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VOL. 452, FEBRUARY 23, 2005 285

Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray Castillon
*
G.R. No. 160709. February 23, 2005.

NELEN LAMBERT, assisted by her husband, GLENROY

ALOYSUIS LAMBERT, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF RAY
CASTILLON, represented by MARILOU T. CASTILLON and
SERGIO LABANG, respondents.

Remedial Law; Certiorari; As a rule, factual findings of the trial court

especially those affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on the
Court when supported by the evidence on record.—In petitions for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may
be put into issue. Questions of fact cannot be entertained. The finding of
negligence by the Court of Appeals is a question of fact which we cannot
pass upon as it would entail going into factual matters on which the finding
of negligence was based. As a rule, factual findings of the trial court,
especially those affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this
Court when supported by the evidence on record.

_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

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286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray Castillon

Civil Law; Negligence; Proximate Cause; Proximate cause is defined

as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.—Clearly, the abrupt and sudden left turn by
Reynaldo, without first establishing his right of way, was the proximate
cause of the mishap which claimed the life of Ray and injured Sergio.
Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury,

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and without which the result would not have occurred. The cause of the
collision is traceable to the negligent act of Reynaldo for, as the trial court
correctly held, without that left turn executed with no precaution, the mishap
in all probability would not have happened.
Same; Same; Contributory Negligence; The underlying precept on
contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his
own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear
the consequences of his own negligence.—The underlying precept on
contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his
own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear
the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must thus be held
liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence. The
determination of the mitigation of the defendant’s liability varies depending
on the circumstances of each case. The Court had sustained a mitigation of
50% in Rakes v. AG & P; 20% in Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court and LBC Air Cargo, Inc. v. Court of Appeals; and 40% in
Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals and Philippine Bank of
Commerce v. Court of Appeals.
Same; Same; Damages; Loss of Earning Capacity; Factors to be
Considered in Determining the Compensable Amount of Lost Earnings.—In
considering the earning capacity of the victim as an element of damages, the
following factors are considered in determining the compensable amount of
lost earnings: (1) the number of years for which the victim would otherwise
have lived; and (2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased.
Jurisprudence provides that the first factor, i.e., life expectancy, is computed
by applying the formula (2/3 x [80 - age at death]) adopted in the American
Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial Combined Experience Table
of Mortality. As to the second factor, it is computed by multi-

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Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray Castillon

plying the life expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased, i.e., the total
earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income
and less living and other incidental expenses. The net earning is ordinarily
computed at fifty percent (50%) of the gross earnings. Thus, the formula
used by this Court in computing loss of earning capacity is: Net Earning
Capacity = [2/3 x (80 – age at time of death) x (gross annual income –
reasonable and necessary living expenses)].
Same; Same; Same; Reason for the Grant of Moral Damages.—
Paragraph 3 of the same provision also serves as the basis for the award of
moral damages in quasi-delict. The reason for the grant of moral damages
has been explained, thus: . . . the award of moral damages is aimed at a
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restoration, within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and
therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The intensity of
the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is proportionate to the
intensity of affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever with the
wealth or means of the offender.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Evergisto S. Escalon for petitioner.
Moises G. Dalisay, Jr. for respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review under 1 Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 21, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 43734, which affirmed the
June 29, 1993 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City,
Branch 06, in Civil Case No. 06-2086.

_______________

1 Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and concurred in by

Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Regalado E. Maambong.

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Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray Castillon

In the evening of January 13, 1991, Ray Castillon visited the house
of his brother Joel Castillon at Tambo, Iligan City and borrowed his
motorcycle. He then invited his friend, Sergio Labang, to roam
around Iligan
2
City. Ray drove the motorcycle with Sergio as the
backrider.
At around past 10:00 p.m., after eating supper at Hona’s
Restaurant and imbibing a bottle of beer, they traversed the highway
towards Tambo at a high speed. Upon reaching Brgy. Sto. Rosario,
they figured in an accident with a Tamaraw jeepney, owned by
petitioner Nelen Lambert and driven by Reynaldo Gamot, which
was traveling on the same direction but made a sudden left turn. The
incident3 resulted in the instantaneous death of Ray and injuries to
Sergio.
Respondents, the heirs of Ray Castillon, thus filed an action for
damages with prayer for preliminary attachment against the
petitioner Nelen Lambert. The complaint was docketed 4
as Civil Case
No. 06-2086 of the RTC of Iligan City, Branch 06. The complaint

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was subsequently amended to include the

5
claim by Joel Castillon for
the damages caused to the motorcycle.
On June 29, 1993, after a full-blown trial, the court a quo
rendered a decision in favor of herein private respondents but
reduced petitioner’s liability by 20% in view of the contributory
negligence of Ray. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and

against the defendants, directing the latter, jointly and severally, to pay the
former the following:
1. The sum of SIX HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE THOUSAND AND
NINETY-ONE (P633,091) PESOS, representing loss of support,

