Republic of the Philippines Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on

SUPREME COURT or before June 24, 1970 in order to apply for a license. Neither did
Manila she sign any application therefor. She affixed her signature only
on the marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.
SECOND DIVISION
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above
certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance
G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994 of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage
between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that
vs. there was no marriage license issued."
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M.
CASTRO, respondents. Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent
appellate court. She insisted that the certification from the local
Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage
respondent. license.

As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the

Decision of the trial court. 3 It declared the marriage between the
PUNO, J.: contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of
Pasig to cancel the subject marriage contract.
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private
respondent Angelina M. Castro in the Regional Trial Court of Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage
to Edwin F. Cardenas. 1 As ground therefor, Castro claims that no Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent
marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the appellate court erred when it ruled that the certification issued by
solemnization of their marriage. the civil registrar that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their
record adequately proved that no such license was ever issued.
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his Petitioner also faults the respondent court for relying on the self-
answer. Consequently, he was declared in default. Trial serving and uncorroborated testimony of private respondent
proceeded in his absence. Castro that she had no part in the procurement of the subject
marriage license. Petitioner thus insists that the certification and
The controlling facts are undisputed:
the uncorroborated testimony of private respondent are insufficient
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas to overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of a
were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. marriage.
Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the
celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant
parties as null and void, respondent appellate court disregarded
Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents
the presumption that the solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo M.
required for the celebration of the marriage, including the
Malvar, regularly performed his duties when he attested in the
procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract
marriage contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was duly
itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the presented to him before the solemnization of the subject marriage.
name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro
Manila. The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not
since the marriage was unknown to Castro's parents. Thus, it was the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private
only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was
that the couple decided to live together. However, their issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the
cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby
was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas. We affirm the impugned Decision.

The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24,
daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her marital status before 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code.
leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. The law 4 provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a
Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of her marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of
marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license
was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the would render the marriage void ab initio. 5
celebration of their marriage.
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from due search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that
the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. It reads: marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not
adequate to prove its non-issuance.
February 20, 1987
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. — A written statement signed by
ANGELINA M. CASTRO who were allegedly married in the Pasay an officer having custody of an official record or by his deputy, that
City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found
(s)upportive marriage license to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970 above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his
cannot be located as said license no. 3196182 does not appear office contain no such record or entry.
from our records.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio. that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist
in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not
(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS
to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil
Senior Civil Registry Officer
registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all

1
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.[4] Both were then 22 years old.
applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such Their union was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah
other relevant data. 6 Sheryll who were born on July 8, 1975 and February 14,
1978,respectively.[5]
The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the
civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila,
charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the then in Apalit, Pampanga, and later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas,
issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any Pampanga. They operated a lumber and hardware business in
circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.[6]
the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find"
sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling.
3196182 to the contracting parties. Since then, the spouses lived separately, and their two children
were in the custody of their mother. However, their son Frederick
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony transferred to his father's residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila
in support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her on May 15,1988, and from then on, lived with his father.[7]
petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her
testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation,
It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil docketed as Civil Case No. 7900 before the Regional Trial Court
ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of petitioner, the
marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" action was later amended to a petition for separation of property
— a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a on the grounds that her husband abandoned her without just
civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives cause; that they have been living separately for more than one
and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The year; and that they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of
records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas Agreement dated September 29, 1983, containing the rules that
was initially unknown to the parents of the former. would govern the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership.[8] Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of
the trial cannot be held against her. Her husband, Edwin F. properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by
Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a the spouses.[9] The trial court also granted custody of the children
copy of the petition. Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the to Filipina.[10]
same. For failure to answer, he was properly declared in default.
Private respondent cannot be faulted for her husband's lack of In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide
interest to participate in the proceedings. There was absolutely no against her husband, docketed as Criminal Case No. 88-68006,
evidence on record to show that there was collusion between before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina testified that in
private respondent and her husband Cardenas. the afternoon of May 15, 1988, she went to the dental clinic at
Masangkay, Tondo, Manila, owned by her husband but operated
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court by his mistress, to fetch her son and bring him to San Fernando,
that the marriage between the contracting parties is null and void Pampanga. While she was talking to her son, the boy ignored her
for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that and continued playing with the family computer. Filipina got mad,
indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the took the computer away from her son, and started spanking him.
civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to At that instance, Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son, and
the solemnizing officer. punched her in the different parts of her body. Filipina also claimed
that her husband started choking her when she fell on the floor,
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the and released her only when he thought she was dead. Filipina
documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private suffered from hematoma and contusions on different parts of her
respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the body as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband, evidenced
subject marriage license. by a Medical Certificate issued by a certain Dr. James Ferraren.
She said it was not the first time Fernando maltreated her.[11]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no
showing of any reversible error committed by respondent appellate The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its
court. decision[12] dated April 26, 1990, convicted Fernando only of the
lesser crime of slight physical injuries, and sentenced him to 20
SO ORDERED.
days imprisonment. Edpmis
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against
private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 8273,on the
following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual
infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent against her life; and (4)
abandonment of her by her husband without justifiable cause for
SECOND DIVISION
more than one year. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
[G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000] Pampanga, in its decision[13] dated December 4,1991, granted the
petition on the grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual
FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF infidelity, and issued a decree of legal separation. It awarded
APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son
FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO Frederick to respondent.
SY, respondents.
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition[14] for the declaration of
DECISION absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of
psychological incapacity. She points out that the final judgment
QUISUMBING, J.: rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions
for separation of property and legal separation, and Fernando's
For review is the decision[1] dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of
infliction of physical violence on her which led to the conviction of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44144, which affirmed the
her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of
decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
psychological incapacity. She also cites as manifestations of her
Pampanga, denying the petition[3] for declaration of absolute nullity
husband's psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual
of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy.
alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her without fault on her part,
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3) refusal to have
contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our sex with her, performing the marital act only to satisfy himself.
Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological incapacity of

2
her husband existed from the time of the celebration of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different and
marriage and became manifest thereafter.[15] incongruous. Jksm

The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an
decision[16] dated December 9, 1993, denied the petition of Filipina issue for the first time on appeal, as this would contravene the
Sy for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to basic rules of fair play and justice,[23] in a number of instances, we
Fernando. It stated that the alleged acts of the respondent, as cited have relaxed observance of procedural rules, noting that
by petitioner, do not constitute psychological incapacity which may technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect and
warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of their promote substantive rights of litigants. We said that certain rules
marriage. Lexjuris ought not to be applied with severity and rigidity if by so doing, the
very reason for their existence would be defeated.[24] Hence, when
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the substantial justice plainly requires, exempting a particular case
decision of the trial court. In the decision[17] of the Court of Appeals from the operation of technicalities should not be subject to
dated May 21, 1996, it ruled that the testimony of petitioner cavil.[25] In our view, the case at bar requires that we address the
concerning respondent's purported psychological incapacity falls issue of the validity of the marriage between Fillipina and Fernando
short of the quantum of evidence required to nullify a marriage which petitioner claims is void from the beginning for lack of a
celebrated with all the formal and essential requisites of law. marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply
Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to show seated and violent conflict between the parties. Note, however,
that the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent had that here the pertinent facts are not disputed; and what is required
existed at the time of the celebration of their marriage in 1973. It now is a declaration of their effects according to existing law.
reiterated the finding of the trial court that the couple's marital
problems surfaced only in 1983, or almost ten years from the date Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in
of the celebration of their marriage. And prior to their separation in her petition for annulment of marriage before the trial court that the
1983, they were living together harmoniously. Thus, the Court of incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the celebration
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court which it found to of the marriage itself would lead to the conclusion that her
be in accordance with law and the evidence on record. [18] marriage to Fernando was void from the beginning, she points out
that these critical dates were contained in the documents she
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,[19] which the Court of submitted before the court. The date of issue of the marriage
Appeals denied in its resolution dated November 21, 1996. [20] license and marriage certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained
in their marriage contract which was attached as Annex "A" in her
Hence, this appeal by certiorari[21] wherein petitioner now raises
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the
the following issues: Jurismis
trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibit "A" in the course of the
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS trial.[26] The date of celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of
MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ON THE DATE Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973, is admitted
OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE PARTIES' MARRIAGE ON both by petitioner and private respondent, as stated in paragraph
NOVEMBER 15, 1973, NOT DISPUTED BY RESPONDENT three of petitioner's petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of
FERNANDO, THERE WAS NO MARRIAGE LICENSE THERETO; marriage before the trial court, and private respondent's answer
admitting it.[27] This fact was also affirmed by petitioner, in open
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS court, on January 22, 1993, during her direct examination, [28] as
COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING follows: Es m
THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY APPELLANT [herein
petitioner] DO NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that you were married
INCAPACITY AS WOULD JUSTIFY NULLIFICATION OF HER on November 15,1973?
MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE [herein respondent];
FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the
COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING
parents in both their son's and daughter's birth certificates, which
THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE ALLEGED
are also attached as Annexes " B" and "C" in the petition for
UNDESIRABLE ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE HAD EXISTED
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and
OR WERE PRESENT AT THE TIME THEIR MARRIAGE WAS
thereafter marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course of the
CELEBRATED IN 1973; Jjjuris
trial.[29] These pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no
APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its
AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE LOWER absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the
COURT THAT THERE IS A REDEEMING ATTITUDE SHOWN marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered
TO THE COURT BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO WITH 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner
RESPECT TO HIS CHILDREN AND ALSO BELIEVES THAT nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona.[30]
RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS NOT A
Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record,
REMOTE POSSIBILITY WHICH IS ERRONEOUS; AND
we find that indeed petitioner did not expressly state in her petition
5.WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V.COURT OF before the trial court that there was incongruity between the date
APPEALS (240 SCRA 20) IS APPLICABLE HERETO.[22] of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of the
issuance of their marriage license. From the documents she
In sum, two issues are to be resolved: justice presented, the marriage license was issued on September
17,1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on
1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and
November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the
private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage
marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license.
license at the time of the ceremony; and
Nowhere do we find private respondent denying these dates on
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically record. Article 80 of the Civil Code[31] is clearly applicable in this
incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to warrant a case. There being no claim of an exceptional character, the
declaration of its absolute nullity. purported marriage between petitioner and private respondent
could not be classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being 79[32] of the Civil Code. We thus conclude that under Article 80 of
void for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and private
celebration. It appears that, according to her, the date of the actual respondent is void from the beginning. Es msc
celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their
We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are
only photocopies. So are the birth certificates of their son Frederick

3
and daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents were ART. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements
marked as Exhibits during the course of the trial below, which may be valid, it must be made before the celebration of the
shows that these have been examined and admitted by the trial marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and
court, with no objections having been made as to their authenticity 136.
and due execution. Likewise, no objection was interposed to
petitioner's testimony in open court when she affirmed that the ART. 77. The marriage settlements and any modification thereof
date of the actual celebration of their marriage was on November shall be in writing, signed by the parties and executed before the
15, 1973. We are of the view, therefore, that having been admitted celebration of the marriage. They shall not prejudice third persons
in evidence, with the adverse party failing to timely object thereto, unless they are registered in the local civil registry where the
these documents are deemed sufficient proof of the facts marriage contract is recorded as well as in the proper registries of
contained therein.[33] property.

The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private ART. 78. A minor who according to law may contract marriage may
respondent need no longer detain us. It is mooted by our also enter into marriage settlements, but they shall be valid only if
conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab the persons designated in Article 14 to give consent to the
initio for lack of a marriage license at the time their marriage was marriage are made parties to the agreement, subject to the
solemnized. Esmm is provisions of Title IX of this Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the ART. 79. For the validity of any marriage settlements executed by
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, dated a person upon whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been
December 9,1993 as well as the Decision promulgated on May 21, pronounced or who is subject to any other disability, it shall be
1996 by the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated November indispensable for the guardian appointed by a competent court to
21, 1996, in CA-G.R. No. 44144 are set aside. The marriage be made a party thereto.
celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Yap [33]
See also Son vs. Son, 251 SCRA 556 (1995); Tison vs. CA,
and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab
276 SCRA 582 (1997); Quebral vs. CA, 252 SCRA 353 (1996).
initio for lack of marriage license at the time of celebration. No
pronouncement as to costs. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
SO ORDERED.
Manila
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr.,
FIRST DIVISION
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006
[31]
Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,
beginning: vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
xxx
DECISION
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages
of exceptional character; CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
xxx This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the
[32]
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74416 dated
ART. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties
20 December 2004 which set aside the Decision2 of the Regional
to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring danger,
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated
dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party
25 January 2002.
may apply to the court for relief.
In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla
ART. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession,
before the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969, through
occupation, business or activity without the consent of the other.
machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by
The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds.
Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not: Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita
went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a
(1) The objection is proper, and certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the
Gospel. On the said date, the father of Carmelita caused him and
(2) Benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection or Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of
thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage
obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they
spouse who has not obtained consent. obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently,
no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors
who acted in good faith. For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and
claims that she and Jaime were married civilly on 19 May
ART. 74. The property relations between husband and wife shall
1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 19695 at
be governed in the following order:
the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages
(1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage; were registered with the local civil registry of Manila and the
National Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of
(2) By the provisions of this Code; and marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years.
(3) By the local customs. The trial court made the following findings:
ART. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May
agree upon the regime of absolute community, conjugal 19, 1969, he and defendant [Carmelita] appeared before a certain
partnership of gains, complete separation of property, or any other Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the city hall in
regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the Manila where they executed a Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in civil
regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute community of rites. A certain Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an
property as established in this code shall govern. aide of defendant's father accompanied them, and who, together
with another person, stood as witness to the civil wedding. That
although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San

4
Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated in the marriage finally had sex. She learned from Dr. Escudero, plaintiff's physician
contract, the same was fictitious for he never applied for any and one of their wedding sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing
marriage license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon verifications made by him psychiatric therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some
through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the Civil Registry of traumatic problem compounded by his drug habit. She found out
San Juan, a Certification dated March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") was plaintiff has unusual sexual behavior by his obsession over her
issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, knees of which he would take endless pictures of. Moreover,
that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by said plaintiff preferred to have sex with her in between the knees which
office." On May 31, 1969, he and defendant were again wed, this she called "intrafemural sex," while real sex between them was far
time in church rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most and between like 8 months, hence, abnormal. During their
Holy Redeemer Parish Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where marriage, plaintiff exhibited weird sexual behavior which defendant
they executed another marriage contract (Exh. "F") with the same attributed to plaintiff's drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A
marriage license no. 2770792 used and indicated. Preparations compulsive liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who breaks things when
and expenses for the church wedding and reception were jointly he had tantrums. Plaintiff took drugs like amphetamines,
shared by his and defendant's parents. After the church wedding, benzedrine and the like, "speed" drugs that kept him from sleep
he and defendant resided in his house at Brixton Hills until their and then would take barbiturates or downers, like "mogadon."
first son, Jose Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his parents Defendant tried very hard to keep plaintiff away from drugs but
continued to support him financially, he and defendant lived in failed as it has become a habit to him. They had no fixed home
Spain for some time, for his medical studies. Eventually, their since they often moved and partly lived in Spain for about four and
marital relationship turned bad because it became difficult for him a half years, and during all those times, her mother-in-law would
to be married he being a medical student at that time. They started send some financial support on and off, while defendant worked
living apart in 1976, but they underwent family counseling before as an English teacher. Plaintiff, who was supposed to be studying,
they eventually separated in 1978. It was during this time when did nothing. Their marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff
defendant's second son was born whose paternity plaintiff physically and verbally abused her, and this led to a break up in
questioned. Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree against defendant their marriage. Later, she learned that plaintiff married one Angela
in the United States in 1981 and later secured a judicial separation Garcia in 1991 in the United States.
of their conjugal partnership in 1983.
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself aware of the civil wedding of his daughter with the plaintiff; that his
manifested that when his service was engaged by plaintiff, and daughter and grandson came to stay with him after they returned
after the latter narrated to him the circumstances of his marriage, home from Spain and have lived with him and his wife ever since.
he made inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry of San Juan His grandsons practically grew up under his care and guidance,
where the supposed marriage license was obtained and with the and he has supported his daughter's expenses for medicines and
Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish where the religious hospital confinements (Exhs. "9" and "10").
wedding ceremony was celebrated. His request letters dated
March 3, 1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994 Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and
(Exh. "M") and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent to and corroborated that it was plaintiff's family that attended to all the
received by the Civil Registrar of San Juan, who in reply thereto, preparations and arrangements for the church wedding of her
issued Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"), and March 11, sister with plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the couple wed in
1994 (Exh. "E") and September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no civil rites some time prior to the church wedding. She also stated
marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office." that she and her parents were still civil with the plaintiff inspite of
Upon his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church issued him a the marital differences between plaintiff and defendant.
certified copy of the marriage contract of plaintiff and defendant
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that
(Exh. "F") and a Certificate of Marriage dated April 11, 1994 (Exh.
because of irreconcilable differences with defendant and in order
"G"), wherein it noted that it was a "purely religious ceremony,
for them to live their own lives, they agreed to divorce each other;
having been civilly married on May 19, 1969 at the City Hall,
that when he applied for and obtained a divorce decree in the
Manila, under Marriage License No. 2770792 issued at San Juan,
United States on June 14, 1983 (Exh. "13"), it was with the
Rizal on May 19, 1969."
knowledge and consent of defendant who in fact authorized a
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of certain Atty. Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21).
San Juan, identified the Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March During his adverse testimony, plaintiff identified a recent
11, 1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael Aliscad, Jr., certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") issued by the Local
the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to Civil Registrar of San Juan, that the marriage license no. 2770792,
locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have the same marriage license appearing in the marriage contract
been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5). (Exh. "A"), is inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious.6

Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the
a steady romantic relationship after they met and were introduced marriage of the parties, the trial court made the following
to each other in October 1968. A model, she was compelled by her justifications:
family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty pageant when plaintiff
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the
who was afraid to lose her, asked her to run away with him to
marriage, the lack or absence of a license renders the marriage
Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff, she turned back on her family
void ab initio. It was shown under the various certifications (Exhs.
and decided to follow plaintiff in Baguio. When they came back to
"I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the office of the Local Civil
Manila, she and plaintiff proceeded to the latter's home in Brixton
Registrar of the Municipality of San Juan, and the more recent one
Hills where plaintiff's mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told her not to worry.
issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no marriage license no.
Her parents were hostile when they learned of the elopement, but
2770792 was ever issued by that office, hence, the marriage
Mrs. Sevilla convinced them that she will take care of everything,
license no. 2770792 appearing on the marriage contracts
and promised to support plaintiff and defendant. As plaintiff was
executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on May 31, 1969 (Exh.
still fearful he may lose her, he asked her to marry him in civil rites,
"F") was fictitious. Such a certification enjoys probative value
without the knowledge of her family, more so her father (TSN, 5-
under the rules on evidence, particularly Section 28, Rule 132 of
28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969, before a minister and where she
the Rules of Court, x x x.
was made to sign documents. After the civil wedding, they had
lunch and later each went home separately. On May 31, 1969, they xxxx
had the church wedding, which the Sevilla family alone prepared
and arranged, since defendant's mother just came from hospital. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage
Her family did not participate in the wedding preparations. between Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized
Defendant further stated that there was no sexual consummation by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May 19, 1969
during their honeymoon and that it was after two months when they as well as their contract of marriage solemnized under religious
rites by Rev. Juan B. Velasco at the Holy Redeemer Parish on May

5
31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the requisite marriage Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an
license. Let the marriage contract of the parties under Registry No. essential requisite for the validity of marriage. The marriage
601 (e-69) of the registry book of the Local Civil Registry of Manila between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.
be cancelled.
At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and involving a marriage that is null and void on the ground of absence
property registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family of a marriage license based on the certifications issued by the
Code. Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the Office of the Local Civil Registar of San Juan. As ruled by this Court in the case
Solicitor General for its record and information. 7 of Cariño v. Cariño13:

Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision [A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license.
trial court and held: In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a
certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present
Supreme Court explained that: "The presumption of regularity of case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys
official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, a record of all date relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of
is rebutted, it becomes conclusive." petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It
then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local is valid and that they secured the required marriage license.
civil registry of San Juan testified that they"failed to locate the Although she was declared in default before the trial court,
book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered," for petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the
the reason that "the employee handling is already absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of
retired." With said testimony We cannot therefore just presume Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the
that the marriage license specified in the parties' marriage contract issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put
was not issued for in the end the failure of the office of the local her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their
civil registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of the marriage marriage cannot stand.
license was attributable not to the fact that no such marriage
license was issued but rather, because it "failed to locate the book It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner
wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered." Simply put, Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without
if the pertinent book were available for scrutiny, there is a strong the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the
possibility that it would have contained an entry on marriage marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is
license no. 2720792. undoubtedly void ab initio.

xxxx The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications

issued by the Local Civil Registrar should be read in line with the
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on decision in the earlier case of Republic v. Court of
the basis of a mere perception of plaintiff that his union with Appeals,14 where it was held that:
defendant is defective with respect to an essential requisite of a
marriage contract, a perception that ultimately was not The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify
substantiated with facts on record.8 that despite diligent search, a particular document does not
exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public
which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 6 April documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the
2005. duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are
required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was
He raises the following issues for Resolution. issued and such other relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.)

1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar
accordance with law to the parties herein prior to the celebration must categorically state that the document does not exist in his
of the marriages in question; office or the particular entry could not be found in the register
despite diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied of lack or absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of
on the presumption of regularity of officials acts, particularly the the Rules of Court:
issuance of a marriage license, arising solely from the contents of
the marriage contracts in question which show on their face that a SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – a written statement signed by
marriage license was purportedly issued by the Local Civil Registry an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy
of San Juan, Metro Manila, and that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is
found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the
presumption of validity of a marriage arising from the admitted "fact records of his office contain no such record or entry.
of marriage."9
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by
At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan in connection with Marriage
not the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan License No. 2770792 complied with the foregoing requirements
stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the and deserved to be accorded probative value.
marriage contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to
declare their marriage as null and void ab initio. The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, Metro Manila, was dated 11 March 1994. It reads:
We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force
at the time of the marriage of the parties are Articles 53,10 5811 and No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by
80.12 this Office. With regards (sic) to Marriage License Number
2880792,16 we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.

6
 Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full Registrar of San Juan, Province of Rizal, from January 19, 1969
force locating the above problem. to May 1969. Did you bring with you those records?

San Juan, Metro Manila A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.

March 11, 1994 Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for
subpoena?
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .
Local Civil Registrar
Q Did you bring that with you?
The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and
provides: A No, sir.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: Q Why not?

This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.
ever issued by this Office with regards to Marriage License Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage
Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the said applications that your office maintains as required by the manual
number. of the office of the Local Civil Registrar?
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full COURT
force locating the above problem.
May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.
San Juan, Metro Manila
xxxx
September 20, 1994
COURT
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license
Local Civil Registrar
2880792 is the number issued by their office while with respect to
license no. 2770792 the office of the Local Civil Registrar of San
The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states: Juan is very definite about it it was never issued. Then ask him
how about no. 2880792 if the same was ever issued by their office.
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Did you ask this 2887092, but you could not find the record? But
This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no for the moment you cannot locate the books? Which is which now,
Marriage License Application was filed and no Marriage License was this issued or not?
No. 2770792 allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by this
A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19
Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA
CARDENAS-SEVILLA. Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that
utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook where
This is to further certify that the said application and license do not
Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the
exist in our Local Civil Registry Index and, therefore, appear to be
presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the
fictitious.
Local Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively
This certification is being issued upon the request of the interested rebutted.
party for whatever legal intent it may serve.
According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the
San Juan, Metro Manila presumption that official duty has been regularly performed is
among the disputable presumptions.
July 25, 2000
In one case, it was held:
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR. A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of
Local Civil Registrar evidence that may be accepted and acted on where there is no
other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one
Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope which may be overcome by other evidence. One such
and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an official act or duty has
locating the above problem." It could be easily implied from the been regularly performed. x x x.21
said statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not
exert its best efforts to locate and determine the existence of The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work." Likewise, affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.22
both certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is
not such license was issued.
disputable and can be overcome by other evidence as in the case
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative at bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the
from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita tenor of the first and second certifications.
Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of
the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already
non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean,
retired. Further, the testimony of the said person was not
as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot
presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the former
be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search
custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his
for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the
testimony could not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts
same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
to locate the logbook or prove the material contents therein, had
been exerted. Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact
leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
marriage bonds.23 The courts look upon this presumption with
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the
this Court among other things the register of application of/or (sic) presumption is of great weight.24
for marriage licenses received by the Office of the :Local Civil

7
 11
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized
protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under Article 75, no
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.25 by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides.
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and
lived together for several years producing two offsprings,26 now 12ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the
adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the beginning:
petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another
individual sometime in 1991.27 We are not ready to reward xxxx
petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages
freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit
of exceptional charater.
and perfidy.28
13 G.R. No. 132529, 2 February 2001, 351 SCRA 127, 133-134.
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the
family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the 14 G.R. No. 103047, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 257, 262.
policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution
15
in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no Records, Vol. I, p. 103.
stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The 16 Atty. Josa Ma. Abola, counsel for Jaime Sevilla testified before
break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence,
the trial court that in his letter requesting for the issuance of a
their preservation is not the concern of the family members
certification, addressed to the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
alone.29
he mistakenly read the Marriage License No. as 2880792 instead
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x of 2770792. (Records, Vol. II, pp. 725-726.)
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, 17 Id. at 228.
but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which
the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of 18 Records, Vol. II, p. 888.
the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of 19 Id. at 735-737.
any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
20
fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of Rule 131. BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves
xxxx
out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of
decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions
Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting themselves are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of overcome by other evidence;
marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume
marriage."30 xxxx

This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on (m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.31 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling
Manila
with his emotion or deepest sentiments. As we have said
in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are FIRST DIVISION
situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide
the specific answers to every individual problem. G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 vs.
December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
DECISION
SO ORDERED.
CORONA, J.:
Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr.,
J.J., concur. When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He
created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)

Footnotes Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she
heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind!
1Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74416, penned by Associate North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the
Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso with Associate Justices Roberto A. reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and
Barrios and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; Rollo, pp. 20-31. slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the
other was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong)
2 Rollo, p. 46. Penned by Judge Zeus C. Abrogar. and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas
10 and Maganda)
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these
requisites are complied with: When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; particular, does the law recognize the changes made by a
physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a
(2) Their consent, freely given; person’s sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of
name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and of a sex reassignment surgery?
(4) a marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio
character. filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth
certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The

8
petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a
registrar of Manila as respondent. decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s
decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex
Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted
Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and
Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner
certificate). His sex was registered as "male." moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex
"anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the
he had always identified himself with girls since Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA
childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several 9048.10
doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His The petition lacks merit.
attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January
27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of
Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Sex Reassignment
Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his
Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he
petition for change of name and sex. As found by the trial court:
(petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged
judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive
to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth
but solely for the purpose of making his birth records
certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex
compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
from "male" to "female."
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the
of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes
People’s Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in
sought. We disagree.
Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks. 3 Copies of the order
were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and
registrar of Manila. entities for purposes of identification.11 A change of name is a
privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were
by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code
established. No opposition to the petition was made.
provides:
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr.
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without
Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as
judicial authority.
witnesses.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision 4 in favor of
Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or
and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil
judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but
register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name
his present sex.
or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with
relief asked for. the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. 14 It vests the
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name
be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned.
With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change
thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned
a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude
not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him. the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change
of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently
On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much- denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding
awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the
the realization of their dreams. proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily
administrative in nature, not judicial.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground
to deny the present petition despite due notice and publication RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first
thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to name may be allowed:
interpose any [o]pposition.
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. –
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed
petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the in any of the following cases:
entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner,
specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto" (1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous,
to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5 tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), (2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly
Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

9
(3) The change will avoid confusion. ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void
compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss,
legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial
change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor;
than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his and (16) changes of name.
declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil
registry and the public interest. The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407
of the Civil Code include even those that occur after
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can
present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of
justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be sex reassignment.
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. 20 In this case,
he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the
as a result of using his true and official name. faults or error from" while to change means "to replace something
with something else of the same kind or with something that serves
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the as a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no
change of petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first
jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an
improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry
that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong of certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of
venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births,
of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such
no merit since the use of his true and official name does not as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of
prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of
correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and
his first name was concerned. changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees
produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity,
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly
As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not
among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the
statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code "Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation
provides: (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in
view of his age, nationality and his family membership. 27
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order. The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive
are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of
be made through administrative proceedings and without the need legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family
for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation,
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.22 Rule adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
entries in the civil register.23
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In
error" is: this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil
following terms shall mean: status shall be governed by special laws.
xxx xxx xxx But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed
in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration
or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall
to other existing record or records:Provided, however, That be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such
no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall
status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied) be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the
birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the either parent of the newborn child.
change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a
substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to
of the Rules of Court. the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and
nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil
correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such
provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24 other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.

10
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked,
of the facts as they existed at the time of birth.29Thus, the sex of a what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be
person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has
(the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation
reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that
time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31 privilege.

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol
common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary on when a person may be recognized as having successfully
legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion
the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact
even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written
common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of
peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life
a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33Female of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams."
is "the sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are
sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the
ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that,
understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies
reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed
which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
been used in that sense unless the context compels to the WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law
was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot Costs against petitioner.
be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable
through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male- SO ORDERED.
to-female transsexual to be included in the category "female."
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia,
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in JJ., concur.
altering his body and appearance through the intervention of
modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex
in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for
his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth Footnotes
certificate.
1Petitioner went for his elementary and high school, as well as his
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name Bachelor of Science in Statistics and Master of Arts, in the
or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity University of the Philippines. He took up Population Studies
Program, Master of Arts in Sociology and Doctor of Philosophy in
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in
Sociology at the University of Hawaii, in Manoa, Hawaii,
consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It believed
U.S.A. Rollo, p. 48.
that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice
to anyone. This is wrong. 2 This consisted of "penectomy [surgical removal of penis] bilateral
oschiectomy [or orchiectomy which is the surgical excision of the
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-
testes] penile skin inversion vaginoplasty [plastic surgery of the
ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial
vagina] clitoral hood reconstruction and augmentation
court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step
mammoplasty [surgical enhancement of the size and shape of the
towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However,
breasts]." Id.
marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special
contract of permanent unionbetween a man and a woman.37 One 3 On January 23, 2003, January 30, 2003 and February 6, 2003.
of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting
parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes 4 Penned by Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr. Rollo, pp. 51-53.
sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter
5
the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of Id., pp. 52-53 (citations omitted).
a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a 6 Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 78824.
male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are
various laws which apply particularly to women such as the 7 Special Sixth Division.
provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, 39 certain
8
felonies under the Revised Penal Code 40 and the presumption of Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok with
survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Aurora Santiago-Lagman
Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in concurring. Rollo, pp. 25-33.
relation to women which could be substantially affected if 9
petitioner’s petition were to be granted. Resolution dated September 14, 2006, id., pp. 45-46.
10
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the
or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, Consul General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an
obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil
for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is Register Without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending for the
to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it. Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
11Wang v. Cebu City Civil Registrar, G.R. No. 159966, 30 March
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it
2005, 454 SCRA 155.
choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the
recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for 12 Id.
legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case
where the claims asserted are statute-based. 13K v. Health Division, Department of Human Resources, 277 Or.
371, 560 P.2d 1070 (1977).
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change
of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil

11
14 21
Under Section 2 (6) of RA 9048, "first name" refers to a name or In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc.2d 6, 513 N.E.2d 828 (1987).
nickname given to a person which may consist of one or more
22
names in addition to the middle names and last names. Thus, the Lee v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 392 (2001).
term "first name" will be used here to refer both to first name and 23 Id.
nickname.
24
15
Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, 23 February
The last paragraph of Section 7 of RA 9048 provides:
2004, 423 SCRA 420.
SECTION 7. Duties and Powers of the Civil Registrar General. – 25 Id.
xxx xxx xxx
26 Id.
Where the petition is denied by the city or municipal civil registrar
or the consul general, the petitioner may either appeal the decision 27 Beduya v. Republic of the Philippines, 120 Phil. 114 (1964).
to the civil registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the
28
proper court. Salonga, Jovito, Private International Law, 1995 Edition, Rex
Bookstore, p. 238.
16 SECTION 3. Who May File the Petition and Where. – Any
29
person having direct and personal interest in the correction of a This, of course, should be taken in conjunction with Articles 407
clerical or typographical error in an entry and/or change of first and 412 of the Civil Code which authorizes the recording of acts,
name or nickname in the civil register may file, in person, a verified events and judicial decrees or the correction or change of errors
petition with the local civil registry office of the city or municipality including those that occur after birth. Nonetheless, in such cases,
where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept. the entries in the certificates of birth are not be corrected or
changed. The decision of the court granting the petition shall be
In case the petitioner has already migrated to another place in the annotated in the certificates of birth and shall form part of the civil
country and it would not be practical for such party, in terms of register in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar. (Co v. Civil
transportation expenses, time and effort to appear in person Register of Manila, supranote 24)
before the local civil registrar keeping the documents to be
30
corrected or changed, the petition may be filed, in person, with the The error pertains to one where the birth attendant writes "male"
local civil registrar of the place where the interested party is or "female" but the genitals of the child are that of the opposite sex.
presently residing or domiciled. The two (2) local civil registrars 31Moreover, petitioner’s female anatomy is all man-made. The
concerned will then communicate to facilitate the processing of the
body that he inhabits is a male body in all aspects other than what
petition.
the physicians have supplied.
Citizens of the Philippines who are presently residing or domiciled 32 Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th edition (2004), p.1406.
in foreign countries may file their petition, in person, with the
nearest Philippine Consulates. 33 Words and Phrases, volume 39, Permanent Edition, p. 106.
The petitions filed with the city or municipal civil registrar or the 34In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, 2003-Ohio-7221
consul general shall be processed in accordance with this Act and (No. 2002-T-0149, slip op., Not Reported in N.E.2d, 2003 WL
its implementing rules and regulations. 23097095 (Ohio App. 11 Dist., December 31, 2003), citing
Webster’s II New College Dictionary (1999).
All petitions for the clerical or typographical errors and/or change
of first names or nicknames may be availed of only once. 35 Id.
17SECTION 5. Form and Contents of the Petition. – The petition 36Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), 31 S.Ct.
shall be in the form of an affidavit, subscribed and sworn to before 502, 55 L.Ed. 619.
any person authorized by the law to administer oaths. The affidavit
37
shall set forth facts necessary to establish the merits of the petition Article 1, Family Code.
and shall show affirmatively that the petitioner is competent to
38
testify to the matters stated. The petitioner shall state the particular Article 2(1), Id.
erroneous entry or entries, which are sought to be corrected and/or 39These are Articles 130 to 138 of the Labor Code which include
the change sought to be made.
nightwork prohibition, facilities for women, prohibition on
The petition shall be supported with the following documents: discrimination and stipulation against marriage, among others.
40
(1) A certified true machine copy of the certificate or of the page of These include Article 333 on adultery, Articles 337 to 339 on
the registry book containing the entry or entries sought to be qualified seduction, simple seduction and acts of lasciviousness
corrected or changed; with the consent of the offended party and Articles 342 and 343 on
forcible and consented abduction, among others.
(2) At least two (2) public or private documents showing the correct
41
entry or entries upon which the correction or change shall be Section 3(jj)(4).
based; and

(3) Other documents which the petitioner or the city or municipal

civil registrar or the consul general may consider relevant and
necessary for the approval of the petition.

