEY PROBLEMS

Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) surveys and workshops continue to indicate
a strong need for improving the knowledge and experience of utility personnel in-
volved in the operation, maintenance, and replacement of feedwater heaters (FWHs).
It is particularly important that such personnel understand the principal problems
that have already been experienced many times throughout the industry. Only with a
good understanding of these problems will they be able to avoid, detect, and mini-
mize similar problems in their own systems. Accordingly, this section of the guide
addresses each major problem area identified by previous EPRI surveys* and provides
comments and recommendations from the combined experience of the FWH experts who
contributed to this effort. In selecting material for the following sections, the
emphasis has been to focus on those key points that experience has shown to be most
essential for proper operation and maintenance of FWH systems.

2.1 LEVEL CONTROL AND DRAINS COOLER ZONE PROBLEMS

2.1.1 Overview Of Major Problem Areas
A mistake that is often made by utility personnel is to consider the drains flowing
to the drains cooler as if they were like hot water coming from the tap in the kit-
chen sink. The failure to realize that the tap water is subcooled (by approximately
50°~), whereas drains are formed within a FWH under saturated conditions, leads to a
basic misunderstanding of flashing and the need to sub-cool the drains. As these
drains travel through the heater to the drains cooling zone, the geometry of the
internals changes their direction in various flow patterns, which result in pressure
drops. A saturated liquid that is subjected to a pressure drop will, of course,
flash. Flashing is similar to normal boiling in that some of the liquid is trans-
formed to steam; however, it is caused by a reduction in pressure rather than by an
addition of heat.

Few people give much thought to the phenomenon or realize that if a given weight of
saturated water decreased in pressure from 100 psia to - 5 psia, approximately 24%

*Especially EPRI Report CS-1776, "Failure Cause Analysis - Feedwater Heaters."

o f it would f l a s h t o v a p o r and i n c r e a s e i n volume more t h a n e i g h t t h o u s a n d t i m e s .
T h i s example o f p r e s s u r e loss i s e x a g g e r a t e d and s h o u l d n e v e r o c c u r e x c e p t i n t h e
case o f a d r a s t i c p l a n t load reduction. However, p o o r l y d e s i g n e d c o n d e n s a t e f l o w
p a s s a g e s and d r a i n s c o o l e r e n t r a n c e a r e a s c o u l d c a u s e p r e s s u r e d r o p s t h a t would
i n c r e a s e v e l o c i t i e s , due t o f l a s h i n g , by a s much a s a h u n d r e d f o l d . Foreign
m a t e r i a l s i n t h i s f l o w p a t h would have a s i m i l a r e f f e c t . Such e x p a n s i o n c a u s e s
e x c e s s i v e v e l o c i t i e s o f t h e steam/water m i x t u r e , which t h e n impinges upon t h e
h e a t e r i n t e r n a l s w i t h damaging f o r c e . The e r o s i o n and e r o s i o n - c o r r o s i o n
a c t i o n s t h a t r e s u l t can d e s t r o y t u b e s , t u b e s u p p o r t s , and o t h e r s t r u c t u r e s i n
a short period of t i m e .

How can t h i s phenomenon, which is a major c o n t r i b u t o r of FWH f a i l u r e , be d e a l t w i t h ?

What c a n be done t o c o n t r o l o r e l i m i n a t e t h e f l a s h i n g ? T h i s problem c a n be ad-
d r e s s e d i n an o r d e r l y f a s h i o n by c o n s i d e r i n g t h e s p e c i f i c s o f t h r e e b a s i c t y p e s o f
EWHs: h o r i z o n t a l , v e r t i c a l c h a n n e l down, and v e r t i c a l c h a n n e l up.

2.1.1.1 H o r i z o n t a l Feedwater H e a t e r s . I n t h e h o r i z o n t a l FWH, whether i t i s a

t h r e e - z o n e h e a t e r w i t h d e s u p e r h e a t i n g , d r a i n s c o o l i n g , and condensing z o n e s o r a
two-zone h e a t e r w i t h condensing and d r a i n s c o o l i n g zones o n l y , t h e r e a r e b a s i c a l l y
t w o types of d r a i n s cooler designs. FWH m a n u f a c t u r e r s r e c o g n i z e t h e s e a s s h o r t ( o r
p a r t i a l l e n g t h ) and long ( o r f u l l l e n g t h ) d r a i n s c o o l e r s , and t h e d i f f e r e n c e i s
b a s i c a l l y i n t h e way t h a t t h e s h r o u d i n g r e l a t e s t o t h e t u b e s and b a f f l i n g a s shown
i n F i g u r e 2-1. The most common is t h e s h o r t d r a i n s c o o l e r , w h e r e i n t h e s h r o u d i n g
encompasses a l l o f t h e t u b e s i n t h e f i r s t f e e d w a t e r p a s s s t a r t i n g a t t h e t u b e s h e e t
and e n d i n g a t t h e p o i n t where i t h a s i n c o r p o r a t e d a l l o f t h e s u r f a c e needed t o per-
form t h e t a s k of h e a t t r a n s f e r t o d o t h e s p e c i f i e d amount of s u b c o o l i n g . A flat

p l a t e a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h e s h e l l mid-point s e r v e s a s t h e c l o s u r e o f t h e f u l l 1800
arc. The s h r o u d i n g is l e a k t i g h t s u c h t h a t t h e c o n d e n s a t e e n t e r s an opening a t t h e
bottom o f t h e d r a i n s c o o l e r , away from t h e t u b e s h e e t , and c o m p l e t e l y f l o o d s t h e o u t -
s i d e s u r f a c e of t h e t u b e s a s it f l o w s p a s t b a f f l i n g t o t h e o u t l e t end, which i s
l o c a t e d c l o s e t o t h e back o f t h e t u b e s h e e t .

I n t h e long d r a i n s c o o l e r , t h e s h r o u d i n g r u n s t h e f u l l l e n g t h o f t h e t u b i n g b u t
encompasses o n l y a p o r t i o n of t h e t u b e s i n t h e f i r s t p a s s . The f l a t p l a t e p o r t i o n
o f t h e s h r o u d i n g p a s s e s between t h e t u b e rows, and t h e a r c d e p t h v a r i e s depending
upon t h e amount o f t u b e s u r f a c e r e q u i r e d f o r s u b c o o l i n g . The c o n d e n s a t e e n t e r s a
l o n g d r a i n s c o o l e r a t t h e end f a r t h e s t from t h e t u b e s h e e t and f l o w s t h e f u l l l e n g t h
p a s t t h e b a f f l i n g t o t h e e x i t , which is l o c a t e d c l o s e t o t h e back o f t h e t u b e s h e e t .
 Table 2-1

P R O P E R T I E S OF SATURATED WATER VAPOR AND L I Q U I D

Sat. Volume P e r Pound V o l u m e t r i c Ratio

Pressure Temp. Sat. L i q . Sat. Vap. s a t . Vap.
(psis) (OF) ( ~ t3., ( ~ t 3. ) Sat. L i q .

*These numbers were used i n t h e example i n Section 2.1.1.

2-3
 Feed Out

Drains Cooler
Shrouding
4
M i n i m Liquid Level Drains Cooler

Drains Out Feed In

Q 1st Pass

D r a b s Cooler
Shrouding

Short Drains Cooler Design

Feed Out

M i n i m Liquid Level

r
Drains C o o l e r
Shrouding
T'
-l t
Drains Out Feed In
Drains Cooler
Shrouding

Long Drains Cooler Design

Figure 2-1. Drains Cooler Shrouding Designs

2-4
In the case of the long drains cooler, the minimum operating level should be main-
tained above the flat plate of the shrouding. In the case of the short drains
cooler, the minimum operating level should be maintained at a point where the en-
trance into the shrouding (the "snorkel" area) is always covered, even throughout
plant transients. A horizontal unit, of course, does have the capability of storing
relatively large quantities of water such that the level can be maintained within a
few inches in the vertical direction.

It is important to recognize that the level within a FWH is not necessarily the same
at all locations. The level can vary, depending on the pressure that exists at the
surface of the condensate, which is a function of the position of the steam inlet,
the design of the internals, and the flow through the unit. Discussions with ex-
perienced utility and vendor engineers indicate that these phenomena have been ob-
served under test conditions in the past. One thing that was established is that
the level can vary significantly from the back of the tubesheet to the other end of
the FWH. Under certain circumstances of operation, it could have a reverse slope;.
it could even have a two-way slope with a peak in the middle or vice versa. Main-
taining a suitable level as the condensate approaches the drains cooling zone of the
EWH is essential. It is especially important to maintain the level above the en-
trance at all times. Therefore, the location of the liquid level control instru-
mentation should be as close as practical to that region. A mistake often made is
to provide liquid level control sensor points that are located physically a signif-
icant distance from the areas of concern. Some years ago, there was an experience
at a utility in Europe where it was determined that the water level at the U-bend
end was 18 inches higher than at the drains cooler entrance. An investigation re-
vealed that the FWH was very poorly designed. The heater was designed along the
principles governing water-to-water heat exchangers, which did not provide enough
clearance for steam flow. Therefore, large pressure drops occured, resulting in the
great level variations. Because both water and steam are present in a FWH, each
zone must be considered individually during design. It is important that the shell
side of a FWH with a horizontal drains cooler be as free of obstruction as possible
and that it be properly sized so that there is good distribution of steam without
undue pressure drop.

The short drains cooler, while capable of performing satisfactorily if properly

designed and operated, does offer more of a challenge than the long drains cooling
zone. It is important to remember that in this particular case, as the drains are
being condensed they have to travel the length of the shell before they reach the
inlet to the drains cooler. In so traveling, the drains could be impeded by
b a f f l e s , s u p p o r t p l a t e s , etc., which c r e a t e p r e s s u r e d r o p s l i k e l y t o c a u s e f l a s h i n g
and a r t i f i c i a l w a t e r l e v e l s . For t h i s reason, i t may b e n e c e s s a r y t o m a i n t a i n a
l e v e l s u c h t h a t t w o or t h r e e rows o f l o n g U-tubes w i l l b e submerged a t a l l t i m e s ,
permitting pre-cooling of the drains. If t h e d r a i n s a r e pre-cooled o n e o r t w o de-
grees, they w i l l not flash. I f they a r e n o t pre-cooled a few d e g r e e s and i f t h e
p r o p e r l e v e l is n o t m a i n t a i n e d a t t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e s u c t i o n i n l e t a t a l l times,
t h e y w i l l f l a s h upon e n t e r i n g t h e s n o r k e l or d r a i n s cooler p r o p e r . When t h e y f l a s h ,
t h e volume w i l l i n c r e a s e d r a m a t i c a l l y a s i n d i c a t e d e a r l i e r . The v e l o c i t y a t t h e
s u c t i o n i n l e t t o t h e d r a i n s c o o l e r w i l l n o l o n g e r r e m a i n a t 2-3 f e e t p e r s e c o n d , b u t
w i l l i n c r e a s e t o a much h i g h e r v a l u e . T h i s w i l l g e n e r a t e more f l a s h i n g , d u e t o
f u r t h e r l o s s i n p r e s s u r e w i t h i n t h e d r a i n s cooler; t h e r e f o r e , t h e f i r s t f e w b a f f l e s
w i l l a c t n o t a s a d r a i n s c o o l e r b u t a s a condensing region. When t h i s phenomenon i s
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h i m p r o p e r p o s i t i o n i n g o f t h e d r a i n s c o n t r o l v a l v e , w h i c h may b e o p e n
more t h a n i t s h o u l d b e f o r t h e c o n d i t i o n s , f l a s h i n g w i l l b e i n d u c e d f a r t h e r i n t o t h e
drains cooler. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , many u t i l i t i e s d o n o t f u l l y a p p r e c i a t e and u n d e r s t a n d
t h i s phenomenon. U n t i l a l l d e s i g n e r s a n d o p e r a t o r s p a y more a t t e n t i o n t o t h e d e s i g n
b a s i s o f t h e d r a i n s cooler, t h e s e p r o b l e m s w i l l p e r s i s t .

A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e t u r b i n e m a n u f a c t u r e r s may h a v e o v e r p l a y e d t h e i r role i n i m p r e s s i n g
upon t h e u t i l i t i e s and t h e o p e r a t i n g p e r s o n n e l o f t h e power p l a n t t h a t t h e i n d u c t i o n
o f water i n t o t h e t u r b i n e must be avoided a t a l l c o s t s . T h i s p o i n t h a s been
s t r e s s e d i n many t e c h n i c a l p a p e r s and v e n d o r m a n u a l s to t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e o p e r a -
t o r s i n t h e c o n t r o l room a r e s o w e l l a w a r e o f t h i s w a r n i n g t h a t t h e i r r a t i o n a l e f o r
p r o p e r o p e r a t i o n o f FWHs is sometimes c l o u d e d . They f e a r t h a t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f
i n d u c i n g w a t e r i n t o t h e t u r b i n e b y a l l o w i n g a h i g h w a t e r l e v e l i n t h e EWHs is s o
g r e a t t h a t a p r i m e c o n c e r n is t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e l e v e l s t a y s a s l o w a s p o s s i b l e .
T h i s l i n e o f r e a s o n i n g sometimes l e a d s to t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t a z e r o w a t e r l e v e l i s
d e s i r a b l e b e c a u s e i t p r o v i d e s maximum t u r b i n e p r o t e c t i o n .

T h e r e h a v e b e e n many i n s t a n c e s where t h i s p h i l o s o p h y h a s b e e n a p p l i e d to t h e FWH

c o n t r o l system such t h a t d r a i n s o u t l e t c o n t r o l v a l v e s have been p u r p o s e l y l e f t f u l l y
opened. Some c a l l t h i s " j a c k i n g o p e n " o r " s h o r t s t r o k i n g " t h e v a l v e , e n s u r i n g by
m e c h a n i c a l means t h a t t h e v a l v e w i l l n e v e r close. E x p e r i e n c e h a s shown t h a t where
t h e r e i s l a c k o f knowledge o f t h e $ l a s h i n g phenomenon, t h i s p r a c t i c e i s q u i t e o f t e n
used. The o p e r a t i n g p e r s o n n e l r e a s o n t h a t t h e y a r e making s u r e t h a t t h e s t e a m b l o w s
through, t h u s ensuring t h a t t h e l e v e l does n o t increase. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , when t h e s e
v a l v e s a r e l e f t o p e n , t h e s t e a m d o e s n o t s i m p l y blow t h r o u g h . I t s t a r t s through,
c o n d e n s e s , f l a s h e s , r e c o n d e n s e s , and so f o r t h . The d r a i n s coolers h a v e b e e n de-
s i g n e d by t h e m a n u f a c t u r e r t o p a s s l i q u i d a t r e a s o n a b l e v e l o c i t i e s (2-4 f e e t p e r
second i n c u r r e n t d e s i g n s ) . When t h e volume i n c r e a s e s d u e t o t h e f l a s h i n g , t h e
v e l o c i t i e s a r e g o i n g to b e i n c r e a s e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n t h e d r a i n s c o o l i n g z o n e s .
Under t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s , a g r e a t d e a l o f e n e r g y is b e i n g r e l e a s e d to impinge t h e
s t e a m / w a t e r m i x t u r e , w i t h damaging f o r c e , a g a i n s t t h e FWH's i n t e r n a l s .

I t may b e h e l p f u l t o t h i n k o f d r a i n s t h a t a r e a b o u t t o f l a s h l i k e a n e x p l o s i v e ,
w h i c h i f h a n d l e d p r o p e r l y , c a n b e b o t h managed and t r a n s p o r t e d . However, i f t h e y
a r e n o t h a n d l e d p r o p e r l y , t h e y w i l l e x p l o d e w i t h t e r r i f i c f o r c e and c a u s e damage.
The d e t o n a t o r m u s t b e removed f r o m t h e e x p l o s i v e . How c a n t h i s o b j e c t i v e b e accom-
plished with the flashing? The f l a s h i n g c o n d i t i o n s h o u l d b e e l i m i n a t e d , s t a r t i n g
w i t h t h e s u c t i o n o f t h e d r a i n s c o o l e r a l l t h e way down t o t h e d r a i n s c o n t r o l v a l v e .
T h i s c a n b e a c c o m p l i s h e d by m a i n t a i n i n g t h e p r o p e r l e v e l i n t h e d r a i n s c o o l e r . Not
o n l y s h o u l d t h e l i q u i d l e v e l c o n t r o l l e r b e l o c a t e d a t t h e p o i n t where c o n d e n s a t e
e n t e r s t h e d r a i n s c o o l e r , b u t a l o c a l g a g e g l a s s s h o u l d b e i n s t a l l e d a t t h e same
location for visual level verification. I t is a l s o a good i d e a f o r t h e l o w e r r a n g e
o f t h e c o n t r o l l e r t o b e no l o w e r t h a n t h e b o t t o m o f t h e s h e l l so t h a t t h e f u l l r a n g e
is e f f e c t i v e . A n y t h i n g below t h e s h e l l b o t t o m is u s e l e s s , and o n e s h o u l d n o t p r o -
mote t h e i d e a t h a t a n o p e r a t o r would a l l o w t h e l e v e l t o d r o p t h a t low.

2.1.1.2 V e r t i c a l C h a n n e l Down F e e d w a t e r H e a t e r s . A v e r t i c a l c h a n n e l down FWH c a n

b e , a s f a r a s t h e d r a i n s c o o l e r is c o n c e r n e d , o f t w o t y p e s . One is t h e t h r e e - z o n e
FWH w i t h a c o n d e n s i n g z o n e , a d r a i n s c o o l i n g z o n e , and a d e s u p e r h e a t i n g z o n e t h a t
m u s t b e l o n g e r t h a n t h e d r a i n s c o o l i n g zone. The o t h e r i s t h e two-zone FWH w i t h o u t
a desuperheater. I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o a d d r e s s e a c h o n e o f them s e p a r a t e l y b e c a u s e o f
their peculiarities.

I n a v e r t i c a l c h a n n e l down FWH, t h e f i r s t t h i n g t o o b s e r v e is t h a t t h e c a p a c i t a n c e *
i n a t h r e e - z o n e FWH i s a p p r o x i m a t e l y h a l f t h a t i n a two-zone FWH b e c a u s e , a s shown
i n F i g u r e 2-2, t h e s p a c e t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e d e s u p e r h e a t e r s h r o u d i n g p e n e t r a t e s is
e l i m i n a t e d i n computing t h e c a p a c i t a n c e . I n a two-zone FWH, a l l o f t h e c r o s s - s e c -
t i o n a l a r e a around both p a s s e s o f tubes is a v a i l a b l e f o r maintaining t h e l e v e l .
T h o s e t u b e s n o t i n c o r p o r a t e d w i t h i n t h e d r a i n s cooler a r e c o n s i d e r e d i n e f f e c t i v e
s u r f a c e b e c a u s e t h e y a r e submerged and s e r v e n o r e a l h e a t t r a n s f e r p u r p o s e . How-
e v e r , t h i s a r r a n g e m e n t i m p r o v e s t h e c a p a c i t a n c e f a c t o r a s compared t o a t h r e e - z o n e
design.

* C a p a c i t a n c e , a s r e l a t e d t o t h e a d e q u a c y o f d e s i g n i n g a c o n t r o l s s y s t e m , is d e f i n e d
a s t h e s t o r a g e volume ( u s u a l l y g a l l o n s ) o f l i q u i d p r e s e n t p e r i n c h o f l e v e l c h a n g e
i n t h e l e v e l c o n t r o l range.
 Steam I n

Drains

Drains Outlet

Two-Zone Feedwater Heater Three-Zone Feedwater Heater

F i g u r e 2-2. Comparison Of Feedwater H e a t e r C a p a c i t a n c e

2-8
In a three-zone FWH, one must pay special attention to the distance between the top
of the drains cooling zone and the exit of the desuperheating zone because it is
important to maintain the drains water level between these two points. A well-
designed FWH should have the exit of the desuperheating zone well above* the drains
cooling zone and a low liquid level that is maintained several inches** above the
drains cooling zone. High-level conditions that allow the overflow of water into
the desuperheating zone are detrimental to the life of that zone.

The vertical FWH, by its nature, will usually have considerably less capacitance
than a horizontal FWH. Unless the diameter of the shell is such that adequate ca-
pacitance is provided, it is somewhat analogous to controlling the level in a straw:
the minute that one starts sucking, the level will disappear. It is imperative to
provide enough volume so that the load changes do not drive the level out of the
designed control range due to lack of capacitance. Table 2-2 shows the desired
reservoir capacity needed by most# control systems in gallons per inch of depth,
depending upon the quantity of the drains that are being handled. Practical exper-
ience has shown that if these guidelines are followed, it is possible to control the
level within the 25-45 inch span typically recommended by experienced personnel.
However, it is noted that many FWHs now in existence have a smaller band, which may
demand superior performance from the level control system.

For proper level control, it may be necessary to increase the shell diameter for a
given tube bundle diameter so that the proper capacitance is available. Figure 2-3
displays a modification that was made on a FWH in just that manner. The lower por-
tion of the FWH shell was enlarged to what is referred to as a belly band. This
modification not only provides greater capacitance, but also lowers the velocity of
the flashed steam (from inlet drains) as it exits from the lower portion of the FWH.

Figure 2-4 shows internals of the same FWH that had its shell enlarged. A portion
of the drains cooling zone shroud was cut away (as indicated by the white line) to
increase the difference in elevation between the drains cooling and desuperheating
zones from approximately 14-24 inches. In considering such a modification, it is

*At least 24 inches (and preferably more to accommodate fluctuations in level con-
trol).

**Some experts recommend 5 inches or more,

#performance and capability depend upon the response of the system being used.
Typically, systems in use today are represented in Table 2-2.
 Table 2-2

DESIRED CAPACITANCE FOR TYPICAL*

FEEDWATER HEATER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEMS

Fluid Flow- Reservoir Capacity

Through Valve (In gallons/inch
(Gallons/Minute) of depth)

*This is a composite of typical capacitance data for many existing systems . It is

shown for illustrative purposes only . Similar data for a specific l e v e l control
system should be obtained from the vendor .
FSgwe 2-3- Belly Band Xo-rBification To A Verlicenl
Paadwatar BcaB&r S1"Lgbl [Betweea Xrrows)
necessary to determine whether it will lead to undesirable reductions in drains sub-
cooling. For this particular FWH, that was not a problem.

It has been stated that the lowest water level allowed should be at least several
inches above the top of the drains cooler. For reasons of economy, some may desire
smaller FWHs, not allowing room for such a margin at the low level. It must be
remembered that if the water level should drop below'the shroud itself, there will
be steam but no drains going into the drains cooler, which is not the way to operate
the unit.

In a two-zone FWH, by these same guidelines, the level is easier to maintain, with-
out increasing the size of the shell, inasmuch as the complete shell cross-section
minus the cross-section of all tubes is available for the required capacitance
levels.

One special circumstance that can develop in a three-zone vertical FWH is where the
desuperheating zone surface is less than the drains cooling surface. In such a
case, it becomes necessary to artificially raise the top of the desuperheating zone
so as to meet the aforementioned level range criteria. This can be accomplished by
providing special baffling at the bottom of the desuperheating zone, thereby cre-
ating a dead zone from that point down to the tubesheet. When this happens, there
may be a tendency to skimp on realistic control ranges leading to operational prob-
lems. There is also a possibility that some novel design of drains cooler will be
attempted to cut its height. Over the years, there have been a number of variations
of two-pass shellside drains cooler (otherwise called "double-shrouded" or "reverse
flow syphon-drains cooler") designs that have rarely worked. These supposedly will
allow maintaining an operating level a few inches above the backside of the tube-
sheet. Although some of these designs might work at stable load conditions and with
no imperfections in the manufacturing process, actual operating conditions make them
impractical. Flashing in the upflow pass invariably occurs, and the drains cooler
becomes ineffective.

2.1.1.3 Vertical Channel Up Feedwater Heaters. A vertical channel up FWH that in-
cludes a drains cooler is subject to similar difficulties of flashing during varying
load conditions. In this design, the drains cooler shrouding encloses several rows
of tubes, and water level is maintained at the bottom of the shell (U-bend end).
These drains must be lifted to the top of the unit, and the potential for flashing
is exceptionally high.
2.1.2 Examples Of D r a i n s C o o l e r Problems
F i g u r e 2-5 shows p i c t u r e s o f t y p i c a l damage from f l a s h i n g i n d r a i n s c o o l i n g zones.
I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e t h a t t h e f l a s h i n g t h a t t a k e s p l a c e is s o v i o l e n t t h a t t h e
b a f f l e s and s h r o u d s have been t h i n n e d , t u b e s d e s t r o y e d , and welds c r a c k e d . When
t h i s happens, t h e a b i l i t y t o o p e r a t e t h e FWH i n a normal manner is l o s t and a d d i -
t i o n a l problems d e v e l o p t h a t must b e c o r r e c t e d ; i f t h e y a r e n o t , t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f
t h e FWH f o l l o w s r a p i d l y . A few examples o f t y p i c a l problems a r e c i t e d below f o r

emphasis :

Case 1: I n o n e u t i l i t y , i n 1970, i t was d i s c o v e r e d t h a t a v e r t i c a l

c h a n n e l down FWH had c r a c k e d welds i n i t s d r a i n s c o o l i n g shroud. Ex-
t e n s i v e r e p a i r s were made, c o n s i s t i n g o f complete removal o f t h e d r a i n s
c o o l e r shroud and r e p o s i t i o n i n g o f t h e l i q u i d l e v e l . The r e p a i r s were
s u c c e s s f u l , and t h i s EWH h a s been o p e r a t i o n a l s i n c e , a l t h o u g h a s l i g h t
s a c r i f i c e i n t o t a l p l a n t performance had t o b e a c c e p t e d d u e t o t h e e l i m -
i n a t i o n o f d r a i n s c o o l i n g . R e p a i r o f t h e c r a c k e d s h r o u d i n g was con-
sidered impractical,

Case 2: A v e r t i c a l c h a n n e l down FWH developed a c r a c k e d weld i n t h e

p a r t i t i o n p l a t e t o t h e t u b e s h e e t a r e a due t o v i o l e n t f l a s h i n g i n t h e
d r a i n s c o o l i n g zone. T h i s p l a t e s e p a r a t e s t h e d r a i n s c o o l e r and de-
s u p e r h e a t e r zones. I t was t e m p o r a r i l y r e p a i r e d by u s i n g a s e a l a n t t h a t
i s e f f e c t i v e a t h i g h t e m p e r a t u r e s . The l e a k a g e r a t e , which was o v e r 20
g a l l o n s p e r m i n u t e , was c u t down t o 2 g a l l o n s p e r minute. The FWH was
a b l e t o o p e r a t e i n t h i s manner f o r t h r e e more y e a r s w h i l e a new FWH was
purchased. I n a new d e s i g n o r a r e p l a c e m e n t FWH, a good way t o minimize
t h i s problem is by u s i n g s e p a r a t e shroud w a l l s f o r t h e d e s u p e r h e a t e r and
d r a i n s c o o l e r z o n e s , r a t h e r t h a n a common p l a t e which s e e s t h e f u l l tem-
p e r a t u r e d i f f e r e n t i a l between t h e two zones.

