SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

Rule 72-90

Silverio Sr. vs Silverio Jr

August 13 2014
Facts:

The late Beatriz S. Silverio died without leaving a will on October 7, 1987. She was survived by her legal
heirs, namely: Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (husband), Edmundo S. Silverio (son), Edgardo S. Silverio (son),
Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. (son), Nelia S.

Silverio-Dee (daughter), and Ligaya S. Silverio (daughter). Subsequently, an intestate proceeding (SP
PROC. NO. M-2629) for the settlement of her estate was filed by SILVERIO, SR.

In the course of the proceedings, the parties filed different petitions and appeal challenging several
orders of the intestate court that went all the way up to the Supreme Court.

CA-G.R. SP No. 121172

The first petition of the three consolidated petitions is CA-G.R. SP No. 121172 wherein petitioner,
RICARDO S. SILVERIO JR. ("SILVERIO JR.") assails the Order of the intestate court dated 16 June 2011
reinstating RICARDO SILVERIO SR. ("SILVERIO SR.") as administrator to the... estate of the late Beatriz
Silverio.

The administrator first appointed by the Court was EDGARDO SILVERIO ("EDGARDO"), but by virtue of a
Joint Manifestation dated 3 November 1999 filed by the heirs of BEATRIZ D. SILVERIO, the motion to
withdraw as administrator filed by EDGARDO was approved by the intestate court... and in his stead,
SILVERIO SR. was appointed as the new administrator.

Thereafter, an active exchange of pleadings to remove and appoint a new administrator ensued
between SILVERIO SR. and SILVERIO JR.

CA-G.R. SP No. 121173

On 15 March 2011, heirs SILVERIO JR., EDMUNDO and LIGAYA represented by her legal guardian moved
for the disqualification and/or inhibition of JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. based on the following grounds: (1)
Absence of the written consent of all parties in interest allowing JUDGE GUANLAO,... JR. to continue
hearing the case considering that he appeared once as counsel in the intestate proceedings; (2) JUDGE
GUANLAO, JR. has shown bias and partiality in favor of SILVERIO SR. by allowing the latter to pursue
several motions and even issued a TRO in violation of the... rules against forum shopping; (3) Heir
LIGAYA's Petition for Support and Release of Funds for Medical Support has not been resolved; and (4) It
is in the best interest of all the heirs that the proceedings be presided and decided by the cold neutrality
of an impartial... judge.

On 23 March 2011, JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. issued an order denying the Motion for Disqualification and/or
Inhibition.
CA-G.R. SP NO. 122024

The intestate court in its Omnibus Order dated 31 October 2006, ordered among others, the sale of
certain properties belonging to the estate.

By virtue of the aforesaid Order, SILVERIO, JR. on 16 October 2007 executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of CITRINE HOLDINGS, Inc. ("CITRINE") over the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park,
Makati City. CITRINE became the registered owner thereof on 06 September 2010 as evidenced by TCT
No. 006-201000063.

A Deed of Absolute Sale was likewise executed in favor of Monica P. Ocampo (notarized on September
16, 2010) for the lot located at No. 82 Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park, Makati City. On 23 December
2010, TCT No. 006-2011000050 was issued to Monica P. Ocampo. The... latter subsequently sold said
property to ZEE2 Resources, Inc. (ZEE2) and TCT No. 006-2011000190 was issued on 11 February 2011
under its name.

On 04 February 2011 SILVERIO SR. filed an Urgent Application for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order/Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction (With Motion For the Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum
and Subpoena Duces Tecum) praying among others, that a TRO be issued restraining and/or preventing
SILVERIO, JR., MONICA OCAMPO, CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC. and their successors-in-interest from
committing any act that would affect the titles to the three properties.

On 14 February 2011, SILVERIO SR. filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion (a) To Declare as Null and Void the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated 16 September 2010; (b) To cancel the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006-
2011000050; and (c) To reinstate the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2236121 in the name of Ricardo C.
Silverio Sr. and the Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio.

On 28 February 2011 the Intestate Court issued an Order granting a Temporary Restraining Order
The consolidated petitions for certiorari filed by respondent Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. ("Silverio, Jr.") before
the CA questioned the following issuances of the intestate court: CA-G.R. SP No. 121172 Order dated
June 16, 2011 reinstating Silverio, Sr. As Administrator; CA-G.R. SP No. 121173 (1) Order dated March
23, 2011 granting Silverio, Sr.'s application for preliminary injunction enjoining Silverio, Jr. or anyone
acting on their behalf from committing any act that would affect the titles to the subject... properties
and enjoining the Register of Deeds of Makati City from accepting, admitting, approving, registering,
annotating or in any way giving due course to whatever deeds, instruments or any other documents
involving the Cambridge and Intsia properties, (2) Order dated March 23, 2011 which denied Silverio,
Jr.'s motion or disqualification and/or inhibition of Judge Guanlao, Jr., and (3) Order dated June 14, 2011
denying the motion for reconsideration of the March 23, 2011 Order (granting application for
preliminary injunction); and in CA-G.R. SP No. 122024 Order dated August 18, 2011 declaring the Deed
of Absolute Sale, TCT and all derivative titles over the Cambridge and Intsia properties as null and void.

On March 8, 2013, the CA rendered its Decision, the fallo of which reads:

1. The petition in CA G.R. SP No. 121172 is DENIED for lack of merit.

2. The petition in CA GR. S.P. No. 121173 is partly DENIED for lack of merit insofar as it questions the 23
March 2011 Order denying RICARDO SILVERIO, JR's Motion for Disqualification and/or Inhibition of
Judge Honorio E. Guanlao, Jr.

3. The petition in CA G.R.-S.P. No. 122024 is GRANTED. Accordingly, the 18 August 2011 Order declaring
the Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificate of Title and all derivative titles over the Cambridge and
Intsia Property null and void is hereby

REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Issues:

The CA committed a reversible error in upholding the validity of the Intsia and Cambridge properties
upon the ground that the intestate court cannot annul the sales as it has a limited jurisdiction only and
which does not include resolving... issues of ownership. It is asserted that the CA should not have
stopped there and looked into the nature of the properties sold, which formed part of the conjugal
partnership of Ricardo Silverio, Sr. and Beatriz S. Silverio. (Whether or not the sale of Intestate Estate is
valid)

Ruling:

The probate court having jurisdiction over properties under administration has the authority not only to
approve any disposition or conveyance, but also to annul an unauthorized sale by the prospective heirs
or administrator.

In this case, the sale of the subject properties was executed by respondent Silverio, Jr. with prior
approval of the intestate court under its Omnibus Order dated October 31, 2006. Subsequently,
however, the sale was annulled by the said court on motion by... petitioner.

In reversing the intestate court's order annulling the sale of the subject properties, the CA noted that
said ruling is anchored on the fact that the deeds of sale were executed at the time when the TRO and
writ of preliminary injunction issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 was still... in effect. It then concluded that
the eventual decision in the latter case making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent only with
respect to the appointment of petitioner as administrator and not to the grant of authority to sell
mooted the issue of whether the sale was... executed at the time when the TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction were in effect.

The CA's ruling on this issue is hereunder quoted:

The more crucial question that needs to be addressed is: Whether the authority to sell the properties in
question granted under the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order, was nullified by the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196. A look at the... dispositive portion of the decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
97196 would lead us to reasonably conclude that the grant of authority to sell is still good and valid.

The October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order of the testate [sic] court in so far as it authorizes the sale of the
three properties in question was not declared by the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division as null and void.
the injunction order which was made permanent by the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) was
declared to be limited only to the portion of the Omnibus Order that upheld the grant of letters of
administration by SILVERIO, JR. and the... removal of SILVERIO, SR. as administrator and nothing else.

when the... preliminary injunction was issued on 23 March 2011 new titles over the disputed properties
were already issued to CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC. and ZEE2 RESOURCES INC.

While it is true that petitioner was eventually reinstated as Administrator pursuant to the August 28,
2008 decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 (petition for certiorari filed by Nelia Silverio-Dee), we agree with
the CA that the permanent injunction issued under the said decision,... as explicitly stated in its fallo,
pertained only to the portions of the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of
administration to and taking of an oath of administration by respondent Silverio, Jr., as otherwise the CA
would have expressly set... aside as well the directive in the same Omnibus Order allowing the sale of
the subject properties. Moreover, the CA Decision attained finality only on February 11, 2011 when this
Court denied with finality respondent Silverio, Jr.'s motion for reconsideration of the

February 11, 2009 Resolution denying his petition for review (G.R. No. 185619).

The CA therefore did not err in reversing the August 18, 2011 Order of the intestate court annulling the
sale of the subject properties grounded solely on the injunction issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196.
Respondents Ocampo, Citrine and ZEE2 should not be prejudiced by the... flip-flopping appointment of
Administrator by the intestate court, having relied in good faith that the sale was authorized and with
prior approval of the intestate court under its Omnibus Order dated October 31, 2006 which remained
valid and subsisting insofar as it... allowed the aforesaid sale.

Rodolfo San Luis vs Felicidad Sagalongos -San Luis

514 SCRA 294

FACTS: During his lifetime, Felicisimo San Luis (Rodolfo San Luis’s dad) contracted three marriages. His
first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children. On August
11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias.
However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and
Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad San Luis,
then surnamed Sagalongos. He had no children with Felicidad but lived with her for 18 years from the
time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Upon death of his dad, Rodolfo sought the
dissolution of their Felicisimo’s conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On
December 17, 1993, Felicidad filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City. Rodolfo claimed that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition because she
was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to
Merry Lee. Felicidad presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved.
Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2 Article 26
of the Family Code.
Rodolfo asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to
validate Felicidad’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in
derogation of Article 256.

ISSUE: Whether or not Felicidad may file for letters of administration over Felicisimo’s estate.

HELD: The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of Felicidad and Felicisimo under
the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and
proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24
and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.

With regard to Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As
stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged
and proved.

The case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree
obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

G.R. No. 177099 June 8, 2011

EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, Petitioner,
vs.
SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO
DAGORO, Respondents.

FACTS: Joaquin Agtarap died intestate leaving 2 parcels of lands and improvements in Pasay City,
Joaquin contracted 2 marriages during his lifetime, Eduardo, his son in his second marriage, was named
by the RTC as administrator for the whole estate of the Land.
RTC issued the order of partition in favor of the heirs of Joaquin of which Eduardo was also included,
however Eduardo filed a motion for reconsideration, and an appeal afterwards, both them alleging that
the Court erred in declaring that the bulk of the realties subject of this case belong to the first marriage
of Joaquin to Lucia and not to the marriage with his manager as a consequence thereof the Heirs of the
1st Marriage was awarded with more property.
He also alleged that the RTC, acting as an intestate court with limited jurisdiction, was not vested with
the power and authority to determine questions of ownership, which properly belongs to another court
with general jurisdiction.

ISSEUE:
Whether or not RTC as an intestate court, had jurisdiction to resolve the same

HELD:
Yes RTC had jurisdiction to resolve the same. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court,
either as a probate or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the
will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. However, this general rule is subject to
exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience. First, the probate court may provisionally pass
upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the final determination of ownership in a separate
action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the
rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on
ownership.
SC held that the general rule does not apply to the instant case considering that the parties are all heirs
of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the ownership issue.
More importantly, the determination of whether the subject properties are conjugal is but collateral to
the probate court’s jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin.

Suntay III vs. Cojuanco-Suntay

(G. R. No. 183053, October 10, 2012, Perez J.)

Facts:

Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990. Cristina was survived by her
spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including
herein respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by
Federico and Cristina only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents. After Cristina’s
death, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration.

Federico, opposed the petition, and filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabela’s petition for letters of
administration on the ground that Isabel had no right of representation to the estate of Cristina, she
being an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of her parent’s marriage being declared null and
void.

Undaunted, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedent’s estate on his behalf in the event
letters of administration issues to Federico. Consequently, Emilio III filed an Opposition-In-Intervention,
echoing the allegations in his grandfather’s opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III,
was better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
Federico died. Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court rendered a decision
appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent’s intestate estate. On appeal by certiorari, the
Supreme Court in an earlier case reversed and set aside the ruling of the appellate court.

Issue:

Whether Emilio III is better qualified to act as administrator of the estate than Isabel

Held:

No. Isabel is better qualified to act as administrator of the estate than Emilio III. The general rule in the
appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules
of Court: SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted, If no executor is named in the
will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or
next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife,
or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; (b) If such surviving
husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the
person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it
may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve; (c) If there is
not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court
may select.

Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in the appointment of an
administrator. This order of preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of
kin and the creditors in the appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in jurisprudence. The
paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a decedent is the
prospective administrator’s interest in the estate. This is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule
78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrator for the
estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and
economical administration of the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste,
improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer
the estate correctly.

In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be appointed administrator of a
decedent’s estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest therein greater
than any other candidate. The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to
be settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-administration thereof. Neither does
squabbling among the heirs nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of preference
set forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a deceased
person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be
appointed as administrator.

Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in the estate as one of the decedent’s legitimate grandchildren and
undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of the same estate,
cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the Courts and
depends on the facts and the attendant circumstances of the case. Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the
attendant facts and circumstances of this case even as we reiterate Isabel and her siblings apparent
greater interest in the estate of Cristina. These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the
order of preference mapped out in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. They compel that a choice
be made of one over the other.

The evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out to be an unsuitable administrator of the estate.
Respondent Isabel points out that after Emilio III’s appointment as administrator of the subject estate in
2001, he has not looked after the welfare of the subject estate and has actually acted to the damage and
prejudice thereof.

Lee vs. RTC of Quezon City

G.R. No. 146006 February 23, 2004 J. Corona

Facts: Dr.Juvencio P. Ortañez incorporated the Philippine International Life Insurance Company, Inc. on
1956. At the time of the company’s incorporation, Dr.Ortañez owned ninety percent (90%) of the
subscribed capital stock. On July 21, 1980, Dr.Ortañez died. He left behind a wife (Juliana Salgado
Ortañez), three legitimate children (Rafael, Jose and Antonio Ortañez) and five illegitimate
children by LigayaNovicio (herein private respondent Ma. DivinaOrtañez-Enderes and her siblings Jose,
Romeo, Enrico Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed Ortañez).
Special administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez submitted an inventory of the estate of
their father which included 2,029 shares of stock in Philippine International Life Insurance Company,
representing 50.725% of the company’s outstanding capital stock. Juliana (wife) and Jose (legit child)
sold 1,014 and 1,011 shares respectively to FLAG. The legal family entered into an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of Dr.JuvencioOrtañez, partitioning the estate among themselves. This was the
basis of the number of shares separately sold by them. The lower court declared the shares of stock as
null and void. CA affirmed.
Meanwhile, the FLAG-controlled board of directors, increased the authorized capital
stock of Philinterlife, diluting in the process the 50.725% controlling interest Dr.JuvencioOrtañez, in the
insurance company. Enderes filed an action at the SEC. The SEC hearing officer dismissed the case
acknowledging the jurisdiction of the civil courts. Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao as president and secretary
of Philinterlife ignored the orders nullifying the sales of the shares of stock.