In case of change of first name or nickname, the petition shall

likewise be supported with the documents mentioned in the
immediately preceding paragraph. In addition, the petition shall be
published at least once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation. Furthermore, the petitioner shall
submit a certification from the appropriate law enforcement
agencies that he has no pending case or no criminal record.
18Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97906, 21 May 1992,
209 SCRA 189.
19 Supra note 11.
20 Id.

12
 but the latter opted to proceed with the celebration of said
marriages.
Article 4
Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed
Republic of the Philippines Clerk of Court II, the employees of the court were already hostile
SUPREME COURT to her, especially complainant Ramon Sambo who told her that he
Manila was filing a protest against her appointment. She avers that it was
only lately when she discovered that the court had a marriage
EN BANC
Register which is in the custody of Sambo; that it was Sambo who
failed to furnish the parties copies of the marriage contract and to
register these with the local civil registrar; and that apparently
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994 Sambo kept these marriage contracts in preparation for this
administrative case. Complainant Sambo, however, claims that all
JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C.
file copies of the marriage contracts were kept by respondent
SAMBO, and APOLLO A. VILLAMORA, complainants,
Baroy, but the latter insists that she had instructed Sambo to follow
vs.
up the submission by the contracting parties of their marriage
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and
licenses as part of his duties but he failed to do so.
NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of Court II, both of the
Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage
Sur, respondents. between Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin falls under Article 34
of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt from the marriage license
Esteban R. Abonal for complainants.
requirement; that he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo
Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents. to furnish the couple a copy of the marriage contract and to file the
same with the civil registrar, but the latter failed to do so; that in
order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized
their marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their
PER CURIAM, J.: marriage contract, a copy of which was filed with the civil registrar;
that the other five marriages alluded to in the administrative
Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C.
complaint were not illegally solemnized because the marriage
Sambo, and Apollo Villamora, are Stenographer I, Interpreter I,
contracts were not signed by him and they did not contain the date
Clerk II, and Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial
and place of marriage; that copies of these marriage contracts are
Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P.
in the custody of complainant Sambo; that the alleged marriage of
Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively
Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria
the Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same court.
Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, and of Arsenio
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Sabater and Margarita Nacario were not celebrated by him since
Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein respondents were he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license;
charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization that the marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was
of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence
bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non- of the parties in order to avoid embarrassment to their guests but
issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the that, at any rate, he did not sign their marriage contract which
custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing remains unsigned up to the present.
fees from exempted entities. 1
2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991 regarding the
Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents filed number of marriages solemnized and the number of documents
their respective Comments. 2 A Reply to Answers of Respondents notarized.
was filed by complainants. 3 The case was thereafter referred to
It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he
Executive Judge David C. Naval of the Regional Trial Court, Naga
solemnized seven (7) marriages in the month of July, 1992, when
City, for investigation report and recommendation. The case was
in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and
however transferred to First Assistant Executive Judge Antonio N.
void; that respondents likewise made it appear that they have
Gerona when Judge Naval inhibited himself for the reason that his
notarized only six (6) documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial
wife is a cousin of respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. 4
Register will show that there were one hundred thirteen (113)
The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual documents which were notarized during that month; and that
antecedents of this administrative matter, as culled from the respondents reported a notarial fee of only P18.50 for each
records thereof, are set out under each particular charge against document, although in fact they collected P20.00 therefor and
respondents. failed to account for the difference.

1. Illegal solemnization of marriage Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage registry
where all marriages celebrated by respondent judge are entered
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages is under the exclusive control and custody of complainant Ramon
even without the requisite marriage license. Thus, the following Sambo, hence he is the only one who should be held responsible
couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of paying for the entries made therein; that the reported marriages are
the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a merely based on the payments made as solemnization fees which
marriage license, viz.: Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin, are in the custody of respondent Baroy. She further avers that it is
Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Sambo who is likewise the custodian of the Notarial Register; that
Gacer, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, Arsenio Sabater and she cannot be held accountable for whatever alleged difference
Margarita Nacario, and Sammy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte. As a there is in the notarial fees because she is liable only for those
consequence, their marriage contracts (Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and payments tendered to her by Sambo himself; that the notarial fees
A, respectively) did not reflect any marriage license number. In she collects are duly covered by receipts; that of the P20.00
addition, respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts charged, P18.50 is remitted directly to the Supreme Court as part
and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being of the Judiciary Development Fund and P150 goes to the general
that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be fund of the Supreme Court which is paid to the Municipal Treasurer
submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondent theorizes that the
ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with discrepancies in the monthly report were manipulated by
the local civil registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo, who prepares complainant Sambo considering that he is the one in charge of the
the marriage contracts, called the attention of respondents to the preparation of the monthly report.
lack of marriage licenses and its effect on the marriages involved,

13
Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous number household help; and that he had to order the case archived
of marriages celebrated was intentionally placed by complainant because it had been pending for more than six (6) months and the
Sambo; that the number of marriages solemnized should not be accused therein remained at large.
based on solemnization fees paid for that month since not all the
marriages paid for are solemnized in the same month. He claims 6. Unlawful collection of docket fees
that there were actually only six (6) documents notarized in the
Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from
month of July, 1992 which tallied with the official receipts issued
the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc. although such
by the clerk of court; that it is Sambo who should be held
entity is exempt by law from the payment of said fees, and that
accountable for any unreceipted payment for notarial fees
while the corresponding receipt was issued, respondent Baroy
because he is the one in charge of the Notarial Register; and that
failed to remit the amount to the Supreme Court and, instead, she
this case filed by complainant Sambo is merely in retaliation for his
deposited the same in her personal account.
failure to be appointed as the clerk of court. Furthermore,
respondent judge contends that he is not the one supervising or Respondents Baroy contends that it was Judge-Designate
preparing the monthly report, and that he merely has the Felimon Montenegro (because respondent judge was on sick
ministerial duty to sign the same. leave) who instructed her to demand payment of docket fees from
said rural bank; that the bank issued a check for P800.00; that she
3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court
was not allowed by the Philippine National Bank to encash the
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of check and, instead, was instructed to deposit the same in any bank
court, respondent judge forwarded to the Supreme Court the account for clearing; that respondent deposited the same in her
applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell Abiog. account; and that after the check was cleared, she remitted
However, they were surprised when respondent Baroy reported for P400.00 to the Supreme Court and the other P400.00 was paid to
duty as clerk of court on October 21, 1991. They later found out the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
that respondent Baroy was the one appointed because she gave
On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-Executive
a brand-new air-conditioning unit to respondent judge.
Judge Antonio N. Gerona prepared and submitted to us his Report
Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga City she and Recommendations dated May 20, 1994, together with the
purchased an air-conditioning unit but when she was appointed administrative matter. We have perspicaciously reviewed the
clerk of court she had to transfer to Tinambac and, since she no same and we are favorably impressed by the thorough and
longer needed the air conditioner, she decided to sell the same to exhaustive presentation and analysis of the facts and evidence in
respondent judge. The installation and use thereof by the latter in said report. We commend the investigating judge for his industry
his office was with the consent of the Mayor of Tinambac. and perspicacity reflected by his findings in said report which,
being amply substantiated by the evidence and supported by
Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the applications logical illations, we hereby approve and hereunder reproduce at
for the position of clerk of court to the Supreme Court which has length the material portions thereof.
the sole authority over such appointments and that he had no hand
in the appointment of respondent Baroy. He contends that the air- xxx xxx xxx
conditioning unit was bought from his
The first charge against the respondents is illegal solemnization of
co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992, eight (8)
marriage. Judge Palaypayon is charged with having solemnized
months after Baroy had been appointed clerk of court. He claims
without a marriage license the marriage of Sammy Bocaya and
that he would not be that naive to exhibit to the public as item which
Gina Besmonte (Exh. A). Alano Abellano and Nelly Edralin (Exh.
could not be defended as a matter of honor and prestige.
B), Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), Eddie Terrobias
4. Cash bond issued without a receipt and Maria Emma Gaor (Exh. D), Renato Gamay and Maricris
Belga (Exh. F) and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh.
It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled "People vs. G).
Mendeza, et al., "bondswoman Januaria Dacara was allowed by
respondent judge to change her property bond to cash bond; that In all these aforementioned marriages, the blank space in the
she paid the amount of P1,000.00 but was never issued a receipt marriage contracts to show the number of the marriage was
therefor nor was it made to appear in the records that the bond has solemnized as required by Article 22 of the Family Code were not
been paid; that despite the lapse of two years, the money was filled up. While the contracting parties and their witnesses signed
never returned to the bondswoman; and that it has not been shown their marriage contracts, Judge Palaypayon did not affix his
that the money was turned over to the Municipal Treasurer of signature in the marriage contracts, except that of Abellano and
Tinambac. Edralin when Judge Palaypayon signed their marriage certificate
as he claims that he solemnized this marriage under Article 34 of
Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was deposited the Family Code of the Philippines. In said marriages the
with the former clerk of court, then turned over to the acting clerk contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage
of court and, later, given to her under a corresponding receipt; that contract and the Local Civil Registrar was not sent either a copy of
the cash bond is deposited with the bank; and that should the the marriage certificate as required by Article 23 of the Family
bondswoman desire to withdraw the same, she should follow the Code.
proper procedure therefor.
The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have been
Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438 was solemnized by Judge Palaypayon without a marriage license. The
archieved for failure of the bondsman to deliver the body of the testimonies of Bocay himself and Pompeo Ariola, one of the
accused in court despite notice; and that he has nothing to do with witnesses of the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, and the
the payment of the cash bond as this is the duty of the clerk of photographs taken when Judge Palaypayon solemnized their
court. marriage (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) sufficiently show that Judge
Palaypayon really solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared
5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners that they were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten
(10) days after their marriage was solemnized and bring with them
Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got detention
their marriage license. In the meantime, they already started living
prisoners to work in his house, one of whom was Alex Alano, who
together as husband and wife believing that the formal requisites
is accused in Criminal Case No. 5647 for violation of the
of marriage were complied with.
Dangerous Drugs Act; that while Alano was in the custody of
respondent judge, the former escaped and was never recaptured; Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage of
that in order to conceal this fact, the case was archived pursuant Bocaya and Besmonte because the parties allegedly did not have
to an order issued by respondent judge dated April 6, 1992. a marriage license. He declared that in fact he did not sign the
marriage certificate, there was no date stated on it and both the
Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that he never
employed detention prisoners and that he has adequate

14
parties and the Local Civil Registrar did not have a copy of the already only gave rise to the suspicion that the first time he
marriage certificate. solemnized the marriage it was only made to appear that it was
solemnized under exceptional character as there was not marriage
With respect to the photographs which show that he solemnized license and Judge Palaypayon had already signed the marriage
the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, Judge Palaypayon certificate. If it was true that he solemnized the first marriage under
explains that they merely show as if he was solemnizing the exceptional character where a marriage license was not required,
marriage. It was actually a simulated solemnization of marriage why did he already require the parties to have a marriage license
and not a real one. This happened because of the pleading of the when he solemnized their marriage for the second time?
mother of one of the contracting parties that he consent to be
photographed to show that as if he was solemnizing the marriage The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of
as he was told that the food for the wedding reception was already Abellano and Edralin was not a marriage at all as the marriage
prepared, visitors were already invited and the place of the parties certificate did not state the date when the marriage was
where the reception would be held was more than twenty (20) solemnized and that the contracting parties were not furnished a
kilometers away from the poblacion of Tinambac. copy of their marriage certificate, is not well taken as they are not
any of those grounds under Article(s) 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the
The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe. The Family Code which declare a marriage void from the beginning.
fact alone that he did not sign the marriage certificate or contract, Even if no one, however, received a copy of the marriage
the same did not bear a date and the parties and the Local Civil certificate, the marriage is still valid (Jones vs. H(o)rtiguela, 64
Registrar were not furnished a copy of the marriage certificate, do Phil. 179). Judge Palaypayon cannot just absolve himself from
not by themselves show that he did not solemnize the marriage. responsibility by blaming his personnel. They are not the
His uncorroborated testimony cannot prevail over the testimony of guardian(s) of his official function and under Article 23 of the
Bocaya and Ariola who also declared, among others, that Bocaya Family Code it is his duty to furnish the contracting parties (a) copy
and his bride were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after of their marriage contract.
ten (10) days with their marriage license and whose credibility had
not been impeached. With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta
Carrido (Exh. C), and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario
The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding ceremony up (Exh. G), Selpo and Carrido and Sabater and Nacarcio executed
to the signing of the marriage certificate in front of Judge joint affidavits that Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their
Palaypayon and on his table (Exhs. K-3, K-3-a, K-3-b, K-3-c, K-4, marriage (Exh. 13-A and Exh. 1). Both Carrido and Nacario
K-4-a, K-4-b, K-4-c, testified for the respondents that actually Judge Palaypayon did
K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and K-9), cannot not solemnize their marriage as they did not have a marriage
possibly be just to show a simulated solemnization of marriage. license. On cross-examination, however, both admitted that they
One or two pictures may convince a person of the explanation of did not know who prepared their affidavits. They were just told,
Judge Palaypayon, but not all those pictures. Carrido by a certain Charito Palaypayon, and Nacario by a certain
Kagawad Encinas, to just go to the Municipal building and sign
Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge
their joint affidavits there which were already prepared before the
Palaypayon would allows himself to be photographed as if he was
Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
solemnizing a marriage on a mere pleading of a person whom he
did not even know for the alleged reasons given. It would be highly With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga
improper and unbecoming of him to allow himself to be used as an (Exh. f), their marriage contract was signed by them and by their
instrument of deceit by making it appear that Bocaya and two (2) witnesses, Atty. Elmer Brioso and respondent Baroy (Exhs.
Besmonte were married by him when in truth and in fact he did not F-1 and F-2). Like the other aforementioned marriages, the
solemnize their marriage. solemnization fee was also paid as shown by a receipt dated June
7, 1992 and signed by respondent Baroy (Exh. F-4).
With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B),
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized their marriage, but Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the marriage of
he claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a Gamay and Belga allegedly because there was no marriage
marriage license was not required. The contracting parties here license. On her part, respondent Baroy at first denied that the
executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as marriage was solemnized. When she was asked, however, why
husband and wife for almost six (6) years already (Exh. 12; Exh. did she sign the marriage contract as a witness she answered that
AA). she thought the marriage was already solemnized (TSN, p. 14; 10-
28-93).
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when
it was solemnized, it was stated that Abellano was only eighteen Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge
(18) years, two (2) months and seven (7) days old. If he and Palaypayon. She signed the marriage contract of Gamay and
Edralin had been living together as husband and wife for almost Belga as one of the two principal sponsors. Yet, she wanted to give
six (6) years already before they got married as they stated in their the impression that she did not even know that the marriage was
joint affidavit, Abellano must ha(ve) been less than thirteen (13) solemnized by Judge Palaypayon. This is found very difficult to
years old when he started living with Edralin as his wife and this is believe.
hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon should ha(ve) been aware of
this when he solemnized their marriage as it was his duty to Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having solemnized
ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might also the marriage of Terrobias and Gaor (Exh. D). The contracting
ha(ve) executed a false joint affidavit in order to have an instant parties and their witnesses also signed the marriage contract and
marriage by avoiding the marriage license requirement. paid the solemnization fee, but Judge Palaypayon allegedly did not
solemnize their marriage due to lack of marriage license. Judge
On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed, Palaypayon submitted the affidavit of William Medina, Vice-Mayor
Judge Palaypayon married again Abellano and Edralin, this time of Tinambac, to corroborate his testimony (Exh. 14). Medina,
with a marriage license (Exh. BB). The explanation given by Judge however, did not testify in this case and so his affidavit has no
Palaypayon why he solemnized the marriage of the same couple probative value.
for the second time is that he did not consider the first marriage he
solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code as (a) marriage at Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have
all because complainant Ramon Sambo did not follow his been that before the contracting parties and their witnesses enter
instruction that the date should be placed in the marriage his chamber in order to get married, he already required
certificate to show when he solemnized the marriage and that the complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he assigned the task of
contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage preparing the marriage contract, to already let the parties and their
certificate. witnesses sign their marriage contracts, as what happened to
Gamay and Belga, and Terrobias and Gaor, among others. His
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of purpose was to save his precious time as he has been solemnizing
Abellano and Edralin for the second time with a marriage license marriages at the rate of three (3) to four (4) times everyday (TSN,

15
p. 12; discharge of his functions (The Phil. Trial Lawyer's Asso. Inc. vs.
2-1-94). Agana, Sr., 102 SCRA 517). In Nidera vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 581,
it was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency
This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper and or mismanagement of his court personnel."
irregular, if not illegal, because the contracting parties are
supposed to be first asked by the solemnizing officer and declare On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the blame of the
that they take each other as husband and wife before the falsification of the monthly report of cases on complainant Sambo
solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two (2) witnesses whom she allegedly assigned to prepare not only the monthly
before they are supposed to sign their marriage contracts (Art. 6, report of cases, but the preparation and custody of marriage
Family Code). contracts, notarized documents and the notarial register. By her
own admission she has assigned to complainant Sambo duties
The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge Palaypayon as she was supposed to perform, yet according to her she never
to his alleged practice and procedure before solemnizing a bother(ed) to check the notarial register of the court to find out the
marriage, is not true as shown by the picture taken during the number of documents notarized in a month (TSN, p. 30; 11-23-93).
wedding of Bocaya and Besmonte (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) and by the
testimony of respondent Baroy herself who declared that the Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the preparation of the
practice of Judge Palaypayon ha(s) been to let the contracting monthly report of cases to Sambo, which was denied by the latter
parties and their witnesses sign the marriage contract only after as he claims that he only typed the monthly report based on the
Judge Palaypayon has solemnized their marriage (TSN, p. 53; data given to him by her, still it is her duty to verify and check
10-28-93). whether the report is correct.

Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show also that The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo was the one in
he was really solemnizing three (3) to four (4) marriages everyday. custody of marriage contracts, notarized documents and notarial
On the contrary his monthly report of cases for July, 1992 shows register, among other things, is not acceptable not only because
that his court had only twenty-seven (27) pending cases and he as clerk of court she was supposed to be in custody, control and
solemnized only seven (7) marriages for the whole month (Exh. supervision of all court records including documents and other
E). His monthly report of cases for September, 1992 shows also properties of the court (p. 32, Manual for Clerks of Court), but she
that he solemnized only four (4) marriages during the whole month herself admitted that from January, 1992 she was already in full
(Exh. 7). control of all the records of the court including receipts (TSN, p.
11; 11-23-93).
In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages,
respondent Judge Palaypayon has presented and marked in The evidence adduced in this cases in connection with the charge
evidence several marriage contracts of other persons, affidavits of of falsification, however, also shows that respondent Baroy did not
persons and certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. account for what happened to the notarial fees received for those
12-B to 12-H). These persons who executed affidavits, however, documents notarized during the month of July and September,
did not testify in this case. Besides, the marriage contracts and 1992. The evidence adduced in this case also sufficiently show
certification mentioned are immaterial as Judge Palaypayon is not that she received cash bond deposits and she did not deposit them
charged of having solemnized these marriages illegally also. He is to a bank or to the Municipal Treasurer; and that she only issued
not charged that the marriages he solemnized were all illegal. temporary receipts for said cash bond deposits.

The second charge against herein respondents, that of having For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents reported to have
falsified the monthly report of cases submitted to the Supreme been notarized by Judge Palaypayon although the documents
Court and not stating in the monthly report the actual number of notarized for said month were actually one hundred thirteen (113)
documents notarized and issuing the corresponding receipts of the as recorded in the notarial register. For September, 1992, there
notarial fees, have been sufficiently proven by the complainants were only five (5) documents reported as notarized for that month,
insofar as the monthly report of cases for July and September, though the notarial register show(s) that there were fifty-six (56)
1992 are concerned. documents actually notarized. The fee for each document
notarized as appearing in the notarial register was P18.50.
The monthly report of cases of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Respondent Baroy and Sambo declared that what was actually
Sur for July, 1992 both signed by the respondents, show that for being charged was P20.00. Respondent Baroy declared that
said month there were six (6) documents notarized by Judge P18.50 went to the Supreme Court and P1.50 was being turned
Palaypayon in his capacity as Ex-Officio Notary Public (Exhs. H to over to the Municipal Treasurer.
H-1-b). The notarial register of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur, however, shows that there were actually one hundred thirteen Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to show that she
(113) documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon for the said really sent to the Supreme Court the notarial fees of P18.50 for
month (Exhs. Q to Q-45). each document notarized and to the Municipal Treasurer the
additional notarial fee of P1.50. This should be fully accounted for
Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no falsification of the considering that Baroy herself declared that some notarial fees
monthly report of cases for July, 1992 because there were only six were allowed by her at her own discretion to be paid later.
(6) notarized documents that were paid (for) as shown by official Similarly, the solemnization fees have not been accounted for by
receipts. He did not, however, present evidence of the alleged Baroy considering that she admitted that even (i)n those instances
official receipts showing that the notarial fee for the six (6) where the marriages were not solemnized due to lack of marriage
documetns were paid. Besides, the monthly report of cases with license the solemnization fees were not returned anymore, unless
respect to the number of documents notarized should not be based the contracting parties made a demand for their return. Judge
on how many notarized documents were paid of the notarial fees, Palaypayon declared that he did not know of any instance when
but the number of documents placed or recorded in the notarial solemnization fee was returned when the marriage was not
register. solemnized due to lack of marriage license.
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not personally verifying Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon Sambo did not turn
and checking anymore the correctness of the monthly reports over to her some of the notarial fees. This is difficult to believe. It
because he relies on his co-respondent who is the Clerk of Court was not only because Sambo vehemently denied it, but the
and whom he has assumed to have checked and verified the minutes of the conference of the personnel of the MTC of
records. He merely signs the monthly report when it is already Tinambac dated January 20, 1992 shows that on that date Baroy
signed by respondent Baroy. informed the personnel of the court that she was taking over the
functions she assigned to Sambo, particularly the collection of
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken because
legal fees (Exh. 7). The notarial fees she claims that Sambo did
he is required to have close supervision in the preparation of the
not turn over to her were for those documents notarized (i)n July
monthly report of cases of which he certifies as to their
and September, 1992 already. Besides there never was any
correctness. As a judge he is personally responsible for the proper
demand she made for Sambo to turn over some notarial fees

16
supposedly in his possession. Neither was there any The alleged sale between respondents is not beyond suspicion. It
memorandum she issued on this matter, in spite of the fact that was bought by Baroy at a time when she was applying for the
she has been holding meetings and issuing memoranda to the vacant position of Clerk of Court (to) which she was eventually
personnel of the court (Exhs. V, W, FF, FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs. 4- appointed in October, 1991. From the time she bought the air
A (supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and 8-S). conditioner on August 24, 1991 until it was installed in the office of
Judge Palaypayon it was not used yet. The sale to Judge
It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on October 29, 1991 a cash Palaypayon was only evidenced by a mere typewritten receipt
bond deposit of a certain Dacara in the amount of One Thousand dated May 29, 1992 when this case was already filed. The receipt
(P1,000.00) Pesos was turned over to her after she assumed office could have been easily prepared. The Municipal Mayor of
and for this cash bond she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Tinambac who signed in the receipt as a witness did not testify in
Y). She did not deposit this cash bond in any bank or to the this case. The sale is between the Clerk of Court and the Judge of
Municipal Treasurer. She just kept it in her own cash box on the the same court. All these circumstances give rise to suspicion of
alleged ground that the parties in that case where the cash bond at least impropriety. Judges should avoid such action as would
was deposited informed her that they would settle the case subject (them) to suspicion and (their) conduct should be free from
amicably. the appearance of impropriety (Jaagueta vs. Boncasos, 60 SCRA
27).
Respondent Baroy declared that she finally deposited the
aforementioned cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon received a cash
with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in February, 1993, bond deposit of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos from Januaria
after this administrative case was already filed (TSN, pp. 27-28; Dacara without issuing a receipt, Dacara executed an affidavit
12-22-93). The Pass Book, however, shows that actually Baroy regarding this charge that Judge Palaypayon did not give her a
opened an account with the LBP, Naga Branch, only on March 26, receipt for the P1,000.00 cash bond she deposited (Exh. N). Her
1993 when she deposited an amount of Two Thousand affidavit, however, has no probative value as she did not show that
(P2,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. 8 to 8-1-a). She claims that One this cash bond of P1,000.00 found its way into the hands of
Thousand (P1,000.000) Pesos of the initial deposit was the cash respondent Baroy who issued only a temporary receipt for it and
bond of Dacara. If it were true, it was only after keeping to herself this has been discussed earlier.
the cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for around one
year and five months when she finally deposited it because of the Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the getting of
filing of this case. detention prisoners to work in his house and one of them escaped
while in his custody and was never found again. To hide this fact,
On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two days after she finally the case against said accused was ordered archived by Judge
deposited the One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos cash bond of Palaypayon. The evidence adduced with respect to this particular
Dacara, she withdrew it from the bank without any authority or charge, show that in Crim. Case No. 5647 entitled People vs.
order from the court. It was only on July 23, 1993, or after almost Stephen Kalaw, Alex Alano and Allan Adupe, accused Alex Alano
three (3) months after she withdrew it, when she redeposited said and Allan Adupe were arrested on April 12, 1991 and placed in the
cash bond (TSN, p. 6; 1-4-94). municipal jail of Tinambac, Camarines Sur (Exhs. 0, 0-1, 0-2 and
0-3; Exh. 25). The evidence presented that Alex Alano was taken
The evidence presented in this case also show that on February
by Judge Palaypayon from the municipal jail where said accused
28, 1993 respondent Baroy received also a cash bond of Three
was confined and that he escaped while in custody of Judge
Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from a certain Alfredo Seprones in
Palaypayon is solely testimonial, particularly that of David Ortiz, a
Crim. Case No. 5180. For this cash bond deposit, respondent
former utility worker of the MTC of Tinambac.
Baroy issued only an annumbered temporary receipt (Exh. X and
X-1). Again Baroy just kept this Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Herein investigator finds said evidence not sufficient. The
Pesos cash bond to herself. She did not deposit it either (in) a bank complainants should have presented records from the police of
or (with) the Municipal Treasurer. Her explanation was that the Tinambac to show that Judge Palaypayon took out from the
parties in Crim. Case No. 5180 informed her that they would settle municipal jail Alex Alano where he was under detention and said
the case amicably. It was on April 26, 1993, or almost two months accused escaped while in the custody of Judge Palaypayon.
later when Judge Palaypayon issued an order for the release of
said cash bond (Exh. 7). The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated April 6, 1992 in
Crim. Case No. 5047 archiving said case appears to be without
Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she assumed office on basis. The order states: "this case was filed on April 12, 1991 and
October 21, 1991 she used to issue temporary receipt only for the records show that the warrant of arrest (was) issued against
cash bond deposits and other payments and collections she the accused, but up to this moment there is no return of service for
received. She further admitted that some of these temporary the warrant of arrest issued against said accused" (Exh. 0-4). The
receipts she issued she failed to place the number of the receipts records of said case, however, show that in fact there was a return
such as that receipt marked Exhibit X (TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93). of the service of the warrant of arrest dated April 12, 1991 showing
Baroy claims that she did not know that she had to use the official that Alano and Adupe were arrested (Exh. 0-3).
receipts of the Supreme Court. It was only from February, 1993,
after this case was already filed, when she only started issuing Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated April 6, 1992
official receipts. archiving Crim. Case No. 5047 referred only to one of the accused
who remained at large. The explanation cannot be accepted
The next charge against the respondents is that in order to be because the two other accused, Alano and Adupe, were arrested.
appointed Clerk of Court, Baroy gave Judge Palaypayon an air Judge Palaypayon should have issued an order for the arrest of
conditioner as a gift. The evidence adduced with respect to this Adupe who allegedly jumped bail, but Alano was supposed to be
charge, show that on August 24, 1991 Baroy bought an air confined in the municipal jail if his claim is true that he did not take
conditioner for the sum of Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred custody of Alano.
(P17,600.00) Pesos (Exhs. I and I-1). The same was paid partly in
cash and in check (Exhs. I-2 and I-3). When the air conditioner The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he ordered the
was brought to court in order to be installed in the chamber of case archived was because he heard from the police that Alano
Judge Palaypayon, it was still placed in the same box when it was escaped. This explanation is not acceptable either. He should
bought and was not used yet. ha(ve) set the case and if the police failed to bring to court Alano,
the former should have been required to explain in writing why
The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge Palaypayon for Alano was not brought to court. If the explanation was that Alano
Twenty Thousand (P20,00.00) Pesos on installment basis with a escaped from jail, he should have issued an order for his arrest. It
down payment of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos and as proof is only later on when he could not be arrested when the case
thereof the respondents presented a typewritten receipt dated May should have been ordered archived. The order archiving this case
29, 1993 (Exh. 22). The receipt was signed by both respondents for the reason that he only heard that Alano escaped is another
and by the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur and circumstance which gave rise to a suspicion that Alano might have
another person as witness.

