The European Journal of International Law Vol. 27 no.

1
© The Author, 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of EJIL Ltd.
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Referencing Patterns at the

International Criminal Court
Stewart Manley*

Abstract
A largely neglected area of study in international law has been referencing patterns by
international courts and tribunals. This article assesses referencing data collected from the
International Criminal Court’s (ICC) records issued in the Uganda and Central African
Republic situations. The data is generally restricted to ‘persuasive citations’ – those references
that the ICC’s various chambers have used to help decide a point of law. Covering over 500
records, this study addresses, among other things, the frequency with which the ICC cites its
own judgments, the nature of external sources cited, how referencing changes over time and
how often individual judges cite their own decisions. The data may prove useful to the ICC
itself, advocates who appear before it and scholars of international law.

1  Introduction
The extent to which international courts and tribunals use prior judgments as a
basis for decision making has been a subject of increasing scholarly interest.1 Still a
relatively unexplored area of study,2 to date only qualitative research has been con-
ducted.3 Qualitative research has its advantages, but it is unable to capture patterns
that are only discernible by examining large quantities of citations. This article aims

* Faculty of Law, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Email: [email protected].

1
See, e.g., Borda, ‘The Direct and Indirect Approaches to Precedent in International Courts and Tribunals’,
14 Melbourne Journal of International Law (2013) 1; Nerlich, ‘The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent in
Proceedings Before the ICC’, in C. Stahn and G. Sluiter (eds), The Emerging Practice of the International
Criminal Court (2009) 305; Romano, ‘Deciphering the Grammar of the International Jurisprudential
Dialogue’, 41 New York Journal of International Law and Politics (2009) 755.
2
See, e.g., D.  Terris, C.  Romano and L.  Swigart, The International Judge: An Introduction to the Men and
Women Who Decide the World’s Cases (2007), at 120; Romano, supra note 1, at 759–760.
3
Yonatan Lupu and Erik Voeten have applied network analysis to case citation patterns at the European
Court of Human Rights to determine whether the Court chooses case citations to satisfy domestic legal
audiences. The type of data they collected and the manner in which it was used is quite different from this
study. See Lupu and Voeten, ‘Precedent in International Courts: A Network Analysis of Case Citations by
the European Court of Human Rights’, 42 British Journal of Political Science (2010) 413.

EJIL (2016), Vol. 27 No. 1, 191–214 doi:10.1093/ejil/chw002

192 EJIL 27 (2016), 191–214

to partially address that lacuna through a quantitative study of the use of precedent
by the International Criminal Court (ICC).4
Counting citations to reveal patterns – often called ‘citation analysis’ – can answer
questions that qualitative work cannot, such as: How frequently does the Court refer-
ence external sources of law and how often does it turn inward to its own decisions?
Do the different divisions of the ICC – the Pre-Trial, Appeals and Trial Divisions – differ
in their referencing rates and the sources that they cite? How do citation rates change
over time? Which external courts are cited most frequently? How often do judges cite
their own decisions? In answering these questions, this article covers the ICC deci-
sions issued in the Uganda and Central African Republic (CAR) matters.5 While the
data collected encompasses a wide variety of sources to which the Court cites, the
article focuses primarily on the ICC’s use of its own previous decisions. In this study,
574 orders and decisions were analysed – slightly over 17 per cent of the ICC’s total of
3,374, as of 2 May 2014, the final date on which data was collected.
This study did not use software to count citations (also called ‘references’). Software
is unable to discern whether a court is citing to a source to (i) support a point of law
or (ii) merely indicate procedural history or cite the prosecution’s or defence’s sub-
missions. In this article, the former is counted, while the latter is not. Recitations of
judgments are not ‘precedent’ and, thus, counting them would undermine the useful-
ness of the data. Software is also not capable of determining, for instance, whether a
citation is being used as a persuasive precedent or is being distinguished. In this study,
each footnote in the 574 court records was individually scrutinized to determine how
the court was using the sources in that footnote.
From the data gathered for this article, some generalizations about the ICC’s ref-
erencing can be made. Referencing rates largely depend on, and reflect, the progress
of a case. At the commencement of a case, the number of court records issued and
the sources of law cited at the Pre-Trial Chambers is high. As the proceedings shift to
the trial stage (as in the CAR case, which has a trial in progress), the burden to issue
records, and, thus, an increase in citations, swings to the Trial Chamber. Overall, refer-
encing rates of the combined chambers (but not necessarily between individual cham-
bers) were comparable between the Uganda and CAR matters. The combined chambers
adjudicating the Uganda case averaged slightly over nine references per court record,
while those hearing the CAR case averaged nearly seven references per record.6

4
The term ‘precedent’ as used in the context of international law can be ambiguous and confusing.
See, e.g., Miller, ‘An International Jurisprudence? The Operation of “Precedent” Across International
Tribunals’, 5(3) Leiden Journal International Law (2002) 483, at 488. While Miller prefers the term ‘refer’,
this article uses ‘precedent’ when appropriate – for instance, to distinguish ‘persuasive precedent’ from
‘binding precedent’.
5
A second investigation in the Central African Republic (CAR) was opened on 24 Sept. 2014 with respect
to crimes allegedly committed since 2012.
6
These numbers exclude court records that cited no sources. The figures mean little without context.
Courts cite sources of law for a myriad of reasons, and the amount per decision depends largely on the
number and nature of the legal issues at hand as well as the availability of relevant sources of law. Some
ICC decisions subjected to analysis extended to nearly 200 pages and contained long strings of citations,
while others were less than five pages and contained one or two citations.
 Referencing Patterns at the International Criminal Court 193

The Appeals and Pre-Trial Chambers generally refer at a higher rate than the
Trial Chamber, although only slightly.7 All three chambers handle complicated legal
issues that require support through references, but it is not surprising that the Trial
Chamber would address fewer such issues. The Pre-Trial Division, of which the Pre-
Trial Chambers are a part, was established in part to relieve the Trial Division of at
least some of the burden of motions that had prolonged trials at the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.8 Free to focus on its primary duty – to
ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and is conducted with full respect for the
rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses9 – the
Trial Chamber could be expected to handle fewer disputes over points of law requiring
extensive referencing. In the CAR case, the Pre-Trial Chambers averaged 9.6 refer-
ences per record, the Trial Chamber 5.2 and the Appeals Chamber 5.6; at the Pre-Trial
Chamber hearing the Uganda case, there were 8.1 references per record, while at the
Appeals Chamber, 10.3.
Case law dominates the sources of law used by the ICC. The use of persuasive cases
as a percentage of all sources of law10 ranged from a low of 70 per cent at the Pre-
Trial Chambers in the CAR matter to a high of 92 per cent at the Appeals Chamber
in that matter. The second most common source of law was treatises, journal articles
and dictionaries11 (combined), which was 12 per cent at its highest rate. Among the
case law referenced, the number of prior decisions from the ICC chambers themselves
significantly overshadowed those from all of the other courts.
ICC judges not only cite precedent from other ICC chambers, but they also cite their
own prior decisions. Although technically acceptable, self-citing, particularly when it is
unusually high, raises a concern that judges are basing their legal opinions upon little
more than their own prior opinions. ‘Self-citing’, as it is used in this article, does not
mean a chamber merely citing itself but, instead, refers to a judge citing his or her own
previous decision. Self-citing in the CAR matter – the only matter in which self-citing
was analysed – was highest in the Appeals Chamber, where it was over three times the
average in the Trial Chamber and over ten times the average in the Pre-Trial Chambers.
The second part of this article explains the use of precedent by international courts
and tribunals, the sources of law – both mandatory and permissive – used by the ICC
and the referencing of external case law. Turning to the data in this study, the third