Issue: Whether or not the sale of the shares of stock of Philinterlife is void.

Ruling: YES. Our jurisprudence is clear that:

(1) any disposition of estate property by an administrator or prospective heir pending final
adjudication requires court approval and
(2) any unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate court, there
being no need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition.
· An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration under
NCC 533 which provides that possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir
without interruption from the moment of death of the decedent. However, an heir can only alienate
such portion of the estate that may be allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate or
intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall have been paid or the devisees or
legatees shall have been given their shares. This means that an heir may only sell his ideal or undivided
share in the estate, not any specific property therein.
It goes without saying that the increase in Philinterlife’s authorized capital stock,
approved on the vote of petitioners’ non-existent shareholdings and obviously calculated to make it
difficult for Dr.Ortañez’s estate to reassume its controlling interest in Philinterlife, was likewise void ab
initio.

Estate of Hilario Ruiz v CA

G.R. No. 118671. January 29, 1996

FACTS:

Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted
daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters,

On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died.

On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator’s death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz
Montes who filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate and
approval of Hilario Ruiz’s will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz

ISSUE:

whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estate’s debts
and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support
of the testator’s grandchildren; (2) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs; and (3) to grant
possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.

RULING:

1. No. Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the
decedent’s estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to “widow and children” and does not extend it
to the deceased’s grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.

2. No. No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-mentioned has been
made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the
court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.

3. No. The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real and
personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised “so long as it is necessary
for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration, He cannot unilaterally assign to himself
and possess all his parents’ properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and
appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his
administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of
which are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness.
 G.R. No. 149926. February 23, 2005
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EDMUND SANTIBAEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAEZ
ARIOLA, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Facts:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibaez entered into
a loan agreement. The amount was intended for the payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford
6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. During the pendency of the testate
proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence SantibaezAriola, executed a Joint
Agreement dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession
of the three (3) tractors.
A Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilitieswas executed by and between FCCC and Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and
liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the probate court
before which the testate estate of the late EfraimSantibaez was pending, as the sum of money being
claimed was an obligation incurred by the said decedent.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:
WON the obligations of the deceased were transmitted to the heirs, thus no need for the probate court
to approve the joint agreement on the ground that the heirs partitioned the tractors owned by the
deceased and assumed the obligations related thereto.

Held
A probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered.
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated.
The three (3) subject tractors being the subject of any partition among the heirs is not valid. The joint
agreement executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid,
specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of
their late fathers holographic will covering the said tractors.
The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory.
SC found that finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not sufficiently shown that it is the
successor-in-interest of the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned its assets and
liabilities.

Garcia-Quiazon vs Belen

Facts:

This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed
by herein respondents who are Eliseo's common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by
herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo... was married. Amelia was joined by
her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).

Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.

On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes
Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las
Piñas City.

Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her
parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes
to marry, Elise impugned the validity of

Eliseo's marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the
subsistence of the latter's marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the
decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters... of Administration her Certificate of
Live Birth[4] signed by Eliseo as her father.

Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth
and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to
Dismiss.[5] The petitioners asserted that as... shown by his Death Certificate,[6] Eliseo was a resident of
Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court,[7] the petition for settlement of... decedent's estate should have been filed in
Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City.

In a Decision[8] dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise
upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid
in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting... the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseo's last residence
was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay.

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008 Decision[10]
rendered by the Court of Appeals

In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able... to prove that Eliseo
and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo's death in
1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement... of Eliseo's estate, the Court of Appeals
upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City.

Issues:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS
PIÑAS AND THEREFORE[,] THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH
THE [RTC] OF LAS PIÑAS THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT
SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION
Ruling:

We find the petition bereft of merit.

Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of
a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his
death

Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the... terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant."[15] In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or... place of abode.

As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person's
actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the
ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas
City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime,... Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road,
Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be
laid in the said city.

In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseo's Death
Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled. While the
recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs... of a decedent's residence at the time of his
death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from
1972 up to the time of his... death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo
filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch
106, on the ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous.[20] That Eliseo went to the extent of
taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners' position that
Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children.

Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners' contention that Elise has not shown any
interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to the
issuance of letters of administration

An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the
phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the... decedent is such that they are entitled
to share in the estate as distributees.[28]
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo's
estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by
Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners' pounding... on her lack of interest in the
administration of the decedent's estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the
findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate
of Eliseo is on good... grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is
entitled to her legitime after the debts of the estate are satisfied.[29] Having a vested right in the
distribution of Eliseo's estate as one of his natural... children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an
interested party within the purview of the law.

ERLINDA PILAPIL and HEIRS OF DONATA ORTIZ BRIONES namely ESTELA, ERIBERTO and VIRGILIO
SANTOS, ANA SANTOS CULTURA, ELVIRA SANTOS INOCENTES, ERNESTO MENDOZA, RIZALINA
SANTOS, ADOLFO MENDOZA and PACITA MENDOZA vs. HEIRS OF MAXIMINO BRIONES namely:
SILVERIO BRIONES, PETRA BRIONES, BINIFACIO CABAHUG JR., ANITA TRASMONTE, CIRILITA FORTUNA,
CRESENCIA BRIONES, FUGURACION MEDALLE and MERCEDES LAGBAS
G.R. NO. 150175 FEBRUARY 5, 2007

DOCTRINE: The settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem, and that the
publication in the newspapers of the filing of the application and of the date set for the hearing of the
same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole world of the existence of the
proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time indicated in the publication.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Petitioners were the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones while respondents were the heirs of
the late MaximinoBriones. Maximino married Donata but their union did not produce any children.
When Maximino died in 1952, Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle her husband's estate in
CFI Cebu City. The court issued Letters of Administration appointing Donata as the administratrix of
Maximino's properties. Subsequently, CFI also issued an order awarding ownership of real estate
properties to Donata which she filed at the Registry of Deeds. Thus, new TCT's were issued covering the
real estate properties in her name.

When Donata died on 1977, Erlinda, one of her nieces, instituted with the RTC a petition for the
administration of the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her husband was appointed as
administrators of Donata's intestate estate.

On 1985, SilverioBriones, nephew of Maximino, filed a petition with the RTC for letters of
Administration for the Intestate estate of Maximino which was later on granted by the RTC. RTC likewise
allowed Silverio to collect rentals from Maximino's properties. Gregorio (Erlinda's Husband) filed a
motion to set aside order claiming that the said properties were already under his and his wife's
administration as part of the intestate estate of Donate. For this reason, the Letter of Administration
issued to Silverio was set aside by the RTC.
 On 1987, the Heirs of Maximino filed a complaint with the RTC against the heirs of Donata for
the partition, annulment and recovery of possession of real property. The Complaint was later on
amended alleging that Donata, as administratrix, through fraud and misrepresentation, in breach of
trust and without the knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in registering the properties under her
name.

RTC ruled in favor of the heirs of Maximino and ordered Erlinda to reconvey the real estate
properties to the heirs of Maximino. The heirs of Donata appealed the case to the CA but the Appellate
Court affirmed the ruling made by the RTC. SC reversed the decision rendered by the CA and the RTC.
Thus, Respondents moved for the reconsideration of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court.

The main contention of respondents was that since the CFI Order was based on Donata's
fraudulent misrepresentation that she was Maximino's sole heir, it being void, such order does not
produce any legal effect.

ISSUE OF THE CASE

WON the CFI order declaring Donata to be the sole heir of Maximino was valid despite Donata's
alleged misrepresentation. YES

RULING OF THE CASE

The heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Donata managed,
through fraud, to have the real properties, belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino, registered in
her name. In the absence of fraud, no implied trust was established between Donata and the heirs of
Maximino under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code. Donata was able to register the real properties in
her name, not through fraud or mistake, but pursuant to an Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued by the
CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The CFI Order, presumed to be fairly and regularly issued, declared
Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of Maximino; hence, making Donata the singular owner
of the entire estate of Maximino, including the real properties, and not merely a co-owner with the
other heirs of her deceased husband. There being no basis for the Complaint of the heirs of Maximinoin
Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the same should have been dismissed.

While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximino still had surviving siblings and
so the court was not able to order that these siblings be given personal notices of the intestate
proceedings, it should be borne in mind that the settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a
proceeding in rem, and that the publication in the newspapers of the filing of the application and of the
date set for the hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole world of
the existence of the proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time indicated in the publication.
The publication requirement of the notice in newspapers is precisely for the purpose of informing all
interested parties in the estate of the deceased of the existence of the settlement proceedings, most
especially those who were not named as heirs or creditors in the petition, regardless of whether such
omission was voluntarily or involuntarily made.

This Court cannot stress enough that the CFI Order was the result of the intestate proceedings
instituted by Donata before the trial court. As this Court pointed out in its earlier Decision, the manner
by which the CFI judge conducted the proceedings enjoys the presumption of regularity, and
encompassed in such presumption is the order of publication of the notice of the intestate proceedings.
A review of the records fails to show any allegation or concrete proof that the CFI also failed to order the
publication in newspapers of the notice of the intestate proceedings and to require proof from Donata
of compliance therewith. Neither can this Court find any reason or explanation as to why Maximinos
siblings could have missed the published notice of the intestate proceedings of their brother.

Moreover, even if Donata's allegation that she was Maximinos sole heir does constitute fraud, it
is insufficient to justify abandonment of the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, considering the nature of
intestate proceedings as being in rem and the disputable presumptions of the regular performance of
official duty and lawful exercise of jurisdiction by the CFI in rendering the questioned Order, dated 15
January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R.

Sabidong vs Solas
A.M. No. P-01-1448, June 25, 2013

Trinidad Sabidong, complainant’s mother, is one of the longtime occupants of a parcel of land,
designated as Lot 11 originally registered in the name of C. N. Hodges and situated at Jaro, Iloilo City.
The Sabidongs are in possession of one-half portion of Lot 11 of the said Hodges Estate, as the other
half-portion was occupied by PriscilaSaplagio. In 1983 ejectment suit however Saplagio was ordered to
vacate the portion of Lot 11 leased to her.
In 1984, respondent who was the Clerk of Court III of MTCC, Branch 3, Iloilo City Offered to Purchase on
installment Lots 11 and 12. The Administratrix of the Hodges Estate rejected respondent’s because the
actual occupant of Lot 12 manifested their intention to buy it. He was nevertheless informed that he
may file an offer to purchase Lot 11 "should the occupant fail to avail of the priority given to them”
which the respondent immediately made.
The probate court (Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 27) in Special Proceedings No. 1672 ("Testate
Estate of the Late Charles Newton Hodges, Rosita R. Natividad, Administratrix"), approved the offer
upon the court’s observation that the occupants of the subject lots "have not manifested their desire to
purchase the lots they are occupying up to this date and considering time restraint and considering
further, that the sales in favor of the x xxofferors are most beneficial to the estate x xx".
Consequently the title of the lot was transferred to the respondent. Later on a writ of demolition was
issued by the probate court in favor of respondent and against all adverse occupants of Lot 11.
In 1999, a complaint was initiated against the respondent in the Supreme Court alleging the prohibition
for court personnel to buy properties in litigation. The complaint likewise alleged that the respondent
committed deception, dishonesty, oppression and grave abuse of authority. It was alleged that
complainant and his family were made to believe by the respondent that he is the representative of the
Estate. The complainant relied on the representations of the respondent that he was authorized to
facilitate the sale, with more reason that respondent represented himself as the City Sheriff;

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is prohibited to purchase the property subject of probate.

Held:
NO. For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the
pendency of the litigation involving the property.34 Where the property is acquired after the
termination of the case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.
 In the case at bar, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on November 21, 1994, the Decision in Civil
Case No. 14706 which was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long become final. Be that as it may, it
cannot be said that the property is no longer "in litigation" at that time considering that it was part of
the Hodges Estate then under settlement proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 1672).
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also
from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge.36 A property forming part
of the estate under judicial settlement continues to be subject of litigation until the probate court issues
an order declaring the estate proceedings closed and terminated. The rule is that as long as the order for
the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed
closed and terminated.37 The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only
after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the
same.38 Since there is no evidence to show that Sp. Proc. No. 1672 in the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, had
already been closed and terminated at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale With Mortgage
dated November 21, 1994, Lot 11 is still deemed to be "in litigation" subject to the operation of Article
1491 (5) of the Civil Code.
This notwithstanding, we hold that the sale of Lot 11 in favor of respondent did not violate the rule on
disqualification to purchase property because Sp. Proc. No. 1672 was then pending before another court
(RTC) and not MTCC where he was Clerk of Court.

Aranas vs Mercado,
G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014

Facts: Emigdio Mercado died intestate and survived by his second wife, Teresita V. Mercado, and their
five children. He inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate shares
in Mervir Realty Corporation. He assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir
Realty, and sold his real property to such corporation. Thelma, his daughter, filed in the Regional Trial
Court in Cebu City a petition for the appointment of Teresita, his second wife, as the administrator of
Emigdio’s estate. Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio. Claiming that Emigdio had
owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct
Teresita to amend the inventory. Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, contended that one of the
real properties had already been sold and came into the possession to Mervir Realty. Hence, such
property should not be included in the inventory.

Issue: Whether or not, the other properties which were sold to the corporation should be included in
the inventory.