17
really escaped while in his custody only that the complainants Tinambac, Camarines Sur, has been found to have falsified the
could not present records or other documentary evidence to prove monthly report of cases for the months of July and September,
the same. 1992 with respect to the number of documents notarized, for
having failed to account (for) the notarial fees she received for said
The last charge against the respondents is that they collected filing two (2) months period; for having failed to account (for) the
fees on collection cases filed by the Rural Bank of Tinambac, solemnization fees of those marriages allegedly not solemnized,
Camarines Sur which was supposed to be exempted in paying but the solemnization fees were not returned; for unauthorized
filing fees under existing laws and that the filing fees received was issuance of temporary receipts, some of which were issued
deposited by respondent Baroy in her personal account in the unnumbered; for receiving the cash bond of Dacara on October
bank. The evidence presented show that on February 4, 1992 the 29, 1991 in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for
Rural Bank of Tinambac filed ten (10) civil cases for collection which she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y) and for
against farmers and it paid the total amount of Four Hundred depositing it with the Land Bank of the Philippines only on March
(P400.00) Pesos representing filing fees. The complainants cited 26, 1993, or after one year and five months in her possession and
Section 14 of Republic Act 720, as amended, which exempts Rural after this case was already filed; for withdrawing said cash bond of
Banks (from) the payment of filing fees on collection of sums of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos on April 29, 1993 without any
money cases filed against farmers on loans they obtained. court order or authority and redepositing it only on July 23, 1993;
for receiving a cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos
Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do with the payment
from Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180, MTC, Tinambac,
of the filing fees of the Rural Bank of Tinambac as it was
Camarines Sur, for which she issued only an unnumbered
respondent Baroy who received them and besides, on February 4,
temporary receipt (Exhs. X and X-1) and for not depositing it with
1992, he was on sick leave. On her part Baroy claims that the bank
a bank or with the Municipal Treasurer until it was ordered
paid voluntarily the filing fees. The records, however, shows that
released; and for requiring the Rural Bank of Tinambac,
respondent Baroy sent a letter to the manager of the bank dated
Camarines Sur to pay filing fees on February 4, 1992 for collection
January 28, 1992 to the effect that if the bank would not pay she
cases filed against farmers in the amount of Four Hundred
would submit all Rural Bank cases for dismissal (Annex 6,
(P400.00) Pesos, but turning over said amount to the Municipal
comment by respondent Baroy).
Treasurer only on March 12, 1992, it is respectfully recommended
Respondent Baroy should have checked whether the Rural Bank that said respondent clerk of court Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy be
of Tinambac was really exempt from the payment of filing fees dismissed from the service.
pursuant to Republic Act 720, as amended, instead of threatening
It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits shall be by the
the bank to have its cases be submitted to the court in order to
clerk of court who shall issue official receipt to the provincial, city
have them dismissed. Here the payment of the filing fees was
or municipal treasurer for the amount withdrawn. Court deposits
made on February 4, 1992, but the Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos
cannot be withdrawn except by order of the court, . . . ." (Revised
was only turned over to the Municipal Treasurer on March 12,
Manual of Instructions for Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and 626; p.
1992. Here, there is an undue delay again in complying with her
127, Manual for Clerks of Court). A circular also provides that the
obligation as accountable officer.
Clerks of Court shall immediately issue an official receipt upon
In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence presented by receipt of deposits from party litigants and thereafter deposit intact
the complainants sufficiently show that respondent Judge Lucio P. the collection with the municipal, city or provincial treasurer and
Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized marriages, particularly that of their deposits, can only be withdrawn upon proper receipt and
Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte, without a marriage license, order of the Court (DOJ Circular No. 52, 26 April 1968; p. 136,
and that it having been shown that he did not comply with his duty Manual for Clerks of Court). Supreme Court Memorandum Circular
in closely supervising his clerk of court in the preparation of the No. 5, 25 November 1982, also provides that "all collections of
monthly report of cases being submitted to the Supreme Court, funds of fiduciary character including rental deposits, shall be
particularly for the months of July and September, 1992 where it deposited immediately by the clerk of court concerned upon
has been proven that the reports for said two (2) months were receipt thereof with City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer where
falsified with respect to the number of documents notarized, it is his court is located" and that "no withdrawal of any of such deposits
respectfully recommended that he be imposed a fine of TEN shall be made except upon lawful order of the court exercising
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that the same jurisdiction over the subject matter.
or similar offenses will be more severely dealt with.
Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with the foregoing
The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts circulars, or deliberately disregarded, or even intentionally violated
or certificates of those marriages he solemnized without a them. By her conduct, she demonstrated her callous unconcern for
marriage license, there were no dates placed in the marriage the obligations and responsibility of her duties and functions as a
contracts to show when they were solemnized, the contracting clerk of court and accountable officer. The gross neglect of her
parties were not furnished their marriage contracts and the Local duties shown by her constitute(s) a serious misconduct which
Civil Registrar was not being sent any copy of the marriage warrant(s) her removal from office. In the case of Belen P. Ferriola
contract, will not absolve him from liability. By solemnizing alone a vs. Norma Hiam, Clerk of Court, MTCC, Branch I, Batangas City;
marriage without a marriage license he as the solemnizing officer A.M. No. P-90-414; August 9, 1993, it was held that "The clerk of
is the one responsible for the irregularity in not complying (with) court is not authorized to keep funds in his/her custody; monies
the formal requ(i)sites of marriage and under Article 4(3) of the received by him/her shall be deposited immediately upon receipt
Family Code of the Philippines, he shall be civilly, criminally and thereof with the City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer. Supreme
administratively liable. Court Circular Nos. 5 dated November 25, 1982 and 5-A dated
December 3, 1982. Respondent Hiam's failure to remit the cash
Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his negligence or failure to bail bonds and fine she collected constitutes serious misconduct
comply with his duty of closely supervising his clerk of court in the and her misappropriation of said funds constitutes dishonesty.
performance of the latter's duties and functions, particularly the "Respondent Norma Hiam was found guilty of dishonesty and
preparation of the monthly report of cases (Bendesula vs. Laya, serious misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
58 SCRA 16). His explanation that he only signed the monthly and (the Court) ordered her immediate dismissal (from) the
report of cases only when his clerk of court already signed the service.
same, cannot be accepted. It is his duty to closely supervise her,
to check and verify the records if the monthly reports prepared by xxx xxx xxx
his clerk of court do not contain false statements. It was held that
We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct
"A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or
and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with
incompetence of court personnel (Nidua vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA
the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest
158).
clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
In view also of the foregoing finding that respondent Nelia responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be
Esmeralda-Baroy, the clerk of court of the Municipal Trial Court of characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must

18
be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an example of 8 Article 4, id.
integrity, uprightness and honesty. 5 Integrity in a judicial office is
more than a virtue, it is a necessity. 6 It applies, without 9 Article 352, Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 39, Act
qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the least of its No. 3613.
personnel, they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of
ethics and morality imposed upon a Court of justice.
FIRST DIVISION
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code
pertinently provides that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter [A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002]
alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for
therein. 7 Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE
the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal
DECISION
requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and PUNO, J.:
administratively liable. 8
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those Gross Ignorance of the Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23
affected by the illegal marriages, and what we are providing for May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal
herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on
without prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to
Penal Code provides that "(p)riests or ministers of any religious her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage
denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial
authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in jurisdiction.
accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law." 9 This is of
course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this
Government. marriage until her husband passed away. However, since the
marriage was a nullity, petitioners right to inherit the vast properties
The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of
be imposed on respondent judge should, therefore, be modified. receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the
For one, with respect to the charge of illegal solemnization of Philippine Navy.
marriages, it does appear that he had not taken to heart, but
actually trifled with, the law's concern for the institution of marriage Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent
and the legal effects flowing from civil status. This, and his judge for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations which
undeniable participation in the other offenses charged as allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and
hereinbefore narrated in detail, approximate such serious degree sufferings.
of misconduct and of gross negligence in the performance of
judicial duties as to ineludibly require a higher penalty. On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief
Justice to then Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao for
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court
on respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern Administrator required respondent judge to comment.
warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the
future will definitely be severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that
Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000
forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000.
employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were
Government, including government-owned or controlled complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the
corporations. Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17
February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty
Let copies of this decision be spread on their records and furnished walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan
to the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action. which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua.
Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the
SO ORDERED. marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Respondent judge further avers that before he started the
Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, ceremony, he carefully examined the documents submitted to him
JJ., concur. by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess
Cruz, J., took no part. the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the
marriage and suggested its resetting to another date. However,
Bidin, J., is on leave. due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and
the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to
solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He also feared
#Footnotes that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical
condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the
1 Original Record, 1. solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license
and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render
2 Ibid., 9 and 23. the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent
judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of
3 Ibid., 86. that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge
followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same
4 Ibid., 134.
reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his
5 Annong vs. Vda. de Blas, A.M. No. P-91-602, October 15, 1991, sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
202 SCRA 635.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting
6 Capuno, et al. vs. Jaramillo, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-93-944, July 20, parties that their marriage is valid despite the absence of a
1994. marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment
suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.
7 Article 3(2), Executive Order No. 209, as amended.

19
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the
dated 28 August 2001 with the Office of the Court Administrator. instant case. x x x While magistrates may at times make mistakes
She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent
her marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an
that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons. [3]
eventually solemnized the same. She confessed that she filed this
administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is
Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of
shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience. solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance
Orobia filed their Application for Marriage License on 5 January of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating
shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner the law on marriage.
nor Orobia claimed it.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People vs.
a Certification that it has no record of such marriage that allegedly Lara,[4] we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of
took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of
Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to
Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage
the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record of their license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize
marriage. a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority
when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect,
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
judge so the latter could communicate with the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of
marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has consistently held in
Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not
a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed respondent necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from
judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license due to the disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration
failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be
spouse. undermined.[5] Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve
purely private or personal matters. They can not be made to
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one
Recommendation dated 15 November 2000, found the respondent reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound
judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves
marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial the Courts constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise,
jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of
on respondent judge. a public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as
a disciplining authority.[6]
We agree.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is
authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior
fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition
courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial
of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more
jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.
severely.
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs.
SO ORDERED.
Domagtoy,[1] respondent judge held office and had jurisdiction in
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago,
del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in JJ., concur.
the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within
the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos. We held that:
SECOND DIVISION
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance
to marry the faithful is authorized to do so only within the area or [G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004]
diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines PHILIPPINES, respondent.
to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the
requisites of the law are complied with.However, judges who are DECISION
appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings
only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge QUISUMBING, J.:
solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the
a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in
Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the decision[1] dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment [2] dated August
liability.[2] (Emphasis supplied.) 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in
Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy
on the ground that his act of solemnizing a marriage outside his and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision
jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further held correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
that: mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the
resolution[3] of the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000,
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, denying Morigos motion for reconsideration.
are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than
the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be

20
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a
house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences
a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978). thereof.

After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals,
contact with each other. docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.

In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700
Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange was pending before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a
of letters, they became sweethearts. decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between
Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then
to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant became final and executory.
communication.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to 20700 as follows:
petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get
married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same
de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada SO ORDERED.[11]

leaving appellant Lucio behind.
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General stressed that the subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucios
Division) a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio.
by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article
17, 1992. 349[12] of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a
second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from
Jececha Lumbago[4] at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
City, Bohol.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could not be accorded
declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15 [13] of the Civil Code
Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this
among others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage with jurisdiction. Under Article 17[14] of the Civil Code, a declaration of
Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment
place. promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts
Information[5] filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with decision, contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v.
the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.[6] People,[15] allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as
the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the
ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for
with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His lack of merit.[16] However, the denial was by a split vote.
motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for The ponente of the appellate courts original decision in CA-G.R.
reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion
case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed
petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued. that as the first marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then
there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment
retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since herein
in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:
petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision A.
Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day
of Prision Mayor as maximum. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED
SO ORDERED.[7] UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN
INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners
NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio.
APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL
Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,[8] the trial court ruled that
INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of
bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to B.
assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must
first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
before they can be allowed to marry again. HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL.
817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court
cited Ramirez v. Gmur,[9] which held that the court of a country in C.
which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both
spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY
parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE
recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucios defense of good faith in ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.[17]
contracting the second marriage, the trial court stressed that
following People v. Bitdu,[10] everyone is presumed to know the

21
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of
petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never
faith is valid. married from the beginning. The contract of marriage is null; it
bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion,
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time
good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. He he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and
highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the
and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense
doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of.
is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised
Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished
criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that from Mercado v. Tan.[25] In the latter case, the judicial declaration
there is a difference between the intent to commit the crime and of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the
the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:
follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is
tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy. A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary
before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such
submits that good faith in the instant case is a convenient but judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even
flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as void. [26]
in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[18] which held that bigamy can be
successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur, It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was
stressing that under Article 40[19] of the Family Code, a judicial actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge
declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six
Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least,
account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later
counters that petitioners contention that he was in good faith declared void ab initio.
because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was
negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial
performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
criminal intent, we must first determine whether all the elements of semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
bigamy are present in this case. InMarbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[20] we declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be
laid down the elements of bigamy thus: deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a
(1) the offender has been legally married; judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent
marriage.
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his
or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally
declared presumptively dead; construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every
circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case,
we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been
find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense
for the existence of the first.
of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during academic.
the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed
1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to
decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
wit:
G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioners motion for
rendered decreeing the annulment of the marriage entered into by reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner
petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY
Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral
Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract. certainty.

SO ORDERED.[21] SO ORDERED.

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga,
performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. JJ., concur.
Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage
contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer.
The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in
accordance with Articles 3[22] and 4[23] of the Family Code. As the
dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, This
[1]
simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that Rollo, pp. 38-44. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S.
such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. Labitoria and concurred in by Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon
In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date and Edgardo P. Cruz.
of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date
[2]
of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the Records, pp. 114-119.
eyes of the law, never married.[24] The records show that no appeal [3]
Rollo, pp. 46-58. Per Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, with
was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No.
Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia and Marina L. Buzon,
6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory.
concurring and Eugenio S. Labitoria and Bernardo P. Abesamis,
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused dissenting.
must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking,
the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is

22
[4] THIRD DIVISION
Her correct name is Maria Jececha Limbago (Italics for
emphasis). See Exh. B, the copy of their marriage contract.
Records, p. 10.
[5]Theaccusatory portion of the charge sheet found in Records, p.
1, reads:
RESTITUTO M. G.R. No. 167746
That, on or about the 4th
day of October, 1992, in the City of ALCANTARA,
Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Petitioner,
Honorable Court, the above-named accused being previously Present:
united in lawful marriage with Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990
and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
second marriage with Maria Jececha Limbago to the damage and
prejudice of Lucia Barrete in the amount to be proved during trial. Chairperson,
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 349 of the AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
[12] - versus -
ART. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be CHICO-NAZARIO,
imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally NACHURA, and
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the REYES, JJ.
proper proceedings.
[13]Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
Promulgated:
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
ROSITA A. ALCANTARA
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
and HON. COURT OF
[14]
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other APPEALS,
August 28, 2007
public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in
Respondents.
which they are executed.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or
- - -x
consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign
country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be
observed in their execution.
DECISION
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
[19]
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by
[20]
petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the Decision[1] of the Court
Supra. of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724
[21] CA Rollo, p. 38. denying petitioners appeal and affirming the decision [2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil
[22] Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his petition
for annulment of marriage.
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in

Chapter 2 of this Title; and The antecedent facts are:

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance

of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take each other as husband and A petition for annulment of marriage [3] was filed by petitioner
wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8
December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required
[23]
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of
shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They
35 (2). met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a
certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage CDCC BR Chapel.[4] They got married on the same day, 8
voidable as provided in Article 45. December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went through another
marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of
in Tondo,Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise
the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity
celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The
shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
alleged marriage license, procured inCarmona, Cavite, appearing
[24] Rollo, p. 54. on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a
resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for
[25] G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000, 337 SCRA 122. a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14
October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose
[26] Id. at 124. Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate
lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued
declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to

23
cancel the corresponding marriage contract[5] and its entry on c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
file.[6] when it failed to apply the ruling laid down by this Honorable Court
in the case of Sy vs. Court of Appeals.(G.R. No. 127263, 12 April
2000 [330 SCRA 550]).
Answering petitioners petition for annulment of marriage,
respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that
there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary when it failed to relax the observance of procedural rules to protect
to petitioners representation, respondent gave birth to their first and promote the substantial rights of the party litigants.[14]
child named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to
another daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October
1992.[7] Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three
children.[8] Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to
evade prosecution for concubinage.[9] Respondent, in fact, has We deny the petition.
filed a case for concubinage against petitioner before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch
60.[10] Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of
marriage be denied for lack of merit. Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with
the respondent was celebrated, there was no marriage license
because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and
dealt with a fixer who arranged everything for them. [15] The
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in
rendered its Decision disposing as follows: CDCC BR Chapel where Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized
the marriage belongs.[16] He and respondent did not go
to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows: marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them,
neither he nor the respondent was a resident of the place. The
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite,
cannot be given weight because the certification states that
1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit; Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of
Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario[17] but their
marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty license number.
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) per month as support for their two
(2) children on the first five (5) days of each month; and
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8
December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
3. To pay the costs.[11] applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was
the law in effect at the time of its celebration.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53

As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the
dismissing the petitioners appeal. His Motion for Reconsideration marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)[18] in relation to
was likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 Article 58 of the same Code.[19]
April 2005.[12]

Article 53 of the Civil Code[20] which was the law applicable at the
The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties time of the marriage of the parties states:
is presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner had not
presented any evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover,
the parties marriage contract being a public document is a prima
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these
facie proof of the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130
requisites are complied with:
of the Rules of Court.[13]

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following
issues for resolution:

(2) Their consent, freely given;

a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
when it ruled that the Petition for Annulment has no legal and
factual basis despite the evidence on record that there was no (3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
marriage license at the precise moment of the solemnization of the
marriage.
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character.
b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
when it gave weight to the Marriage License No. 7054133 despite
the fact that the same was not identified and offered as evidence
during the trial, and was not the Marriage license number
appearing on the face of the marriage contract. The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every

24
marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita
interested.[21] A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.[26]

Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to

impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases where the court
considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been
considering the marriage void are clear-cut. regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was
done in the regular conduct of official business. [27] The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Local Civil duty.However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no
Registrar issued a certification of due search and inability to find a less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus,
record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every
was issued to the parties. The Court held that the certification of reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption
due search and inability to find a record or entry as to the purported and, in case of doubt as to an officers act being lawful or unlawful,
marriage license, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.[28] Significantly,
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage
a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.[29]
license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there is
absence of a marriage license that would render the marriage
void ab initio.
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the
marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a
resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is
In Cario v. Cario,[23] the Court considered the marriage of therein no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondents
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago S. Carino as marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality,
void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance
petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to
and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered
Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. The mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the
court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is marriage.[30] An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of
adequate to prove the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties
marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and
license and not being one of the marriages exempt from the administratively liable.[31]
marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and
the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio.

Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage

license number in the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar,
In Sy v. Court of Appeals,[24] the marriage license was issued which states that the marriage license issued to the parties is No.
on 17 September 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took 7054133, while the marriage contract states that the marriage
place on 15 November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable license number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this
conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to assume that the
marriage license. same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the
marriage contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1,
such that the marriage license may read either as 7054133 or
In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage 7054033. It therefore does not detract from our conclusion
license which rendered the marriage void. regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to
the parties.

Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered clean hands,[32] petitioner cannot pretend that he was not
void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now
requires that the absence of such marriage license must be insists took place without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner
apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported admitted that the civil marriage took place because he initiated
by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage it.[33] Petitioner is an educated person. He is a mechanical
license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage engineer by profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to
contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went
license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action
local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite.[25] The certification and be allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond at his
moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste
whom the marriage license was issued, or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance such effrontery.
namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating His attempt to make a mockery of the institution of marriage
the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. betrays his bad faith.[34]

The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony
of Carmona, Cavite, reads: twice in a span of less than one year utilizing the same marriage
license. There is no claim that he went through the second
wedding ceremony in church under duress or with a gun to his
This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed head. Everything was executed without nary a whimper on the part
in this office, Marriage License No. 7054133 was issued in favor of the petitioner.
of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December
8, 1982.
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they
presented to the San Jose de Manuguit Church the marriage

25
contract executed during the previous wedding ceremony before SO ORDERED.
the Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in petitioners testimony as
follows Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
WITNESS Manila

As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary SECOND DIVISION
document prior to the wedding.
G.R. No. 191425 September 7, 2011
COURT
ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., Petitioner,
What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I vs.
am referring to the San Jose de Manuguit church. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

WITNESS DECISION

I dont remember your honor. CARPIO, J.:

COURT The Case

Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License? G.R. No. 191425 is a petition for review1 assailing the
Decision2 promulgated on 30 September 2009 as well as the
WITNESS Resolution3 promulgated on 23 February 2010 by the Court of
Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538. The appellate
I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a
court affirmed the 19 November 2007 Decision4 of Branch 215 of
Marriage Contract and I dont know if it is good enough for the
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (trial court) in Criminal
marriage and they accepted it your honor.
Case No. Q-04-129031.
COURT
The trial court found accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) guilty
In other words, you represented to the San Jose of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and
de Manuguit church that you have with you already a Marriage sentenced him to suffer imprisonment. Co-accused Rowena
Contract? Geraldino (Geraldino) was acquitted for the prosecution’s failure to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WITNESS
The Facts
Yes your honor.
The appellate court recited the facts as follows:
COURT
On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond
That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same Jonathan B. Lledo filed an Information against Atilano O. Nollora,
marriage License in the Marriage Contract issued which Marriage Jr. ("Nollora") and Rowena P. Geraldino ("Geraldino") for the crime
License is Number 7054033. of Bigamy. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
WITNESS "That on or about the 8th day of December 2001 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA,
Yes your honor.[35]
JR., being then legally married to one JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA,
The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing and as said marriage has not been legally dissolved and still
participant to all that took place at that time. Obviously, the church subsisting, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby contract a subsequent or second marriage with her [sic] co-
cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO, who knowingly consented
wedding.[36] and agreed to be married to her co-accused ATILANO O.
NOLLORA, JR. knowing him to be a married man, to the damage
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared and prejudice of the said offended party JESUSA PINAT
before a fixer who arranged everything for them and who facilitated NOLLORA."
the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of
the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not strengthen his Upon his arraignment on April 18, 2005, accused Nollora assisted
posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have by counsel, refused to enter his plea. Hence, a plea of not guilty
performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence was entered by the Court for him. Accused Geraldino, on the other
of any showing to the contrary.[37] Moreover, the solemnizing hand, entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on June 14,
officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage 2005. On even date, pre-trial conference was held and both the
license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil prosecution and defense entered the following stipulation of facts:
registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the
"1. the validity of the first marriage between Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be
and Jesusa Pinat Nollora solemnized on April 6, 1999 at Sapang
presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has Palay, San Jose del Monte;
fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had
fulfilled the requirements of law.[38] 2. that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted the second marriage with
Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 in Quezon City;
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always
in favor of the validity of the marriage.[39] Every intendment of the 3. that in the Counter-Affidavit of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., he
law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The admitted that he contracted the second marriage to Rowena P.
Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be Geraldino;
lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
4. that Rowena P. Geraldino attached to her Counter-Affidavit the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition Certificate of Marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. dated December
is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals 8, 2001;
dated 30 September 2004affirming the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, 5. the fact of marriage of Rowena P. Geraldino with Atilano O.
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. Nollora, Jr. as admitted in her Counter-Affidavit."

The only issue thus proffered by the prosecution for the RTC’s
resolution is whether or not the second marriage is bigamous.

26
Afterwards, pre-trial conference was terminated and the case was To prove that he is a Muslim convert even prior to his marriage to
set for initial hearing. Thereafter, trial ensued. the private complainant, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. presented a
Certificate of Conversion dated August 2, 2004 issued by one
Evidence for the Prosecution Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueño and approved by one Khad Ibrahim A.
Alyamin wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. allegedly
As culled from the herein assailed Decision, the respective
converted as a Muslim since January 19, 1992 (Exhibit ‘2,’ ‘3’ and
testimonies of prosecution witnesses were as follows:
‘4’). Aside from said certificate, he also presented a Pledge of
"xxx (W)itness Jesusa Pinat Nollora xxx testified that she and Conversion dated January 10, 1992 issued by the same Hadji
accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. met in Saudi Arabia while she was Abdul Kajar Madueño and approved by one Khad Ibrahim A.
working there as a Staff Midwife in King Abdulah Naval Base Alyamin (Exhibit ‘7’).
Hospital. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. courted her and on April 6, 1999,
He claimed that the private complaint knew that he was a Muslim
they got married at the [IE]MELIF Chruch [sic] in Sapang Palay,
convert prior to their marriage because she [sic] told this fact when
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan (Exhibit ‘A’). While working in said
he was courting her in Saudi Arabia and the reason why said
hospital, she heard rumors that her husband has another wife and
private complainant filed the instant case was due to hatred having
because of anxiety and emotional stress, she left Saudi Arabia and
learned of his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino. She
returned to the Philippines (TSN, October 4, 2005, page 10). Upon
[sic] further testified that Rowena P. Geraldino was not aware of
arrival in the Philippines, the private complainant learned that
his first marriage with the private complainant and he did not tell
indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a second marriage with
her this fact because Rowena P. Geraldino is a Catholic and he
co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 (Exhibit
does not want to lose her if she learns of his first marriage.
‘B’) when she secured a certification as to the civil status of Atilano
O. Nollora, Jr. (Exhibit ‘C’) from the National Statistics Office He explained that in his Marriage Contract with Jesusa Pinat, it is
(NSO) sometime in November 2003. indicated that he was a ‘Catholic Pentecostal’ but that he was not
aware why it was placed as such on said contract. In his Marriage
Upon learning this information, the private complainant confronted
Contract with Rowena P. Geraldino, the religion ‘Catholic’ was also
Rowena P. Geraldino at the latter’s workplace in CBW, FTI, Taguig
indicated because he was keeping as a secret his being a Muslim
and asked her if she knew of the first marriage between
since the society does not approve of marrying a Muslim. He also
complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to which Rowena P.
indicated that he was ‘single’ despite his first marriage to keep said
Geraldino allegedly affirmed and despite this knowledge, she
first marriage a secret (TSN, January 30, 2006, pages 2-13).
allegedly still married Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him
so much and because they were neighbors and childhood friends. Defense witness Hadji Abdul Qasar Madueño testified that he is
Private complainant also knew that Rowena P. Geraldino knew of the founder and president of Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of
her marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because when she the Philippines and as such president, he has the power and
(private complainant) was brought by Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. at the authority to convert any applicant to the Muslim religion. He
latter’s residence in Taguig, Metro Manila and introduced her to alleged that sometime in 1992, he met accused Atilano O. Nollora,
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.’s parents, Rowena P. Geraldino was there Jr. in Mabini (Manila) who was then going abroad. Atilano O.
in the house together with a friend and she heard everything that Nollora, Jr. applied to become a Muslim (Exhibit ‘14’) and after
they were talking about. receiving the application, said accused was indoctrinated
regarding his obligations as a Muslim. On January 10, 1992,
Because of this case, private complainant was not able to return
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. embraced the Muslim faith. He was then
to Saudi Arabia to work as a Staff Midwife thereby losing income
directed to report every Sunday to monitor his development.
opportunity in the amount of P34,000.00 a month, more or less.
When asked about the moral damages she suffered, she declared In the year 2004, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. visited him and asked for
that what happened to her was a tragedy and she had entertained a certification because of the filing of the instant case. On October
[thoughts] of committing suicide. She added that because of what 2, 2004, he issued a Certificate of Conversion wherein it is stated
happened to her, her mother died and she almost got raped when that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is a Muslim convert since January 10,
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. left her alone in their residence in Saudi 1992. Apart from the above-mentioned document, their ‘Imam’
Arabia. However, she declared that money is not enough to also issued a Pledge of Conversion (Exhibit ‘7’). He declared that
assuage her sufferings. Instead, she just asked for the return of a Muslim convert could marry more than one according to the Holy
her money in the amount of P50,000.00 (TSN, July 26, 2005, Koran. However, before marrying his second, third and fourth
pages 4-14). wives, it is required that the consent of the first Muslim wife be
secured. Thus, if the first wife is not a Muslim, there is no necessity
Prosecution witness Ruth Santos testified that she knew of the
to secure her consent (TSN, October 9, 2006, pages 2-12).
marriage between the private complainant and Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr., because she was one of the sponsors in said wedding. During his cross-examinations, he declared that if a Muslim
Sometime in November 2003, she was asked by the private convert gets married not in accordance with the Muslim faith, the
complainant to accompany the latter to the workplace of Rowena same is contrary to the teachings of the Muslim faith. A Muslim
P. Geraldino in FTI, Taguig, Metro Manila. She declared that the also can marry up to four times but he should be able to treat them
private complainant and Rowena P. Geraldino had a confrontation equally. He claimed that he was not aware of the first marriage but
and she heard that Rowena P. Geraldino admitted that she was aware of the second. Since his second marriage with Rowena
(Rowena) knew of the first marriage of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and P. Geraldino was not in accordance with the Muslim faith, he
the private complainant but she still went on to marry Atilano O. advised Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to re-marry Rowena P. Geraldino in
Nollora, Jr. because she loves him very much (TSN, October 24, accordance with Muslim marriage celebration, otherwise, he will
2005, pages 3-5). not be considered as a true Muslim (TSN, June 25, 2007, pages
3-7).
Evidence for the Defense
Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a victim
The defense’s version of facts, as summarized in the herein
in this incident of bigamous marriage. She claimed that she does
assailed Decision, is as follows:
not know the private complainant Jesusa Pinat Nollora and only
"Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted two came to know her when this case was filed. She insists that she is
(2) marriages, the first with private complainant Jesusa Pinat and the one lawfully married to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., having been
the second with Rowena P. Geraldino. He, however, claimed that married to the latter since December 8, 2001. Upon learning that
he was a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, even Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a first marriage with the private
before he contracted the first marriage with the private complainant, she confronted the former who admitted the said
complainant. As a [M]uslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marriage. Prior to their marriage, she asked Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
marry four (4) wives as allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief. if he was single and the latter responded that he was single. She
also knew that her husband was a Catholic prior to their marriage
but after she learned of the first marriage of her husband, she

27
learned that he is a Muslim convert. She also claimed that after that said Rowena P. Geraldino was aware that she and Atilano
learning that her husband was a Muslim convert, she and Atilano Nollora, Jr., were married. This conclusion is obviously misplaced
O. Nollora, Jr., also got married in accordance with the Muslim since it could not be reasonably presumed that Rowena P.
rites. She also belied the allegations of the private complainant that Geraldino understands what was going on between her and
she was sought by the private complainant and that they had a Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is axiomatic that "(E)very circumstance
confrontation where she admitted that she knew that Atilano O. favoring accused’s innocence must be taken into account, proof
Nollora, Jr. was married to the private complainant and despite this against him must survive the test of reason and the strongest
knowledge, she went on to marry him because she loved him very suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment" (People vs.
much. She insisted that she only came to know the private Austria, 195 SCRA 700). This Court, therefore, has to acquit
complainant when she (private complainant) filed this case (TSN, Rowena P. Geraldino for failure of the prosecution to prove her
August 14, 2007, pages 2-8)."5 guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Trial Court’s Ruling WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered, as follows:
In its Decision6 dated 19 November 2007, the trial court convicted
Nollora and acquitted Geraldino. a) Finding accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy punishable under Article
The trial court stated that there are only two exceptions to 349 of the Revised Penal Code. This court hereby renders
prosecution for bigamy: Article 417 of the Family Code, or judgment imposing upon him a prison term of two (2) years, four
Executive Order No. 209, and Article 180 8 of the Code of Muslim (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum of
Personal Laws of the Philippines, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
The trial court also cited Article 27 of the Code of Muslim Personal prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by
Laws of the Philippines, which provides the qualifications for law.
allowing Muslim men to have more than one wife: "[N]o Muslim
male can have more than one wife unless he can deal with them b) Acquitting accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO of the crime of
in equal companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic Bigamy for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
Law and only in exceptional cases." reasonable doubt.

In convicting Nollora, the trial court’s Decision further stated thus: Costs against accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.

The principle in Islam is that monogamy is the general rule and SO ORDERED.9
polygamy is allowed only to meet urgent needs. Only with the
permission of the court can a Muslim be permitted to have a Nollora filed a notice of appeal and moved for the allowance of his
second wife subject to certain requirements. This is because temporary liberty under the same bail bond pending appeal. The
having plurality of wives is merely tolerated, not encouraged, trial court granted Nollora’s motion.
under certain circumstances (Muslim Law on Personal Status in
Nollora filed a brief with the appellate court and assigned only one
the Philippines by Amer M. Bara-acal and Abdulmajid J. Astir,
error of the trial court:
1998 First Edition, Pages 64-65). Arbitration is necessary. Any
Muslim husband desiring to contract subsequent marriages, The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty
before so doing, shall notify the Shari’a Circuit Court of the place of the crime charged despite the prosecution’s failure to establish
where his family resides. The clerk of court shall serve a copy his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.10
thereof to the wife or wives. Should any of them objects [sic]; an
Agama Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If said council fails The Appellate Court’s Ruling
to secure the wife’s consent to the proposed marriage, the Court
On 30 September 2009, the appellate court dismissed Nollora’s
shall, subject to Article 27, decide whether on [sic] not to sustain
appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision.11
her objection (Art. 162, Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines).
The appellate court rejected Nollora’s defense that his second
Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-
marriage to Geraldino was in lawful exercise of his Islamic religion
accused Rowena P. Geraldino, did not comply with the above-
and was allowed by the Qur’an. The appellate court denied
mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did not even declare that
Nollora’s invocation of his religious beliefs and practices to the
he was a Muslim convert in both marriages, indicating his criminal
prejudice of the non-Muslim women who married him pursuant to
intent. In his converting to the Muslim faith, said accused
Philippine civil laws.1avvphi1Nollora’s two marriages were not
entertained the mistaken belief that he can just marry anybody
conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws,
again after marrying the private complainant. What is clear,
hence the Family Code of the Philippines should apply. Nollora’s
therefore, is [that] a Muslim is not given an unbridled right to just
claim of religious freedom will not immobilize the State and render
marry anybody the second, third or fourth time. There are
it impotent in protecting the general welfare.
requirements that the Shari’a law imposes, that is, he should have
notified the Shari’a Court where his family resides so that copy of In a Resolution12 dated 23 February 2010, the appellate court
said notice should be furnished to the first wife. The argument that denied Nollora’s motion for reconsideration. The allegations in the
notice to the first wife is not required since she is not a Muslim is motion for reconsideration were a mere rehash of Nollora’s earlier
of no moment. This obligation to notify the said court rests upon arguments, and there was no reason for the appellate court to
accused Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is not for him to interpret the Shari’a modify its 30 September 2009 Decision.
law. It is the Shari’a Court that has this authority.
Nollora filed the present petition for review before this Court on 6
In an apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, the accused April 2010.
recelebrated their marriage in accordance with the Muslim rites.
However, this can no longer cure the criminal liability that has The Issue
already been violated.
The issue in this case is whether Nollora is guilty beyond
The Court, however, finds criminal liability on the person of reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.
accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., only. There is no sufficient evidence
that would pin accused Rowena P. Geraldino down. The evidence The Court’s Ruling
presented by the prosecution against her is the allegation that she
Nollora’s petition has no merit. We affirm the rulings of the
knew of the first marriage between private complainant and Atilano
appellate court and of the trial court.
Nollora, Jr., is insufficient[,] being open to several interpretations.
Private complainant alleged that when she was brought by Atilano Elements of Bigamy
Nollora, Jr., to the latter’s house in Taguig, Metro Manila, Rowena
P. Geraldino was there standing near the door and heard their Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
conversation. From this incident, private complainant concluded

28
Art. 349. Bigamy. ‒ The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed (d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by
upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent two competent persons.
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved,
or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any Muslim male at
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. least fifteen years of age and any Muslim female of the age of
puberty or upwards and not suffering from any impediment under
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: the provisions of this Code may contract marriage. A female is
presumed to have attained puberty upon reaching the age of
1. That the offender has been legally married. fifteen.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his x x x.
or her spouse is absent, theabsent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code. Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular form of marriage
ceremony is required but the ijab and the qabul in marriage shall
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage. be declared publicly in the presence of the person solemnizing the
marriage and the two competent witnesses. The declaration shall
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
be set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed or marked by the
requisites for validity.13
contracting parties and said witnesses, and attested by the person
The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of solemnizing the marriage. One copy shall be given to the
bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally married to Pinat; 14 (2) Nollora and contracting parties and another sent to the Circuit Registrar by the
Pinat’s marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of solemnizing officer who shall keep the third.
the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of his
Art. 18. Authority to solemnize marriage. - Marriage maybe
second marriage to Geraldino;15 and (4) Nollora and Geraldino’s
solemnized:
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except for the
lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage. 16 (a) By the proper wali by the woman to be wedded;
The marriage certificate17 of Nollora and Pinat’s marriage states (b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by any person who is
that Nollora and Pinat were married at Sapang Palay IEMELIF competent under Muslim law to solemnize marriage; or
Church, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan on 6 April
1999. Rev. Jonathan De Mesa, Minister of the IEMELIF Church (c) By the judge of the Shari’a District Court or Shari’a Circuit
officiated the ceremony. The marriage certificate18 of Nollora and Court or any person designated by the judge, should the
Geraldino’s marriage states that Nollora and Geraldino were proper wali refuse without justifiable reason, to authorize the
married at Max’s Restaurant, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, Metro solemnization.
Manila on 8 December 2001. Rev. Honorato D. Santos officiated
the ceremony. Art. 19. Place of solemnization. - Marriage shall be solemnized
publicly in any mosque, office of the Shari’a judge, office of the
A certification dated 4 November 2003 from the Office of the Civil Circuit Registrar, residence of the bride or her wali, or at any other
Registrar General reads: suitable place agreed upon by the parties.