Case 3: A weld c r a c k e d i n a s h i e l d p l a t e i n a p o r t i o n of t h e d r a i n s
c o o l e r shroud o f a v e r t i c a l c h a n n e l down FWH. The weld c r a c k s were de-
t e c t e d a f t e r o b s e r v i n g t h e i n a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l t h e l e v e l . The FWH was
p r o p e r l y r e p a i r e d and r e t u r n e d to s e r v i c e .

* -Case 4: Another c a s e was a FWH t h a t developed c r a c k s a t t h e back of t h e

t u b e s h e e t and t h e p a r t i t i o n weld, as w e l l a s t h e s i d e o f t h e p a r t i t i o n
p l a t e w e l d s and t h e s h r o u d s p r o p e r . The r e p a i r s were made w i t h o n l y
p a r t i a l s u c c e s s due t o t h e i n a b i l i t y t o r e a c h c e r t a i n a r e a s o f t h e
c r a c k e d welds f o r r e p a i r welding. The l e a k a g e o f 10 g a l l o n s p e r minute
was c u t down t o 1 / 3 o f a g a l l o n p e r m i n u t e and t h e FWH was r e t u r n e d t o
s e r v i c e . Two more FWHs d e v e l o p e d s i m i l a r c r a c k s a t t h e back o f t h e t u b e -
s h e e t where t h e d r a i n s c o o l e r s h r o u d is a t t a c h e d . In t h i s particular
i n s t a n c e , no r e p a i r s were made s i n c e t h e s e were v e r t i c a l c h a n n e l down
FWHs w i t h o n l y two z o n e s , and t h e l e a k a g e was n o t , t h e r e f o r e , i m p o r t a n t
f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e FWHs. More o f t h e same phenomenon was e x p e r -
i e n c e d i n two a d d i t i o n a l FWHs. The p o s s i b i l i t y o f d e t e c t i n g l e a k s i n t h e
i n t e r n a l s h r o u d s , w i t h o u t removing t h e FWH, is l i m i t e d t o t h e v e r t i c a l
c h a n n e l down d e s i g n . H o r i z o n t a l FWHs and v e r t i c a l c h a n n e l up FWHs d o n o t
o f f e r t h e c a p a b i l i t y o f w a t e r c o n t a i n m e n t , which is n e c e s s a r y t o de-
termine l e a k s e x t e r n a l l y . I n t h e s u r v e y e d u t i l i t y , a p p r o x i m a t e l y 100
FWHs a r e v e r t i c a l c h a n n e l down h e a t e r s , and a p p r o x i m a t e l y 6 0 o f t h e s e
have i n t e r n a l s h r o u d s . The i n t e r n a l weld f a i l u r e s were c a u s e d , i n p a r t ,
 mkxt d@il~?~troy@dby a hhiqh-vebciky
rmpbknqmeat a% a b a ~ ~ olf t flashing
in &e d r a i n s cwler zane of a
harizontak f@e&&Qar heatan-

Pabe band%@&mag@ Prom f Lrnslrkng f n Baffle %hinnLng and t u b e &a~lsgei n a

the draans ecmlar Z O R ~o f d v e r t i c a l v e r t i c a l Pee6water heatbar.
fee6Zbsater heatex,
 by inferior welds during the manufacturing process. Failure was ac-
celerated by improper operation of the FWHs for a number of years and, in
some cases, by an excessive temperature differential across the shrouds
themselves. Temperature differential problems can sometimes be present
if the design of a desuperheating zone is such that steam comes into
contact with the drains cooler shroud.

Case 5: In another case involving a vertical head down installation, the

shell-to-bundle clearance was insufficient to provide adequate capaci-
tance, and the level controls were constantly hunting, even in stable
load operation. Rather than add a separate flash tank to accept drains
from the next higher FWH (space was not available), the utility cut
through the shell in the area of designed operating level and welded in a
section of 36-inch diameter pipe (shown in Figure 2-6) that was capped on
the outside. This significantly improved level control, especially at

.
stable load operation.

Case 6: A mid-Atlantic utility operating a nuclear station with three

strings of FWHs found one of the first-stage LP EWHs in the condenser
neck having problems, while the other two were operating well. After
much searching, it was found that an improper setting of the level con-
troller was allowing levels below drains cooler entrance with subsequent
failure of the stainless steel tubing in the bottom rows due to high
velocities and vibration caused by the lower density steam flowing into
the drains cooler. Adjustment of the level control to the proper po-
sition stopped the problem, but damage was significant enough to justify
considering FWH replacement. An almost identical problem with a two-
string situation at another utility required extensive repair.

Figure 2-6. Vertical Channel Down Feedwater Heater With Welded Blister

2-16
In summary, the experience of the experts who contributed to this guide clearly
points to flashing and improper operation of drains cooling zones as one of the
most important contributors to the failure of FWHs, particularly in horizontal
FWHs. This judgment is supported by the failure analysis data summarized in EPRI
Report CS-1776. The utility survey on which that report was based also showed that
the real cause of many FWH failures was never determined. gain, experience sug-
gests that many of the "unknowns" could have belonged in the level control and
drains cooler zone category.

EPRI Report CS-1776 also contains a concise summary of drains subcooler problems as
discussed in the literature. Pages 4-1 through 4-14 are recommended reading for
operators to gain further understanding of the operation of the level control sys-
tem and the drains subcooler zone as well as the major problems to be avoided. A
good appreciation of the experiences outlined above and in CS-1776 will help plant
personnel avoid or minimize many of the problems that threaten the life of their
feedwater FWHs.

2.1.3 Symptoms Of Level Control And rains Cooler Zone Problems

Indications of drains cooling zone problems can be obtained by observing the liquid
level swing or the absence of level in a FWK. An excessively high water level
could be an indication of drains cooler problems, although ruptured tubes in other
zones would result in the same symptom. Some units have liquid level indicators
located in the control room to facilitate monitoring the operating levels. Another
quick observation is the position of the drains control valve between each FWH. If
the valve is always fully open, it is probably not doing its job or is consistently
overloaded.

An unusual noise that is often heard (like marbles in a bottle) is the sound of
flashing. It is not unusual to detect this type of sound downstream of the drains
control valve. However, when a similar noise is heard upstream of the valve, then
i t is an indication of potentially damaging flashing. Today's technology has pro-
duced equipment that is capable of differentiating between noises to pinpoint a
certain type. Acoustic monitors are available on the market that give the user an
opportunity to first establish that a flashing noise exists and then to quickly
determine whether this condition exists upstream of the drains control valve.

For comprehensive, accurate performance tests, the ANSI/ASME Performance Test Codes
(PTC 12.1, 1978) should be used as a detailed guide. However, for routine trouble-
shooting and quick checks of FWH performance, the simple test outlined below can be
made without a complete heat balance, special instrumentation, or elaborate compu-
tations. The test form shown in Figure 2-7 can be used to determine uncorrected
terminal temperature difference (TTD) and the approach for comparison with design
figures for these parameters, Note that the uncorrected TTD developed in line 4 of
Figure 2-7 for the "actual" column is different (for simplicity) from the corrected
TTD* developed in PTC 12.1 as indicated below:

TTD = (saturated temperature for actual steam pressure)

(actual feedwater outlet temperature)

TTD* = (saturated temperature for designed steam pressure)

minus
(feedwater outlet temperature corrected to design conditions)

The TTD is, in effect, a measure of the heat transfer capability of the FWH. The
higher the terminal temperature difference above design (if the value is positive),
the poorer the performance of the FWH. The actual measurements can only be com-
pared to the values obtained during performance tests to see whether any serious
change is taking place. If for the same conditions the TTD is substantially higher,
then the FWH has problems.

The "approach" in line 7 is the difference between the drains outlet temperature
and the feedwater inlet temperature.

In addition to the general data recorded at the top of this form, critical readings
to be gathered are:

r Line 1: Steam-side pressure (saturation pressure) as measured in the FWH

shell;

Lines 3 & 6: Temperature reading of the feedwater flow at the EWH outlet
and inlet connections;

r Line 5: Temperature of the drains as they leave the FWH shell; and

r Line 8: Measurement of actual feedwater flow.

Lines 2, 4, and 7 do not involve data gathering in the plant but are obtained from
the steam tables (for Line 2) or simple arithmetic (Lines 4 and 7).
 GENERATING STATION U N I T NO.

T E S T NO. HEATER NO.

ACTUAL MW LOAD MW LOAD % OF DESIGN

DATE TIME

OBSERVED LEVEL (COMMENTS)

ACTUAL DESIGN
CONDITION CONDITION

1. Shell-side steam operating

pressure psia psia

2. Shell-side steam corresponding

0 0
saturated temperature F F

0 0
3. Feedwater o u t l e t temperature F F

4. TTD (terminal temperature

difference uncorrected)
Item 2 -
I t e m 3 = Item 4

5. Drains o u t l e t temperature

6. Feedwater i n l e t temperature

7. "Approach"
Item 5 -
I t e m 6 = Item 7

8. Feedwater flow

Figure 2-7. Feedwater Heater T e s t Sheet. ( t o determine ckains cooler behavior)

For p r o p e r a n a l y s i s o f t h i s d a t a , i t would be d e s i r a b l e t o show t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e
w a t e r l e v e l w i t h i n t h e s h e l l and t h e means by which i t was d e t e r m i n e d . Assuming
d r a w i n g s o f t h e FWH i n q u e s t i o n a r e a v a i l a b l e , a s t u d y o f t h e problem c a n t h e n be
made.

The numbers i n t h e a c t u a l column a r e compared t o t h o s e f o r t h e 100% l o a d d e s i g n

conditions. F i g u r e 2-8 i s a v e r y s i m p l e example o f a f a m i l y o f c u r v e s showing u n i t
megawatt l o a d p e r c e n t a g e o f f u l l l o a d v e r s u s s h e l l o p e r a t i n g p r e s s u r e i n p s i a . The
t o p c u r v e is f o r t h e h i g h e s t s t a g e FWH ( i . e . , h i g h e s t t e m p e r a t u r e and p r e s s u r e ) ,
These a r e s t r a i g h t l i n e s from 100% l o a d t o 0% l o a d . Using F i g u r e 2-8, one can
q u i c k l y d e t e r m i n e what t h e o p e r a t i n g p r e s s u r e s h o u l d b e a t any p a r t i a l l o a d con-
dition. I t s t a n d s t o r e a s o n t h a t w i t h a p a r t i a l l o a d , t h e TTD and t h e a p p r o a c h
values should be b e t t e r ( l e s s ) than a t f u l l load. Many u t i l i t i e s have f a m i l i e s o f
c u r v e s showing TTD and a p p r o a c h a t v a r i o u s l o a d s t h a t have been p r e p a r e d by t h e
m a n u f a c t u r e r and s u b m i t t e d t o them f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f p e r f o r m a n c e a n a l y s i s . Op-
e r a t o r s s h o u l d r e f e r t o t h e s e c u r v e s , i f t h e y want more p r e c i s e i n f o r m a t i o n ; b u t
f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f t h i s t e s t , t h e d a t a i n F i g u r e 2-7 s h o u l d be s u f f i c i e n t . By
looking a t t h e approach temperature, i t c a n b e d e t e r m i n e d i f t h e r e is f l a s h i n g i n
t h e d r a i n s c o o l e r and f l a s h i n g i n t h e s y s t e m (assuming e a r l i e r tests have shown
t h a t t h e FWH is n o t d e f i c i e n t from t h e t h e r m a l d e s i g n s t a n d p o i n t ) . Most FWHs i n
use today a r e designed f o r an approach o f approximately lo0. I f t h e FWH is o p e r -
a t i n g a t 75% l o a d i n s t e a d o f loo%, t h e n t h e a p p r o a c h m i g h t b e OF o r OF. I£ t h e
t e s t shows t h a t t h e t e m p e r a t u r e o f t h e a p p r o a c h i s 2 O 0 ~ - 3 o 0 ~ ,t h e r e is s t r o n g r e a -
son t o s u s p e c t t h a t t h e FWH i s e x p e r i e n c i n g problems i n t h e d r a i n s c o o l i n g zone
and/or t h e operation of t h e d r a i n s c o n t r o l valve.

2.1.4 O p e r a t i o n a l P r a c t i c e s To void Or M i t i g a t e Problems

I t s h o u l d be emphasized t h a t most o f t h e f o r e g o i n g d i s c u s s i o n s assume a c o n d i t i o n
where a l l FWHs a r e o p e r a t i o n a l . I f some a r e o u t o f s e r v i c e , t h e remainder o f t h e
FWHS, which a r e i n t h e o v e r l o a d c o n d i t i o n , c a n n o t be e x p e c t e d t o m a i n t a i n t h e ap-
p r o a c h t h a t was p r e v i o u s l y d i s c u s s e d . For example, i n a s i n g l e s t r i n g o f e i g h t FWHs
(ascending numerically with pressure with t h e e i g h t h being t h e high-pressure FWH),
i f FWNs 4 and 5 a r e o u t , t h e t e m p e r a t u r e o f t h e w a t e r g o i n g i n t o FWH 6 w i l l be much
lower t h a n normal. T h a t p a r t i c u l a r FWH, t h e r e f o r e , i s g o i n g t o be o p e r a t e d under a
g r e a t overload condition. A t one u t i l i t y having more t h a n 300 FWHs, maximum p o t e n -
t i a l o v e r l o a d c o n d i t i o n s on downstream FWHs r a n g e from 120%-304% w i t h one a d j a c e n t
u p s t r e a m FWH c u t o u t . Under s u c h c o n d i t i o n s , one s h o u l d e x p e c t t h e a p p r o a c h t o b e
much h i g h e r t h a n normal. I t is p a r t i c u l a r l y important i n these circumstances t o
make s u r e t h a t f l a s h i n g is e l i m i n a t e d b o t h i n t h e d r a i n s c o o l e r and u p s t r e a m o f t h e
 Unit MW Load (2)

Figure 2-8. Unit MW Load V s . Feedwater Heater Shell Operating P r e s s u r e

(Generic Example). These curves may be developed from t h e s t a t e d designed
p r e s s u r e s , or they may be approximated by measuring one o r more p o i n t s a t
s t e a d y - s t a t e p l a n t conditions.
d r a i n s c o n t r o l v a l v e , b e c a u s e f l a s h i n g under t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s is o f such g r e a t i n -
t e n s i t y and f o r c e t h a t d e s t r u c t i o n o f a h e a t e r i s u s u a l l y reached w i t h i n a s h o r t
p e r i o d o f time. A check w i t h t h e FWW s u p p l i e r s h o u l d be made b e f o r e o p e r a t i n g a t

any o v e r l o a d c o n d i t i o n . I t would be an e x c e l l e n t p r a c t i c e f o r p l a n t o p e r a t o r s t o
know t h e v e r s a t i l i t y o f any FWH t h a t might b e r e q u i r e d t o o p e r a t e under abnormal
conditions. ( S e c t i o n 3 a d d r e s s e s t h i s a r e a i n more d e t a i l . )

The a b i l i t y o f t h e f e e d w a t e r system t o h a n d l e abnormal c o n d i t i o n s is v e r y i m p o r t a n t .

I f t h e s y s t e m d o e s n o t p r o v i d e means o f b y p a s s i n g t h e f e e d w a t e r s i d e o r b y p a s s i n g
t h e d r a i n s , s a f e abnormal o p e r a t i o n c a n b e s e v e r e l y l i m i t e d . A feedwater system
t h a t d o e s n o t have some f l e x i b i l i t y o f o p e r a t i o n is p o o r l y d e s i g n e d and w i l l d e v e l o p
problems. I n p e a k i n g p l a n t s , t h e r e w i l l b e a demand f o r power t h a t w i l l c r e a t e
cyclical conditions. The l a c k of p r o p e r a d j u s t m e n t o f c o n t r o l s w i l l i n c r e a s e t h e
r a t e o f d e t e r i o r a t i o n and d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e EWHs. A s t r i n g o f FWHs t h a t c a n op-

e r a t e i n a s t e a d y s t a t e c o n d i t i o n w i t h o u t problems may e x h i b i t s i g n i f i c a n t f l u c t u -
a t i o n o f w a t e r l e v e l when c y c l i c a l c o n d i t i o n s a r e e x p e r i e n c e d . T h i s p o i n t empha-
s i z e s t h e need f o r t h e o p e r a t o r s to r e c o g n i z e t h a t blowing steam t h r o u g h a d r a i n s
c o o l e r is n e v e r a p r o p e r o p e r a t i n g p r a c t i c e . One s h o u l d b e l o o k i n g f o r a l e v e l t h a t
is r e l a t i v e l y steady. While undergoing l o a d c h a n g e s , t h e r e s h o u l d b e some l e v e l
f l u c t u a t i o n ; b u t upon r e t u r n t o s t e a d y s t a t e , even a f t e r g o i n g from a 100% l o a d t o a
25% l o a d , t h e l e v e l s h o u l d s t a b i l i z e . I f i t d o e s n o t , t h e swinging o f t h e l e v e l is
an i n d i c a t i o n o f problems i n t h e s y s t e m ( p r o b a b l y c o n t r o l s ) under s t e a d y o p e r a t i o n
t h a t should be i n v e s t i g a t e d . The t e s t t h a t was p r e v i o u s l y d e s c r i b e d i s a g u i d e t o
a c c o m p l i s h t h i s end.

I t is e s s e n t i a l t h a t t h e o p e r a t o r s u n d e r s t a n d t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e d r a i n s o u t l e t
c o n t r o l v a l v e w i t h r e s p e c t to c o n t r o l l i n g t h e w a t e r l e v e l w i t h i n t h e power p l a n t FWH
system, Many c o n t r o l v a l v e s a r e n o t p r o p e r l y s i z e d and o p e r a t e d f o r t h e s e r v i c e
intended. The tendency seems to b e to o v e r s i z e t h e c o n t r o l v a l v e s and, i n a d d i t i o n ,
t o o p e r a t e w i t h t h e v a l v e s opened wider t h a n n e c e s s a r y . A b a s i c mistake is n o t

r e a l i z i n g t h a t when t h e v a l v e is opened w i d e r t h a n n e c e s s a r y , t h e r e c o u l d be
f l a s h i n g upstream o f t h e v a l v e , whereas t h e f l a s h i n g s h o u l d t a k e p l a c e o n l y down-
stream of t h e valve s e a t . Again, i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o remember t h a t t h e p a s s i n g o f
f l u i d t h r o u g h a c e r t a i n a r e a is a f u n c t i o n n o t j u s t o f t h e p r e s s u r e and open s p a c e ,
b u t a l s o o f t h e d e n s i t y and volume o f t h e f l u i d and t h e geometry o f t h e a r e a . When
f l a s h i n g is a l l o w e d upstream o f t h e v a l v e , t h e f l u i d volume and v e l o c i t y i n c r e a s e
d r a m a t i c a l l y , and a v a l v e s i z e d on t h e b a s i s o f p a s s i n g o n l y w a t e r c o u l d b e t o o
s m a l l t o p a s s t h e m i x t u r e o f f l a s h e d steam and w a t e r (two-phased f l o w ) .
In one set of tests, identical drain quantities were passed by the liquid level
control valve when it was adjusted manually to only 60% open, as compared to what it
was passing when wide open under automatic control. When the valve was only 60%
open, the pressure drop through it was high enough that the upstream pressure re-
mained sufficient to preclude flashing; when the valve was wide open, the pressure
condition at the point of inlet was such that flashing was occurring ahead of the
valve. Therefore, with the limited valve opening, only hot water was passing
through, whereas a combination of hot water and steam was flowing across the valve
seat when the valve was wide open. Even though the same quantity of drains flowed
in each instance, the 100% open valve condition was most likely damaging the valve
trim (i.e., the valve plug and the seat).

Similarly, another utility developed problems with a LP FWH drains valve to the
condenser. Upon investigation, the operating personnel were asked to override the
controls of this valve, which was not passing the required quantity of drains while
it was fully open. When the valve was manually set to a position 50% open, an in-
creasing level was experienced for a short period of time, followed by a decrease to
the design level. Prior to that adjustment, it was decided to bypass the drains
from the upstream FWH to the condenser, rather than to cascade to the lowest pres-
sure FWH, thereby minimizing flow through that troubled valve. When the real prob-
lem was recognized and solved, the operators returned to the cascading mode without
further difficulties.

It is also possible to encounter problems if the drains control valve is undersized

rather than oversized. If it is undersized, the alternative drains valve or "dump
valve" to the condenser will be called upon to operate for long periods partially
open. This situation may go undetected, resulting in poor plant performance as well
as deterioration of the dump valve. This also degrades the turbine water induction
protection, which relies upon proper dump valve operation during high-water-level
emergencies.

Failure to recognize such operating considerations is costing the electric utility

industry millions of dollars in both poor performance and equipment destruction.
Both the approach and the TTD are affected. FWHs are designed for an optimum TTD
and an optimum approach, which can exist at any given operating condition, provided
an operating level is maintained that allows complete liquid phase flow to the
drains cooler without flashing. If it is necessary to submerge one or two rows of
tubes to accomplish this (in a horizontal FWH), the TTD will still be superior to
what w i l l e x i s t i f a low w a t e r l e v e l i s p e r m i t t e d and f l a s h i n g t a k e s p l a c e a t t h e
drains cooler entrance.

Performance o f a l i q u i d l e v e l c o n t r o l s y s t e m is d e p e n d e n t upon p r o p e r m o n i t o r i n g a s
w e l l a s t h e a b i l i t y o f a l l components t o d o t h e i r job. T h e r e f o r e , it is n e c e s s a r y
t o know where t h e v a r i o u s l e v e l s s h o u l d be i n a FWH. For e a c h FWH t h e r e s h o u l d be a
s i m p l e s k e t c h o f t h e i n t e r n a l s s i m i l a r t o t h a t shown i n F i g u r e 2-9, which i n d i c a t e s
where t h e low t u b e i s , how many t u b e s s h o u l d b e submerged, and what happens when t h e
l e v e l moves from h i g h to low. The o p e r a t o r s i n t h e power p l a n t s h o u l d have a s u f -
f i c i e n t u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f what a low o r h i g h l e v e l means and how l e v e l s s h o u l d f l u c -
t u a t e during t r a n s i e n t s . F i g u r e s 2-10 and 2-11 d e p i c t b o t h h i g h and low s h e l l l e v -
e l s for a horizontal situation. F i g u r e 2-11 c l e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e s where a f l a s h i n g
c o n d i t i o n d e v e l o p s when a l e v e l is m a i n t a i n e d too l o w .

The l a c k o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g c o n c e r n i n g t h e l e v e l s on t h e FWHs c a n b e c o r r e c t e d by
r e q u e s t i n g a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n s o t h a t t h e u t i l i t i e s have p r o p e r d r a w i n g s and
information. One u t i l i t y p o s t s t h e s e l e v e l s i n t h e c o n t r o l room on d i a g r a m s s i m i l a r
t o F i g u r e 2-12. The example shows a v e r t i c a l c h a n n e l down u n i t , i n d i c a t i n g t h e
l o c a t i o n s o f t h e low p o i n t , t h e h i g h p o i n t , t h e normal w a t e r l e v e l , and t h e d i s -
t a n c e s between them. A l s o i n f e r r e d from t h i s d i s p l a y is t h e number o f i n c h e s

746 U q u b e s --
3/4" O.D. And 15/16" A P i t c h
Band O f L e v e l From Low To High 2-7/8" --

Water L e v e l s I n c h e s From S h e l l Comments

Normal Water L e v e l 3-1/2 Tube Rows Submerged

Low Water L e v e l 1-1/2 Tube Rows Submerged
High Water L e v e l 5 Tube Rows Submerged
T r i p Out

F i g u r e 2-9. Feedwater H e a t e r Water L e v e l Limits

 Exit From
Desuperheater

2r17
-Trip Out
i
-High W.L.