Ruling: Yes, the property sold to the corporation should be included in the inventory. The Rules of Court
provides that within three months after his appointment, every executor or administrator shall return to
the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased which has
come into his possession or knowledge. For the phrase true inventory implies that no properties
appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the
possession of another person or entity, which is the corporation in the given facts. Furthermore, while it
is true that the probate Court does not have the jurisdiction to resolve issue of ownership because it has
limited jurisdiction only with respect to settlement of estate, it can resolve the question of ownership
only for inventory purpose.
 SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG v. MA. GRACIA RIÑOZA PLAZO
G.R. No. 187524
August 05, 2015

Facts:

On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Riñoza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including his
children with his first wife, respondents Ma. Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as well as several
properties including a resort covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) both located in Nasugbu,
Batangas.

Respondents alleged that sometime in March 1991, they discovered that their co-heirs, Pedro's
second wife, Benita Tenorio and other children, had sold the subject properties to petitioners, spouses
Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong, who are now deceased and substituted by their son, Dr.Ruel B.
Villafria, without their knowledge and consent. When confronted about the sale, Benita acknowledged
the same, showing respondents a document she believed evidenced receipt of her share in the sale,
which, however, did not refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan obtained by Pedro and Benita
from a bank. When respondents went to the subject properties, they discovered that 4 out of the 8
cottages in the resort had been demolished.

Subsequently, respondents learned that on July 18, 1991, a notice of an extra-judicial settlement
of estate of their late father was published in a tabloid called Balita. They filed their complaint praying,
among others, for the annulment of all documents conveying the subject properties to the petitioners
and certificates of title issued pursuant thereto.

In their Answer, petitioners denied the allegations and he also presented an Extra-Judicial
Settlement with Renunciation, Repudiations and Waiver of Rights and Sale which provides, among
others, that respondents' co-heirs sold the family home to the spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc
for P1 million as well as a Deed of Sale whereby Benita sold the resort to petitioners for P650,000.00.

On October 1, 2001, the trial court nullified the transfer of the subject properties to petitioners
and spouses Bondoc due to irregularities and the Extra-Judicial Settlement was notarized by a notary
public who was not duly commissioned as such on the date it was executed. The Deed of Sale was
undated, the date of the acknowledgment therein was left blank, and the typewritten name "Pedro
Riñoza, Husband" on the left side of the document was not signed The trial court also observed that
both documents were never presented to the Office of the Register of Deeds for registration and that
the titles to the subject properties were still in the names of Pedro and his second wife Benita. In
addition, the supposed notaries and buyers of the subject properties were not even presented as
witnesses who supposedly witnessed the signing and execution of the documents of conveyance. On the
basis thereof, the trial court ruled in favor of respondents.

Issue:

Whether or not the nature and extent of the interests of the parties thereon, may fall under an
action for settlement of estate.

Ruling:
 Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of respondents' causes of action pertaining to the
properties left behind by the decedent Pedro, his known heirs, and the nature and extent of their
interests thereon, may fall under an action for settlement of estate. However, a complete reading of the
complaint would readily show that, based on the nature of the suit, the allegations therein, and the
reliefs prayed for, the action is clearly one for judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of
possession.

It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed
to name an executor in his will or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or. fails to
furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially
administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order established in
Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.29 An exception to this rule, however, is found in the
aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 74 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left no will and no debts due
from his estate, may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary action for partition without
submitting the same for judicial administration nor applying for the appointment of an administrator by
the court.30 The reason is that where the deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no
necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer the estate for them and to deprive the
real owners of their possession to which they are immediately entitled.31redarclaw

In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not disputed, that Pedro died
without a will, leaving his estate without any pending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner'.s
contention, respondents were under no legal obligation to submit me subject properties of the estate to
a special proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and are, in fact, encouraged to have the same
partitioned, judicially or extrajudicially.

The instant petition is denied.

Rule 91

Castorio Alvarico vs. Amelita L. Sola G.R. No. 138953. June 6, 2002
Ponente: Quisumbing, J.

Facts:

Bureau of Lands approved and granted the Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) of land in favor of
Fermina Lopez. Lopez then executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication and Transfer of Rights over the land in
favor of Amelita Sola.

In 1989, the Bureau of Lands issued an order approving the transfer of rights and granting the
amendment of the application from Lopez to Sola. In 1994, Alvarico claimed that Lopez donated the land
to him and immediately thereafter, he took possession of the same.

Sola maintained that the donation to Alvarico is void because Lopez was no longer the owner of the
property when it was allegedly donated to him since the property was already been transferred to her.
During trial, Sola submitted a copy of Deed of Self-Adjudication and Transfer of Rights over the property
dated 1983 executed by Fermina in her favor, and a certification from the municipal treasurer that she
had been declaring the land as her and her husband’s property for tax purposes since 1993.

Alvarico presented a Deed of Donation dated January 4, 1984, showing that the lot was given to him by
Lopez and he immediately took possession in 1985 and continues in possession up to the present. He
also claimed that Sola was in bad faith because he was first in material possession in good faith.

RTC rendered a decision in favor of Alvarico declaring he lawfully owned the land and the defendant,
Sola, was directed to reconvey the same to the former. Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
RTC.

Issue:
Who between Alvarico and Sola has a better claim to the land?

Ruling:
Sola has a better tile to the land. The execution of public documents, Affidavits of Adjudication, is
entitled to the presumption of regularity, hence convincing evidence is required to assail and controvert
them. It is undisputed that original certificate of title was issued in 1989 in favor of Sola. It requires more
than bare allegation to defeat the Title which on its face enjoys the legal presumption of regularity of
issuance. A Torrens title, once registered, serves as notice to the whole world.

Even assuming that Sola acquired title to the disputed land in bad faith, only the State can institute
reversion proceedings under Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act. Alvarico has no standing at all to question
the validity of Sola’s title. It follows that he cannot recover the property because, to begin with, he has
not shown that he is the rightful owner thereof. A private individual may not bring an action for
reversion or any action which would have the effect of canceling a free patent and the corresponding
certificate of title issued on the basis thereof, such that the land covered thereby will again form part of
the public domain.

G.R. No. 172720, SEPTEMBER 14, 2015

ELISEO MALTOS AND ROSITA P. MALTOS, petitioners, v. HEIRS OF EUSEBIO BORROMEO, respondents
PONENTE: LEONEN, J.

FACTS: On February 13, 1979, EusebioBorromeo was issued Free Patent No. 586681 over a piece of
agricultural land located in San Francisco, Agusandel Sur, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-
9053. On June 15, 1983, well within the five-year prohibitory period, EusebioBorromeo sold the land to
EliseoMaltos. EusebioBorromeo died on January 16, 1991. His heirs claimed that prior to his death, he
allegedly told his wife, Norberta Borromeo,3 and his children to nullify the sale made to EliseoMaltos
and have the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5477 cancelled because the sale was within the five-year
prohibitory period. On June 23, 1993, NorbertaBorromeo and her children (heirs of Borromeo) filed a
Complaint for Nullity of Title and Reconveyance of Title against EliseoMaltos, Rosita Maltos, and the
Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 946. EliseoMaltos and
Rosita Maltos (Maltos Spouses) filed their Answer, arguing that the sale was made in good faith and that
in purchasing the property, they relied on EusebioBorromeo's title. Further, the parties were in pari
delicto. Since the sale was made during the five-year prohibitory period, the land would revert to the
public domain and the proper party to institute reversion proceedings was the Office of the Solicitor
General. The Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur also filed an Answer, arguing that the deed of sale was
presented for Registration after the five-year prohibitory period, thus, it was ministerial on its part to
register the deed. The heirs of Borromeo countered that good faith was not a valid defense because the
prohibitory period appeared on the face of the title of the property.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the herein plaintiffs are the legal heirs of the late EusebioBorromeo.
2. Whether or not the sale of the disputed property within the prohibitory period is valid or binding.

HELD: 1.The five-year period prohibiting the sale of land obtained under homestead or free patent is
provided under Section 118 of the Public Land Act, which states:

SECTION 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, or legally
constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be
subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of
five years from and after the date of issuance1 of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the
satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops
on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.

The main purpose in the grant of a freq patent of homestead is to preserve and keep in the family of the
homesteader that portion of public land which the State has given to him so he may have a place to live
with his family and become a happy citizen and a useful member of the society. In Jocson v. Soriano, we
held that the conservation of a family home is the purpose of homestead laws. The policy of the state is
to foster, families as the foundation of society, and thus promote general welfare. . . .

Section 118 of CA 141, therefore, is predicated on public policy. Its violation gives rise to the cancellation
of the grant and the reversion of the land and its improvements to the government at the instance of
the latter. The provision that "nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted
prior to that expiration of the five-year period" is mandatory and any sale made in violation of such
provision is void and produces no effect whatsoever, just like what transpired in this case. Clearly, it is
not within the competence of any citizen to barter away what public policy by law seeks to preserve.

In this case, Section 10187 of the Public Land Act is applicable since title already vested in
EusebioBorromeo's name. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the sale was made
within the five-year prohibitory period. Thus, there is sufficient cause to revert the property in favor of
the state. However, this court cannot declare reversion of the property in favor of the state in view of
the limitation imposed by Section 101 that an action for reversion must first be filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General.

The doctrine of in pari delicto non orituractio is inapplicable when public policy will be violated. The in
pari delicto rule is provided under Articles 1411 and 1412 of the Civil Code. Article 1411 pertains to acts
that constitute criminal offenses, while Article 1412 pertains to acts that do not These provisions state:

ART. 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the
act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no action against
each other, and both shall be prosecuted. Moreover, the provisions of the Penal Code relative to the
disposal of effects or instruments of a crime shall be applicable to the things or the price of the contract.

This rule shall be applicable when only one of the parties is guilty; but the innocent one may claim what
he has given, and shall not be bound to comply with his promise.

ART. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal
offense, the following rules shall be observed:

(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by
virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the other's undertaking;cralawlawlibrary

(2) When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he cannot recover what he has given by reason of
the contract, or ask for the fulfilment of what has been promised him. The other, who is not at fault, may
demand the return of what he has given without any obligation to comply with his promise.

The case under consideration comes within the exception above adverted to. Here appellee desires to
nullify a transaction which was done in violation of the law. Ordinarily the principle of pari delicto would
apply to her because her predecessor-in-interest has carried out the sale with the presumed knowledge
of its illegality, but because the subject of the transaction is a piece of public land, public policy requires
that she, as heir, be not prevented from re-acquiring it because it was given by law to her family for her
home and cultivation. This is the policy on which our homestead law is predicated. This right cannot be
waived. "It is not within the competence of any citizen to barter away what public policy by law seeks to
preserve." We are, therefore, constrained to hold that appellee can maintain the present action it being
in furtherance of this fundamental aim of our homestead law.

As the in pari delicto rule is not applicable, the question now arises as to who between the parties have
a better right to possess the subject parcel of land. This issue was addressed in Santos:

What is important to consider now is who of the parties is the better entitled to the possession of the
land while the government does not take steps to assert its title to the homestead. Upon annulment of
the sale, the purchaser's claim is reduced to the purchase price and its interest. As against the vendor or
his heirs, the purchaser is no more entitled to keep the land than any intruder. Such is the situation of
the appellants. Their right to remain in possession of the land is no better than that of appellee and,
therefore, they should not be allowed to remain in it to the prejudice of appellee during and until the
government takes steps toward its reversion to the State. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in
ruling that while there is yet no action for reversion filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the
property should be conveyed by petitioners to respondents.

With respect to Appellees' claim for the reimbursement of the improvements on the land in question,
they are hereby declared to have lost and forfeited the value of the necessary improvements that they
made thereon in the same manner that Appellants should lose the value of the products gathered by
the Appellees from the said land. We are constrained to hold that the heirs of the homesteader should
be declared to have lost and forfeited the value of the products gathered from the land, and so should
the defendants lose the value of the necessary improvements that they have made thereon.

Reversion is a remedy provided under Section 101 of the Public Land Act:
SECTION 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or
improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor-General or the officer acting in his stead, in the
proper courts, in the name of Commonwealth of the Philippines.

The purpose of reversion is "to restore public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private
individuals or corporations to the mass of public domain. The general rule is that reversion of lands to
the state is not automatic, and the Office of the Solicitor General is the proper party to file an action for
reversion. The objective of an action for reversion of public land is the cancellation of the certificate of
title an|l the resulting reversion of the land covered by the title to the State| This is why an action for
reversion is oftentimes designated asj an annulment suit or a cancellation suit. Since an action for
reversion presupposes that the property in dispute is owned by the state, it is proper that the action be
filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, being the real party-in-interest.

There is, however, an exception to the rule that reversion is not automatic. Section 29 of the Public Land
Act provides:

SECTION 29. After the cultivation of the land has begun, the purchaser, with the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, may convey or encumber his rights to any person, corporation,
or association legally qualified under this Act to purchase agricultural public lands, provided such
conveyance or encumbrance does not affect any right or interest of the Government in the land: And
provided, further, That the transferee is not delinquent in the payment of any installment due and
payable. Any sale and encumbrance made without the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce shall be null and void and shall produce the effect of annulling the acquisition and
reverting the property and all rights to the State, and all payments on the purchase price theretofore
made to the Government shall be forfeited. After the sale has been approved, the vendor shall not lose
his right to acquire agricultural public lands under the provisions of this Act, provided he has the
necessary qualifications.

In this case, a free patent over the subject parcel of land was issued to EusebioBorromeo. This shows
that he already had title to the property when he sold it to petitioner EliseoMaltos. Thus, Section 101 of
the Public Land Act applies. Wherefore, the petition is denied.

Narcise vs. Valbueco, Inc.

Rules 92-97

G. R. No. 147148. January 13, 2003

PILAR Y. GOYENA, petitioner vs. AMPARO LEDESMA-GUSTILO, respondent.
Ponente: CARPIO-MORALES, J.

Facts: Respondent filed at the RTC of Makati a Petition For Letters Of Guardianship over the
person and properties of her sister Julieta who, for the most part during the years 1995 and 1996, has
been a patient in the Makati Medical Center where she is under medical attention for old age, general
debility, and a mini-stroke which she suffered in the United States in early 1995. Petitioner, Julieta’s
close friend and companion of more than 60 years, filed an Opposition to the petition for letters of
guardianship. She asserts that the petition lacked factual and legal basis in that JulietaLedesma is
competent and sane and there is absolutely no need to appoint a guardian to take charge of her
person/property and that respondent is not fit to be appointed as the guardian of JulietaLedesma since
their interests are antagonistic. Also, petitioner has interposed her objection to the appointment of
respondent as guardian because she thinks that the latter dislikes her. The trial court found Julieta
incompetent and incapable of taking care of herself and her property and appointed respondent as
guardian of her person and properties, which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue: Whether the appellate court and the trial court erred in finding that respondent is
suitable for appointment as guardian of the person and properties of Julieta.