We certify that ATILANO JR O. NOLLORA who is alleged to have Art. 20. Specification of dower. - The amount or value of dower
been born on February 22, 1968 from ATILANO M. NOLLORA SR may be fixed by the contracting parties (mahr-musamma) before,
and FLAVIANA OCLARIT, appears in our National Indices of during or after the celebration of marriage. If the amount or the
Marriage for Groom for the years 1973 to 2002 with the following value thereof has not been so fixed, a proper dower (mahr-mithl)
information: shall, upon petition of the wife, be determined by the court
according to the social standing of the parties.
Date of Marriage Place of Marriage
Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states
that "[i]n case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-
Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this
a) April 06, 1999 b) SAN JOSE DEL MONTE, BULACAN Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order
No. 209,19 in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply."
a) December 08, 2001 b) QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA (2nd District)
Nollora’s religious affiliation is not an issue here. Neither is the
Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora put up his Muslim claim that Nollora’s marriages were solemnized according to
religion as his sole defense. He alleged that his religion allows him Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora
to marry more than once. Granting arguendo that Nollora is indeed cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.21
of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Geraldino that his
marriages,20 Nollora cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies civil status is "single." Moreover, both of Nollora’s marriage
were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or
Personal Laws, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The applicable falsehood of the declaration of one’s religion in the marriage
Articles in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws read: certificate is not an essential requirement for marriage, such
Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil contract but a civil omissions are sufficient proofs of Nollora’s liability for bigamy.
institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are governed Nollora’s false declaration about his civil status is thus further
compounded by these omissions.
by this Code and the Shari’a and not subject to stipulation, except
that the marriage settlements to a certain extent fix the property [ATTY. CALDINO:]
relations of the spouses.
Q: In your marriage contract, Mr. Witness, with Jesusa Pinat, you
Art. 15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage contract shall be indicated here as your religion, Catholic Pentecostal, and you were
perfected unless the following essential requisites are complied saying that since January 10, 1992, you are already a [M]uslim
with: convert. . . you said, Mr. Witness, that you are already a [M]uslim
(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; convert since January 10, 1992. However, in your marriage
contract with Jesusa Pinat, there is no indication here that you
(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given; have indicated your religion. Will you please go over your marriage
contract?
(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least
two competent persons after the proper guardian in marriage (wali) [NOLLORA:]
has given his consent; and
A: When we got married, they just placed there Catholic but I didn’t
know why they did not place any Catholic there.

29
xxx Costs against petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.

Q: Now, Mr. Witness, I would like to call your attention with SO ORDERED.
respect to your marriage contract with your co-accused in
this case, Rowena Geraldino, x x x will you please tell us, Mr. Footnotes
Witness, considering that you said that you are already a *Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1074 dated 6
[M]uslim convert on January 10, 1992, why in the marriage
September 2011.
contract with Rowena Geraldino, you indicated there your
religion as Catholic, Mr. Witness? **
Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1066 dated 23
August 2011.
A: Since I was a former Catholic and since I was then keeping,
I was keeping it as a secret my being my Balik-Islam, that’s 1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
why I placed there Catholic since I know that the society
7
doesn’t approve a Catholic to marry another, that’s why I Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
placed there Catholic as my religion, sir. subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
Q: How about under the column, "civil status," why did you spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
indicate there that you’re single, Mr. Witness? spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger
A: I also kept it as a secret that I was married, earlier
of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
married.22 (Emphasis supplied)
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall
xxx be sufficient.

[PROSECUTOR TAYLOR:] For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
Q: Would you die for your new religion, Mr. Nollora? summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
A: Yes, ma’am. effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
Q: If you would die for your new religion, why did you allow that 8 Article 180. Law applicable. The provisions of the Revised Penal
your faith be indicated as Catholic when in fact you were already Code relative to the crime of bigamy shall not apply to a person
as you alleged [M]uslim to be put in your marriage contract? married in accordance with the provisions of this Code or, before
its effectivity, under Muslim law.
xxx
16 Exhibit "B," Records, p. 118. Also Article 2 of the Family Code
[A:] I don’t think there is anything wrong with it, I just signed it so
of the Philippines, Executive Order No. 209 (1988).
we can get married under the Catholic rights [sic] because after
that we even got married under the [M]uslim rights [sic], your Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites
Honor. are present:
xxx (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male
and a female; and
Q: Under your Muslim faith, if you marry a second wife, are you
required under your faith to secure the permission of your first wife (2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.
to get married?
17 Exhibit "A," Records, p. 117.
A: Yes, ma’am.
18 Exhibit "B," id. at 118.
Q: Did you secure that permission from your first wife, Jesusa
19
Nollora? Exhibit "C," id. at 119.
20
A: I was not able to ask any permission from her because she was Id. at 195-198, 201, 206-207. Nollora presented various proofs
very mad at me, at the start, she was always very mad, ma’am. 23 of his Muslim affiliation:

In his petition before this Court, Nollora casts doubt on the validity Exhibit "1" and submarkings - Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of
of his marriage to Geraldino.1avvphi1 Nollora may not impugn his the Philippines’ Membership Application Form accomplished in
marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate himself from criminal handwritten form, dated 10 January 1992;
liability; otherwise, we would be opening the doors to allowing the
solemnization of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As we Exhibit "2" and submarkings - Certificate of Conversion to Islam
stated in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:24 dated 2 October 2004 issued by Hadji Abdul Hai Qahar Madueño,
President of Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of the Philippines;
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such
a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal Exhibit "3" and submarkings - Certificate of Conversion to Islam
consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring dated 17 December 2003 issued by Abdullah M. Al-Hamid,
criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the Director General of the Riyadh branch of the Ministry of Islamic
State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow Affairs, Endowments, Call and Guidance, Kingdom of Saudi
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be Arabia;
flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
Exhibits "4," "12" and "13" - Certificate of Conversion to Islam
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless
dated 17 December 2003 issued by the Civil Registry of
women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
Zamboanga City, Zamboanga del Sur; and
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court
Exhibit "7" and submarkings – Nollora’s Pledge of Conversion
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538 promulgated on 30
dated 10 January 1992 issued by Hadji Abdul Hai Qahar Madueño,
September 2009 and the Resolution promulgated on 23 February
President of Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of the Philippines.
2010 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Bigamy in Criminal Case No. Q-04- 21 Supra note 8.
129031 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment with
22
a term of two years, four months and one day of prision TSN, 30 January 2006, pp. 11-12.
correccional as minimum to eight years and one day of prision 23 TSN, 29 May 2006, pp. 6, 9-10.
mayor as maximum of his indeterminate sentence, as well as the
accessory penalties provided by law. 24 467 Phil. 723, 744 (2004).

30
Republic of the Philippines Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of
SUPREME COURT the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The
Manila RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the
motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was
THIRD DIVISION declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent
to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, consideration of $2,000.00.
vs.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
Ruling of the CA
DECISION

MENDOZA, J.: In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA
affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not
t of Court assailing the September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court understand the nature and consequence of getting married and
of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained
April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract
(RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that
is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the
The facts consideration of $2,000.00.
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios Hence, this petition.
were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Assignment of Error
Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR
declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS
that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL
lived as husband and wife because they never really had any ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire
their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as
American citizenship and for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both
one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and
September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG,
and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter being
Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the
Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a
concept of a marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally
determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled
consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were
investigation.
otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor would be rendered futile.
appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition,
notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits
reiterating her stand that her marriage was similar to a marriage
ensued.
by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
Ruling of the RTC
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its
Decision,5
In its April 25, 2008 the RTC declared the marriage void arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.
ab initio, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Ruling of the Court
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is
rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee
a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American
Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the
consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using
ground of lack of consent?
the surname of respondent as she never acquired any right over it
and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of The Court resolves in the negative.
respondent.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the
xxxx phenomenon of marriage fraud for the purposes of immigration.
SO ORDERED.6 Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This
convenience only. Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it has led to the development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose
stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages
enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or
thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited
ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is one
returned to the United States and never again communicated with entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.12 Another, which
her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because is the subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes.
he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the
ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out
the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14
and should not be recognized from its inception.

31
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest
Naturalization Service,15 established the principal test for considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the
determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00.
It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never
intend to establish a life together at the time they were married. intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
"This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the
the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not parties’ supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family
"entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the
the United States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite
intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention of shall render a marriage void ab initio.
evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely
standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore,
given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A
does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a
"freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly
marriage.
and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the
sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such
legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. 24Consent must
marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable
the notable case of of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial
or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or
to allow an alien to stay in the country, the parties had agreed to hypnotism.26
marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six
months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and
marriage to convert temporary into permanent permission to stay Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated
in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit: nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was
also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage,
Mutual consent is necessary to every contract; and no matter what as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was
forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of
contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly
may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this rule: demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the
a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
it as such to the outside world and with the understanding that they understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them,
will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to
they have never really agreed to be married at all. They must accomplish their goal.
assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and
it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA
deceive others.18 characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage
in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a
(Italics supplied) joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage
status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating
Hellenic Lines,19 which declared as valid a marriage entered into a purpose to enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage
solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating not intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal
that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent.
marriage was entered into for a limited purpose." 20 The 1980 Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or
immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent.
fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely
subsisting one. no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in
therefore, been recognized as problematic. The problem being jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be
that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the
first necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine
denied annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where a consent to be married would allow them to further their objective,
couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an
upheld such marriages as valid.23 application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention
to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie,
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore,
Respondent’s marriage not void clearly present.

In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family
when a marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real
should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to
denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The
to explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and
failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to
intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or
the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that
RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than
lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of
nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and

32
 11
formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud . 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1
or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared (2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000
valid.28 956. Lutwak v. United States , 344 U.S. 604, 612-613 (U.S. 1953).
12
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud . 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1
State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple (2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000
chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go 956; citing Schibi v. Schibi , 69 A.2d 831 (Conn. 1949) (denying
into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious annulment where parties married only to give a name to a
constitutional questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows prospective child); Bishop v. Bishop , 308 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct.
married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way 1970); Erickson v. Erickson , 48 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1944)
they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no (holding similarly to Schibi ); Delfino v.Delfino , 35 N.Y.S.2d 693
children, to love one another or not, and so on. 30 Thus, marriages (Sup. Ct. 1942) (denying annulment where purpose of marriage
entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as was to protect the girl’s name and there was an understanding that
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided the parties would not live together as man and wife); Bove v.
that they comply with all the legal requisites, 31are equally valid. Pinciotti , 46 Pa. D. & C. 159 (1942); Campbell v. Moore , 189
Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not S.E.2d 497 (S.C.1939) (refusing an annulment where parties
the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not entered marriage for the purpose of legitimizing a child); Chander
precluded by law, may validly support a marriage. v. Chander , No.2937-98-4, 1999 WL 1129721 (Va. Ct. App. June
22, 1999) (denying annulment where wife married husband to get
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to his pension with no intention to consummate marriage because
utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the husband knew that was the purpose of the marriage).
marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be
13
considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of
it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting. Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
(2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing Immigration
of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the and Nationality Act (INA), § 237(a)(1)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(G)
circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may (2000).
constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous
14
conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage
of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually ; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, (2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing 132
deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a CONG.REC. 27,012, 27,015 (1986) (statement of Rep Mc Collum)
marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading (promoting the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986).
immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed
15
circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975).
fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the 16Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of
present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer
Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
(2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf.
marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared void 17 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).
would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court
cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to 18 United States v. Rubenstein , 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).
qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its
19
benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. , 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex.
individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in 1969), aff’d , 440 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1971).
their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial 20Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud . 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1
institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not
(2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000
be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient
956; citing Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. , 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D.
situation.
Tex. 1969), aff’d, 440F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1971).
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in 21 Matter of McKee, 17 I. & N. Dec. 332, 333 (B.I.A. 1980).
violable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded 28 Article 4, Family Code.
from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court
cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered 29
Bark v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 511 F.2d 1200,
into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily 1201 (9th Cir. 1975).
nullified when no longer needed.
30Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 (2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing McGuire v.
lack of merit. McGuire , 59 N.W.2d 336, 337 (Neb. 1953). Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).
SO ORDERED.
31 Article 4, Family Code.
Footnotes
32 Const. ( 1987), Article XV, Section 2.
*Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Marvic
Mario Victor F. Leonen per Special Order No. 1570 dated October
14. 2013.
**
Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto
A. Abad. Per Special Order No. 1554dated September 19, 2013.
1Rollo. pp. 26-32; penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez.
Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato. Jr. and
Associate Justice Fiorito S. Macalino of the Fifth Division. Manila.

33
Republic of the Philippines On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy
SUPREME COURT cases against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the
Manila Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on
whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his
THIRD DIVISION counsel.8
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013 Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee
of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,
appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil
vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent. Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining
to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo
DECISION Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993. 9

VELASCO, JR., J.: Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage
licenses and that the numbers are issued chronologically. 10 He
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the Decision1 of the signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of
Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967
86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382- was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January
CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of
Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, the same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person. 11
2008, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA
Decision. For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented
Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed May Ann Ceriola.
Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister
as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. of the Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is authorized to
Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in solemnize marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified that he
Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at
known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the
annulment of his marriage to Gloria. witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary
Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar with the
Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez
January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this gave him the marriage license the day before the actual wedding,
information that is crucial to the resolution of this case. and that the marriage contract was prepared by his
secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it was
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met
registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz
Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married
submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license
on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. 4 He arrived in
with that office.17
the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at
around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-law’s Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the
residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride,
mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to
that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin
requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8,
nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria 1993.19 He further testified that he did not know where the
signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the marriage license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding
ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as
testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the
marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In couple, the solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann
July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Ceriola.21
Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was
asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed
marriage license number could be found. 5 The Municipal Civil Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present at the
Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house. 22 She
11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila
in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. City Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week before
9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a the marriage was to take place, a male person went to their house
certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said certification with the application for marriage license.23 Three days later, the
reads as follows: same person went back to their house, showed her the marriage
license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev.
11 July 2003 Dauz, the solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did
not read all of the contents of the marriage license, and that she
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
was told that the marriage license was obtained from
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy case had been filed
in this office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in favor by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003,
January 19, 1993. pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26

No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the counsels for both parties
SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of
1993. Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen
in the wedding photos and she could identify all the persons
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of
whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.7 Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.

34
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and II
presented the marriage contract bearing their signatures as
proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A
securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING
sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK
get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING
with an application for marriage license for them to sign, which she PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR
and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER
gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS
solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.28
III
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE
June 15, 1993.29
OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF THE
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT
had married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the BELOW.35
existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was
The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her
docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of
appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar
Manila.30
failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said
August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said certification could not be accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled
marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence
one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was
them at the time were Chinese.31 compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.37

The Ruling of the RTC It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed
the marriage contract. The CA also considered that the parties had
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only
valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for
of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage bigamy.38
License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and
Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been issued for
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED.
Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither
The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27 January
party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage
2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil
License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the
Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
Family Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The
the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage
marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas
license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria
contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No
and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
costs.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
SO ORDERED.39
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1,
petitioner, and against the respondent declaring as follows:
200840 but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed July 24, 2008.41
Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby
Hence, this petition.
annulled;
Grounds in Support of Petition
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the
petitioner and the respondent even if no property was acquired I
during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of
the parties. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY
General, National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURT’S OWN
from their respective civil registries the marriage contracted by FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas
on January 9, 1993 in Manila. II

SO ORDERED.34 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF
questioned decision to the Court of Appeals. NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42
The Ruling of the CA The Ruling of this Court
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment The petition is meritorious.
of errors:
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9,
I 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the
Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE
would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3),
BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL
which read as follows:
AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE
DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
ONE.

35
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite,
and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in document.
Chapter 2 of this Title; and
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance certification, stating that it did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132
of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their of the Rules of Court.
personal declaration that they take each other as husband and
wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite
diligent search" in the certification, and since the certification used
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no
shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article diligent search had been conducted and thus the certification could
35(2). not be given probative value.
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court
voidable as provided in Article 45. of Appeals.45 It is worth noting that in that particular case, the
Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of
license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil
the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity
Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage
shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
license could not be located as the same did not appear in their
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated
that the officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a
xxxx categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court to apply.
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by
the preceding Chapter. Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable
presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed,
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the
absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held,
Family Code, nor with the formal requisites of the authority of the
"The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
is the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid
duty."46 No such affirmative evidence was shown that the
marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The
Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking
resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid
the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact,
marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held
proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as
that no valid marriage license had been issued. The CA held that
Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted
there was a valid marriage license.
to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance. correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the
presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or records of her office.
a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the
testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a
To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the marriage
of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where,
allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for
certification that no such license was issued. In the case of the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity
Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as and existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses
permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads: she presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as
none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of
an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy the license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty.
that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo
found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for the
records of his office contain no such record or entry. license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified
as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the
Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license, testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this
the Court held: Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys
probative value.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to
certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the
exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was marriage contract and a copy of the marriage license were
not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of
civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, the marriage license could have simply been secured from that
of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid
applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such marriage license issued for her and Syed.
other relevant data.44
In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the case of
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil Republic,48 it was held that the certification of the Local Civil
registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was
records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of
Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the
the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of
marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued
the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was
a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria
valid, and that the required marriage license had been
and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage
secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only
license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra
conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license
Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No.
was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity

36
in the marriage license that would not affect the validity of the Footnotes
marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No
33
marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Article 9. A Marriage License shall be issued by the Local Civil
Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Registrar of the city or municipality where either contracting party
Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the habitually resides, except in marriages where no license is
alleged marriage license. required in accordance with Chapter 2 of this Title.
51
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its Art. 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at
conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To quote the the point of death, the marriage may be solemnized without
CA: necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid even if the
ailing party subsequently survives.
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and
documentary, that appellant and appellee have been validly Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no
married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally
by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be solemnized
of legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in without necessity of a marriage license.
favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their consent freely.
Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the
Appellee admitted that the signature above his name in the
solemnizing officer shall state in an affidavit executed before the
marriage contract was his. Several pictures were presented
local civil registrar or any other person legally authorized to
showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer,
administer oaths that the marriage was performed in articulo mortis
the witnesses and other members of appellant’s family, taken
or that the residence of either party, specifying the barrio or
during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where
barangay, is so located that there is no means of transportation to
the lunch was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all
enable such party to appear personally before the local civil
is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the Marriage
registrar and that the officer took the necessary steps to ascertain
Contract.
the ages and relationship of the contracting parties and the
xxxx absence of legal impediment to the marriage.

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding
has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on article, together with a legible copy of the marriage contract, shall
15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he be sent by the person solemnizing the marriage to the local civil
filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of registrar of the municipality where it was performed within the
Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note period of thirty days after the performance of the marriage.
that said Petition appears to have been instituted by him only after
Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew
an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was
members may also be solemnized by a ship captain or by an
filed against him for contracting a second or subsequent marriage
airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in
with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not
flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call.
ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage
and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned
from his own deceit and perfidy.50 officer, shall likewise have authority to solemnize marriages in
articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony
operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians.
was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not
operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 Art. 33. Marriage among Muslims or among members of the ethnic
of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of cultural communities may be performed validly without the
the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab necessity of marriage licenses, provided they arc solemnized in
initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family accordance with their customs, rites or practices.
Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license
is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man
requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at
Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
marriage license, is void ab initio.1âwphi1 affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found
it may well be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to no legal impediment to the marriage.
evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make
up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid
marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by
Republic of the Philippines
petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed
SUPREME COURT
to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The
Manila
law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is
clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio. SECOND DIVISION
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013
GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and
Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,
CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The vs.
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the
marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is DECISION
hereby REINSTATED.
CARPIO, J.:
No costs.
The Case
SO ORDERED.
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August
2011 Decision2 and the 14 March 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.

37
The Antecedent Facts not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics
Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a subsisting marriage with Azucena.
petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was docketed as Civil was not bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second marriage
Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that on 10 September was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but
1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage
They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case. The trial
Benjamin III. court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice
and Bentley because they were not parties to the case. The trial
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally court denied Sally’s claim for spousal support because she was
GoBangayan (Sally) who was a customer in the auto parts and not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support for
supplies business owned by Benjamin’s family. In December Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask
1981, Azucena left for the United States of America. In February for support.
1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife.
Sally’s father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not
order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in claim the 37 properties she named in her answer as part of her
Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally
contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him was not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that
that the marriage contract would not be registered. Sally was claiming were owned by Benjamin’s parents who gave
the properties to their children, including Benjamin, as advance
Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his
and Bentley. During the period of their cohabitation, they acquired brothers and the phrase "married to Sally Go" was merely
the following real properties: descriptive of Benjamin’s civil status in the title. As regards the two
lots under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722
they were bought by Benjamin using his own money and that Sally
registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
failed to prove any actual contribution of money, property or
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the industry in their purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a
name of Benjamin, married to Sally; registered co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-
193656, and 253681 as well as the two condominium units under
(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that the
8782 and 8783 registered in the name of Sally, married to lot under TCT No. 61722 and the two condominium units were
Benjamin; and purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court
ruled that the properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in
190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal
the name of Sally as a single individual.
partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice to
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally Benjamin’s right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a
left for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She then separate proceeding.
filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because
documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage
she knew that Benjamin was married to Azucena. Applying Article
contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for
148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sally’s share in the
declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity
properties covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor
of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage
of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamin’s share reverted to his
to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a
conjugal ownership with Azucena.
valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition
of the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the
properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR.
of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44 and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro
registered properties became the subject of the partition before the Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further
trial court. Aside from the seven properties enumerated by declared NONEXISTENT.
Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
Respondent’s claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724,
evidence which the trial court denied. Sally filed a motion for 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos.
reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Sally filed a 188949, 188950, 188951, 193035, 194620, 194621, 194622,
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and asked for the 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627, 194628, 194629,
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction which 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636,
the Court of Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to present 194637, 194638, 194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211,
any evidence before the trial court citing the pendency of her 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
petition before the Court of Appeals. The trial court gave Sally registered owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto
several opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are
2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2 the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go" Consequently, the
October 2008, 23 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. Despite Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and Manila are directed to
repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally still refused to present delete the words "married to Sally Go" from these thirty-seven (37)
her evidence, prompting the trial court to consider the case titles.
submitted for decision.
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos.
The Decision of the Trial Court 8782 and 8783 are properties acquired from petitioner’s money
without contribution from respondent, hence, these are properties
In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner and his lawful wife. Consequently, petitioner is
ofBenjamin. The trial court gave weight to the certification dated appointed the administrator of these five (5) properties.
21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was Respondent is ordered to submit an accounting of her collections
confirmed during trial, that only Marriage License Series Nos. of income from these five (5) properties within thirty (30) days from
6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982 notice hereof. Except for lot under TCT No. 61722, respondent is
and the purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued further directed within thirty (30) days from notice hereof to turn
to Benjamin and Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the marriage was

38
over and surrender control and possession of these properties Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear
including the documents of title to the petitioner. and convincing evidence that would show bias and prejudice on
the part of the trial judge that would justify his inhibition from the
On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these case.
properties are under co-ownership of the parties shared by them
equally. However, the share of respondent is declared The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:
FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go
Bangayan. The share of the petitioner shall belong to his conjugal WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is
ownership with Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition and PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Order dated
distribution of these two (2) properties shall be further processed March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the Regional
pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March 15, 2003. Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-109401 are
hereby AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720
Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-appellee
pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10. while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well
as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be solely owned by the
Respondent’s claim of spousal support, children support and respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be
counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, no owned by them and common and to be shared equally but the
declaration of the status of the parties’ children. share of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the conjugal
partnership under his first marriage while the share of respondent-
No other relief granted.
appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands.
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial
SO ORDERED.8
Prosecutor, the Solicitor General and the Registry of Deeds in
Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan. Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’
decision. In its 14 March 2012 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
SO ORDERED.6
denied her motion.
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion
Hence, the petition before this Court.
for Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27 August 2009,7 the trial
court denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial court’s decision The Issues
before the Court of Appeals.
Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted affirming the trial court’s ruling that Sally had waived her right to
the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court did not present evidence;
err in submitting the case for decision. The Court of Appeals noted
that there were six resettings of the case, all made at the instance (2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
of Sally, for the initial reception of evidence, and Sally was duly affirming the trial court’s decision declaring the marriage between
warned to present her evidence on the next hearing or the case Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and non-existent; and
would be deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the
warning, Sally still failed to present her evidence. She insisted on (3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
presenting Benjamin who was not around and was not affirming with modification the trial court’s decision regarding the
subpoenaed despite the presence of her other witnesses. property relations of Benjamin and Sally.

The Court of Appeals rejected Sally’s allegation that Benjamin The Ruling of this Court
failed to prove his action for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
The petition has no merit.
Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamin’s action was based on his
prior marriage to Azucena and there was no evidence that the Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
marriage was annulled or dissolved before Benjamin contracted
the second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled that Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial
the trial court committed no error in declaring Benjamin’s marriage court’s ruling that she waived her right to present her evidence.
to Sally null and void. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present evidence that she
and Benjamin were married, the trial court abandoned its duty to
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin protect marriage as an inviolable institution.
and Sally was governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. The
Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties acquired by the It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to the
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their discretion of the trial court.9 In this case, Sally’s presentation of
respective contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 37 evidence was scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter, there
properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11
his siblings. September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008.
They were all made at Sally’s instance. Before the scheduled
As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned Sally that in
of Appeals ruled that only the properties under TCT Nos. 61720 case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be
and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him submitted for decision. On the date of the scheduled hearing,
exclusively because he was able to establish that they were despite the presence of other available witnesses, Sally insisted
acquired by him solely. The Court of on presenting Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on that
day. Sally’s counsel insisted that the trial court could not dictate on
Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and
the priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial
253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were exclusive
court’s prior warning due to the numerous resettings of the case.
properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamin’s actual
Sally could not complain that she had been deprived of her right to
contribution in their purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
present her evidence because all the postponements were at her
property under TCT No. 61722 registered in the names of
instance and she was warned by the trial court that it would submit
Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be
the case for decision should she still fail to present her evidence
shared equally. However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to
on 28 November 2008.
the conjugal partnership under his existing marriage with Azucena
while Sally’s share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to
and convincing proof of bad faith. present her evidence, she was deemed to have waived her right
to present them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sally’s

39
continued failure to present her evidence despite the opportunities and Sally were supposedly married on 7 March 1982 which did not
given by the trial court showed her lack of interest to proceed with match the dates reflected on the birth certificates.
the case. Further, it was clear that Sally was delaying the case
because she was waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between
on her petition questioning the trial court’s denial of her demurrer Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time,
to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage
any temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34
accuse the trial court of failing to protect marriage as an inviolable where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning."
institution because the trial court also has the duty to ensure that In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no
by one of the parties.10 marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License
No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February
1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 20 which
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between
recognized her marriage to Benjamin because a marriage could Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general
not be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void ab initio. rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil
Sally further alleges that if she were allowed to present her Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are
evidence, she would have proven her marriage to Benjamin. To "inexistent and void from the beginning." 21 Thus, the Court of
prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the
that in acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio
declaring he was "married to" her; that Benjamin was the informant and non-existent.
in their children’s birth certificates where he stated that he was
their father; and that Benjamin introduced her to his family and Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the
friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there was no real Court of Appeals affirmed in all aspects the trial court’s decision
property registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally and ruled that "the rest of the decision stands."22 While the Court
further alleges that Benjamin was not the informant in the birth of Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned
certificates of his children with Azucena. from the dispositive portion of the decision declaring that "the rest
of the decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial
First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was court’s discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
duly established before the trial court, evidenced by a certified true is not bigamous.1âwphi1 The trial court stated:
copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally
entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the
between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting. concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is
not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena
Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of the Local Civil shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence
Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on
license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only the face of their marriage contract. However, if the second
Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the marriage was void not because of the existence of the first
month of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of
match the series issued for the month. Oliveros further testified bigamy was not committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G.,
that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue Marriage 4079], it was held that what was committed was contracting
License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from marriage against the provisions of laws not under Article 349 but
the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage
marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the of the parties is therefore not bigamous because there was no
certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer marriage license. The daring and repeated stand of respondent
charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be
issuance of a marriage license.11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and sustained. Assuming that her marriage to petitioner has the
Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage was void from marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or
the beginning for lack of a marriage license.12 criminally as it would be invalidated by a prior existing valid
marriage of petitioner and Azucena.23
It was also established before the trial court that the purported
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with the For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have
local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of all the essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a
record was certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration Officer IV of prior marriage.24 In this case, there was really no subsequent
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage
Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was
Records Management and Archives Office, National Commission not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics
for Culture and the Arts;14 and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not
Registration Department of the National Statistics Office.15 The exist. They lived together and represented themselves as husband
documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was no and wife without the benefit of marriage.
marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial
court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
in jest"16 and "a simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally,
intended to cover her up from expected social humiliation coming The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of
from relatives, friends and the society especially from her parents Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code
seen as Chinese conservatives."17 In short, it was a fictitious which states:
marriage.
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of the marriage between their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall
Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
informant in Bernice’s birth certificate which stated that Benjamin contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
and Sally were married on 8 March 1982 18 while Sally was the contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal.
informant in Bentley’s birth certificate which also stated that The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982. 19 Benjamin money and evidences of credit.

40
 12
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share Article 35 of the Family Code states:
in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community of
conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age
share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
even with the consent of parents or guardians;
paragraph of the preceding Article.
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both
perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with
parties are in bad faith.
either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. officer had the legal authority to do so;
Thus, only the properties acquired by them through their actual
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by
joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
the preceding Chapter;
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions.
Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly (4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under
excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were Article 41;
given by Benjamin’s father to his children as advance inheritance.
Sally’s Answer to the petition before the trial court even admitted (5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as
that "Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of to the identity of the other; and
properties to his children and their respective spouses which
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
included Sally x x x."25
21 Article 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the
from the beginning:
decision of the Court of Appeals is more in accord with the
evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 xxxx
was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as
spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 (2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;
were in the name of Benjamin27 with the descriptive title "married
to Sally." The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were xxxx
registered in the name of Sally28 with the descriptive title "married
to Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and
253681 were registered in the name of Sally as a single individual. Article 21
We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the name of
a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered THIRD DIVISION
owner.29 Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of
[G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001]
actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no
co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.30 GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-
RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
Inhibition of the Trial Judge
DECISION
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge
Gironella) to inhibit himself from hearing the case. She cited the PANGANIBAN, J.:
failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her
evidence. She further alleged that Judge Gironella practically A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
labeled her as an opportunist in his decision, showing his partiality jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national
against her and in favor of Benjamin. law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the
We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of
matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the
judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged
evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in and proven according to our law on evidence.
addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision
or order itself.32In this case, we have sufficiently explained that The Case
Judge Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision
because of Sally’s continued refusal to present her evidence. Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision [1] and the
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge March 24, 1999 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan
Gironella may have used uncomplimentary words in writing the City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF. The assailed Decision
decision, they are not enough to prove his prejudice against Sally disposed as follows:
or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the case that would
justify the call for his voluntary inhibition. WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace
J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry
14 March 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties. [3]
No. 94226.
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted
SO ORDERED. Decision.

The Facts

Footnotes Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an

Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. [4] They
* Designated additional member per Raffle dated 8 October 2012. lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18,
1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 1989, [5] a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage,
was issued by an Australian family court.
2Rollo, pp. 29-40. Penned by Associate Justice (now Supreme
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as
Court Associate Justice) Estela M. PerlasBernabe with Associate
shown by a Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by the
Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes (now also a Supreme Court
Associate Justice) and Samuel H. Gaerlan, concurring. Australian government.[6] Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and respondent
were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help

41
Church in Cabanatuan City.[7] In their application for a marriage The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree
license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino.[8] obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the
parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts. [19]
separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While
the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision,
on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce
secured in Australia.[9] between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2)
whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more
Nullity of Marriage[10] in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy - necessity to take up the rest.
- respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time
he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned The Courts Ruling
of respondents marriage to Editha Samson only in November,
1997. The Petition is partly meritorious.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he First Issue:
had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
dissolution.[11] He contended that his first marriage to an Australian
citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce
Australia in 1989;[12] thus, he was legally capacitated to marry between respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong
petitioner in 1994. Seng Gee,[20] petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any
other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding
only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing
and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending --
absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She
respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family
adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably
broken down.[13] Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed
the law of the place where they were celebrated (thelex loci
on the ground that it stated no cause of action.[14] The Office of the
celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the
Solicitor General agreed with respondent.[15]The court marked and
foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to
admitted the documentary evidence of both parties. [16] After they
the legal requirements of the place where the marriage was
submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for
performed.
resolution.[17]
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and
take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide
Order.
for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.[21] A
Ruling of the Trial Court marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a
divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15[22] and 17[23] of the
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that Civil Code.[24] In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the foreigner, Article 26[25] of the Family Code allows the former to
Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly
any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
is, respondents alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it remarry.[26] A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both
based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, consistent with their respective national laws.[27]
there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading
Hence, this Petition.[18] and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo
Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
Issues recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law.[28] Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove
1 the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign
law allowing it.[29] Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree insufficient.
obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso facto terminated his
first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to Divorce as a Question of Fact
contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in
2 evidence, it must first comply with the registration requirements
under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code.These articles
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, read as follows:
to present a certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes
absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioners marriage ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the
to the respondent contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for
such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify
3 the following:
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the xxxxxxxxx
Family Code in this case.
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous
4 marriage was dissolved or annulled;
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. xxxxxxxxx
11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable
provisions in this case. ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been
previously married, the applicant shall be required to
5

42
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer
previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish, when they introduce new matters.[42] Since the divorce was a
instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent
preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of
annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take
marriage. x x x. judicial notice of foreign laws.[43] Like any other facts, they must be
alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their
marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the judicial function.[44] The power of judicial notice must be exercised
spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should
shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of be resolved in the negative.
property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons.
Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce
decree is a public document -- a written official act of an Australian Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the
family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in
authenticity and due execution. 1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage was voidab initio.