7
The first trial in the CAR matter, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, began on 22 Nov. 2010. No ICC
Trial Chamber has yet been involved in the Uganda matter.
8
Corrie, ‘Pre-Trial Division of the International Criminal Court: Purpose, Powers, and First Cases’, avail-
able at www.amicc.org/docs/Pre-Trial%20Chamber%20Corrie.pdf (last visited 16 Mar. 2015).
9
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) 1998, 2187 UNTS 90, Art. 64(2).
10
In this article, the term ‘sources of law’ excludes the Rome Statute, ibid.; the Elements of Crimes of the
International Criminal Court 2002, UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000); the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence of the International Criminal Court 2002, UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (2000) and
travaux preparatoires. These sources were excluded because, as at least the first three are so clearly manda-
tory sources that must be initially consulted by the Court, they are unhelpful in illuminating the Court’s
exercise of discretion to choose between sources.
11
Although dictionaries are not a source of law, the data include dictionaries because the ICC judges use
them as a source for interpreting words, and, thus, they can have a meaningful impact on the ICC’s
analyses.
194 EJIL 27 (2016), 191–214

part describes the scope of the data and methodology of collection. The fourth part
of the article presents and analyses the data, while the fifth part concludes with the
potential usefulness of the data and raises some areas for further study.

2  Referencing by International Courts and Tribunals

A  General Referencing Standards
The standards by which international courts and tribunals reference sources of law
provide the crucial context in which this article’s data should be interpreted. Generally,
international courts and tribunals do not use stare decisis, the doctrine requiring
judges to follow previous similar decisions.12 Rather, a particular decision binds only
the parties before the court.13 As a result, prior decisions are of diminished importance
at the international level, in contrast to the national level where precedent is binding
on lower courts in common law countries such as the USA and England.
An early sign that prior rulings would not be binding on international tribunals was
given by the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), which was inaugurated in
1922. The creators of the PCIJ agreed that the PCIJ’s decisions should merely state law
and not create law.14 The Statute of the PCIJ provided that judicial decisions were only
a ‘subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law’.15 The International Court
of Justice (ICJ) – the successor of the PCIJ – similarly confirmed that it is not required to
follow its precedent, though it frequently cites its own decisions to ensure consistency
in decision making.16 In fact, the ICJ considers its previous decisions ‘authoritative’.17
The application of stare decisis in international court systems with appellate organs
is less uniform. At the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR),18 rationales from the appellate authorities are binding,
not only in the case at hand but also in subsequent subordinate chambers’ decisions.19
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) relies heavily on prior deci-
sions, at times referring to them as ‘precedent’.20 While the decisions of the Appellate

12
G.I. Tunkin, Theory of International Law (1974), at 182.
13
Lupu and Voeten, supra note 3, at 413.
14
Guillaume, ‘The Use of Precedent by International Judges and Arbitrators’, 2 Journal International Dispute
Settlement (2011) 5, at 7.
15
Ibid., at 8; see also Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice 1920, 6 LNTS 379, 390, Art. 38(d).
16
Guillaume, supra note 14, at 9–10.
17
M. Shaw, International Law (2008), at 110; see also I.  Brownlee, Principles of Public International Law
(2003), at 21.
18
In full, these tribunals are named the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory
of Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of Rwanda (ICTR).
19
Guillaume, supra note 14, at 12.
20
Lupu and Voeten, supra note 3, at 3; see also Mowbray, ‘An Examination of the European Court of Human
Rights’ Approach to Overruling its Previous Caselaw’, 9 Human Rights Law Review (2009) 179, 180–183;
ECtHR, Cossey v. United Kingdom, Appl. no. 16/1989/176/232, Judgment of 29 Aug. 1990, para. 35.
 Referencing Patterns at the International Criminal Court 195

Body of the World Trade Organization do not officially bind the lower Dispute
Settlement Panel,21 ‘de facto norms of stare decisis’ nonetheless apply.22 The European
Court of Justice, on the other hand, has shown little reluctance to distinguish, and, in
some cases, explicitly overrule, precedent.23 The key point for the purposes of this art­
icle is that at the ICC’s founding in 1998 the standard that at single-level international
courts precedent is treated with respect and deference but is not binding had become
somewhat established by the PCIJ and ICJ, while at multi-level courts the treatment of
precedent remained inconsistent.

B  Referencing Rules at the ICC

Article 21 of the ICC’s founding statute – the Rome Statute – is unique among
international tribunals.24 In contrast to the charters, statutes, laws and agree-
ments of most other prominent international tribunals,25 Article 21 specifically
sets out the applicable law for the Court.26 Additionally, unlike Article 38 of the
Statute of the ICJ, the Rome Statute lays out a clear hierarchy of sources of law to
be applied.27
Under this hierarchy, the Court must first apply the Rome Statute itself.28 If the
Statute does not address the issue at hand, and the issue is related to genocide, crimes
against humanity or war crimes, the Court must then turn to the Elements of Crimes, a
document adopted by the ICC Assembly of States Parties that elaborates on the crimes
described in the Rome Statute.29 When relevant, the Court must also look to its Rules of
Procedure and Evidence.30 If the Rome Statute, the Elements of Crimes and the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence do not adequately address an issue, Article 21(1)(b) requires
the Court to then, where appropriate, apply applicable treaties and the principles and
rules of international law.31 If still not resolved, the Court must turn to a third cat-
egory of law, namely the ‘general principles of law derived by the Court from national
laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States
21
Guillaume, supra note 14, at 12.
22
Lupu and Voeten, supra note 3, at 3.
23
Guillaume, supra note 14, at 14.
24
Rome Statute, supra note 9.
25
These include the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East, the ICTY, the ICTR and the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
26
Bitti, ‘Article 21 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Treatment of Sources of Law
in the Jurisprudence of the ICC’, in C. Stahn and G. Sluiter (eds), The Emerging Practice of the International
Criminal Court (2009) 285, at 286.
27
Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute) 1945, 1 UNTS 993.
28
Rome Statute, supra note 9, Art. 21(1)(a).
29
Elements of Crimes, supra note 10; Rome Statute, supra note 9, Art. 21(1)(a). Although the Rome Statute,
the Elements of Crimes and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence are all listed in the same subsection
without any distinction as to relative importance, the Statute is clearly superior to the Elements and the
Rules. See Rome Statute, supra note 9, Art. 51(5).
30
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 10; Rome Statute, supra note 9, Art. 21(1)(a).
31
Rome Statute, supra note 9, Art. 21(1)(b). See also Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to Article
19 (2) (a) of the Statute of 3 Oct. 2006, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06-772),
Appeals Chamber, 14 Dec. 2006, para. 34.
196 EJIL 27 (2016), 191–214

that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime’.32 The Court must apply the
sources of law heretofore mentioned. In contrast, the Court may, but need not, apply
the principles and rules of law as interpreted in its own decisions.33 There is no hier­
archy among the decisions of the ICC’s three divisions.34 In practice, the Court did not
wait long to use its decisions as precedent, and the use of precedent thus far has not
indicated that the Appeals Chamber rulings are superior to those of other chambers.35
Finally, the application and interpretation of all sources of law by the ICC must be con-
sistent with internationally recognized human rights and cannot make adverse distinc-
tions based on race, gender, language, wealth, age, colour, religion or belief, political or
other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, birth or other status.36