Ruling:
No. In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge who deals directly with
the parties. As a rule, when it appears that the judge has exercised care and diligence in selecting the
guardian, and has given due consideration to the reasons for and against his action which are urged by
the interested parties, his action should not be disturbed unless it is made very clear that he has fallen
into grievous error. In the case at bar, petitioner has not shown that the lower courts committed any
error. Petitioner can neither rely on certain letters of Julieta to establish her claim that there existed a
rift between the two which amounts to antagonistic interests. No inference as to the existence of
antagonistic interests between respondent and Julieta can thus be made. Petitioner's assertion that
respondent's intent in instituting the guardianship proceedings is to take control of Julieta's properties
and use them for her own benefit is purely speculative and finds no support from the records.

The claim that respondent is hostile to the best interests of Julieta also lacks merit. That respondent
removed Julieta from the Makati Medical Center where she was confined after she suffered a stroke
does not necessarily show her hostility towards Julieta, given the observation by the trial court, cited in
the present petition, that Julieta was still placed under the care of doctors after she checked out and
was returned to the hospital when she suffered another stroke.

Likewise, petitioner opposed the petition for the appointment of respondent as guardian before the trial
court because, among other reasons, she felt she was disliked by respondent, a ground which does not
render respondent unsuitable for appointment as guardian.

Accordingly, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby dismissed.

Caiza vs CA
GR No. 110427 February 24, 1997
NARVASA, C.J.:

Facts:
Carmen Caiza was adjudged incompetent because of her advanced age and physical infirmities
which included cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal
guardian of her person and estate. Caiza was the owner of a house and lot in Quezon City. Later, she
commenced a suit in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City to eject the spouses Pedro and
Leonora Estrada from said premises through her legal guardian, Amparo.
 Out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses to temporarily reside in her house, rent-
free but because of an urgent need of the house on account of her advanced age and failing health, she,
through her guardian, had asked the Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate the house. However, they
had refused to do so.

The Estradas insist that the case against them was really not one of unlawful detainer; they argue that
since possession of the house had not been obtained by them by any "contract, express or implied," as
contemplated by Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, their occupancy of the premises could not be
deemed one "terminable upon mere demand (and hence never became unlawful) within the context of
the law." Neither could the suit against them be deemed one of forcible entry, they add, because they
had been occupying the property with the prior consent of the "real owner," Carmen Caiza, which
"occupancy can even ripen into full ownership once the holographic will of petitioner Carmen Caiza is
admitted to probate." They conclude, on those postulates, that it is beyond the power of Caiza's legal
guardian to oust them from the disputed premises.

Carmen Caiza later on died and was substituted as plaintiff by her legal guardian.

Issue:

Whether or not Amparo as legal guardian had the authority to bring the action and to
continuously represent Caiza even after her death.

Ruling:
Yes. She was appointed by a competent court the general guardian of both the person and the
estate of her aunt, Carmen Caiza. By that appointment, it became Evangelista's right and duty to get
possession of, and exercise control over, Caiza's property, both real and personal, it being recognized
principle that the ward has no right to possession or control of his property during her
incompetency.That right to manage the ward's estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof
and recover it from anyone who retains it,and bring and defend such actions as may be needful for this
purpose.

Evangelista was merely discharging the duty to attend to "the comfortable and suitable maintenance of
the ward" explicitly imposed on her by Section 4, Rule 96 of the Rules of Court, viz.:

"SEC. 4. Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied to maintenance of ward. A guardian must
manage the estate of his ward frugally and without waste, and apply the income and profits thereof, so
far as maybe necessary, to the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward and his family, if
there be any; and if such income and profits be insufficient for that purpose, the guardian may sell or
encumber the real estate, upon being authorized by order to do so, and apply to such of the proceeds as
may be necessary to such maintenance."

G.R. No. 194366

October 10, 2012

NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI-MONDEJAR, VISMINDA D. NERI-CHAMBERS, ROSA D. NERI-

MILLAN,DOUGLAS D. NERI, EUTROPIA D. ILLUT-COCKINOS AND VICTORIA D. ILLUT-PIALA,
 vs.
HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND JULPHA IBRAHIM UY,

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
AnunciacionNeri had seven children: first marriage with Gonzalo Illut, namely: Eutropia and Victoria and
second marriage with Enrique Neri, namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa. Throughout
the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired several homestead properties located
in Samal, Davao del Norte.
In 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his
minor children Rosa and Douglas, with Napoleon, Alicia, and Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale on 7/7/1979, adjudicating among themselves the
said homestead properties and thereafter, conveying them to the late spouses Uy for a consideration of
P 80,000.00.
In June 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of sale of the homestead
properties against spouses Uy before the RTC, assailing the validity of the sale for having been sold
within the prohibited period. The complaint was later amended to include Eutropia and Victoria
additional plaintiffs for having been excluded and deprived of their legitimes as children of Anunciacion
from her first marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether the father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, has the
power to dispose or encumber the property of the minor?

RULING:
All the petitioners are legitimate children of Anunciacion from her first and second marriages and
consequently, they are entitled to inherit from her in equal shares, pursuant to Articles 979 and 980 of
the Civil Code. In the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale
in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion should have participated. Considering that Eutropia
and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly
represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them. While the settlement of the
estate is null and void, the subsequent sale of the properties made by Enrique and his children,
Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the spouses is valid but only with respect to their
proportionate shares. With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution
of the settlement and sale, their natural guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in the
transaction.
However, on the basis of the laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with powers of
administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares in the estate of their mother.
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of fruits according
to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the
substance of the patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of administration.
Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 7.Parents as Guardians. – When the property of the child under parental authority is worth two
thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his
legal guardian. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or the
mother shall be considered guardian of the child’s property, with the duties and obligations of guardians
under these Rules, and shall file the petition required by Section 2 hereof. For good reasons, the court
may, however, appoint another suitable persons.

Thus, A FATHER OR MOTHER, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, does not
have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such power is granted by law only to
a judicial guardian of the ward’s property and even then only with courts’ prior approval secured in
accordance with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.
Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his minor children without the
proper judicial authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of majority, is unenforceable in
accordance with Articles 1317 and 1403 (1) of the Civil Code.
However, records show that Napoleon and Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement of the estate
with absolute deed of sale. In their Joint-Affidavit and Manifestation before the RTC, “they both
confirmed, respect and acknowledge the validity of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Deed
of Absolute Sale in 1979”. The ratification thus purged all the defects existing at the time of its execution
and legitimizing the conveyance of Rosa’s 1/16 share in the estate of Anunciacion to spouse Uy. The
same, however, is not true with respect to Douglas for lack of evidence showing ratification.

NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO OROPESA

G.R. No. 184528
April 25, 2012

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Decision rendered by the Court of
Appeals affirming the Order of the RTC in a Special Proceedings, which dismissed NiloOropesa’s,
petitioner, petition for guardianship over the properties of his father, respondent, CiriloOropesa.

On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, a
petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the property of his
father, the (respondent) CiriloOropesa. In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the
(respondent) has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years already
having suffered a stroke on April 1, 2003 and June 1, 2003, that his judgment and memory [were]
impaired and such has been evident after his hospitalization; that even before his stroke, the
(respondent) was observed to have had lapses in memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to
manage his property properly; that due to his age and medical condition, he cannot, without outside
aid, manage his property wisely, and has become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people
around him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.

CiriloOropesa filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship filed by his (ever caring and
loving) son. During trial, petitioner presented his evidence, which consists of his, his sister, and
respondent’s former nurse’s testimony.

After presenting evidence, petitioner rested his case but failed to file his written formal offer of
evidence. Respondent, thereafter, filed his Omnibus Motion to declare that petitioner has waived the
presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and Evidence since they were not formally offered; To expunge the
documents of the petitioner from records; and to grant leave to the Oppositor to file Demurrer to
Evidence. A subsequent Demurrer was filed and was granted. Motion for reconsideration was filed by
petitioner and appealed the case to Court of appeals but failed. Hence this petition to the Supreme
Court.

Issue: Whether respondent is considered incompetent as per the Rules who should be placed under
guardianship?

Ruling: No. The petition is without merit. Under the rules, incompetent includes persons suffering the
penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to
read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not
being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot
without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming an easy prey for
deceit and exploitation. Finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and
definite evidence. Nilo lacks material evidence to support his claims that his father is incompetent due
to his alleged deteriorating medical and metal condition. The only medical document presented “report
of neuropsychological screening proves that he is indeed competent to run his personal affairs.

Abad vs. Biazon

Rule 98

G.R. No. 166884 June 13, 2012

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LAMBERTO C. PEREZ, NESTOR C. KUN, MA. ESTELITA P. ANGELES-PANLILIO, and NAPOLEON O.
GARCIA, Respondents.

BRION, J.:

FACTS

Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) is a government financial institution and the official
depository of the Philippines. Respondents are the officers and representatives of Asian Construction
and Development Corporation (ACDC), a corporation incorporated under Philippine law and engaged in
the construction business. On several occasions respondents executed in favor of LBP trust receipts to
secure the purchase of contruction materials that they will nedd in their construction projects. The trust
receipts matured and ACDC failed to return to LBP the proceeds of the construction projects or even the
materials subject of the trust receipts. After several demands ACDC failed to act accordingly,
consequently LBP filed a complaint for Estafa or violation of Art. 315 , par 1(b) of the RPC in relation to
PD 115, against the respondent officers of ADC.

ISSUE

Whether or not the disputed transaction is a trust receipt or a loan?

RULING
The the transaction is one of a trust receipt. There are two obligations in a trust receipt transaction. The
first is covered by the provision that refers to money under the obligation to deliver it (entregarla) to the
owner of the merchandise sold. The second is covered by the provision referring to merchandise
received under the obligation to return it (devolvera) to the owner. Thus, under the Trust Receipts Law
intent to defraud is presumed when (1) the entrustee fails to turn over the proceeds of the sale of
goods covered by the trust receipt to the entruster; or (2) when the entrustee fails to return the goods
under trust, if they are not disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipts. In all trust
receipt transactions, both obligations on the part of the trustee exist in the alternative – the return of
the proceeds of the sale or the return or recovery of the goods, whether raw or processed. When both
parties enter into an agreement knowing that the return of the goods subject of the trust receipt is not
possible even without any fault on the part of the trustee, it is not a trust receipt transaction penalized
under Section 13 of P.D. 115; the only obligation actually agreed upon by the parties would be the
return of the proceeds of the sale transaction. This transaction becomes a mere loan where the
borrower is obligated to pay the bank the amount spent for the purchase of the goods. Article 1371 of
the Civil Code provides that "[i]n order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered." Under this provision, we can
examine the contemporaneous actions of the parties rather than rely purely on the trust receipts that
they signed in order to understand the transaction through their intent. We note in this regard that at
the onset of these transactions, LBP knew that ACDC was in the construction business and that the
materials that it sought to buy under the letters of credit were to be used for the following projects: the
Metro Rail Transit Project and the Clark Centennial Exposition Project LBP had in fact authorized the
delivery of the materials on the construction sites for these projects, as seen in the letters of credit it
attached to its complaint. Clearly, they were aware of the fact that there was no way they could recover
the buildings or constructions for which the materials subject of the alleged trust receipts had been
used. Notably, despite the allegations in the affidavit-complaint wherein LBP sought the return of the
construction materials, its demand letter dated May 4, 1999 sought the payment of the balance but
failed to ask, as an alternative, for the return of the construction materials or the buildings where these
materials had been used.

The fact that LBP had knowingly authorized the delivery of construction materials to a construction site
of two government projects, as well as unspecified construction sites, repudiates the idea that LBP
intended to be the owner of those construction materials. As a government financial institution, LBP
should have been aware that the materials were to be used for the construction of an immovable
property, as well as a property of the public domain. As an immovable property, the ownership of
whatever was constructed with those materials would presumably belong to the owner of the land,
under Article 445 of the Civil Code

Even if we consider the vague possibility that the materials, consisting of cement, bolts and reinforcing
steel bars, would be used for the construction of a movable property, the ownership of these properties
would still pertain to the government and not remain with the bank as they would be classified as
property of the public domain, which is defined by the Civil Code. In contrast with the present situation,
it is fundamental in a trust receipt transaction that the person who advanced payment for the
merchandise becomes the absolute owner of said merchandise and continues as owner until he or she is
paid in full, or if the goods had already been sold, the proceeds should be turned over to him or to her.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the January 20, 2005 decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 76588. No costs.
Rules 99-100

Castro vs. Gregorio

CANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 105308
September 25, 1998

Facts: This case is a petition for review on certiorari over the Decision of CA affirming the decree of
adoption issued by the RTC of Cebu for the adoption of minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony all
surnamed Cang.

Minors’ parents are Hebert Cang (Petitioner) and Anna Marie Clavano. Anna Marie subsequently filed
for legal separation which was granted. Petitioner then left for the United States. Petitioner sought a
divorce decree there, and was granted. Petitioner thereafter took an American wife and thus became a
naturalized American citizen. Later on, he divorced his American wife and never remarried. While in the
U.S., Petitioner remitted money to the Philippines for his minor children.

Meanwhile, Spouses Clavano, here in the Philippines, filed a Special Proceedings for the Adoption of the
three (3) minor Cang children before the RTC of Cebu. 14 year old Keith, as well as the mother Anna
Marie, consented to the said adoption and alleged that Petitioner abandoned them and forfeited
already his parental rights over their children. Anna Marie consented to the adoption of her children to
her relatives because she would go to U.S. as well, to find a job and live there.

Upon learning of the petition for adoption, Petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines and filed
an opposition thereto. He alleged that although he has only meager finance compared to Spouses
Clavano, he cannot allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority.

Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, Petitioner moved to reacquire custody over his children
alleging that Anna had gone to the US thereby leaving custody to their children to Spouses Clavano
(Private Respondents). Such petition was granted and the Trial Court ordered that the custody of the
minor children should be transferred to their father.

Later on, the the Petition for Adoption was granted.

Issue: Whether adoption should be granted?

Held: No. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to
abandonment.

The General Rule under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court provides that:

The written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption.
The exception of this rule is that the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent
has abandoned the child or that such parent is insane or hopelessly intemperate.