- Normal W. L . I

f
Entrance To
Drains Cooler
41-11/16" I
Drains Cooler
-
Steam Inlet

Drains
Out
* .) - I
/
I Back Of
Tube Shell

I
I

I
Figure 2-12. Level I n d i c a t i o n s O f A V e r t i c a l Channel Down Feedwater Heater

2-27
remaining before damaging conditions are established within the FWHs. For instance,
in a vertical channel down unit, the level is shown where the drains cooler water is
going to flow into the desuperheating zone and create problems leading to the de-
struction of tubes and baffles as the steam exits from the desuperheating zone.*

One experienced vendor suggested that the utilities be warned not to place much
faith in the location of level benchmarks that the manufacturer often places on the
outside of the FWH shell. These are intended to indicate the optimum water level,
but there are two drawbacks to relying on such benchmarks. First, the utility can-
not be sure that the benchmark is really in the correct position for optimum FWH
performance. Second, the level indication may not represent the true level in the
vicinity of the entrance to the drains cooler, as discussed earlier in Section
2.1.1.1. For these reasons, some FWH experts recommend that after the new FWH is
installed and operating, it should be checked to ensure that the designed approach
temperature is achieved at the intended "normal" level. If not, the "normal" level
should be adjusted to achieve the optimum approach temperature, while avoiding any
sharp increase in approach at the low-level end of the operating range. Figure 2-13
is a plot of an actual test performed on a horizontal FWH to check liquid level set
points. The level was raised to 3 inches or more above the bottom tubes (12 inches
above the bottom of the shell in this FWH). After temperatures had stabilized,
performance data were recorded and plotted. Then the level was lowered in succes-
sive steps to obtain and plot additional data. The resulting curves of outlet pres-
sure and approach showed significant breaks or "knees" at 6 inches on the level
indication scale. At this critical level, flow velocity was increasing rapidly from
flashing and the pressure drop was increasing across the drains cooler. Using this
type of data, the "normal" level was set to meet the designed approach, ensuring
that that point was well above the critical level (approximately 2 inches above the
critical level for this particular FWH). It is suggested that the optimum arrange-
ment for most horizontal FWHs is an operating range (including the low-level alarm
setpoint) completely above the critical level with the normal level at the designed
approach. It is also important to provide ample separation between the normal oper-
ating range and both the high- and the low-level alarm setpoints to avoid spurious
alarms for normal plant transients. If it is necessary to plug some of the lower
tubes in a horizontal FWH, it is wise to repeat this procedure for checking levels
by temperature performance; higher level setpoints may be needed.

*In the example shown, this point is 2 inches above trip out or 42 inches above
the entrance to the drains cooler.
 S H E L L LIQUID LEVEL-INCHES
ABOVE BOTTOM 10 OF SHELL

Figure 2-13. Example Of Data Used To Check Level Vs. Temperature Performance.
(This EWH is different from those represented by other figuxes in this section.)

Source: Feedwater Heater Operation, F.H. Linley, Jr., Southwestern Engineering Co.,
Annual Conference of the Southeastern Electric Exchange, New Orleans, LA, April 1983.

If following the above procedure leads to a "normal" level somewhat higher than the
manufacturer's benchmark, no harm will be done. However, if it leads to lowering
the level, the utility must be very careful because a normal level that is close to
the snorkel input to the drains cooler (in a horizontal FWH) or within 2 inches of
the top of the drains cooler shroud (vertical, head-down FWH) may provide too little
margin for power excursions, allowing steam to flow directly into the drains cooler.
~f in doubt, or if the drains cooler approach temperature indicates that significant
level adjustment is necessary, it is prudent to discuss this problem with the vendor
and ensure that the decisions reached are based on a sound engineering judgment of
all factors applying to the specific installation. Ensuring proper level control
throughout the FWH's life is essential to avoiding the serious problems described
herein.

2.1.5 Preventive And Corrective Maintenance

Preventive and corrective maintenance practices have a great deal of influence on
the ability to operate a power plant efficiently and correctly. A simple example
will distinguish between the terms "corrective" and "preventive" as used in this
guide. If a component malfunctions and must be cleaned or repaired to restore
proper operation, such work is corrective maintenance. However, periodic cleaning
or adjustment that avoids such a malfunction is preventive maintenance.
as mentioned earlier, some operators do not understand the flashing phenomenon with-
in the drains cooler. Because of this, they pay little attention to a drains con-
trol valve that is stuck open and will consider this a low priority repair. They
may consider this drainage to the lower pressure units as a minor problem, unaware
that the internals of the drains cooler are being destroyed while they are attending
to other plant problems. The major concern about water induction to the turbine
demands that the drains control valve open upon air failure, and this will probably
override all other considerations when designing a controls system. However, seri-
ous thought should be given to establishing an emergency alarm demanding immediate
operator attention, should this drains control valve enter a failed open operating
mode. If that valve is allowed to operate in a fully open position for any signif-
icant period of time, high fluid velocities will cause impingement erosion and
vibration-induced damage within the drains cooler section.

The practice mentioned earlier of "jacking open" valves or "short stroking" valves
to prevent water induction to the turbine is destructive and costly. Valves should
not be jacked open or short stroked in any power plant. Instead, proper maintenance
and, in some cases, preventive maintenance will permit proper operation. Valves
tend to leak and must be repaired, and some need repacking on a regular basis. It
is important that valves be capable of performing the function for which they were
intended. This is true not only in reference to control valves; it also applies to
isolation valves and check valves in steam lines as well as in drain lines. Too
often, such valves are ignored and will not perform their designed function because
of the lack of preventive or corrective maintenance.

During operation and layup periods, crud deposits can build up on floats, liquid
level sensors, and regulator valves, causing malfunction of the level control sys-
tem. The plant's preventive maintenance program should include periodic inspection
and cleaning of those components as well as a review of chemistry control procedures
to minimize the deposits. Another worthwhile preventive maintenance action is peri-
odic inspection for steam leaks, especially in the vicinity of the electronic con-
trols for the level control system. Corrective maintenance may be needed not only
to stop the leaks but, in some cases, to relocate sensitive control modules away
from such steam sources.

Taking appropriate data and adjusting the drains control system for proper operation
as discussed earlier is an example of a good preventive maintenance practice that
can ensure proper system operation if the individual components are kept in good
working condition. When in excellent condition, the control system of a power plant
that is cycling can still maintain good performance. When there are sticking valves
or controllers, system damage is likely to be occurring somewhere in the plant.

2.1.6 System Modification

System modification can often provide additional flexibility to enhance operations
and maintenance. This is particularly true in regard to isolating and bypassing
FWHs. The optimum arrangement is one that permits dependable isolation of each FWH
individually without shutting down the others. This would allow maintenace to be
performed on an individual FWH without removing the entire string from service.
Some experienced utility engineers insist on this capability for any new system
designs or major modifications they consider in this area, Other utilities find it
difficult to justify the cost of such expensive modifications after significant unit
life has been expended. The economics must be evaluated for each plant situation.
For example, one experienced consulting engineer reports that some plants have been
designed such that it may be more economical to isolate the 2 highest pressure FWHs
as a series pair without exceeding turbine or boiler limits. This arrangement would
require fewer isolation valves; the important point is to carefully consider all
components affected in the operation of the system not just the FWH itself. (Sec-
tion 3 comments further on operation under degraded conditions, and Section 4 ad-
dresses the wide variation in cost considerations for different FWH situations.)
For EWH isolation, valve integrity is the key. Ideally, HP FWHs should have two
high-integrity isolation valves with pressure drains between them. Single valves
may suffice for LP FWHs if a good valve maintenance program is in place. For main-
tenance during plant operation, safety considerations must be paramount- Numerous
injuries have been experienced daring maintenance on E'WHs without high-integrity
isolation from water at high temperature and pressure. One example is that of a
mechanic who received severe burns when an expandable bag used to hold back drips
from a Leaking isolation valve burst, dumping hot water on the mechanic.

The ability to bypass drains on the shell side is also desirable. It is impossible
for the drains to be handled normally when they are increased beyond the drains
cooler flow capability. In such a case, the bypass or spill of drains to the con-
denser will probably be mandatory. This deficiency is presect in many installations
in the United States. Usually, this bypass to the condenser is called the dump
valve or high-level spill valve. Many installations have two-position (non-modu-
lating) open or closed valves that open wide to the condenser upon indication of
high level in the FWH. With a good design, and under normal operating conditions,
the drains control valve should be capable of passing the flow from a higher to a
lower pressure FWH with the valve modulating not on the high open side but somewhere
in the middle range. Under abnormal circumstances, the valve should be able to open
up to the full capacity. Only when this drains control valve is incapable of pass-
ing the flow should the dump valve be called on to act. At that point, the dump
valvz should be opened slowly and modulated like the control valve. Flashing is
again a concern because the system reaches a region of much lower pressure. If
drains go from a HP FWH operating at 600-800 psi (via the bypass) to the condenser,
which is operating on 1 psia, the hazard of introducing a low-pressure region into
the drains cooler is very real, especially if the dump valve is not operating and
modulating the way it should.

An extreme example is an instance when one unit had a dump valve from a HP EW3 to
the condenser stick in the open position. This vertical EWH was shaking on its
foundation. Calculations later showed that the pressure decreased to the point that
all drains cooler drains were flashing and the pressure was so low that there was
fluid at sonic velocity inside that one FWHts drains cooler. Again, the valves that
are drain valves leading into a low-pressure region should be modulating valves, not
open or closed valves. As such, they should be identified as "drains cooler bypass
control valves," and the term "dump valves" should be eliminated.

A utility that uses quick-opening drains cooler bypass control valves should consi-
der modification. When doing so, consideration should be given to the recommenda-
tion that a drains cooler bypass control valve should always be located in a sepa-
rate line that taps off from a shell connection located ahead of the drains cooler.
Many existing installations locate this valve in a branch line off the main drains
line. In so doing, all of the emergency dump flow must first pass through the
drains cooler baffling. Since this flow is usually in excess of design conditions,
and also in a flashing state, considerable damage to the drains cooler internals can
be expected when the drains bypass valve in such a location goes into operation.

2.2 TUBE VIBRATION

2.2.1 Overview
Vibration in shell and tube heat exchangers is a natural phenomenon caused by the
interaction of elastic tubes with the fluctuating forces imposed by the flowing
shell-side fluid. Tube vibration becomes a problem when its intensity reaches a
point at which damage at the tube-to-support-plate joints occurs by fretting, fa-
tigue, etc. Further vibration intensity can lead to tube collision damage midspan
between support plates.

Tubes vibrate at discrete frequencies that depend on the tube geometry, tube ma-
terial, and fluid densities. The lowest frequency is called the natural frequency.
2-32
The forces imposed on a tube by shell-side fluid flow fluctuate at certain frequen-
cies that are dependent on the flow rate and the geometry of the flow area. The
fluctuating forces will often cause the tube to vibrate, but damage results only if
the amplitude of the tube vibration is sufficient to cause (1) stresses in the tube
or tube joint that exceed the endurance limit for fatigue failure, (2) collision
between adjacent tubes, or (3) frettins wear between the tube and tube support
plate. The amplitude of tube vibration is the product of the static deflection and
the magnification factor !CMF). The static deflection is the non-vibrating tube
displacement caused by the lift and drag forces due to fluid flow over the tube.
The value of CMF depends on the ratio of the flow frequency to the tube natural
frequency and on the Level of system damping. When the frequency ratio is near
unity (resonance), large amplitude vibration can occur.

Much research on vibration in heat exchangers has been conducted in recent years by
the Heat Transfer Research Institute, Oak Ridge National Laboratories, and many
others. A recent literature search sponsored by EPRI identified numerous articles
pertinent to FWH application. A summary of that material, including brief explana-
tions of the principle theories for predicting vibration behavior, is contained in
Section 3.0 of EPRI Report CS-1776, "Failure Cause Analysis - Feedwater Heaters."
This reference was distributed to the utilities and should be read by FWH engineers
for background information and utility experience as reported in recent years.
Short explanations are provided therein for theoretical matters that are beyond the
scopz of this guide but are of real interest in appreciating tube vibration problems
(e.g., vortex shedding, turbulent buffeting, fluidelastic whirling).

Many of the conditions leading to damage by tube vibration can be resolved at the
purchasing stage by practical, common sense limits imposed in the specification. As
a minimum, the manufacturer should be asked to address transient and overload con-
ditions in his vibration analysis and to demonstrate how he determined the design to
be adequate for such conditions as well as normal operation. For reference, it
should be recognized that the maximum unsupported tube lengths recommended in Heat
Exchange Institute (HEI) and Tubular Exchange Manufacturers Association (TEMA) guide-
lines are not conservative, although they may be adequate for flows experienced in
normal operation. Some rWHs may see 200% or even 300% load when the next upstream
FWHS are isolated for repair; this condition may double or triple the steam flow and
cause excessive vibration if the FWH was not designed to accommodate this situation.

The most practical ways to minimize vibration hazards are to:

 Control extraction steam and other fluid flows within designed limits;

Provide adequate tube pitch (distance between tubes);

Limit the unsupported tube span; and

Ensure proper drilling of tube supports and baffles.

With regard to the last of the above items, it is important to note that tolerances
on tube holes in baffles and support plates must not be reduced too low just to
reduce vibration; proper allowance must be left for tube length expansion and con-
traction during temperature changes to preclude tube drag wear at supports, es-
pecially in horizontal FWHs. Typical tolerance is 1/64 inches (-0156 inches).
This point is less applicable to vertical FWHs where the tube weight does not rest
on support plates (which serve as spacers rather than as supports).

EPRI Report CS-1776 contains a summary and comparison of industry standards related
to vibration as published by HE1 and TEMA. That report also concludes that these
standards are inadequate with respect to preventing vibration problems; however,
pages 3-25 through 3-33 of the report are recommended reading for FWH engineers and
should be of assistance until improved guidelines are developed.

The following sections will describe the effects of the vibration phenomenon on the
various zones within a FWH on the shell side: the condensing zone, the drains cool-
ing zone, and the desuperheating zone.

2.2.1.1 Tube Vibration In The Condensinq Zone. There are two areas in the con-
densing zone that can be affected by destructive tube vibration. One area is the
U-tube area as shown in Figure 2-14. The unsupported tube length in the U-tube area
historically has been far greater than it should be. Even competent manufacturers
commonly followed the T?3MA guidelines that specify an unsupported tube length on the
U-tube rear support. The recommendation of TEMA in this instance is not considered
satisfactory for FWH power plant application. Experience has shown that one should
go beyond the TEMA requirement. As a general rule for U-tube bundles, it is recom-
mended that special supporting spacers or strapping be used to support (and separ-
ate) U-tubes for any unit where the outer tube limits are greater than 24 inches in
diameter. To make this rule of thumb clearer, if the outer tube limit is 48 inches
in diameter, every tube bend that is in the 24-48 inch diameter range should be
supported at U-bends. Figure 2-14 clearly indicates the condition of a large tube
bundle where the U-bends were not properly supported. Figure 2-15 shows the re-
placed bundles where baffles were provided at the U-bends for proper tube separation
and support.
P I v r a 2-78, T a k e Vibration Daaaqe A t %e O-Bend
S p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n must be p a i d where d r a i n s i n l e t o r s t e a m i n l e t o r b y p a s s e s a r e
a d m i t t e d a t t h e U-bend end. Impact p l a t e s a t t h e s e l o c a t i o n s must be anchored w i t h
g r e a t c a r e b e c a u s e t h e y a r e s u b j e c t t o v i b r a t i o n due t o t h e change i n p h a s e of t h e
l i q u i d a t t h e f l o w c o n d i t i o n s t h a t may e x i s t . The b e s t method of i n t r o d u c i n g d r a i n s
beyond t h e U-tubes i n h o r i z o n t a l FWHs i s t o p r o v i d e an e x t e n d e d chamber o f t h e s h e l l
i t s e l f beyond t h e U-tubes w i t h t h e p r o p e r b a f f l e plate/dam t o s e p a r a t e t h e d r a i n s
i n l e t from t h e U-bends p r o p e r . Such a dam s h o u l d have p r o v i s i o n s f o r s e p a r a t i o n o f
t h e f l a s h i n g steam a t t h e t o p and f l o w d r a i n s a t t h e bottom. F i g u r e 2-16 shows one
c o n f i g u r a t i o n f o r t h i s purpose.

Another a r e a of c o n c e r n f o r t u b e v i b r a t i o n i s w i t h i n t h e b u n d l e i t s e l f i n t h e con-
d e n s i n g zone. I n a d d i t i o n t o improper t u b e s u p p o r t l e n g t h , t h e major c a u s e o f t u b e
v i b r a t i o n on a condensing zone s t r a i g h t p o r t i o n is t h e v e l o c i t y o f t h e condensing
s t e a m w i t h i n t h e s h e l l around t h e bundle. Two major m i s t a k e s a r e made i n t h i s a r e a .
The f i r s t m i s t a k e i s p r o v i d i n g a s h e l l t h a t is t o o s m a l l i n d i a m e t e r , t h u s i n d u c i n g
high velocity. The second m i s t a k e is p r o v i d i n g s u p p o r t s t h a t e x t e n d t o t h e i n s i d e
d i a m e t e r ( I D ) o f t h e s h e l l and a r e made such t h a t v e r y l i t t l e a r e a is a v a i l a b l e f o r
f l o w around t h e v a r i o u s s u p p o r t s . F i g u r e 2-17 i l l u s t r a t e s how FWHs have been modi-
f i e d by c u t t i n g a p o r t i o n o f t h e s u p p o r t p l a t e s , t h e r e b y p r o v i d i n g improved opening
of flow a r e a a t t h e s u p p o r t l o c a t i o n s . T h i s is o n e a r e a t h a t c a n be a d d r e s s e d i n

Baf f le PI ate / 0am

F i g u r e 2-16. D r a i n s I n l e t B a f f l e Plate/Dam. When t h e h i g h - t e m p e r a t u r e

d r a i n s f l a s h upon e n t e r i n g t h e s h e l l , t h e l i q u i d p o r t i o n d r o p s and f l o w s
a l o n g t h e s h e l l bottom, and s t e a m d i s s i p a t e s i t s e l f i n t o t h e c o n d e n s i n g
zone. T h i s c a n b e done in a v a r i e t y of ways, and t h i s may be t h e s i m p l e s t .
D r a i n i n l e t l i q u i d f l o w must a l s o be i n t r o d u c e d such t h a t u n n a t u r a l wave
forms o r l e v e l f l u c t u a t i o n s a r e not created. The lower dam p l a t e h e l p s
i n t h i s function'.
 F i g u r e 2-17. S c a l l o p e d B a f f l e s And ~ u p p o r k s

t h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n s t a g e , t h e r e v i e w o f drawing d e t a i l s s t a g e , and d u r i n g i n s p e c t i o n
o f t h e manufacturing f a c i l i t i e s . I t d o e s n o t i n v o l v e e x p e n d i t u r e s o f money, b u t it
d o e s r e q u i r e c o o p e r a t i o n o f t h e vendor." The same t y p e o f e f f o r t c a n b e made w i t h
e x i s t i n g u n i t s i n t h e f i e l d where it becomes n e c e s s a r y , f o r r e a s o n s o f m a i n t e n a n c e
o r r e p a i r , t o g a i n access t o t h e t u b e bundle. The s c a l l o p i n g o f s u p p o r t p l a t e s by
c u t t i n g w i t h a c u t t i n g wheel o r by b u r n i n g is a s i m p l e t a s k t h a t h a s been done suc-
c e s s f u l l y on many o c c a s i o n s . T h i s modification reduces t h e v e l o c i t y through t h e
s h e l l and m i n i m i z e s t h e d e s t r u c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s e x i s t i n g w i t h i n a s h e l l t h a t is t o o
s m a l l i n o r i g i n a l design. I n v e r t i c a l FWHs, t h i s m o d i f i c a t i o n s h o u l d b e compli-
mented w i t h t h e u s e o f dam s t r i p s on t h e s t e a m i n l e t s i d e o f t h e s u p p o r t p l a t e s t o
p r e v e n t c o n d e n s a t e t h a t a c c u m u l a t e s o n t h e s u p p o r t p l a t e s from c a s c a d i n g back i n t o
t h e vapor stream. Formulas e x i s t t o v e r i f y t h e c o r r e c t n e s s o f t h e EWH s h e l l dimen-
sion. The vendor s h o u l d be r e q u i r e d to d e m o n s t r a t e how h e u s e d t h e s e f o r m u l a s i n
e n s u r i n g p r o p e r geometry between t h e s h e l l and t h e t u b e b u n d l e .

* U n l e s s c l e a r l y r e q u i r e d t o d o s o i n t h e p r o c u r e m e n t p r o c e s s , some v e n d o r s a r e
s t i l l r e l u c t a n t t o a l l o w r e v i e w o f t h e i r p r o p r i e t a r y d e s i g n s and may n o t p r o v i d e
adequate drawings t o t h e u t i l i t y .
2.2.1.2 Tube Vibration In the Subcooling Zone. The subcooling zone has to be re-
cognized as a turbulent zone within a FWH. In a previous section, it was indicated
that an explosive condition may exist in the subcooling zone due to flashing. Pre-
vious comments regarding baffle spacing, tube pitch, and support plate configuration
that were made for the condensing zone are equally valid for the subcooling zone.
Consideration of unusual modes of operation, therefore, must be addressed at the
specification stage and, for existing equipment, has to be recognized during oper-
ation, preventive maintenance, and corrective maintenance activities. Pr~perprep-
aration of baffles at the cut line, where the tube is resting, to eliminate sharp
corners within the hole or half-hole has to be assured. Proper areas must be pro-
vided at the entrance and exit of the drains cooler and at baffle cuts so that ve-
locities are within reasonable ranges.

~t is also important to emphasize the proper assembly of the tube bundles both in
repair shops and new fabricating facilities to minimize vibration in the subcooling
zone as well as in the other zones. Errors made in the design or manufacture of the
shell and/or tube bundle that will cause flow restriction of steam or condensate
will increase velocities beyond design intention and this could bring about unac-
ceptable vibration.

2.2.1.3 Vibration In The Desuperheating Zone. In the desuperheating zone, vibra-

tion can occur with destructive forces equal to those in the subcooling zones under
flashing conditions. Desuperheating zones are designed to pass steam existing as a
high-velocity gas (100-150 feet per second) above the saturated condition. Load
variations can increase the volume of flow significantly, inducing velocities that
may be excessive and cause vibration. The higher the velocity, the greater the
amplitude of the vibration and the more likely the damage, particularly in the
cross-flow condition. It follows that a load change may create conditions that can
be destructive for the desuperheating zone. In this section, it is possible that
conditions at reduced load may be even more critical than at full load or overload.
~t reduced power, the decrease in steam pressure 4s accompanied by an even greater
increase in specific volume and steam velocity. Also the reduced pressure results
in more rapid condensation, which, combined with the higher velocity steam, can
cause excessive erosion-corrosion in the exit of the desuperheating zone. If this
situation is properly considered during the design stage, it can be avoided. Again,
it becomes imperative that the tube supporting length and the steam velocity be
maintained at a conservative level. It may also be necessary to increase the tube
pitch within the bundle. (Increased tube pitch may also reduce vibration damage in
the subcooling zone.) It is recognized in so doing that the size of the FWH will
i n c r e a s e , b u t a g a i n , i t is emphasized t h a t a good economical d e c i s i o n i s a good
long-term economical d e c i s i o n , n o t a s h o r t - t e r m one.

2.2.2 Symptoms Of V i b r a t i o n Problems

One i t e m t h a t may a l e r t t h e o p e r a t i n g p e r s o n n e l o r maintenance p e r s o n n e l t o t u b e
v i b r a t i o n problems i s an u n u s u a l n o i s e t h a t sounds l i k e a r a t t l e and is a c t u a l l y t h e
c o l l i s i o n o f t u b e s w i t h i n a FWH. A more i n d i c a t i v e method, o f c o u r s e , is v i s u a l
i n s p e c t i o n and a n a l y s i s o f t h e p a t t e r n o f t u b e f a i l u r e s . If a g r o u p o f t u b e s f a i l s
simultaneously, vibration-related f r e t t i n g c o r r o s i o n o r midspan c o l l i s i o n s may b e
damaging t h e t u b e s . Group f a i l u r e c a n a l s o b e i n d i c a t i v e o f f l a s h i n g , s e c o n d a r y i m -
pingement, and v e n t i n g problems. A c o m p l e t e a n a l y s i s o f f a i l u r e l o c a t i o n and e l e -

v a t i o n can determine t h e cause of f a i l u r e . T h e r e a r e s e v e r a l ways to d e t e r m i n e

where t h e t u b e s f a i l e d w i t h i n t h e bundle. Tube i n t e r n a l s c a n b e examined by v a r i o u s
p r o b e s u s i n g eddy c u r r e n t o r a c o u s t i c t e c h n i q u e s o r v i s u a i l y by boroscope d e v i c e s .
A s i m p l e r method is t h a t of p r e s s u r i z i n g t h e s h e l l and i n s e r t i n g a p l u n g e r inside
t h e tube u n t i l a i r f l o w i s d e t e c t e d , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e plunger has j u s t passed t h e
point of tube rupture. A w i d e l y used p r a c t i c e is t h a t o f c u t t i n g windows i n t o

s h e l l s o r d r i l l i n g 1/2-inch t o 1-inch h o l e s a t c e r t a i n l o c a t i o n s t o p e r m i t t h e i n -
t r o d u c t i o n of l i g h t s and b o r o s c o p e s i n t o t h e bundle a t t h e r e g i o n o f t u b e f a i l u r e .
There a r e v e r y good, f l e x i b l e b o r o s c o p e s on t h e m a r k e t today t h a t p e r m i t v i s u a l
e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e damaged a r e a s a s w e l l a s t h e a b i l i t y t o t a k e p h o t o g r a p h s wherever
such i n s t r u m e n t s c a n r e a c h . However, i n some s t a t e s doing t h i s w i t h o u t having an
"R" stamp o r informing o n e ' s i n s u r a n c e u n d e r w r i t e r may v o i d t h e Sec. V I I I stamp on
the vessel. I t i s a d v i s e d t h a t r e s p o n s i b l e a g e n t and code r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s f i r s t b e
approached. I t i s u n f o r t u n a t e t h a t some u t i l i t i e s have n o t y e t a c q u i r e d t h e h a b i t
o f d e t e r m i n i n g t h e r e g i o n ( i - e . , l o c a t i o n and e l e v a t i o n ) and t h e c a u s e s o f f a i l u r e .
Without some i n v e s t i g a t i o n , a n a l y s i s , and judgment, i t is i m p o s s i b l e t o d e t e r m i n e
t h e m o d i f i c a t i o n s n e c e s s a r y t o t h e FWH o r t o o p e r a t i n g and maintenance p r o c e d u r e s .