C  Referencing External Judicial Decisions

Citing by international courts and tribunals to external judicial decisions – that is, those
from other courts – while widespread, varies in frequency and is diverse in form and con-
tent.37 External decisions are used for a wide range of purposes, from assisting in the inter-
pretation of procedural issues, to providing specific rules of law, to supplying general legal
principles.38 ICJ decisions (particularly on matters of general public international law)
and the decisions of international and regional human rights courts (especially on due
process issues) are given great deference and considered ‘highly persuasive’.39 External
decisions may be persuasive, but they clearly have no binding force40 and are considered
only when there are no useful precedents from the courts’ own jurisprudence.41
Although the Rome Statute expressly permits the Court to utilize its own prior rul-
ings in decision making, it does not expressly address the use of external judicial deci-
sions.42 While the ICC has referred to decisions of the ICTY and ICTR, as well as the

32
Rome Statute, supra note 9, Art. 21(1)(c). See also Grover, ‘A Call to Arms: Fundamental Dilemmas
Confronting the Interpretation of Crimes in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, 21(3)
European Journal of International Law (EJIL) (2010) 543, at 550.
33
Rome Statute, supra note 9, Art. 21(2).
34
Bitti, supra note 26, at 292; Decision on the Supplemented Applications by the Legal Representatives of
Victims to Present Evidence and the Views and Concerns of Victims, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba
Gombo (ICC-01/05-01/08-2138), Trial Chamber, 22 Feb. 2012, para. 11.
35
Bitti, supra note 26, at 292.
36
Rome Statute, supra note 9, Art. 21(3).
37
Miller, supra note 4, at 489; Simma, ‘Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a
Practitioner’, 20(2) EJIL (2009) 265, at 287; Borda, ‘Precedent in International Criminal Courts and
Tribunals’, 2(2) Cambridge Journal of International Comparative Law (2013) 287, at 293, 296.
38
Miller, supra note 4, at 496, 498–499.
39
Borda, supra note 37, at 303, 304. See also Charney et al., ‘The “Horizontal” Growth of International
Courts and Tribunals: Challenges or Opportunities?’, 96 Proceedings of the American Society of International
Law (2002) 369, at 370.
40
The non-binding nature of decisions from other tribunals has been confirmed by the ICC Trial Chamber.
See Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Prosecutor v.  Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-
01/06-2842), Trial Chamber, 14 Mar. 2012, para. 603. See also Borda, supra note 1, at 6–7.
41
Terris, supra note 2, at 120.
42
External national judicial decisions could be considered sources that identify general principles of law
derived ‘from national laws of legal systems of the world,’ as described by the Rome Statute, supra note 9,
Art. 21(1)(c).
 Referencing Patterns at the International Criminal Court 197

ICJ and ECtHR, on substantive law, it has not done so on procedural issues because its
rules concerning victims and the roles of the prosecutor and judges are different from
the rules of ad hoc tribunals.43 In Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo,44 for instance,
the ICC Trial Chamber relied extensively on decisions of other international criminal
courts and tribunals such as the ICTY and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL)
and also cited the decisions of the ECtHR.45 ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I has used ICTY
rulings to help it determine the meaning of ‘international armed conflict’, ‘armed
conflict not of an international character’ and the relationship required between indi-
vidual criminal conduct and the hostilities occurring.46 In fact, references to ICTY and
ICTR decisions are common.47 Reportedly, participants in the proceedings have ‘con-
stantly’ referred to the ad hoc tribunals in their submissions to the Court even though
their jurisprudence is not applicable law under Article 21.48 Perhaps in response, the
ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber II announced that ‘the law and practice of the ad hoc tribu-
nals, which the Prosecutor refers to, cannot per se form a sufficient basis for importing
into the Court’s procedural framework remedies other than those enshrined in the
Statute’.49 National judicial decisions, on the other hand, are a last resort.50 Guidance
at the international level must generally be exhausted before international criminal
courts and tribunals will turn to decisions from national courts.51

3  Scope and Methodology

From the discussion above, it is clear that international courts use a wide variety of
legal sources upon which to base their decisions. Yet to date there have not been any
systematic studies identifying what those sources are. This article attempts to address
this gap in the literature by assessing the use of precedent by the ICC in the Uganda
and the CAR matters.
43
Guillaume, supra note 14, at 20. For an in-depth analysis of the ICC’s use of ICTY and ICTR precedent, see
Nerlich, supra note 1.
44
This case resulted in the ICC’s first conviction – of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, a rebel leader from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 40.
45
Borda, supra note 37, at 304.
46
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, The Prosecutor v.  Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06-
803), Pre-Trial Chamber, 29 Jan. 2007, paras 208–210, 233, 287 (citing Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, The Prosecutor v.  Dusko Tadić (IT-94-1-AR75), 2 Oct.
1995, para. 70; Appeal Judgment, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić (IT-94-1-A), 2 Oct. 1995, paras 70, 84;
Appeal Judgment, The Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Cerkez (IT-95-14/2-A), 17 Dec. 2004, para.
299; Trial Judgment, The Prosecutor v.  Radoslav Brdanin (IT-99-36-T), 2 Oct. 1995, para. 123; Trial
Judgment, The Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Cerkez (IT-95-14/2-T), 26 Feb. 2001, paras 32, 33).
47
Nerlich, supra note 1, at 305–306. Cf. Grover, supra note 32, at 55.
48
Bitti, supra note 26, at 296.
49
Decision on the Prosecutor’s Position on the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II to Redact Factual
Descriptions of Crimes from the Warrants of Arrest, Motion for Reconsideration, and Motion for
Clarification, The Prosecutor v. Kony et al. (ICC-02/04-01/05-60), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 28 Oct. 2005,
para. 19.
50
Borda, supra note 37, at 305.
51
Ibid.
198 EJIL 27 (2016), 191–214