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was
is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his legal
presented and admitted in evidence.[30] A divorce obtained abroad capacity to marry under Australian law.
is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal
a judgment is the judgment itself.[31] The decree purports to be a
sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a
written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a
cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
foreign country.[32]
types.The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first
or document may be proven as a public or official record of a kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and
foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy leaves the bond in full force.[45] There is no showing in the case at
thereof attested[33] by the officer having legal custody of the bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree --
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during
authenticated by the seal of his office. [34]
which no reconciliation is effected.[46]
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under
appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family
some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under
court.[35] However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with
some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute;
the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of of adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may
May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior. [47]
objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a
been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
restriction that reads:
City.[36] The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to
petitioners qualification.[37] Hence, it was admitted in evidence and 1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the
properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act offence of bigamy.[48]
of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.[38]
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely
Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national
Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which
1992.[39] Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso
clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a facto restored respondents capacity to remarry despite the paucity
citizen.[40] Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of of evidence on this matter.
their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By
becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree
Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to his
personal laws. civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 [49] of the Rules of Court,
for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal
Burden of Proving Australian Law effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the
validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by
satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together with the
of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is
in that country for quite a long time.Besides, the Australian divorce proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is
judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
determined by the national law of the party concerned. The
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have
alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had
prosecution or defense of an action.[41] In civil cases, plaintiffs he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted
have the burden of proving the material allegations of the certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the
complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. [50]

43
 [22]
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit
[23]
A Complaint;[51] (b) Exhibit B Certificate of Marriage Between ART. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and
Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the
(Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva country in which they are executed.
Ecija;[52] (c) Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A.
xxxxxxxxx
Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1,
1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;[53] (d) Exhibit D Office of the City Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of those which have for their object public order, public policy and
annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
in its records;[54] and (e) Exhibit E Certificate of Australian judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[55] (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit agreed upon in a foreign country.
1 -- Amended Answer;[56] (b) Exhibit 2 Family Law Act 1975
[24]
Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Tenchaves v. Escano 15 SCRA 355, 362, November 29,
Australia;[57] (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate of Australian Citizenship of 1965; Barretto Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 58 Phil. 67, 71-72, March 7,
Rederick A. Recio;[58] (d) Exhibit 4 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of 1933.
Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;[59] and Exhibit [25]Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
5 -- Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22,
1995.[60] solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5), and
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, (6), 36, 37, and 38. (71a)
who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
with petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in finding that
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient
law. (As amended by EO 227, prom. July 27, 1987)
evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status;
or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the [26]Cf. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr., 139 SCRA 139, 143-144, October
second marriage. 8, 1985; and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653, 663, June 30,
1989.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to
respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may [27] Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr., supra.
turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to
[28]
marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we Ibid., p. 143.
believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the
[29]
trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal For a detailed discussion of Van Dorn, see Salonga, Private
capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a International Law, 1995 ed. pp. 295-300. See also Jose C.
quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 ed., p.
bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage 16;
certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in [30]
SEC. 19. Classes of documents.For the purpose of their
Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in
presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
Public documents are:
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial
justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose (a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondents legal sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the officers, whether in the Philippines, or of a foreign country.
parties marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above
discussed. No costs. x x x x x x x x x.
[31]
SO ORDERED. Burr W. Jones, Commentaries on the Law of Evidence in Civil
Cases, Vol. IV, 1926 ed., p. 3511; 3, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur. Evidence provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents
of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself.
[32]
SEC. 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
[9]
The couple secured an Australian Statutory Declaration of their
Public documents are:
legal separation and division of conjugal assets.
[17] (a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
RTC Order of December 16, 1998; ibid., p. 203.
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
[18]
The case was deemed submitted for decision on January 11, officers, whether in the Philippines, or of a foreign country.
2000, upon this Courts receipt of the Memorandum for petitioner,
x x x x x x x x x.
signed by Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba. The Memorandum for
respondent, signed by Atty. Gloria V. Gomez of Gomez and [33]Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy
Associates, had been filed on December 10, 1999. of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence,
[19] the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct
Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 8-9; rollo, pp. 242-243.
copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may
[20] 43 Phil. 43, 49, March 3, 1922. be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal,
[21]
Ruben F. Balane, Family Courts and Significant Jurisprudence under the seal of such court.
in Family Law, Journal of the Integrated Bar of the
[34]
Philippines, 1st & 2nd Quarters, 2001, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, p. 25. Sec. 24. Proof of official record.The record of public documents
referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any

44
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by Promulgated:
a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the
record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept
in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
September 21, 2005
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign
country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy CRASUS L. IYOY,
or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent
or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed R e s p o n d e n t.
in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
by the seal of his office.
- - - -x
See also Asiavest Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 539, 550-
551, September 25, 1998; Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corp.
v. National Labor Relations Commission, 161 SCRA 122, 133- DECISION
134, May 6, 1988.
[35]The transcript of stenographic notes states that the original
copies of the divorce decrees were presented in court (TSN,
December 16, 1998, p. 5; records, p. 176), but only photocopies
of the same documents were attached to the records (Records, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Index of Exhibits, p. 1.).
[36] TSN, December 15, 1998, p. 7; records, p. 178.
[37] TSN, December 16, 1998, p. 7; records, p. 178.
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
[38]
People v. Yatco, 97 Phil. 941, 945, November 28, of Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
1955; Marella v. Reyes, 12 Phil. 1, 3, November 10, 1908; People Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the
v. Diaz, 271 SCRA 504, 516, April 18, 1997; De la Torre v. Court Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated
of Appeals, 294 SCRA 196, 203-204, August 14, 1998; Maunlad 30 July 2001,[1] affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court
Savings & Loan Asso., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 114942, (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077,
November 27, 2000, pp. 8-9. dated 30 October 1998,[2] declaring the marriage between
respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void
[39] Art. 15, Civil Code. on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
[49]SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect
of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows: The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a
Complaint[3] for declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent
xxxxxxxxx Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint,
respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result
judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as of their union, they had five children Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie,
between the parties and their successors in interest by a Calvert, and Carlos who are now all of legal ages. After the
subsequent title. celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that
Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.),
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after
[50]In passing, we note that the absence of the said certificate is Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from
merely an irregularity in complying with the formal requirement for her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he
procuring a marriage license. Under Article 4 of the Family Code, disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent
an irregularity will not affect the validity of a marriage celebrated Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children,
on the basis of a marriage license issued without that that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually
certificate. (Vitug, Compendium, pp. 120-126; Sempio- had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her
Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, 1997 American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City.
reprint, p. 17; Rufus Rodriguez, The Family Code of the Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was
Philippines Annotated, 1990 ed., p. 42; Melencio Sta. Maria afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she
Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law, 1999 ed., p. 146.) had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times
more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in
SECOND DIVISION 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in
1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her
American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using
REPUBLIC OF THE G.R. No. 152577 the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the
PHILIPPINES, U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations
Present: made in which she was named as Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus. At the
Petitioner, time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left
and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more
possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus
PUNO,
finally alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and
Chairman, dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground
for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to
CALLEJO, SR.,
Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
- versus-
TINGA, and

CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

45
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim[4] with the RTC on 05 June The ground bearing defendants psychological incapacity deserves
1997. She asserted therein that she was already an American a reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiffs testimony is
citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed
she admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus and exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply
having five children with him, Fely refuted the other allegations with her marital duties such as striving for family unity, observing
made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. From the evidence
she was no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she presented, plaintiff adequately established that the defendant
may had been indignant at respondent Crasus on certain practically abandoned him. She obtained a divorce decree in the
occasions but it was because of the latters drunkenness, United States of America and married another man and has
womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to establish [sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an
contribute to the maintenance of their household. She could not anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already
have been extravagant since the family hardly had enough money married to another man in another country.
for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons
as respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then earning
as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to
Defendants intolerable traits may not have been apparent or
support their family. Although she left all of her children with
manifest before the marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless
respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to
allows the annulment of the marriage provided that these were
them, as well as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was
eventually manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the case
able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert,
in this instance.
who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file for
divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a
letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed
divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Certainly defendants posture being an irresponsible wife erringly
Fely married her American husband and acquired American reveals her very low regard for that sacred and inviolable institution
citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American of marriage which is the foundation of human society throughout
husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her the civilized world. It is quite evident that the defendant is bereft of
status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely the mind, will and heart to comply with her marital obligations, such
also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was presently incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question
living with another woman who bore him a child. She also accused is shown by defendants own attitude towards her marriage to
respondent Crasus of misusing the amount ofP90,000.00 which plaintiff.
she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of their son,
Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the
RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendants
that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in
damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses. question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein
case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal
Iyoy, firmly.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-
Trial Briefs,[5] the RTC afforded both parties the opportunity to
present their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial Going over plaintiffs testimony which is decidedly credible, the
through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.[6] Court finds that the defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable
signs of such psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
obligations. These are her excessive disposition to material things
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in over and above the marital stability. That such incapacity was
support of his Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by
1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his defendants own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for
Complaint;[7] (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the these reasons there is a legal ground to declare the marriage of
Health Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and
Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of void ab initio.[15]
Deeds, such marriage celebration taking place on 16 December
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of
1961;[8] and (3) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their
the RTC was contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the
eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American husbands
Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision,
surname, Micklus.[9]
dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC,
finding no reversible error therein. It even offered additional
ratiocination for declaring the marriage between respondent
Felys counsel filed a Notice,[10] and, later on, a Motion,[11] to take Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit
the deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely and her children,
Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the
consular officers of the Philippines in New York and California,
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has
U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders [12]and
remarried, and is now permanently residing in the United States.
Commissions[13] issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of
Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons for
New York and California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the
seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage
witnesses upon written interrogatories, not a single deposition was
ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it had been
over a year since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence
and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998, [14] considering Fely
to have waived her right to present her evidence. The case was
thus deemed submitted for decision.
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely (6), 36, 37 and 38.
null and void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings

46
WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of
FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS the Family Code of the Philippines, reads
THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN
SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW. the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological
provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines for
citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the determining its existence.
latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or she
has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant
has undoubtedly acquired her American husbands citizenship and
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the term psychological incapacity
thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the
was defined, thus
benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino
citizen whose spouse eventually embraces another citizenship
and thus becomes herself an alien.
. . . [P]sychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances,
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
plaintiff would still be considered as married to defendant, given
so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
her total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the former.
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
and in fact does not exist and to remain married to a spouse who
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
is incapacitated to discharge essential marital covenants, is verily
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
to condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
abhorrent and will not countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
be given relief by affirming the trial courts declaration of the nullity
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is
of the marriage of the parties.[16]
celebrated[21]
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by
2002,[17] denied its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner Republic
filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the following
arguments/grounds
(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
a marriage;
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do
not per se constitute psychological incapacity. (b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history
of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were
in accord with law and jurisprudence considering that the Court of
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26,
involved.[22]
paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at
bar.[18]

In his Comment[19] to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of
that Felys psychological incapacity was clearly established after a Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines were handed down
full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family by this Court inRepublic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,[23] which,
Code of the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be
respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had already reproduced below
become an American citizen. He further questioned the personality
of petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, to institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment and
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
declaration of nullity of marriages.
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on
the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees
After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution
laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant Petition to be at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
meritorious. protected by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and

the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
I
solidarity.

The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to

support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.

47
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the based on psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity,
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity however, must be established by the totality of the evidence
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations presented during the trial.
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
jurisprudence, this Court finds that the totality of evidence
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus
before the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put into
question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The
Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
(2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in
thereto.
which Fely used her American husbands surname. Even
considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to
respondent Crasuss Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily obligations of marriage.
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the
the exercise of a profession or employment in a job
Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a
mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability the errant spouse.[26] Irreconcilable differences, conflicting
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical
mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a psychological incapacity under the said Article.[27]
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases,
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves.
It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[28]
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family.
Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of
respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was
not identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified,
then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or
mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
it is incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues
psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the
a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Courts ruling in Marcos v.
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
Marcos,[29] respondent Crasus must still have complied with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
Molina[30] that the root cause of the incapacity be identified as a
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under
explained.
Canon 1095.[24]
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[25] further clarified that there is no
the marriage.[31] No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the
requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be

48
policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. [32] of the land, then his intervention in such proceedings could only
serve and contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than
II thwart it.
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not
applicable to the case at bar.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or
Philippines the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this
Court or the Court of Appeals.[35] While it is the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State,
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to the appellate
Philippine law. courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and
practical that even while the proceeding is still being held before
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise
wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting
the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of the
its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot interests of the State.
be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely
because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of
Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely the Solicitor General in several cases for annulment and
herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it,
obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta[36]
for the United States in 1984, after which she married her
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198
American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that
(1997)], this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation
she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed
and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which
for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the
concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:
Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights
and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues
Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
respondent Crasus. therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
III
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
of marriages. the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
respondent Crasus argued that only the prosecuting attorney or This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285
fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in (2001)] reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of
proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages; Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or
hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no personality to file fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
the instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides State[37]

Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of

Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity Marriages,[38] which became effective on 15 March 2003, should
of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to of the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. to intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General
to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are
does not bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings for reproduced below
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order
No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.
appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal
defender of the Government.[33] His Office is tasked to represent (4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy
the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the
lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law same period.
office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties
Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the parties and the
requiring the services of lawyers.[34]
public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor
General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their
claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own
ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No
in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court.
marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the
fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that

49
After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be Azcuna, JJ
considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,

Respondent. Promulgate

October 5,
Sec. 19. Decision.
x----------------------------------------------
----x

(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public DECISION
prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision personally
or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication QUISUMBING, J.:
failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one
shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.
party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid
divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino
spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days
from notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to
motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of make a definite ruling on this apparently novel question, presented
the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General. as a pure question of law.

Sec. 20. Appeal. In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails
the Decision[1] dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
(2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and
may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within its Resolution[2] dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for
fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein
or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.
appeal on the adverse parties. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:

Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph
those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and sustains the of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree
validity and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given
and Fely. At most, Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity, and the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]
but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as
same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent
follows.
Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless
and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.
law nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-
problem.[39] an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed
Orbecido.
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated
30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along
Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal- Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had
Iyoy remains valid and subsisting. obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent
Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566
SO ORDERED.
A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority
FIRST DIVISION to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court
granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154380
it was denied.
Petitioner, In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER

ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE[4]
Present:
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies
to Jr.,
Davide, a valid
C.J.,mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between
a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the
- versus - (Chairman),
OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation.[5] Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that
Quisumbing,
governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a
matter of legislation and not of judicial determination. [6]
Ynares-Santiago,

Carpio,For
andhis part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly
applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized alien
wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry,

50
he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties
12, Article II of the Constitution.[7] were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as
an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American
before the trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
provides: Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings[9] on the Family
Code, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP)
RULE 63 registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES 1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against
those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad.
These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while
Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or
of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign
other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be
determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for
deleted and made into law only after more widespread
a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
...
Legislative Intent
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations
be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between
showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to
persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking
Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the
issue is ripe for judicial determination.[8] Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985
alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while
case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case involved a
in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse
institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists
is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is
also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the
remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but
his second marriage. later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by
naturalization?
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code apply to the case of respondent? The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v.
Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about Court of Appeals.[11] In Quita, the parties were, as in this case,
in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a
enactment? naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the
same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that
Brief Historical Background
a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code,
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying
which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38. obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be
Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a
amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
provides: legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and
reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this intent.[12]
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38. If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied) In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the
situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is

51
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, G.R. No. 186571
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time Petitioner,
a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
Present:
the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American

citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated CARPIO MORAL
between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized
alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her BRION,
to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
- versus - BERSAMIN,
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus
Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to *ABAD, and
remarry.
VILLARAMA, JR
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper
remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for
annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be
a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even
feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to
Promulgated:
have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation
would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage DAISYLYN TIROL STO. August 11, 2010
tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain TOMAS and The SOLICITOR
married to the naturalized alien spouse. GENERAL,
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent Respondents. -- -
evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce
decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled rule x-----------------------------------------------------------------
that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.[13]
DECISION
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove
his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen.
Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by
our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a BRION, J.:
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.[14] Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws
must be alleged and proved.[15] Furthermore, respondent must
also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision [1] of the
as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11,
evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into elevated via a petition for review oncertiorari[2] under Rule 45 of
another marriage. the Rules of Court (present petition).
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2
of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by
E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who
has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering on November 29, 2000.[3] OnJanuary 18, 2005, Gerbert married
that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.[4] Due
and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left
bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to
citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but
American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with
declaration could only be made properly upon respondents another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned
submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor. to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of
Justice, Windsor,Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a
is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and month later, on January 8, 2006.[5]
Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs. Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found
another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina
SO ORDERED. fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his
Republic of the Philippines
and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the
Supreme Court divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO)
informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still
Manila subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign
divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. [6]

THIRD DIVISION Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of

foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as

52
dissolved (petition) with the RTC.Although summoned, Daisylyn The alien spouse can claim no right under the second
did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive
notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to
file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and
personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative
considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
history and intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied Gerberts

petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages
party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
void[15] and voidable[16] marriages. In both cases, the basis for
divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled
the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the
that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the
marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, [8] in order for
the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for
him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law. [9] Article 26
cause arising after the marriage.[17] Our family laws do not
of the Family Code reads:
recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.[18]

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this Constitution,[19] enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
(6), 36, 37 and 38.

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry (6), 36, 37 and 38.
under Philippine law.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
intent behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry
Orbecido III;[10] the provision was enacted to avoid the absurd under Philippine law.
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.[11] Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding
in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[20]and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[21] In both
THE PETITION cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses
assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts divorce decree
between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized
that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond
From the RTCs ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present petition.[13] between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v.
Romillo that:
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for
declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus,
similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse]
the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and
Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The
benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with,
stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien
the petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there are to be served.[22]
is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries
his Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two marriage certificates,
involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The
Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,[14] both support Gerberts position. As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law
to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second longer married to the Filipino spouse.[23] The legislative intent is for
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital
the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
recognition of a foreign divorce decree. decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right
THE COURTS RULING to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as
dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.[24]Without the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial

53
recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode
of severing the marital bond;[25] Article 17 of the Civil Code
provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign
subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The
judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to
inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code
institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the
provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for
foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less,
recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino
that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in
spouse and his or her alien spouse.
the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her
national law.[27]

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article

26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment
divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the
is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice
alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino
of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage.No
a rule, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.[28] This means
for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the
that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed
facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens
by his national law.[26]
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the
alien himself or herself.[29] The recognition may be made in an
action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of
purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, his claim or defense.
the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for
the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the
Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this
national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain
provision.
a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority,
Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This
Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2)
copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
recognition in this jurisdiction foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of

Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of
with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In authenticity,[30] but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article divorce.[31] Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply
26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless
of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to
divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the
authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been Canadian divorce law.
duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the
effect of foreign judgments. This Section states: We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action,
given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina
wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand,
at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive
a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice
having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless
follows: to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with
our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment,
once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata[32] between
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the Court.[33]
thing; and

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between
person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence nations, the res judicataeffect of the foreign judgments of divorce
of a right as between the parties and their successors in serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and
interest by a subsequent title. for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms.This same
effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse
were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provides.

54
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce
decree
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the
As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by
the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the themselves do not ipso facto authorize the
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate decrees registration. The law should be read in relation with the
based on the mere presentation of the decree.[34] We consider requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before
the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present
attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done. case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce
decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out
of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial
the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in
the civil register. The law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a
persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting all his Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the
personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4,
not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being series of 1982,[36] and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181,
legitimate or illegitimate, orhis being married or not.[35] series of 1982[37] both of which required a final order from a
competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a
marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless,
allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law,
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one,
the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite
affecting a persons legal capacity and status that must be
judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal
recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil
effect.
Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in
the civil registry:

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition

that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not,
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for
by itself, authorize thecancellation of the entry in the civil
recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be
entered: registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the
proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the
cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

(a) births;

(b) deaths; Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register
shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of
(c) marriages; Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically
providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the
(d) annulments of marriages;
civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of
(e) divorces; the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
(f) legitimations; authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the
civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified
(g) adoptions; petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located;[38] that the civil registrar and
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties
(i) naturalization; and to the proceedings;[39] and that the time and place for hearing must
be published in a newspaper of general circulation. [40] As these
(j) changes of name. basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present
case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC
as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
xxxx

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the
preserve in their offices the following books, in which they shall, registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for
respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for
persons: cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such
as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish
(1) Birth and death register; the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule
108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding[41] by which the applicability of the foreign judgment
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities,
marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
marriages. or fact.

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari,
and naturalization register. and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of
the Regional Trial Court of LaoagCity, Branch 11, as well as

55
its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to (a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar
General. No costs. xxxx

SO ORDERED. Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of
the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has
Republic of the Philippines been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in
SUPREME COURT the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in
Manila the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x

SECOND DIVISION The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in
"gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based its
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013 dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides
that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the
vs.
petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL
husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can
CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS. Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for
DECISION
declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No.
CARPIO, J.: 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign
judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a
The Case status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is
"for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court
redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC
(RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for review
sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure
and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition
question of law. The petition assails the Order 1 dated 31 January
of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage
2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution
between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy.
dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for
The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was
Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial
consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Philippines11on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition
Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of
by Philippine courts.12
petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
The Facts
applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married on the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of
Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the
petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be
where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other. absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue.
In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a
(Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing
Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left
Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3 Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act
their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil
from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. 4 On 14 divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree
January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized." 17 Section 2 of
Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to
judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and
Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are
35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; 5 and (3) for the subject to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC
RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese
the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and
between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to Maekara.
the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the
National Statistics Office (NSO).6 Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that
the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may
be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction,
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a
issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate
from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the
of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of the
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC): venue by motu proprio dismissing the case." 20Moreover, petitioner
alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed"
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he
–
substantially complied with the provision.

56
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino
reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. citizen.
02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees
improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10- concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as
SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law
proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that
divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and
to be judicially recognized, x x x." 23 On the other hand, the RTC status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears
did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be
"[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no
ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x." 24
jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108,
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which
based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special attacked."41
proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no
comply with the directive for them to comment on the
jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the
petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact
"validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be
that she was previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara also denied
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper
that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay. 44 On the other
party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for
hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the
correction of entry] x x x."27
petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and
validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court Fujiki.46
held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the The Issues
petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum
shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted
the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision. (1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor 10-SC) is applicable.
General and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
comment on the petition for review.30 The public respondents, the between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil bigamy.
Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of
the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General (3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign
filed a Manifestation and Motion.31 judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries
in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the
RTC’s "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x The Ruling of the Court
x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be
We grant the petition.
reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings. 32 The Solicitor
General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does
between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to
cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this
In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained: Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he
marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is
or she had only discovered during the connubial period that the
bigamy."48
marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had
already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit I.
from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they
would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to
circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific,
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to
prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may
of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official
marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34 publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who
has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by
Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108 the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign
proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office. 50
"[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a
Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and
establish the status or right of a party or a particular the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and
fact."37 WhileCorpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the
present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-

57
trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party
repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108
the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are
In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No.
judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death
plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation." 59 noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court
declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must fact."67
determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic
public policy and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to
the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of
is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file
Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where
citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between
void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the
marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule
laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara
substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese
capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of Family Court.
another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material
foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt
judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record
interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of
of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68)
by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right
allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the
foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it family"70 and preserving the property regime of the marriage.71
can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends further
mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the
to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and
policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations, 61 as
Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family
well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62
Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity
have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to
evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse
extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of
of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent
ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law,
marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section
Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce
2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her
wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting
foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a
a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of
judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-
bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under 11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous
349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the
marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349
existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance
of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is
with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy
48(b) of the Rules of Court.
because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and
II. prevention of crimes.77If anyone can file a criminal action which
leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the
fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share

58
in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The second
his marriage. paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes
Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.
the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is
the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
"is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure
prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the to address the anomaly that results from a marriage between a
prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen,
entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino
this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free
judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is
as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign
established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it
entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry. was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v.
III. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
to be served."91
Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to
nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign
the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The
action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage
dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second
collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara. paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the
foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage,
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a
is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of
Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where the
the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the
Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse
Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.
is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family
Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the
Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the
limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the
lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition and
foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A
distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the
critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and
investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. 86 A
a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy,
direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is
as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with
also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the
Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family
Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act
Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino
No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in
spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for
the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the
declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but
corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino
this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts
citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of
have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a
changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or bigamy.
cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are
foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is
incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was
a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of
decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family
the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A.
the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus,
No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to
Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend
nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize
the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign
the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case
judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of
which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The
a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend
procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to
its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex
recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage
nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither
can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court. For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether
the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine
in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to
courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino
prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want
spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of
mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public
the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a
policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence
capacity to remarry under Philippine law." InRepublic v.
of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign
Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the
judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves
second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd
as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien

59
 8
registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a Rollo, pp. 44-45. Section 5 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) provides:
registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the
recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. – (1) The petition shall allege
records in the Philippines.1âwphi1 the complete facts constituting the cause of action.

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a (2) It shall state the names and ages of the common children of
bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy the parties and specify the regime governing their property
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of relations, as well as the properties involved.
a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground
If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between
for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the
the parties, the petitioner may apply for a provisional order for
Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised
spousal support, custody and support of common children,
Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy]
visitation rights, administration of community or conjugal property,
shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
and other matters similarly requiring urgent action.
archipelago."
(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer
forum shopping. The verification and certification must be signed
sees the need to address the questions on venue and the contents
personally by the petitioner. No petition may be filed solely by
and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of
counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31
certification against forum shopping shall be authenticated by the
January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the
duly authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or legation,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No.
consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular agent in said
Q-11-68582 are REVERSED andSET ASIDE. The Regional Trial
country.
Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further
proceedings in accordance with this Decision. (4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy
of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office
SO ORDERED.
of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date
Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur. of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the
same period.

Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be

a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition.
Footnotes
9RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(c). See rollo, pp. 55-56
1 Penned by Judge Jose L. Bautista Jr. (Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration).
2 10
In Pasay City, Metro Manila. RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(a).
3 11
See rollo, p. 88; Trial Family Court Decree No. 15 of 2009, FAMILY CODE (E.O. No. 209 as amended), Art. 35. The
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage between Maria Paz Galela following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
Marinay and Shinichi Maekara dated 18 August 2010. Translated
by Yoshiaki Kurisu, Kurisu Gyoseishoshi Lawyer’s Office (see xxxx
rollo, p. 89).
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under
4 Id. Article 41;

5FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (E.O. No. 209 as xxxx

amended): 12 Rollo, p. 56.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: 13FAMILY CODE, Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party
xxxx who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
Article 41; manifest only after its solemnization.
14
xxxx Rollo, p. 68.
15
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence Enacted 26 November 1930.
of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
16
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been CIVIL CODE, Art. 413. All other matters pertaining to the
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In 17Act No. 3753, Sec. 7. Registration of marriage. - All civil officers
case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
and priests or ministers authorized to solemnize marriages shall
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
send a copy of each marriage contract solemnized by them to the
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
local civil registrar within the time limit specified in the existing
6 Rollo, pp. 79-80. Marriage Law.

7 The dispositive portion stated: In cases of divorce and annulment of marriage, it shall be the duty
of the successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby ordered DISMISSED send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local civil registrar
and WITHDRAWN from the active civil docket of this Court. The of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was
RTC-OCC, Quezon City is directed to refund to the petitioner the solemnized.
amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to be taken from the
Sheriff’s Trust Fund. In the marriage register there shall be entered the full name and
address of each of the contracting parties, their ages, the place
and date of the solemnization of the marriage, the names and
addresses of the witnesses, the full name, address, and

60
relationship of the minor contracting party or parties or the person The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting
or persons who gave their consent to the marriage, and the full officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal,
name, title, and address of the person who solemnized the under the seal of such court.
marriage.
Rule 39, Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. —
In cases of divorce or annulment of marriages, there shall be The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
recorded the names of the parties divorced or whose marriage was country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order, is
annulled, the date of the decree of the court, and such other details as follows:
as the regulations to be issued may require.
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the
18 RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
cancellation or correction. — Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the
(a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring between the parties and their successors in interest by a
marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; subsequent title.
(i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k)
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m)
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
minor; and (o) changes of name.
50
29
See RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 24-25. See also
Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC states in part:
Corpuz v. Santo Tomas, supra note 36 at 282.
Contents and form of petition. – x x x 51 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 5.
xxxx 52 Id., Sec. 6.
(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against 53 Id., Sec. 9.
forum shopping. The verification and certification must be signed
personally by the petitioner. No petition may be filed solely by 54 Id., Sec. 11-15.
counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.
55 Id., Sec. 17-18.
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and
56
certification against forum shopping shall be authenticated by the Id., Sec. 19 and 22-23.
duly authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or legation, 57Mijares v. Rañada, 495 Phil. 372, 386 (2005) citing Eugene
consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular agent in said
Scoles & Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws 916 (2nd ed., 1982).
country.
58 Id.
xxxx
59 Id. at 386.
Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be
a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition. 60 Civil Code, Art. 17. x x x
30 Resolution dated 30 May 2011. Rollo, p. 105. xxxx
31 Under Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz. Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
32Rollo, p. 137. The "Conclusion and Prayer" of the "Manifestation those which have for their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
and Motion (In Lieu of Comment)" of the Solicitor General stated:
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
In fine, the court a quo’s pronouncement that the petitioner failed agreed upon in a foreign country.
to comply with the requirements provided in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC 61 Mijares v. Rañada, supra note 57 at 386. "Otherwise known as
should accordingly be set aside. It is, thus, respectfully prayed that
Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 be reinstated for further proceedings. the policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect party expectations
resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard against the
Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises are likewise harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be
prayed for. increased by never-ending litigation of the same disputes, and – in
a larger sense – to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrer’s Case
46 Id. of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: ‘rest and quietness.’"
47
(Citations omitted)
Supra note 33.
62
48
Mijares v. Rañada, supra note 57 at 382. "The rules of comity,
Supra note 33 at 655.
utility and convenience of nations have established a usage
49 RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 24. Proof of official among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts
record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered
(a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested countries." (Citations omitted)
by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his 63 43 Phil. 43 (1922).
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If 64Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628
the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the SCRA 266, 280; Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723 (2001); Adong v.
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, Cheong Seng Gee, supra.
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
65
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the FAMILY CODE, Art. 26. x x x
foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
the seal of his office.
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct law.
copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be.

61
66Act No. 3753, Sec. 1. Civil Register. — A civil register is 83 See supra note 68.
established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall
84
be entered: (a) births; (b) deaths; (c) marriages; (d) annulments of FAMILY CODE, Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and
marriages; (e) divorces; (f) legitimations; (g) adoptions; (h) in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement
acknowledgment of natural children; (i) naturalization; and (j) between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the
changes of name. spouses and the custody and support of their common children.
The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and
Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with
cancellation or correction. — Upon good and valid grounds, the whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent.
(a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e)
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 61.
marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; 85 FAMILY CODE, Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs
(i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k)
(2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply
election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m)
in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a
annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
minor; and (o) changes of name.
67 The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation,
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, supra note 36 at 287.
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the
68 FAMILY CODE, Art. 35-67. custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of
third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
69 FAMILY CODE, Art. 74-148. adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
70 FAMILY CODE, Art. 195 in relation to Art. 194. All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community
or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for
71 See supra note 69. liquidation.
72 CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 1: "No person shall be deprived In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law x x x." situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of
73 Articles 102 and 129.
FAMILY CODE, Art. 68-73.
74 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 19. Decision.— (1) If the court renders
CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5). The Supreme Court shall
a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the
have the following powers:
decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued
xxxx by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation,
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement Partition and Distribution of Properties.
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and xxxx
legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a 86
FAMILY CODE, Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. x x x
the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
x x x x (Emphasis supplied) and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
75 Emphasis supplied. In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment
shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of
76Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815, as amended), Art. 349. judgment.
Bigamy. - The penalty of prisión mayor shall be imposed upon any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 9. Investigation report of public
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before prosecutor. — (1) Within one month after receipt of the court order
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating whether the
parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and
77See III RAMON AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE (1997), their respective counsels, if any.
518.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state
78
RULES OF COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and the basis thereof in his report. The parties shall file their respective
civil actions. — (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil comments on the finding of collusion within ten days from receipt
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense of a copy of the report The court shall set the report for hearing
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to the petition.
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action. (3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the
court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public
xxxx prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.
79 Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Sec. 2. Parties in interest. — A 93 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 72, Sec. 2. Applicability of rules
real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or of civil actions. — In the absence of special provisions, the rules
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable,
of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, applicable in special proceedings.
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest. Rule 111, Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. — x x
x
80 Juliano-Llave v. Republic, supra note 33.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already
81 Supra note 25. been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it
82
may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall
Supra note 25.
last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action.