2.2.3 O p e r a t i n g And Maintenance P r a c t i c e s To Avoid Or M i t i g a t e V i b r a t i o n

Damage
~ l t h o u g hv i b r a t i o n problems a r e o f t e n c o n s i d e r e d d e s i g n problems, t h e o p e r a t i n g
p r a c t i c e s o f many power p l a n t s s h o u l d a l s c be reviewed i n t h e l i g h t o f t h e problems
a s they a r e detected. I f c o n d i t i o n s e x i s t such t h a t f l a s h i n g o c c u r s i n s i d e t h e
d r a i n s c o o l e r r e s u l t i n g i n d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e t u b e s by t u b e v i b r a t i o n and f r e t t i n g
corrosion, t h e problem may sometimes be c o r r e c t e d by r e s e t t i n g v a l v e s o r v a l v e con-
t r o l s y s t e m s a s mentioned e a r l i e r i n S e c t i o n 2.1, " L e v e l C o n t r o l And D r a i n s Cooler
Zone Problems."
Relative to earlier comments on symptoms, a point should be made that, when a defi-
nite pattern of tube failures is taking place, a user should contact the engineering
or service personnel of the original manufacturer for suggestions about what might
be wrong, Before doing so, the user should study all of the facts that may shed
light on the problem, and he should consider that it may be caused by some opera-
tional problem or a faulty purchase specification rather than by a poor FWH design.
By obtaining an opinion early, it is quite possible that a FWH could be saved. A
second opinion from a neutral consultant might also be advisable at that time. Bow-
ever, in trying to resolve the problem, it is essential for the user not only to
define a pattern of failures but also to identify which leg of a U-tube is affected
and the distance from the failure to the face of the tubesheet. A comparison of
such data with a diagram of the FWH internals will show which zone is affected and
may suggest the cause of the problem.

2.2.4 System Modification

Several types of corrective modification have already been discussed in the above
subsections. Another way to reduce vibration and tube failure in the desuperheating
zone is by providing a bleed steam bypass, that is, another pipe and another valve,
which will allow the steam from the extraction point in the turbine to feed into the
FWH beyond the desuperheating zone such that under certain conditions ofsoperation
the steam will be going partially into the desuperheating and partially into the
condensing zones. By this means alone, the velocities inside the desuperheater will
be cut in half (or almost in half); therefore, vibration that results from high
velocities will be minimized. Of course, it is also necessary that the shell be of
adequate design to accept the higher temperatures during these intermittent opera-
tions. If this type of modification is needed, impingement protection must be pro-
vided, and the effect of admitting superheated steam into a wet condensing zone must
be carefully evaluated (i.e., admittance may cause condensed water to flash back to
steam locally). For example, in one installation that was modified in this manner,
the superheated steam was admitted too close to the drains inlet causing new prob-
lems that may have been as severe as the original difficulties.

A similar type of philosophy may also be followed when the shell sizing is such that
excessive velocities exist in the condensing zone. It is possible to provide an
additional bleed steam inlet on the shell side or to relocate a bleed steam inlet
such that the flow of steam travels equally in two directions, rather than in one
direction. These are all judgments that can be made very quickly with appropriate
inspection and analysis and can save a utility money while increasing plant per-
formance. HE1 Standards for Closed Feedwater Heaters, third edition, relates to
this matter in a limited fashion on pages 6 and 7. According to good design prac-
tice, the steam inlet should be located taking into account the thermal center line
such that good distribution is accomplished without creating excessive localized
velocities even when the nozzle entrance velocity criteria is being met. Depending
on shell size, it may be advisable to locate the inlet nozzle above the thermal
center in vertical installations. Problems can become acute when a utility decides
to replace a tube bundle that requires more surface due to a material change. In
trying to use an existing shell in such a case, the clearance between the tube bun-
dle and shell may become too tight, inviting vibration damage due to excessive steam
velocities.

Another design or modification consideration is the potential problem of welded-only

tube joints. Although it is standard practice by most FWH manufacturers (and usual-
ly specified by most users) to contact roll a tube joint that has been welded, there
are instances where welded-only tube joints have been put into service; in most
cases, problems have developed, especially in vertical FWHs. While a FWH design
might be adequate against vibration within the various zones, the minor amount of
normal vibration that would take place could eventually cause a circumferential
crack resulting from fatigue stressing. This type of unexpected vibrational effect
would be eliminated by at least contact rolling after a welded joint has been made
and tested. For this reason, some experienced engineers recommend hard rolling for
approximately 2-1/2 inches beginning 1/2 inch behind the weld joint and contact
rolling to within 1/8 inch to 3/16 inch of the rear tubesheet surface. In vertical
EWHs, this practice also reduces the opportunities for crevice corrosion at the
tube-to-tubesheet joint at the rear of the tubesheet.

2.3 TUBE-INLET EROSION

2.3.1 Overview
~ube-inleterosion is a combined erosion-corrosion process that attacks the first
several inches of the tube at the inlet end. Erosion-corrosion can be defined as an
accelerated deterioration of metal caused by the relative movement between a fluid
and the metal surface, which may be aggravated by adverse chemical conditions in the
fluid. Several forms of such attack relate to high fluid velocities, fluid vorti-
city, flow buffeting, or a change in fluid state that might be called cavitation.
The cavitation effect in a FWH relates to excessive turbulence in the channel at the
tubesheet face and/or a vena-contracta formation as the fluid enters the tube. It
is commonly believed, and supported by experimentation, that the damage results
from the continuous formation of oxide layers and their rapid removal by the turbu-
lent water. This action eats away tube metal, weld metal, or both, in the first few
inches of the tube-inlet end, exhibiting scooped-out, rounded spots with a carved --
almost scalloped -- appearance. Figure 2-18 is a photograph illustrating the tube-
inlet erosion phenomenon. In this particular example, damage also occurred outside
the tube inlet, attacking weld metal and the tubesheet as well as the tubes in the
most turbulent area.

The principal factors that increase the severity of tube-inlet erosion-corrosion are
high water turbulence, low pH, high 02, and relatively low temperature (less than
400°~). Section 5.0 of EPRI Report CS-1776, "Failure Cause Analysis - Feedwater
Heaters," provides additional explanations, a summary of key material in the lit-
erature, and the results of a recent industry survey that should be read as back-
ground for better understanding of this problem.

A special form of erosion termed "worm-holing" or "rat-holing" is a very serious

threat to long life of equipment when maintenance personnel do a poor job of
checking the quality of the equipment, especially after a tube plugging or welded
joint repair has taken place. The worm-holing starts when a leak path between the
tube and the tubesheet hole is allowed to progress over a period of time, eventually
eroding away a large area in the tubesheet ligaments that progressively grows with
time and leakage. This leak path might originate with a poor weld joint, a cracked
ligament, or a poor job of weld repair and/or tube plugging. This is a slower form
of erosion but, if not detected early, can progress to become a very serious problem
and one that would require some major maintenance remedies.

2.3.2 ~ e s i g nConsiderations
Material selection and other design considerations offer many opportunities to min-
imize the effects of erosion-corrosion. The susceptibility of various metals to
tube-inlet erosion is indicated in Table 2-3. Most susceptible to attack are the
carbon steels, followed by high copper alloys, monel, and stainless steel.

The first consideration in designing a r'WH that is resistant to erosion attack is

the selection of the proper material. There is a history of problems with carbon
steel deterioration by general corrosion as well as erosion-corrosion problems of
the inlet end throughout the years. As a result, carbon steel is being avoided in
deference to stainless steel for FWH application.

In addition to material selection, another design consideration affecting erosion of

the tube inlet is the location of the feedwater inlet. The cJoser the inlet is to
the face of the tubesheet, the greater the possibility of damage to the inlet end of
the tube. It is a mistake to accept FWHs that have been designed in the interest of
short-term economics with the feedwater inlet and outlet possibly as close as 1/2
inch from the face of the tubesheet. They should be at least 5-6 inches from the
face of the tubesheet. The orientation of the connection has a great impact on
inlet-end erosion. If the orientation is such that the flow is directed toward the
face of the tubesheet at close range, erosion-corrosion attack on the tubes is like-
ly to be severe. If the geometry of the inlet piping is such that it makes a sharp
turn before coming into the channel barrel, as in the case of a 90° elbow, the tur-
bulence of this incoming water in the immediate area of the tubesheet face will
cause deterioration of the metal that could be severe, especially if the face of the
tubesheet has not been overlaid with some erosion-resistant material and the proper
tube material selection was not made. Inlet nozzle flow diffusers can reduce tur-
bulence in this area.

~ l s oimportant to feedwater inlet considerations is the water velocity. There have

been instances where the case was made for high velocity in the feedwater piping in
the interest of acquisition cost econdmy. However, experience has shown that the
more moderate guidelines of the HE1 should be followed in this area. When a plant
operates with three strings of EWHs and one string is bypassed for maintenance, then
 T a b l e 2-3

TUBE MATERIALS USED FOR FEEDWATER HEATERS AND OTHER HEAT EXCHANGERS
I N POWER PLANT APPLICATIONS

TUBE ALLOY ASME

MATERIAL NUMBER -NUMBER ESTIMATED RELATIVE S U S C E P T I B I L I T Y TO FORMS O F CORROSION*

Leach-
General Inter- i n g or Erosion- Stress
Copper-Based Attack Crevice Pitting granular Parting Corrosion Corrosion

Arsenical Admiralty
Arsenical Copper
Copper-Nickel (90/10)
Copper-Nickel (80l20)
Copper-Nickel (70/3 0 )

Nickel-Based Alloys
N
I
MONEL 400 SB- 163 5 5 6 7 2 6 6

Ferrous Alloys

C a r b o n Steel

S t a i n l e s s Steel
T y p e 304

*SUSCEPTIBILITY LEDGER
Scale o f : 0 t o 10
Where: 0 = Immune
1 0 = E x t r e m e l y Susceptible

Source: " T u b e M a t e r i a l Selection F o r F e e d w a t e r H e a t e r s A n d H e a t E x c h a n g e r s , "

P u b l i c Service G a s C o m p a n y , E n g i n e e r i n g D e p a r t m e n t , D e c e m b e r 8 , 1975.
t h e remaining s t r i n g s r i s k b e i n g s u b j e c t e d t o i n c r e a s e d f l o w r a t e s . T h i s would
r e s u l t i n e x c e s s i v e v e l o c i t i e s , h i g h enough t o d e t e r i o r a t e t u b e i n l e t s . The e f f e c t s ,
o f c o u r s e , depend upon t h e m a t e r i a l s e l e c t i o n and t h e d e g r e e o f t u r b u l e n c e r e s u l t i n g
from t h e geometry o f t h e t u b e - i n l e t a r e a .

For new HP FWHs r e q u i r i n g a welded t u b e j o i n t , a new t e c h n i q u e f o r e x p l o s i v e welding

is now a v a i l a b l e t h a t i n h e r e n t l y improves t h e f e e d w a t e r flow p a t t e r n i n t o t h e t u b e
entrance. A c t u a l e x p e r i e n c e w i t h t h e e x p l o s i v e l y welded t u b e j o i n t is somewhat
l i m i t e d a t t h i s w r i t i n g , b u t i t may b e t h e d e s i g n o f t h e f u t u r e . I n order t o get a
good m e t a l l u r g i c a l bond between t h e t u b e and t h e t u b e s h e e t , t h e t u b e h o l e must be
d r i l l e d w i t h a t a p e r w i t h i n t h e f i r s t few i n c h e s of t h e t u b e s h e e t . When t h e t u b e is
exploded i n t o t h e t u b e s h e e t , a f l a r e d c o n f i g u r a t i o n i s a c h i e v e d t h a t is much less
l i k e l y t o e x p e r i e n c e t u r b u l e n t flow t h a n a r e s t a n d a r d d e s i g n s today. The vena-
c o n t r a c t a p o t e n t i a l f o r c a u s i n g s e r i o u s e r o s i o n problems a t t h e e n t r a n c e of s u c h a
j o i n t s h o u l d b e minimized, i f n o t e l i m i n a t e d . With t h e welded t u b e j o i n t s t h a t
e x i s t t o d a y , o n e must b e s u r e t h a t weld r o l l - o v e r i n t o t h e tube e n t r a n c e does not
c r e a t e a n o r i f i c e e f f e c t t h a t makes t h e v e n a - c o n t r a c t a problem even more pronounced
t h a n normal. A t u b e t h a t p r o t r u d e s from t h e ' f a c e of t h e t u b e s h e e t might a l s o gen-
e r a t e l o c a l eddy e f f e c t s t h a t c o u l d c r e a t e abnormal e r o s i o n - c o r r o s i o n problems a t
t h e f a c e of t h e t u b e s h e e t a s w e l l a s a t t h e e n t r a n c e o f t h e t u b e . R e g a r d l e s s of
what t y p e o f t u b e s h e e t is employed i n t h e m a n u f a c t u r e o f a new EWH, t h e p u r c h a s e r
s h o u l d r e c o g n i z e i t s p o t e n t i a l f o r c a u s i n g e r o s i o n problems and d o a p r o p e r i n s p e c -
t i o n o f t h i s a r e a t o be s u r e t h a t h e is n o t i n v i t i n g t r o u b l e t h r o u g h a f a i l u r e d u e
t o a manufacturing technique. An i d e a l g o a l i n t h e d e s i g n o f a FWH c h a n n e l flow
d i s t r i b u t i o n and t u b e e n t r a n c e would be t o e l i m i n a t e a l l eddy e f f e c t s a t a l l l o a d s .
S i n c e t h i s is n o t always p o s s i b l e , i t is e s s e n t i a l t h a t t h e p u r c h a s e r and d e s i g n e r
consider t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r inlet-end erosion.

2.3.3 Symptoms And ~ e t e c t i o nO f T u b e - I n l e t E r o s i o n

I t is q u i t e s i m p l e t o d e t e r m i n e t h e symptoms o f t u b e - i n l e t e r o s i o n i n FWHs. Since
t h e f a i l u r e is a t t h e f a c e o f t h e t u b e s h e e t , a v i s u a l i n s p e c t i o n o f t h e f e e d w a t e r
s i d e w i l l i n d i c a t e t h i s t y p e o f problem a s shown i n F i g u r e 2-18. While t h e i n d i c a -
t i o n s s h o u l d be most prominent on t h e i n l e t p a s s , it is a d v i s a b l e t o - l o o k a l s o a t
t h e condition of t h e o u t l e t pass. To look a t b o t h p a s s e s , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o remove
t h e p a s s p a r t i t i o n c o v e r , b u t t h e added amount o f t i m e and l a b o r c o u l d p r o v e worth-
while. A v i s u a l i n s p e c t i o n o f t h e i n t e r i o r s u r f a c e s o f t h e c h a n n e l b a r r e l and a

b o r o s c o p e i n s p e c t i o n o f t h e f i r s t 6 i n c h e s o f a random number o f f i r s t - p a s s t u b e s
s h o u l d a l s o b e made f o r e a r l y d e t e c t i o n o f e r o s i o n symptoms s u c h a s e x c e s s i v e m e t a l
p o l i s h i n g o r wear. I f e r o s i o n is d e t e c t e d , i t is w i s e t o i n s p e c t even f a r t h e r down
the tube (perhaps 10 inches or more) to be sure the damage does not extend farther
than was first apparent. One way to detect the failure of a tube-to-tubesheet weld
is by pressurizing the shell side with air to 15-30 pounds and utilizing a solution
of soap at the face of the tubesheet. Any bubbles appearing within the confines of
the tube inside diameter (ID) would indicate that the tube leaks. Any bubbles
showing distinctly around the tube weld itself are tube-to-tubesheet joint failures.

2.3.4 Operational Practice To Avoid Or Mitigate Damage

With a given FWH design, the two principal areas that the operator can control to
minimize damage from tube-inlet erosion are the rate of feedwater flow and the water
chemistry. Again, it is important to pay particular attention to these variables
during plant transients, startup, and shutdown. Considering the tendency in the
utility industry to utilize some power plants in the peaking mode, it is more im-
portant than ever to recognize these basic causes of deterioration of FWHs. What
can be done during operation to minimize or prevent erosion-corrosion of tubes?
Rules of thumb that will help control the key variables are:

1. Whenever a FWHs or string of FWH is removed from service for maintenance

purposes, provide feedwater bypassing or reduce load so that excessive
velocities through the tubes are not maintained for more than several
hours.

2. If possible, reduce oxygen levels in the feedwater stream to reasonable

levels prior to passing water through FWHs. Depending upon tube mater-
ials, considerable damage can be done to tubes (especially carbon steel)
if no effort is made to remove oxygen and correct pH early in the start-
up stage. Below 7 ppb of dissolved oxygen is generally safe for most
systems.

3. Every time a tube is plugged, the velocity through remaining tubes in-
creases. As more tubes need to be plugged, a running check should be
riade to be sure that excessive velocities do not cause rapid destruction.
Plan for realistic retubing or replacement, allowing proper lead times
for work to be done.

4, water chemists should be careful to maintain proper pH at all times as

related to the tube material involved. Batch-type control or continuous
feed at varied loads are undesirable because they cause extreme varia-
tions in pH levels at some localized areas in the feedwater system. A pH
level in the range of 9.3 to 9.6 is usually appropriate for minimizing
erosion-corrosion attack on carbon steel tubing, given proper O 2
scavenging. The pH range for protecting copper alloys is in the range of
8.6 to 8.9.

2.3.5 System Modifications

To reduce turbulence, it may be necessary to use additional mechanical devices
either in new units or in existing units. These devices include flow diverters or
diffusers that will provide the opportunity to divert the flow away from the face
of the tubesheet and thereby avoid direct, localized high-velocity impingement on
some of the tubes. The manufacturers have various types of diffusers available.
Each one has certain good characteristics and some limitations. In addition to or
in place of flow diverters, there are those who prefer a perforated plate ahead of
the tubesheets. In addition to the flow diverter and diffuser, tube inserts can be
installed in the inlet feedwater pass inside the tubes where the material is most
susceptible to the erosion. These inserts can be mechanically or explosively in-
stalled using a material with high erosion resistance (usually stainless steel).
The use of inserts is usually limited to carbon steel tubing, although they have
been used on LP FWBs with admiralty tubes. One would not consider using an insert
on higher erosion-resistant materials such as monel or stainless steel. The im-
proper installation design of inserts can transfer erosion downstream of inserts.
To avoid this problem, the downstream end of the insert must taper gently to the
tube ID.

2.3.6 Maintenance Practices

As indicated earlier, if a problem of inlet-end erosion-corrosion starts, there is
probably little that can be done to stop its progress beyond the good operational
practices recommended above. However, the following maintenance measures may serve
to extend the useful life for several years:

1. Install metal tube inserts of high erosion resistance in the inlet pass.
Explosive installation would be preferable, but mechanical expanding can
be done if conditions are ideal.

2. Add flow diffusers on the inlet pass to minimize turbulence in the tube
entrance area.

3. In some cases, it may be possible to modify the geometry of the incoming

feedwater piping to relocate elbows, increase the flow cross section.
etc,, to provide smoother water flow at lower velocities.

4. Check the quality of tube-joint weldments at each annual overhaul. If

the shell can be pressurized for a soap solution check, this would be
best. If not, a dye-penetrant check of tube weldments should definitely
be performed.

5. When a tube needs plugging, use extra care to assure that adjacent tubes
are not damaged in the process. use mechanical plugs where applicable
(low pressure only). Otherwise, thin thimble-type plugs could be used
and will require a minimum amount of heat concentration to properly weld
into place.

6. DO not safety plug tubes adjacent to the failed tube without checking for
actual need. Equipment is now available in the service industry to in-
dividually test each tube for soundness. If an adjacent tube has been
severely damaged due to secondary impingement from the failed tube, this
can be detected quickly by hydrostatic tube testing.
 7. With the help of the plant's water chemist and/or an outside consultant,
determine a compatible water chemistry (especially pH and 02 control)
related to FWH tubes and the rest of the feedwater system. Anytime a
change is made to a water treatment system, a check of the tubing in all.
FWHs, heat exchangers, and condensers should be made to assure compatabil-
ity.

2.4 WATER CHEMISTRY AND CORROSION

2.4. L Overview
This section provides a basic understznding of the types of corrosion problems that
degrade FWH performance and stresses the importance of maintaining proper chemistry
control of the system. For more comprehensive technical coverage beyond the scope
o f this guide, the reader is referred to EFRI Report RP-1265-11, "Corrosion-Related
Failures In Feedwater Heaters."

There are many problems and inadequacies in dealing with the metals used in FWHs,
and none is totally immune to corrosion. The nature and aggressiveness of the en-
vironment determines, to a large extent, the degree and the type of corrosion. It
is misleading to consider a power plant environment as benign. All of the following
major categories of corrosion have been experienced in feedwater systems:

Uniform corrosion or general attack;

Galvanic or tube metal corrosion;

Crevice corrosion;

Pitting;

Intergranular corrosion;

Selective leaching or parting;

Erosion-corrosion; and

Stress corrosion.

A brief description of each of these types of corrosion follows.

2.4.1.1 uniform Corrosion Or General Attack. The uniform loss of the metal sur-
face is brought about by a chemical or electrochemical reaction. An average cor-
rosion rate can be established by measurement in mils per year, and the metal life
expectancy can be predicted. This form of corrosion is responsible for the great-
est destruction of metal by weight, but it is not as insidious as other types that
lack uniformity and predictability. General corrosion attacks are most evident in
c a r b o n s t e e l , b u t a l s o o c c u r t o a l e s s e r d e g r e e i n n o n - f e r r o u s m e t a l s and s t a i n l e s s
steel.

2.4.1.2 G a l v a n i c Or Tube M e t a l C o r r o s i o n . T h i s form o f c o r r o s i o n i s b r o u g h t a b o u t

by a p o t e n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e between two d i s s i m i l a r m e t a l s . The f a r t h e r a p a r t t h e
m e t a l s a r e i n t h e g a l v a n i c s e r i e s , t h e g r e a t e r t h e p o t e n t i a l g e n e r a t e d and t h e
greater its corrosion effect. The phenomenon is w e l l known, and s o is i t s preven-
tion. L e s s known i s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a c e l l r e v e r s a l b r o u g h t a b o u t by p o l a r i z a -
t i o n , whereby p a r a d o x i c a l l y t h e more n o b l e of t h e two m e t a l s i s a t t a c k e d .

2.4.1.3 Crevice Corrosion. A localized corrosion attack begins i n crevices, fis-

s u r e s , o r o t h e r c o n f i n e d mechanical i n t e r f a c e s where t h e r e e x i s t d i f f e r e n c e s i n
oxygen c o n c e n t r a t i o n i n t h e s t a g n a n t zone. I t was b e l i e v e d u n t i l r e c e n t l y t h a t
t h i s t y p e o f c o r r o s i o n r e s u l t s from d i f f e r e n c e s i n m e t a l i o n o r oxygen c o n c e n t r a -
tion. More r e c e n t work h a s i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e o v e r a l l e l e c t r o c h e m i c a l r e a c t i o n
i n v o l v e s t h e d i s s o l u t i o n o f m e t a l and t h e r e d u c t i o n o f oxygen t o hydroxyl. Crevice
c o r r o s i o n a t t a c k o c c u r s i n many mediums, a l t h o u g h i t is most i n t e n s e i n halogen
environments. I t d o e s r e q u i r e a l o n g i n c u b a t i o n p e r i o d t o d e v e l o p , b u t once s t a r t e d ,
i t p r o c e e d s a t an e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g rate. S t a i n l e s s s t e e l s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y suscep-
tible. C r e v i c e c o r r o s i o n o f t e n s t a r t s a t t h e back o f a t u b e - j o i n t weld where t h e
m a n u f a c t u r e r d i d n o t expand t h e t u b e i n t o t h e t u b e s h e e t a f t e r welding. Especially
i n a v e r t i c a l head down d e s i g n , t h e s t a g n a n t w a t e r and c r u d t h a t is i n c o n s t a n t
c o n t a c t w i t h t h e weld nugget may e v e n t u a l l y c o r r o d e t h r o u g h . When t h a t happens, a
worm-hole c o n d i t i o n i s e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t c a n work i t s way i n t o t h e f a c e o f t h e t u b e
inlet. Once t h i s p e n e t r a t i o n is made, i t i s a g g r a v a t e d by t h e p r e s s u r e d i f f e r e n t i a l
from t h e c h a n n e l t o t h e s h e l l ; r a p i d e r o s i o n o c c u r s , r e s u l t i n g i n c a t a s t r o p h i c
tube-to-tubesheet failure. I n some c a s e s , t h e t u b e - j o i n t weld h a s f a i l e d around
t h e c o m p l e t e c i r c u m f e r e n c e , and t h e s e p a r a t e d t u b e end, a s d e t e c t e d by b o r o s c o p i c
e x a m i n a t i o n , was found beyond t h e back o f t h e t u b e s h e e t . Tube f a i l u r e s o f t h i s
k i n d a l l o w l a r g e volumes o f w a t e r t o e n t e r t h e s h e l l and p o s s i b l y t h e t u r b i n e be-
f o r e being d e t e c t e d .

