1. People v.

Genosa, 341 SCRA 493 (NATURE AND DEFINITION)

Ponente: Panganiban J

Facts:

Characters

Appeallant: Marivic Genosa Y Isidro (wife of the victim)

Victim: Ben Genosa

Under criminal case no. 50160, appellant Marivic Genosa Y Isidro in connection with automatic
review on sept 25, 1998 was found guilty of parricide (murder of direct relative) aggravated by
treachery and sentenced to her death

Information dated on Nov 14, 1996 that were available for the provincial prosecutor are as
follows:

- on the 15th day of November 1995 the appellant attacked, assaulted, hit and wounded Ben
Genosa

He was inflicted the following wounds:

-Cadaveric Spasm

-2nd stage of decomposition

-blackened bloated face (swollen with post mortem Latinity) with protruding eyes and tongue

-Open, depressed, fracture on the head causing brain lacerations

-spontaneous rupture of brain blood vessels

-blisters on both anterior and posterior chest

-shedding epidermis

Upon being found guilty under the crime of parricide is sentenced to death

Additionally the court adds a pay to heirs of the deceased of P50,000 and an indemnity of
another P50,000

The case extends when the appellant files and urgent omnibus prior to filing her appeal.

Allegations are as follows:

-the court erred in concluding that she had lied about the means of employment for killing

-stating that she consistently claimed that she shot him

-court concludes that the cause of death was cardio pulmonary arrest of the occipital
bone

-this is what led her to admitting on the act of smashing him

-failure of appreciation for her self defence theory

-that killing her husband was out of self-defence

-with consideration to evidence of severe beatings and abuse

-at least 6 counts of injuries (testament of DR. Dino Caing)

-23 times of severe hypertension due to emotional stress

-and unsaid amount of verbal abuse (testament of her brother and mother)

On August 22, 2000 the solicitor general filed his comment, which substantially objected to the
motion of the ground that the appellant was “deprived of her right to due process, substantial or
procedural”

Issues that arose are as follows:

-whether the body of the victim should be exhumed and re-examined to ascertain the cause of
death

-whether the appellant should be qualified by psychologists or psychiatrists to determine her

state of mind during the killing

Court Ruling

Remand the case to RTC for reception of evidence from qualified psychologists or psychiatrists
whom the parties may present to establish state of mind during the time of killing

Resolving 1st issue:

Considering the appellant admitted to the fact of killing her husband and the acts of
hitting the nape with a metal pipe and shooting him at the back of his head, exhumation is
unnecessary

*more over the matter of proving the death should have been proven before the trail court

Resolving 2nd issue

Considering the characteristics of the Battered Woman Syndrome

1 the woman believes that the violence was her fault

2 she has an inability to place the responsibility for the violence elsewhere

3 she fears for her life and/ her children’s lives

4 she has and irrational belief that the abuser is omnipresent and omniscient

Trapped in a cycle of violence and constant fear, it is not unlikely she would succumb to her
helplessness and fail to perceive possible solutions to the problem other than to injure or kill
her killer (this is not an official psychiatric assessment)
The court decides that the discourse in her omnibus motion convinced the court that the
syndrome deserves serious consideration. Especially in the light of its possible effect on her
life

It is equally important to determine whether appellant genosa had acted freely, intelligently and
voluntarily when she killed her spouse. The court however cannot properly evaluate her Battered-
Woman-Syndrome defence.

FINAL RULING:

Wherefore, the urgent omnibus motion of the appellant Marivi C Genosa is PARTLY GRANTED. The case
is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and or psychiatric
opinion on the Battered-w-Syndrome plea within 90 days from notice

2. People v. Tulin, 364 SCRA 10 (Territorial Act)

Ponente: J. Melo

(An appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Br. 49)

PARTIES INVOLVED:

People of the Philippines (plantiff-appellee)

Emilio O. Changco (a.k.a Captain Bobby, Robert Castillo, Kevin Ocampo)

Cecilio O. Chango
Roger P. Tulin
Virgilio I. Loyola
Andres C. Infante
Cheing San Hiong (a.k.a Ramzan Ali, Sonny Csh)
 Attendant/supervisor of “Navi Pride” vessel
 Chief Officer (Certification from Australia)
 Employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port Captain
John Does (various unnamed accused)

FACTS:
 March 2, 1991, evening, “M/T Tabarangao”, a cargo vessel (boarded with 21 crew
members) owned by PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation loaded with various
petroleum products with a total value of P40,426,793.87, was sailing off cost of Mindoro
near Silonay Island.

 The vessel was boarded and led by E. Changco together with Tulin, Loyola and Infante
armed with rifles, guns and bolos. Loyola ordered three (3) crew members to paint over,
using black paint rear portion of the vessel, as well as PNOC logo and changed the name
of the vessel to “M/T Galile” with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras.
  The crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all the while sending misleading radio
messages to pNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.

 PNOC after losing the contact, reported the disappearance to Phil. Coast Guard, Phil. Air
Force and Phil. Marines for search and rescue but nevertheless negative results.

 March 9, 1991, the vessel arrived at the vicinity of Singapore and wait for another
vessel, however, failed to arrived. March 14, 1991, pirates force to return to Phils and
arriving at Calagtan, Batangas on March 20, 1991.

 March 29, 1991, the vessel (M/T Galile) sailed again to Singapore where another vessel
(Navi Pride) anchered beside the former. E. Chango ordered the crew to transfer the
petroleum products to the hold of Navi Pride and completed on March 30, 1991.

 April 8, 1991, M/T Galile arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vessel remained at sea.
April 10, 1991, crew members were released in three (3) batches with the stern of
warning not to report to the government authorities for a period of two (2) days or until
April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be killed.

 C. Changco fetched, via newly painted passenger jeep, the crews released and brought
the the latter to their respective residences and different places in manila.

 Series of arrest effected as follows:

o May 22, 1991, Tullin was arrested at U.K. Beach, Balibago, Calagtan, Batanges
o May 20, 1991, Hiong and Changco was arrested at the lobby of Alpha Hotel in
Batangas City
o Arrested as well, Infante and Loyola.
o E. Changco at large

HELD by Regional Trial Court RTC:

 Tulin, Loyola, Infante and C. Changco - Guilty beyond reasonable doubt (Crime of Piracy
in Phil. Waters Section 2(d) of P.D. No. 532
 Cheong San Hiong – Guilty pursuant to Art. 52 of RPC in relation to Sec. 5 of PD 532

HELD by Supreme Court (SC):

 The Court hereby affirms the judgment of the trial court in toto.
3. White Light Corp. v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, 20 Jan. 2009 (DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION)

PONENTE: JUSTICE TINGA

➢ Incessant clash between government power and individual liberty in tandem with the archetypal tension
between law and morality.

➢ Assails a similarly-motivated city ordinance that prohibits those same establishments from offering short-
time admission, as well as pro-rated or "wash up" rates for such abbreviated stays.

➢ Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which seeks the reversal of the Decision in C.A.-G.R. S.P.
No. 33316 of the Court of Appeals, challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An
Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in
Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila"
(the Ordinance)

➢ On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the Ordinance.The Ordinance
is reproduced in full, hereunder:

➢ SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City Government to protect
the best interest, health and welfare, and the morality of its constituents in general and the youth
in particular.

➢ SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance" prohibiting short time admission in
hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.

➢ SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other
similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension
houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.

➢ SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging of room
rate for less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms more than
twice a day or any other term that may be concocted by owners or managers of said
establishments but would mean the same or would bear the same meaning.

➢ SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of this ordinance
shall upon conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos or
imprisonment for a period of not exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and imprisonment at
the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case of [a] juridical person, the president, the
manager, or the persons in charge of the operation thereof shall be liable: Provided, further, That
in case of subsequent conviction for the same offense, the business license of the guilty party
shall automatically be cancelled.

➢ SEC. 6. Repealing Clause. Any or all provisions of City ordinances not consistent with or contrary to
this measure or any portion hereof are hereby deemed repealed.

➢ SEC. 7. Effectivity. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval.
Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session today, November 10, 1992.
➢ December 15, 1992 - Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory
relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order ( TRO) with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila
(the City) represented by Mayor Lim. MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and
inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that
as owner and operator of the Victoria Court in Malate, Manila it was authorized by Presidential Decree
 (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time basis as well as to charge customers wash up rates for
stays of only three hours.

➢ December 21, 1992 - White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and
Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-
intervention on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-
in-hotels and motels in Manila.The three companies are components of the Anito Group of Companies
which owns and operates several hotels and motels in Metro Manila.

➢ December 23, 1992 - the RTC granted the motion to intervene. The RTC also notified the Solicitor General
of the proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. On the same date, MTDC
moved to withdraw as plaintiff.

➢ December 28, 1992 - he RTC granted MTDC's motion to withdraw. The RTC issued a TRO on January 14,
1993, directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance

➢ January 22, 1993 - The City filed an Answer alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police
power.

➢ February 8, 1993 - the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to desist from the
enforcement of the Ordinance.

➢ March 8, 1993 - the Solicitor General filed his Comment arguing that the Ordinance is constitutional.

➢ October 20, 1993 - the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. (The ordinance
"strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution.")