Data was collected up to 2 May 2014. By this date, the ICC chambers had issued 119
decisions and orders52 related to the Uganda matter and 455 decisions and orders related
to the CAR matter. The Uganda and CAR matters were selected because they were two
of the earliest – the first and third – situations referred to the ICC. The situation in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo – the second matter to reach the ICC and the only other
situation in which trials have commenced (and, in the case of Thomas Lubanga, resulted in
a conviction) – was not chosen because the number of records generated (1,810) would
have made a timely analysis unfeasible. Naturally, a higher number of records would
result in superior data, and, in fact, a study that included all records from all situations
would be preferable, but the author submits that the data presented herein – although
limited – nonetheless provides meaningful insight into the ICC’s use of precedent.
Put simply, the methodology used for this article to determine the ICC’s referenc-
ing was to count the number of cases, treaties, articles, treatises and other sources
that each chamber used as a basis for its decisions. The crucial element that made
something ‘precedent’ was that it was used by an ICC chamber to support a decision.
Put another way, each footnote of each order and decision was analysed to determine
whether the sources cited therein were merely part of the procedural history of the
matter (in which case, they were not counted) or whether they were being used by the
chamber to assist in determining a point of law or in making a decision (in which case,
they were). This determination – precedent or not – is a matter of judgment. At times,
the distinction was a difficult one to make. The most challenging situations arose
when references were made to sources that did not appear to be assisting the judges
in their decision making but, at the same time, were not merely part of the procedural
history of the case. In these situations, the referents have been designated ‘mentioned
precedent’ rather than persuasive precedent. They were uncommon.
When an ICC chamber cited to a source more than once in the same order or
decision, the source was only counted once. However, when both the majority
and a dissenting opinion cited a source, it was counted twice. As a hypothetical
illustration, if the majority opinion in the Pre-Trial Chamber’s Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest cited XYZ v. HIJ case 10 times in
its opinion, and a judge dissenting to the decision cited XYZ v. HIJ three times, this
article would reflect two citations – one from the majority and one from the dissent.
When one ICC chamber mentioned that another ICC chamber used a source –
that is, a chamber referred to another chamber’s use of precedent – that source was
only counted once (as the persuasive precedent of the first chamber that cited it).
Additionally, when a chamber cited a source that in turn cited another source (for
example, a Pre-Trial Chamber footnote stated: ‘XYZ v. HIJ (citing to Smith v. Barney)’),
only the first source (in this case, XYZ v. HIJ) was counted.
Precedent was collected from all types of opinions: majority, separate and dissent-
ing. As mentioned above, like citations to the Rome Statute itself, citations to travaux

The terms ‘rulings’, ‘decisions’ and ‘orders’ are used synonymously with ‘court records’, which is the
52

label that perhaps best encompasses all of the types of public documents issued by the ICC chambers.
These include all court records such as judgments, decisions, warrants and orders.
 Referencing Patterns at the International Criminal Court 199

preparatoires and other ICC-related materials (other than ICC judgments), such as
the Report of the Preparatory Committee of the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court and the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, were not included in the data
because they do not meaningfully reflect the Court’s exercise of discretion to choose
among sources.53
The ICC chambers frequently cited the decisions of other international tribunals,
such as the ICTR, the ICTY and the SCSL. Each judicial decision of these courts was
counted, but different decisions in the same case were only counted once. In other
words, if a judgment concerning the use of witnesses in the ICTY case of Prosecutor
v. Dusko Tadić was cited, it would not be counted again if the warrant of arrest in Dusko
Tadić was also cited in the same ICC record. Citations to statutes of these tribunals and
courts were also included in the data, although it is worth noting that they were rare.
When the ICC chambers issued identical decisions twice under different document
identification numbers, the citations have only been counted once.54 When a citation
was made to an ICC record that was unavailable, it was excluded from the data unless
the chamber issuing the record was ascertainable. Very few records were unavailable.55

4 Data
A  Rulings and Precedents Generally
At the ICC, rulings are associated either with a situation generally or with a specific
case. For instance, a ruling can be issued as part of the proceedings related to the
situation in the CAR or in connection with a case against a particular defendant,
such as Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo. Figures 1A and 1B illustrate the num-
ber of court rulings and citations associated with the situation in Uganda and the
case Prosecutor v.  Joseph Kony, et  al.56 As indicated above, the terms ‘citations’ and

53
Report of the Preparatory Committee of the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Doc. A/
CONF.183/2, 14 Apr. 1998.
54
See, e.g., Decision on Victims’ Applications for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06,
a/0081/06, a/0082/06, a/0084/06 to a/0089/06, a/0091/06 to a/0097/06, a/0099/06, a/0100/06,
a/0102/06 to a/0104/06, a/0111/06, a/0113/06 to a/0117/06, a/0120/06, a/0121/06 and
a/0123/06 to a/0127/06, Situation in Uganda (ICC-02/04-124-Conf-Exp), Pre-Trial Chamber, 14
Mar. 2008; Decision on Victims’ Applications for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06,
a/0081/06, a/0082/06, a/0084/06 to a/0089/06, a/0091/06 to a/0097/06, a/0099/06, a/0100/06,
a/0102/06 to a/0104/06, a/0111/06, a/0113/06 to a/0117/06, a/0120/06, a/0121/06 and
a/0123/06 to a/0127/06, The Prosecutor v.  Joseph Kony, et  al. (ICC-02/04-01/04-281-Conf-Exp), Pre-
Trial Chamber, 14 Mar. 2008 (ICC-02/04-125 and ICC-02/04-01/05-282).
55
ICC records were downloaded from the official ICC website, available at www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/default.
aspx (last visited 16 Mar. 2015) or, if unavailable there, from the ICC’s Legal Tools Database, available at
https://www.legal-tools.org/search/ (last visited 16 Mar. 2015).
56
Figures throughout this article are in the order of the Pre-Trial Chamber, Trial Chamber and Appeals
Chamber. At the ICC, an Appeals Chamber will generally become involved in a matter before a Trial
Chamber because issues from the Pre-Trial Chamber are appealed to the Appeals Chamber before a trial
commences. Nonetheless, the order in this article reflects the more typical system in which appellate
courts generally hear matters after (and are considered ‘superior to’) trial courts.
200 EJIL 27 (2016), 191–214

120
109

100

80

60

40

20
10

0
Situation in Uganda Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, et al.
Figure 1A:  Uganda Number of Court Records

200
182

150

100

50 34

0
Situation in Uganda Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, et al.
Figure 1B:  Uganda Number of Citations
‘references’ refer only to references made to sources of law that were used as a basis
for an ICC decision or point of law.57
Figures 1C and 1D indicate the number of court records and citations in the situ-
ation in the CAR and the two cases that have been opened against CAR defendants.

Public court records for the Situation in Uganda exclude repeats from Prosecutor v. Kony, et al. There were
57

37 public court records for the Situation – 27 of them repeats and 10 unique, all at the pre-trial level. At
the Appeals Chamber level, all Situation records were repeats and, thus, are excluded from the data.
 Referencing Patterns at the International Criminal Court 201

400 371
350
300
250
200
150
100 66
50 18
0
Situation in CAR Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre
Bemba Gombo, et al. Bemba Gombo

Figure 1C:  Central African Republic Number of Court Records

1200 1069

1000

800

600

400

200
44
6
0
Situation in CAR Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre
Bemba Gombo, et al. Bemba Gombo

Figure 1D:  Central African Republic Number of Citations

The ICC chambers issued significantly fewer records in the Uganda matter – 119
compared to 455 in the CAR matter. The Situation in Uganda was brought before the
ICC in March 2004, but the first defendant to be arrested, Dominic Ongwen, was not
surrendered to ICC custody until 16 January 2015. As a result, the chambers have
been less active. Though the Situation in the Central African Republic was referred to
the ICC in December 2004 – approximately nine months after Uganda – Jean-Pierre
Bemba Gombo, the former vice-president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
was arrested in May 2008 for war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly com-
mitted in the CAR and was transferred to the ICC in July 2008. This led to a sharp
increase in court records. His trial is ongoing. The numbers of records and citations
divided by chamber, shown below in Figures 2A and 2B, shed light on the different
frequency with which each chamber references.
Figures 2A and 2B include records with no references (sometimes these brief orders
were only two or three pages long). This article specifies with each figure whether
records with no references were included. In deciding whether to include or exclude
records with no references, it has attempted to portray the data in the manner
202 EJIL 27 (2016), 191–214