2.4.1.4 Pitting. T h i s u n i q u e t y p e o f a n o d i c r e a c t i o n is an a u t o c a t a l y t i c p r o c e s s
c o n t i n u o u s l y f e e d i n g i n its p r o d u c t . P i t t i n g i s one o f t h e most d e s t r u c t i v e and
i n s i d i o u s forms o f c o r r o s i o n a t t a c k . I t is e x t r e m e l y l o c a l i z e d and p r o d u c e s des-
t r u c t i o n o f m e t a l by p i e r c i n g . Most p i t s d e v e l o p and grow downward from h o r i z o n t a l
s u r f a c e s i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of g r a v i t y . Fewer p i t s d e v e l o p on v e r t i c a l s u r f a c e s and
o n l y r a r e l y d o p i t s grow upward, o p p o s i t e g r a v i t y . Similar t o crevice corrosion
a t t a c k , p i t t i n g r e q u i r e s a long i n c u b a t i o n p e r i o d t o d e v e l o p , b u t once s t a r t e d , t h e
pit penetrates the metal at an ever-increasing rate. Low fluid velocities and/or
stagnation are associated with pits. Stainless steel alloys ate more susceptible to
pitting corrosion than are other metals.

2.4.1.5 Intergranular Corrosion. Localized attack at and adjacent to grain bound-

aries in a metal matrix with relatively little corrosion of the grains is known as
intergranular corrosion. The result is disintegration of the alloy and/or its loss
of strength. Well-known forms of intergranular corrosion attacks are sensitization
of stainless steel and exfoliation of copper-nickel alloys. Sensitization of stain-
less steel occurs when the alloy is heated or cooled slowly through the temperature
range of 900°~ - 1500°~. The chromium-rich carbide in this temperature range pre-
cipitates to a degree directly related to the temperature and the dnration of expo-
sure. The precipitation results in the depletion of chromium near the grain bound-
ary. The chromium-depleted zone deteriorates because it does not contain sufficient
corrosion resistance to resist attack in many environments. This sensitization
creates miniature galvanic cells that further enhance attack. Exfoliation is a
special form of intergranular corrosion attack that is characterized by the elongated
grain attack on a plane parallel to the rolled or extruded surface. This results in
a characteristic delamination, or peeling, of the metal strata. Susceptible alloys
other than aluminum and magnesium are the 70/30 and the 80/20 copper-nickel alloys.
The 90/10 alloy is immune. Another form of intergranular corrosion attack is known
as weld decay. This corrosion failure takes place in or near the heat-affected zone
where sensitization occurred.

2.4.1.6 Selective Leaching Or Parting. The removal of one element from a solid
alloy by the process of corrosion is known as selective leaching or parting. The
two best known examples of selective leaching are dezincification and graphitiza-
tion. The first describes a process by which selective removal of zinc takes place
in brass alloys. The affected alloy can be readily detected by the red or copper
color in contrast to the original yellow color and by its brittleness and porosity.
Graphitization is selective leaching of the iron or steel matrix in cast iron leav-
ing the graphite network. The cast iron appears to become graphitized, as it has
the appearance of graphite and can be cut easily with a pen knife. Another example
is the leaching of nickel from 70/30 copper-nickel tubing. One utility reports that
layers of almost pure copper were found as thick as -010 inches on tube exteriors
and .002 inches to -004 inches on tube interiors.

2.4.1.7 Erosion-Corrosion. Erosion-corrosion was covered briefly in a previous

section of the guide that addresses tnbe inlet-end erosion-corrosion. It is
generally defined as the accelerated deterioration of metal caused by the relative
movement between the fluid and the surface of the corroding metal.

2.4.1.8 Stress Corrosion. Stress corrosion can be defined as a catastrophic metal

failure promoted by the interaction of tensile stresses, time, and environment.
This metal failure has the appearance of a brittle mechanical fracture. Both inter-
granular and transgranular stress corrosion cracks have been observed. There is
inadequ~teknowledge of the failure mechanism due to the complexity of the interplay
of the failure-promoting elements. Since the nature of failure is catastrophic,
this has become one of the most feared and important corrosion problems today.
Stress-originated or -assisted cracks and failures caused by such mechanisms as cor-
rosion fatigue, hydrogen attack, embrittlement, cracking, etc., are included in the
stress-corrosion category. Chloride stress corrosion is of particular concern in
power plants using austenetic stainless steel. These steels are susceptible when
under stress in the presence of high temperature, oxygen, and chlorides (or other
halogen salts).

2.4.2 The Feedwater Heater Environment

For plant operations, it is particularly important to consider the environment. All
forms of corrosion are broadly defined in the literature as the degradation of
material by reaction with its environment. The degree of corrosion is dependent
upon the corrosion-resistant characteristics of the material and the corrosion-
contributing characteristics of the environment. The search for the characteristic
behavior of both material and environment is a never-ending and, at times, frus-
trating effort of gigantic proportion. The interaction of the two is subject to so
many variables that it is difficult to extrapolate controlled laboratory parameters
to actual operational behavior in the field. The corrosion-resistant characteris-
tics o f the various tube metals used in power plant applications are summarized in
Table 2-3. The estimates in that table originated in a utility that has studied
this problem for many years. Each of the common tube materials listed has been
rated to reflect its susceptibility to the eight forms of corrosion. The corrosion-
contributing characteristics in a power plant environment are also dependent upon
the type of unit, whether it is fossil (sub- or super-critical) or nuclear (pressur-
ized water reactor or boiling water reactor); the feedwater treatment utilized; and
the mode of operation. The fluid under consideration is demineralized water exist-
ing at the various phases from liquid to superheated steam in a temperature range of
1 0 0 9 - 1050°~, and in a pressure range from almost full vacuum to 5200 psig. Some
of the impurities that are present in feedwater are calcium and magnesium salts, to-
tally dissolved and suspended solids, as well as corrosion products and contaminants.
Silica, aluminum, iron, and copper deposits are commonly encountered, as well as
residuals of oxygen, hydrazine, ammonia, phosphate, hydroxide, and sulfite. Partic-
ularly during shutdown, startup, and transient operations, these impurities may
reach higher-than-monitored levels in certain zones of the system or exchanger by
reasons of heat transfer, fluid mechanics, two-phase flow, high-temperature concen-
tration, etc. Contingent on the specific type of unit, control limits are estab-
lished for boiler feedwater chemistry. There are two basic treatments used in the
industry: (1) the all-volatile treatment and (2) the coordinated-phosphate treat-
ment.

Vital to the control of the environment is the effectiveness of the water treatment.
The all-volatile treatment, also known as "zero solids," is a method of boiler water
treatment that entails the use of ammonia and/or hydrazine for pH conditioning and
dissolved oxygen scavenging. This method is used widely in the industry. Complete
reaction of hydrazine with oxygen produces nitrogen and water. As a byproduct of
this reaction, ammonium hydroxide is formed. Residuals of oxygen, ammonia, and
acid-forming gas such as C02 can also concentrate in certain zones of the system or
exchanger. The resulting environment is potentially hazardous to all
copper, copper-nickel, and nickel-copper alloys.

The coordinated-phosphate treatment is a boiler water chemistry control method

intended to produce water that will not concentrate caustic on evaporation and will
contain enough alkalinity to give corrosion protection. Amines such as hydrazine
are used for dissolved oxygen scavenging. Residuals of oxygen, ammonia, and other
gases are present, creating an environment that can become corrosive.

It is important to recognize that the chemistry of the water can vary considerably
throughout the feedwater system, For this reason the system should be monitored and
adjusted by chemical treatment at multiple points to ensure key components are not
,exposed to unhealthy conditions. A recent survey in one plant showed variations in
p~ from 7.2 to 10.4 at different points in the feedwater system.

Non-ferrous materials have been recognized as susceptible to corrosion attack in the

ammoniated environment typical of power plant applications. Type 304 stainless
steel has been considered by many as immune to attack in this environment, although
it has been widely recognized as being highly susceptible to chloride stress cor-
rosion. It should be recognized that the other halogens ( e . g . , fluorine, bromine,
iodine) can also be detrimental. On the surface, it would appear that none of the
halogens is present in power plant environments, which helps to explain the wide use
of type 303 stainless steel for tube material. Unfortunately, the possibility of
halogen contamination either by external sources such as welding fumes, lubricants,
PBC material, airborne salts, etc., or internally through circulating water excur-
sions into the feedwater system, system material contaminants, etc., is always pre-
sent. Recognizing the potential problem, it is essential that careful consideration
be given to the corrosion aspects in design, chemistry control, and operation of
FWHS .
2.4.3 Detection Of Water Chemistry-Related Problems
Problems associated with water chemistry can be detected, in many instances, by
the operational problems that are experienced. The first line of defense, of
course, is continuous monitoring of the limits set for the treatment in use at the
plant for the specific application. Tables 2-4 and 2-5 list typical examples of
these control limits and desired ranges. Table 2-4 shows control limits for vola-
tile (zero solids) treated units for drum-type boilers. The ppb for oxygen control
limits is stated in 5 ppb. Cation conductivity is less than - 8 micro-mhos. Feed-
water before and after treatment has indicated levels for silica, pH conductivity,
etc. The values at the economizer inlet are indicated so that any deviation from
the desired limits will be the first indication of the symptoms of possible prob-
lems with the M s . Table 2-5 gives similar information for low-level coordinated
phosphate-treated units. CAUTION: These tables are provided as illustrative ex-
amples only; they should not be used for any plant unless a careful system study of
all components in the boiler/feedwater/condensate systems shows these limits to be
compatible with the materials in those systems. A systems approach is always nec-
essary for chemistry control, recognizing that the actual chemistry will vary
throughout the system. The specification limits may be different for different
locations, provided that they can be maintained in a practical manner at the various
levels desired during system operation.

Lack of monitoring of these control limits to ensure that they remain in the design
range will, with t h e , result in tube failures of one kind or another. For in-
stance, if there were an ammonia attack, which starts the exfoliation deterioration
of the outside surfaces of copper and nickel tubing, such a failure may first be
indicated by difficulty in maintaining a stable liquid level even under steady load
operation. Upon inspection, it may be seen that the entrance to the drains cooling
zone may be severely blocked by deposits on the tubes as shown in Figure 2-19.
Failure of copper-nickel tubes by exfoliation may not be detected immediately but
will be quite apparent with time as shown in Figure 2-20. This condition might
well be aggravated by poor venting practices that allow a concentration of gases or
 Table 2-4

TYPICAL* CONTROL LIMITS FOR VOLATILE (ZERO SOLIDS)

TREATED UNITS (DRUM-TYPE BOILERS)

Control Limits Desired Range

Primary Condensate

Oxygen (Max.) P P ~ 14.0 a

Conductivity Aft. Exch. mmhos (0.8

Economizer Inlet

Conductivity Bef. Exch. mmhos --

PH 8.7 - 9.2
Hydrazine P P ~ 5.0 - 15.0
Oxygen P P ~ Max. 5.0
Copper PP~
Iron PPb - -

Boiler Water

mmhos --
mmhos Max. 3.5
PPm Max. 0.25
8.5 - 9.0
PPm Zero

PPb Max. 25.0C

PPm Max. 0.40

Make-Up (Externally
Treated Supply)

Silica ppb Max. 10.0 3.0 - 5.0

Conductivity mmhos 1.0 0.5

*Note: These are not recommended limits; they are examples for illustrative pur-
poses only.

a0.6 for brackish cooling-water supplies.

bO. 2 to 0.4 for non-brakish cooling-water supplies.
C~uringstart-up.
 T a b l e 2-5

T Y P I C A L * CONTROL L I M I T S FOR LOW-LEVEL COORDINATED

PHOSPHATE-TREATED UNITS

-- - --- .Limits
Control -. Deslred Range

Primary
--. --
.
Condensate

Oxygen (Max.) PP~

Conductivity Aft. Exch. mmhos

Before Treatment
Silica
pH
Conductivity Bef. Exch. mmhos
Conductivity Aft. Exch. mmhos

After Treatment
pH
Ammon ia
Hydrazine

Deaerator Out=

Oxygen

Economizer Inlet

Conductivity Bef. Exch. mmhos --

Silica PP~ --
PH 8.6 - 9.0
Oxygen PP~ Max. 5.0
Hydrazine PPb 5.0 - 15.0
copper --
P P ~
Iron --
PPb

Boiler Water

Conductivity Bef. Exch. mmhos --

Silica PPm Max. 0 . 2 ~ ~
Phosphate as PO4 PPm Max. 5.0
Hydroxide as OH PPm Max. 2.0
PH 9.5 - 10.0

Saturated Steam

Silica Max. 2 5 . 0 ~
Ammonia Max. 0.4

Make-Up (Externally
Treated Supplyl

Silica PPb Max. 10.0

Conductivity mrnhos <1.0

*Note: These are lot recommended limits; they are examples for illustrative
purposes only.

a ~ o t a lsuspended solids by Millipore filter usually.

b ~ t a t-up
r maximsm.
Fiqura X-Za++ GxfoifatLsn O f Capper-Hickel Tubing

2-57
ammonia in selected zones. An inspection of the vent system and the position of
the valves and the orifices may indicate if problems can be expected in this region.

Indications of high oxygen levels can be a warning of vulnerability to stress corro-

sion. In the presence of oxygen, heat, stress, and halogens, some steels (especial-
ly austenitic stainless steels) experience rapid stress corrosion cracking. Halo-
gens can enter the FWH when it is open for maintenance (e-g., from welding fumes,
airborne chloride salts). A photograph of a tube failures from stress corrosion is
shown in Figure 2-21.

2.4.4 Operations And Maintenance

Lack of proper chemical control is likely to degrade the performance of the FWHs,
the operation of the units, and eventually the economics of the power plant. There-
fore, the focus of operations and maintenance efforts must be to:

Ensure that proper chemistry limits are established, monitored, and main-
tained ;

.
Inspect for signs of corrosion problems as indicated above; and

~eterminethe cause of corrosion problems and ensure that remedial ac-

tions is proper for the design of the entire feedwater system, not just
for the FWH.

Figure 2-21. Tube Failure From Stress Corrosion

2-58
The above actions must be carefully tailored to the individual plant and may re-
quire expert assistance from feedwater system corrosion experts as well as from
vendor representatives. Two specific areas that are often neglected need special
emphasis here because recent field experience shows that many utilities are neg-
lecting them without full appreciation of the corrosion damage likely to result in
their FWHs. They are the blanketing and venting of FWHs to prevent corrosion from
oxygen and non-condensibles that promote corrosive attack. The areas are addressed
in the following two subsections.

2.4.4.1 Blanketing Of Feedwater Heaters. When a utility purchases a new plant or

a replacement FWH, the specifications are very detailed in identifying the cleanli-
ness factors, the technique of preparation for shipment, and the pressurization of
the shell with an inert gas, usually nitrogen. Such blanketing with inert gas is
maintained through the delivery and short-term storage, but when the equipment is
ready for installation, the persons responsible for the installation often do not
realize the importance of maintaining this protection against corrosion, Frequent-
ly the caps are removed from all nozzle connections, releasing the nitrogen blanket-
ing only to have the FWH sit for weeks prior to connection of the piping. Even
after the piping is connected, very little care is taken to prevent contamination
from the air, especially moisture that filters into equipment that has been stand-
ing at rest for extended periods of time. The utility should be concerned about
the care that the equipment is being given through the point of operation. Even
after the unit becomes operational, it is quite possible that special precautions
are needed to protect the FWHs against exposure to atmospheric conditions each time
the unit comes off the line. Depending upon the materials used in the EWHs, blan-
keting with inert gas or with water containing a rust inhibitor may be necessary.
Such measures apply to tubes that are susceptible to corrosion (especially carbon
steel) and also to support structures such as support plates, which are often made
of industrial-grade carbon steel. The consequences of tube failure from corrosion
are obvious. However, it is less obvious to many operators that corrosion of tube-
support plates is also a dangerous condition in that the designed tube-to-support-
plate clearances will be altered, promoting tube failure from vibration as well as
from corrosion. Recognizing the importance of tube-support plates ahd the precise
configuration that they need to maintain to do their job, some utilities have re-
cently decided to use stainless steel support structures for new FWHs (especially
for vertical FWHs where erosion-corrosion of FWH internal supports has been a sig-
nificant problem) .

The manufacturer's instruction book provided with each FWH should include specific
instructions on blanketing when needed. The utility should ensure that such
2-59
instructions are available to the operators and are specifically applicable to the
FWH(s) in question. If such guidance is lacking, it should be obtained from the
vendor and from other feedwater systems' chemistry experts as necessary. Once the
necessary blanketing needs are known, they should be clearly promulgated in the
operating instructions and meticulously followed despite the inconvenience during
short outages. This point has been emphasized here because a recent survey of op-
erating coal plants revealed that many operators are aware of the blanketing re-
quirements for their EWHs but consider them optional, rather than mandatory. A
typical comment was to the effect that "our procedures call for nitrogen blanketing
but usually we are too busy in short outages." This observation suggests that man-
agement should be more involved in these plants. If operating requirements are
unreasonable, they should be reviewed and improved. Until they are properly
changed, the requirements should be mandatory and should be followed at all times.

2.4.4.2 Venting Of Feedwater Heaters. It is important to ensure proper venting of

both the FWH shell and the FWH channel. The channel venting requirements are easily
understood, as it is imperative to free the feedwater side of any pockets of air
and non-condensibles to maintain proper chemistry of the feedwater and to avoid
degradation of heat transfer. During filling and startup, venting of the feedwater
side of the channel is usually attained through vents directly to the atmosphere
since the feedwater side is above atmospheric pressure; however, venting to the
deaerator or condenser is also an accepted practice.

The importance of venting the shell side cannot be overemphasized. On the shell
side, non-condensibles of the various kinds (e.g., oxygen, ammonia) can signifi-
cantly reduce the heat transfer rate as well as contribute to corrosion attack of
tubes and supports. Even stainless steel is not immune to corrosion attack if
chlorides are present with the oxygen. According to most manufacturers and the HE1
standard for closed FWHs, it is necessary that all FWHs be vented continuously
through the vent connections provided. Minimum provisions should be made for vent-
ing 1/2 of 1% of the vapor entering the shell.

A proper venting system should be set up starting with the venting internals in the
FWH shell. It is strongly recommended that internal air manifolds or channels be
provided for all types of FWHs. Such internal full-length manifolds or channels of
various types are usually provided by the manufacturer; however, if they are not,
they should be requested by the users. Providing a venting system connected to the
air manifolds will assure that the venting of the FWH shell can be accomplished in
a reasonably short period of time.
There are basically two types of vents: the startup vents and the continuous vents.
Sometimes vents serve a dual purpose and are so identified in the drawings as
"startup and continuous vents." Startup vents purge the shell of all air and non-
condensibles during the initial phase of the cycle. During plant startup, venting
to the atmosphere is satisfactory when FWHs are operated above atmospheric pressures
at all loads as long as the proper sonic conditions can be developed across the
orifice. If the FWHs are not operated above atmospheric pressure, the startup
vents should be connected to lower-pressure equipment in the system (surface con-
densers or deaerators) that is capable of removing non-condensible gases. Acces-
sible valves should be provided in the lines to close these vents after startup.
As a general rule, vents should not be cascaded to other FWHs because doing so may
lead to the accumulation of harmful gasses that will cause severe corrosion to FWH
internals. This recommendation is made by HE1 (Standards for Closed Feedwater
Heaters, 3rd edition, p. 8.) and is supported by the experience of seasoned main-
tenance managers and FWH specialists who have witnessed severe damage to FWH trains
with cascaded vents. However, one large utility reports successful experience with
cascaded vents and advises that they can be used (with some thermal benefits) if
careful attention is paid to the following points.

Ensure that the vent system is designed to vent 1/2 of 1% of the entering
steam plus 100% of the mass of any cascaded vents through an orifice that
has been properly calibrated for this purpose.

Use venting designs that vent the full length of the tube bundle.

Ensure that operators pay attention to maintaining the proper venting

rates (check the venting rate and condition of orifices as routine
preventive maintenance) .
Give careful consideration to total FWH system metallurgical and chem-
istry considerations. This will. normally rule out the use of cascaded
vents in systems with carbon steel or CuNi tubes and probably admiralty
and Monel designs, as well. Stainless steel systems (especially with
stainless steel support plates and baffles) are relatively safe if the
above precautions are taken.

Continuous vents are provided for the purpose of withdrawing non-condensible gases
from the shell space during operation. As mentioned above, it is usually necessary
that these vent lines be individually connected to the steam surface condenser or
the deaerator (rather than cascaded to lower-stage FWHs). It is suggested that
continuous vent lines be open at startup along with the startup vents so that vent-
ing of the shell space can take place quickly. Continuous vent lines should be
provided with orifices to limit and control the amount of steam vented together
with the non-condensibles to the lower-pressure deaerator or steam surface
condenser. These orifices should be located outside the FWH; however, some manu-
facturers provide internal orifices that are located within the FWH shell. Such a
design will lead to problems that are very difficult to trace, should the orifices
become plugged or damaged. It is a mistake to accept such a design that cannot be
properly inspected and maintained through the intended life of the FWH.

An arrangement similar to that shown in Figure 2-22 is recommended. This arrange-

ment allows the bypass valve to be opened at startup, thus gaining the benefit of
the full capacity of the line for fast evacuation of the shell. When the bypass
valve is closed during normal operation, the orifice controls the amount of steam
being vented. Note that this arrangement shows isolation valves on each side of
the orifice to permit inspection and cleaning of the orifice while the FWH is op-
erational. Threaded and flanged joints are convenient for such maintenance; how-
ever, they can also become ingress points for non-condensible gases in lines oper-
ating under vacuum conditions. Some utilities that have welded versus threaded
joints in the orifice piping have found it necessary to cut these lines as a rou-
tine preventive maintenance action to inspect and clean the vent orifices. Locating
the orifice as shown is considered preferable to having its position switched with
that of the bypass valve. Experience has shown that if the orifice is Located in
the straight-line path of the venting vapor, it may become clogged by scale or

Continuous Vent Orifice

F\w Shell 1

-isolation Valves* 1 I I
-
I I ___)

To Deaerator
Or Condenser
/
Vent Line
Startup Bypass Valve
(Locpted Near Second
Tee To Provide Crud
Collection Leg Up-
'/ stream of Valve)

Figure 2-22. A Continuous Vent Orifice With Startup Bypass Valve. (*Isolation
valves permit inspection and maintenance during system operation. This section
of line should be higher than the bypass valve line to avoid water seal or crud
trap. )
other particles during startup because such heavy particles will tend to follow a
straight-line path even with the bypass valve open.

For proper operation of equipment, it is important that all vent lines be as free
of bends and restrictions as possible. Sharp bends and low spots without traps add
to the possibility of foreign materials getting lodged in the line and restricting
flow.

It is advisable to plan piping arrangements so that all maintenance and by-pass

valves, instruments, and controls are easily accessible. Piping should be designed
so that joints and fittings are disturbed as little as possible when FWHs are dis-
mantled or repaired. Any vent lines from a FWH to either the deaerator or the
condenser should also be designed such that there is no possibility of a water seal
being generated by the cooling-off effect as this vented steam/air mixture moves to
the low-pressure point. Should such a condition take place, the effectiveness of a
vent line is practically eliminated, Too often the installation of these vent
lines is left to a plumber's discretion, and not realizing that problems could set
in, he allows a dip somewhere in the line, which will generate such a seal.

It is important to make sure that the vent lines are, in fact, connected and that
they are properly utilized during operation. At a Northeast utility, a FWH that
had a severe case of exfoliation was returned to the shop. upon examination, it
was discovered that all vents were still plugged as originally shipped to the util-
ity. The vents were never functional, resulting in the failure of the FWH in a
short period of time.

2.4.5 Chemistry Considerations Related To Design And System ~odifications

The reader is reminded that the typical water chemistry control limits shown in
Tables 2-4 and 2-5 are basically oriented to the boiler itself. Although most util-
ities and architect/engineers have historically been concerned about details related
to turbine generators and boilers, too often the selection of the balance-of-plant
equipment has been based upon low acquisition cost, rather than on practical engi-
neering. The major reason that carbon steel tubes became popular with increasing
plant pressures in the 1960s was that they were less expensive than other alterna-
tives at that time. However, that was the case regarding only the HP FWHS. The
cost of admiralty tubing was usually less than carbon steel tubing for LP FWH use;
therefore, many users purchased a combination of carbon steel in HP FWHs and ad-
miralty in LP FWHs. Apparently the selection process did not recognize the fact
that the water chemistry had to be different for those two materials or one of them
would have problems. Since the boiler dictated water chemistry in a plant because
of its high costs, many units began having problems with the admiralty-tubed LP FWHs
because the water chemistry was more adapted to the carbon steel tubes in the boil-
er. For long life, the carbon steel tube needed a pH in the range of 9.2 to 9.6,
which was very aggressive toward the admiralty tubes in the LP FWHs. Some utilities
tried to arrive at a compromised pH level, only to find that this led to more severe
damage in the HP FWHs; hence, the problems and frustrations continued. The lessons
here are valid today: it is essential to take a sound systems engineering approach
to ensure that the metals and welds throughout the boiler, feedwater, and condensate
systems are compatible with the chemistry parameters throughout those systems.

The point of admission and method of admission of chemicals for water treatment must
also be looked at as possible problems, should the concentrations become heavier at
one point in a cycle as compared to another. This would be of special concern if
chemical additives are being admitted in a batch-type fashion, rather than at a
continuous rate (varied or fixed). ~f it is absolutely necessary for high concen-
trations of any additive to be present in any specific localized area, be sure that
it is compatible with the materials it will be contacting. In making a tube selec-
tion for a FWH (whether it is a replacement or a new unit), all of these factors
need to be taken into account; if they are not, the likelihood of encountering cor-
rosion damage may be unacceptably high.

Many problems in the older plants today relate to the fact that a water treatment
system was changed from a phosphate to an all-volatile treatment system without
proper consideration of the potential damage that could be done to the existing tube
materials in the condensers and the EWHs. If it was absolutely necessary to change
to a system that added significant amounts of ammonia, the water chemists and the
plant engineers should have considered all aspects of the change carefully. At a
minimum, it would have been appropriate to investigate methods of venting the FWHs
and condensers and to develop some means of protective lay-up of this equipment
during plant outages. Whenever the moist surface (internal or external) of a tube
is given an opportunity to dry in an atmosphere where existing contaminants will
first dissolve in that moisture and then dry out as some corrosive salt, the plant
is inviting problems.