➢ January 26, 1994 - City filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court

➢ Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power
pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities, among other local
government units, the power:

[To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels,
motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and
transports.
➢ Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and
the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and
oppressive interference in their business.

➢ The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.

• First, it held that the Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as
it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time
stays.

• Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object
obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims
to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to
operate.
 • Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in
general.

• Finally, as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of Manila, liberty is
regulated by law.

➢ the crux of the matter is whether or not these establishments have the requisite standing to plead for
protection of their patrons' equal protection rights.

➢ Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and
harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case. More importantly,
the doctrine of standing is built on the principle of separation of powers, sparing as it does unnecessary
interference or invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of
government.

➢ The petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize their
establishments for a "wash-rate" time frame.

➢ Enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging
establishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels
and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this
is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens.

➢ Requisites for Ordinance:

(1) Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not
be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
➢ primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed under Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution

➢ Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a
person of life, liberty, or property. Procedural due process concerns itself with government action adhering
to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere. Examples range from the
form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing.

➢ Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether
the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.

➢ The judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a discrimination against a "discrete and insular"
minority or infringement of a "fundamental right."

➢ The Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of
lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a
police power measure.

➢ The means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
of private rights.
 ➢ The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be
diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of
prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation.

➢ Needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. How ever well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in
effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

4. Estrada v. Escritor, 492 SCRA 1 (FREEDOM OF RELIGION)

Ponente: Puno, J.

Facts:

- More than 20 yrs ago (assume 20 years back when she was asked to testify for herself) respondent
Soledad Escritor (a member of Jehovah's witnesses, the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society) admitted
"living in" with a certain Luciano Quilapio, Jr. (same religious affiliation) without benefit of marriage, when
her husband was still alive. Respondent and Quilapio have a son.

- 10 years into the "live in" relationship with Quilapio, respondent executed on July 28 ,1991 a
"Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness", which allows members of the congregation (jehovah's witnesses)
who have been abandoned by their spouses (Escritor was no longer living with her husband, and so was
Quilapio) to enter into marital relations. Such union is binding within the congregation. The declaration
made between the two was executed in the usual and approved manner prescribed by Jenovah's
witnesses.

- Respondent's husband died in 1998.

- Respondent worked as a court interpreter in 1999.

- Petitioner Alejandro Estrada requested Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of Branch 253,
Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City, through a sworn-letter complaint dated July 27, 2000, to
investigate on the respondent for living with a man not her husband, and having borne a child within a
"live-in" arrangement. Respondent was charged of committing "disgraceful and immoral conduct" under
Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Code.

- Respondent invoked the religious beliefs, practices and moral standards of her congregation, in her
assertion that her conjugal arrangement does not constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct for which
she was being held liable.

- (the case reached the Supreme Court, no detail was provided on the events that followed)

- August 4, 2003, the Court remanded the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), and
ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to intervene. The Court held in its decision: (1)
"benevolent neutrality or accommodation", is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the religion
clause in our Constitution; and (2) in deciding respondent's plea of exemption based on the Free Exercise
Clause (from the law with which she is administratively charged) it is "compelling state interest test", the
strictest test, which must be applied.
- NOW (time of ruling on the case), the only task that the Court is left to do is to determine whether the
evidences adduced by the State proves its more compelling interest. This issue involves a pure question
of fact.
Issue:

Does the Constitutional protection of freedom of religion apply in defense of the respondent (exemption
from the law with which she was being held liable)?

Held:

Respondent made out an exemption from the law based on her right to religious freedom; her conjugal
arrangement cannot be penalized.

1. The sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice are beyond reasonable
doubt.

2. Compelling State Interest Test - there being a law or government practice which inhibits the free
exercise of a person's religious beliefs, and there being no doubt as to the sincerity and centrality of his
faith to claim exemption based on the free exercise clause, BURDEN SHIFTED TO THE GOVERNMENT
TO DEMONSTRATE THE LAW OR PRACTICE JUSTIFIES COMPELLING SECULAR OBJECTIVE and
THAT IT (the law or practice) IS THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS TO ACHIEVING THAT (compelling)
OBJECTIVE. (in relation to this, justice carpio's argument on protection of family and marriage as social
institutions was considered merely speculative)

3. Free exercise of religion is fundamental, and "most inalienable and sacred of human rights". The State
must articulate in SPECIFIC TERMS THE STATE INTEREST INVOLVED PREVENTING FOR THE
EXEMPTION, WHICH MUST BE COMPELLING, FOR ONLY THE GRAVEST ABUSES, ENDANGERING
PATAMOUNT INTERESTS CAN LIMIT FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM. IT MUST
PRECISELY SHOW HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT ITS OBJECTIVES WILL BE UNDERMINED IF
EXEMPTIONS ARE GRANTED.

4. Benevolent Neutrality - Although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, BENEVOLENT

NEUTRALITY COULD ALLOW FOR ACCOMMODATION OF MORALITY BASED ON RELIGION,
PROVIDED IT DOES NOT OFFEND STATE INTERESTS. THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
EXTENDS ONLY TO PUBLIC AND SECULAR MORALITY. (secular morality distinguished from religious
morality, thus which immoral acts according to public and secular morality fall under "disgraceful and
immoral acts").

5. FINALLY, EVEN IF THE OSG HAS PROVED A COMPELLING STATE INTEREST, IT HAS TO
FURTHER DEMONSTRATE THAT THE STATE USED THE LEAST INTRUSIVE MEANS POSSIBLE SO
THAT FREE EXERCISE IS NOT INFRINGED ANY MORE THAN NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THE
LEGITIMATE GOAL OF THE STATE. No iota of evidence was offered in relation to this.

Administrative Case Dismissed.

EXTRA POINTS:

Two Components of Right to Freedom of Religion:

1. Free exercise clause - prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious
beliefs and practices.

2. Establishment clause - prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious
beliefs and practices.
Discussions on how the Court arrived on benevolent neutrality as a mode of separation between church
and state not included here. ANYWAY:

Modes of separation

1. Separation Standard
a. Strict separation
b. strict neutrality (tamer than strict separation)

Point is, both works under the premise that there must be a wall of separation between church and state,
and such a wall is to PROTECT STATE FROM THE CHURCH. Both rigid on the separation of church and
state principle.

2. Benevolent neutrality or accommodation

Wall is meant to PROTECT CHURCH FROM STATE.

5. People v. Echangaray, 267 SCRA 682 (NO EXCESSIVE FINES, NOR CRUEL, DEGRADING OR
INHUMAN PUNISHMENT)

 Rape case
 Accused – appellant LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO was sentenced the penalty of death
when she raped her 10 yr old daughter.
 ECHEGARAY filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion raises grounds for
the reversal of death sentence one of which was Republic Act No. 7659, re-
imposing the death penalty is unconstitutional per se: for crimes where no death
results from the offense, the death penalty is a severe and excessive penalty in
violation of ARTICLE III, SEC. 19(1) OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
 ISSUE: Is ART. III, SEC. 19(1) of the 1987 CONSTITUTION a limitation on Criminal
Law?
 HELD: YES. It has the implications of the foregoing provision on the effectivity of
the death penalty provisions in the REVISED PENAL CODE and certain special
criminal laws and the state of the scale of penalties thereunder, were
tremendous…. (PLEASE SEE PAGE 699 OF THE PHOTOCOPY 2ND PARAGRAPH AND
READ MORE ABOUT THE CHANGE OF THE SCALE OF PENALTIES WHICH IS ONE OF
THE REASONS).
 NOTES:
1. Memorize ARTICLE III SEC. 19(1) of the 1987 CONSTITUTION
2. Be familiar on the different CRIMES mentioned in the case (PHOTOCOPY PAGE
718 TO 721)
3. Requirement for Congress to re-impose death penalty: (SEE PHOTOCOPY PAGE
683 LAST PARAGRAPH)
4. See Heinous Crime definition under R.A. No. 7659 (IN THE PHOTOCOPY PAGE
715 SECOND PARAGRAPH).
 5. Know the EFFECTIVITY OF RA NO 7659 – IN THE PHOTOCOPY page 713 LAST
PARAGRAPH.

6. Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 180016, 29 April 2004 (NO EXCESSIVE FINES, NOR CRUEL,
DEGRADING OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT)

LITO CORPUZ, petitioner VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent

PONENTE: Peralta, J.

 Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision dated March 22,
2007 and Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed with
modification the decision dated July 30, 2004 of the RTC Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding
the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph
(1) sub paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
 Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner Corpuz met at the Admiral Royale Vasino in
Olongapo City some time in 1990.
 Tangcoy was then engaged in the business of lending money to casino players and had some
pieces of jewelry for sale.
 Upon hearing this, Corpuz approached Tangcoy on May 2, 1991 at the Casino and offered to sell
the pieces of jewelry on commission basis.
 Tangcoy agreed and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the pieces of jewelry with an
aggregate value of P98,000.00 (18k diamond ring for men, a woman’s bracelet, one men’s
necklace and another men’s bracelet), as evidenced by a receipt of even date.
 They agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and if unsold, return the same
items within a period of 60 days.
 The period expired on July 5, 1991 without the petitioner remitting the proceeds or returning the
jewelry.
 Tangcoy was able to meet the petitioner again. Petitioner promised the complainant that he will
pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.
 Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of Estafa.
 Corpuz, under expressed obligation to remit the proceeds of sale of the items or to return the
same, if not sold.
 Once in possession of the said items, with intent to defraud, and with unfaithfulness and abuse
of confidence, and far from complying with his aforestated obligation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and
benefit the aforesaid items or the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands,
the accused failed and refused to return the said items or to remit the amount of Ninety- Eight
Thousand Pesos (P98,000.00), to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in the
aforementioned amount.
 On January 28, 1992, Corpuz, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.
Trial on the merits ensued.
 Prosecution presented the lone testimony of Tangcoy while the defense presented the lone
testimony of Corpuz.
 Corpuz’ testimony: petitioner and complainant were collecting agents of Antonio
Balajadia (engaged in the financing business of extending loans). He denied having
transacted any business with private complainant.
Corpuz admitted that he previously transacted with Balajadia for which he was made to
sign a blank receipt dated May 2, 1991. He claimed that the same receipt was used as
evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell the pieces of jewelry, which he did
not see.
 RTC found Corpuz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Estafa under Art.
315 of the RPC sentencing him to suffer the penalty of deprivation of liberty consisting of an
imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of 4 years and 2 months of Prison
Correccional as minimum to 14 years and 8 months of Reclusion Temporal as maximum; to
indemnify Tangcoy the amount of P98,000 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
 The case was elevated to CA. CA denied the instant appeal.
 The assailed judgment dated July 30, 2004 was affirmed and modified. The rest of the decision
of the RTC stands plus 1 year for each additional P10,000 or a total of 7 years.
 Petitioner filed with the SC, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, stating that CA
erred in affirming the ruling of trial court, admitting in evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991
marked as Exhibit “A” although the same was merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best
evidence rule.
 Records show that Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence.
 Corpuz further contends that the information does not contain the period when the pieces of
jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the date when the crime occurred was different
from the one testified to by private complainant.
 An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the
offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof.
 The failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date does not render the
Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within
which accused-appellant should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of
jewelry] as testified upon by Tangcoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules.
 It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa. ART. 315.
Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means With
unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence,
 The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or
other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return
the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party
on the offender.
 Petitioner argued that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended party on
the offender, was not proved. SC disagreed
 The law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence of the
crime of embezzlement. It so happens that failure to account, upon demand for funds or
property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.
 There was misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of those pieces of
jewelry sold or failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within or after the agreed period
despite demand from the private complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.
 As regards the penalty, the validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving
property was questioned. The legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the value of the
money and property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code.
 There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the courts
continue to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the amount of
damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932.
 However, this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that would
constitute judicial legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending
the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's
decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of another branch of the
government.
 It can be appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had
anticipated this matter by including Article 5.
The second paragraph of article 5 of the RPC is similar to the first except for the situation
wherein the act is already punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is
deemed by the court as excessive.
 The court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive, this time, of the need for a legislation to
provide the proper penalty.
 In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, Guillermo B. Guevara opined that in
Article 5, the duty of the court is merely to report to the Chief Executive, with a recommendation
for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh.
 Article 5 is based on the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege," that is, that
there can exist no punishable act except those previously and specifically provided for by penal
statute.
 No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it necessary to
prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be entirely powerless to
punish such act.
 Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a sentence
on the ground that the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would cause
excessive or harsh penalty. All that the Court could do in such eventuality is to report
the matter to the Chief Executive with a recommendation for an amendment or
modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh.
 "Whether or not the penalties prescribed by law upon conviction of violations of particular
statutes are too severe or are not severe enough, are questions as to which commentators on
the law may fairly differ; but it is the duty of the courts to enforce the will of the legislator in all
cases unless it clearly appears that a given penalty falls within the prohibited class of excessive
fines or cruel and unusual punishment."
 Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not
usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or
construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation,
modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which
is repugnant to its terms.
 The Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of
the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of
separation of powers by means of judicial legislation.
 Some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense committed as tantamount to cruel
punishment. However, all penalties are generally harsh, being punitive in nature.
 Whether or not they are excessive or amount to cruel punishment is a matter that should be left
to lawmakers. It is the prerogative of the courts to apply the law, especially when they are clear
and not subject to any other interpretation than that which is plainly written.
 The Court is ill-equipped, has no resources, and lacks sufficient personnel to conduct public
hearings and sponsor studies and surveys to validly effect these changes in our Revised Penal
Code. This function clearly and appropriately belongs to Congress.
 Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes the view that the role of the Court is not merely
to dispense justice, but also the active duty to prevent injustice. Thus, in order to prevent
injustice in the present controversy, the Court should not impose an obsolete penalty pegged
eighty three years ago, but consider the proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply compensating for
inflation. Furthermore, the Court has in the past taken into consideration "changed conditions" or
"significant changes in circumstances" in its decisions.
 To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisión correccional maximum to
prisión mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time each of which portion
shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 65 of the RPC.
 Considering that the amount of P98,000.00 is P76,000.00 more than the P22,000.00 ceiling set by
law, then, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8
months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7 years. Taking
the maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is 8 years, plus an additional 7 years, the
maximum of the indeterminate penalty is 15 years.
 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa
charge against petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty
next lower would then be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
 Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6 months and
1 day to 4 years and 2 months.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of petitioner Lito
Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution
dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Decision
dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-
paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
the penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3)
YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN
(15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.

SO ORDERED.
7. People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (BILL OF ATTAINDER)

Justice Fernando as the PONENTE

A criminal complaint against the respondent Feliciano Co was filed before the Court of First

Instance of Tarlac on March 5, 1970 in violation of the section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act on

the grounds of his position as an officer and/ or as a ranking leader of the Communist Party of

the Philippines, an illegal organization which targets to overthrow the Government of the

Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion or any other illegal means for the

purpose of establishing a totalitarian regime under the control of a foreign power apropos his

profession as an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, a school designed to train recruits of

the New People’s Army, which had been deemed as a military arm of the Communist Party.

The aggravating circumstances are as follows:

a.) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or insult to public authorities;

b.) That the crime was committed by a band; and

c.) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.

Co, however, contends that the complaint is a bill of attainder.

Another criminal complaint was filed in the same court on May 25, 1970, accusing the defendant

Nilo Tayag (alias Romy Reyes alias TABA) and five others which include Arthur Garcia, Renato

Casipe, Abelardo Garcia, Manual Alvado, Benjamin Bie alias Commander Melody and many

other John Does (a placeholder name substituting for other unknown identities) in violation of

the Anti-Subversion Law.

In about March 1969 or prior thereto and thereafter, they joined and became officers and/or

ranking leaders of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a subversive organization. Furthermore,

Commander Melody became an officer and/or ranking official in the CCP and also in the New

People’s Army, a branch of the CCP. Hence, the above-named accused conspired, confederated,

and mutually assisted one another and wilfully and feloniously commit subversive and/or

seditious acts, by instigating and stirring the people to unite and rise publicly against the

government and engage in riots and conspiracies to overthrow the government by force,

violence, deceit, subversion and/or illegal means vis-à-vis:

1.) Within Tarlac, the accused conducted meetings and/or seminars to overthrow the

government. A chapter of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN in barrio Motrico, La Paz, Tarlac

consigned with the purpose of undertaking an armed revolution, seditious propaganda, riots, and

conspiracies to usurp the government of the Philippines.

2.) Nilo Tayag together with Francisco Portem alias Kiko Gonzales pursued subversive and/or

seditious activities in San Pablo City by recruiting members for the New People’s Army to

overthrow the government.

The aggravating circumstances are as follows:

a.) raid of armed men or persons to insure or afford impunity; and b.) craft, fraud, or disguise

was employed.

Tayag moved to quash the validity of the statute: 1.) it is a bill of attainder; 2.) it is vague; and 3.)

it embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and 4.) it denies him the

equal protection of the laws.

The court declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague

and overboard, and dismissed the information against the two accused on September 15, 1970.

Look for the section 4 of the Rep. Act No, 1700 Laws and Res. 102 (1957) as a reference. It’s

footnoted on the handouts.

8. US v. Diaz Conde, L-18208, 14 February 1922 (EX-POST FACTO LAWS)

PONENTE: JOHNSON, J.
FACT: On the 30th day of December, 1915, the alleged offended persons Bartolome Oliveros
and Engracia Lianco executed and delivered to the defendants a contract evidencing the fact
that the former had borrowed from the latter the sum of P300, and that, by virtue of the terms of
said contract, the said persons obligated themselves to pay to the defendants interest at the
rate of five percent (5%) per month, payable within the first ten days of each and every month,
the first payment to be made on the 10th day of January, 1916.
A complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila on May 6, 1921,
charging the defendants Vicente Diaz Conde and Apolinaria R. De Conde with a violation
of the Usury Law. Upon said complaint they were arrested, charged, and pleaded not guilty.
On September 1, 1921, the case was finally brought on for trial. At the end of the trial, with
consideration to the evidences cited in court, Hon. M. V. del Rosario, judge, found that the
defendants were guilty of the crime charged in the complaint and sentenced each of them to
pay a fine of P120 and, if they cannot meet their debt obligations, the defendants would
suffer subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of the law. From that
sentence each of the defendants made an appeal.
ISSUE: Is the contract upon which the alleged usurious interest was collected was executed
before Act No. 2655 was adopted?
Is the time that the said contract was made (December 30, 1915), there was no usury law in
force in the Philippine Islands?