62
Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action for annulment of marriage.[2] Hence, this petition for review
action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be with this Court grounded on a pure question of law. Scnc m
consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal
action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with
the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and
criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioners
cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party in averment that the allegations in the petition are true and correct."
the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no
The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules.[3] However,
decided jointly. upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal
and reinstated the petition for review.[4]
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the
period of prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior
separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to
tolled. determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect
at the time of their celebration.[5] A valid marriage license is a
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,[6] the
of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to
deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the Article 80(3)[7] in relation to Article 58.[8] The requirement and
criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability issuance of marriage license is the States demonstration of its
may arise did not exist. involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested. [9] This
FIRST DIVISION interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State
recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to
the family as a basic "autonomous social
[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000] institution."[10] Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as
an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the which shall be protected by the State.[11] This is why the Family
minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent
PEPITO NIAL, JR.,petitioners, vs. NORMA union"[12] and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a
BAYADOG, respondent. Ncmmis lifetime commitment."[13]
DECISION However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code
wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
provided in Article 76,[14] referring to the marriage of a man and a
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other
declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death? as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at
least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to
1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due
year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license.
and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such
license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit persons from legitimizing their status.[15] To preserve peace in the
dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of
securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and
a car accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition exempt them from that requirement. Sdaa miso
for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging
that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to
case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage license.
of the second marriage would affect petitioners successional In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have
rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we
persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under now desire to marry each other."[16] The only issue that needs to
Article 47 of the Family Code. be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is
contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future
City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a
Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each
following issues: other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be
a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire
defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may
at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the
is already dead; cohabitation period?
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived
father with defendant is null and void ab initio; together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of
marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity
of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing
of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their fathers
factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In
death.[1]
other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should
action to declare null and void their fathers marriage to respondent be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately
which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of

63
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the
was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is personality to file a petition to declare their fathers marriage void
unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is after his death?
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family
the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties Code[20] cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for
to have common law relationships and placing them on the same declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows
being a special relationship must be respected as such and its "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before the
requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not
based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to
parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable
single requirement and later use the same missing element as a and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable
pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage
should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken
the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It place[21] and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be
should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription
public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot
that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void
the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void
registrar.[17] The Civil Code provides: marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party
but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of
Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice the local and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly
civil registrar thereof. x x x." valid.[22] That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but
marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void
investigation, examining persons under oath. x x x" Sdaad marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law
concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, [23] and its
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in
persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53
advise the local civil registrar thereof. x x x." and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime
governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known and the children conceived before its annulment are
to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note legitimate. Sup rema
down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the
application for a marriage license. x x x." Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father
extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a
absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved
same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void
subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of
be illegal and void,[18] subject only to the exception in cases of either extinguished nothing.
absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.
The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree
contracting of two or more marriages and the having of is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. [24] "A
extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the
concubinage and adultery.[19] The law sanctions monogamy. parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but
though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind
cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage
and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of
time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his competent jurisdiction."[25] "Under ordinary circumstances, the
marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal
Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken
and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity
each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage
that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death
that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof
absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or
marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable
It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct
already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on
subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is
severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot made good ab initio.[26] But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly
make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
being one as "husband and wife". Scs daad previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage[27] and such absolute nullity can be based only
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case
on a final judgment to that effect.[28] For the same reason, the law
is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage
makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute
license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
nullity of marriage imprescriptible.[29] Corollarily, if the death of
either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for

64
 [12]
defense, then the same cannot be considered Article 1, Family Code provides: "Marriage is a special contract
imprescriptible. Juris of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal or family life.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action x x x.
is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
[13]
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, Santos v. CA, 58 SCAD 17 (1995); 310 Phil. 21, 41 (1995).
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution
[14]
of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may Now Article 34, Family Code. Art. 76. No marriage license shall
pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the
instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each
that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall
judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages
the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found
obtained only for purpose of remarriage. no legal impediment to the marriage.
[15]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.
the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing [16] Rollo, p. 29.
Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said
case is ordered REINSTATED. [17] Articles 63 and 64, Civil Code; Article 17 and 18, Family Code.
SO ORDERED. [18]Article 83, Civil Code provides "Any marriage subsequently
contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur. Sc juris
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be
Pardo, J., on official business abroad. illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years."
[1]The dispositive portion of the Order dated March 27, 1998
Article 41 of the Family Code reads: "A marriage contracted by
issued by Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of Regional Trial Court
any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
(RTC) - Branch 59, Toledo City, reads: "WHEREFORE, premises
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
considered, defendants motion to dismiss is hereby granted and
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
this instant case is hereby ordered dismissed without costs." (p.
years"
6; Rollo, p. 21).
[19]
[2]
Arts. 333 and 334, Revised Penal Code.
Order, p. 4; Rollo, p. 19.
[20]
[3]
Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by
Minute Resolution dated July 13, 1998; Rollo, p. 39.
the following persons and within the periods indicated herein:
[4] Minute Resolution dated October 7, 1998; Rollo, p. 50.
(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party
[5] Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 (1998). whose parent or guardian did not give his or her consent, within
five years after attaining the age of twenty-one; or by the parent or
[6]
Now Article 3, Family Code. Art. 53. No marriage shall be guardian or person having legal charge of the minor, at any time
solemnized unless all the requisites are complied with: before such party has reached the age of twenty-one;

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; their consent, freely (2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the sane
given; spouse, who had no knowledge of the others insanity; or by any
relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane,
(2) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and at any time before the death of either party, or by the insane
spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;
(3) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character. (3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured
[7] party, within five years after the discovery of the fraud;
Now Article 4, Family Code. Art. 80. The following marriages
shall be void from the beginning: (4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured
party, within five years from the time the force, intimidation or
xxxxxxxxx
undue influence disappeared or ceased;
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages
of exceptional character.
FIRST DIVISION
xxxxxxxxx
[8] [A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001]
Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized
in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under article 75, no HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE
marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides. RESOLUTION
[9] DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975).
[10]
Section 12, Article II, 1987 Constitution; Hernandez v. CA, G. The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties
R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999; See also Tuason v. CA, 256 who were both bound by a prior existing marriage is the bone of
SCRA 158 (1996). contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge
Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan.
[11] Section 2, Article XV (The Family), 1987 Constitution. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges
respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn

65
Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is
on 12 May 1999. significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22
March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their
Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was
Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. [1] Four indicated that both were separated.
children were born out of that marriage.[2] On 22 March 1993,
however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting
Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. [3]When respondent previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the
Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that subsequent marriage null and void.[7] In fact, in his Comment, he
the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he
stated that both contracting parties were separated. would have discouraged him from contracting another
marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same
when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were
did not know that Manzano was legally married.What he knew was subscribed and sworn to before him.
that the two had been living together as husband and wife for
seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their
in their joint affidavit.[4] According to him, had he known that the respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article
late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a
to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but
bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise
of merit and for being designed merely to harass him. stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much
less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found
guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of
P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been
would be dealt with more severely. cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years.Just like
separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous
whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between
basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other
affirmative. is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could
not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his
subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing
plea for the dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his earlier
marriage.
Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two
separate affidavits[5] of the late Manzano and of Payao, which Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the
were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The
instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one has special
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to application to judges,[8] who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence,
their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be
they had both left their families and had never cohabited or conversant with the law and basic legal principles. [9] And when the
communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it
alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[10]
solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34
of the Family Code. ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator
is hereby ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount of
We find merit in the complaint. fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is
increased to P20,000.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
SO ORDERED.
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least Republic of the Philippines
five years and without any legal impediment to marry each SUPREME COURT
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an Manila
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he SECOND DIVISION
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found
no legal impediment to the marriage. G.R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008

For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner,
apply, the following requisites must concur: vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.
1. The man and woman must have been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage; DECISION

2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other; TINGA, J.:

3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
must be present at the time of marriage; in CA-GR CV. No. 69166,2 declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De
Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2) that the
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid until properly
together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment nullified by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that
to marry each other]; and purpose.

5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had
found no legal impediment to their marriage.[6]

66
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626,
They planned to get married, thus they applied for a marriage is AFFIRMED with theMODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna
license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the appellant and the
September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in appellee and (2) declaring the marriage on 13 March 1995
October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When between the appellant and the appellee valid until properly
the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the annulled by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that
marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push purpose. Costs against the appellant.8
through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed
an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was
together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple denied by the Court of Appeals.9 Hence this petition.
got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe,
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
his marriage with respondent because as shown by the evidence
administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony,
and admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated
petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and
without a marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit they
did not live together as husband and wife.
executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained a false narration
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named of facts, the truth being that he and respondent never lived
Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the child’s birth, respondent has together as husband and wife. The false affidavit should never be
been the one supporting her out of her income as a government allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the absence of a marriage
dentist and from her private practice. license.10 Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for
the appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against only an ordinary action for support and not an action for annulment
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (trial or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case,
court.3 In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine
petitioner and that the latter has "reneged on his the invalidity of their marriage since it was validly invoked as an
responsibility/obligation to financially support her "as his wife and affirmative defense in the instant action for support. Citing several
Reinna Tricia as his child."4 authorities,11 petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the
subject of a collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that another independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the
their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by marriage between the parties. The refiling of another case for
a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by declaration of nullity where the same evidence and parties would
respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from be presented would entail enormous expenses and anxieties,
embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to would be time-consuming for the parties, and would increase the
her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental advice burden of the courts.12 Finally, petitioner claims that in view of the
from his parents before he got married. He also averred that they nullity of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial of
never lived together as husband and wife and that he has never the child’s paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals gravely erred
seen nor acknowledged the child. in declaring the child as his legitimate child.
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,5 the trial court ruled that the In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required
marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid because respondent and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file
it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared their respective comments on the petition.13
petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give
her support. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, In her Comment,14 respondent claims that the instant petition is a
arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion mere dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of the decision of the Court
when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate court,
provide support to the child when the latter is not, and could not she argues that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked
have been, his own child. collaterally, but can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit
specifically brought for that purpose. With regard to the filiation of
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that her child, she pointed out that compared to her candid and
a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial declaration straightforward testimony, petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive
of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the child in answering questions about their sexual encounters. Moreover,
was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties’ she adds that despite the challenge from her and from the trial
marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon court, petitioner strongly objected to being subjected to DNA
petitioner’s refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity testing to prove paternity and filiation.15
and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last
time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in
petitioner’s "forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to holding that it was improper for the trial court to declare null and
relieve him of his obligation and reward him of his being void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for
irresponsible."6 Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit support. Citing the case of Niñal v. Bayadog,16 it states that courts
dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily may pass upon the validity of a marriage in an action for support,
admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child. since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the existence
of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented during the
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for proceedings in the trial court showed that the marriage between
support, it was improper for the trial court to declare the marriage petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage
of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same license, and that their affidavit (of a man and woman who have
case. There was no participation of the State, through the lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife
prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion for at least five years) was false. Thus, it concludes the trial court
between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for correctly held that the marriage between petitioner and respondent
declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show is not valid.17 In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of the
that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter that trial court that the child is an illegitimate child of petitioner and thus
can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the entitled to support.18
instant proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should
have been limited to the obligation of petitioner to support the child Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial
and his wife on the basis of the marriage apparently and voluntarily court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage
entered into by petitioner and respondent.7 The dispositive portion between petitioner and respondent in an action for support and
of the decision reads: second, whether the child is the daughter of petitioner.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had
October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, National jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between

67
petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of
collaterally attacked.19 Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, we held: the child, thus stating:

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action 1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO
is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other who was born on November 3, 1995 at Better Living, Parañaque,
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, Metro Manila;30
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution
of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the
pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly trial court:
instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue
is supported not only by the testimony of the latter, but also by
that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
respondent’s own admission in the course of his testimony
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose
wherein he conceded that petitioner was his former girlfriend.
is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final
While they were sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the
judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of
latter’s house or clinic. At times, they would go to a motel to have
the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.20
pregnant which ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid, as
Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,21 the Court ruled that it earlier ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely forced
is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of two to undergo the marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the
marriages despite the main case being a claim for death benefits. occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3," "C," "C-1"
Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court may pass upon the and "C-2," "D," "D-1" and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and
validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to "F-2," "G," "G-1" and "G-2" and "H," "H-1" to "H-3"). In one of the
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1" and "D-2"), defendant is seen putting the
the determination of the case. However, evidence must be wedding ring on petitioner’s finger and in another picture (Exhs.
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of "E," "E-1" and "E-2") respondent is seen in the act of kissing the
grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity.22 petitioner.31

Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed
formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No.
a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court
voidable.23 In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000
presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage is hereby REINSTATED.
license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they
presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for
more than five years.24 However, respondent herself in effect
admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during Footnotes
cross-examination, thus—
1 Rollo, pp. 31-41.
ATTY. CARPIO:
2Captioned Annabelle Assidao–De Castro v. Reinel Anthony B.
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living De Castro.
together as husband and wife for the last five years on or before
3
March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct? The case was eventually raffled to Branch 70 of the Pasig RTC,
presided by Judge Pablito M. Rojas.
A Yes, sir.25
23 Family Code, Art. 4.
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere
24
irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses Purportedly complying with Art. 34 of the Family Code, which
with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who provides:
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man
and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years
and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at
before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing
least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a
The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
marriage license.26 In the instant case, there was no "scandalous
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found
cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all.
no legal impediment to the marriage.
The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so
they could push through with the marriage has no value 25 TSN, 18 February 2000, p. 20.
whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt
from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and 26
Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 669 (2000), citing THE
present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio. REPORT OF THE CODE COMMISSION, p. 80.

Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s 27 Family Code, Art. 175.
illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to support.
28 Family Code, Art. 172.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate In the book Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines by
children.27 Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, p. 246 (1988), the following were given as
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an examples of "other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private special laws:" (a) the baptismal certificate of the child ; (b) a judicial
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the admission; (c) the family bible wherein the name of the child is
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, entered; (d) common reputation respecting pedigree; (e)
or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special admission by silence; (f) testimonies of witnesses; and (g) other
laws.28 kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130.

The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner as the

father. In addition, petitioner, in an affidavit waiving additional tax

68
Republic of the Philippines with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were
SUPREME COURT both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating
Manila Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for
disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty
THIRD DIVISION of suspension from service for one year without emolument. 7
G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008 On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision 8 dismissing the
Complaint. It disposed:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs. WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent. evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds and so holds
that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered
G.R. No. 179474 DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].9

FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner, The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented,
vs. the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent. 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of the story as
implausible, and rationalized that:
DECISION
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose]
could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual,
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and
as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it
G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the
[was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release
Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa
of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could have
Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the
put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa]
Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November
told him that her brother would kill them if he will not sign the
2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage
papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to
between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
"discover" that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic]
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that
were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for a ride" by
by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and [Felisa.]
Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986,
[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied
attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and
by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when
that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife
he wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly notarized statement of assets
for at least five years.
and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint 4 for Annulment and/or discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of
(RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This
with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated Court does not believe that the only reason why her name was
between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there
stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers
least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the
through fraud. name of his sister.

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath,
his filing of the same. According to Jose, he was introduced to she testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to
Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25,
boarder in Felisa’s house, the latter being his landlady. Some three November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature
weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his
City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract
her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre- (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she
arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that
paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes.
the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He The testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his
initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him consent was procured through fraud.10
that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action
had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the
had prescribed. It cited Article 8711 of the New Civil Code which
pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left.
requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be
It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had
commenced by the injured party within four years after the
contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of
discovery of the fraud. Thus:
paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisa’s house. When
he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was
marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he
latter feigned ignorance. could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage
at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and
the alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take
defended the validity of their marriage. She declared that they had
any action to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.12
maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality
of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision
contracting marriage with him on account of their age to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the
difference.5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The
marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:
with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3
June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13
Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose

69
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage "x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation
between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
marriage under Article 8614 of the Civil Code did not exist in the immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a
marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no
annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck continuity – that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
down Jose’s appeal in the following manner: cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the
parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
employed on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the action encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing
for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their
and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected
marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The
by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
(4) years from the time the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any
as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987 excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use
then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to
for annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing
that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the
Felisa.15 ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required
in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion that
in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of
his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage
any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the
license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article
local civil registrar.
7616 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the
parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized
woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional
five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the
affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception
husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect to the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab
the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was initio because of the absence of a marriage license.21
misled by the statements contained therein. In this manner, the
Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no
solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate avail. The appellate court rendered a Resolution 22 dated 10 May
court further noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of 2007, denying Felisa’s motion.
marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated
that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of
the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this
marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Jose’s argument Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals’
that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev. Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set
Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and
Article 5617 of the Civil Code did not require that either one of the Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate
contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly
officer’s church or religious sect. The prescription was established assailing the appellate court’s Amended Decision. On 1 August
only in Article 718 of the Family Code which does not govern the 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the
parties’ marriage. interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought
before it for resolution.23
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion
for Reconsideration thereof.1avvphi1 His central opposition was The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following
that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:
a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully
I
attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal
condition that the man and the woman must have been living RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION
together as husband and wife for at least five years before the OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital
cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false. II

The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN
and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM
Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads: HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED III

and SET ASIDE and another one entered declaring the marriage
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE
between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil LICEN[S]E.24
Registrar of Pasay City.19
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling misapplied Niñal.25 She differentiates the case at bar from Niñal by
of this Court in Niñal v. Bayadog,20 and reasoned that: reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior
marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her
In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only
solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of their affidavit sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for
that they had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in
they had lived together for at least five (5) years and that they order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity
desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows: of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.

70
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan
Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.34
tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the
Philippines and Felisa. The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation
under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances
give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage exists between ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and
Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least
citing this Court’s ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals. 26 To five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall
buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republic’s affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal impediment to the marriage.
requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not
The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission,
required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally
is that the publicity attending a marriage license may discourage
obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a license
such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from
is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully
legalizing their status.36
obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the
parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was
they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they
addition, the Republic posits that the parties’ marriage contract executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of
states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as
Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the parties and their husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this
witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of union, they desire to marry each other."37 One of the central issues
marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of
following documents: (1) Jose’s notarized Statement of Assets and marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of
Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the
his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City,
attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and We answer in the affirmative.
wife in said barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID card, dated 2
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions
May 1988, indicating Felisa’s name as his wife.
to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction,
of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly38 but reasonably
A survey of the prevailing rules is in order. construed.39 They extend only so far as their language fairly
warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was provisions rather than the exception. 40 Where a general rule is
celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the
Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. former or add to the latter by implication. 41 For the exception in
Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and
marriage as a contract: the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being
unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these
least five years.
requisites are complied with:
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The
(2) Their consent, freely given; exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to
those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no
ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had,
character. (Emphasis ours.) since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite
of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the
Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized
language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to
without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the
be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save
in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes
marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil
of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76
Code, but not those under Article 75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil
also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite
Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the
facts42 in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more
administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who
than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took
license is the essence of the marriage contract.30 This is in stark
steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contrast to the old Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a
contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for
marriage.
the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil
Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived
contracting parties, after the proper government official has together for five years at the time they executed their sworn
inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.32 affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose
and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are
months before the celebration of their marriage.43 The Court of
covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit,
Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was introduced to
these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point
her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or
of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2)
March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution.44 The appellate court also
consular marriages,33 (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4)

71
cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an
Jose commenced to live in her house.45 exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a
mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie,
question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect.
or falsehood of the alleged facts.46Under Rule 45, factual findings Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
are ordinarily not subject to this Court’s review.47 It is already well-
settled that: In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the
argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit
are binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be
when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a
administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the law.54 There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation,
exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code.
Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of
factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their criminal
Court if such findings are supported by the record or based on liability.55
substantial evidence.48
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for
executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had
of a marriage license, is beyond question. lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s
subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of
that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of
the statements in the parties’ affidavit will not affect the validity of
nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were
complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is
cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was imprescriptible.56 Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated sans
celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except
Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void
Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.
wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the
requirement of a marriage license. Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule
that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76
Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this means a five-year period computed back from the date of
Court holds that the same finds no applicability to the case at bar. celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it
Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with not been for the absence of a marriage.57 It covers the years
reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within
lawful contract of marriage.49 Restated more explicitly, persons the five years - and continuity that is unbroken.58
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision
case, to be in fact married.50 The present case does not involve an of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV
apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-
applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their
into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, criminal liability, if any. No costs.
compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant SO ORDERED.
consolidated Petitions.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code 51 that every Associate Justice
intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will
WE CONCUR:
not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the
effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
was entered into without the requisite marriage license or Associate Justice
compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under Acting Chairperson
exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage
without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead PRESBITERO J.
DANTE O. TINGA*
or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against VELASCO, JR.**
Associate Justice
innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the Associate Justice
law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for
a valid marriage.52 The protection of marriage as a sacred RUBEN T. REYES
institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union Associate Justice
but the exposure of an invalid one as well. 53 To permit a false
affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject ATTESTATION
circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.
opinion of the Court’s Division.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact
Associate Justice
that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have
cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is CERTIFICATION
flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the
marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in Division Acting Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby certified that
the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in

72
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the (1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting
opinion of the Court’s Division. parties;

REYNATO S. PUNO (2) Nondisclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a
Chief Justice crime involving moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was
imprisonment for two years or more;

(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the
marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband;
Footnotes
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune
*Per Special Order No. 497, dated 14 March 2008, signed by Chief or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for
Justice Reynato S. Puno designating Associate Justice Dante O. action for the annulment of marriage.
Tinga to replace Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago,
who is on official leave under the Court’s Wellness Program and 15 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 122.
assigning Associate Justice Alicia Austria-Martinez as Acting
16
Chairperson. ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man
and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who,
**
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. was designated to sit as being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
additional member replacing Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties
per Raffle dated 12 September 2007. shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or
1Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon with Associate minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
Justices Mario L. Guariña III and Santiago Javier Ranada, affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 175581), pp. 65-70; rollo, (G.R. No. qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
179474), pp. 156-161. impediment to the marriage.
2 Records, p. 170. 17 ART. 56. Marriage may be solemnized by:
3 Id. (1) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme
4 Court;
Id. at 1-8.
5 (2) The Presiding Justice and the Justices of the Court of Appeals;
The marriage contract shows that at the time of the celebration
of the parties’ marriage, Jose was 27 years old, while Felisa was (3) Judges of the Courts of First Instance;
37.
(4) Mayors of cities and municipalities;
6The Administrative complaint before the Administrative
Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman was (5) Municipal judges and justices of the peace;
docketed as OMB-ADM-0-93-0466; Records, pp. 252-258.
(6) Priests, rabbis, ministers of the gospel of any denomination,
7 Id. at 257. church, religion or sect, duly registered, as provided in Article 92;
and
8 Id. at 313-323.
(7) Ship captains, airplane chiefs, military commanders, and
9 Id. at 323. consuls and vice-consuls in special cases provided in Articles 74
10 and 75.
Id. at 321-322.
18
11 ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
ART. 87. - The action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the parties and within the periods as follows: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s
jurisdiction;
(1) For causes mentioned in Number 1 of Article 85, by the party
whose parent or guardian did not give his or her consent, within (2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious
four years after attaining the age of twenty or eighteen years, as sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and registered
the case may be; or by the parent or guardian or person having with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written
legal charge, at any time before such party has arrived at the age authority granted him by his church or religious sect and provided
of twenty or eighteen years; that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the
solemnizing officer's church or religious sect;
(2) For causes mentioned in Number 2 of Article 85, by the spouse
who has been absent, during his or her lifetime; or by either spouse (3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the cases mentioned
of the subsequent marriage during the lifetime of the other; in Article 31;
(3) For causes mentioned in Number 3 of Article 85, by the sane (4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is
spouse, who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any assigned, in the absence of the latter, during a military operation,
relative or guardian of the party of unsound mind, at any time likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32; or
before the death of either party;
(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided
(4) For causes mentioned in Number 4, by the injured party, within in Article 10.
four years after the discovery of the fraud;
26 377 Phil. 919 (1999).
(5) For causes mentioned in Number 5, by the injured party, within
four years from the time the force or intimidation ceased; 27ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized
in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under Article 75, no
(6) For causes mentioned in Number 6, by the injured party, within marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued
eight years after the marriage. by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
12 contracting party habitually resides.
Records, p. 322.
28
13 ART. 75. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be
Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 125.
solemnized by consuls and vice-consuls of the Republic of the
14 ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute Philippines. The duties of the local civil registrar and of a judge or
fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article: justice of the peace or mayor with regard to the celebration of
marriage shall be performed by such consuls and vice-consuls.

73
29 45
ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the Id. at 159.
beginning:
46First Dominion Resources Corporation v. Peñaranda, G.R. No.
xxxx 166616, 27 January 2006, 480 SCRA 504, 508.
47
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521, 30
of exceptional character. September 2005, 471 SCRA 589, 605.
30 48
People v. De Lara, No. 12583-R, 14 February 1955, 51 O.G. Id.
4079, 4082.
49 Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 708 (1999).
31The Marriage Law, otherwise known as Act No. 3613, requires
50
the following essential requisites: (1) legal capacity of the Id.
contracting parties; and (2) their mutual consent. 51 ART. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity
32Report of the Code Commission, pp. 79-80; see also Ambrosio of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or fact leans toward
Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, 1956 Edition, Vol. I, p. 195. the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds,
the legitimacy of children, the community of property during
33 Must be read with Article 58 of the Civil Code which provides: marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the
validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful
ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized aggression.
in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under Article 75, no
52
marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued People v. De Lara, supra note 30 at 4083.
by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
53
contracting party habitually resides. Malcampo-Sin v. Sin, 407 Phil. 583, 588 (2001).
54
34Edgardo L. Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated (1984 Salavarria v. Letran College, 357 Phil. 189, 196 (1998);
Eleventh Ed.), pp. 302-310. Aparente, Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 387 Phil.
96, 108 (2000).
35In Niñal v. Bayadog (supra note 20 at 668-669), this Court
55
articulated the spirit behind Article 76 of the Civil Code, thus: Supra note 33 at 306. Alicia V. Sempio-Diy in A Handbook on
the Family Code of the Philippines (1995 Ed., p. 38) wrote that "If
"However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil the parties falsify their affidavit in order to have an instant
Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which marriage, although the truth is that they have not been cohabiting
is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and for five years, their marriage will be void for lack of a marriage
a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other license, and they will also be criminally liable." Article 76 of the Civil
as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at Code is now Article 34 of the Family Code, which reads:
least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license
is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to ART. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
persons from legitimizing their status. To preserve peace in the The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found
and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of no legal impediment to the marriage.
their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and Republic of the Philippines
exempt them from that requirement."
36
Supreme Court
The Report of the Code Commission states that "No marriage
license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have Manila
attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years desire to marry THIRD DIVISION
each other. In such case, the publicity attending a marriage license
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, G.R. No. 179922
may discourage such persons from legalizing their status," Report
of the Code Commission, p. 80. Petitioner,
37Records, p. 49. The affidavit was denominated by the parties as Present:
an "Affidavit on (sic) Marriage Between Man and Woman Who
Haved (sic) Lived Together as Husband and Wife for at Least Five
Years."
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
38 Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 722, 744 (2001).
Chairperson,
39Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 363
Phil. 130, 137 (1999). AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

40 Id. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also CHICO-NAZARIO,

41Id. citing Samson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43182, 25 known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. NACHURA, and
November 1986, 145 SCRA 654, 659.
DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD REYES, JJ.
42 The first part of Article 76 states, "No marriage license shall be
SANDOVAL CARLOS or
necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age
of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA.
husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other
x x x." DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO Promulgated:
43 Rollo (G.R. No. 175581), p. 38. CARLOS II,
44Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 158, citing TSN (Civil Case No. B- Respondents. December 16, 2008
4143), 15 April 1999.

74
 by Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-
B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2
x----------------------------------------------- by Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the subd. plan, containing
---x an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS, more or
less.

PARCEL No. 4
DECISION
A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being
REYES, R.T., J.:
a portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137),
ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa,
marriages solemnized during the effectivity of the Family Code, Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27,
except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by
annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the Mangangata River; and on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B
pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment. of the subd. plan x x x containing an area
of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE
METERS.
We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the PARCEL No. 5
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set
aside the summary judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child,
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de
recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of money, and damages.
Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la
parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle
Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el
The Facts cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta
manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila,
situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos.
The events that led to the institution of the instant suit are unveiled Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial de CIENTO
as follows: CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.

Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left
six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos
PARCEL No. 6
and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly
described as follows:

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd.

De Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con la
Parcel No. 1
parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle
Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el
cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de
Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de
No. 6137 of the Court of Land Registration. Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan
y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial de CIENTO
CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.[3]
Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is
specifically reserved.
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate
to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid the payment
of inheritance taxes.Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn
Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.
over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan
De Dios Carlos.

Parcel No. 2 Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and
registered in the name of Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued
by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159,
by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; and TCTNo. 139058
situated in the Bo. of issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x
containing an area of Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One
(13,441) square meters.
Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is
now covered by TCT No. 160401 issued by the Registry of Deeds
of Makati City.

Parcel No. 3
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by
respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo
A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, II). Upon Teofilos death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the
approved as a non-subd. project), being a portion of Lot 159-B name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The
[LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, said two (2) parcels of land are covered by TCT Nos. 219877 and
Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.

75
 counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorneys fees, be granted.
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before
the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-
1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the
approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under the But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents
compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective shares in moved for summary judgment. Attached to the motion was the
the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage.
land. This includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of
said land. respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and
respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.

On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of

extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land of the first On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary
parcel between them. judgment on the ground of irregularity of the contract evidencing
the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his own motion
for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from
the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there
Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,[4] 2,331 is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.
square meters of the second parcel of land were adjudicated in
favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter portion
was later divided between petitioner and respondents.
Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary
judgment the testimony of respondent Felicidad in another
case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384,
The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las
agreement executed on August 17, 1994, with respect to Civil Pias. In her testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated that co-
Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the supplemental respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo. [5]
compromise agreement, which was approved accordingly.

Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in

August 1994. Under the contracts, the parties equally divided Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa
between them the third and fourth parcels of land. submitted to the trial court its report and manifestation, discounting
the possibility of collusion between the parties.

RTC and CA Dispositions

In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil
Case No. 95-135, against respondents before the court a quo with
the following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage;
(b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as
and (e) sum of money and damages. The complaint was raffled to follows:
Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants (respondents)

In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiffs
late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view (petitioners) Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor plaintiff as follows:
the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.

1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval

Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962,
entered into with respondent Felicidad with respect to the subject evidenced by the Marriage Certificate submitted in this case, null
real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license;
certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He argued
that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including
the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be 2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not
reconveyed to him. the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo
E. Carlos;

3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the

Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral
sum of P18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon at the
and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and
legal rate from date of filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;
costs of suit.

4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel

On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They
of land, less the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
denied the material averments of petitioners complaint.
11975, covered by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of Deeds of
Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the
Makati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to cancel said
requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidads marriage to
title and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate
child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman.

5. Declaring the Contract, Annex K of complaint, between plaintiff

and defendant Sandoval null and void, and ordering the Register
On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction
of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of
over the subject matter, respondents prayed for the dismissal of
Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff
the case before the trial court. They also asked that their
herein;

76
 own brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as
husband and wife for thirty years and that the annulment of their
6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between marriage is the very means by which the latter is sought to be
plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void; deprived of her participation in the estate left by the former call for
a closer and more thorough inquiry into the circumstances
surrounding the case. Rather that the summary nature by which
7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of the court a quo resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to the
defendant Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and effect that the material facts alleged in the complaint for annulment
ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in of marriage should always be proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of
the exclusive name of plaintiff herein; the Revised Rules of Court provides:

8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to
defendant Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the
ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party,
the sole name of plaintiff herein. direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved. (Underscoring supplied)
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiffs
evidence on his claim for moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorneys fees, appearance fees, and litigation expenses on June Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules
7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon. on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the
record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would
still not be warranted. While it may be readily conceded that a valid
marriage license is among the formal requisites of marriage, the
SO ORDERED.[6]
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to
reflect the serial number of the marriage license on the marriage
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and
respondents argued, inter alia, that the trial court acted without or appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as
in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling appellee represents it to be.Aside from the dearth of evidence to
the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo the contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandovals affirmation of the
II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr. existence of said marriage license is corroborated by the following
statement in the affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas, then
Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside
the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:
That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license
issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis of the said
marriage contract executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad
WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from
Sandoval, but the number of said marriage license was
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new
inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for the reason
one is entered REMANDING the case to the court of origin for
that it was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the Marriage
further proceedings.
Contract who in turn, may have overlooked the same.

SO ORDERED.[7]
Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are
of the considered view that the veracity and credibility of the
foregoing statement as well as the motivations underlying the
The CA opined: same should be properly threshed out in a trial of the case on the
merits.

We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment

by the court a quo contrary to law and public policy as ensconced If the non-presentation of the marriage contract the primary
in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it was appellants who evidence of marriage is not proof that a marriage did not take
first sought summary judgment from the trial court, did not justify place, neither should appellants non-presentation of the subject
the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an action to marriage license be taken as proof that the same was not
recover upon a claim or to obtain a declaratory relief, the rule on procured. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage,
summary judgment apply (sic) to an action to annul a marriage. it must be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt
The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented and the desire should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
to expedite the disposition of the case cannot justify a
misinterpretation of the rule. The first paragraph of Article 88 and
101 of the Civil Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of
Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who
annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession
disputes the legitimacy of a particular party, the same may be said
of judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition for summary
of the trial courts rejection of the relationship between appellant
judgment practically amount to these methods explicitly proscribed
Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on the basis of the
by the law.
inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandovals
statements. Although it had effectively disavowed appellants prior
claims regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the
We are not unmindful of appellees argument that the foregoing averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son of appellees
safeguards have traditionally been applied to prevent collusion of brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the possibility of
spouses in the matter of dissolution of marriages and that the the said appellants illegitimate filiation, his right to prove the same
death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively dissolved or, for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as such.
the marriage herein impugned. The fact, however, that appellees

77
 I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor
Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment
find appellees bare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was disallowed.
merely purchased from an indigent couple by appellant Felicidad
Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support what could well be
a minors total forfeiture of the rights arising from his
putativefiliation. Inconsistent though it may be to her previous Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19 [10] of the
statements, appellant Felicidad Sandovals declaration regarding Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when
considered in the light of the fact that, during the last eight years
of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said appellant the use of his name SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to
and the shelter of his household. The least that the trial court could tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the
have done in the premises was to conduct a trial on the merits in adverse partys pleading, the court may, on motion of that party,
order to be able to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to the direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of
filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos II.[8] marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.

On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and

for the inhibition of the ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia- He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules
Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions. of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on
judgment on the pleadings.

Issues
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within
the provisions of the Rule on judgment on the pleadings. In
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues: disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise considered the
provisions on summary judgments, to wit:

1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment

under the Decision, Annex A hereof, and in denying petitioners Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules
Motion for reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F hereof, on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the
with respect to the nullity of the impugned marriage, petitioner record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would
respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a grave still not be warranted. x x x[11]
reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code,
despite the fact that the circumstances of this case are different
from that contemplated and intended by law, or has otherwise But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary
decided a question of substance not theretofore decided by the judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the summary judgment
Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner probably not in rendered by the trial court.Both the rules on judgment on the
accord with law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of
Court; declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment
of marriage.