About the same time that many plants changed their water chemistry, they also began
to operate on a cycling system, rather than the full load for which the unit was
designed. When a plant is started up several times a month, as compared to once a
year, the operators have a strong tendency to neglect their start-up vents. The
resultant buildup of non-condensibles adds further to the problem of corrosion with-
in the system. The point here is to understand that as the operating characteris-
tics of a plant change, the designed chemistry control limits and procedures may
become inadequate. Therefore, it is critical that the system be completely re-
viewed. In this case, evaluating the chemistry effects on the boiler and turbine
alone is not enough; the steam, condensate, and feedwater sub-systems must be con-
sidered as integral, coordinated parts of the overall system.

Having experienced the problems outlined above, some power plant engineers are be-
ginning to consider sophisticated and expensive materials such as Inconel and In-
coloy 400. It is possible that such expense may not be necessary in many cases if a
change in operating procedure were considered that might allow some less costly
material to be used.

One of the materials that is gaining more acceptability because of its higher re-
sistance to stress corrosion problems and good resistance to erosion is type 439
stainless steel. Recent experience suggests that this material is economical for LP
E'WHs. In addition, it appears suitable for replacing carbon steel and copper alloy
tubes in LP FWHs without requiring excessive increases in shell diameters or FWH
lengths. It has also been utilized in some HP EWHs; however, there is inadequate
long-term performance data available to make further comment at this time.

2.5 STEAM IMPINGEMENT

2.5.1 Overview
Steam impingement damage usually refers to shell-side tube damage caused by the
impact of extraction steam flowing against the tubes. The presence of water drop-
lets in high-velocity steam results in a severe eroding action that can be consid-
ered similar to sandblasting. Although tube damage is the primary concern, often
the steam impingement action causes damage to other structures including the shell
itself. Such problems are frequently encountered in condensing zone admission FWHs
in the form of support structure degradation and shell damage. Severe degradation
of this nature has been experienced in vertical FWHs designed with undersized dome
areas and with no dam strips on support plates.

Six of the most common causes of steam impingement damage are:

1. Wet steam conditions in the desuperheater zone due to:

-- droplets present in the incoming steam;

-- condensation occurring within the desuperheating zone;
 -- a tube leak; and
-- back flow of condensate into the desuperheating zone.

2. Inadequate design of the impingement plate;

3. An impingement plate breaks loose;

4. Dry steam leaves the desuperheater zone and enters the moist condensing
zone at excessive velocities;

5. Wet or dry steam admission into condensing zone, compounded by backflow

of condensate into steam dome in vertical W H s ; and

6. Impingement of solid particles entrained in the extraction steam.

Further discussion of these likely causes of steam impingement damage is presented

in EPRI Report CS-1776, "Failure Cause Analysis - Feedwater Heaters." That report
also presents a summary of recent survey results showing the frequency with which
failures of this type were reported by the utilities.

The damaging results of steam impingement action are shown dramatically in the
following photographs:

Figures 2-23 and 2-24: Tube destruction from steam impingement at the de-
superheater exit of a three-zone FWH.

Figure 2-25: Solid particle or moisture droplet impingement attack on small

impact plates and nearby tubes.

Figure 2 - 2 6 : Impingement erosion of the shell itself with some erosion pits
penetrating 50% of a 5/8-inch shell. (Complete shell penetration has occurred
in some other cases similar to this one.)

Figure 2-27: A HP FWH shell that has been cut to gain access to a fallen
impact plate. The plate was quite small and was improperly welded in the
desuperheating zone.

Figure 2-28: Impingement damage to the tubes that were exposed after the
impact plate in the figure became dislodged.

2.5.2 Symptoms Of Impingement Attack

An increase in noise levels at the FWH (other than the vibration noises described
earlier) may provide some warning of possible impingement attack, However, such
noises can be difficult to notice in the noisy environment of typical plant opera-
tions. Accordingly, the first real symptoms may result from visual observations
during maintenance inspections or from actual tube failures. Even in the case of
tube failure, it will be necessary to locate the areas of tube failures before
impingement may be diagnosed as the cause. (See Section 2.5.4, "Preventive And
Corrective Maintenance.")

Actual experience has shown that most impingement problems are discovered only
after a tube or tubes have failed and water level control becomes very difficult or
impossible. Visual inspection for location of tube failure will then verify that
it is in an area where an impact plate should be or in an area of possible high
velocity.

2.5.3 Operational Practices To Avoid Or Mitigate Steam Impingement Damage

As plants grow older, the possibility increases that abnormal operation will be
experienced on some FWHs while others are out of service. The resulting overload
may lead to abnormal steam velocities in the desuperheating and/or condensing zones
or abnormal condensate velocities in drains coolers. FWHs designed many years ago
probably did not include allowances for this type of operation and may be more
susceptible to impingement damage than those of more recent design. It is possible
that the operator may be able to adjust operational practices and avoid damage if
he is thoroughly aware of these problems and his plant's limitations. Accordingly,
it would be ad'visable for a utility to review overload potentials and the design of
all of its FGJHs relative to their ability to withstand the abnormal conditions that
may be imposed today. This may lead to modifying procedures such that the load is
reduced to specified levels when an upstream FWH is out of service, to avoid damage
on equipment downstream. The main concern is to be certain that excessive flows
are not introduced that would cause damage. As the plant begins to operate in ways
that were not taken into account during the original design stage, it is recom-
mended that the FWH manufacturer be contacted, where possible, for his evaluation
of potential problems. If that original supplier is no longer available, a FWH
consultant or engineering representatives from other power companies could be of
assistance. (See Section 3 for more detailed comments.)

Ar:other area wherein operatio~alprocedures are very important is that of plant

start-up. An example involving sensitivity to impingement would be that of the
start-up of a HP E'WH that incorporates a desuperheating zone in a once-through
fossil plant. Although less likely to be a problem in drum-type boiler systems,
there have been many occasions in super-critical and sub-critical once-through
applications where the steam circulating through the cycle was admitted to the HP
FWH earlier than it should have been. As a once-through plant starts up, a sig-
nificant amount of time is required for the water, as it recirculates through the
system, to come up to saturation temperature and then more to get the steam to the
superheated levels identified in the designed heat balance. Due to impatience on
the part of some operators, the steam has sometimes been admitted to the HP E'WHs
earlier than it should have been, thereby admitting steam at conditions other than
those used in the design of the FWH. While the desuperheating zone o f a HP FWH is
normally designed such that the steam leaving that zone (at design conditions)
still contains a small amount of superheat, such a condition is impossible when the
entrance steam does not contain the degree of superheat required. This means that
droplets begin to form within the desuperheating zone itself, creating impingement
problems that become very severe, especially in those cases where carbon steel
tubing is used. Again, the solution here is to cover this problem clearly in the
plant operating procedures and ensure that the operators appreciate the hazards of
impatience in following those procedures.

2.5.4 Preventive And Corrective Maintenance

Steam impingement phenomena are present in numerous installations throughout the
country. The ability to detect these conditions in time is important and necessary
to avoid costly failures. Basic maintenance inspection procedures of a preventive
nature can be devised within a utility or within an operating plant to inspect FWHs
early in their operational life and periodically thereafter. Therefore, the abil-
ity to open up the FWHs and gain access quickly and efficiently is very important
and will encourage plant personnel to investigate problems or suspicions before
damage is out of hand. The best way, of course, is by visual observation, either
by direct access, by boroscope, or by opening windows in the shell, etc.* Main-
tenance personal must acquire the habit of performing these tasks routinely and
with proper precautions, to observe the phenomenon as it starts and to correct it
at the start. In the case of a missing or loose impact plate, for instance, it may
have been possible to gain access to the area for repair and to resolve the problem
several years ago rather than allowing it to continue and, eventually, to destroy
the FWB.

Some utilities have begun a practice of checking all or most of their FWH tubes by
eddy-current testing at each annual outage. In this way, a wear pattern can be
detected from year to year. Direct impingement, however, can cause problems very
quickly, in which case loss of water level control will probably be the first sign
of a problem. Another means of checking for excessive thinning of tube walls is to
conduct hydrostatic pressure tests on individual tubes during the first general

"Previous caution to advise insurance representatives and state pressure vessel

inspectors applies here, also, if the shell is cut.
maintenance outage and periodically thereafter when in doubt about the tube integ-
rity. When checking specifically for impingement attack, one or two peripheral
rows should be tested as a minimum. Special test equipment is now available in the
service and consulting industry to perform tube hydrotesting expeditiously. While
an eddy-current test of tubes might be quicker, there is some concern about the
accuracy of such a one-time test on a worn EWH, and this concern will vary with the
tube material and experience of the test crew. If an eddy-current test is done
that indicates that a significant number of tubes should be plugged, the FWH manu-
facturer should be consulted and/or a pressure test be performed on those tubes
before plugging.

When access is available to the FWH internals for corrective maintenance, it is

sometimes possible to eliminate some of the conditions leading to excess velocities
and impingement damage. For example, it may be possible to improve the distribu-
tion area within the shell by scalloping support plates and thereby removing some
of the restriction between the shell and the tube bundle. Figure 2-4 is a picture
of such a corrective measure for this purpose. In vertical FWHs, scalloping needs
to be accompanied by dam stripping to preclude backflow of condensate into steam
domes.

Of course, the most practical first step in preventive maintenance is a complete

inspection at the manufacturer's plant just prior to the bundle insertion into the
shell. At that time, it is possible to check the quality of impact plate attach-
ment and to be certain that an impact plate has been attached in the area of every
steam and drains inlet connection.

2.5.5 System Design And Modifications To Reduce Impingement Damage

Two principal areas already mentioned that influence impingement in design and
modification activities are those related to impact plates and to steam distribu-
tion within the desuperheating and condensing zones.

Relative to the design of impact plates, HEI1s Standard For Closed Feedwater Heaters
refers to 45O impingement as a minimum standard. The purchaser must-be certain
that he clearly identifies his concern on this matter, recognizing that some ex-
perienced engineers prefer a wider angle of impingement protection. Furthermore,
the user must identify the normal maximum flow rates for steam and drains inlets
and also any overload conditions that could take place due to variations in op-
erating modes.
Although many p e r s o n s t o d a y r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e n o z z l e s s h o u l d b e s i z e d f o r an o v e r -
load condition, it is r a r e f o r a u s e r t o i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e d e s i g n o f t h e i n t e r n a l
flow p a s s a g e s and t h e impact p l a t e s h o u l d a l s o t a k e t h e s e o v e r l o a d c o n d i t i o n s i n t o
account. One d o e s n o t s o l v e a problem by making a n o z z l e l a r g e r and t h e n having a
r e s t r i c t e d a r e a between t h e impingement p l a t e and s h e l l ID, e t c . , once t h e f l o w
enters the shell.

A vendor s h o u l d a l s o be r e q u i r e d t o c a r e f u l l y i d e n t i f y t h e method by which an i m -

p a c t p l a t e w i l l b e i n s t a l l e d i n t h e c l o s e d FWH t o a s s u r e t h a t t h i s p l a t e w i l l n o t
dislodge i t s e l f a f t e r a s h o r t period of operation. V a r i o u s FWHs have d i f f e r e n t
d e s i g n s o f impact p l a t e s ; t h e m o s t rugged would i n c l u d e a s t r e n g t h weld t o a t l e a s t
o n e , b u t p r e f e r a b l y two, s u p p o r t p l a t e s o r s u p p o r t b a r s . Tack welding o r minimal
f i l l e t weld d e s i g n s s h o u l d be a v o i d e d . Damage w i l l o c c u r soon a f t e r a p l a t e i s
dislodged. I£ t h i s happens w i t h i n f i v e y e a r s o f s t a r t - u p , equipment l i f e w i l l be
severely shortened. Steam impingement d i r e c t l y on t h e t u b e s w i l l c r e a t e damage,
and s i g n i f i c a n t amounts o f s u r f a c e c a n b e l o s t from t h i s f a i l u r e i n a s h o r t t i m e .

A problem t h a t h a s been e x p e r i e n c e d by p r o b a b l y e v e r y FWH m a n u f a c t u r e r o v e r t h e

y e a r s (and o n e t h a t c a n b e s o l v e d o n l y by p r o p e r q u a l i t y c o n t r o l d u r i n g manufac-
t u r e ) is t h a t of l e a v i n g an impact p l a t e o u t of t h e FWH; damage t h e n o c c u r s w i t h i n
weeks a f t e r t h e p l a n t s t a r t s up. Sometimes t h i s happens when a n e n g i n e e r f o r t h e
u t i l i t y changes t h e l o c a t i o n o f a nozzle o r adds a nozzle l a t e i n t h e design s t a g e ,
such t h a t a m a n u f a c t u r e r may r e l o c a t e t h e n o z z l e on t h e s h e l l , b u t t h e d e t a i l s of
t h e i n t e r n a l components d o n o t g e t t h e p r o p e r a t t e n t i o n and a c o n n e c t i o n f o r steam
o r d r a i n s a d m i s s i o n is p u t on a s h e l l w i t h o u t p r e l o c a t i n g t h e impact p l a t e t o pro-
tect t h e t u b e s . I t is n e c e s s a r y t o e n s u r e p r o p e r c o o r d i n a t i o n and i n s p e c t i o n t o
p r e v e n t t h i s t y p e of f a i l u r e .

I n v e r t i c a l FWHs i f c o n d e n s a t e l e a k s i n t o t h e d e s u p e r h e a t i n q zone it w i l l be p i c k e d
u p by t h e r i s i n g s t e a m and c a r r i e d w i t h damaging f o r c e a g a i n s t t h e F W H ' s i n t e r n a l s .
To a v o i d t h i s problem o n e u t i l i t y i n s i s t s upon f u l l p e n e t r a t i o n welds f o r t h e de-
s u p e r h e a t i n g zone p l a t i n g and f o r t h e i n l e t steam p e n e t r a t i o n j o i n t s . After fabri-
c a t i o n , t h e j o i n t s a r e w a t e r t e s t e d i n t h e shop t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e y d o n o t l e a k .

I n t o d a y ' s atmosphere where s o many o l d e r p l a n t s a r e b e i n g r e n o v a t e d and r e t r o f i t -

t e d r a t h e r t h a n new p l a n t s b e i n g b u i l t , t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r s t e a m impingement prob-
l e m s becomes q u i t e s e v e r e f o r t h o s e u t i l i t i e s t h a t p r e f e r changing o u t t u b e bun-
d l e s , r a t h e r t h a n a c o m p l e t e FWH. For example, when t h e t u b e m a t e r i a l is changed
from a c o p p e r a l l o y t o a s t a i n l e s s s t e e l , i t is l i k e l y t h a t t h e r e q u i r e d s u r f a c e t o
maintain existing heat transfer characteristics will require a larger diameter
bundle that will mean a tighter relationship of bundle to shell. A reputable FWH
manufacturer should identify a potential problem in this regard, but when the matter
comes down to obtaining or losing an order, it is possible that this consideration
may get less attention than it deserves. Therefore, the utility engineer must be
concerned about introducing problems to his FWN from this type of modification to
the tube bundle. Specifically, he should:

. Review the design of the proposed modification with careful focus on

steam flow paths and clearances;

. Insist that the vendor show how these clearances have been determined
adequate for. abnormal as well as normal conditions;

Consider scalloping and dam stripping or other design changes of the

support plates to prevent excessive velocities between the bundle and the
shell;

Consider increasing the dimensions of the impact plates if the surfaces

.
of tubes in that area indicate excessive polishing; and

Consider adding shell liner(s) or gutter strips on impingement plates in

areas where shell wear is being experienced from ricochet off impact
plates.

TOO often, the apparent savings expected from keeping the existing shell are more
than offset by future problems when the tube bundle-to-shell relationship is too
tight. When these problems show up after the FWH warranty runs out, the frustra-
tions become even worse.

2.6 PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH TUBE PLUGGING

2.6.1 Overview
The plugging of tube leaks is a common corrective maintenance action used to keep
FWHs operational after the failure of one or more tubes. Unfortunately, too often
the tube plugging is only a temporary correction. In fact, there has been so much
difficulty in tube-plugging maintenance that these activities have become a major
source of additional FWH problems. This section of the guide outlines the basic
techniques used today, including their principal limitations, and addresses the
major problems encountered in tube-plugging maintenance. Potential solutions are
suggested where applicable. The main theme is the need for an organized approach to
tube plugging, following recent, updated procedures that are based on sound techni-
cal analysis and professional expertise. Until a utility's management recognizes
the need for developing and following the optimum tube-plugging procedures, it will
be difficult to achieve permanent repairs and reliable FWH performance. The material
presented here is largely a compendium of the individual experiences of the authors.
It also draws heavily upon previous EPRI workshops and surveys in this area.

The principal reference here is EPXI Report CS-1776, "Failure Cause Analysis - Feed-
water Heaters," which has already been distributed by EPRI to the utilities. Sec-
tion 8.0 and Appendix D of that report are devoted to tube-plugging techniques and
problems and should be studied carefully by utility personnel who are responsible
for improvements in this area. (Excerpts from EPRI Report CS-1776 have been used in
the following subsections where they are applicable to the scope of this guide.)

2.6.2 ~ube-Plugging Techniques And Limitations

2.6.2.1 Tapered Plug. Tapered plugs are often used in low- and intermediate-pres-
sure heat exchangers. Their main deficiency is man-made (i.e., the plugs are driven
into the tubesheet with such force that tubesheet ligaments have a tendency to
crack). Failure may also occur if reaming done prior to plugging fails to achieve a
true, round hole. (This is also a problem with the various types of welded plugs.)
A variation of the tapered plug called the "Eliott plug" has a shouldered collar
around the tapered pin. It is used primarily for temporary repairs in LP FWHs;
however, leakage problems have led to reduced utilization of this design. Another
variation, sometimes called "pop-a-plug" has serrations around the outer surface of
the collar, tending to reduce leakage by that path.

2.6.2.2 Roller-Expanded Plug. Roller-expanded plugs are in the form of a blind

nipple, obtained by machining bar stock or by plug welding an end of a section of
tubing. To seal a tube, the plug is expanded by rolling in place with mechanical
rollers. Such plugs have been used primarily for LP and IP FWHs. Some utilities
have also used them in HP FWHs inside the tubesheet, in addition to the welded plugs
at the face of the tubesheet, when cracked or "worm-holed1' ligaments exist.

2.6.2.3 Welded Plug. The use of welded plugs (shaped to allow expansion), when
carefully welded at the edge to sound, clean base metal, has resulted in trouble-
free repairs. However, welded plugs or clusters of plugs that formed massive, rigid
welded areas have often developed peripheral weld or ligament cracks. The hollow
"thimblew-shaped welded plug is fabored by some experts because of its ability to
withstand many cycles of thermal expansion and contraction without cracking.

2.6.2.4 ~xplosion-WeldedPlug. This is a cartridge-like plug that is detonated

inside a tube or tubesheet to form a metallurgical bond along a large area. This
method is simple and effective, but requires specially trained and licensed
personnel. One utility reports that only one type of plug material (nickel) is
required to plug any tube of tubesheet material, and strong bonds are obtained even
between dissimilar metals. However, the reaming of adjacent tube-weld roll-over to
permit the insertion of protective, tapered, half-round rods has caused secondary
tube failures in some instances when this method was used on U.S. FWH designs.

2.6.2.5 Seal Plug. Plugs having various types of packing or seal material have
been used for years for plugging condenser tubes and LP and IP FWH tubes. Although
some of these plugs have performed satisfactorily for long periods (several years),
this technique is more often considered a temporary repair to be followed by per-
manent plugging when more time and proper conditions are available, However, with
the latest technological advances in this field, seal plugs capable of withstanding
up to 5,000 psig and 600°~ have been used successfully in HP FWHs. Their use as
permanent plugs when tubesheet ligaments are deteriorated is worthy of serious
consideration.

2.6.3 Principal Problems And Potential Solutions

2.6.3.1 Short-Term Expediency. Too often there is excessive pressure on the opera-
tors and maintenance personnel to plug the leaking tube(s) quickly so that the FWH
can be returned to service, especially if the entire plant must remain shut down for
the repairs.

The desire to minimize the downtime of a baseloaded plant is commendable, but rush-
ing the maintenance actions to the extent that there is inadequate time for proper
troubleshooting, analysis, and repair is false economy. Not only will the repair be
of marginal reliability, but the causes of the initial tube leaks will probably
remain obscured until it is too late to save the FWH. The result is usually a story
of repeated failures, temporary fixes, no clear diagnosis, and finally urgent re-
placement of a FWH that might have had a reasonable life with proper maintenance
actions.

Recommendations to avoid this common shortcoming are:

. use rapid, temporary plugging measures only when there is sound justifi-
cation (e.g., to keep a FWH operational for a few more days before a
scheduled outage). Such a decision may be reasonable if it is based on a
sound understanding of the FWH and its apparent problems and if the prop-
er troubleshooting, diagnosis, and repair follow in a well-planned
manner.

Before the "permanent" repairs are attempted, ensure that the location
of the leak(s) is determined and documented. An air test of the shell
 side to 15-30 psi will permit a good soap test of the tubes and tubesheet.
Bubbles on the tube ID indicate a tube leak, whereas bubbles between the
tube and the ligament indicate a leakage path around the tube, through
the tubesheet. The approach to plugging will, of course, be different
depending upon these determinations,

Be sure to determine (and document) the location of the leak along the
length of the tube as well as which leg (of a U-tube). This information
is essential for analyzing the probable cause(s) of the tube leaks. Var-
ious types of tube-leak location detectors are available on the market
today. An alternative method used by some utilities on vertical FWHs is
to rig a length of transparent plastic tubing up along the outside of the
shell and connect its lower end to a shellside fitting. Then the shell
can be vented and filled with water until leakage is observed through the
faulty tube. ~f the water filling is stopped at that point, the level in
the tubing will stabilize at the same level as the leak in the tube.
Careful measurement of this point will document the distance of the leak
along the tube length.

I£ the above data fails to reveal a convincing pattern of tube failures

pointing to the cause, it may be necessary to open the FWH for careful
visual inspection as mentioned in earlier sections of this guide. With-
out an accurate diagnosis, a permanent cure is unlikely and tube plugging
becomes a temporary relief from symptoms only.

Compare the visual evidence of tube and tubesheet conditions with the
construction details of the FWH before selecting the details of the opti-
mum repair technique. The engineer should have the following types of
information on hand (as a minimum) for these considerations: the nature
of the tube-to-tubesheet joint (expanded? rolled? explosion welded? to
what extent? tube diameter at various depths in the tubesheet? metals
used in tube, tubesheet, and cladding?); conditions of the tubesheet
Ligaments; geometry of tube rolling (Does tube rollover interfere with
plugging? ~f so, the rollover will have to be reamed).

2.6.3.2 Lack Of Good Procedures. isc cuss ions with numerous utility personnel have
shown that there is a widespread lack of confidence in the tube-plugging procedures
available to the utilities. In many cases, the plugging procedures recommended by
the FWH vendor at the time the FWH was purchased have proven inadequate or imprac-
tical for application in the plant environment. Tube plugging is a rapidly devel-
oping art. Many promising techniques are available today that were not in ex-
istence (or were untried) when FWHs and their manuals were purchased 10 years ago.
Accordingly, periodic review and updating of plugging procedures is necessary.
Practical recommendations to obtain and follow sound plugging procedures are:

In new FWH procurements, require the vendor to consider tube plugging in

the basic design of the FWH and to provide optimum procedures for the
various tube- and tubesheet-plugging maintenance actions that may be
required. The vendor should also provide a convincing technical ra-
tionale for these recommended procedures.
 For existing FWHs, ask the vendor for his latest recommendations on
plugging for the specific design of the FWH in question. It may be wise
to augment that advice with second opinions from proven experts who
specialize in tube-leak repairs (rather than selling replacement FWBs).

When convinced that the optimum procedures have been determined, be sure
they are formally promulgated for use without deviation. If deviations
become necessary, require formal approvals. Change the written procedure
if necessary to improve it, but do not tolerate sloppy adherence or per-
sonal variations from the specified "optimumw procedures.

All of the above may be useless if not accompanied by thorough training

and disciplined supervision.

2.6.3.3 Lack Of Experience. There is wide variation in the experience level of

the personnel who plan, supervise, and execute tube-plugging repairs. In most
cases, Lack of experience leads to repeating previous maintenance errors or attemp-
ting repair techniques that are not proper for the existing conditions. In some
cases, these shortcomings are augmented by the lack of management emphasis on a-
chieving proper, permanent repairs. Utility management must be involved to under-
stand these shortcomings and to take initiatives to correct them. Experience levels
cannot be upgraded by management edict, nor can in-house training solve the problem
if the utility also lacks experienced, qualified instructors. It is hoped that this
guide can help the utility decide how serious its lack of experience in FWHs may be.
Following the suggestions in this guide, a utility should be capable of hiring the
professional expertise that it may need for developing sound procedures and for
training personnel in tube plugging (as well as other FWH maintenance functions).
The short-term cost of professional assistance from the vendor and/or other FWH
maintenance and engineering specialists can save millions of dollars in the years to
come. Failure to develop training and maintenance programs on a sound technical
basis with experienced personnel is a common shortcoming with expensive, long-term
consequences.