200
164

150 Public court records

103 Citations
100

52
50
16

0
Pre-Trial Chamber Appeals Chamber
Figure 2A:  Uganda Number of Records and Citations by Chamber

600 561

500 434 Public court records

400
Citations
300
219
200 165
124
100 71

0
Pre-Trial Chamber Trial Chamber Appeals Chamber
Figure 2B:  Central African Republic Number of Records and Citations by Chamber

most useful to the reader. At times, the decision is briefly explained in the following
discussion.
When records with no references are excluded, the number of average citations
per record increases and the rankings change slightly, as indicated by compar-
ing Figures 3A (including references) and 3B (excluding references). For instance,
the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Uganda matter moves from lowest when including
records with no citations to third highest when excluding these records. There
are two factors to consider when comparing Figures 3A and 3B. First, different
chambers have different percentages of records with no citations. For instance,
in the CAR matter, only 10 per cent of the Pre-Trial Chamber records included
references, in contrast to 31 per cent of the Appeals Chamber records and 49 per
cent of the Trial Chamber records. Second, records with citations contain differ-
ent amounts of citations. Thus, even though a Pre-Trial Chamber may have more
records with no citations, those records it has with citations may have more per
record than another chamber.
The Pre-Trial Chamber averaged slightly more than two citations per record less
than the Appeals Chamber in the Uganda matter, while the Pre-Trial Chambers
 Referencing Patterns at the International Criminal Court 203

Pre-trial chamber

Trial Chamber

Appeals Chamber
3.5 3.25

3.0 2.63 2.56

2.5

2.0 1.75
1.59
1.5
No
1.0 Trial

0
0.5

0.0
Uganda Central African Republic
Figure 3A:  Uganda and Central African Republic Average Citations Per Record Separated by
Chamber Including Records Without Citations

12 Pre-trial Chamber
10.33
9.64 Trial Chamber
10
8.05
Appeals Chamber
8

5.64
6 5.15

4 No
Trial
2
0

0
Uganda Central African Republic
Figure 3B:  Uganda and Central African Republic Average Citations Per Record Separated by
Chamber Excluding Records Without Citations

10 9.19

8 6.88

0
Uganda Central African Republic
Figure 3C:  Uganda and Central African Republic Average Citations Per Record – Combined
Chambers
in the CAR matter averaged four citations more than the Appeals Chamber.
There is no apparent reason for this flip-flop. Appeals courts generally confront
issues laden with complex legal questions whose resolution requires extensive
204 EJIL 27 (2016), 191–214

referencing. While pre-trial chambers also face a number of requests, objections

and applications from the parties, they would presumably require fewer references
than the matters raised at the appeals level. The data, however, indicate that, at
least in the CAR matter, the resolution of issues raised before the pre-trial judges
may be requiring as much citation to legal authorities as those at the appellate
level. In the CAR matter, the Trial Chamber averaged fewer precedents per record
than the other two chambers.
As indicated by Figure 3B, the combined chambers presiding over the Uganda mat-
ter have averaged slightly more citations per record (excluding records with no refer-
ences) than the combined chambers presiding over the CAR matter.58

B  Use of Precedents over Time

The ICC’s use of precedent over time generally reflects the progress of the cases before
it. As a case develops from referral, to arrest warrant, to arrest, to trial, the number
of court records issued rises. This correlation makes sense because as issues before
the court become more complex and the case more active, the chambers must look to
applicable legal sources to resolve them. Figures 4A, 4B, 4C, 4D and 4E illustrate the
use of references over time in the Uganda and CAR matters (key events are noted in
the bubble boxes).59

Arrest warrants
50 issued
14 October 2005
50
ICC investigation
40 began
ICC Prosecutor called for
40
29 July 2004
renewed efforts to make
30 arrests
6 October 2008
30

20 20

10 10

0 0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Pre-Trial Chamber – Number of records with citations

Pre-Trial Chamber – Number of citations
Figure 4A:  Uganda Pre-Trial Chamber Number of Records and Citations Over Time

Figure 3B excludes records without citations.

58

The data as it relates to time is represented per year, not per month. Thus, the number of records issued in
59

2007, for instance, is shown directly above the number 2007 representing the middle of the year 2007,
rather than being represented over the entire year from 2007 to 2008. As a result, the figures show
distinct spikes above each year, rather than gradual fluctuations over time. Moreover, as the most recent
data were gathered in May 2014, the levels of records and citations for 2014 will be a lower reflection
than they eventually will be at the end of the year. The records exclude those without citations because
some ICC records are brief orders that do not address substantive legal issues, and, thus, their inclusion
could give the false impression of fewer precedents per order.
 Referencing Patterns at the International Criminal Court 205

40 40
Arrest warrants
35 issued
ICC Prosecutor called
35
ICC investigation 14 October 2005
30 began
for renewed efforts to
make arrests
30
29 July 2004
25 6 October 2008
25
20 20
15 15
10 10
5 5
0 0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Appeals Chamber – Number of records with citations

Appeals Chamber – Number of citations

Figure 4B:  Uganda Appeals Chamber Number of Records and Citations Over Time

Investigation opened
22 May 2007

250 Jean-Pierre Bemba

arrested Bemba trial opened
24 May 2008 22 November 2010
200 Situation referred to
ICC
7 January2005
150
Arrest warrants issued
for Jean-Pierre Bemba
100 and associates
20 November 2013

50

0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Pre-Trial Chamber – Number of records with citations

Pre-Trial Chamber – Number of citations

Figure 4C:  Central African Republic Pre-Trial Chamber Number of Records and Citations Over Time

Naturally, the rise and fall of referencing reflects only somewhat the number of records
issued because some records contain many more references than others, even when the
data is restricted to records that contain citations. Somewhat predictably, the number of
references used at the pre-trial level far exceed those at the appeals level shortly after the
case commenced because the parties had not yet appealed any pre-trial decisions, while
citations at the appeals level then rose sharply once the pre-trial decisions had time to
be raised on appeal. Figures 4A and 4B end at 2012 because no records were issued
between that year and the date on which data collection was completed.
The data for the chambers handling the CAR matter reflects similar trends.60 The number
of records at the pre-trial and appeals levels rose slowly and steadily after the investigation

Records without citations were excluded.