2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and,

in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court of With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as Rule on
origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
that the Court of Appeals committed a serious reversible error in of Voidable Marriages, the question on the application of summary
applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or
of Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule annulment of marriage has been stamped with clarity.The
35 governing Summary Judgments; significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which took effect
on March 15, 2003[12] is found in Section 17, viz.:

3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and,

in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court of SEC. 17. Trial. (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct
origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits the trial of the case. No delegation of evidence to a commissioner
that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion, shall be allowed except as to matters involving property relations
disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on ground of of the spouses.
speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise committed
misapplications of the laws and misapprehension of the
facts.[9] (Underscoring supplied)
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of
marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings,
summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may allowed. (Underscoring supplied)
be declared void ab initio through a judgment on the pleadings or
a summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial. But there
are other procedural issues, including the capacity of one who
Likewise instructive is the Courts pronouncement in Republic v.
is not a spouse in bringing the action for nullity of marriage.
Sandiganbayan.[13] In that case, We excluded actions for nullity or
annulment of marriage from the application of summary
judgments.
Our Ruling

78
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a
marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal separation, petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of
summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by
actions.[14] (Underscoring supplied) compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The
Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file
the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate
rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the
question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death
State of its lawful right and duty to intervene in the case. The
of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand,
public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The
the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek
State should have been given the opportunity to present
its dissolution.[17] (Underscoring supplied)
controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered. [15]

The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court
sole architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are
should order the prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for
the only ones who candecide when and how to build the
the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees to it
foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of
that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if
their marital life. They are simultaneously the directors and actors
there is no suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor has to
of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can
make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down before
and should decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance with
the court is not fabricated.
the grounds allowed by law.

To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the

The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code
reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:
and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only
to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code
which took effect on August 3, 1988.[18]
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. (a) x x x

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void

(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs
prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the merits of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against
to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the
supplied) compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the
Solicitor General will ensure that the interest of the State is
represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for
of marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by
evidence.[16] the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or
intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can
still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the
Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of
wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced
the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon
before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2)
the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the
Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.[19]

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for
already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any
involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as
party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right
the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003[20] is
of the spouses by stating:
prospective in its application. Thus, the Court held inEnrico v.
Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,[21] viz.:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void

marriages.
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is
prospective in its application.[22] (Underscoring supplied)
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife. (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against
respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was
celebrated on May 14, 1962.Which law would govern depends
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or upon when the marriage took place.[23]
the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage. Therationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:
The marriage having been solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable
law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its

79
celebration.[24] But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an succession, successional rights are transmitted from the moment
action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any of death of the decedent and the compulsory heirs are called to
person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of succeed by operation of law.[30]
marriage?

Upon Teofilos death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil to the extent of the value of the inheritance are transmitted to his
Code cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute compulsory heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad and
a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively.
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.[25]Elsewise stated,
plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to
procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended
wit:
in the name of the real party-in-interest.[26]

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their

Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or
legitimate parents and ascendants;
an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the
case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question
involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material
interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as (2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants,
plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. [27]

(3) The widow or widower;

Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of
Appeals,[28] where the Court held:
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal
fiction;
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time
the respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there
is no specific provision as towho can file a petition to declare the (5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil
nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can Code.[31]
demonstrate proper interest can file the same. A petition to
declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v. Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory
Badayog,the Court held that the children have the personality to heirs. But although a collateral relative, such as a brother, does
file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he
father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights. still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of
the New Civil Code provide:

xxxx
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive
with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half
of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to
In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the the other half.
nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence
of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a
remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional
evidence is necessary to determine whether ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with
remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained the following articles. (Underscoring supplied)
and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos remarriage, then
the trial court should declare respondents marriage as bigamous
and void ab initio but reduced the amount of moral damages Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or
from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages illegitimate children excludes collateral relatives from succeeding
from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is to the estate of the decedent.The presence of legitimate,
proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the deceased precludes
allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the succession by collateral relatives.[32] Conversely, if there are no
instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate
same.[29] (Underscoring supplied) of the decedent.[33]

III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the
petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to seek the declaration of legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would
nullity of the marriage in controversy. then have apersonality to seek the nullity of marriage of his
deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so,
considering that collateral relatives, like a brother and sister,
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent dies
intestate in 1992, his only surviving compulsory heirs are without issue and without ascendants in the direct line.
respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on

80
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his It is stressed that Felicidads declaration against the legitimate
parents. He had no other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II status of Teofilo II is the very act that is proscribed by Article 167
is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An
adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot
estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid
widowpursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes marriage.[37]
petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage of his deceasedbrother with respondent
Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio,
Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for
petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.
causes of action concerning reconveyance, recovery of property,
and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be so, as said
disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the marriage
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner in controversy was null and void ab initio.
to bring the nullity of marriage case is contingent upon the final
declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:
illegitimate son of Teofilo.
1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard
to the action on the status and filiation of respondent Teofilo
Carlos II and the validity ornullity of marriage between respondent
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;
adopted son of Teofilo, then petitioner has no legal personality to
ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and 2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate,
respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no or legally adopted son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is
successional right to be protected, hence, does not have proper strictly INSTRUCTED toDISMISS the action for nullity of marriage
interest. For although the marriage in controversy may be found to for lack of cause of action;
be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its
is because the presence of descendant, illegitimate,[34] or even an
decision is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.
adopted child[35] excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting
from the decedent. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the
merits with dispatch and to give this case priority in its calendar.

No costs.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the
merits to determine the validity or nullity of the subject marriage is SO ORDERED.
called for. But the RTCis strictly instructed to dismiss the
nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is Republic of the Philippines
proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, SUPREME COURT
or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother Manila
of petitioner.
EN BANC

IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
respondent Teofilo II is proper and in order. There is a need
to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the other LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
causes of action before it. vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA
ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling
of the CA on the remand of the case concerning the filiation of
respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We should not leave VITUG, J.:
the matter hanging in limbo.
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial
provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended
by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically
raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their consideration is Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case. [36] celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
conducted in the case, petitioners bare allegation that respondent
solemnization.
Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is insufficient to
support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of
filiation. However, We are not inclined to support its Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision
pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the
the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more court a quo 1 and the Court of Appeal, 2 Leouel persists in
credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such declaration beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage with
of respondent Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"),
remind the CA of the guaranty provided by Article 167 of the Family declared a nullity.
Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First
Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later
proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20
ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although
September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly
been sentenced as an adulteress.(Underscoring supplied)
thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the
latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On
18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened

81
Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice
bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient
interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in
affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that
a number of other things, like when and where the couple should they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however,
start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but
would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack
his own parents. of judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia
Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the
to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. marriage null and void and the former only voidable. Justice
Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She
promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July "That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential
States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 after the celebration."
August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in
touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail. Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in
sufficient use of reason of judgment to understand the essential
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating
with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of
complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a
Oriental. psychological or mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground
for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of
counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its allegations, consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for voidable
claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to
irresponsible and incompetent. the very essence of marital obligations.

A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the
nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial word "mentally" be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred.
Prosecutor (in its report to the court). Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."

On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to
been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that
a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but
evidence. not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is
called selective impotency.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit. 3 Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact
that in inserting the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the Committee used a language which describes a ground for voidable
decision of the trial court. 4 marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in
Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the Canon Law,
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-
there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is
compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of
precisely the reason why they should make a distinction.
non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very
cannot be cured.
least to communicate with him, for more than five years are
circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a
incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel ground for void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa
asserts: explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals,
while psychological incapacity is not.
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if
communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to such lack or incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read
inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five "even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest."
years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." marriage, it is not apparent.
The deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision
Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the
insight on the import of the provision. phrase "psychological or mentally incapacitated" — in the first one,
there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all the
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these
completely, he might not have consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of
incapacity a ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will
the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
encourage one who really understood the consequences of
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the
invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of
made manifest after the celebration.
providing for divorce.

82
xxx xxx xxx obligations, which incapacity continues and later becomes
manifest.
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of
incapacity by reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is
less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is possible that after the marriage, one's psychological incapacity
clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and
there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him
convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals to remarry. 6
and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized
that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and xxx xxx xxx
has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
marriage.
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
xxx xxx xxx
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the
inquired if they do not consider it as going to the very essence of beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its
consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In solemnization.
reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with
general is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is not
"although." On the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the
principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He
clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its
objected to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage
solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create
celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are
the manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa
completely different from each other, because they require a
pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the
different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but
basis of abuse.
in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt that
psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical
should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable incapacities, which are lesser in degree than psychological
of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical
prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is
cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect not a species of vice or consent.
has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for
annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the
issue can be raised that actually, although one might have been minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:
psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase
is no longer true that he has no concept of the consequence of
"psychological or mental impotence" is an invention of some
marriage.
churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law
be a defense? In response, Justice Puno stated that even the would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to
bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that discharge . . ."
psychological incapacity has been cured.
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental"
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity precisely to distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that
of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the
psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, essential obligations of marriage.
however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they
the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of
have decided not to go into the classification of "psychological
marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.
interval in insanity, there are also momentary periods when there
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been
is an understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice
annulments of marriages arising from psychological incapacity,
Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological
Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new
incapacity will not apply if the marriage was contracted at the time
when there is understanding of the consequences of marriage. 5 ground even under Canon Law.

Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in

xxx xxx xxx
Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared
copulate among the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is
commented that in some instances the impotence that in some automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied
instances the impotence is only temporary and only with respect negatively.
to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be
it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable"
retroactive or prospective in application.
has a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated
that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice Caguioa, Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is
however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable. their answer to the problem of church annulments of marriages,
which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is
Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of
enough to show that at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
cases.
one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already
he can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the
is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since in Committee approved.
divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage,
in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of The members voted as follows:
marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the provision is
that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is (1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital prospectivity.

83
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies
Director Eufemio were for retroactivity. any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an
infinite variety.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage,"
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck,
of ten years within which the action for declaration of nullity of the the following explanation appears:
marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved the
suggestion. 7 This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to
commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic
in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This
than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render
resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the
member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the
Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit
13 June 1994); thus: 8 oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological
mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the
incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the
inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be
generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret
overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute
the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John
and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding
Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage
on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved
provision was taken from Canon Law.
not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of
of Canon Law, 9 which reads: giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of
marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage: these duties.
1. who lack sufficient use of reason; Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo
Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who
concerning essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and
opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
accepted mutually;
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
the essential obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.) incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage;
it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for
its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions,
the codal provision. including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family
Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not
account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses
framed, states: as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the
that the legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the
and narrow norm was proposed first: Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American
Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage
Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be
because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem
taken and construed independently of, but must stand in
anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
(cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);
correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than
then a broader one followed: a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf.SCH/1980, canon 1049); as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
finally, a new version was promulgated: "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic
psychiae). condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law
does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the
of the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder; void marriage to be "legitimate."
after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the
ordinary obligations of marriage. The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or

84
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality Republic of the Philippines
or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage SUPREME COURT
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug Manila
addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should
occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for SECOND DIVISION
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These
provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity. CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on
the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in
every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
TORRES, JR., J.:
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The
well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly
or even desirable. inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the
works of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should
continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the
Family Code, is that — This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against
her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the
a man a woman entered into in accordance with law for the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R.
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision November
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for
to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by
this Code. (Emphasis supplied.) The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court
and reproduced by the Court of Appeals 1 its decision are as
Our Constitution is no less emphatic: follows:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation From the evidence adduced, the following acts were
of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and preponderantly established:
actively promote its total development.
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. (Article Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
XV, 1987 Constitution).
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of
nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt defendant's mother.
the tenets we still hold on to.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can the first night of their married life.
come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of
marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations,
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or
neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went
answers to every individual problem. to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to
sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them during the
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and
fourth nights.
SO ORDERED.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo,
Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur. can enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife,
they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother,
Feliciano, J., is on leave. an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the
defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4)
days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse
between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long
walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair
located at the living room. They slept together in the same room
and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989.
But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her
husband's private parts nor did he see hers.

Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical

examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese
General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.

The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy,

normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination
was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was
prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her

85
husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but
he never did. Hence, the instant petition.

The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that she had
I
observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes
the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no
defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his sexual intercourse between the parties without making any
residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the findings of fact.
appearance of a normal man.
II
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch
marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, as proof thereof is totally absent.
the fault lies with his wife.
III
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife
annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the
(2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes
psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very psychological incapacity of both.
young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it
IV
can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of
them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties
be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be decreed by the lower court without fully satisfying itself that there
cured by the intervention of medical technology or science. was no collusion between them.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual
contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-
defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse 3141, private respondent has the burden of proving the allegations
with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to
her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains
claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of
he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate
it. So he stopped. marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that
the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of
plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of
afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the
mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. 3
their marriage.
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid
because they are still very young and there is still a chance to Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails
overcome their differences. to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of
the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts
finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there,
that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings.
capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C") What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage
without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified
out whether or not he has an erection and he found out that from under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath
the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse
of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After
Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which such evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon
is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage
erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there
having sexual intercourse with a woman. was no sexual intercourse between them.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as
collusion between the parties and that the evidence is not stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment
fabricated." 2 annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of
the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1,
which reads:
Rule 19).
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want
the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May
their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no
22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate
collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he
Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr.
and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact
Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be
with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are
furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another
reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution
copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with
SO ORDERED.

86
magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga- inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he
Reyes, viz: refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May
22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be
not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the doubted for not having asserted his right seven though she balked
appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code,
marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both the at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering
documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and
admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was
almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage
suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she
a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate
clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to put her
meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of life in order and put to rest her marital status.
Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995). 4 We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence
proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can
that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private be achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten months
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or
incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes
to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological to love very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable
incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless
which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes
because there might have been other reasons, — i.e., physical psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants
disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why within the contemplation of the Family Code. 7
private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from
May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months. While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged
to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68,
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous,
respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298).
The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is
between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could
void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an
incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural
other becomes immaterial. order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record
of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation
to show that any of the parties is suffering from phychological
and ensures the continuation of family relations.
incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with
private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and
may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above. private respondent. That is — a shared feeling which between
husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual
discussed with private respondent or asked her what is ailing her,
communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive
and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have
interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other
sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing
can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage
in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what
is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view
the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence
the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice
is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his
and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its
impotency and he is capable of erection. 5 Since it is petitioner's
value as a sublime social institution.
claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical
disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the
upon him to prove such a claim. parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal
is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby
incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual DENIED for lack of merit.
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity. 6 SO ORDERED.

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Code is "To procreate children based on the universal principle
that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the
case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.

As aptly stated by the respondent court,

An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's

plea that the wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does not

87
Republic of the Philippines cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and
SUPREME COURT handle their finances.
Manila
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were
EN BANC stipulated:

1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at
the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO 3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
MOLINA, respondents.
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;

5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

PANGANIBAN, J.:
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new petitioner wife.
ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail
the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own
Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria
various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and
Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General
incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents
many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any
provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the
Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but
marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of
nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most
Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the
liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in
present recourse.
addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down
specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article The Issue
36 of the Family Code.
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the
challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision 1of the Court of phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the
Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the
1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to
Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world
Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the which is anathema to our culture."
ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family
Code. In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court
relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage
The Facts between the parties broke up because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by
Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as
respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration
Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws
of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the
on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April
14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically
O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on
showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the
a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other
friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the
his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct,
wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to
between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage,
relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual
sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple fates.
had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship
was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no
in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did,
few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that conclusions thus made.
he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the
marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually
Court of Appeals.
quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be
served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and
their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start. incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he
and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which
and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but
renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities
contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels
and duties."
were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on
maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) The Court's Ruling
Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as
The petition is meritorious.

88
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the
Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36
should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of
and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law the bench and the bar:
has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on
wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing are to be "protected" by the state.
to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It
appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting inviolability and solidarity
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
psychological (nor physical) illness.
must be psychological — not physical. although its manifestations
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
her husband could nor get along with each other. There had been the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8 such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
COURT generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained.
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical
your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the psychologists.
marriage?
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
A Yes, Your Honor. celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman. but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are
psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
with other parties? permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
A Yes, Your Honor. absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like
A Yes, Your Honor. the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children
The Court has no more questions. and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity
existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a
psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved. is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-visexisting law and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code
and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The evidence and included in the text of the decision.
Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for
their informative and interesting discussions during the oral (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
written memoranda. controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision

89
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B.
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on
are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab
causes of psychological nature. 14 initiopursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal
properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52
is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In
it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is
persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent.
tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void. "Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage was
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and action consistent with this Decision.
the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart
from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards "SO ORDERED."
the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family
The Facts
as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married
decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues
twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge
a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring
Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
(2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L.
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
Command Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1).Out of
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
F).
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095. "Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the
Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already
Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during the Marcos
ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent
Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the
with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano from the military service.
to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were
SO ORDERED. assigned at the Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of Imee
Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became
Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur. acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.

Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result. "After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No.
1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which
she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she
was still single.

"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service

THIRD DIVISION
in 1987 and then engaged in different business ventures that did
[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000] not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for
work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to
MARCOS, respondent. engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and
as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force
DECISION
her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also
PANGANIBAN, J.: inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was
so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they
marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence were already living separately.
presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent
should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio "All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic
sine qua non for such declaration. uling" and chickens. While she was still in the military, she would
first make deliveries early in the morning before going to
The Case
Malacaang. When she was discharged from the military service,
she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up
the Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision [1] of the a trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed Construction Development Corporation.
as follows:
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16,
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living
marriage between the parties is hereby declared valid."[2] separately, she did not want him to stay in their house
anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA
so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting
Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration.
physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her

90
aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the
left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house. demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of the
determination of the merits of the Petition."[7]
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical
The Court's Ruling
examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her
injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for
driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their a declaration of psychological incapacity.Nevertheless, the totality
missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad.After knowing of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity.
the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
samurai and even [beat] her driver.

"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various
renting a house in Camella, Paraaque, while the appellant was tests that were submitted to determine respondent's psychological
residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong. incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should not have
been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that
children described their father as cruel and physically abusive to the CA should have realized that under the circumstances, she
them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100). had no choice but to rely on other sources of information in order
to determine the psychological capacity of respondent, who had
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. refused to submit himself to such tests.
Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp.
207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not. In Republic v. CA and Molina,[8] the guidelines governing the
application and the interpretation of psychological
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code [9] were laid
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of down by this Court as follows:
his failure to find work to support his family and his violent
attitude towards appellee and their children, x x x."[3] "1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
not been established by the totality of the evidence presented. It
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on
ratiocinated in this wise:
the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from
cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity which should also dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts are to be 'protected' by the state.
and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be
xxxxxxxxx
proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It 2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision. and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or her
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial
psychologists.
evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically
incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not 3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the
alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a celebration' of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
psychological illness or sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The
there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
suffering from an incapacity which [was] psychological or mental - but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
not physical to the extent that he could not have known the thereto.
obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave,
ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable."[4] 4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
Hence, this Petition.[5] relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
Issues absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
In her Memorandum,[6] petitioner presents for this Court's obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like
consideration the following issues: the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically
the findings by the Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage an essential obligation of marriage.
simply because the respondent did not subject himself to
psychological evaluation. 5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional

91
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a and 225 of the Family Code.
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which
integral element in the personality structure that effectively the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil
complying with the obligations essential to marriage. interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like.[12] At best, the evidence presented by
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband declaring a marriage void.
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law,
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by this Court laid down the procedural requirements for its invocation
evidence and included in the text of the decision. in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined
xxxxxxxxx in Molina.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of
a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating psychological incapacity. No costs.
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the SO ORDERED.
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes,
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
JJ., concur.
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095."[10]
[9]
"Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
Appeals:[11] "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The solemnization.
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the "The action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under this
root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is [12]"Article 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
of the following grounds:
establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of (1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
person concerned need not be resorted to. petitioner;
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to
change religious or political affiliation;
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence
presented in the present case -- including the testimonies of (3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a
petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution,
worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
psychologically incapacitated.
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently more than six years, even if pardoned;
convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the
family and may have resorted to physical abuse and (5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion
of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no (6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous
the marriage or that they are incurable.
marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of
more than six years. It was during this period that he became (9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and
even left the family home. (10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable
cause for more than one year.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said
period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, For purposes of this Article, the term 'child' shall include a child by
there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, nature or by adoption."
especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with

a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital

92
FIRST DIVISION Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between
the parties is dissolved and in lieu thereof a regime of complete
[G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004] separation of property between the said spouses is established in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Family Code,
DAVID B. DEDEL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
without prejudice to rights previously acquired by creditors.
SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a. JANE
IBRAHIM, respondents. Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-respondent. property registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family
Code.
DECISION
SO ORDERED.[9]
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel General, appealed alleging that
while he was working in the advertising business of his father. The
I
acquaintance led to courtship and romantic relations, culminating
in the exchange of marital vows before the City Court of Pasay on THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
September 28, 1966.[1] The civil marriage was ratified in a church DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A VALID GROUND FOR
wedding on May 20, 1967.[2] DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born on II
September 18, 1968;[3] Stephanie Janice born on September 9,
1969;[4] Kenneth David born on April 24, 1971;[5] and Ingrid born THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE
on October 20, 1976.[6] The conjugal partnership, nonetheless, CHURCH MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER IS NULL AND
acquired neither property nor debt. VOID.

Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be III
an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extra-
marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION
the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY THE
Command and later a Jordanian national. SOLICITOR GENERAL AS REQUIRED IN THEMOLINA CASE.

Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the
treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner trial court and ordered dismissal of the petition for declaration of
alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit nullity of marriage.[10]
relationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim,
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution
whom she married and with whom she had two children. However,
dated January 8, 2002.[11] Hence, the instant petition.
when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned to
petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its
accepted her back and even considered the two illegitimate discretion and manifestly erred in its conclusion that the: (1)
children as his own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon respondent was not suffering from psychological incapacity to
abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two perform her marital obligations; (2) psychological incapacity of
children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on respondent is not attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and
special occasions. permanence or incurability; and (3) totality of evidence submitted
by the petitioner falls short to prove psychological incapacity
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner
suffered by respondent.
filed on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of
his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, as defined The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of the
in Article 36 of the Family Code, before the Regional Trial Court of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding that respondent
Makati City, Branch 149. Summons was effected by publication in is psychologically incapacitated.More specifically, does the
the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of general circulation in the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner
country considering that Sharon did not reside and could not be fall within the term psychological incapacity?
found in the Philippines.[7]
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[12] it was ruled:
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she
conducted a psychological evaluation of petitioner and found him x x x psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail and of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
who exerts his best in whatever he does. assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability
and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti- psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is
Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other
to perform the essential obligations of marriage. [8] hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the
other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family
After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of which
Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
reads:
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriages between DAVID B. DEDEL and SHARON L. CORPUZ
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
celebrated on September 28, 1966 and May 20, 1967 are hereby
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality
declared null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity
or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
on the part of the respondent to perform the essential obligations
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should

93
occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for EN BANC
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These
provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner
degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
vs.
incapacity.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are
DECISION
established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on
the degree, extent and other conditions of that incapacity must, in YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect
well-considered opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an
or even desirable.[13] individual’s criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the
subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground
The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the
personality disorder is a very complex and elusive phenomenon celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws
which defies easy analysis and definition. In this case, are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or
respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent
the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground
have given a valid assumption thereof. [14] It appears that of psychological incapacity.
respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of
the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with
marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two
which produced four children. were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of
Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro
not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain
contemplation of the Family Code.Neither could her emotional Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes.
incapacity.[15] It must be shown that these acts are manifestations Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the
of a disordered personality which make conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential was going to cohabit with Villareyes.1
obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth,
immaturity[16] or sexual promiscuity. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage,
this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee,
At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15. 2 When
for legal separation under Article 55[17] of the Family Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes
Code. However, we pointed out in Marcos v. Marcos[18] that Article whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a
36 is not to be equated with legal separation in which the grounds handwritten letter,3Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico
need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. In short, Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against
the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for petitioner.4 The Information,5 which was docketed as Criminal
legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void. Case No. 013095-L, reads:

We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu,
no jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of petitioner and Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
respondent. The authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful
Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman Catholic Church. marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage
having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully,
All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with
appellate court. We cannot deny the grief, frustration and even LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the
desperation of petitioner in his present situation. Regrettably, there accused has all the essential requisites for validity were it not for
are circumstances, like in this case, where neither law nor society the subsisting first marriage.
can provide the specific answers to every individual
problem.[19] While we sympathize with petitioners marital CONTRARY TO LAW.
predicament, our first and foremost duty is to apply the law no
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6
matter how harsh it may be.[20]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with
Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children.
DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to
60406, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-467
each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, is
solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage
AFFIRMED. No costs.
contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in
SO ORDERED. connection with his work as a seaman.8 He further testified that he
requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, and Carpio, whether there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes,
JJ., concur. but there was no record of said marriage.9
Azcuna, J., on official leave. On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City,
Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Republic of the Philippines Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and two
SUPREME COURT (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years
Manila and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.10 On appeal, the

94
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. thereof (Emphasis ours).

Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract,
of errors: issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the
best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and
AND THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL – WHEN Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the
IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A full faith and credence given to public documents.
QUOCONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF
BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification
MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. issued by the National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and
that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR would plainly show that neither document attests as a positive fact
(sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B.
THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather,
COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB the documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices
INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11 have no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to
the absence of a record is quite different from documentary
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent
evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or
reason to disturb the assailed judgment.
documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the Tenebro and Villareyes.
crime of Bigamy are:
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as
(1) that the offender has been legally married; positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of
his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be
submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for
requisites for validity.12 its validity are present.19 There is no evidence presented by the
defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro
Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-
which he (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this
and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second testimony are Villareyes’ letter, Ancajas’ testimony that petitioner
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and
alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential petitioner’s own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the
requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second first marriage had all the requisites for validity.
marriage was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four
of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify
his acquittal.14 the non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by requesting
his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is
Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts. significant to note that the certifications issued by the National
Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively. Both
documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first marriage documents, therefore, are dated after the accused’s marriage to
between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence his second wife, private respondent in this case.
presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract
between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence
which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila presented by the prosecution to prove the first and second
City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and requisites for the crime of bigamy.
certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila; 15 and (2)
a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, The second tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of the
informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally subsequent judicial declaration20 of the nullity of the second
married.16 marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.

To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts
presented (1) a certification issued by the National Statistics Office to the date of the celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such,
dated October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification issued by the City he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently
Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997. 18 Both these declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed. 21
documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record
This argument is not impressed with merit.
of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda
B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity,
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot
invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to
adequately assail the marriage contract, which in itself would
realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on
already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a
the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the
documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public
subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s
documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract,
marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely
Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:
regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence
record. – When the original of a document is in the custody of a of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal

95
liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the
Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the same
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate
proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to
indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision
second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1)
marriage. day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed
the decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, day of prision mayor, as maximum.
there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent
marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for
subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro
criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The State’s penal laws of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the
protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
and punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner
has undoubtedly done. SO ORDERED.

Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that Corona, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for Puno, J., join the opinion of J. Vitug.
validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting Quisumbing, J., join the dissent in view of void nuptia.
parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the solemnizing Austria-Martinez, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the Carpio-Morales, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the Tinga, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two Callejo, Sr., J., see separate dissent.
witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or
female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of
the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 25 and 3826 may contract
marriage.27 SEPARATE OPINION>
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity VITUG, J.:
of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were
over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the Veronico Tenebro has been charged with bigamy for contracting,
second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. while still being married to Hilda Villareyes, a second marriage with
Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence private complainant Leticia Ancajas. Tenebro argues that since his
of at least two witnesses. second marriage with Ancajas has ultimately been declared void
ab initio on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity, he
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the should be acquitted for the crime of bigamy.
ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the The offense of bigamy is committed when one contracts "a second
spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
marriage shall be considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a proper proceedings".1 Bigamy presupposes a valid prior marriage
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although and a subsequent marriage, contracted during the subsistence of
void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these the prior union, which would have been binding were it not for its
legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To being bigamous.
hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy
Would the absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage,
completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure
prior to its judicial declaration as being void, constitute a valid
that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus
defense in a criminal action for bigamy?
escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while
beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity I believe that, except for a void marriage on account of the
and commitment. psychological incapacity of a party or both parties to the marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code (as so hereinafter explained),
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime
the answer must be in the affirmative. Void marriages are
of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the
inexistent from the very beginning, and no judicial decree is
Court of Appeals.
required to establish their nullity.2 As early as the case of People
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, vs. Aragon3 this Court has underscored the fact that the Revised
petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his marriages to Penal Code itself does not, unlike the rule then prevailing in Spain,
Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is require the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior void marriage
irrelevant in the determination of the accused’s guilt for purposes before it can be raised by way of a defense in a criminal case for
of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate bigamy. Had the law contemplated otherwise, said the Court, " an
disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted
kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key in the law, (but that in) its absence, (the courts) are bound by (the)
characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual rule of strict interpretation" of penal statutes. In contrast to a
manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled (and,
State’s basic social institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy therefore, not a defense in a bigamy charge if the second marriage
step in. were contracted prior to the decree of annulment) 4 the complete

96
nullity, however, of a previously contracted marriage, being void all intents and purposes, to be binding and efficacious until
ab initio and legally inexistent, can outrightly be defense in an judicially declared otherwise. Without such marriage having first
indictment of bigamy. been declared a nullity (or otherwise dissolved), a subsequent
marriage could constitute bigamy. Thus, a civil case questioning
It has been held that, by virtue of Article 40 of the Family Code, a the validity of the first marriage would not be a prejudicial issue
person may be convicted of bigamy although the first marriage is much in the same way that a civil case assailing a prior "voidable"
ultimately adjudged void ab initio if, at the time the second marriage (being valid until annulled) would not be a prejudicial
marriage is contracted, there has as yet no judicial declaration of question to the prosecution of a criminal offense for bigamy.
nullity of the prior marriage.5 I maintain strong reservations to this
ruling. Article 40 of the Family Code reads: In cases where the second marriage is void on grounds other than
the existence of the first marriage, this Court has declared in a line
"Article 40. The absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be of cases that no crime of bigamy is committed.12 The Court has
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of the final explained that for a person to be held guilty of bigamy, it must,
judgment declaring such previous marriage void." even as it needs only, be shown that the subsequent marriage has
all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the
It is only "for purpose of remarriage" that the law has expressed
subsisting first union. Hence, where it is established that the
that the absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked
second marriage has been contracted without the necessary
"on the basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous
license and thus void,13 or that the accused is merely forced to
marriage void." It may not be amiss to state that under the regime
enter into the second (voidable) marriage,14 no criminal liability for
of the Civil Code of 1950, the Supreme Court, in Wiegel vs. Judge
the crime of bigamy can attach. In both and like instances,
Sempio-Diy,6 has held that a subsequent marriage of one of the
however, the lapses refers to the elements required for contracting
spouses of a prior void marriage is itself (the subsequent marriage)
a valid marriage. If, then, all the requisites for the perfection of the
void if it were contracted before a judicial declaration of nullity of
contract marriage, freely and voluntarily entered into, are shown to
the previous marriage. Although this pronouncement has been
be extant, the criminal liability for bigamy can unassailably arise.
abandoned in a later decision of the court in Yap vs. Court of
Appeals,7 the Family Code, however has seen it fit to adopt the Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does
Wiegel rule but only for purpose of remarriage which is just to say not relate to an infirmity in the elements, either essential or
that the subsequent marriage shall itself be considered void. There formal, in contacting a valid marriage, the declaration of
is no clear indication to conclude that the Family Code has nullity subsequent to the bigamous marriage due to that
amended or intended to amend the Revised penal Code or to ground, without more, would be inconsequential in a criminal
abandon the settled and prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. 8 charge for bigamy. The judicial declaration of nullity of a
bigamous marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class by
merely nullifies the effects of the marriage but it does not negate
itself. The provision has been from Canon law primarily to
the fact of perfection of the bigamous marriage. Its subsequent
reconcile the grounds for nullity of marriage under civil law with
declaration of nullity dissolves the relationship of the spouses but,
those of church laws.9 The "psychological incapacity to comply"
being alien to the requisite conditions for the perfection of the
with the essential marital obligations of the spouses is completely
marriage, the judgment of the court is no defense on the part of
distinct from other grounds for nullity which are confined to the
the offender who had entered into it.
essential or formal requisites of a marriage, such as lack of legal
capacity or disqualification of the contracting parties, want of Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition.
consent, absence of a marriage license, or the like.