2.6.3.4 Procurement Process And Purchase Specifications. As a general rule, most

utilities have not addressed tube plugging in their FWH purchase specifications,
except under the vague request that the vendor provide operating and maintenance
procedures for the EWH. Occasionally, purchase specifications do request recom-
mended tube-plugging procedures, but seldom are criteria specified to indicate the
acceptable features of those procedures. As a minimum, it is suggested that the
following areas be addressed in the procurement process:

Advise the potential vendors that maintainability (including ease of

permanent tube plugging) will be a key factor in vendor selection.
 Require the vendor to provide detailed, written tube-plugging procedures
for each FWH and for each variation in circumstances likely to be en-
countered. The rationale for the procedures recommended should be
provided and should address the practical problems the utility will face
(i.e., accessibility for repairs, sensitivity to the presence of dirt and
moisture, etc.).

~ecognizing that the vendor will probably adopt newer and better plugging
techniques in the future, it would be wise to commit him, at purchase, to
furnish any improved procedures applicable to the new FWH whenever they
may be identified throughout its life.

2.6.3.5 Incompatibility Of Feedwater Heater Materials. Some utility personnel

have concluded that the failure of their FWH tube-plugging repairs was caused by
using improper materials in the FWH design. In one specific case, the utility
concluded that carbon steel had inadequate resistance to erosion-corrosion; not
only the tubes and tubesheet but also the tube-repair welds were rapidly eroded
away. For this reason, the replacement FWHs utilized stainless steel. There is
inadequate data available to comment further on that utility's decision except to
say that high velocity, turbulent flow will indeed lead to erosion-corrosion of
carbon steel and carbon steel repairs. Stainless steel may be part of the answer,
but it is also necessary to investigate the other details leading to erosion-
corrosion as outlined earlier in Section 2.3. Nevertheless, it is certainly cor-
rect to say that the materials and techniques used for tube plugging must be com-
patible with the material used in the tubes and tubesheet of the specific FWH in
question.

2.5.3.6 Improper Joint Preparations. ~ailureto prepare surfaces properly before

welding or rolling is another common failure in tube-plugging maintenance. The
typical causes of this problem are (1) poor access for machining and cleaning, (2)
wet joint surfaces due to inability to completely isolate the FWH (leaky valves),
and (3) reluctance to shut down the plant (or to isolate the FWH) long enough for
proper repair. Again, the decision should be clearly made whether this is a tem-
porary or a permanent repair. If it is permanent, then it must be done correctly,
with proper preparation and whatever time is required for quality work.

2.6.3.7 Poor Design: Lack Of Access. Many maintenance personnel have reported
serious concern about the FWH designs that provide poor access for maintenance.
Some were adamant that access to their hemispherical head configurations was so bad
as to be unsafe for carrying out prescribed welding procedures. One company re-
ported a policy change whereby all FWHs procured in the future would have full
access to the tubesheet areas, and the hemispherical head configuration would no
longer be used. Apparently other utilities have been reluctant to spend more money
f o r s u c h improved a c c e s s . O t h e r s b e l i e v e t h a t t h e h e m i s p h e r i c a l head geometry c a n
be a d e q u a t e on l a r g e FWHs i f a t t e n t i o n is p a i d t o t h i s c o n c e r n d u r i n g FWH d e s i g n by
r e q u i r i n g manways o f a d e q u a t e s i z e . ( S e e s e c t i o n 2 . 7 . 3 f o r examples o f improved
a c c e s s f o r maintenance.)

2.6.3.8 "Insurance" Plugging. E s p e c i a l l y i n HP FWHs, a l e a k i n o n e t u b e o f t e n

l e a d s t o h i g h - v e l o c i t y f e e d w a t e r j e t s and r a p i d e r o s i o n of o t h e r t u b e s a d j a c e n t t o
the leaking tube. A t t h e time of plugging t h e f a i l e d tube, maintenance personnel

r a r e l y have i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e c o n d i t i o n o f t h e s u r r o u n d i n g t u b e s a n d , t h e r e f o r e ,
may d e c i d e t o p l u g them a s an i n s u r a n c e measure a g a i n s t t h e i r f a i l u r e soon a f t e r
r e t u r n i n g t h e FWH t o s e r v i c e . Many good t u b e s have been plugged u n n e c e s s a r i l y f o r
t h i s reason. I n a d d i t i o n , e x p e r i e n c e h a s shown t h a t i n s u r a n c e p l u g g i n g must be
a c c o m p l i s h e d c a r e f u l l y t o a v o i d a d d i t i o n a l weld f a i l u r e s from t h e e x p a n s i o n and
c o n t r a c t i o n o f weld r e p a i r a r e a s . To a v o i d u n n e c e s s a r y i n s u r a n c e p l u g g i n g , some
u t i l i t i e s have a d o p t e d t h e t e c h n i q u e o f h y d r o s t a t i c t e s t i n g o f s u s p e c t t u b e s . Only
t h o s e t h a t f a i l ( l e a k ) a t 1 . 5 t i m e s t h e i r r a t e d p r e s s u r e a r e plugged. S p e c i a l test
k i t s are c o m m e r c i a l l y a v a i l a b l e t o f a c i l i t a t e t h i s t y p e o f p r e s s u r e t e s t i n g .

2.6.3.9 L a t e D e t e c t i o n Of Leaks
When a t u b e f a i l s , t h e h i g h - p r e s s u r e feedwater escapes i n a very high-velocity stream
t h a t impinges on t h e FWH i n t e r n a l s i n c l u d i n g o t h e r t u b e s . Q u i t e o f t e n , 5-10 s u r -
r o u n d i n g t u b e s a r e d e s t r o y e d o r damaged b e f o r e t h e problem i s d e t e c t e d and t h e FWH
is i s o l a t e d . T h i s problem i s o b v i o u s l y most a c u t e i n t h e HP FWHs. Much less t u b e
p l u g g i n g would be r e q u i r e d i f t h e u t i l i t y had a r a p i d means o f d e t e c t i n g t h e i n i t i a l
tube leak. Very few u t i l i t i e s i n t h e U.S. have s u c h a c a p a b i l i t y on t h e i r FWHs,
a l t h o u g h some have i n s t a l l e d a c o u s t i c s y s t e m s t o d e t e c t l o o s e p a r t s and t u b e l e a k s
i n boilers. I n most U . S . p l a n t s , t h e f i r s t i n d i c a t i o n o f FWH t u b e f a i l u r e s is
e i t h e r (1) loss of w a t e r i n v e n t o r y o r ( 2 ) a n a b n o r m a l l y h i g h , u n s t a b l e w a t e r l e v e l
i n t h e FWH.

I n I t a l y , on t h e o t h e r hand, t h e government-operated u t i l i t y , ENEL, i n s t a l l e d 32

leak-detection s y s t e m s on HP FWHs i n p l a n t s l o c a t e d a t 1 2 d i f f e r e n t s i t e s . * The
l e a k d e t e c t i o n i s b a s e d on t h e a c o u s t i c n o i s e produced by t h e t u r b u l 6 n t l e a k o u t -
flow. The p r i m a r y s e n s o r s a r e p i e z o e l e c t r i c p r e s s u r e t r a n s d u c e r s , i n s t a l l e d n e a r
t h e FWH i n l e t s , i n d i r e c t c o n t a c t w i t h t h e w a t e r . I n o r d e r to e l i m i n a t e m o s t of t h e
n o i s e due t o normal o p e r a t i o n s , t h e f r e q u e n c y band of t h e a u s c u l t a t i o n r a n g e s from a

* T h i s i n f o r m a t i o n is condensed from a p a p e r p r e s e n t e d a t t h e August 25-27, 1982,

EPRI Workshop f o r I n c i p i e n t F a i l u r e D e t e c t i o n f o r F o s s i l Power P l a n t Components,
"New A c o u s t i c T e c h n i q u e s f o r Leak D e t e c t i o n i n F o s s i l F u e l P l a n t Components,"
by G. P a r i n i and G. P o s s a o f Milan, I t a l y .
few kilohertz (kHz) to 10-15 kHz. The signals in this frequency band are simply
characterized by their rms* value and are continuously recorded by means of po-
tentiometric strip chart recorders. The leak occurence is indicated by the signal
rms overcoming a predetermined threshold level. ENEL reports that its experience to
date is satisfactory from all points of view: sensitivity, reliability, acceptance
in plant-control practice, and costs-benefits balance. Several examples are re-
ported of actual leaks promptly detected by this acoustic monitoring. Figure 2-29
shows the frequency spectra associated with typical feedwater system noise. Since
most plant noise is concentrated below 4 kHz, the auscultation range monitored for
leakage noise is normally 5-15 kHz. Figure 2-30 shows an example of a signal trend
in the case of a leak in a HP FWH. The spike labeled "at pressurization" is the
noise signal generated after shutdown when pressure was applied to the sheil side of
the FWH to determine the location of the tube leak.

Neither EPRI nor the study team for this project is in a position to endorse this,
particular system as the best for leak-detection purposes. However, the acoustic
principle is sound, and there is no reason that this type of instrumentation cannot
be designed for simple and reliable use in the manner indicated. The cost of such a
system should be reasonable and well worth the investment, especially for H P FWHs on
baseloaded plants. (Refer to Section 4 . 0 for typical examples of the high cost of
E'WH outages on baseloaded plants. )

2.7 MISCELLANEOUS
2.7.1 The Tubesheet/Channel-Barrel Transition Radius
A design problem common to many FWHs presently in service is that the corner radius
in the forging of the tubesheet face to the channel-barrel transition is too small.
Cracks that originate in this area can result in the catastrophic failure of the
entire forging as shown in Figure 2-31.

Figure 2-32 shows data from tests that were performed in the 1960s on model tube-
sheet forgings to determine the influence of the corner radius and the intensity of
stresses in that region as a result of small radii in high-pressure closures. It is
readily seen that the smaller the corner radius in the forging, the higher the
stresses are with increased operating and test pressure. This phenomenon of high,
concentrated stresses on high-pressure forgings is a very serious defect in many
FWBs. Manufacturers attempt to provide the most economical closure (i.e., the thin-
nest) and in so doing consider the smallest possible ID, thus aggravating the prob-
lem.

*Root of mean square.

 F R E Q U E N C Y (KHz)

I
I

I
I
I

Figure 2-29. Frequency Spectra O f Feedwater

Pressure Noise

NOISE LEVEL
100
AT P R E S S U R I Z A T I O N
1

TIME (HOURS)

Figure 2-30. Example O f Signal Trend For A

Tube Leak In A High-Pressure Feedwater Heater
 T e s t Pressure ( T P ) - 7,500 psi
TP - 7,000 psi

TP - 6,000 psi

TP - 5,000 psi

TP - 4,000 psi

TP - 3,000 psi

TP - 2,000 psi

TP - 1,000 psi

Corner Xadii (r) In Inches

Figure 2-32. Determination O f S t r e s s Concentration F a c t o r s Fox Various

Corner R a d i i O f A C y l i n d r i c a l S h e l l

Source: Graphs of t e s t data p l o t t e d by R. Feng, January 24, 1969.

The possibility does exist to remedy this situation even in existing forgings by
providing relief in this area. One such means of relief is to grind the corner to a
larger radius. Once a FWH is opened for inspection or repair, the opportunity
should be taken to search for cracks at the corner radius by visual examination,
dye-penetrant checks or ultrasonic testing. Failure to detect cracks could lead to
catastrophic results, such as those shown in Figure 2-31, during hydrostatic testing
of the closure. Nil ductility failure of steel is a well-known phenomenon at low
temperatures. If there are low-temperature feedwater tests (such as hydrostatic
testing) associated with the small radius, a small crack can propagate rapidly into
a complete failure of the forging. Test personnel have been injured and killed in
the past when this has happened. Another safety lesson illustrated by such acci-
dents is the need to ensure that all air is vented from the vessel that is being
hydrostatically tested. With only water inside the vessel, the pressure will be
quickly released upon failure. However, a bubble of compressed air can impart con-
tinuing forces, ejecting fragments with explosive consequences.

AS a general guideline, a well-designed EWH should have a corner with a minimum

radius of 1 inch for 1,000 pounds of pressure with an additional 1/2 inch for each
1,000 psi thereafter. Thus a FWH that would be required to handle a pressure of
2,000 psi should have a corner radius of 1-1/2 inch. This requirement Aould be
inserted as part of the specifications for any new FWH. Moreover, when an old FWH
is inspected, these guidelines should be used to determine the care that may be
necessary daring hydrostatic testing.

~t is zlso appropriate at this p i n t to mention another specification requirement

that should be adhered to during the fabrication of a FWH; that is, the requirement
for a Charpy "V" notch test. As stated in the HE1 standards, which are more strin-
gent than the ASME code, all materials used fcr forged carbon steel channeis and
tubesheets should be procured to the requirement of Charpy "V" notch values of 15
foot-pounds average for three tests and 10 foot-pounds for any one test, at a maxi-
mum test temperature of 40%. When so requested by the p~rchaser,the manufacturer
shall specify the minimum hydrostatic test temperature.

I£ the guidelines for a minimum radius and the Charpy ttVt' notch test requirements
are met, then the possibility of catastrophic and dangerous faiLure of the forging
should not be a problem.

2.7.2 Welded Versus Bolted Partition Plates

The partition plate within the channel barrel and channel head is another area of
FWH failure. Figure 2-33 shows such a partition plate of rigid construction that is
susceptible to cracking both in the partition plate and the partition plate cover
and should be avoided. A crack in this region may very well result in a crack pen-
etration into the forging or channel barrel itself with catastrophic effect. Re-
gardless of whether the crack extends into the channel barrel, it starts due to
differential temperature expansion and contraction between the inlet and outlet pass
creating bypass of feedwater, and therefore erosion, to both the partition cover and
the channel itself. There have been some types of construction of internal channel
shrouds at the outlet pass that also fail because of weld defects and cracks that
propagate when subjected to the velocity of the feedwater on the outlet pass, par-
ticularly when those velocities are excessive. This may happen even in a EWH de-
signed for normal velocity when one or two FWHs are cut out, resulting in higher
velocity within those remaining. For these reasons, some experienced engineers
recommend that a bolted partition plate and cover similar in design to those in
Figure 2-34 be utilized because they afford an opportunity to have flexibility and
novement of these members even under higher-than-normal operating temperature con-
ditions. Also, this design affords an opportunity to remove the channel cover and
the partition plate, thereby allowing good accessibility to the tubesheets for in-
spection and repair.

Figure 2-33. Welded Partition Plate

2-89
 Figure 2-34. Bolted Partition Plate

2.7.3 Channel Access Cover

Another item that requires attention and is important from a maintenance standpoint
is the accessibility to the inside of the channel itself. Many EWHs today are de-
signed with a hemispherical head containing a small inspection hole about 4 inches
in diameter, which is completely unsatisfactory from an inspection and maintenance
viewpoint. This type of construction is found in the FWHs that were built in the
1950s and early 1960s. They were normally supplied as standard practice for low-
pressnre application with tubes welded to the face of the tubesheet. The mistaken
contention of manufacturers was that that type of tube-to-tubesheet joint was immune
to erosion and corrosion attack and that, therefore, no maintenance was required.
Maintenance became more necessary with time, and many utilities were faced with the
need to burn the hemispherical head itself to gain access to the tubes for repair.
Many utilities repeatedly repaired the FWHs, and each time rewelded the eliptical
head. One recommended solution to this problem is to substitute a flanged full-
access cover for the eliptical head. When the size of the FWH or the design pres-
sure is such that this solution is too expensive, the modification of the eliptical
head should be done by introducing a large manway. For LP FWHs, a 20-inch or 24-
inch diameter is recommended, which will allow a man to pass through without dif-
ficulty. Figure 2-35 presents this type of of a solution and is considered part of
 Figure 2-35. Manway For Channel Access

a good maintenance and repair approach. The utilization of davits such that the
manhole cover can be removed quickly and efficiently without great effort is an
added feature.
 Section 3

METHODICAL APPROACH TO OPERATION OF FEEDWATER HEATERS

UNDER DEGRADED CONDITIONS

3.1 OVERVIEW: THE NEED TO DEVELOP A SYSTEMS APPROACH

This section discusses the operating limitations and guidelines that should be
imposed upon feedwater heater (FWH) trains when one or more FWHs are removed from
service. Closed FWHs are generally designed to meet thermal performance and shell
and tubeside pressure drop limit specifications at only one set of specific oper-
ating conditions called the "design point." Operation at this design point consti-
tutes normal operation, and the steam, feedwater, and drains flows at this point
are called normal flows. FWH manufacturers are requested to design FWHs to meet
these specifications at the design point. They should also be required to design
equipment for satisfactory operation* at specified abnormal conditions.** Even so,
extraordinary conditions may occur where larger flows are encountered and satis-
factory operation is difficult to obtain unless proper provisions have been made in
the operation of the plant. Removal of various numbers of FWHs from service during
unit operation is of special concern in this regard. A particularly poor practice
occasionally used in some plants is to achieve higher megawatt output from the
plant by cutting out the high-pressure (HP) FWHs and overfiring the boilers. Un-
less the plant was specifically designed for this type of abnormal overload (which
is unlikely), the operator is exposing the boiler to thermal shock, while over-
loading several turbine stages and the remaining FWHs. The degraded heat rate that
results may be acceptable for load dispatch reasons, but the eventual cost in per-
manent system damage could be very high.

If a FWH (or group of FWHs) is bypassed, the feedwater will enter the next stage
FWH at a colder temperature, and that FWH will extract additional steam. Over-
loading up to 300% has been experienced. Large steam flows and the resulting high
drains flows can do catastrophic damage to the FWH from flashing, tube vibration,

*"Satisfactory operation" as used here means that the FWH should have the capacity
of passing the abnormal flows without damage to the equipment for the duration
of the abnormal condition.
**One major utility is now purchasing a large number of replacement FWHs and is
requiring that each one be capable of carrying the overload caused by isolation
of the next upstream (lower-pressure) FWH.
erosion, etc. To avoid this damage, the changes in flow that will be needed to
ensure proper velocities and reasonable pressure drops through all zones of the
remaining FWHs must be carefully analyzed. At the same time, it is important to
remember that turbines and boilers must also be considered. The turbine is affect-
ed when some EWHs are not operational, since steam will not be extracted from all
the design points, thus creating an imbalance in the turbine. However, recommenda-
tions for reduction of load with any and all combinations of FWHs out of service
can and should be obtained from the turbine manufacturer to remedy this situation.

Restrictions are present also in the boiler. If the temperature of the feedwater
at the economizer inlet drops too low, the economizer might suffer thermal shock or
the boiler could be fired too hard, creating problems in the superheating tubes and
in the boiler wall tubes also. Again, the boiler manufacturer should supply infor-
mation stating the minimum feedwater temperature that can be tolerated by the
boiler, and any other limitations which may apply. Figure 3-1 is an example of the
reply received by one utility upon making such a request. The specific boiler in
question was designed to receive feedwater at 530% at 100% power. The vendor
recommended a minimum feedwater temperature of 350°~ to avoid thermal shock to the
economizer. To prevent damage to the superheat tubes, it was also recommended that
during periods of reduced feedwater temperature, the boiler should be operated at
or below the appropriate line on the graph. For example, if feedwater temperature
was reduced to 4 2 3 O ~ ,and it was desired to fire the boiler at 708, it would be
necessary to accept a decrease in superheat of 60% below the designed value. Con-
versely, with a 6 0 O ~reduction in superheat, the boiler should not be fired above
70%. Thus, it is apparent that communication between utility engineers and vendors
is essential in prolonging the service life of not only the FWHs but also the other
major components in the system.

3.2 PRACTICAL EXAMPLES OF AN APPROACH TO DETERMINING OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS

This subsection presents two specific examples in which a number of EWHs were re-
moved from service for repair and discusses the ati ion ale used in determining the
proper operating conditions. In each case, the unit in question was capable of
generating 326 megawatts (MW) (net) at 100% Load.

Case 1, as shown in Figure 3-2, displays a schematic of a two-string (A and B),

eight-FWH (51-58) unit. FWHs 51-56 are considered low-pressure (LP) FWHs, while
EWHs 57 and 58 are the HP FWHs. HP FWHs 57A and 58A were to be removed from ser-
vice for repair. To ensure safe operation of the remaining FWHs during repairs,
without shutting down the plant, the following measures were enacted.
 Design Temp.
Is 530°F

Percentage O f Full-Load Firing Rate

Figure 3-1. B o i l e r Superheat L i m i t a t i o n s With Reduced Feedwater Temperatures

( T h i s example i s f o r i l l u s t r a t i o n only. These curves apply t o a specific
b o i l e r design; o t h e r designs w i l l have d i f f e r e n t l i m i t a t i o n s . )
First, operating data were compared with design data using a worksheet similar to
Figure 2-7. This information was gathered to determine the condition of the FWH.
Then the turbine manufacturer was consulted in an effort to determine the required
reduction in load due to possible turbine limitations. The manufacturer stated
that when two HP FWHs from one string are cut out, the steam flow can be throttled
to a maximum of 2,220,000 pounds per hour (lbs/hr) without detriment to the turbine
parts. Normal flow for this plant at 100% load would be 2,300,000 Ibs/hr.

Having acquired the turbine limits for flow, the next step was to analyze the limi-
tations of the FWHs themselves. Helpful in this effort was information concerning
the operating history of each FWH. Information such as the age of the FWH, tube
material, condition of the tubes and FWH components, when it will be replaced, the
number of tubes plugged, and performance test data (terminal temperature difference,
and approach temperatures) is invaluable when evaluating FWHs, for their ability to
handle load. In Case 1, the utility engineer was aware that FWHs 57B and 58B had
already deteriorated due to erosion at the inlet end and pitting with as much as a
50% wall reduction in many tubes. This condition required additional load re-
strictions. He then went through an iterative process to derive what those limits
should be. Assuming a flow of 2,200,000 lb/hr to the boiler to be acceptable, this
flow was split evenly between the two strings of FWHs. By the time the feedwater
exited from the LP FWHs, it had attained a temperature of 3 8 4 O ~at a shell side
pressure of 200 psia. As before, half of the flow (1,100,000 lbs/hr) continued on
to the inlet of the B string HP FWHs; however, the remaining flow was directed
through a bypass line because HP FWHs 57A and 58A were inoperative. Because of the
aforementioned deteriorated tube condition of HP FWHs 57B and 58B, a judgment was
made to limit the velocity through the FWH to 6 feet per second (ft/sec.). This
measure would prolong the life of the tubes. Since each HP FWH had a different
number of tubes plugged, they had to be individually analyzed. From flow calcu-
lations performed on FWH 57B, it was determined that the maximum flow that could be
allowed through the tubes and still maintain a velocity of 6 ft/sec was 500,000
lbs/hr.* Therefore, provisions were made to bypass the remaining 600,000 lb/hr
through an internal orifice made in the partition plate on the channel that was
sized by using a standard equation. The purpose of the orifice was to divert some
of the water from the tubes and to provide an opportunity for mixing the water at
the outlet of the FWH. In this way, the amount of overloading on a FWH can be

*By reducing the feedwater flow, the steam quantity extracted on the shell side
was also limited. Reducing steam quantities automatically reduces the velocities
in the desuperheating and subcooling zones, which also prolongs FWH life.
limited, thus prolonging its life. Similar calcuations were performed for FWH 5 8 B ,
which showed that only 450,000 lbs/hr needed to be bypassed through an internal
orifice.

By limiting the efficiency of the FWH strings, which must be done to preserve the
life of the FWKis, it is important to consider what the effects will be on the
boiler. As can be seen in Figure 3-2, the temperature at the economizer inlet was
4 2 7 O ~ ,whereas the normal inlet temperature at 1008 load was 530°~. Correspondence
with the boiler manufacturer indicated that 320°~ was the minimum temperature that
should enter the boiler; therefore, the boiler did not place any restrictions in
this case. However, from the graph shown in Figure 3-1, which was supplied by the
boiler manufacturer, it can be seen that at 4 2 7 O ~and 100% load, there is approxi-
mately a 110°~ loss of superheat. This information must be relayed to the turbine
manufacture, who will determine if the loss will be detrimental to the turbine.
For Case 1, this did not present a problem; therefore, the 15% load restriction was
imposed to prevent further deterioration of the FWHs.

From Figure 3-2, one could determine the megawatt net generated with the calculated
parameters, which in this case was 275 MW. Therefore, generating 275 MW with two
HP FWHs removed from service should not further degrade the equipment.

Case 2 (Figure 3-3) presents the dramatic example of all of the LP FWHs from both
strings being removed from service. In many utilities, this situation becomes a
fairly high probability when the ability to bypass individual FWHs or a pair of
FWNs is non-existent. One LP FWH that needs to be repaired can force the removal
of a11 the LP FWHs in that string from service.

Case 2 (Figure 3-3) was handled in the same manner as Case 1. The turbine manu-
facturer indicated that for this condition there was no need to limit feedwater
flow; therefore, the plant engineers analyzed the FWHs themselves. It was readily
apparent that even healthy HP FWHs would not be adequate to handle the increased
load. Again, these FWHs were already deteriorated to the extent that internal ori
fices were installed to bypass some of the flow. Having already dealt with Case 1
as well as a variety of other cases of degraded operation enabled the support en-
gineer to quickly estimate the overall reduction in feedwater flows that would be
necessary to permit safe operation of the remaining FWHs. To verify that these
estimates were correct, he performed the calculations already outlined in the pre-
vious example to ultimately arrive at an economizer inlet temperature of 3 8 8 O ~and
a flow that was throttled to 1,400,000 lbs/hr. For this set of parameters, the
boiler does not impose a reduction in load, although there will be a corresponding
loss of superheat of approximately 1 4 0 ~ ~ .
A consultation with the turbine manu-
facturer resulted in the determination that the loss of superheat at that rate of
steam flow did not necessitate a turbine restriction. Again, it is emphasized that
if limitations were not imposed on the operation of the HP FWHs, they would have
quickly deteriorated, condemning the plant to a forced outage. Serious damage to
the boiler would have been the result of operation without any FWHs. Many boiler
failures can be ascribed to operation in this manner.