60
206 EJIL 27 (2016), 191–214

Bemba trial opened

Investigation opened 22 November 2010
22 May 2007 Jean-Pierre Bemba
arrested
200 24 May 2008

Situation referred to Arrest warrants issued

150 ICC for Jean-Pierre Bemba
7 January2005 and associates
20 November 2013

100

50

0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Trial Chamber – Number of records with citations

Trial Chamber – Number of citations
Figure 4D:  Central African Republic Trial Chamber Number of Records and Citations Over Time

Bemba trial opened

22 November 2010

Jean-Pierre Bemba
Investigation opened
arrested
22 May 2007
24 May 2008
50 50
Arrest warrants issued
40 Situation referred to for Jean-Pierre Bemba
and associates
40
ICC
7 January2005 20 November 2013
30 30

20 20

10 10

0 0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Appeals Chamber – Number of records with citations

Appeals Chamber – Number of citations
Figure 4E:  Central African Republic Appeals Chamber Number of Records and Citations Over Time

was opened in 2007 and then gradually declined, at the pre-trial level in 2009 and at the
appeals level in 2011. The number of citations shot up dramatically in 2007 from both of
these chambers, declining similarly in 2009 and 2011 respectively. In 2009, one year after
Bemba’s arrest and one year before the commencement of his trial, records and citations at
the Pre-Trial Chamber declined while they increased at the Trial Chamber.61

C  Nature of Sources
Perhaps the most useful information from the collected data, at least for the advocates
appearing before the ICC, concerns the nature – that is, the types and the identities
A number of the Trial Chamber’s records were issued before the trial began. This practice is not prohibited. See
61

K. Calvo-Goller, The Trial Proceedings of the International Criminal Court: ICTY and ICTR Precedents (2006), at 217.
 Referencing Patterns at the International Criminal Court 207

of the specific sources of law – of the citations used by the ICC. Recall that Article
21 requires the ICC to apply, first, the Rome Statute; second, the Elements of Crimes
and the Rules of Evidence and Procedure; third, treaties and international law; and,
fourth, general principles of law derived from national legal systems. The Court may,
but need not, apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions.
Which sources of law do the ICC chambers prefer? Do the sources reflect the hier-
archy established by Article 21 of the Rome Statute? When looking outside the ICC’s
own case law, do ICC judges prefer certain international – or even national – courts
and tribunals? Figures 5A and 5B illustrate the types of sources of law referenced
by the chambers hearing the Uganda matter, indicating the chambers’ different reli-
ance on case law, treatises and journal articles, treaties, analogous rules62 and so on.
Case law is clearly the dominant source of law for the ICC chambers in the Uganda
matter.63 Over three quarters of the references made by both the Pre-Trial and Appeals
Chambers are persuasive, mentioned and distinguished case law.64 Treaties, the sec-
ond most important category under Article 21 of the Rome Statute – after only the
ICC’s own statute and rules – comprised only 2–3 per cent of the citations. Treatises
and journal articles, a source not expressly authorized by Article 21, although likely
falling under the umbrella of Article 21(1)(c) because they provide applicable general
principles of law, comprise several times as many citations as treaties.65
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Persuasive cases 119 (72.6%)
Treatises, journals and dictionaries 19 (11.6%)
Mentioned cases 9 (5.5%)
Analogous rules 8 (4.9%)
Treaties 5 (3%)
Distinguished cases 2 (1.2%)
President and Registry 2 (1.2%)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120

Figure 5A:  Uganda Pre-trial Chamber – Citations by Type

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Persuasive cases 37 (71.2%)
Mentioned cases 4 (7.7%)
Treatises, journals and dictionaries 4 (7.7%)
Distinguished cases 4 (7.7%)
Analogous rules 1 (1.9%)
UNGA Resolution 1 (1.9%)

Treaties 1 (1.9%)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

Figure 5B:  Uganda Appeals Chamber – Citations by Type

62
Analogous rules in the Uganda records were the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY and ICTR.
63
The case law in Figures 5A and 5B has not been separated based on the particular court or whether the deci-
sion is external – that is, other than an ICC case – or internal. Figures 6A and 6B show these distinctions.
64
While distinguished cases are not properly a source of law, they are significant in that they are a legal
record that the ICC judge believed was significant enough to have to distinguish. Accordingly, they have
been included in the data.
65
ICJ Statute, supra note 27, Art. 38(1)(d) authorizes the Court to apply ‘the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law’. The
Rome Statute does not have an analogous provision.
208 EJIL 27 (2016), 191–214

As indicated by Figures 5C, 5D and 5E, the use of case law as precedent is even more pro-
nounced in the CAR records, ranging from 72–92 per cent (excluding cases distinguished)
of all citations. Treaties and conventions, such as the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, continue to be cited, albeit in relatively insignificant numbers.66
While Figures 5A–5E divide sources of law by type, Figures 6A and 6B divide case
law precedents by court. They demonstrate the predominance of ICC decisions in the
case law cited. There is apparently little reluctance to look inward, even though the ICC
is still a relatively new court with only two successful convictions.67 There is, of course,
nothing wrong with citing previous ICC decisions, as per Article 21(2). In fact, citing

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350

Persuasive cases 315 (72.6%)
Treatises, journals and dictionaries 51 (11.8%)
Treaties 24 (5.5%)
UNGA resolutions and UNHR Comm. Decisions 24 (5.5%)
Mentioned cases 19 (4.4%)
Board of Directors Trust 1 (0.2%)
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350

Figure 5C:  Central African Republic Pre-trial Chamber – Citations by Type

0 100 200 300 400 500 600

Persuasive cases 505 (90%)

Analogous rules 19 (3.4%)

Treatises, journals and dictionaries 18 (3.2%)

Treaties 7 (1.2%)

Mentioned cases 6 (1%)

Distinguished cases 6 (1%)

0 100 200 300 400 500 600

Figure 5D:  Central African Republic Trial Chamber – Citations by Type

0 20 40 60 80 100 120

Persuasive cases 114 (91.9%)

Treaties 5 (4%)

Treatises, journals and dictionaries 3 (2.4%)

Mentioned cases 1 (0.8%)

Distinguished cases 1 (0.8%)

0 20 40 60 80 100 120

Figure 5E:  Central African Republic Appeals Chamber – Citations by Type

66
Although not technically treaties and conventions, instruments such as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights 1948, UN Doc. A/810 (1948) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
1081, 1520 UNTS 217, have been included under ‘treaties and conventions’. International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights 1966, 999 UNTS 171; European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950, 213 UNTS 250.
67
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court entered into force on 1 July 2002.
 Referencing Patterns at the International Criminal Court 209

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber 38
ICC Appeals Chamber 21
European Court of Human Rights 13
ICTY 7
ICTR 7
Special Court for Sierra Leone 3
ICC Trial Chamber 2
Inter-American Court of Human Rights 2
Germany 2
International Court of Justice 2
England and Wales 1
US 1
South Africa 1
Uganda 1
European Commission of Human Rights 1
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Figure 6A:  Uganda Combined Chambers – Citations by Court or Tribunal

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400

ICC Trial Chamber 372
ICC Appeals Chamber 213
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber 162
European Court of Human Rights 88
ICTY (including rules) 64
Inter-American Court of Human Rights 22
ICTR (including rules) 20
International Court of Justice 9
Special Court for Sierra Leone 8
England and Wales 3
Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal 2
European Commission of Human Rights 2
Germany 1
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
Figure 6B:  Central African Republic Combined Chambers – Citations by Court or Tribunal

prior decisions leads to uniformity and predictability in the law. Nonetheless, the citation
rate of ICC decisions is in marked contrast to the citing of the mandatory sources of law
listed in Article 21(1)(b) – applicable treaties and the principles and rules of interna-
tional law – and Article 21(1)(c) – general principles of law derived by the Court from
national laws of legal systems of the world, including, as appropriate, the national laws
of states that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime (which would be either
Ugandan or CAR laws). This does not mean that the ICC is referencing incorrectly, but it
may indicate that the higher categories of sources of law in Article 21 are less useful –
or, perhaps, less frequently useful – than lower sources. In both matters, decisions of the
ECtHR, the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
also featured prominently. Decisions of the European Commission of Human Rights,
while not technically a court, were also cited in both the Uganda and CAR matters.68