Is Act No. 2655 did not become effective until the May 1, 1916, or four months and a half
after the contract was executed?

Is the said law could have no retroactive effect or operation? Is the said law impairs the
obligation of a contract?

HELD: The court has decided that the acts complained of by the defendants did not
constitute a crime at the time they were committed. A law imposing a new penalty, liability or
disability, or giving a new right of action, must not be construed as having a retroactive
effect. It is an elementary rule of contract that the laws in force at the time of the contract
was made must govern its interpretation and application. Laws must be construed
prospectively and not retrospectively. If a contract is legal at its commencement, it cannot be
rendered illegal by any subsequent legislation. If that were permitted, then the obligations of
a contract might be impaired, which is prohibited by Philippine law.

The complaint was therefore dismissed, and the defendants were discharged from the
custody of the law with costs.

9. People v. Abilong, L-1960, 26 November 1948. (SPANISH TEXT OF THE RCP PREVAILS
OVER THE ENGLISH TEXT)
PONENTE: MONTEMAYOR, J.:

FACTS:

 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
FLORENTINO

ABILONG, defendant-appellant.
 Florentino Abilong was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with
evasion of service
 April 5, 1946
o Rendered final judgment by the municipal court for attempted robbery.
o Sentence
 The accused, a convict sentenced and ordered to serve two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of destierro
 Accessory penalties of the law and to pay the costs.
 During which he should not enter any place within the radius of 100
kilometers from the City of Manila
 September 17, 1947
o He willfully, unlawfully and feloniously evades the service of said
sentence by going beyond the limits made against him and commits
vagrancy.
 APPEAL:
o The lower court erred in imposing a penalty on the accused under article
157 of the Revised Penal Code, which does not cover evasion of
service of "destierro."
 A person like the accused evading a sentence of destierro is not
criminally liable
 Revised Penal Code, article 157 refers only to persons who are
imprisoned in a penal institution and completely deprived of
their liberty.
 Appelant’s basis is the word "imprisonment"
 Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be
imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his
sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by
reason of final judgment.
o Solicitor General
 says that had the original text of the Revised Penal Code been in
 the English language, then the theory of the appellant could be
uphold. However, it is the Spanish text that is controlling in case
of doubt.
 In as much as the Revised Penal Code was originally approved and
enacted in Spanish, the Spanish text governs
 It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used in the English
text is a wrong or erroneous translation of the phrase
"sufriendo privacion de libertad"
 Solicitor General impliedly admits destierro as not constituting imprisonment,
it is a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in the present
case,
o the appellant by his sentence of destierro was deprived of the liberty to
enter the City of Manila.
o He cannot invoke the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
 its provisions do not apply to those who shall have escaped from
confinement or evaded sentence.

ISSUE:

Is the appellant guilty of evasion of service of sentence in a destierro under RPC Article 157?

HELD:

 The appellant is guilty of evasion of service of sentence under article 157 of the
Revised Penal Code (Spanish text),
o during the period of his sentence of destierro he was prohibited from
entering the City of Manila,
o He entered said City.

10. People v. Formigones, L-3246, 29 November 1950 (PRESCRIBED BUT UNDESERVED

PENALTIES)

Ponente: MONTEMAYOR, J.:

 Appeal from decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur finding the appellant guilty
of parricide and sentencing him toreclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
the amount of P2,000, and to pay the costs.

FACTS:

 Nov 1946 – defendant Abelardo Formigones was living on his farm in Bahao, Libmanan,
municipality of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, with wife, Julia Agricola, and his five children. To find
employment as harvesters of palay, they went to live in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias
Formigones.
 Dec 28, 1946 (one month after)- late in the afternoon, Julia was sitting at the head of the stairs of
the house. Abelardo, without any previous provocation, took his bolo from the wall of the house
 and stabbed his wife, Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung, causing severe
hemorrhage resulting to her death. Blow sent Julia toppling down the stairs to the ground,
followed by husband Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms, carried her up the house, laid
her on the floor of the living room and then lay down beside her. Irene Formigones, eldest
daughter witnessed and testified to the stabbing of her mother by her father.
 Abelardo admitted to killing his wife in a written statement (Exhibit D) with the motive of jealousy.
He used to have quarrels with his wife for the reason that he often saw her in the company of
his brother Zacarias; suspecting the two were maintaining illicit relations because he noticed
she became indifferent to him.
 During preliminary investigation, accused pleaded guilty, but during trial of Court of First Instance,
the defendant entered a plea of not guilty, but did not testify. Instead, his counsel presented
two guards working in the provincial jail where Abelardo was confined that accused's conduct
was rather strange and that he behaved like an insane person (removes clothes and go
naked, remains silent and indifferent to his surroundings, refuses to take bath, etc). .
 Appeal based merely on theory that apellant is an imbecile and therefore exempt from criminal
liability under Article 12 of the RPC. Trial court rejects theory and Dr. Francisco Gomez, who
examined him, testified that Abelardo was suffering only from feeblemindedness, or to morbid
mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife and not imbecility and that he
could distinguish right from wrong.

ISSUE: Whether or not Abelardo is an imbecile, freeing him from criminal liability or not.

 To be regarded as an imbecile according to Article 12 of RPC to exempt him from criminal

liability, “it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the
act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own
acts; that he acts without the least discernment; that there be a complete absence of the power
to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held
that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive
a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties
does not exclude imputability.
 Allegation of insanity of imbecility must be clearly proven. However, prior to the crime, there was
no evidence to prove he lost his reason or was demented, Abelardo worked diligently to
provide for family, sell copra at the side = presumed normal condition. It was clearly voluntary.
 HELD: NO. Guilty of parricide but modification that Abelardo may petition to executive branch of
Government, if it be deemed proper in the exercise of the prerogative vested in it by the
sovereign power, may reduce the penalty to that of the next lower.

11. People v. Sylvestre and Atienza, 56 Phil. 353 (Physical Element: Omission)

Ponente: Justice Villareal

 Case of Arson
 Defendant and appellants - Romana Silvestre and Martin Atienza
 Facts:
o Domingo Joaquin, wife of Romana Silvestre by their 2nd marriage. Found out that Romana and
Martin have an affair. He sworn a complaint for adultery against the two.
o The two were arrested but released afterwards on bail.
o The complaint was withdrawn by domingo, given that the two would discontinue to cohabitate
and promising not to live again in the barrio, Masocol, Paombong Bulacan.
o The accused lived in SantoNino, following their exile from the village.
o On November 20, 1930, Romana met Nicolas dela Cruz, her son in her first marriage, in Sto.
Nino asking for some nipa leaves then goes with him in Masocol, where the son resides.
 o Atienza followed the two.
o During supper, Nicolas with his wife, Antonina were gathered together with the appellants.
o Atienza then told the couple to take their furnitures out of the house because he will set it on
fire.
o The reason behind it was he wanted to seek revenge to the people of masocol for charging him
with adultery.
o Atienza was armed with a pistol that no one dared to say anything, not even Romana.
o The couple (Nick and Anty) freaked out and left the house at once to comunicate with the
authority.
o The fire destroyed about 40 houses.

Issue (based on art III) :

 Is Romana Silvestre criminally liable for failure of reporting to the authorities the comission of the
arson that she witnessed?

Held:

 No. Here are the reasons why.

o The element of felonies are,
 There must be an act or omission.
 Act should be considered punishable by the Revised Penal Code.
 Act made should be of dolo or culpa.
o Omission is the failure to do positive duty which one is bound to do.
o Examples of felony by omission:
 Failure to help a wounded person in an uninhabitable place.
 An officer entrusted collection of taxes who voluntarily fails to issue receipt.
 Any person, owing allegiance to Phil., who does not disclose any known knowledge of any
conspiracy against the govt.
o But as stated in the revised penal code (art III) that there is no law that punishes a person who
does not report to the authorities the commission of felony he/she witnessed. It is then not
considered a felony.