In the instant case, records disclose that Petitioner’s conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to
forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to constitute
abandonment.

While admittedly, Petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the US, he was not remiss in his
natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular
communication with his wife and children through telephone calls and letters. He used to send packages
by mail and catered to their whims.

G.R. No. 135216. August 19, 1999]

TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Deceased Alfredo E.
Jacob, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS for the Province of
Camarines Sur, and JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher of Balalong, respondents.
Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts: Plaintiff-appellant, the petitioner herein, TomasaVda. De Jacob, claimed to be the surviving
spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates
of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased.
Defendant-appellee, the private respondents herein, Pedro Pilapil, on the other hand, claimed to be the
legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued
by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by
deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil. During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Alfredo in Case No. T-46 (entitled Tomasavda. de Jacob v. Jose Centenera, et al) herein
defendant-appellee Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the deceased estate as
Alfredos adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage
between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo. Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for
Intervention and filed a complaint for injunction with damages (Civil Case No. T-83) questioning
appellees claim as the legal heir of Alfredo. The lower court as well as the Court of Appeals ruled in favor
of the private respondent declaring that the Order dated July 18, 1961, and the signature of the issuing
Judge JOSE L. MOYA to be genuine and that the private respondent was the legally adopted child and
sole heir of deceased Alfredo and that the reconstructed Marriage Contract presented by the petitioner
was spurious and non-existent. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the

Issue: Whether or not Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob

Ruling: No. At the trial of this case at present, two expert witnesses were presented, one for petitioner
and one for Respondent Pilapil. The trial court relied mainly on respondents expert and brushed aside
the Deposition of Judge Moya himself. Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of
Adoption. More importantly, when shown the signature over his name, he positively declared that it
was not his. The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does not discredit his
statements. At the time, he could with medication still read the newspapers; upon the request of the
defense counsel, he even read a document shown to him. The Court find no reason to disregard and the
respondent has not presented any to disregard the Deposition of Judge Moya. Judge Moyas declaration
was supported by the expert testimony of NBI Document Examiner BienvenidoAlbacea, who declared
that the questioned and the standard signature Jose L. Moya were not written by one and the same
person. Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged Order was
purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he did not
dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court were criminal cases, in
which the accused pleaded guilty. Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he was
assigned was always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did not contain this
information. Furthermore, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted child.
Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management in Manila and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, issued Certifications that there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been
adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption of
respondent. The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship.
This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by petitioner shows that the
alleged adoption is a sham. Thus, the Petition is grantedand the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals was reversedandset aside.The marriage between Petitioner TomasaVda.de Jacob and the
deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was recognized and declared valid and the claimed adoption of Respondent
Pedro Pilapil is declared nonexistent.

Republic vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. G.R. No. 103695. March 15, 1996
MENDOZA, J.

Facts: On September 2, 1988, Spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto filed a petition for
adoption of minor Midael C. Mazon, before the Regional Trial Court in Cavite City Branch XVI.

In their petition, Spouses Carato alleged that Midael C. Mazon had been living with them since he was
seven years old. They further alleged that when they got married on January 19, 1986, Midael C. Mazon
stayed with them under their care and custody.

In the petition, they prayed that after hearing, a judgment be rendered:

a) Declaring the Michael C. Mazon their child for all intents and purposes;
b) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and
c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the petitioners and that the first name
which was mistakenly registered as MIDAEL be corrected to MICHAEL.

The case was set for hearing on September 21, 1988, giving notice thereof by publication and by service
of the Order upon the DSWD and Office of the Solicitor General.

The OSG opposed the petition insofar as the correction of name of Midael was concerned. According to
the OSG, although the change in the name sought was clerical, the petition was basically for adoption
and not for correction of entry under Rule 108.
The RTC granted the petition for adoption and prayer of Spouses Caranto to change the name of the
child from Midael to Michael. The RTC ruled that Rule 108, contrary to the claim of the OSG, was only
applicable to concerns related to civil status of persons.

Issue: Whether or not change of name falls under Rule 108 (Correction of Entry).

Ruling: Yes. Contrary to the findings of the RTC, change of name falls under Rule 108. Section 2 (o) of the
said rule states:

"Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – xxx (o) changes of name."

Clearly, Rule 108 does not only concern civil status of persons but also concern changes of name.
This also means that the decision of the trial court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of
entry, was void. This is so because the Local Civil Registrar, an indespensable party in proceedings falling
under Rule 108, was not notified. Section 3 of the said Rule states:

“3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to
the proceeding.”

Furthermore, the decision of the RTC was void also on the ground that the supposed Petition for
Correction of Entry (change of name) was not published. Meaning, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over the subject matter.

Reyes vs Mauricio

In the Matter of Stephanie Nathy Astorga-Garcia

In Re: Adoption of Michelle & Micheal Lim

Nery v. Atty. Sampana

(A.C. No.10196; September 9,2014; Carpio, Acting C.J.)

Facts: Melody Nery engaged the services of Atty. GlicerioSampana for the annulment of her marriage
and for her adoption by an alien adopter. The petition for annulment was granted and Nery paid Php
200,000.00 for Sampana’s services. For the adoption case, respondent asked Nery if she had an aunt,
whom they could represent as the wife of her alien adopter. Sampana also gave Nery a blurred copy of a
marriage contract, which they would use for her adoption. Thereafter, he was paid in installment in the
amount of Php 100,000.00.
Sampana made Nery believe that a petition for her adoption was filed and that the hearing was already
set. However, when Nery inquired about the status of her petition for adoption from the court (Branch
11, Malolos, Bulacan), she discovered that no such petition was filed. Consequently, Nery asked for
reimbursement, to which Sampana agreed but claimed a deduction of Php 12,000.00 for filing fees.
However, Nery claimed the full amount since no petition was filed.
A disbarment complaint was filed. However, Sampana denied that he misled Nery as to the filing of the
petition for adoption, but after investigation, the IBP found Sampana guilty of malpractice.

Issue: (1) Whether or not respondent is guilty of malpractice.

(2) Whether or not an alien adopter can adopt petitioner.

Ruling: (1) Yes. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives
rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. Sampana admitted that he received "one package fee"
for both cases of annulment and adoption. Despite receiving this fee, he unjustifiably failed to file the
petition for adoption and fell short of his duty of due diligence and candor to his client.
(2) Yes. He suggested to Nery that if the alien adopter would be married to her close relative, the
intended adoption could be possible. Under the Domestic Adoption Act, the alien adopter can jointly
adopt a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino spouse, and the
certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt is waived.
Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana misinformed Nery of the status of
the petition. He then conceded that the annulment case overshadowed the petition for adoption. Verily,
Sampana neglected the legal matter entrusted to him. He even kept the money given him, in violation of
the Code’s mandate to deliver the client’s funds upon demand. Thus, the Court suspended Atty.
Sampana from the practice of law for 3 years.

Bartolome vs. Social Security System,

740 SCRA 78 , November 12, 2014
VELASCO, JR., J.:

FACTS: John Colcol died in a work-related accident while he was employed as an electrician by Scanmar
Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled under the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program
(ECP).

Since John was childless and unmarried, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother
and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits with the SSS.

However, SSS denied the claim, stating that the petitioner is not considered as the parent of John as he
was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol, the victim’s great grandfather, therefore Bernardina cannot be
considered as John’s beneficiary because she is not the deceased’s legitimate parent. Cornelio Colcol,
however, already died on October 26, 1987, less than three years since the decree of John’s adoption
became final.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the interpretation of the ECC stating that only legitimate parents may benefit from
compensation is correct.

2. Whether or not Petitioner qualifies as a dependent parent notwithstanding her son's adoption by
someone else.
HELD:
1. No. The term “parents” in the phrase “dependent parents” in the aforequoted Article 167(j) of the
Labor Code is used and ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to
“legitimate parents” as what the ECC did. The phrase “dependent parents” should, therefore, include all
parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When the law does
not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, “dependent parents” are parents, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who are in need of support or assistance.
Nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that “legitimate parents” pertain to those who exercise
parental authority over the employee enrolled under the ECP. It was only in the assailed Decision
wherein such qualification was made. In addition, assuming arguendo that the ECC did not overstep its
boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor Code provision to the deceased’s legitimate parents, and that
the commission properly equated legitimacy to parental authority, petitioner can still qualify as John’s
secondary beneficiary. True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old,
petitioner’s parental authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the
ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3)
years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age. John’s minority at
the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance,
parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise,
taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no
collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the
adopter passed away?

2. Yes. It is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their
child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered
employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or
intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by
adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still
attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the
exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive
parent. We cannot leave undetermined the fate of a minor child whose second chance at a better life
under the care of the adoptive parents was snatched from him by death’s cruel grasp.
Otherwise, the adopted child’s quality of life might have been better off not being adopted at all if he
would only find himself orphaned in the end. Thus, We hold that Cornelio’s death at the time of John’s
minority resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the adopted child.

Rule 102

Ilusorio vs. Bildner

GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000

FACTS: Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at millions
of pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. He
was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely
Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated from
bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio
Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner lived in
Antipolo City.

In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in Antipolo city.
The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose Potenciano which
caused the latter’s health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for
guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health,
poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio,
Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In March
1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging that
the respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from
returning to Antipolo.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.

HELD: A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the
rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such
petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The
illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral.

Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano’s liberty
that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and under
medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern
his actions. With his full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the subject of
visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy.

The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit
a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to
do so without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond
judicial authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the
sheriffs or by any other process.

Atty. Edward Serapio v. Sandiganbayan (3rd Division)

G.R. No. 148468 January 28, 2003

Facts: Atty. Edward Serapio (petitioner) filed two petitions in the SC; these are: 1. A petition for
certiorari assailing the resolutions of the Third division of the Sandigan bayan denying his petition for
bail, motion for reinvestigation and motion to quash; 2. Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of plunder together with Former President Joseph Estrada and
son Jinggoy Estrada among others. Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and legal counsel
of Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. He allegedly received, on behalf of the said foundation, millions of
pesos coming from illegal activities.
The Ombudsman recommended the filing of a case against him before the Sandigan bayan. A warrant
for his arrest was issued. Upon learning of the said warrant he voluntarily surrendered to the PNP.
Petitioner, thereafter, file an Urgent Motion for Bail but such motion is opposed by the prosecution for
the reason that petitioner should be arraign first before he can avail of Bail. Later on Petitioner
simultaneously filed a motion to quash. The bail hearing was reset several times due to various
pleadings filed by petitioner and the prosecution.
Due to this, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus for the reason that the prosecution have waived
their right to present evidence in opposition to his petition for bail; the prosecution launched an endless
barrage of obstructive and dilatory moves to prevent the conduct of the bail hearings; and, on the
failure of the People to adduce strong evidence of his guilt. For the said reasons, he is still being
deprived of his liberty. Petitioner also cited Moncupa vs. Enrile, which in such case the Court held that
habeas corpus extends to instances where detention, while valid from its inception, has later become
arbitrary.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus should be granted?

Ruling: No. SC finds no basis for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. General rule applies.
“Petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting ones right to bail. It cannot be
availed of where accused is entitled to bail not as a matter of right but on the discretion of the court and
the latter has not abused such discretion in refusing to grant bail, or has not even exercised said
discretion. The proper recourse is to file an application for bail with the court where the criminal case is
pending and to allow hearings thereon to proceed.”
MoncupavsEnrile does not apply in this case because petitioner’s restraint of liberty did not become
arbitrary. His application for bail has yet to commence (to be heard).
The delay in the hearing of his petition for bail cannot be pinned solely to the Sandiganbayan or on the
prosecution because he himself is partly to be blamed (his actions caused delay too.
As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of
his liberty in custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which jurisdiction to do so.
In exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by the courts even when the person
concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is
recognized as the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and
lawless state action due to its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes.

Lacson vs. Perez

Sangca vs City Prosecutor of Cebu

Mangila vs Pangilinan

MA. HAZELINA A. TUJAN-MILITANTE v. RAQUEL M. CADA-DEAPERA

G.R. No. 210636; July 28, 2014

FACTS: Raquel filed before the RTC-Caloocan a verified petition for writ of habeas corpus directing
petitioner Hazelina to produce before the court respondent's biological daughter, minor Criselda, and to
return to her the custody over the child which was granted by the court. But, despite diligent efforts and
several attempts, the Sheriff was unsuccessful in personally serving petitioner copies of the habeas
corpus petition and of the writ.
Meanwhile, petitioner filed a Petition for Guardianship over the person of Criselda before the RTC-
Quezon City but was dismissed due to the pendency of the habeas corpus petition before RTC-Caloocan.
Thereafter, respondent filed a criminal case for kidnapping against petitioner and her counsel.
Raquel moved for the ex parte issuance of an alias writ of habeas corpus before the RTC-Caloocan,
which was granted. The Alias Writ was served upon petitioner at the Office of the Assistant City
Prosecutor of Quezon City during the preliminary investigation of the kidnapping case.

ISSUES: Whether or not the RTC Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petition filed by
respondent.
Whether the writ issued by RTC-Caloocan in Quezon City where petitioner was served a copy is
enforceable.
Whether or not RTC-Caloocan validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and the person of Criselda.

HELD: YES, the RTC-Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus proceeding. A verified petition for
a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. However, the
petition may be filed with the regular court in the absence of the presiding judge of the Family Court,
provided, however, that the regular court shall refer the case to the Family Court as soon as its presiding
judge returns to duty. The petition may also be filed with the appropriate regular courts in places where
there are no Family Courts.
YES. The writ issued by the Family Court or the regular court shall be enforceable in the judicial region
where they belong. In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the family court of Caloocan
City. Since Caloocan City and Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by the
RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented in Quezon City. Whether petitioner resides in the former or the
latter is immaterial in view of the above rule.
As regards petitioner’s assertion that the summons was improperly served, suffice it to state that service
of summons, to begin with, is not required in a habeas corpus petition. As held in Saulo v. Cruz, a writ of
habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by
service of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.