The European Commission of Human Rights became obsolete in 1998. From 1953 to 1998, the Commission’s
68

role was to consider whether a petition was admissible to the European Court of Human Rights. If the petition
was admissible and the Commission was unable to settle the case, it would issue a report with an opinion on
whether a violation had occurred. See Refworld, Council of Europe: European Commission on Human Rights,
available at www.refworld.org/publisher/COECOMMHR.html (last visited 16 March 2015).
210 EJIL 27 (2016), 191–214

One striking difference between Figures 6A and 6B is the percentage of references

to the ICC Trial Chamber. Thirty-nine per cent69 of the CAR references to courts and
tribunals were to the ICC Trial Chamber, compared with only 3 per cent70 by the
chambers presiding over the Uganda matter. This discrepancy can at least partially
be explained by the timing of the records issued in the two matters compared to the
timing of trials generally at the ICC. There have been four trials: Thomas Lubanga’s
trial in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) matter commenced on 13 June
2008 (resulting in conviction); Germain Katanga’s (resulting in conviction on some
charges) and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui’s (resulting in acquittal) trials, also in the DRC
matter, both commenced on 24 November 2009; and Jean-Pierre Bemba’s ongoing
trial in the CAR matter commenced on 2 November 2010.71 Yet the proceedings in the
Uganda matter peaked before or shortly after these trials commenced. The Pre-Trial
Chamber citations peaked in 2006, and the Appeals Chamber’s in 2009. In contrast,
the Pre-Trial Chamber citations in the CAR matter peaked in 2009, the Trial Chamber
citations in 2010 and 2013 (a double peak) and the Appeals Chamber in 2011. Thus,
the CAR chambers had a significantly larger pool of decisions from the Trial Chambers
to which they could reference.
At the outset, one of the goals of this research was to determine whether the ICC,
when referencing national judgments, preferred precedent from Western (European
and US) legal systems. In other words, in a prosecution of a Ugandan defendant, for
example, does the ICC prefer to reference Western case law or Ugandan case law? The
issue of ICC bias has become increasingly important as all of the Court’s official inves-
tigations have been opened in African countries,72 and African leaders have accused
the ICC of targeting Africans while exempting Western leaders from prosecution.73
Article 21(1)(c) of the Rome Statute arguably encourages the Court to reference
general principles of law derived from the laws of the defendant’s country of origin. It
provides that, if those sources enumerated in Articles 21(1)(a) and 21(1)(b) are not
applicable, the Court shall apply:
69
In total, 372 of 966 citations.
70
In total, 2 of 60 citations.
71
Lubanga, supra note 40; Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga
(ICC-01/04-01/07), Trial Chamber II, 7 March 2014; Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute,
The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-02/12-3), Trial Chamber II, 18 December 2012.
72
Preliminary examinations, as opposed to investigations, are being conducted in Afghanistan, Colombia,
Georgia, Guinea, Honduras, Iraq, Nigeria, Ukraine and Palestine. See www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/
structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%20ref/Pages/
communications%20and%20referrals.aspx (last visited 16 March 2015).
73
Maasho and Blair, ‘African Union Runs Critical Eye Over ICC’, Reuters (11 October 2013), available at
www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/11/us-africa-icc-idUSBRE99A0BS20131011 (last visited 16
March 2015); Dixon, ‘African Union Official Attacks “Condescending” International Criminal Court’,
Los Angeles Times (11 October 2013), available at www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-africa-
icc-20131011,0,2565134.story (last visited 16 March 2015); ‘The International Criminal Court: Bench-
mark’, The Economist (14 March 2012), available at www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2012/03/
international-criminal-court (last visited 16 March 2015); York, ‘African Union Demands ICC Exempt
Leaders from Prosecution’, Globe and Mail (12 October 2013), available at www.theglobeandmail.com/
news/world/african-union-demands-icc-to-protect-leaders-from-prosecution/article14850866/ (last
visited 16 March 2015).
 Referencing Patterns at the International Criminal Court 211

general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world
including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction
over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with
international law and internationally recognized norms and standards.74

The drafters of the Rome Statute could have omitted the language ‘including, as
appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction
over the crime’ because, using the example again, Ugandan laws would clearly be
included in the immediately preceding phrase ‘national laws of legal systems of the
world’. The drafters chose, however, to include this language, indicating perhaps not
only that the Court should not ignore Uganda’s laws but also that it should look to
general principles of law derived from Uganda’s laws before those of other states. To
do so would be sensible since a Ugandan defendant would justifiably expect principles
from Ugandan laws, when appropriate and not inconsistent with the Rome Statute
and international laws, norms and standards, to be applied before principles derived
from other countries’ laws.
The collected data reveal that, at least in the Uganda and CAR matters, the ICC per-
haps just slightly prefers Western laws. The ICC Chambers presiding over the Uganda
matter referenced one English, one US, one South African, one Ugandan and two
German laws. The Chambers adjudicating the CAR matter referenced one German
and three English laws. The significance of these figures should not be overstated.
First, the overall amount of domestic decisions referenced (six and four, respectively)
is too small to be statistically meaningful. Second, it is not possible to ascertain from
the references whether the Chambers considered Ugandan and CAR laws (or other
African laws) but determined that they were either inapplicable or inconsistent with
international laws, norms and standards – in which case, their failure to reference
these laws would not indicate bias.

D  Self-Citations
A practice of some interest is not merely the citing of the decisions of other ICC chambers
but also the citing of one’s very own decisions. Citing one’s own decisions is common and
perfectly acceptable in domestic legal systems75 and presumably in international courts and
tribunals as well. Judges of a relatively new court, such as the ICC, would be doubly justified
in citing their own decisions. After all, they have little ability to cite other judges on the same
court simply because there have not been many other judges to cite. Nevertheless, citing to
different ICC judges’ opinions should be viewed as healthy because it encourages diversity
of precedent and, at least, gives the appearance that judges are not merely using their own
prior opinions to buttress their current opinions. Figures 7A, 7B, 7C and 7D illustrate the
self-citations, meaning judges citing their own decisions, in the CAR matter.76
74
Rome Statute, supra note 9, Art. 21(1)(c).
75
See, e.g., Landes, Lessig and Solimine, ‘Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals
Judges’, 27(2) Journal of Legislative Studies (1998) 271, at 274 (analysing in part the effect of self-citing
by US Federal Courts of Appeals judges on their influence).
76
A ‘self-citation’ means that a judge or a panel of judges has cited that judge’s or judges’ previous decision as
persuasive precedent. If, for instance, a decision issued by Judges A, B and C cites an earlier opinion issued
by Judges A, B and D, there are two self-citations. Self-citing data was not collected for the Uganda matters.
212 EJIL 27 (2016), 191–214

0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40

Judge Ekaterina Trendafilova 0.36
Judge Hans-Peter Kaul 0.20
Judge Cuno Tarfusser 0.14
Judge Fumiko Saiga 0
Judge Mauro Politi 0
Judge Fatoumata Dembele Diarra 0
Judge Tuiloma Neroni Slade 0
Judge Sylvia Steiner 0
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40