12. People v. Talingdan, 84 SCRA 19 (PHYSICAL ELEMENT: OMISSION)

Plaintiff-Appellee: The People of the Philippines

Accused-Appellants: Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras, Pedro Bides, and Teresa
Domogma
Ponente: Per Curiam

Facts:

The accused are appealing the judgement of the Court of First Instance of Abra.
Bernardo Bagabag,a farmer/part-time carpenter, and Teresa Domoga (prosecution was unable to find
any evidence of the two being married) lived together in their house in Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra along
with their children. Recently the couple had a string of marital issues. On two separate occasions
Nemesio Talingdan (local policeman) visited Teresa at her home whole Bernardo was out at work. Each
time Teresa would ask Corazon her 12 year old daughter to, go down downstairs and leave them. The
following is the timeline leading to the events:

 One month before murder ( May 1967)

o Teresa deserted their and was gone for 3 weeks while Bernardo took care of
Corazon and went looking for her.
o Bernardo came to know later that she had been spotted with Talingdan in
Tayum, Abra
 2 days before murder ( June 22, 1967)
o Bernardo had a violent quarrel with Teresa in which he slapped her several
times.
o Teresa went down to ask the police for help and after a short while Talingdan
came and asked for Bernardo to come down. Knowing that Talingdan was
armed, Bernardo ignored him
o Before leaving, Talingdan warned Bernardo that he would kill him one day
 1 day before murder ( June 21, 1967)
o Between 10-11 AM while Corazon was washing clothes by the creek, she spotted
her mother meeting with the co-appellants, whom she knew from the small
community, in small hut owned by Bernardo.
o She approached them and heard one of them say “ Could he elude a bullet”
o When Teresa noticed her daughter she shoved her away saying “ You tel your
father that we will kill him”
 Day of murder ( june 22, 1967)
o Shortly after sunset (around 6PM) Corazon was cooking dinner in the kitchen
when she saw her mother leaving the house to go to the yard.
o She saw through the “batalan” ( terrace) slits her mother meeting with the co-
appellants, armed with long guns, talking hushed tones. After about 2 minutes
her mother left the group to go back inside the house while the others went
under a nearby avocado tree.
o After eating alone she called out again for dinner and told her father of the
presence of the people downstairs which Bernardo ignored.
o Bernardo entered the kitchen and sat by the door when suddenly he was fired
upon from below the stairs of the “batalan”
o The four appellants then entered the kitchen with their long guns and seeing
that Bernardo was still alive Talingdan and Tobias finished the job.
o Bides then threatened to kill her if she called for help and fled soon after.
o Teresa then came out of her room and interviewed Corazon, then threatened
her when she told her mother that she knew the identities of her father’s killers.
 June 27, 1967
o Bernardo’s brother and mother arrive and take custody of the children.
  August 5, 1967
o Corazon with the help of her uncle and grandmother gave her sworn statement
to the police which lead to the case.

Court Findings:

 The court finds the Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras, and Pedro
Bides guilty of murder qualified by treachery (deliberately choosing night-time to
suddenly without warning assault their victim, taking advantage of their number and
arms) as charged and that they committed the said offense in conspiracy with each
other with evident premeditation and in the dwelling of the offended party. In other
words, two counts aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the offense,
namely evident premeditation and that it was committed in the dwelling of the victim.
No mitigating circumstance has been proven.

 True it is that the proof her direct participation in the conspiracy is not beyond
reasonable doubt, for which reason, she cannot have the same liability as her co-
appellants. Indeed she had no hand at all in the actual shooting of her husband. Neither
is it clear that she helped directly in the planning and preparation thereof, albeit we are
convinced that she knew it was going to be done and did not object…But this is not
saying that she is entirely free from criminal liability. There is on the record moral
convincing proof that she is at the very least an accessory to the offense committed by
her co-accused…Teresa did not only enjoin her daughter not to reveal what she knew
to anyone she went to the extent of warning “ don’t tell it to anyone. I will kill you if
you tell this to somebody.” Later when the peace officers who repaired to their house
to investigate what happened, instead of helping them with the information given to
her by Corazon she claimed she had no suspects in mind. These subsequent acts of her
constitute “ concealming or assisting in the escape of the principle of the crime” which
makes her liable as an accessory after the fact under Article 19 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Decision:

WHEREFORE, with the above finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellants Nemesio
Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides of the crime of murder with two
aggravating circumstances, without any mitigating circumstances to offset them, they are each hereby
sentenced to DEATH to be executed in accordance with law. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
accessory to the same murder, appellant Teresa Domogma is hereby sentenced to suffer and
indeterminate penalty of 5 years of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as
maximum with the accessory penalties of law.

Makasiar, J dissenting in part (Teehankee, J. concurs but join in the partial dissent) :

“ I dissent insofar as the liability of the accused Teresa Domogma who should be convicted, not merely
as an accessory, but of parricide as principal and meted the death penalty, is concerned.
15. People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257 (MISTAKE OF FACT)

PONENTE: JUSTICE MORAN

FACTS:

 Captain Monsod received an information that Balagtas escaped prison and is now with a
bailarina named Irene
 Defendant-Appellant was then instructed to look for the whereabouts of Balagtas and to
arrest him immediately and if overpowered, to arrest him dead or alive.
 Oanis and Galanta together with their party took the route to Rizal St. Where the house of
Irene is located
 Upon arriving at Irene's house, Oanis asked a girl named Brigada as to where is the room of
Irene
 They then went to the room of Irene and found a man sleeping with his back towards the
door where they are located and they simultaneously and successively fired at him
 It turned out later that the prson shot and killed was not Balagtas but an innocent person
named Serapio Tecson
 They were then charged of murder but they contended that they acted in innocent mistake
of fact. Hence, not criminally liable
ISSUE:

Are Galanta and Oanis criminnaly liable for murder?

HELD:

 YES, because the legal maxim "ignorancia facti excusat" is only applicable when mistake of
fact is committed without fault or carelessness
 In the case at bar, Galante and Oanis acted in fault because they failed to check the real
identity of the person despite having ample time to do so and despite the fact that the
person to be arrested is unarmed
 The case was compared to Ah Chong wherein ignorancia facti excusat was applied because
the accused was able to establish that he acted without negligence because he made a
repetitive warning to the injured person and he was able to asked the identity of the
person but with no response
 Since the person is unarmed there is no need for them to put force in arresting the person

"ignorancia facti excusat" - a person who act in mistake of fact shall be exempted from criminal
liability provided the elements are complete

1. The act would have been lawful had the facts been as the accused believed them to
2. be
3. The intention of the accused is lawful
4. There is no fault or negligence on the part of the accused

16. Padilla v. Dizon, 158 SCRA 127 (MALUM PROHIBITUM AS EXCEPTION TO THE
REQUIREMENT OF MENS REA)

FACTS:
- This is an administrative complaint filed by then Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla
against respondent RTC Judge Baltazar Dizon.

- A tourist named Lo Chi Fai was caught by a customs guard at Manila International Airport
while attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign instruments out of the country.

- He was found carrying with him foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments (380
pieces) amounting to US $ 355,349.57, in various currency denominations.

- Sec. 6 of Circular No. 960 of the Central Bank prohibits the take out of foreign exchange in any
form, out of the Philippines except when specifically authorized by the Central Bank. Tourists
and non-resident visitors may take out or send out from Philippine foreign exchange in
amounts not exceeding such amounts brought in by them. If tourists and non-residents are
bringing with them an amount more than US $ 30,000 or its equivalent in other foreign
currencies, they shall declare their foreign exchange in the form prescribed by Central Bank at
points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines.

- The case against Lo Chi Fai was presided by respondent Judge Baltazar A. Dizon

- Lo Chi Fai explained that he is a businessman who has been in and out of the country, and his
latest venture here in the Philippines, along with his business associates is to invest in a
business that is yet to be determined. That through the several times he came in the country,
there were some instances that he wasn't able to register the amounts of money that he
brought because the Central Bank refused to accept his declaration until he could get a
confirmation as to the source of his money. The other amounts of money also found with him
when he was apprehended at the airport were not his, but belonged to his business associates.
The reason why he is bringing all of the money back to Hong Kong is because he fears that the
revolution taking place in Manila might become widespread.

- Judge Dizon acquitted Lo Chi Fai because he doesn't see any malice or willfull intent to do
wrong on the part of Lo Chi Fai. He even ordered the release of at least US $ 3,000 to Lo Chi Fai
citing Circular No. 960 of the Central Bank.

- Commissioner of Customs Alexander Padilla filed an Administrative case against respondent

Judge Baltazar Dizon to the Supreme Court on the grounds that the judge rendered an
erroneous decision in acquitting Lo Chi Fai and even ordering US $ 3,000 to be released to him.
ISSUE: Is Judge Baltazar Dizon's decision incompetent and is he ignorant of the law because he
acquitted Lo Chi Fai by reason of not having malice or deliberate intent, when such are not
required in offenses punished by special laws?

RULING:

The court ruled that the judge erred in believing Lo Chi Fai's fantastic tale, and not giving
credence to the fact that the foreign instruments found with the accused are 380 pieces in all
and didn't correspond to the foreign declarations presented in the trial, and that the foreign
exchange found with the accused are personal checks of other people which could not be
utilized by the accused to justify his having the foreign exchange in his possession. The judge
was also accused of ignorance of the law by ordering the release of at least US $3,000 to Lo Chi
Fai, citing Circular No. 960 of the Central Bank, when said Circular doesn't provide anything that
would authorize respondent judge to release to Lo Chi Fai the said amount.

Finally, the judge acquitted Lo Chi Fai because of lack of criminal intent or malice in breaking
Sec. 6 of Circular No. 960 of the Central Bank, when said malice or intent is not necessary in
offenses punished by special laws, which are Mala Prohibita.

The court ordered that respondent Judge Baltazar Dizon be dismissed from the service. All
leave and retirement benefits and privileges to which he may be entitled are hereby forefeited
with prejudice to his being reinstated in any branch of government service, including
government owned and controlled agencies or corporations.