The use of the above examples is not intended to be a blanket endorsement of the
use of internal orifices to limit flow through degraded FWHs. In the case cited,
this particular solution was implemented after careful analysis as a temporary
improvement to a bad situation. If a FWH has individual feedwater by-pass valves,
it would normally be better to use them, in which case orifices should not be needed.

These cases vividly illustrate the type of limiting operational guidelines dictated
by the removal of FWHs from service. By considering the protection of the turbine,
boiler, and E%HS simultaneously, it is possible to attain the highest reasonable
power output without destroying the plant in the process.
 Section 4

THE REPAIR OR REPLACE DECISION PROCESS

4.1 OVERVIEW
I t h a s been common p r a c t i c e f o r some u t i l i t i e s t o f o l l o w t h e "10% r u l e " f o r d e t e r -
mining when t o r e p l a c e a f e e d w a t e r h e a t e r (FWH): when t h e number o f plugged t u b e s
r e a c h e s 10% of t h e t o t a l , t h e EWH is r e p l a c e d . * However, e x p e r i e n c e h a s shown t h a t
such a s i m p l e c r i t e r i o n is i n a d e q u a t e f o r making p r u d e n t , economical d e c i s i o n s on
whether t o r e p l a c e o r t o c o n t i n u e to r e p a i r FWHs. I n S e c t i o n 2.5 and F i g u r e 2-28,
a n example is g i v e n of a c a t a s t r o p h i c t u b e f a i l u r e caused by a l o o s e impact p l a t e
t h a t r u p t u r e d more t h a n 10% o f t h e t u b e s . Once t h e c a u s e of t h a t f a i l u r e was d e t e r -
mined, t h e impact p l a t e was r e - i n s t a l l e d c o r r e c t l y , and no more f a i l u r e s were ex-
p e r i e n c e d on t h a t FWH. No d e - r a t i n g o f p l a n t c a p a c i t y was i n v o l v e d and no measura-
b l e h e a t r a t e d e g r a d a t i o n was n o t e d . I n c a s e s such a s t h i s where permanent r e p a i r s
a r e f e a s i b l e and economical, spending l a r g e sums of money t o r e p l a c e FWHs is c l e a r l y
not the correct solution. On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e r e a r e many s i t u a t i o n s where FWH
r e p l a c e m e n t would b e a p p r o p r i a t e l o n g b e f o r e 10% of t h e t u b e s have f a i l e d .

The p u r p o s e of t h i s s e c t i o n i s t o a s s i s t u t i l i t i e s i n d e v e l o p i n g a n o r d e r l y p r o c e s s
f o r d e c i d i n g whether t o r e p l a c e t r o u b l e s o m e FWHs and, i f s o , when. Recent d i s -
c u s s i o n s w i t h p l a n t e n g i n e e r s , u t i l i t y h e a d q u a r t e r s managers, and e x p e r i e n c e d FWH
v e n d o r s show t h a t many u t i l i t i e s have n o t p r o g r e s s e d v e r y f a r beyond t h e "10% r u l e "
and s t i l l r e l y h e a v i l y on " g u t f e e l i n g s " i n t h i s d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s . Until the util-
i t y management makes a d e t e r m i n e d commitment f o r improvement i n t h i s a r e a , m i l l i o n s
o f d o l l a r s w i l l be wasted e a c h y e a r i n poor performance o f t h e p l a n t s i n v o l v e d .

*Other r u l e s o f thumb a r e a l s o i n u s e . One u t i l i t y p r e f e r s changing t u b e b u n d l e s

o v e r FWH r e p l a c e m e n t and g e n e r a l l y r e - t u b e s when 15% 05 t h e t u b e s have f a i l e d (un-
l e s s t h e s h e l l d e s i g n is i n a d e q u a t e o r i f t h e FWH c a n n o t be r e - t u b e d ) . For t h e
p u r p o s e o f t h i s s e c t i o n , r e - t u b i n g is c o n s i d e r e d a major r e p a i r . I t may b e t h e
b e s t s o l u t i o n f o r some FWHs, p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e c a u s e s o f t h e o r i g i n a l f a i l u r e s
a r e c o r r e c t e d and t h e o t h e r p i t f a l l s o u t l i n e d i n S e c t i o n 2 a r e a v o i d e d . I t is
e s p e c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e o l d s h e l l is l a r g e enough t o accommodate
t h e new t u b e b u n d l e w i t h o u t r e d u c i n g f l o w c l e a r a n c e s and c a u s i n g e x c e s s i v e v e l o c i -
ties.
The subsections that follow address the principal economic and technical considera-
tions:

Costs of repeated FWH failures;

Age considerations;

Mechanical design of the FWH;

System design features;

Materials of construction;

Mechanical condition; and

Regulatory and fiscal climate.

In order to consider the above factors, it is essential to have a good understanding

of the FWH system with ready access to the FWH instruction manual, operating guide-
lines, configuration drawings, and bundle construction prints.

It is also highly desirable to have key information tabulated for ready reference in
the appropriate utility support organization to assist in the considerations out-
lined in the following subsections. One utility with an excellent plant performance
record and a strong program for FWH system improvement uses data of the type indi-
cated in Tables 4-1 through 4-4. Information in these tables will be used for il-
lustrative purposes in some of the examples outlined in the remainder of this sec-
tion. There are many ways to tabulate data and many ways to estimate figures such
as those displayed in these tables. No attempt has been made to criticize or im-
prove upon these real-life examples. Instead, they are presented as an illustration
of the general type of information that utilities need to have on hand for long-term
planning and repair/replace consideration.

4.2 COST OF REPEATED FEEDWATER HEATER FAILURES

A frequently encountered situation is that of recurrent tube failures, which re-

quire FWH outages (and often plant outages) to plug the tubes. The principal
costs to the utility for such FWH outages are:

The JWH performance loss cost, which is a direct result of the heat rate
degradation of the plant with the defective FWH isolated during continued
plant operation. (Some utilities call this the "efficiency" cost.) Each
 Table 4-1

UNIT CHRONOLOGY AND FEEDWATER HEATER TUBE MATERIAL

Date Estimated Years ~emaining

Station-Unit Net MW Commercial Retirement As Of 4/1/82 HP FWH Tubes LP FWH Tubes

CuN i Admiralty
Admiralty Ars. Cu.
Admiralty Ars. CU.
CuNi Admiralty
80-20 CuNi Admiralty
80-20, 70-30 CuNi Admiralty
80-20, 70-30 CuNi Admiralty
80-20 CuNi Admiralty
80-20 CuNi Admiralty
80-20 CuNi Admiralty
70-30 CuNi Admiralty
W 70-30 CuNi Admiralty
Monel 400/SS-316 Admiralty
W Monel 400 ~dmiralty
Monel 400/SS-316 Admiralty
Carbon Steel Admiralty
Carbon Steel Admiralty
Monel 400 Monel 400/Admiralty
Carbon Steel SS304
Carbon Steel 55304
Carbon Steel SS304
Carbon Steel SS304
 Table 4-3

AVAILABILITY AND PERFORMANCE COSTS

ASSOCIATED WITH HEATER OUTAGES

P l a n t Capacity T o t a l Performance
Station-Unit Heater Loss Cost/Month And C a p a c i t y
Type & Performance ( 1) S p r i n g O r F a l l Loss Cost Range
Service Heater Loss Cost/Month ( 2 ) Summer ( 3 ) Winter P e r Month

A-I & 2 A $ 10,480 (1

( 6 5 MW) (2)
Coal Peaking (3)
B 7,190 (1)
(21
(3)
C 3,870 (1
D 5,040 (2)
E 3,820 (3)

A-5 A $ 53,153 (11

572 MW (2)
Coal (3
Base-Loaded B 26,706 (1)
(2)
(3
(1)
(2)
(3)
(Ditto

E-6&7 A $ 22,290 (1
( 1 2 7 & 133 MW) (2)
Coal (3)
(Peaking 80%) B 6,020 (1)
(2
(31
C 5,970 (1)
D 9,050 (2)
E 10,540 (3
OOc-lbrd'
ulmrd'
N o l a -

U n W E
N N N N
>>>>
 Table 4-4

PERFORMANCE ASPECTS OF HEATER TRAINS AND

POTENTIAL OVERLOADS W I T H NEXT UP-STREAM FEEDWATER HEATER CUT OUT

(6)
(5) P o t e n t i a l * Thermal (81
(1) % of H e a t e r ' s Load With Next P e r c e n t a g e Of
Station ( 2) ( 31 (4) Contribution t o Up-Stream H e a t e r ( 7) Total Train
Unit(s) Heater OFRise BTU/HTR Total Train Cut-out-% o f Performance Performance
(Mw) Number Hydraulic XlOOO Thermal R i s e Design $/Month Per Heater

A-5 A 222
(572 MW) B 198
Coal C 175
D 213
E 138
-
F1 189.2% avg.
F2

200
1 and 2 153
( 6 5 MW) 221
Coal 146
-
180% avg.

E 1 74.2O 75,600 29.6 175 22,290 41.4

6 and 7 2 58.4' 57,000 22.4 171 6,020 11.2
( 1 2 7 a n d 133 MW) 4 51.8~ 40,600 15.9 198 5,970 11.1
Coal 5 58.7O 39,800 15.6 206
- 9,050 16.8
6 62.3' 42,026 16.5 187.5% avg. 10,540 19.5
305.4~ 255.026 100% $53,870 100%

*The f i g u r e s shown i n column ( 6 ) a r e f i c t i t i o u s , t h e o r e t i c a l maximum l o a d s ; t h e y were simply d e r i v e d by assuming that

a l l t h e t h e r m a l l o a d would be t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e n e x t downstream FWH. The a c t u a l o v e r l o a d w i l l n e v e r b e t h i s h i g h
( a n d r e q u i r e s more complex c a l c u l a t i o n s ) .
 T a b l e 4-4 (cont.)

( 61
(5) P o t e n t i a l * Thermal (8)
(1) % of H e a t e r ' s Load With Next Percentage Of
Station (2) (3 (4) Contribution t o Up-Stream H e a t e r ( 7) Total Train
Unit(s) Heater OFRise BTU/HTR Total Train Cut-out-% of Performance Performance
(Mw) Number Hydraulic Xl 000 Thermal R i s e Design $/Month Per Heater

G A 7lo 192,956 24.6 165 59,450

1 and 2 B 47.5O 124,530 15.9 167 11,132
(380 and 385 MW) C 35.6O 83,942 10.7 260 12,169
Coal D 57.6O 133,492 77.0 177 16,241
E 60.2' 102,142 13.1 20 1 19,631
F 61.3~ 103,490 13.2 142 23,341
185.3% avg. 12,728
$154,692

I A1 177
1 , 2, and 3 A2 177
(860 MW) B1 f 75
Nuclear B2 175
C1 138
C2 138
D1 14 1
D2 141
E1 12 1
E2 12 1
F1 150.4% avg.
F2
F3
 FWH outage results in a performance cost that can be determined by the
following formula:

Performance Cost =

( h e a t rate increase)- (average p l a n t load) x (outa~elength) x (cost of fuel)

(heat content of fuel)

The plant capacity loss cost, which is usually the largest single cost
factor for baseloaded plants. In most cases, the plant should be de-
rated while the FWH is isolated, and the cost of replacement power to
make up for that derating constitutes the plant capacity loss cost (also
called "replacement power" cost) :

Capacity Loss Cost =

(MW loss) x (hours/clay at f u l l load) x (outage l e n g t h ) x ($/%MI

increased cost f o r replacement mr)

FWH repair costs, which include the costs of materials and maintenance
labor for troubleshooting and (in this case) tube plugging. For the
troublesome FWH with recurrent tube failures, such repair costs are usu-
ally minor in comparison to the performance and availability costs cited
above.

Two examples are cited below to illustrate the high costs of FWH outages and the
variable nature of the factors contributing to those costs.

Example 1
Using data for Plant A-5 in Table 4-3, assume that low-pressure (LP) FWH D is ex-
periencing tube failures of one or more tubes per incident with approximately three
incidents per year, randomly spaced over the various seasons. In this plant, all
FWHs can be isolated individualy, and company policy permits working inside the
channel area of LP FWHs while the plant is operating after waiting one day to dem-
onstrate that the isolation valves are holding and temperatures are stabilized.
Under these conditions, each FWH outage requires approximately six days for trou-
bleshooting, data collection, and repair. Therefore, the plant operates with a
performance heat rate loss of:
The utility has estimated (Table 4-3) this performance loss to be approximately
$40,700 per month of FWH downtime. For this example, then, the FWH performance
loss is estimated at: .6 x $40,700, or approximately $24,400.

Since the availability loss varies widely from season to season, this utility has
estimated these costs for three season categories as shown in Table 4-3. In winter,
Plant A-5 is needed at full power most of the time, and replacement power for
forced outages and deratings comes from expensive sources (old coal plants or com-
bustion turbines within the company or purchased power from other companies). In
spring and fall, full power is needed less often, and relatively inexpensive power
is available within the company to make up for Plant A-5's shortcomings. Since we
have assumed that FWH D fails randomly in each of the four seasons, then:

Plant Availability Loss =

A rough estimate of repair costs for three men and materials might be $5,00O/outage
or $15,00O/year.

Summary : Performance Loss = $ 24,40O/year

Capacity Loss = $ 84,30O/year
Repair Costs = $ 15,00O/year

TOTAL YEARLY COST = $123,700

Example 2
For the same plant, A-5, assume a similar frequency of tube failures for HP FWH A.
Although this FWH can also be isolated by itself, safety considerations make it in-
advisable to enter the channel area for repairs with only one-valve protection.
Therefore, the FWH stays isolated for an average of 1-1/2 months before a planned
or forced outage provides sufficient opportunity for repair. This leads to an
average of 3 x 1-1/2 = 4-1/2 months of FWH outage per year. Rough cost estimates
are:

Heater Performance LOSS = 4-1/2 x $53,000 = $238,500

Plant Capacity Loss = 4-1/2 x (58,000 + 58,000 + 337,000 + 627,000) = $1,265,625/year

4

Repair Costs (Approximately) = $22,5OO/year

Summary : Performance Loss = $ 238,500
Capacity Loss = $1,265,625
Repair Costs = $ 22,500

TOTAL YEAlUY COST = $1,526,625

Additional comments on the above examples are:

These examples are not average EWH situations. To make the point that
FWH down time can be very expensive, we have purposely chosen a base-
loaded plant that is normally run at or near full power. The utility is
naturally quite reluctant to shut the whole plant down to repair one
EWH. In addition, the safety rules (in this example) do not permit
working on the H P FWH while the plant is operating, even if the iso-
lation valves hold. The result is an unacceptable capacity loss cost
while the EWH sits isolated for long periods of time each year. This
particular cost would be much lower (perhaps zero) for a peaking plant
or for other situations in which replacement power was not so much
higher in cost.

In example 2, the H P EWH A situation is intolerable. If the problem

cannot be corrected, the FWH must be replaced as soon as a well-designed
and properly constructed FWH is available.

If HP FWH A had a reliable and safe isolation system, it would be reason-

able to expect reduction of the down time from 4-1/2 to - 6 months/year.
This would reduce yearly costs to (.6/4.5) x 1,526,625 = $203,55O/year.
Situations such as this may warrant consideration of a double-valve
isolation capability using high quality valves with "telltale" bleed-off
vents in between. (Such modifications are expensive and usually involve
annual financing costs as well as the initial investment costs.)

Repair costs are usually more expensive for H P FWHs than for LP FWHs.
However, they are relatively insignificant compared to the performance
and capacity loss costs, at least in this type of recurring maintenance
activity for baseloaded plants.

If a similar set of examples was applied to a reserve or peaking plant,

the cost penalties would be much less because (1) the plant seldom is
required at full power; (2) the peaking plant can be shut down for re-
pairs when needed, with little, if any, capacity penalty; and (3) the
cost differential for replacement power is much less for the peaking
plant than for the more cost-efficient baseloaded plants.

Although the costs illustrated in these examples are usually the princi-
pal costs of continued operation of the troublesome FWHs, there are
other cost considerations of a less tangible nature associated with the
other factors described in the following subsections. Such costs should
be recognized even if they are more difficult to quantify.

Capacity-loss costs vary widely with variations in season, location,

etc., as suggested above. They also vary widely among utilities because
there is no standard system throughout the utility industry for properly
determining how much the plant should be derated for each FWH or group
of FWHs isolated. Some plants take no derating unless the turbine or
boiler manufacturers have recommended limits to protect their equipment
 for the situation encountered. Other plants use rough rules of thumb
such as 5% derating for an LP EWH and 10% for a HP FWH. Neither of
these approaches is based on a sound engineering systems approach. In-
stead, they rely on guesswork without evaluating what may be happening
to the remaining FWHs in the system. Section 3.0 addresses this wide-
spread problem and suggests a more orderly approach to operation with
degraded FWH trains.

4.3 AGE CONSIDERATIONS

It is important to consider the age of the installed FWH, the age of the plant,
and the expected life of each. Table 4-1 is a good reference to make several
points in this regard. Note that the older plants shown are expected to continue
in operation until they are more than 50 years old, whereas the newer plants are
planned for only 33-45 years of service. Part of the difference can be attributed
to the advances in technology that have evolved over the years, but also there is
a natural tendency to keep extending the life of old plants by replacing systems
and components as necessary.

If an old plant is going to be in service for another 15 years, there is a strong

probability that its FWHs will need replacement even if their performance has been
satisfactory for the last 30 years. On the other hand, it may be economical to
avoid replacement of FwHs in a plant expected to be decommissioned within the next
five to ten years. It is not likely that a plant of that age will be expected to
perform base-load duties. Accordingly, there is more opportunity for repait and
much less cost from continuing use of the troublesome FWHs.

4.4 MECHANICAL DESIGN OF THE FEEDWATER HEATER

Often a FWH is replaced early in its life because it is known to have basic design
deficiencies that cannot be corrected economically. The same FWH design may have
proven its inadequacy in an earlier application in another plant. However, it is
important to be sure that the real causes of failure in the earlier application(s)
are clearly understood and that the applicability of the FWH's design shortcomings
to the current plant are valid.

4.5 CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS

Most FWHs in use today were designed and installed more than 20 years ago. Since
then, experience has shown that there are more suitable materials for many of the
tube, tubesheet, and internal structure applications. It is difficult to generalize
on this subject because FWHs will experience different mechanical, thermal, and
chemical environments, depending upon the design and operating conditions of the
different plants in which they may be used. However, there has been a trend toward
the use of stainless steels for tubes and even for support structures to reduce
erosion-corrosion. Also, there has been a significant effort to replace FWHs that
had admiralty or copper-nickel tubing in those cases where the plant chemistry lim-
its were designed for carbon steel boiler tubes; the pH limits were inappropriate
for the tubes in the FWHs, which made strong technical and economical arguments for
early replacement of the tube bundles and (more often) the complete FWHs. This type
of consideration can be an important factor in the repair/replace decision process.

4.6 MECHANICAL CONDITION

It is disappointing to witness current situations where utilities are considering
FWH replacement without detailed knowledge of the condition of the FWHs. It i s
necessary to know not only which tubes have failed, but where along the tube length
each failure occurred. Such information often provides information about the cause
of the problem even before opening the FWH for internal inspection. Likewise, it is
important to know such things as: whether shell erosion is present, and to what
degree; the condition of support structures; signs of partition plate failure; the
condition of the tubesheet, etc. Eddy current testing of the tubes often provides
valuable information on their condition and the areas of potential problems. Unless
the FWH is obviously "dead" from catastrophic failure, one must have an accurate
picture of the mechanical condition and the indications of trends to make sensible
decisions on how much longer each FWH can be maintained economically in service.

In the case of the "dead" FWH, it may be wise to open it, as was done to the FWH
shown in Figure 4-1. Such inspections are recommended for learning or confirming
the real causes of failure and for improved understanding of FWH problems. For
example, this practice will often reveal secondary problems that would have ruined
the FWH in another year or two of operation. Failure to learn these lessons fre-
quently leads to the purchase of replacement FWHs with some of the same weaknesses.
Likewise, new E'WHs may be ruined.by failure to correct the deficient operating pro-
cedures that may have been the cause of some of the original FWH's deterioration.

4.7 REGULATORY AND FISCAL CLIMATE

There is pressure from both the regulatory and financial sectors to increase plant
performance in order to (1) reduce costs to the rate payer and (2) postpone the
need for the acquisition of new plants. Hence, there is good reason to expect
strong support for programs that will increase the long-term cost efficiency of the
utility.
However, in real life there is another side of the regulatory/fiscal picture that
can be frustrating to the engineers and productivity planners. The cost of money
is so high and the fiscal future is so uncertain that the financial decisionmakers
within the company may be very reluctant to approve near-term expenditures for
programs whose payoff may not be evident for several years. Hence, there must be a
clear, well-organized case presented for the FWH replacement and upgrade programs
before they will be supported within the company, especially if the company is also
struggling with expensive problems in boiler and turbine maintenance programs.
Also on the negative side of this picture is the fact that the utility commissions
have been slow to recognize that they should encourage sound, long-term maintenance
and efficiency programs by allowing the proper pass-through of such expenditures in
the rate base. Fortunately, some regulatory institutions do recognize the general
problem and are attempting to establish proper long-term incentives via reforms to
the rate-regulating process; however, it will take time.

The basic lesson within the scope of this publication is that the managers at the
plant and in the utility support offices must analyze their problems and their
solutions to them thoroughly and in a well-coordinated manner to gain fiscal sup-
port within the company for FWH (and other) improvement programs. That same anal-
ysis is also needed by utility higher management to educate and convince the util-
ity commissions that regulatory improvements are needed to provide rate-base sup-
port for well-conceived programs of long-term benefit to the public as well as to
the utility stockholders.

It is hoped that this publication will help motivate utilities to develop the badly
needed improvement programs for efficient operation, maintenance, and management of
their FWHs. The organized analysis mentioned above must come from management ini-
tiative. Using that analysis for supportable decisions in the repair/replace
planning process is also a key responsibility of management at all levels.
 USER FEEDBACK FORM

Purpose: To encourage and facilitate recommendations for future improvements

to EPRI1s first edition of "Recommended Guidelines for the Operation
and Maintenance of Feedwater Heaters." Users' comments are encour-
aged by E P R I ; they may be submitted on this or any convenient form
along with other information that may be of use in future editions of
the guidelines. Please mail to: Feedwater Heater Project Manager,
Availability and Performance P r o g r a m , EPRI, 3412 Hillview Avenue,
Palo Alto, California, 94303.

1. Are these guidelines useful in their present form? How

are they being used and at what levels of your organization?

2. Are changes necessary to correct errors or to avoid misinterpre-

tation? If so, please identify and provide reconmenda-
tions for improvement.

3. Some people have suggested that a tutorial, textbook-type publi-

cation is also needed to explain the different types of FWHs in
detail. Do you agree? If so, should it be added to these
guidelines or promulgated separately for use in basic training
efforts?

4. Do you have any pictures or figures that would be of help in

future edition(s)? If yes, please provide.

5. Do you have any procedures, techniques, or organizational innova-

tions that are especially successful and might be of interest to
other utilities? If so, please provide.

6. Name and telephone number of the individual who may be called for
additional discussion of your comments:

7. Provide any other comments for improvement in follow-on editions

or related work. (Use back of form if additional space is
needed. )
 USER FEEDBACK FORM

Purpose: To encourage and facilitate recommendations for future improvements

to EPRIrs first edition of "Recommended Guidelines for the Operation
and Maintenance of Feedwater Heaters." Users' comments are encour-
aged by EPRI; they may be submitted on this or any convenient form
along with other information that may be of use in future editions of
the guidelines. Please mail to: Feedwater Heater Project Manager,
Availability and Performance Program, EPRI, 3412 Hillview Avenue,
Palo Alto, California, 94303.

1. Are these guidelines useful in their present form? How

are they being used and at what levels of your organization?

2. Are changes necessary to correct errors or to avoid misinterpre-

tation? If so, please identify and provide recommenda-
tions for improvement.

3. Some people have suggested that a tutorial, textbook-type publi-

cation is also needed to explain the different types of FWHs in
detail. Do you agree? If so, should it be added to these
guidelines or promulgated separately for use in basic training
efforts?

4. Do you have any pictures or figures that would be of help in

future edition(s) ? If yes, please provide.

5. Do you have any procedures, techniques, or organizational innova-

tions that are especially successful and might be of interest to
other utilities? I£ so, please provide.

6. Name and telephone number of the individual who may be called for
additional discussion of your comments:

7. Provide any other comments for improvement in follow-on editions

or related work. (Use back of form if additional space is
needed.
 USER FEEDBACK FORM

Purpose: To encourage and facilitate recommendations for future improvements

to EPRI's first edition of "Recommended Guidelines for the Operation
and Maintenance of Feedwater Heaters." Users' comments are encour-
aged by EPRI; they may be submitted on this or any convenient form
along with other information that may be of use in future editions of
the guidelines. Please mail to: Feedwater Heater project Manager,
Wailability and Performance Program, EPRI, 3412 Hillview Avenue,
palo Alto, California, 94303.

I. Are these guidelines useful in their present form? How

are they being used and at what levels of your organization?

2. Are changes necessary to correct errors or to avoid misinterpre-

tation? If so, please identify and provide recommenda-
tions for improvement.

3. Some people have suggested that a tutorial, textbook-type publi-

cation is also needed to explain the different types of FWHs in
detail. Do you agree? If so, should it be added to these
guidelines or promulgated separately for use in basic training
efforts?

4. DO you have any pictures or figures that would be of help in

future edition(s)? If yes, please provide.

5. DO you have any procedures, techniques, or organizational innova-

tions that are especially successful and might be of interest to
other utilities? If so, please provide.

6. Name and telephone number of the individual who may be called for
additional discussion of your comments:

7. Provide any other comments for improvement in follow-on editions

or related work. (Use back of form if additional space is
needed. )
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