Figure 7A:  Central African Republic Pre-trial Chambers Average Self-citations Per Record

0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0

Judge Sylvia Steiner 1.52

Judge Joyce Aluoch 1.22

Judge Kuniko Ozaki 1.47

Judge Adrian Fulford 0.63

Judge Elizabeth Odio Benito 0.54

0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0

Figure 7B:  Central African Republic Trial Chamber Average Self-citations Per Record

0.0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.5

Judge Anita Ušacka 0.46
Judge Sang-Hyun Song 1.32
Judge Akua Kuenyehia 0.47
Judge Erkki Kourula 1.33
Judge Daniel David Ntanda Nsereko 0.84
Judge Georghios M. Pikis 1.33
Judge Philippe Kirsch 1.33
Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng 0.00
0.0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.5

Figure 7C:  Central African Republic Appeals Chamber Self-citations Per Record

Judge Ekaterina Trendafilova of Bulgaria led self-citing at the Pre-Trial Chambers

for the CAR matter, averaging a little more than one self-citation in three records.
The statistics for Judges Saiga, Slade and Steiner are insignificant because they issued
so few records in the CAR matter at the Pre-Trial level – 2, 1 and 2 respectively.77
The self-citing average increased at the Trial Chamber, where it ranged from slightly
over one-half citation to slightly over one-and-a-half citations per record, and at the
Appeals Chamber, where it ranged from nearly one-half citation to one-and-a-third
citations per record.78

77
The data reflects average self-citations per record, including records without citations. In Figure  7A,
the numbers of records issued, in the order of the judges listed, were 88, 69, 63, 2, 16, 32, 1 and 2
respectively.
78
The data reflect average self-citations per record, including records without citations. In Figure 7B, the
numbers of records issued, in the order of the judges listed, were 109, 150, 109, 41 and 41 respectively
and in Figure 7C, 68, 71, 68, 70, 62, 3, 3 and 9 respectively.
 Referencing Patterns at the International Criminal Court 213

15 14.09

12

6
4.07

3
1.34

0
Pre-Trial Chambers Appeals Chamber Trial Chamber

Figure 7D:  Central African Republic Average Self-citations Per Record

As with all statistics in this study, self-citing averages may reflect a number of fac-
tors that this article does not attempt to address. For instance, certain judges may have
participated in seminal cases, making them more likely to later cite these landmark
opinions. Judges who have higher averages may have been confronted with more
legal issues that they had already addressed in earlier decisions than other judges.79
As indicated in Figure 7D, overall self-citing in the CAR case – the only case in which
self-citing was analysed – was highest in the Appeals Chamber, where it was over three
times the average in the Trial Chamber and over ten times the average in the Pre-Trial
Chambers.
The data in Figure 7D, as opposed to that in Figures 7A, 7B and 7C, show the aver-
age self-citations per chamber, excluding records without citations. As discussed
above, including or excluding records without citations significantly impacts data.
In Figures 7A, 7B and 7C, records without citations were included to show how
often judges were self-citing among all their records. For instance, if a judge issued
ten records, nine of which had no citations and one that had twenty-five citations,
one of them being a self-citation, the data shows the judge as having a 0.10 self-cita-
tion rate (one citation in ten records). In contrast, the rate of a different judge who
only issues one record that has twenty-five citations, one of them being a self-cita-
tion, would be 1.00. So long as a judge is only compared to other judges within the
same chamber level, this method reflects their self-citation rate fairly, considering
all records issued. Excluding records without citations would, in this author’s view,
lead to deceptively high self-citation rates. On the other hand, Figure 7D compares
self-citing between chambers. Since Pre-Trial Chambers issue many more records
without citations than the other two chambers, these records have been excluded
from Figure 7D so as to avoid a deceptively low self-citation rate for the judges of the
Pre-Trial Chambers.

Time of service on the Court does not appear to be a significant factor as the judges’ year of joining and
79

length of stay do not correspond to self-citing averages: 2003: Kaul, Ušacka, Steiner, Kourula, Kuenyehia,
Song, Diarra and Pikis (until 2009), Politi (until 2009), Fulford (until 2012), Benito (until 2012), Slade
(until 2006); 2006: Trendafilova; 2007: Nserenko (until 2012), Saiga (until 2009); 2009: Tarfusser,
Aluoch and Ozaki.
214 EJIL 27 (2016), 191–214

5  Conclusion
Referencing at international courts remains a largely neglected, but crucial, aspect
of emerging international jurisprudence. The patterns revealed by the data collected
and analysed in this study contribute to a better understanding of how, at its core, the
ICC arrives at its judgments. Each time one of the Court’s chambers references – or
declines to reference – a source of law, it is making a decision that, in the aggregate,
has real consequences for the parties before it. The data in this article may prove most
useful to the Court itself. While judges are of course well aware of the precedent they
use on a case-by-case scale, they may be less cognizant of wider referencing trends.
The referencing patterns reveal perhaps latent, though not necessarily prejudicial or
improper, preferences that are not obvious during the day-to-day process of judging.
The ICC is a particularly worthwhile subject of study because it is a relatively new court
– its founding statute was adopted in 1998 and entered into force in 2002 – which may
prove more amenable than more established tribunals to evaluating the strength and
credibility of its decision-making procedures as well as in its willingness to make neces-
sary adjustments. Parties appearing before the court – prosecutors, defence counsel, legal
representatives of victims and amicus curiae – may also find the data useful. These parties
may be able to increase the effectiveness of their legal submissions by referencing those
source materials that are most frequently utilized in ICC judgments and, when appropri-
ate, can even tailor their use of precedent to the preferences of particular chambers.80
This article is only a beginning. Additional data must be collected and analysed to
provide a complete picture of referencing patterns at the ICC. The Court has com-
menced investigations (in addition to those of Uganda and the CAR) into situations in
the DRC, Mali, Libya, the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, the Republic of Kenya, Darfur and
Sudan. Different judges hearing different cases and confronted with different issues
may well turn to different sources of law. As the Court matures, referencing will likely
shift to an even greater extent to internal ICC case law.81 With increased decisions and
a greater diversity of opinions to cull from, there will be less of a need to look else-
where for precedent. Likewise, self-citing will almost surely diminish.
The data from this study can lead to further areas of exploration. For example, more
analysis on the Court’s use of other sources of law, such as journal articles and texts, or
additional evaluation of the Court’s citation to other international tribunals, could clarify
the importance of these sources. A comparative analysis with the referencing rates of other
international courts would assist in determining whether the ICC’s referencing is unusual
or conventional. Perhaps one of the most interesting areas of future study will be to see
how the Court’s referencing changes over time since the Court, in the context of the overall
development of international law, remains a relative newcomer. This study and other simi-
lar data-driven analyses of the ICC may also counterbalance some of the recent criticism of
the ICC by assessing the Court’s work from an objective, non-political perspective.

80
Although the data in this article does not address referencing by specific judges other than in connection
with self-referencing, the identities of judges from a particular chamber can be discerned without great
difficulty.
81
See Borda, supra note 1, at 14–18; Borda, supra note 37, at 296.