The Matter Of The Petition For Habeas Corpus Of Datukan Malang Salibo, Datukan Malang Salibo
vs.
Warden, Quezon City Jail Annex, BJMP Building, Camp BagongDiwa, Taguig City And All Other Persons
Acting On His Behalf And/Or Having Custody Of Datukan Malang Salibo
G.R. No. 197597 April 8, 2015

FACTS: Butukan S. Malang, one of the accused in the Maguindanao massacre, had a pending warrant of
arrest issued by the trial court in People vsAmpatuan Jr. et. al. When Datukan Malang Salibo learned
that the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S.
Malang, he presented himself to clear his name. Salibo presented to the police pertinent portions of his
passport, boarding passes and other documents tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo
was in Saudi Arabia when the massacre happened. The authorities, however, apprehended and detained
him. He questioned the legality of his detention via Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA,
maintaining that he is not the accused Batukan S. Malang. The CA issued the writ, making it returnable
to the judge of RTC Taguig. After hearing of the Return, the trial court granted Salibo’s petition and
ordered his immediate release from detention.

On appeal by the Warden, the CA reversed the RTC ruling. The CA held that even assuming Salibo was
not the Batukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, orderly course of trial must be pursued
and the usual remedies exhausted before the writ of habeas corpus may be invoked. Salibo’s proper
remedy, according to the CA, should have been a motion to quash information and/or warrant of arrest.

On the other hand, Salibo believes that the Warden erred in appealing the RTC decision before the CA.
Salibo argued that although the CA delegated to the RTC the authority to hear the Warden’s Return, the
RTC’s ruling should be deemed as the CA ruling, and hence, it should have been appealed directly before
the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Salibo properly availed the remedy of a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

HELD: Yes, habeas corpus is the remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. In such
cases, the person is not under any lawful process and is continuously being illegally detained.

First, it was Butukan S. Malang, not Salibo, who was charged and accused in the Information and Alias
Warrant of Arrest issued in the case of People vsAmpatuan. Based on the evidence presented, Salibo
sufficiently established that he could not have been Butukan S. Malang. Therefore, Salibo was not
arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense, nor restrained under a lawful process or an
order of a court.

Second, Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. When he was in the presence of authorities,
he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense and the police officers had no personal
knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. Further, Salibo was not an escape prisoner.
This only means that the police officers have deprived him of his liberty without due process of law.
Therefore, Salibo correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

Padilla vs. Congress of the Phil.

Change of Name vs. Correction/ Cancellation of Entries, as amended R.A. 9048 and 10172 (Rule 103 vs.
Rule 108)

MA. LOURDES BARRIENTOS ELEOSIDA, for and in behalf of her minor child, CHARLES CHRISTIAN
ELEOSIDA, petitioner, vs. LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and CARLOS VILLENA
BORBON, respondents.
[G.R. No. 130277. May 9, 2002]

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the RTC of Quezon City dismissing
motupropio the petition for Ma. Lourdes Eleosida to correct some entries in the birth certificate of her
son, Charles Christian.
Petitioner seeks to correct in the birth cert. of her son the following:
The surname “Borbon” should be changed to Eleosida (since the parents were never married; the child
is illegitimate and, therefore, should follow the mother’s surname;
The date of the wedding should be blank;
Petitioner’s name should be Ma. Lourdes Eleosida (instead of Borbon).
No opposition was made to this petition.
RTC, however, dismissed it on the basis that only clerical errors (CLERICAL ERRORS) of a harmless and
innocuous nature like misspelled name, occupation of the parents, etc. may be subject of judicial order
authorizing changes or corrections and not as may affect the civil status, nationality or citizenship of the
person (substantial/material change/error) involved.
Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether changes or corrections which are substantial may be subject of a judicial proceeding.

Decision: Yes, Court find merit in the petition.

Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the
correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is
summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed
substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. (Note: CLERICAL -SUMMARY; SUBSTANTIAL-
ADVERSARIAL)
If all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 (Notice and publication [especially]) (Note:
Adversarial) have been followed, it was therefore error for the trial court to dismiss the petition
motupropio without allowing the petitioner to present evidence to support her petition (and all the
other persons who have an interest over the matter to oppose the same).

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CARLITO I. KHO, ET. AL

G.R No. 170340, JUNE 29,2007
CARPIO MORALES, J.

FACTS:
CarlitoKho and his family applied for the correction of various details in their birth certificate. Carlito
petitioned for 1) change of citizenship of his mother from “Chinese” to “Filipino”; 2) delete “John” from
his name; 3) delete the word “married” opposite the date of marriage of his parents. The last correction
was ordered to be effected likewise in the birth certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy, Nona and
Heddy Moira.
The petition from a non-adversarial nature of the change is premised on RA 9048, which allows first
name and nickname in the birth certificates without judicial order. The Municipal officer approved the
change. The Solicitor General objected to the correction on the ground that the correction is not merely
clerical but requires an adversarial proceeding. The Court of Appeals favored with Kho.

ISSUE: Whether or not Kho’s request for change in the details of their birth certificate requires an
adversarial proceeding.

RULING: It cannot be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the citizenship of Carlito’s
mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and delete the “married” status of Carlito’s parents in his
and his siblings’ respective birth certificates, as well as change the date of marriage of Carlito and
Marivel involves the correction of not just clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature. Rather,
the changes entail substantial and controversial amendments.
For the change involving the nationality of Carlito’s mother as reflected in his birth certificate is a grave
and important matter that has a bearing and effect on the citizenship and nationality not only of the
parents, but also of the offspring.
Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlito’s and his sibllings’ parents were “married” alters their
filiation from “legitimate” to “illegitimate”. with significant implications on their successional and other
rights. Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an adversary proceeding.
The enactment in March 2001 of RA 9048 known as “An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil
Registrar or the Consul General to Correct A Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of
First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register Without Need of Judicial Order.” has been considered to
lend legislative affirmation to the judicial precedence that substantial corrections to the civil status of
persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected through the filing of a petition under Rule 108.
When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the appropriate adversary
proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections to the entries of the civil register is satisfied.

IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/ CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL
REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN WANG, to be amended/corrected
as JULIAN LIN WANG vs. CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR
G.R. No. 159966. 30 March 2005. Tinga, J.

Facts Julian Lin Carulasan Wang (herein referred to as Julian) was born out of wedlock. In 1998, his
parents, Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang got married, and thereafter executed a Deed of
Legitimation, as a result thereto, petitioner’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang.
Anna Lisa and Sing-Foe plan to stay in Singapore for a long time to send Julian to school together with
his sister, Wang Mei Jasmine. Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother
are not carried in a persons’ name, they anticipate that Julian will be discriminated because of his
current registered name which carries a middle name. Also, Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore’s
Mandarin language since they do not have the letter R, but if there is, they pronounced it as L. Hence,
on 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian, represented by his mother, filed a petition for change of name
and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner
sought to drop his middle name.
The trial court held that the reason given for the change of name sought in the petition, that Julian will
be discriminated when he study in Singapore because of his middle name, did not fall within the
grounds recognized by law; the same is merely for the convenience of the child. To grant such petition
would be tantamount to giving due recognition to or application of the laws of Singapore instead of
Philippine law, which is controlling. Further stated, Article 174 of the Family Code provides that,
legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no
reason why this right should now be taken from petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor.
Trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration; hence, petitioner filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari. Petitioner pointed out that the middle name Carulasan will cause him undue embarrassment
and the difficulty in writing or pronouncing it will be an obstacle to his social acceptance and integration
in the Singaporean community.

Issue: Whether the petitioner shall be allowed to drop his middle name anchored on grounds of
convenience?
Ruling: No. The Court affirmed the decision rendered by the trial court.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification,
and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right; as such, before a person can be authorized to
change his name either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show reasonable cause or
compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.
In addition, petitioner must not only show proper reasons, but also the fact that he will be prejudiced by
the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid
are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when
the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion;
(d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was
unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former
alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose
or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left
to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and
not all the best evidence available. What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance
of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced
in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole
prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts.

G.R. No. 181174. December 4, 2009.*

MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and JANELLE ANN T. BRAZA, petitioners, vs.THE
CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, minor PATRICK ALVIN TITULAR
BRAZA, represented by LEON TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR and LUCILLE C. TITULAR, respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner Ma. Cristina Braza and Pablo Braza Jr. were married. During the wake of Pablo, who
died in a vehicular accident, respondent Lucille Titular and her son, Patrick Alvin Titutar showed up and
introduced themselves as the wife and son, respectively, of Pablo. Stated in Patrick’s birth certificate
from the Local Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental that: (1) Pablo is the father of Patrick having
acknowledged by the father on January 13, 1997; and, (2) Patrick was legitimated by virtue of the
subsequent marriage of his parents; hence, his name was changed to Patrick Alvin Titular Braza. Cristina
likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were married in 1998.

Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of Patrick’s birth records
and that the rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto. They contended that Patrick could not
have been legitimated by the supposed subsequent marriage between Lucille and Pablo because said
marriage is bigamous on account of a valid and subsisting marriage between her (Cristina) and Pablo.

ISSUE: May the court pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy in an action to
correct entries in the civil registrar?

HELD: No. Under Rule 108, the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy
and filiations. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical,
spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry.
The Petitioners cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void
for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule
108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 17118 of the Family
Code, respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said
Code.
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack
such as the petition filed before the court a quo.

Republic vs. Silverio

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner VERSUS JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, respondent

G.R. NO. 166676, SEPTEMBER 12, 2008
PONENTE: J. QUISIMBING

FACTS: The following facts were presented by the respondent to the RTC:
(a) She was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as female in the Certificate of Live birth.
(b) While growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics because of CAH, which is a
condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics.
(c) Respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of
Psychiatry, UP-PGH and the latter issued a medical certificate. Such document testified respondent’s
claim.

Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the abovementioned
ruling had been filed.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth
certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male under Rules 103 and 108 of
the Rules of Court.

HELD: No. The trial court did not err in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent. The court considered the unique circumstance in this case where nature had taken its
course.

As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the
consequences that will follow. The trial court's grant of respondent's change of name from Jennifer to
Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that
respondent's change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent's
change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from
female to male.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy

G.R. No. 198010 August 12, 2013
Facts: Dr, Norma LugsanayUy filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live Birth. She
alleged that she was born on February 8, 1952 and is the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and
SoteraLugsanay. Her Certificate of Live Birth shows that her full name is "Anita Sy" when in fact she is
allegedly known to her family and friends as "Norma S. Lugsanay. She also contended that she is a
Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos.

Dr.Uy sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate, particularly those pertaining to her first
name, surname and citizenship. She also sought the correction allegedly to reflect the name which she
has been known for since childhood, including her legal documents such as passport and school and
professional records.

RTC issued an Order finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance and setting the case for
hearing, with the directive that the said Order be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
City of Gingoog and the Province of Misamis Oriental at least once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks at the expense of respondent.

CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. The CA held that respondent’s failure to implead other indispensable
parties was cured upon the publication of the Order setting the case for hearing in a newspaper of
general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and by serving a copy of the notice to the Local Civil
Registrar, the OSG and the City Prosecutor’s Office.

Republic of the Philippines filed a petition on the sole ground that the petition is dismissible for failure
to implead indispensable parties. It assailed that the changes are obviously not mere clerical as they
affects her rights and obligations in this country and these changes are clearly substantial.

Issue: Whether or not failure to implead and notify the affected or interested parties may be cured by
the publication of the notice of hearing?

Ruling: No. When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves
substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court is mandated. Section 3 of Rule 108 states that “when cancellation or correction of an entry in the
civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding”.

The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice
thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. Summons must
be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the
requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his
interest if he so chooses.

The subject matter of the petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous
nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as
controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. Supreme Court
adheres to the principle that substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.
If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere summary proceedings and
not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or
represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be
detrimental and far reaching.

Minoru Fujiki vs Marinay

People vs Merlinda Olaybar

FRANCLER P. ONDE, petitioner vs.THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRATION OF LAS PIÑAS
CITY, respondent.
G.R. No. 197174. September 10, 2014
Ponente: VILLARAMA, JR., J.

Facts: Petitioner filed a petition for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth before the RTC and
named respondent Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City as sole respondent. Petitioner
alleged that he is the illegitimate child of his parents Guillermo A. Onde and Matilde DC Pakingan, but
his birth certificate stated that his parents were married. His birth certificate also stated that his
mother's first name is Tely and that his first name is Franc Ler. The RTC dismissed the petition and ruled
that the proceedings must be adversarial since the first correction is substantial in nature and would
affect petitioner’s status as a legitimate child. It was further held that the correction in the first name of
petitioner and his mother can be done by the city civil registrar under RA 9048.

Issue: Whether the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for correction of entries.

Ruling: No. We agree with the RTC that the first name of petitioner and his mother as appearing in his
birth certificate can be corrected by the city civil registrar under RA 9048. Indeed, under Section 1 of RA
9048, clerical or typographical errors on entries in a civil register can be corrected and changes of first
name can be done by the concerned city civil registrar without need of a judicial order. Aforesaid
Section 1, as amended by RA 10172, states that “No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or
nickname, the day and month in the date of birth or sex of a person where it is patently clear that there
was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the entry, which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act
and its implementing rules and regulations”.

We also agree with the RTC in ruling that correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his
parents were married to "not married" is a substantial correction requiring adversarial proceedings. Said
correction is substantial as it will affect his legitimacy and convert him from a legitimate child to an
illegitimate one. Substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established
provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceedings.
This substantial correction is allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. We also stress that a petition
seeking a substantial correction of an entry in a civil register must implead as parties to the proceedings
not only the local civil registrar but also all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected by the correction. This is required by Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Thus, in his new
petition, petitioner should at least implead his father and mother as parties since the substantial
correction he is seeking will also affect them.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Orders of the RTC, Branch 201, LasPiñas City. The
dismissal ordered by the RTC is, however, declared to be without prejudice.

Almojuela vs. Republic

Gan vs. Republic

Prerogative Writs

Daniel Masangkay Tapuz v. Hon. Judge Elmo Del Rosario

G.R No. 182484
June 17, 2007

Facts: The private respondents spouses Sanson filed with the Aklan MCTC a complaint for forcible entry
and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the
petitioners and other John Does numbering about 120.
The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the registered owners of the
disputed land; (2) they were the disputed land’s prior possessors when the petitioners – armed with
bolos and carrying suspected firearms and together with unidentified persons – entered the disputed
land by force and intimidation, without the private respondents’ permission and against the objections
of the private respondents’ security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.

In their Answer, the petitioners denied the material allegations and essentially claimed that: (1)
they are the actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private
respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private respondents’ certificate of title to the disputed
property is spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim for
damages.