_______________

2 TSN, July 6, 1992, pp. 20-21.

3 Id., at pp. 21-26.
4 Records, pp. 1-5.
5 Id., at pp. 6-10.

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death indemnity, funeral and related expenses, moral damages and

attorney’s fees and
2. Costs of the suit.
For lack of merit, defendants’ counterclaim is dismissed.
On the claim of Joel Castillon, the evidence shows that he is not the real
owner of the motorcycle. He is not the real party in interest. Accordingly,
his complaint is dismissed.
On the third-party complaint, the third-party defendant Zenith Insurance
Corporation is ordered to pay the sum of P16,500.00 directly to the
plaintiffs. This sum, if paid, should be deducted from the amount adjudged
in par. 1 above. 6
SO ORDERED.”
7
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence
the present petition, based on the following arguments:

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious error of

law and grave abuse of discretion when it did not apply the
ruling of this Honorable Court in the case of Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines vs. The Honorable Intermediate Appellate
Court and Casiano Pascua, Et Al., [189 SCRA 168, August
30, 1990], as reiterated recently in the case of Edna A.
Raynera vs. Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla [306 SCRA
102, April 21, 1999], in which this Honorable Court
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enunciated that drivers of vehicles “who bump the rear of

another vehicle” are presumed to be the cause of the
accident.
2. The erroneous conclusion of the Honorable Trial Court as
affirmed by the Honorable Court of Appeals that the act of
tailgating, at high speed, constitutes contributory negligence
only, is contrary to the rulings of this Honorable Court in
the case of Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. vs. The Honorable
Court of Appeals [300 SCRA 20, December 10, 1998] and
the case of Edna A. Raynera vs. Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy
Orpilla [306 SCRA 102, April 21, 1999].
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals grossly erred in its
conclusion that petitioner’s driver was negligent, without
taking into

_______________

6 Rollo, pp. 59-60.

7 Id., at p. 47.

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Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray Castillon

consideration the presumptions enunciated by this

Honorable Court in the case of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines
vs. The Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court and
Casiano Pascua, Et Al., [189 SCRA 168, August 30, 1990],
and the case of Edna A. Raynera vs. Freddie Hiceta and
Jimmy Orpilla [306 SCRA 102, April 21, 1999].
4. As an alternative relief, petitioner most respectfully assigns
as error the Honorable Trial Court’s computation as to the
loss of earning capacity of Ray Castillon. Such computation
is contrary to the formula enunciated by this Honorable
Court in the case of Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. The
Honorable Court of Appeals [31 SCRA 511 (1970)].
5. The Honorable Trial Court’s award of moral damages is
contrary to the pronunciation of this Honorable Court in the
case of Ace Haulers Corporation vs. The Honorable Court
of Appeals and Abiva [338 SCRA 572, August 23, 2000],
wherein the award of moral damages was 8
disallowed absent
any evidence of bad faith or ill-motive.

Petitioner insists that the negligence of Ray Castillon was the

proximate cause of his unfortunate death and therefore she is not
liable for damages.
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In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, only questions of law may be put into issue. Questions of fact
cannot be entertained. The finding of negligence by the Court of
Appeals is a question of fact which we cannot pass upon as it would
entail going into factual matters on which the finding of negligence
was based. As a rule, factual findings of the trial court, especially
those affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are9 conclusive on this Court
when supported by the evidence on record.
Our examination of the records shows that both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals carefully considered the factual backdrop
of the case. No cogent reason exists for disturb-

_______________

8 Id., at pp. 15-16.

9 See Imperial v. Jaucian, G.R. No. 149004, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 517.

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Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray Castillon

ing the following findings of the trial court, which the Court of
Appeals affirmed:

. . . To the mind of the court, this is exactly what happened. When Reynaldo
Gamot was approaching the side road, he slightly veered to the right for his
allowance. Ray Castillon, who was following closely behind, instinctively
veered to the left but it was also the moment when Reynaldo Gamot sharply
turned to the left towards the side road. At this juncture both were moving
obliquely to the left. Thus the motorcycle sliced into the side of the jeepney
throwing the driver forward so that his forehead hit the angle bar on the left
front door of the jeepney even as the motorcycle shot forward and the
jeepney veered back to the right and sped away.
...
The testimonies of the witnesses Frias, Opada, Labang and Sumile show
that he did not stop even for a second, or less before making the left turn.
On the contrary, he slightly veered to the right immediately followed by the
abrupt and sudden turn to the left in order to enter the side road. It is
apparent that Reynaldo Gamot did not keep a lookout for vehicles or
persons following him before proceeding to turn left. He failed to take into
account the possibility that others may be following him. He 10
did not employ
the necessary precaution to see to it that the road was clear.