17. Magno v. CA 210 SCRA 475 (MALUM PROHIBITUM AS EXCEPTION TO THE REQUIREMENT
OF MENS REA)

Ponente: Edgardo(?) Paras

FACTS:

ORIEL MAGNO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

 Magno was in the process of putting up a car repair shop in April 1983 but he did not
have complete equipment and enough funds to purchase said equipment to make his
business operational.
 Magno approached Corazon Teng, Vice-President of Mancor Industries, for the
equipment he needed, of which Mancor was a distributor.
 Teng, having been told of Magno’s predicament, referred him to LS Finance and
Management Corporation.
  Teng told Joey Gomez, VP of LS Finance, that Mancor was willing to supply the
equipment if LS Finance could accommodate Magno and provide credit facilities.
 The arrangement went through on the condition that Magno had to put up a warranty
deposit equivalent to 30% of the total value of the pieces of equipment to be
purchased, amounting to P29,790.00.
 Since Magno could not come up with the said amount, he requested Joey Gomez to find
a third party lender.
 Unknown to Magno, it was Corazon Teng who advanced the deposit as a short term
loan with 3% interest.
 Magno and LS Finance entered a leasing agreement whereby LS Finance shall lease the
equipment and Magno shall pay the corresponding rent with the option to buy the
same.
 Magno issued six checks to LS Finance, requesting that the checks not be deposited
since he no longer banked with Pacific Bank. The checks were delivered to Teng,
unknown to Magno.
 Subsequently, Magno could not pay LS Finance the monthly rentals and LS Finance
pulled out the equipment.
 Magno became aware that Teng was the one who advanced the warranty deposit and
promised to pay the latter but the payment never came. The four checks were
deposited but were returned for the reason “account closed”.
 Magno was found guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22 (Anti- Bouncing Checks Act). Magno is
appealing for a review of the decision.
ISSUE

Is Magno criminally liable for issuing the four invalid checks?

HELD: No. The court reversed its decision and acquitted Magno of the charge. Since the
equipments were pulled out by LS Finance, it is lawful that the warranty deposit not be
charged. In fact, it would have been an unjust “debt” since Magno did not receive the
amount.The “warranty deposit” is also believed to be a scheme by Teng to victimize Magno.

NOTES

Malum Prohibitum (wrong because it is prohibited) -was used as a basis for the original
decision. Magno was found guilty simply on the grounds that the four checks bounced,
regardless of criminal intent.

“And the trial court concluded that there is no question that the accused violated BP Blg. 22,
which is a special statutory law, violations of which are mala prohibita. The court relied on the
rule that in cases of mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the law had been
violated, proof of criminal intent not being necessary for the conviction of the accused, the acts
being prohibited for reasons of public policy and the defenses of good faith and absence of
criminal intent being unavailing in prosecutions for said offenses."
Protective Theory -affirms that the primary function of punishment is the protective (sic) of
society against actual and potential wrongdoing.

18. Garcia v. CA 484 SCRA 617 (MALUM PROHIBITUM AS EXCEPTION TO THE REQUIREMENT
OF MENS REA)

Ponente: Quisumbing, J.

FACTS:

 On or about May 11, 1995 ― during the canvassing of the May 8, 1995 elections in the
Municipality of Alaminos, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines

 Accused of conspiring and unlawfully decreasing the votes received by senatorial

candidate Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. from six thousand nine hundred ninety-eight (6,998)
votes to one thousand nine hundred twenty-one (1,921) votes:
o Election Officer Arsenia B. Garcia - (Chairman, Municipal Board of Canvassers
of Alaminos, Pangasinan)
o Municipal Treasurer Herminio R. Romero - (Vice-Chairman, Municipal Board of
Canvassers)
o Public School District Supervisor Renato R. Viray - (Member-Secretary, Municipal
Board of Canvassers)
o Rachel Palisoc, tabulator
o Francisca de Vera, tabulator
 Complaint-affidavit was filed by Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., who ran in the 1995 senatorial
elections.

 In a Decision (9/11/2000), the RTC acquitted all accused for insufficiency of evidence.
 Petitioner was, however, convicted.
o GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
o Sentenced to SIX (6) YEARS but applying the INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW,
minimum penalty is the next degree lower: SIX (6) MONTHS.
o Not entitled to probation
o Sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office
o Deprived of right to suffrage
 Petitioner appealed before the CA
 CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC and increased the increased the minimum penalty
imposed by the latter court from six (6) months to one (1) year
 Petitioner filed for motion to reconsider; CA denied the motion for reconsideration.
 Petitioner contended that the CA erred in its ruling stating the errors that the said
appellate court committed:
 o On the First and Second grounds relied upon by the Respondent Court, (1) that
it could not have been Secretary Viray who decreased the votes of complainant
Pimentel since he merely relied on what the petitioner dictated, and (2) that it
could not have also been the tabulators because petitioner was the one who
read the adding [machine] tape.
o On the Third ground, (3) that petitioner did not produce the tapes during the
trial because if produced, it is going to be adverse to her.
o On the fourth ground, (4) that the petitioner was the one who entered the
reduced figure of 1,921 in the Certificate of Canvass (COC) when the duty was
that of the secretary of the board.
o The reduction of votes of Candidate Pimentel was clearly not willful or
intentional.
 Petitioner vied that (1) the CA’s judgment was erroneous―based on speculations and
conjectures and (2) there was no motive on the Petitioner’s part to tamper with the votes of
the complainant.

 Respondent rebuts that bona fide or good faith is not a qualified defense in the violation
of an election law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita.
o Mala prohibita ― criminal acts that are not innately evil but become punishable
only because the law says they are forbidden.
o Mala in se ― criminal acts that are inherently evil/ immoral; criminal intent is a
prerequisite.
Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646 provides:

SEC. 27. Election Offenses.- In addition to the prohibited acts and election offenses enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, the following shall be guilty of an election offense:

―――

(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes
received by a candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to credit
the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.

Ruling:

Violations committed against Sec. 27 (b) of Rep. Act No. 6646 are mala in se. Therefore, good
faith and the lack of criminal intent may be considered as a valid defense. Criminal intent is
presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes,
unless the contrary shall appear. Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the burden
of proving its existence.

In the case at bar, however, the petitioner was unable to prove the existence of good faith on
her actions. The instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
sustaining the petitioner’s conviction but increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence to
one (1) year instead of six (6) months is AFFIRMED.
19. People v. Pugay, 167 SCRA 439 (NEGLIGENCE OR LACK OF FORESIGHT)
PONENTE: Medialdea J.

Place: Rosario, Cavite

Characters:

People- Plaintiff-appellee

Fernando Balcita Pugay and Benjamin Magdalena Samson- accused appellants

Eduardo Gabion- witness that appeared court

Abelardo Reyes and Monico Alimorong- witness not called to court

P.O. Rolando Silangcruz- Police at Rosario Police Force

P.O. Reynaldo Canlas- took the written statements of each

Facts of the Case:

Miranda, 25 retardate, and Pugay were friends. On eve of May 19, 1982 (town fiesta fair), some time after midnight,
Gabion, while reading comics in the feris wheel with friend Henry, saw Pugay, Samson and others noisy and happy,
appearing to be drunk. As Miranda walked by, they started to make fun of him by poking him with a stick in the ass
while making him dance. Not content, Pugay took a can of gasoline under the feris wheel and poured it on Miranda.
(Gabion told him to stop while he was pouring). Then Samson set the Miranda on fire. The ride operator doused
Miranda with water. Other also helped by pouring sand and covering him with rags. PO Silangcruz arrived while the
Miranda was still on fire. Miranda was rushed to Grace Hospital. The two accused, Gabion and five other where
brought in the Rosario Building for interrogation. PO Canlas took their written statements. All but the two were
released. Pugay admitted on his statement that he did pour the contents of the can on Miranda but did not know it
was gasoline (unbelievable due to the smell of the gasoline and were it was located). Samson admitted he saw
Pugay pour the gasoline but did not see who set Miranda on fire. Both repudiated their statements, stating they were
extracted by force. They also “engaged in a concerted effort to lay blame” on Gabion for the act committed.

First Held Decision: (Court of first instance now RTC of Cavite)

Guilty of Murder: Qualifying circumstance of treachery and aggravating circumstance of premeditation and
superior strength. This though favored Pugay with lack of intention (mitigating circumstance) hence lighter sentence.
Also preventive imprisonment of Pugay is deducted.

Penalty:

Pugay, 12 yrs. prison mayor (min) – 20 yrs. Reclusion temporal (max)

Samson reclusion perpetua

Indemnify heirs with P13,940 + 10,000 moral damages + 5,000 exemplary damages

Appeal done due to:

1.) Court erred in utilizing the statements of the accused.

2.) Suppression by the prosecution of some evidence
3.) Court erred in lending credence to Gabion’s testimony (one of the suspects questioned)
 Appeal grounds is without merit. Why?
1.) Said statements were not the sole basis for findings. Even w/o them, there is still Gabion’s positive and
convincing testimony.
2.) Other witnesses’ statements are corroborative evidence and thus maybe suppressed.
3.) Gabion never even talked to the mother of Miranda. What convinced Gabion to testify was his uncle. Plus
Gabion and Pugay were friends and had no previous misunderstanding with both.

However, no proof showing conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention hence the criminal liability is
individual not collective as.