The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered a decision in the private respondents’ favor, finding
prior possession through the construction of perimeter fence in 1993.

The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to RTC. On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private
respondents’ motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction upon posting of a
bond. The writ – authorizing the immediate implementation of the MCTC decision – was actually issued
by respondent Judge del Rosario after the private respondents had complied with the imposed
condition. The petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ; the private respondents, on the
other hand, filed a motion for demolition.

The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners’ MR and to Defer Enforcement of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.
 Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition. The respondent Judge
nevertheless issued via a Special Order a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen (15) days after
the Sheriff’s written notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the private
respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land.

The petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Review of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction
and Order of Demolition in CA.

Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition. Hence, the
present petition for certiorari with writs of amparo and habeas data.

ISSUE: W/N petition for certiorari with writ of amparo and habeas data is proper

HELD: No. We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally defective,
both in substance and in form. The petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, on the other hand, is
fatally defective with respect to content and substance.

Based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition for certiorari to
nullify the assailed RTC orders has been filed out of time. Based on the same material antecedents, we
find too that the petitioners have been guilty of willful and deliberate misrepresentation before this
Court and, at the very least, of forum shopping. In sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed
for the cited formal deficiencies, for violation of the non-forum shopping rule, for having been filed out
of time, and for substantive deficiencies.

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of
available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address
violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent
remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules.
What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ
that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
– in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance
demands – requires that every petition for the issuance of the Writ must be supported by justifying
allegations of fact.

On the whole, what is clear from these statements – both sworn and unsworn – is the overriding
involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the
property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can
hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right
to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and harassments implied from
the presence of “armed men bare to the waist” and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably,
none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and
security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing.

These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus
rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or
unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition
likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police
authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for
the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has
not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than
the “fishing expedition” that this Court – in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data – had in mind
in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the
petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order. PETITION DENIED.

Infant JULIAN YUSA y CARAM, represented by his mother, MA. CHRISTINA YUSA y CARAM vs. Atty.
MARIJOY SIGUE, Atty. SALLY ESCUTIN, VILMA CABRERA and CELIA YANGCO
G.R. No. 193652. 5 August 2014. Villarama, Jr., J.

Facts
Petitioner Ma. Christina YusayCaram (herein referred to as Christina) had an amorous relationship with
GicanoConstantinoIII (herein referred to as Marcelino), and eventually became pregnant without the
benefit of marriage. Christina mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion; and to avoid
placing her family in a potentially embarrassing situation for having a second illegitimate son, she
intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children (Sun and Moon, for
brevity). After giving birth to Baby Julian, Christina surrendered him by way of a Deed of Voluntary
Commitment to the DSWD. Not long after, Marcelino suffered heart attack and died. During the wake,
Christina disclosed to the family of Marcelino the birth of Baby Julian and the fact that she gave him up
for adoption. The said family vowed to help Christina recover and raise the baby.
Christina wrote a letter to the DSWD asking for the suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption proceedings.
However, DSWD had already issued a Certificate declaring Baby Julian as “Legally Available for
Adoption,” he was “matched” with spouses Vergel and Filomina Medina; and thereafter, supervised trial
custody commenced. The Certificate abovementioned had attained finality and, in effect, Christina’s
parental authority was terminated and Baby Julian is effectively made a ward of the State. DSWD, in
response to the letter, informed petitioner that they were no longer in the position to stop the adoption
process, and Christina lost her right to reacquire her parental authority over Baby Julian or halt the
adoption process since the reglementary period for the said action had already lapsed under Sec. 7 of
RA No. 9523.
Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo, seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian
from respondents. Christina argues that the life, liberty and security of Baby Julian is being violated or
threatened by herein respondents; that the latter "blackmail" her into surrendering custody of her child
to the DSWD, and utilized an invalid Certificate of Availability for Adoption to misrepresent that all legal
requisites for adoption of the minor child had been complied with. As such, respondents had acted
beyond the scope of their legal authority thereby depriving her of her custodial rights and parental
authority over him.
Initially, the trial court affirmed the remedy availed of by petitioner and issued a Writ of Amparo,
commanding respondents to produce the body of Baby Julian at the scheduled hearing, to which they
refused to comply. However, the court, later on, dismissed the petition for issuance of a Writ of Amparo,
on ground that the same it is not the proper remedy to regain custody of the child. The court held that
Christina should have filed either (a) civil case for custody of her child as laid down in the Family Code
and the Rule on Custody of Minors; or (b) Petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus in
Relation to Custody of Minors, in case there is extreme urgency to secure custody of a minor who has
been illegally detained by another, either as a principal or ancillary remedy.
Issue
Whether a petition for a Writ of Amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and
custody of a minor child?

Ruling
No.The Court held that the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal
killings" and "enforced disappearances," as such, it is confined to these two instances or to threats
thereof.
In relation thereto, "enforced disappearance" is characterized by an arrest, detention or abduction of a
person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or
indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of
the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons
outside the protection of law.
In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her "enforced separation" from
Baby Julian and that their action amounted to an "enforced disappearance" within the context of the
Amparo rule. Contrary to her position, however, the respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby
Julian's whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD's Memorandum explicitly stating
that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses; she even admitted in her petition for review
on certiorari that the respondent presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing. There is
therefore, no "enforced disappearance" as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and
fourth elements are missing.
Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the
latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the
child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental
authority over the child and contesting custody over him. Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that
what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all
intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparorule cannot be
properly applied

Vivares et al vs. St. Therese College et al.

Razon vs Tagitis

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABES DATA IN
FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, ET. AL.
GR NO. 189155 SEPTEMBER 7, 2010
PEREZ, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent. She enrolled in an exposure program to the
Philippines with the group BAYAN-USA. Petitioner together with her companions decided to rest in the
house of one Mr. Paolo in La Paz, Tarlac after doing survey work. 15 heavily armed men forcibly entered
and barged inside the house. The armed men were all in civilian clothes and wearing bonnets with the
exception of their leader. Petitioner and her companions were abducted by the armed men.
Petioner was detained for being a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines- New Peoples
Army (CPP-NPA). Petitioner was escorted to a room that she believed was a cell. From there, she could
hear the sounds of gunfire, noise of planes taking off and landing and some construction bustle. She
inferred that she was taken to the military camp of Fort Magsaysay. Petitioner was interrogated for 5
straight days coupled with torture.
Petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncles house in Quezon City but the abductors gave
the petitioner a cellular phone with a SIM card, an email address with password, and other things. She
was also sternly warned not to report the incident or something will happen to her and her family.
After her release, petitioner seek sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression
of any existing government files or records linking her to the communist movement, petitioner filed a
Petition for the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data. Petitioner impleaded public officials occupying the
uppermost echelons of the military and police hierarchy as respondents on the belief that it was
government agents who were behind her abduction and torture.

ISSUES:
Amparo
1. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility invoked by the petitioner in impleading the public
respondents is proper in her amparo petition.
2. Whether the totality of evidence proves that the respondents were her abductors or that she was
detained in Fort Magsaysay.
3. Whether the prayer to inspect Fort Magsaysay is correct.

Habeas Data
1. Whether or not the grant of Habeas Data by the Court of Appeals is correct.

RULING:
Amparo
1. No. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability.
Command responsibility is “an omission mode of individual criminal liability.” whereby the
superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or
punish the perpetrators. Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an
imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or
administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding.

2. Direct evidence of identity is accorded more weight than circumstantial evidence in amparo
proceedings. Given that the identities of the men in the cartographic sketches were not identified as
belonging to the military or public officials, they cannot be held liable. Roxas is just a sojourner in the
Philippines and not even a citizen so the Court can’t rely on her inference that she was taken to Fort
Magsaysay merely because the distance from Mr. Paolo’s house to where they were taken felt like the
distance between the house and Fort Magsaysay.
3. It is a rule in amparo proceedings that a place inspected must at least be identified with clarity and
precision and that the allegations be sufficient in themselves to make a prima facies case. Since it was
not proven that Fort Magsaysay was indeed the place where abductees were taken, an order to inspect
it would tantamount to “fishing expedition” for evidence. Thus, prayer to inspect Fort Magsaysay is
hereby denied.

Habeas Data
1. No. Habeas data is conceptualized as a judicial remedy for enforcing a right to privacy, most especially
the right to information, privacy of individuals. It operates to protect a person’s right to control
information regarding himself particularly in the instances where such information is being collected
through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. The indispensable element is a showing, at
least substantially, that a violation or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or
security has happened which the petitioner has failed to do. There is no evidence that any of the public
respondents have violated or threatened a right to privacy of the petitioner. There wasn’t even evidence
that they had access to the photos and videos. The grant of habeas data by the CA has no legal basis.

Burgos vs. Esperon

(G.R. 178497, February 4, 2014, Brion, J.)

Facts:

These incidents stemmed from our June 22, 2010 Resolution referring the present case to the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) as the Court’s directly commissioned agency, tasked with the
continuation of the investigation of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos’ abduction with the obligation to report its
factual findings and recommendations to this Court. This referral was necessary as the investigation by
the Philippine National Police–Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP–CIDG), by the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Provost Marshal, and even the initial CHR investigation had been less
than complete. In all of them, there were significant lapses in the handling of the investigation. In
particular, we highlighted the PNP–CIDG’s failure to identify the cartographic sketches of two (one
male and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas, based on their interview with the eyewitnesses
to the abduction.

Based on its finding that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance, the CA concluded that the
present case falls within the ambit of the Writ of Amparo. The CA found that the totality of the evidence
supports the petitioner’s allegation that the military was involved in the enforced disappearance of
Jonas. The CA took note of Jeffrey Cabintoy’s positive identification of Lt. Baliaga as one of the abductors
who approached him and told him not to interfere because the man being arrested had been under
surveillance for drugs; he also remembered the face of Lt. Baliaga – the face he identified in the pictures
because he resembles his friend Raven. The CA also held that Lt. Baliaga’s alibi and corroborative
evidence cannot prevail over Cabintoy’s positive identification, considering especially the absence of any
indication that he was impelled by hatred or any improper motive to testify against Lt. Baliaga. Thus, the
CA held that Lt. Baliaga was responsible and the AFP and the PNP were accountable for the enforced
disappearance of Jonas.

Issue:
Whether the Petitioner can request for another writ
Held:
No. the Rule on the Writ of Amparo accords the Court a wide latitude in crafting remedies to
address an enforced disappearance, it cannot (without violating the nature of the writ of Amparo as a
summary remedy that provides rapid judicial relief) grant remedies that would complicate and prolong
rather than expedite the investigations already ongoing. Note that the CA has already determined with
finality that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance.
The petitioner’s request for the reissuance of the writ and for the rehearing of the case by the CA would
be redundant and superfluous in light of: (1) the ongoing investigation being conducted by the DOJ
through the NBI; (2) the CHR investigation directed by the Court in this Resolution; and (3) the
continuing investigation directed by the CA.
The ROLE of the Supreme Court in a writ of Amparo proceeding is merely to determine whether an
enforced disappearance has taken place; to determine who is responsible or accountable; and to define
and impose the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.

As shown above, the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the present case with
the CA’s final determination of the persons responsible and accountable for the enforced disappearance
of Jonas and the commencement of criminal action against Lt. Baliaga. At this stage, criminal,
investigation and prosecution proceedings are already beyond the reach of the Writ
of Amparo proceeding now before us.

MARICRIS D. DOLOT, CHAIRMAN OF THE BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN-SORSOGON,

vs.
HON. RAMON PAJE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, REYNULFO A. JUAN, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, MINES AND GEOSCIENCES
BUREAU, DENR, HON. RAUL R. LEE, GOVERNOR, PROVINCE OF SORSOGON, ANTONIO C. OCAMPO, JR.,
VICTORIA A. AJERO, ALFREDO M. AGUILAR, AND JUAN M. AGUILAR, ANTONES ENTERPRISES, GLOBAL
SUMMIT MINES DEV'T CORP., AND TR ORE
G.R. No. 199199 August 27, 2013
REYES, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with the parish priest of the Holy Infant Jesus Parish and
the officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina saMatnog, filed a petition for continuing mandamus, damages and
attorney’s fees with the RTC of Sorsogon. The petition contained the following pertinent allegations: (1)
sometime in 2009, they protested the iron ore mining operations being conducted by Antones
Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and
Bon-otDaco, located in the Municipality of Matnog, to no avail; (2) Matnog is located in the southern tip
of Luzon and there is a need to protect, preserve and maintain the geological foundation of the
municipality; (3) Matnog is susceptible to flooding and landslides, and confronted with the
environmental dangers of flood hazard, liquefaction, ground settlement, ground subsidence and
landslide hazard; (4) after investigation, they learned that the mining operators did not have the
required permit to operate; (5) Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the
operators a small-scale mining permit, which they did not have authority to issue; (6) the
representatives of the Presidential Management Staff and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), despite knowledge, did not do anything to protect the interest of the people of
Matnog; and (7) the respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the People’s Small-Scale
Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and the Local Government Code.
Thus, they prayed for the following reliefs: (1) the issuance of a writ commanding the respondents to
immediately stop the mining operations in the Municipality of Matnog; (2) the issuance of a temporary
environment protection order or TEPO; (3) the creation of an inter-agency group to undertake the
rehabilitation of the mining site; (4) award of damages; and (5) return of the iron ore, among others.
The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 being the designated
environmental court. In the Order dated September 16, 2011, the case was summarily dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether the petition is dismissible on the grounds that there is no final court decree, order or
decision that the public officials allegedly failed to act, on which is a condition for the issuance of the
writ of continuing mandamus.

RULING:
The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay. Now cast in stone under Rule 8 of the Rules, the writ of
continuing mandamus enjoys a distinct procedure than that of ordinary civil actions for the
enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which are covered by Part II (Civil Procedure). Similar to
the procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules requires that the petition filed should be sufficient in form and
substance before a court may take further action; otherwise, the court may dismiss the petition
outright. Courts must be cautioned, however, that the determination to give due course to the petition
or dismiss it outright is an exercise of discretion that must be applied in a reasonable manner in
consonance with the spirit of the law and always with the view in mind of seeing to it that justice is
served.
Sufficiency in form and substance refers to the contents of the petition filed under Rule 8,
Section 1:
When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a
right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto
supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation, and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the
judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious
neglect to perform the duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall
also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.