Clearly, the abrupt and sudden left turn by Reynaldo, without first
establishing his right of way, was the proximate cause of the mishap
which claimed the life of Ray and injured Sergio. Proximate cause is
defined as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence,

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unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces11 the injury,

and without which the result would not have occurred. The cause
of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of Reynaldo for, as
the trial court correctly held, without that left turn executed with no

_______________

10 Rollo, p. 53.
11 Casa Montessori Internationale v. BPI, G.R. No. 149507, 28 May 2004, 430
SCRA 261.

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292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray Castillon
12
precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have happened.
13
Petitioner misunderstood our ruling in Raynera v. Hiceta. That
case also involved a motorcycle crashing into the left rear portion of
another vehicle, and we declared therein that drivers of vehicles
“who bump the rear of another vehicle” are presumed to be 14“the
cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence.” In
Raynera, the death of the victim was solely attributable to his own
negligence in bumping the rear of the trailer truck which was
traveling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. Raynera,
being the driver of the rear vehicle, had full control of the situation
as he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. The
trailer truck therein did not make a sudden left turn as in the case at
bar. Thus, the theory that drivers of vehicles “who bump the rear of
another vehicle” are presumed to be the cause of the accident is, as
in this case, sufficiently contradicted by evidence, which is the
sudden left turn made by Reynaldo which proximately caused the
collision.
While we agree with the trial court that Ray was likewise guilty
of contributory negligence as defined under Article 2179 of the Civil
Code, we find it equitable to increase the ratio of apportionment of
damages on account of the victim’s negligence.
Article 2179 reads as follows:

When the plaintiff ’s negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of
his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

_______________

12 Rollo, p. 54.

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13 365 Phil. 546; 306 SCRA 102 (1999).

14 Id., at p. 554; p. 110.

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The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is

partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover
damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The
defendant must15thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by
his negligence. The determination of the mitigation of the defendant’s
liability varies depending on the circumstances of each case.
16
The Court had
sustained a mitigation of 50% in Rakes v. AG &17 P; 20% in Phoenix
Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate
18
Appellate Court and LBC Air Cargo,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals;
19
and 40% in Bank of the Philippine Islands 20v.
Court of Appeals and Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals.

In the case at bar, it was established that Ray, at the time of the
mishap: (1) was driving the motorcycle at a high speed; (2) was
tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney; (3) has imbibed one or two21 bottles
of beer; and (4) was not wearing a protective helmet. These
circumstances, although not constituting the proximate cause of his
demise and injury to Sergio, contributed to the same result. The
contribution of these circumstances are all considered and
determined in terms of percentages of the total cause. Hence,
pursuant to Rakes v. AG & P, the heirs of Ray Castillon shall recover
damages only up to 50% of the award. In other words, 50% of the
damage shall be borne by the private respondents; the remaining
50% shall be paid by the petitioner.
Anent the award of loss of earning capacity, we agree with the
petitioner that the trial court erred in the computation of the net
earnings.

_______________

15 Syki v. Begasa, G.R. No. 149149, 23 October 2003, 414 SCRA 237, 244.
16 7 Phil. 359 (1907).
17 G.R. No. L-65295, 10 March 1987, 148 SCRA 353.
18 311 Phil. 715; 241 SCRA 619 (1995).
19 G.R. No. 102383, 26 November 1992, 216 SCRA 51.
20 336 Phil. 667; 269 SCRA 695 (1997).
21 Rollo, p. 54.

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Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray Castillon

In considering the earning capacity of the victim as an element of

damages, the following factors are considered in determining the
compensable amount of lost earnings: (1) the number of years for
which the victim would otherwise have lived; and (2) the rate of loss
sustained by the heirs of the deceased. Jurisprudence provides that
the first factor, i.e., life expectancy, is computed by applying the
formula (2/3 x [80 -age at death]) adopted in the American
Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial Combined
Experience Table of Mortality. As to the second factor, it is
computed by multiplying the life expectancy by the net earnings of
the deceased, i.e., the total earnings less expenses necessary in the
creation of such earnings or income and less living and other
incidental expenses. The net earning is ordinarily computed at fifty
percent (50%) of the gross earnings. Thus, the formula used by this
Court in computing loss of earning capacity is: Net Earning
Capacity = [2/3 x (80 – age at time of death) x22 (gross annual income
– reasonable and necessary living expenses)].
It was established that Ray was 35 at the time of his death and
was earning a gross annual income of P31,876.00 as a driver at the
Mindanao State University. In arriving at the net earnings, the trial
court deducted from the gross annual income the annual living
expenses in the amount of P9,672.00, broken down as follows:
P20.00 a day for travel or P520.00 per month; P60.00 a month for
cigarettes; P26.00 for drinks; and other personal expenses 23
like
clothing, toiletries, etc. estimated at P200.00 per month. The
amount of P9,672.00, however, appears unrealistic, and constitutes
only 30.34% of the gross earnings. It even includes expenses for
cigarettes which by no means can be classified as a necessary
expense. Using the cited formula with the net earnings computed at
50% of the gross earnings, a detailed computation is as follows:

_______________

22 Pleyto v. Lomboy, G.R. No. 148737, 16 June 2004, 432 SCRA 329.
23 Rollo, pp. 57-58.

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NET = LIFE x GROSS – LIVING

EARNING EXPECTANCY ANNUAL EXPENSES
CAPACITY [2/3 (80-age at INCOME - (50% of GAI)
(X) the time of (GAI)
death)]
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X = [2/3 (80 - 35)] x [P 31,876.00 - 50% x

P31,876.00]
X = [2/3 (45)] x [P 31,876.00 - P 15,938.00]
X = 30 x P15,938.00 -
X = P478,140.00

We sustain the awards of P33,215.00

24
as funeral and burial expenses
being supported with receipts; P50,000.00 as death indemnity; and
P50,000.00 as moral damages. However, the award of P20,000.00 as
attorney’s fees must be deleted for lack of basis.
The indemnity for25 death caused by a quasi-delict used to be
pegged at P3,000.00, based on Article 2206 of the Civil Code,
which reads:

ART. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-
delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have
been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of
the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such
indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless
the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the
defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the
provisions of article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the
decedent’s inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may
demand support from the person causing the death, for a period of not
exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;

_______________

24 Records, pp. 121, 128, & 131.

25 Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 359 Phil. 18, 35; 298
SCRA 495, 506 (1998).

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Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray Castillon

(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of

the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of
the death of the deceased.

However, the amount has been gradually increased through the

years. At present,
26
prevailing jurisprudence fixes the amount at
P50,000.00.

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Paragraph 3 of the same provision also serves as the basis for the
award of moral damages in quasi-delict. The reason for the grant of
moral damages has been explained, thus:

. . . the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits

possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The intensity of the pain experienced
by the relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity of affection for
him and 27bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the
offender.

While it is true that there can be no exact or uniform rule for

measuring the value of human life and the measure of28damages
cannot be arrived at by a precise mathematical calculation, we hold
that the trial court’s award of moral damages of P50,000.00 for the
death of Ray 29
Castillon is in accord with the prevailing
jurisprudence.
With respect to attorney’s fees, it is well settled that the same
should not be awarded in the absence of stipulation except under the
instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. The trial
court did not indicate the basis for its

_______________

26 Pestaño v. Sps. Sumayang , G.R. No. 139875, 4 December 2000, 346 SCRA
870, 879.
27 Cesar Sangco, Torts and Damages, 1994 edition, p. 986.
28 Sps. Hernandez v. Sps. Dolor, G.R. No. 160286, 30 July 2004, 435 SCRA 668.
29 People v. Hapa, 413 Phil. 679, 699-700; 361 SCRA 361, 379 (2001).

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Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray Castillon

award. As we have30
held in Rizal Surety and Insurance Company v.
Court of Appeals:

“Article 2208 of the Civil Code allows attorney’s fees to be awarded by a

court when its claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act or omission of
the party from whom it is sought. While judicial discretion is here extant, an
award thereof demands, nevertheless, a factual, legal or equitable
justification. The matter cannot and should not be left to speculation and
conjecture (Mirasol vs. De la Cruz, 84 SCRA 337; Stronghold Insurance
Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 619).
In the case at bench, the records do not show enough basis for sustaining
the award for attorney’s fees and to adjudge its payment by petitioner . . .”

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Likewise, this Court held in Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs.

Court of Appeals that:

“In Abrogar v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 67970, January 15,
1988, 157 SCRA 57] the Court had occasion to state that ‘[t]he reason for
the award of attorney’s fees must be stated in the text of the court’s decision,
otherwise, if it is stated only in the dispositive portion of the decision, the
same must be disallowed on appeal.’ . . .

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED.

The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the net earnings is computed at 50% of
the gross annual income to conform with the prevailing
jurisprudence, and the FURTHER MODIFICATION that petitioner
NELEN LAMBERT is ordered to pay the heirs of Ray Castillon
only 50% of the damages herein awarded, except attorney’s fees
which is DELETED for lack of basis.

_______________

30 329 Phil. 786, 811; 261 SCRA 69, 88 (1996).

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298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lu Ym vs. Nabua

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Quisumbing, Carpio and

Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Petition denied, assailed decision affirmed with modification.

Note.—The rule is that the antecedent negligence of a person

does not preclude the recovery of damages caused by the
supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to
prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
(Canlas vs. Court of Appeals, 326 SCRA 415 [2000])

——o0o——

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