Held:

Homicide through Reckless Imprudence (Failure to exercise all diligence necessary)

Pugay is sentenced 4 months arresto mayor (min) – 4yrs. & 2 months prision correccional

Homicide ( no reason to kill the deceased before the incident hence no treachery for it has to be deliberate)

Samson is sentenced to 8 yrs. Prision mayor (min) – 14 yrs reclusion temporal (max)

Fines for both: liable for P13,940 (hospital and wake bills) + 30,000 (death) + jointly and severally liable for
10,000 (moral damages) + 5,000 (exemplary damages)

21. People v. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307. (ABERRATIO ICTUS)

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (plaintiff-appellee) vs. JULIO GUILLEN (defendant-appellant)

Per Curiam:
 Julio Guillen y Corpus became disappointed in President Roxas for his alleged failure to
fulfill his promises during the presidential campaign and it was aggravated when
President Roxas sponsored for the approval of the so-called "parity" measure.
 On the night of March 10, 1947 at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila, President Roxas
delivered his speech in front of a big crowd. Guillen attended that meeting and
attempted to kill the president.
 He was carrying two hand grenades, one of which, he hurled at the president when the
latter had just closed his speech. General Castañeda saw the hissing grenade and kicked
it away from the platform and towards an open space where the general thought the
grenade was likely to do the least harm.
 The grenade exploded in a group of persons who were standing close to the platform.
The fragments of the grenade had seriously injured Simeon Varela (or Barrela) who died
on the following day as the result of mortal wounds.
 Guillen was rendered guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
multiple frustrated murder by the Court of First Instance of Manila and is sentenced to
the penalty of death, to indemnify the of the deceased Simeon Valera (or Barrela) in the
sum of P2,000 and to pay the costs.
  The accused appealed that he was not guilty of murder to Simeon Varela and multiple
frustrated murder and that the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and contempt
of public authorities are not applicable.
 Aberratio Ictus (mistake in the blow): In general, aberatio ictus gives rise to a complex
crime. You have a single act as against the intended victim and another felony as against
the actual victim. This being so, the penalty for the more serious crime is imposed in the
maximum period.
 In this case, the various aggravating circumstances is not deemed necessary because
article 48 of the Revised Penal Code requires that the penalty for the most serious of
said crimes be applied in its maximum period. Furthermore he is not guilty of multiple
frustrated murder, but merely, multiple attempted murder. However, he is still
sentenced with murder with its extreme penalty which is death. Nevertheless, the
sentence of the trial court was upheld.

22. People v. Sabalones, 294 SCRA 751 (TRANSFER INTENT: ERROR IN PERSONAE)

Ponente: J. Panganiban
Appellants/ Accused: Rolusape Sabalones and Timoteo Beronga
*Initially, they are four (4) with other accused, Teodulo Alegarbes and Eufemio Cabanero
*Alegarbes died during the course of trial
*Cabanero is still at large

Crime charged: 2 counts of murder

3 counts of frustrated murder

Casualties (In murder case): Glenn Tiempo

Alfredo Nardo
*Both were killed through fatal gunshot wounds
*Both cases are CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 248 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE

Injured persons (In frustrated murder case): Rey Bolo

Rogelio Presores
Nelson Tiempo
*Cases abovementioned are in VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 248 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE

Setting of the crime:

The convictions arose from a shooting incident on June 1, 1985 in Mansueto Village, Brgy. Bulaco, Talisay,
Cebu, which resulted in the killing of two persons and the wounding of three others, who were all riding in
two vehicles which were allegedly ambushed by appellants.

Murder Case Information:

 The above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with high-
powered firearms, with intent to kill and treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot GLENN TIEMPO and ALFREDO NARDO, who were riding in an owner type
jeepney and who gave no provocation, thereby inflicting upon the them several gunshot wounds, thereby
causing their instantaneous death.

Frustrated Murder Case Information:

The above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with high-
powered firearms, with intent to kill and treachery, did and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot REY BOLO, ROGELIO PRESORES and NELSON TIEMPO who were riding in a car
and who gave no provocation, thereby inflicting upon the them injuries.

Performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator, i.e. the
timely medical attendance.

Prosecution Witnesses: Edwin Santos (Survivor of the assailment)

Rogelio Presores (Survivor of the assailment)

First Issue:
Credibility of Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence

The Supreme Court did not deny the credibility of the witnesses as they were priorly tested in both the trial
court and Court of Appeals.

“As this Court has reiterated often enough, the matter of assigning values to declarations at the witness stand
is best and most competently performed or carried out by a trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates,
can weigh such testimony in light of the accused’s behavior, demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial.”

Positive Identification

 Apellees actually saw the accused

Appellants allege that the two witnesses could not have properly identified the appellants because, after the
first burst of shooting, they both crouched down, such that they could not have seen the faces of their
assailants.

Ruling: This contention does not persuade. Both eyewitnesses testified that the firing was not continuous;
thus, during a lull in the firing, they raised their heads and managed a peek at the perpetrators.

Hence, they were able to see and identify the appellants, having had a good look at them after the initial
burst of shots. We stress that the normal reaction of a person is to direct his sights towards the source of a
startling shout or occurrence. As held in People v. Dolar, “the most natural reaction for victims of criminal
violence is to strive to see the looks and faces of their assailants and to observe the manner in which the
crime is committed.”

 There is a light sufficient for the crime to be done

Even assuming arguendo that the lampposts were not functioning at the time, the headlights of the jeep and
the car were more than sufficient to illuminate the crime scene. The Court has previously held that the light
from the stars or the moon, an oven, or a wick lamp or gasera can give ample illumination to enable a
person to identify or recognize another. In the same vein, the headlights of a car or a jeep are sufficient to
enable eyewitnesses to identify appellants at the distance of 4 to 10 meters.
Second Issue:
Denial and Alibi

Beronga: He was in his residence in Lapulapu City (in the time of crime), but such was not shown to be so
remote and inaccessible that it precluded his presence in Mansueto Subdivision.

Sabalones: sought to establish that he was a mere 20-25 meters away from the scene of the crime.

Ruling: The defense of alibi cannot overcome the positive identification of the appellants. As aptly held by
this Court in People v. Nescio:

“Alibi is not credible when the accused-appellant is only a short distance from the scene of the crime. The
defense of alibi is further offset by the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses. Alibi, to
reiterate a well-settled doctrine, is accepted only upon the clearest proof that the accused-appellant was not
or could not have been at the crime scene when it was committed.”

Flight of Sabalones

Appellants further object to the finding that Sabalones, after the incident, “made himself scarce from the
place of commission. On his supposedly borrowed freedom, he jumped bail and hid himself deeper into
Mindanao, under a cloak of an assumed name.

Ruling: It is well-established that “the flight of an accused is competent evidence to indicate his guilt, and
flight, when unexplained, is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn.” It must be
stressed, nonetheless, that appellants were not convicted based on legal inference alone but on the
overwhelming evidence presented against them.

Third Issue:
Crime and Punishment

Ruling:
Penalties for both Murder and Frustrated Murder are modified as follows:

There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, aside from the qualifying circumstance of treachery,
the appellate court correctly imposed reclusion perpetua for murder.

It modified the trial court’s computation of eight (8) years of prision mayor (minimum), as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal (minimum) as maximum for frustrated
murder.

*Indemnities were rendered according to the actual damages incurred by the victims i.e., hospitalization.

Decision:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED.

23. People v. Alburquerque, 59 Phil. 150 (Praeter Intentionem)

Ponente: Avancena, C.J

FACTS:

This case is an appeal from a judgement of the Court of First instance by appellant Gines
Alburquerque with a case of homicide. He was sentenced to 8 years and one day of prison
mayor and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1000 with costs.

Gines Alburquerque- accused widower, 55 years of age, father of nine children (of which two
girls are married and one is a nun), has been suffering from partial paralysis, walks dragging
one leg, has lost control of the movement of his right arm Maria- daughter of Alburquerque who
is the only bread winner Manuel Osma- deceased Pilar- daughter of Alburquerque, was in a
relationship with Osma

Timeline

Pilar became aquatinted intimately with Osma about at the end of the year of 1928, while still
living with Maria.

Osma frequently visits Maria’s home and the relationship culminated to Pilar’s giving birth to a
child, Alburquerque did not have knowledge of their relationship until one day Pilar deceived her
father onto going to her godfather’s house in Singalong when in fact she went to the Chinese
Hospital for her delivery. Alburquerque only learned the truth when Pilar returned home with a
child.

Alburquerque was deeply affected because of the dishonour it brought and the child meant
another burden for Maria. He wrote some letters at some time to Osma at time they were hostile
and threatening and others entreating Osma to marry Pilar or at least support the child

Osma had promised to support the child but never delivered

Alburquerque went to Osma’s office one day and asked the manager if they (Osma and him)
could talk. What happened later, nobody knows.

After excluding the improbable portions, the court infers from the testimony that Alburquerque
proposed that Osma marry his daughter and when was refused whipped out his pen knife.
Osma tried to seize him by the neck, Alburquerque intended to just inflict a wound that would
leave a permanent mark on deceased face or one that would lead to a hospitalisation of a week
or two. Due to his lack of control with his right hand he had landed the weapon at the base of
Osma’s neck which led to his death.