On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must contain supporting evidence as well as a
sworn certification of non-forum shopping. It is also necessary that the petitioner must be one who is
aggrieved by an act or omission of the government agency, instrumentality or its officer concerned.
Sufficiency of substance, on the other hand, necessitates that the petition must contain substantive
allegations specifically constituting an actionable neglect or omission and must establish, at the very
least, a prima facie basis for the issuance of the writ, viz: (1) an agency or instrumentality of government
or its officer unlawfully neglects the performance of an act or unlawfully excludes another from the use
or enjoyment of a right; (2) the act to be performed by the government agency, instrumentality or its
officer is specifically enjoined by law as a duty; (3) such duty results from an office, trust or station in
connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law, rule or regulation or a right
therein; and (4) there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law.
The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to compel the
performance of an act specifically enjoined by law." The petition should mainly involve an
environmental and other related law, rule or regulation or a right therein. The RTC’s mistaken notion on
the need for a final judgment, decree or order is apparently based on the definition of the writ of
continuing mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit:

(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or
instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final
judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied.

The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually pertains to the
judgment or decree that a court would eventually render in an environmental case for continuing
mandamus and which judgment or decree shall subsequently become final.

Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8, Section 7 and such
judgment has become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the
government agency concerned is performing its tasks as mandated by law and to monitor the effective
performance of said tasks. It is only upon full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a
final return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the court finds that the judgment has been fully
implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket. A writ of continuing
mandamus is, in essence, a command of continuing compliance with a final judgment as it "permits the
court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the
reliefs mandated under the court’s decision."

Meralco v Lim
GR No 184769 10/5/2010
J. Carpio-Morales

Facts:
A letter was sent to the Meralco admin department in bulacan denouncing Lim, an administrative clerk.
She was ordered to be transferred to Alabang due to concerns over her safety. She complained under
the premise that the transfer was a denial of her due process. She wrote a letter stating that:
“It appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be [sic] highly suspicious, doubtful or
are just mere jokes if they existed at all.” She added, “instead of the management supposedly extending
favor to me, the net result and effect of management action would be a punitive one.” She asked for
deferment thereafter. Since the company didn’t respond, she filed for a writ of habeas data in the
Bulacan RTC due to meralco’s omission of provding her with details about the report of the letter. To
her, this constituted a violation of her liberty and security. She asked for disclosure of the data and
measures for keeping the confidentiality of the data.
Meralco filed a reply saying that the jurisdiction was with the NLRC and that the petition wasn’t in order.
Trial court ruled in her favor.
In the SC, Meralco petitioned that Habeas Data applies to entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved party’s person, family or home

Issue: Is Habeas Data the right remedy for Lim?

Held: No, petition dismissed

Ratio:
“Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party”
It’s a forum for enforcing one’s right to the truth. Like amparo, habeas data was a response to killings
and enforced disappearances.
Castillo v Cruz- and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor
when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.
Employment is a property right in the due process clause. Lim was concerned with her employment, one
that can be solved in the NLRC.
There was no violation of respondent’s right to privacy. Respondent even said that the letters were
mere jokes and even conceded the fact that the issue was labor related due to references to “real intent
of management”.

DR. JOY MARGATE LEE vs. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN

G.R. No. 203254, October 08, 2014

Facts: In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data dated June 22, 2012, Ilagan alleged that he
and petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee (Lee) were former common law partners. Sometime in July 2011, he
visited Lee at the latter’s condominium, rested for a while and thereafter, proceeded to his office. Upon
arrival, Ilagan noticed that his digital camera was missing. On August 23, 2011, Lee confronted Ilagan at
the latter’s office regarding a purported sex video (subject video) she discovered from the aforesaid
camera involving Ilagan and another woman. Ilagan denied the video and demanded Lee to return the
camera, but to no avail. During the confrontation, Ilagan allegedly slammed Lee’s head against a wall
inside his office and walked away. Subsequently, Lee utilized the said video as evidence in filing various
complaints against Ilagan, namely: (a) a criminal complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 9262,
otherwise known as the “Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004,” before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati; and (b) an administrative complaint for grave misconduct before
the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM). Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts of reproducing the subject
video and threatening to distribute the same to the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it
to the internet violated not only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the other
woman, and thus, the issuance of a writ of habeas data in his favor is warranted.

Finding the petition prima facie meritorious, the RTC issued a Writ of Habeas Data dated June
25, 2012, directing Lee to appear before the court a quo, and to produce Ilagan’s digital camera, as well
as the negative and/or original of the subject video and copies thereof, and to file a verified written
return within five (5) working days from date of receipt thereof.

In her Verified Return dated July 2, 2012, Lee admitted that she indeed kept the memory card of
the digital camera and reproduced the aforesaid video but averred that she only did so to utilize the
same as evidence in the cases she filed against Ilagan. She also admitted that her relationship with
Ilagan started sometime in 2003 and ended under disturbing circumstances in August 2011, and that she
only happened to discover the subject video when Ilagan left his camera in her condominium.
Accordingly, Lee contended that Ilagan’s petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data should be
dismissed because: (a) its filing was only aimed at suppressing the evidence against Ilagan in the cases
she filed; and (b) she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data regarding the person
of Ilagan.

The RTC granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data in Ilagan’sfavor. Dissatisfied, Lee filed
this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of
Ilagan.

Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas
data now stands as “a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party.” Thus, in order to support a petition
for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition
sufficiently alleges, among others, “[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how
it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” In other words, the petition must
adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right
to life, liberty or security on the other.

In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy
in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened
dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this
video – which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public
consumption – he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to
life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions.
As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus
between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data
cases, so much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as
in this case.

As the records show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving
testimony which hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data
Rule. This is because nothing therein would indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt
act towards the end of violating Ilagan’s right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything on
record even lead a reasonable mind to conclude that Lee was going to use the subject video in order to
achieve unlawful ends. Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as well as the glaring absence
of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC Decision and dismiss the habeas
data petition.

MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO, et. al.

v.
SCOTT H. SWIFT, et. al.
G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014
 Villarama, J.

FACTS: The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December
2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel “to enter and
exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of
routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo,
Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar,
Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the
northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No
one was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS
Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the
provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga
del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

HELD:Yes, petitioners have legal standing. As reiterated by the Supreme Court in many cases, locus
standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” Specifically, it is “a party’s
personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result” of the act being challenged, and “calls for more than just a generalized grievance.” However, the
rule on standing is a procedural matter which Supreme Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs
like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the
subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest.

In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., Supreme Court recognized the “public right” of
citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.” It declared that the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners, who were minors, in Oposa,
Supreme Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of
environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future generations.

HON. RAMON JESUS PAJE, in his capacity as DENR Secretary v. Hon. Teodoro Casino, et al. G.R. No.
207257/February 3, 2015/J. Del Castillo
Facts: The Department of Environment and Natural Resources, issued an Environmental Compliance
Certificate for a proposed coal-fired power plant at Subic, Zambales to be implemented by RP Energy.
Hon. Teodoro Casino and a number of legislators filed a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan against RP
energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Paje as the DENR secretary on the ground that actual environmental
damage will occur if the power plant project is implemented and that the respondents failed to comply
with certain laws and rules governing or relating to the issuance of an ECC and amendments thereto.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition for the Writ of Kalikasan and invalidated the ECC. Both
the DENR and Casino filed an appeal, the former imputing error in invalidating the ECC and its
amendments, arguing that the determination of the validity of the ECC as well as its amendments is
beyond the scope of a Petition for a Writ of kalikasan; while the latter claim that it is entitled to a Writ
of Kalikasan.
Issues: Whether the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of Kalikasan;
and
Whether the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan
Ruling: Yes, the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of Kalikasan
because the Rules on the Writ of kalikasan (Rule 7, Section 16 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases)allow the parties to raise, on appeal, questions of fact— and, thus, constitutes an
exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court— because of the extraordinary nature of the circumstances
surrounding the issuance of a writ of kalikasan.
Yes, the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan because such writ is
principally predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology, which involves environmental damage of a magnitude that transcends political and
territorial boundaries.
A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the
issuance of an ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or irregularities, but must also provide a
causal link or, at least, a reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in the issuance of
an ECC and the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed
outright and the action re-filed before the proper forum with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies.
In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even attempted
relative to the aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of the perceived defects or
irregularities in the issuance of the ECC.

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v. Secretary Angelo Reyes in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy, et.al. (G.R. No. 180771 and 181527)
DATE: 21 April 2015
PONENTE: J. Leonardo-De Castro

FACTS

On 13 June 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the Department of Energy (DOE)
entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with Japan Petroleum
Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX).
The studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data.
Geophysical and satellite surveys as well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon Strait was conducted.
On 12 December 2004, DOE and JAPEX converted GSEC-102 to Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46) for the
exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a block covering approximately
2,850 sqm. offshore the Tañon Strait.
From 9-18 May 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around Tañon Strait, including a multi-
channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kms. to determine the area’s underwater
composition.
During the 2nd sub-phase of the project, JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well. Since the same
was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguisan and Pinamungajan where the Tañon Strait was
declared a protected seascape in 1988, JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact
Assessment requirements under Presidential Decree No. 1586 (PD 1586), entitled “Establishing an
Environmental Impact Statement System, Including Other Environmental Management Related
Measures and For Other Purposes.”

On 31 January 2007, the Protected Area Management Board (PAMB) of the Tañon Strait issued
Resolution No. 2007-01 where it adopted the Initial Environmental Examination commissioned by JAPEX,
and favourably recommended the approval of the latter’s application for an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC).

On 6 March 2007, DENR-EMB Region VII granted an ECC to DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas
exploration project in Tañon Strait.

From 16 November 2007 to 8 February 2008, JAPEX drilled an exploratory well with a depth of 3,150
meters near Pinamungajan town.

On 17 December 2007, two separate original petitions were filed commonly seeking that the
implementation of SC-46 be enjoined for violation of the 1987 Constitution.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 are the “Resident Marine Mammals” which inhibit the waters in and
around the Tañon Strait, joined by “Stewards” Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their
legal guardians and friends seeking their protection. Also impleaded as unwilling co-petitioner is former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. In G.R. No. 181527, the petitioners are the Central VisayasFisherfolk
Development Center (FIDEC), a non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental organization established for
the welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in Region VII and representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk of
the municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu. Their contentions are:
A study made after the seismic survey showed that there is a drastic reduce in fish catch by 50-70%
attributable to the destruction of the “payao” or the artificial reef.
The ECC obtained by the respondents is invalid because there is no public consultations and discussions
prior to its issuance.

SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, considering that
there is no general law prescribing the standard or uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for
service contracts involving oil exploration and extraction
FIDEC alleges that it was barred from entering and fishing within a 7-kilometer radius from the point
where the oilrig was located, an area grated than the 1.5-kilometer radius exclusion zone stated in the
Initial Environmental Examination

The respondents in both petitions are: the late Angelo T. Reyes, DOE Secretary; Jose L. Atienza, DENR
Secretary; Leonardo Sibbaluca, DENR-Region VII Director and Chairman of Tañon Strait PAMB; JAPEX, a
Japanese company; and Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS) as the alleged Philippine agent of JAPEX. Their
counter-allegations are:

The “Resident Marine Mammals” and “Stewards” have no legal standing to file the petition.
SC-46 is constitutional.
The ECC was legally issued.
The case is moot and academic since SC-46 is mutually terminated on 21 June 2008.

ISSUES

WON the case is moot and academic

WON Petitioners have a legal standing
WON SC-46 is unconstitutional

RULING

No. The Court makes clear that the “moot and academic” principle is not a magic formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Despite the termination of SC-46, the Court deems
it necessary to resolve the consolidated petitions as it falls within the exceptions. Both petitioners allege
that SC-46 is violative of the Constitution, the environmental and livelihood issues raised undoubtedly
affect the public’s interest, and the respondents’ contested actions are capable of repetition.

Yes. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more liberalized approach.
The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allow for a “citizen suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen
to file an action before our courts for violation of our environmental laws on the principle that humans
are stewards of nature:

“Section 5.Citizen suit. – Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or
generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws.
Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of
the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to
intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order
once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected baragngays copies of
said order.

Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their respective
provisions. (Emphasis supplied)”

Although the petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure may be retroactively applied
to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and will not violate any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of
procedure.

Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, the SC had
already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, the SC
allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn “based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.”
It is also worth noting that the Stewards in the present case are joined as real parties in the Petition and
not just in representation of the named cetacean species.

Yes. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides in part:

“The President may enter into agreement with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical
or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law,
based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical
resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution.” (Emphases supplied)

The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous petroleum in the
Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 (PD 87) or the Oil Exploration and Development
Act of 1972. Although the Court finds that PD 87 is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a general law,
the absence of the two other conditions, that the President be a signatory to SC-46, and that the
Congress be notified of such contract, renders it null and void.

SC-46 appears to have been entered into and signed by the DOE through its then Secretary Vicente S.
Perez, Jr. Moreover, public respondents have neither shown nor alleged that Congress was subsequently
notified of the execution of such contract.

Service contracts involving the exploitation, development, and utilization of our natural resources are of
paramount interest to the present and future generations. Hence, safeguards were out in place to
insure that the guidelines set by law are meticulously observed and likewise eradicate the corruption
that may easily penetrate departments and agencies by ensuring that the President has authorized or
approved of the service contracts herself.

Even under the provisions of PD 87, it is required that the Petroleum Board, now the DOE, obtain the
President’s approval for the execution of any contract under said statute.

The SC likewise ruled on the legality of SC-46 vis-à-vis other pertinent laws to serve as a guide for the
Government when executing service contracts.

Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon Strait is an environmentally critical area, having been
declared as a protected area in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the scope of its management plan
may only be implemented pursuant to an ECC secured after undergoing an Environment Impact
Assessment (EIA) to determine the effects of such activity on its ecological system.

Public respondents admitted that JAPEX only started to secure an ECC prior to the 2 nd sub-phase
of SC-46, which required the drilling of the exploration well. This means that no environmental impact
evaluation was done when the seismic surveys were conducted. Unless the seismic surveys are part of
the management plan of the Tañon Strait, such surveys were done in violation of Section 12 of NIPAS
Act and Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586.
While PD 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration and
extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present case
may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area. Since
there is no such law specifically allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in the Tañon Strait, no energy
resource exploitation and utilization may be done in said protected seascape.

West Tower Condominium vs. Phil Ind. Corp