ISSUE:

Could Alburquerque use self- defence as a defence with his action?

HELD:
The mitigating circumstances of lack of intention to cause grave injury as in the case death, as
well as Alburquerque surrendering himself to authorities, and him acting under passion and
obfuscation was taken into consideration. The court could not entertain his contention that he
acted in self- defence because he provoked and commenced aggression by whipping out his
penknife. The facts constituted the crime of homicide and shall be penalised with reclusion
temporal although, in view of the concurrence of 3 mitigating circumstances without any
aggravating circumstance he was given the penalty next lower in degree, prison mayor, should
be imposed.

24. Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181 (CAUSATION)

Ponente: Montemayor, J.

FACTS:

 Shortly after midnight, on Sept. 13, 1952, bus No. 30 of the Medina Transportation,
operated by its owner, defendant Mariano Medina, driven by regular chauffeur,
Conrado Saylon, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City
 18 passengers were on board including the driver and the conductor
 About 2:00 am in the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the
vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and
turned turtle
 Some passengers managed to leave the bus, others being helped and pulled out. 3
passengers seated beside the driver, Bataclan, Lara, the Visayan (apparently from the
Visayan Islands but didn’t know his name), and the woman behind them, Natalia
Villanueva. Shouts for help were called out saying they couldn’t get out of the
overturned bus
 No evidence was shown regarding the matter of whether or not the passengers already
free from the wreck, including the driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull
out said passengers however calls or shouts of help were made to the houses in the
neighborhood.
 After 30 minutes, came about 10 men, one carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo
and a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum.
 A fierce fire started consuming the bus and the 4 passengers trapped inside it
 It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the
gas tank on the side of the chassis and that the lighted torch brought help set it on fire
 Once the bodies were identified on the same day, specially that of Juan Bataclan, his
widow, Salud Villanueva, brought the present suit to recover from Mario Medina
compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees in the total amount
of P87.150.
 After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded:
o P1,000 to the plaintiffs
o P600 as attorney’s fees
 o P100 for the value of the merchandise carried by Bataclan
 Plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but the
latter court endorsed the appeal to us because of the value involved in the claim of the
complainant

ISSUE:

 Is the carrier liable?

 What was the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan?
DECISION:

 There is no question that under the following circumstances, the defendant carrier is
liable due to:
o Breach of Contract – The case involves a breach of contract of transportation of
hire, the Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to
his destination, Pasay City
o Negligence – There was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his
agent, the driver, Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow
out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers. Also, from
the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus
overturned after zig-zagging, there was a distance of about 150 meters.

 The trial courst was of the opinion that the proximate cause of death of Baticlan was not
the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus. At the time the fire
started, he was still alive, and so damages were awarded, not for his death, but for the
physical injuries suffered by him.

 We disagree. The definition of proximate cause is found in Vol. 38, pages 695-696 of
American Jurispudence is as follows:

. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result
of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

 In the present case, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause of the death of
Bataclan was the overturning of the bus. The coming of the men with a torch was to be
expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus.
 The burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier.
Neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to
warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence of the
 agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions, particularly Articles 1733, 1759,
and 1793. Also, Articles 1755 and 1756 amply provides for the responsibility of a
common carrier to its passengers.

o ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound
to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.

Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and
1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extra ordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth
in articles 1755 and 1756.

o ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.

o ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755

o ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or
willful acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their
authority or in violation of the order of the common carriers.

This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.

o ART. 1763. A common carrier responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts
or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise
of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.

 As to the damages to which plaintiffs are entitled, considering the earning capacity of
the deceased, we are satisfied that the amount of:
o P6,000 for statutory compensation which includes compensatory, moral, and
other damages
o P800 for attorney’s fees
o P100 for the loss of the merchandise carried by the deceased

 A shocking part of this case is that, according to the evidence, one of the passengers
who was hospitalized, was visited by the defendant Mariano Medina.
o She overheard overheard him speaking to one of his bus inspectors, telling said
inspector to have the tires of the bus changed immediately because they were already
old, and that as a matter of fact, he had been telling the driver to change the said tires,
but that the driver did not follow his instructions. If this be true, it goes to prove that the
driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions to insure the
safety of his passengers.
o Yet the criminal case against him, on motion of the fiscal and with his consent, was
provisionally dismissed, because according to the fiscal, the witnesses on whose
testimony he was banking to support the complaint, either failed or appear or were
reluctant to testify.
 o In the public interest the prosecution of said erring driver should be pursued, this, not
only as a matter of justice, but for the promotion of the safety of passengers on public
utility buses.

 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, with the modification that the damages awarded by the
trial court are increased from ONE THOUSAND (P1,000) PESOS TO SIX THOUSAND
(P6,000) PESOS, and from SIX HUNDRED PESOS TO EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS, for
the death of Bataclan and for the attorney’s fees, respectively, the decision appealed is
from hereby AFFIRMED, with costs.

25. Intod v. CA, 215 SCRA 52 (IMPOSSIBLE CRIMES)

PONENTE: Campos, Jr.

Petitioner: Sulpicio Intod

Respondents: Honorable Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines

- February 4, 1979 (morning): Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to
Salvador Mandaya's house and asked him to go to Bernardina Palangpangan's house.
- Intod, Pangasian, Tubio, Daligdig and Mandaya went to Aniceto Dumalagan first to have a meeting with
the latter.
- Dumalagan told Mandaya that he wanted Bernardina Palangpangan to be killed because of a land
dispute between them and Mandaya should accompany Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdid or else,
Mandaya would also get killed.
- February 4, 1979 (evening): The five (5) men: Intod, Pangasian, Tubio, Daligdig and Mandaya, armed
with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house.
- Mandaya pointed the Palangpangan's bedroom.
- Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired the said room.
- However, Palangangan was in another city and her home was occupied by her son-in-law and his
family.
- No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire
- The witnessed identified the petitioner and his companions.
- One witness testified that before the the five (5) men left the house, they shouted "We will kill you (the
witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if you were not injured)
- The Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder.
- Petitioner Intod seeks a modification of the judgment on the ground that he is only liable for an
impossible crime, Art. 4, par. 2.
- Petitioner contends that Bernardina Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his
companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
- On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible
instead the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder.
- ISSUE: Is petitioner liable only for impossible crime?
- TO BE IMPOSSIBLE UNDER THIS CLAUSE, THE ACT INTENDED BY THE OFFENDER MUST BE
BY ITS NATURE ONE IMPOSSIBLE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.
- There must be EITHER (1) legal impossibility, or (2) PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF
ACCOMPLISHING THE INTENDED ACT in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
- Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances UNKNOWN TO THE ACTOR OR
BEYOND HIS CONTROL PREVENT THE CONSUMMATION OF THE INTENDED CRIME.
- The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where HE THOUGHT HIS VICTIM
WOULD BE, ALTHOUGH IN REALITY, THE VICTIM WAS NOT PRESENT IN SAID PLACE (extraneous
circumstance) AND THUS, THE PETITIONER FAILED TO ACCOMPLISH HIS END.
- The factual situation in the case at bar presents a PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY which rendered the
intended crime IMPOSSIBLE of accomplishment.
- Under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the RPC, such physical impossibility is sufficient to make the act an
impossible crime.
- Petition is GRANTED, the decision of respondent, Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of
an impossible crime is MODIFIED.
- Petitioner is guilty of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME.
- PONENTE: Campos, Jr.

REQUISITES OF AN IMPOSSIBLE CRIME:

1. That the act performed would be an offense against PERSONS or property. ☑️
- Person: Bernardina Palangpangan
2. That the act was done with EVIL INTENT. ☑️
- Petitioner has the intent to do an injury to Bernardina Palangpangan.
3. That its accomplishment is INHERENTLY IMPOSSIBLE, or that the means employed is either
inadequate or INEFFECTUAL. ☑️
- Ineffectual because of the physical impossibility because of the extraneous circumstance that
Palangpangan was not inside her bedroom.
4. That the act performed should not constitute a violation of another provision of the Revised Penal
Code. ☑️

26. People v. Saladino, 89 Phil. 807 (IMPOSSIBLE CRIMES)

Ponente: Bellosillo. J

Facts:

• Rape Case

• Accused-Appellant Conrado Saladino y Dingle was convicted of three(3) counts of rape & one(1)
attempted rape and was sentenced to death.

• Appellant in attempt to discredit complaint, pointed out supposed "inconsistencies" against the
appellant which defines the crime impossible to act.

Issue: Is an impossibility of a crime relieves the accused from charges?

Held: No, A witness who is telling the truth is not always expected to give a perfect concise testimony,
considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory. Thus we have followed the rule in
accord with human nature and experience that honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters
serve to strengthen, rather than destroy, the credibility of a witness, especially of witnesses to crimes
shocking to the conscience and numbing to the senses.

Wherefore, appellant is found guilty of said crimes.

Notes:

Lawphil.net (No photocopy on hand during the making of this digest)

Please refer to the Footnotes:

1 - Crimes convicted of

17 – Inconsistency of a statement qualifying the crime as impossible.

18,19 - Defense towards the qualified impossible crime.