The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity of

a party or the parties thereto may be said to have the earmarks of
a voidable, more than a void, marriage, remaining to be valid until Footnotes
it is judicially decreed to be a nullity. Thus, Article 54 of the Family
24
Code considers children conceived or born of such a void marriage Family Code, Art. 3; Vitug, Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993
before its judicial declaration of nullity to be legitimate similar to the Edition, pp. 119-120, citing the Family Code, Articles 2 and 3.
rule on a voidable marriage. It is expected, even as I believe it safe 25Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and
to assume, that the spouses’ rights and obligations, property
void from the beginning, whether the relationship between the
regime and successional rights would continue unaffected, as if it
parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
were a voidable marriage, unless and until the marriage is judicially
declared void for basically two reasons: First, psychological (1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
incapacity, a newly-added ground for the nullity of a marriage
under the Family Code, breaches neither the essential nor the (2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full — or half-
formal requisites of a valid marriages;10and second, unlike the blood.
other grounds for nullity of marriage (i.e., relationship, minority of 26 Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning
the parties, lack of license, mistake in the identity of the parties)
for reasons of public policy:
which are capable of relatively easy demonstration, psychological
incapacity, however, being a mental state, may not so readily be (1) Between collateral blood relatives; whether legitimate or
as evident.11 It would have been logical for the Family Code to illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
consider such a marriage explicitly voidable rather than void if it
were not for apparent attempt to make it closely coincide with the (2) Between step-parents and stepchildren;
Canon Law rules and nomenclature.
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
Indeed, a void marriage due to psychological incapacity appears
to merely differ from a voidable marriage in that, unlike the latter, (4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
it is not convalidated by either cohabitation or prescription. It might
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the
be recalled that prior to republic Act No. 8533, further amending
adopted child;
the Family Code, an action or defense of absolute nullity of
marriage falling under Article 36, celebrated before the effectivity (6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the
of the Code, could prescribe in ten years following the effectivity of adopter;
the Family Code. The initial provision of the ten-year period of
prescription seems to betray a real consciousness by the framers (7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
that marriages falling under Article 36 are truly meant to be
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
inexistent.
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the
Considerations, both logical and practical, would point to the fact
other, killed that other person’s spouse or his or her own spouse.
that a "void" marriage due to psychological incapacity remains, for

97
27Valdez v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City, G.R.
No. 122749, 31 July 1996.
DECISION
28 Family Code, Art. 54.

8 I might add, parenthetically, that the necessity of a judicial PERALTA, J.:

declaration of nullity of a void marriage even for purposes of
remarriage should refer merely to cases when it can be said that
the marriage, at least ostensibly, has taken place. For instance, no This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
such judicial declaration of nullity would yet be required when of the Rules of Court, praying that the Decision [1] of the Court of
either or both parties have not at all given consent thereto that Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution[2] dated July
verily results in a "no" marriage situation or when the prior 8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.
"marriage" is between persons of the same sex.
10Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential
requisites are present: On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 117 under the
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male following Information in Criminal Case No. 00-08-11:
and a female; and
INFORMATION
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.
(53a)

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S.
JARILLO of the crime of BIGAMY, committed as follows:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in

Chapter 2 of this Title; and That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo,
of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their being previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo,
personal declaration that they take other as husband and wife in and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did
the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
55a) second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage
was only discovered on January 12, 1999.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article Contrary to law.
35(2).
On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the and, thereafter, trial proceeded.
validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n) The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are
as follows.
11One might observe that insanity, which could be worse than
psychological incapacity merely renders a marriage voidable, not On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married
void. in a civil wedding ceremony solemnized by Hon. Monico C.
Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H,
H-1, H-2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN dated November 17, 2000).
G.R. No. 164435 On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again
celebrated marriage in a church wedding ceremony before Rev.
Angel Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN
Present: dated November 17, 2000). Out of the marital union, appellant
VICTORIA S. JARILLO, begot a daughter, Rachelle J. Alocillo on October 29, 1975 (Exhs.
F, R, R-1).
Petitioner,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent
marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy, at
Chairperson, the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge
Nicanor Cruz on November 26, 1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1, pp.
CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus - 15-18, TSN dated November 22, 2000).
VELASCO, JR.,
On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital
NACHURA, and vows anew in a church wedding in Manila (Exh. E).

PERALTA, JJ. In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No.
99-93582 for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Promulgated: Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City x x x.
Respondent.

September 29, 2009

xxxx
x--------------------------------------------
------x

98
Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on
October 5, 2000, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Civil
Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of their marriage. V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER
FOR THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE SUPERVENING
PROOF THAT THE FIRST TWO MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER
On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed TO ALOCILLO HAD BEEN DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT
decision, the dispositive portion of which states: NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby
finds accused Victoria Soriano Jarillo GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of BIGAMY. V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS A PENDING
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL
indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional, as COURT BRANCH 38 BETWEEN EMMANUEL SANTOS AND
minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum. VICTORIA S. JARILLO.

This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
case, such as the nullity of accuseds bigamous marriage to Uy and ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE INSTANT CASE OF
its effect on their children and their property. This aspect is being BIGAMY HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
determined by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No.
99-93582.

V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE

ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE MARRIAGE OF
Costs against the accused. VICTORIA JARILLO AND EMMANUEL SANTOS UY HAS NO
VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE.

The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same

court in that assailed Order dated 2 August 2001.[3] V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED
AN ERRONEOUS PENALTY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL
For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 CODE AND THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.
marriages to Alocillo were null and void because Alocillo was
allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the
celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and
Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3)
the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall
Alocillo as far back as 1978. be discussed jointly. It is true that right after the presentation of the
prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of the
On appeal to the CA, petitioners conviction was affirmed in toto. In proceedings on the ground of the pendency of the petition for
its Decision dated July 21, 2003, the CA held that petitioner declaration of nullity of petitioners marriages to Alocillo, which,
committed bigamy when she contracted marriage with Emmanuel petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial question. In her appeal,
Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo she also asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of her
had not yet been declared null and void by the court.This being so, marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a ground for suspension
the presumption is, her previous marriage to Alocillo was still of the proceedings. The RTC denied her motion for suspension,
existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck while the CA struck down her arguments.In Marbella-Bobis v.
down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioners contentions that Bobis,[6] the Court categorically stated that:
her marriages were celebrated without a marriage license, and
that Uy had notice of her previous marriage as far back as 1978. x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in
Decision dated March 28, 2003, declaring petitioners 1974 and such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the
1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of
Alocillos psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and nullity. x x x
executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for reconsideration,
petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the xxxx
reversal of her conviction. However, in its Resolution dated July 8,
2004, the CA, citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,[4] denied x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its
reconsideration and ruled that [t]he subsequent declaration of nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the
nullity of her first marriage on the ground of psychological case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes
incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the celebration of the regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second
marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any
concerned, the said marriage is not without legal consequences, decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact
among which is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. [5] that respondent entered into a second marriage during the
subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil
case is not essential to the determination of the criminal
charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. x x x[7]
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court where petitioner alleges that: The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v.
People,[8] where it was held thus:

V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE

ERROR IN PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of
OUTCOME OF THIS CASE. nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover,
petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy

99
cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to Alocillo. It must be obvious that without the confirmatory testimony
declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that of her mother, the attribution of the latter of any act which she
action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allegedly did is hearsay.[13]
allow that.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners

marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,[14] the prescriptive
determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the
case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at party, the authorities or their [agents], as opposed to being counted
the time the second marriage is contracted. from the date of registration of the bigamous marriage. [15] Since
petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the period of
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or prescription began to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore,
voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a ineffectual.
judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually
obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the
point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting
Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an
before the first marriage was annulled.[9]
erroneous penalty under the Revised Penal Code. Again,
petitioner is mistaken.

For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases,

petitioners conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The
The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall
subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioners two
be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of
marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the
which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second
could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the
marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared
minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next
null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated
lower than that prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first
because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage,
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the
petitioners marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared
commission of the crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves
null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed
it entirely within the sound discretion of the court to determine the
valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the
minimum penalty, as long as it is anywhere within the range of the
nullity of petitioners marriage to Uy make any difference. [10] As
penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which
held in Tenebro, [s]ince a marriage contracted during the
it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are
subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of
considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the
this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance
indeterminate sentence.[16]
of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the
provision penalizesthe mere act of contracting a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on
marriage.[11] petitioner is proper. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
the imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. The penalty
Petitioners defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail. next lower is prision correccional, which ranges from 6 months and
1 day to 6 years. The minimum penalty of six years imposed by
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is
the trial court is, therefore, correct as it is still within the duration
punishable by prision mayor, which is classified under Article 25 of
of prision correccional. There being no mitigating or aggravating
said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90 thereof provides that
circumstances proven in this case, the prescribed penalty
[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in
of prision mayor should be imposed in its medium period, which is
fifteen years, while Article 91 states that [t]he period of
from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years.Again, the trial court correctly
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the
imposed a maximum penalty of 10 years.
crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents x x x . However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that
petitioners marriage to Alocillo has after all been declared by final
judgment[17] to be void ab initio on account of the latters
Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as psychological incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was
far back as 1978; hence, prescription began to run from that subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to
time. Note that the party who raises a fact as a matter of defense reduce the penalty imposed by the lower courts. Thus, petitioner
has the burden of proving it. The defendant or accused is obliged should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
to produce evidence in support of its defense; otherwise, failing to imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1)
establish the same, it remains self-serving.[12] Thus, for petitioners day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day
defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon her to of prision mayor, as maximum.
adduce evidence that as early as the year 1978, Uy already
obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 21,
A close examination of the records of the case reveals that 2003, and its Resolution dated July 8, 2004 are
petitioner utterly failed to present sufficient evidence to support her hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed, but AFFIRMED in
allegation. Petitionerstestimony that her own mother told Uy in all other respects. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an
1978 that she (petitioner) is already married to Alocillo does not indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four
inspire belief, as it is totally unsupported by any corroborating (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum,
evidence. The trial court correctly observed that: to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother the person
who allegedly actually told Uy about her previous marriage to

100
Republic of the Philippines In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshio’s
SUPREME COURT psychological incapacity, the trial court held that:
Manila
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses
THIRD DIVISION failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of the petitioner and
father to his daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible and
G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004 unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family. Such
indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear manifestation of
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child which
vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent. characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such behavior
could be traced to respondent’s mental incapacity and disability of
DECISION entering into marital life.5

CORONA, J.: The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals but
Before us is a petition for review of the decision1 dated August 20, the same was denied in a decision dated August 28, 1997, the
2001 of the Court of Appeals2 affirming the decision3 dated August dispositive portion of which read:
28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72, declaring
as null and void the marriage contracted between herein WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to
respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and evidence on
Hamano. hand, judgment is hereby rendered denying the instant appeal.
The decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband SO ORDERED.6
Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their
psychological incapacity.
daughter a month after the celebration of the marriage, and
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started returned to Japan with the promise to support his family and take
a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the steps to make them Japanese citizens. But except for two months,
Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan he never sent any support to nor communicated with them despite
and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she the letters respondent sent. He even visited the Philippines but he
gave birth to their child. did not bother to see them. Respondent, on the other hand,
exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge
Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was
Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to
to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, render mutual help and support" pursuant to Article 68 of the
Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court rhetorically
celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to asked:
respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling
support. She wrote him several times but he never responded.
party to the cohesion and creation of a family as a social inviolable
Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that
institution? Why should petitioner be made to suffer in a marriage
Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and
where the other spouse is not around and worse, left them without
their child.
even helping them cope up with family life and assist in the
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he upbringing of their daughter as required under Articles 68 to 71 of
was no longer residing at his given address. Consequently, on July the Family Code?7
8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be
service of summons by publication. The trial court granted the
equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
motion on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons,
Molina8 and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.9 In those cases, the
accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a
spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a "mixed
newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his
marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
answer. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after
the lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent filed a motion Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone
dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for assignment of error:
investigation. The trial court granted the motion on November 7,
1996. I

On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to
report finding that no collusion existed between the parties. He prove the psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform
prayed that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to his marital obligations, despite respondent’s failure to comply with
intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not the guidelines laid down in the Molina case.10
fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted
respondent’s motion to present her evidence ex parte. She then According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family
testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter and his insensitivity to them did not automatically constitute
offered documentary evidence to support her testimony. psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple
inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe
dispositive portion of which read: and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in
accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between
petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent,
hereby declared NULL and VOID. reiterated the ruling of the courts a quo and sought the denial of
the instant petition.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics
Office are ordered to make proper entries into the records of the We rule in favor of petitioner.
afore-named parties pursuant to this judgment of the Court.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to
SO ORDERED.4 protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social

101
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. 11 Thus, (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
marriage.12 controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
xxx
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
of the Philippines provides that: the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
solemnization. within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under
interpretation and application of Article 36 for the guidance of the
Canon 1095.13 (emphasis supplied)
bench and the bar:
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
mandated by the Court in Santos: "psychological incapacity must
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
incurability."14 The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically
of the family. x x x
identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.15
that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although
We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
proved Toshio’s psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
responsibilities.
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with,
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. care for and support his family. He abandoned them a month after
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as his marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him several letters
not to limit the application of the provision under the principle but he never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did not
of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, care at all to see his family.
1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his
clinical psychologists. marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was
doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped
thereto. respondent’s case had she presented evidence that medically or
clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such separation.16 There was no showing that the case at bar was not
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation.
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that
the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that
and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of
own children as an essential obligation of marriage. doing so due to some psychological,not physical, illness.17 There
was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and
"mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 18
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a According to the appellate court, the requirements
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present case
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese
integral element in the personality structure that effectively national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We
complying with the obligations essential to marriage. cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because
the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
regardless of nationality.
evidence and included in the text of the decision.

102
In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was
inviolable social institution that the State cherishes and protects. neither.13
While we commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage
to her husband may not necessarily be the fitting denouement. (4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated
with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities
decision dated August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and
even presented an invitation to that effect 14 but petitioner
SO ORDERED. discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel
that no such occasion had taken place.15
Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez,
and under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming
Republic of the Philippines to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one
SUPREME COURT moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2
Manila million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the
one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the
THIRD DIVISION truth in one of their quarrels.17 He likewise realized that Babes
Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
when he discovered they were not known in or connected with
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner, Blackgold.18
vs.
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus,
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
she altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher
DECISION income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told
petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer. 19 She
TINGA, J.: spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing
money from other people on false pretexts.20
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad
truth has unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony. Any (7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent
sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he
always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her
following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her
dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouse’s capability to fulfill behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November
the marital obligations even more. 1991.21

The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera
the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated 29 Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.
November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had
reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on
declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal,
Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other
consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court. hand, they observed that respondent’s persistent and constant
lying
Antecedent Facts
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was relationship that should be based on love, trust and
26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year respect.22 They further asserted that respondent’s extreme
after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia
Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner
wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based
Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically
born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later. incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.23

On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed
to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for her marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her
nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented
obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:
existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists
up to the present.8 (1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner
because she was afraid of losing her husband.25
As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological
incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied (2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill her
about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, because she surmised such intent from David’s act of touching her
educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit: back and ogling her from head to foot.26

(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an (3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had
illegitimate son,10 and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2)
the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about years.27
the boy’s parentage when petitioner learned about it from other
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an
sources after their marriage.11
executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3)
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-
attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told
occurred.12 petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was
not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon
obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends

103
show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily
on 8 December 1979.28 influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to the factual
allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of
her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts
of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the
Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares.29 demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate
their candor or lack thereof.42 The Court is likewise guided by the
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband
fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the
but averred that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter
evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court
if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not
concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to establish the
to monitor her husband’s whereabouts.30
psychological incapacity of respondent.43
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of
supported almost ten people from her monthly budget
petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial question remains
of P7,000.00.31
as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of
child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards
petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was were definitively laid down in the Court’s 1997 ruling in Republic v.
that the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a Court of Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45), and indeed
finding of psychological incapacity on her part. 32 the Court of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the
RTC in the case at bar.46 Since Molinawas decided in 1997, the
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity
Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. 47 In fact, even
psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi
conducted by his assistant,33together with the screening Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively
procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under
Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that Article 36.
respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the
behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family
control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned.49 Yet
presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.34 what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of
guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of
evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose
administered and interpreted respondent’s psychological the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised
evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called the bar for its allowance.
CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the
results of such test.35 Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36

After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted
and held that respondent’s propensity to lying about almost by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
income, among others−had been duly established. According to obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
the trial court, respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." 50 The
stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make- concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of
believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity
rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a
marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between marriage.
petitioner and respondent null and void.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan marriage persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of their reason
Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic at the time of contracting marriage."51 Marriages with such persons
marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on were ordained as void,52 in the same class as marriages with
the part of the parties.37During the pendency of the appeal before underage parties and persons already married, among others. A
the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal’s ruling was party’s mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the
affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate Divorce Law of 1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of
Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an
impaired by a lack of due discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929. 54 Divorce
of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the on the ground of a spouse’s incurable insanity was permitted under
Roman Rota of the Vatican.39 the divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation. 55 Upon
the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the a party of "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the
Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTC’s Civil Code as a voidable marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack
judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for
completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the
nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family
insufficient to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity. It Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind.58
declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals40 governing the application and interpretation of Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice
psychological incapacity had not been satisfied. of consent, just like insanity impinges on consent freely given
which is one of the essential requisites of a contract. 59 The initial
Taking exception to the appellate court’s pronouncement, common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36
petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends herein that of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of
the evidence conclusively establish respondent’s psychological consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the
incapacity. Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have
opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and

104
conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably
consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling useful in providing a unitary framework that guides courts in
such rights and obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At
1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear
"psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each
obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage."61 situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary
understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case
36 as phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino opined shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to
that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the
marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable under Article Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first
45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law
for annulment of the marriage only."62 At the same time, Tolentino experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but
noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had
understand the essential marital obligations, because then this bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity
would amount to lack of consent to the marriage." 63 These was derived from canon law,73 and as one member admitted,
concerns though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled
of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law. 74 It would
acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
the marriage."65 Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.75 Still, it must be
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to
emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of
understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere
influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the
inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in
concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation
the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now
into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation
Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to
occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church
establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that
thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he
psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts. 76
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal
that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of
as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume." 68 courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited
Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological
state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the
incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its
central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that
with the essential marital obligations of marriage." 69 At the same "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
time, it has been consistently recognized by this Court that the the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions
intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional
allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of
the principle ofejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the
state protection to marriage as a social institution and the
revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision ona
foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of
to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on
influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the
provision was taken from Canon Law."70 Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls
on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71 that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished
at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case
defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal
calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than
effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life,
in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be
as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and
judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial
generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to
denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it
constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact
is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The
merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a
trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its
circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be
own judgment for that of the trial court.72
the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.
incapacity, as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages
intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological
contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity,
incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into
should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection
account the particulars of each case, current trends in
of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting
psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is
marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as
under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that
the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for
the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been
the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote

105
family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further 6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
essential obligations of marriage. obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the
present petition. 7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,
recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under
which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its
promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the "The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who
general rules. They warrant citation in full: are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature."
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people,
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed
the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void. 77
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor
are to be "protected"’ by the state. General issue a certification stating his reasons for his agreement
or opposition to the petition.78 This requirement however was
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
solidarity. Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.79 Still, Article 48
of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously,
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the consistent
must be psychological–not physical, although its manifestations
vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
nullity. In any event, the fiscal’s participation in the hearings before
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
the trial court is extant from the records of this case.
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of binding on this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of
application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis, Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological considered that respondent had consistently lied about many
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert material aspects as to her character and personality. The question
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes
psychologists. her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and
generally, the Molina guidelines.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The in Molina.
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the
thereto. psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own
testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically allegations on his wife’s behavior, and certifications from
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily disputed respondent’s claims pertinent to her alleged singing
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any
the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a event, both courts below considered petitioner’s evidence as
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that
and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.80
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage. As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of
nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, action cannot be considered as a non-public matter between
"mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the
integral element in the personality structure that effectively petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion
complying with the obligations essential to marriage. among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.

106
Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves
has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, to fabricate about herself."84
sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial
court’s decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological
from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial transcripts of
peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing respondent’s testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of
personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine
fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that
educational attainment, and family background, among others.81 personal examination of the subject by the physician is not
required for the spouse to be declared psychologically
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were incapacitated.86 We deem the methodology utilized by petitioner’s
further linked to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions.
from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopez’s common conclusion of
witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed respondent’s psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own
the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major acceptance of petitioner’s version as the true set of facts.
hospitals,82 testified as follows: However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of
petitioner’s factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the
WITNESS: conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by
petitioner’s expert witnesses.
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided
to me, I can say that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial
wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems court explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its
(sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit. One of decision in this wise:
which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the
"respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that
behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness) her actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies
about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health,
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these
her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability
actuations of the respondent she is then incapable of performing
to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically
the basic obligations of her marriage?
lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in a
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to
another. The lack of concern, the lack of love towards the person, petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner,
and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between
see, relationship is based on communication between individuals spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by
and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is
feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological
[you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly incapacity.87
lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as this relationship
Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to
is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that
have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration
should be based on love, trust and respect.
of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise,
the respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural child’s real
then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage? parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the
truth after their marriage.
xxx
Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness) sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who
shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the
is the third witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent
exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance
has been calling up the petitioner’s officemates and ask him (sic)
speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports
on the activities of the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of
the belief that respondent’s psychological incapacity, as borne by
the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the
the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life
transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr.
was dubitable.
witness?
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid,
adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into
which means that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that
marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of
her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the
respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the
extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel
truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on
jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but
respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic
everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or
nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory
pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the
of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the essential
husband is having an affair with another woman and if she
obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish
persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with
between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to
different women, then that is pathological and we call that paranoid
comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its
jealousy.
psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality
considered psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional
obligations of the marriage? commitments.

A- Yes, Ma’am.83 The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent
allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not
the psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her
psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay

107
extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave
obligations. Respondent’s ability to even comprehend what the lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94
essential marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering
that the evidence convincingly disputes respondent’s ability to Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived
adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the at not only by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we
marriage cannot be accorded much credence. must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the
marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioner’s
which states that a marriage may be annulled if the consent of allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondent’s
either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such
enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would
previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings
as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that
such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between
misrepresentations made by respondent and the Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement
misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be
Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score
does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court,
the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that
to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological respondent’s condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not
incapacity under Article 36. testify to such effect.95

Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially
marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage
Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, work. However, respondent’s aberrant behavior remained
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and
and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the
inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic conclusion that respondent’s condition is incurable.
tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded
respect.
that respondent’s condition is incurable? It would seem, at least,
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into that respondent’s psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a
consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had
by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed petitioner’s expert witnesses characterized respondent’s condition
this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the
anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioner’s efforts to psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.
bring the matter to its attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts’
contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by
taciturnity on this point.
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and
great respect by our courts. the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These
events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of
made explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity
Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in
must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due
Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any
discretion" on the part of respondent.90Such decree of nullity was
other provision of the Family Code.
affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact, On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in
respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the deliberations
that a restrictive clause93was appended to the sentence of nullity of the Family Code committee,96 then the opinion of canonical
prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without scholars,97 before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal
the Tribunal’s consent. definition of psychological incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice
Caguioa’s opinion expressed during the deliberations that
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate
"psychological incapacity is incurable," 99 and the view of a former
Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be
consent is considered ontologically defective and wherefore characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on
possession and employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any
perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical reference to incurability as a characteristic of psychological
understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from incapacity.101
the correct appreciation of the integral significance and
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before
implications of the marriage vows.
the trial court came out with its own ruling that remained silent on
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude whether respondent’s psychological incapacity was incurable.
required by law that based on the depositions of the Partes in Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of
Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and the psychological incapacity be established in an action for
Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity
in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation
markedly antithetical to the substantive content and of the trial court’s decision that required a medical finding of
implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a
undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in time when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception
terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted of evidence.
with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an
judgment formation on account of an adverse action and
argument that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively
reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting
a judicially binding matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient

108
with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
the statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
utterly practical considerations. The requirement that as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent’s "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability
there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law
apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the
prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
those presently on appellate review, where presumably the implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the
seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in void marriage to be "legitimate."
those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a
spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the "The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
trial court level. marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable
interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual
perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during
an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation
parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are various circumstances being themselves, depending on the
sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent’s degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. incapacity.
Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the
Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability "Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are
as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on
sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in
contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted. every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful
The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in or even desirable." Santos v. Court of Appeals, id. at 39-41.
reversing the trial court.

There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing

as it does the marital bond as having been inexistent in the first THIRD DIVISION
place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological
state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent
challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court
placed undue emphasis on respondent’s avowed commitment to
remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal DIGNA A. NAJERA, G.R. No. 164
reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal
Petitioner, Present:
contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of
people in love to live together.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC YNARES-SAN

dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner
and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family - versus - Chairperson,
Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.
CHICO-NAZA
SO ORDERED.
EDUARDO J. NAJERA, VELASCO, JR
93 "A restrictive clause is herewith attached to this sentence of
nullity to the effect that the respondent may not enter into another Respondent. NACHURA, a
marriage without the express consent of this Tribunal, in deference
PERALTA, JJ
to the sanctity and dignity of the sacrament of matrimony, as well
as for the protection of the intended spouse."; rollo, p. 97.
101 "It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, Promulgated
including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family
Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase July 3, 2009
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses
----x
as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
(cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the
Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the DECISION
Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American
Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for
Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be
taken and construed independently of but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus PERALTA, J.:
correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than

109
 (e) Respondent left the family home, taking along all their
personal belongings. He lived with his mother at Banaga,
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated Bugallon, Pangasinan, and he abandoned petitioner.
February 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
68053 and its Resolution August 5, 2004, denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Petitioner learned later that respondent jumped ship while it was
Pangasinan, Branch 68 (RTC), which found petitioner Digna A. anchored in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
Najera and respondent Eduardo J. Najera entitled to legal
separation, but not annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Petitioner prayed that upon filing of the petition, an Order be issued
appointing her as the sole administrator of their
conjugal properties; and that after trial on the merits, judgment be
The facts are as follows: rendered (1) declaring their marriage void ab initio in accordance
with Article 36 of the Family Code; (2) in the alternative, decreeing
legal separation of petitioner and respondent pursuant to Title II of
the Family Code; and (3) declaring the dissolution of the conjugal
On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified partnership of petitioner and respondent and the forfeiture in
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with Alternative
Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for Designation as favor of petitioner of respondents share in the said properties
Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of pursuant to Articles 42 (2) and 63 (2) of the Family Code; and (4)
Gains.[1] granting petitioner other just and equitable reliefs.

Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are residents On March 7, 1997, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion
of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is presently living in the of petitioner to effect service by publication as provided under
United States of America (U.S.A). They were married on January Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
31, 1988 by Rev. Father Isidro Palinar, Jr. at the Saint Andrew the
Apostle Church at Bugallon, Pangasinan.[2] They are childless.
On April 17, 1997, respondent filed his Answer [3] wherein he
denied the material allegations in the petition and averred that
Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, petitioner was incurably immature, of dubious integrity, with very
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the low morality, and guilty of infidelity. He claimed that the subject
essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity house and lot were acquired through his sole effort and money. As
became manifest only after marriage as shown by the following counterclaim, respondent prayed for the award of P200,000.00 as
facts: moral damages, P45,000.00 as attorneys fees, and P1,000.00 as
appearance fee for every scheduled hearing.

(a) At the time of their marriage, petitioner was already

employed with the Special Services Division of the Provincial On July 18, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Notice
Government of Pangasinan, while respondent was jobless. He did of Appearance.
not exert enough effort to find a job and was dependent on
petitioner for support. Only with the help of petitioners elder
brother, who was a seaman, was respondent able to land a job as
On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Order[4] terminating the pre-
a seaman in 1988 through the Intercrew Shipping Agency.
trial conference after the parties signed a Formal
Manifestation/Motion, which stated that they had agreed to
dissolve their conjugal partnership of gains and divide equally their
(b) While employed as a seaman, respondent did not give conjugal properties.
petitioner sufficient financial support and she had to rely on her
own efforts and the help of her parents in order to live.
On August 3, 1998, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ely R. Reintar
filed a Compliance manifesting that after conducting an
(c) As a seaman, respondent was away from home from investigation, he found that no collusion existed between the
nine to ten months each year. In May 1989, when he came home parties.[5] The initial hearing of the case was held on November 23,
from his ship voyage, he started to quarrel with petitioner and 1998.
falsely accused her of having an affair with another man. He took
to smoking marijuana and tried to force petitioner into it.When she Petitioner testified in court and presented as witnesses the
refused, he insulted her and uttered unprintable words against following: her mother, Celedonia Aldana; psychologist Cristina R.
her. He would go out of the house and when he arrived home, he Gates; and Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Sonny Dela Cruz, a
was always drunk. member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Bugallon,
Pangasinan.

(d) When respondent arrived home from his ship voyage in

April 1994, as had been happening every year, he quarreled with Petitioner testified that she was a commerce graduate and was
petitioner. He continued to be jealous, he arrived home drunk and working as an accounting clerk in a government agency in
he smoked marijuana. On July 3, 1994, while he was quarreling Manila. She and respondentmarried on January 31, 1988 as
with petitioner, without provocation, he inflicted physical violence evidenced by their marriage contract.[6] At the time of their
upon her and attempted to kill her with a bolo. She was able to marriage, respondent was jobless, while petitioner was employed
parry his attack with her left arm, yet she sustained physical as Clerk at the Special Services Division of the Provincial
injuries on different parts of her body. She was treated by Dr. Government of Pangasinan with a monthly salary of P5,000.00. It
Padlan, and the incident was reported at the Bugallon Police was petitioners brother who helped respondent find a job as a
Station. seaman at the Intercrew Shipping Agency in Manila. On July 30,
1988, respondent was employed as a seaman, and he gave

110
petitioner a monthly allotment of P1,600.00. After ten months at PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE
work, he went home in 1989 and then returned to work after three INTERVIEWS:
months. Every time respondent was home, he quarreled with
petitioner and accused her of having an affair with another man.
Petitioner noticed that respondent also smoked marijuana and
It is clear from the interviews that Respondent is afflicted with
every time he went out of the house and returned home, he was
psychological hang-ups which are rooted in the kind of family
drunk. However, there was no record in their barangay that
background he has. His mother had an extramarital affair and
respondent was involved in drugs.[7]
separated from Respondents father. This turn of events left an
irreparable mark upon Respondent, gauging from his alcoholic and
marijuana habit. In time, he seemed steep in a kind of a double
In 1990, petitioner and respondent were able to purchase a lot out bind where he both deeply loved and resented his mother.
of their earnings. In 1991, they constructed a house on the lot.[8]

His baseless accusation against his wife and his violent behavior
On July 3, 1994, petitioner and respondent were invited to a party towards her appears to be an offshoot of deep-seated feelings and
by the boyfriend of petitioners sister. Respondent, however, did recurrent thoughts towards his own mother. Unable to resolve his
not allow petitioner to go with him. When respondent arrived home childhood conflicts and anger, he turned to his wife as
at around midnight, petitioner asked him about the party, the the scapegoat for all his troubles.
persons who attended it, and the ladies he danced with, but he did
not answer her. Instead, respondent went to the kitchen. She
asked him again about what happened at the party. Respondent
Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM IV),
quarreled with her and said that she was the one having an affair
Respondent is afflicted with a Borderline Personality Disorder as
and suddenly slapped and boxed her, causing her eyes to be
marked by his pattern of instability in his interpersonal
bloodied. When she opened her eyes, she saw respondent
relationships, his marred self-image and self-destructive
holding a bolo, and he attempted to kill her. However, she was able
tendencies, his uncontrollable impulses. Eduardo Najeras
to parry his attack with her left arm, causing her to sustain injuries
psychological impairment as traced to his parents separation,
on different parts of her body. When respondent saw that she was
aggravated by the continued meddling of his mother in his adult
bloodied, he got nervous and went out. After 10 minutes, he turned
life, antedates his marriage to Petitioner Digna Aldana.
on the light in the kitchen, but he could not find her because she
had gone out and was hiding from him. When she heard
respondent start the motorcycle, she left her hiding place
and proceeded to Gomez Street toward the highway. At the Furthermore, the ingestion of prohibited substances (alcohol and
highway, she boarded a bus and asked the conductor to stop at a marijuana), known to cause irreparable damage organically, and
clinic or hospital. She alighted in Mangatarem, Pangasinan and the manifest worsening of his violent and abusive behavior across
proceeded to the clinic of one Dr. Padlan, who sutured her time render his impairment grave and irreversible. In the light of
wounds. After a few hours, she went home.[9] these findings, it is recommended that parties marriage be
annulled on grounds of psychological incapacity on the part of
Respondent Eduardo Najera to fully assume his marital duties and
responsibilities to Digna Aldana-Najera.[15]
When petitioner arrived home, the house was locked. She called
for her parents who were residing about 300 meters away. She
then asked her brother to enter the house through the ceiling in
order to open the door. She found that their personal belongings
were gone, including her Automated Teller Machine card
Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that the chances of curability
and jewelry.[10]
of respondents psychological disorder were nil. Its
curability depended on whether the established organic damage
was minimal -- referring to the malfunction of the composites of the
Thereafter, petitioner reported the incident at the police station of brain brought about by habitual drinking and marijuana,
Bugallon, Pangasinan.[11] whichpossibly afflicted respondent with borderline personality
disorder and uncontrollable impulses.[16]

Since then, respondent never returned home. He stayed with his

mother in Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan. Petitioner learned that Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the PNP, Bugallon,
he went abroad again, but she no longer received any allotment Pangasinan, testified that on July 3, 1994, he received a complaint
from him.[12] from petitioner that respondent arrived at their house under the
influence of liquor and mauled petitioner without provocation on
her part, and that respondent tried to kill her. The complaint was
Petitioner testified that her parents were happily married, while entered in the police blotter.[17]
respondents parents were separated. Respondents brothers were
also separated from their respective wives.[13]
On March 31, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision that decreed
only the legal separation of the petitioner and respondent, but not
Petitioner disclosed that she also filed a petition for the annulment the annulment of their marriage. The dispositive portion of the
of her marriage with the Matrimonial Tribunal of the Diocese of Decision reads:
Alaminos, Pangasinan on the ground of psychological incapacity
of respondent.[14]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
Psychologist Cristina R. Gates testified that she interviewed
petitioner, but not respondent who was abroad. She confirmed her
Psychological Report, the conclusion of which reads: 1. Decreeing legal separation of Petitioner/Plaintiff Digna
Najera and respondent/defendant Eduardo Najera;

111
2. Ordering the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of the dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
petitioner/plaintiff and respondent/defendant, and to divide the Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
same equally between themselves pursuant to their Joint of the family.Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Manifestation/Motion dated April 27, 1998.[18] Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees
marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution[19] dated May 2, 2000. xxxx
Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision and Resolution to the Court (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
of Appeals. medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
In a Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations
affirmed the Decision of the RTC, the dispositive portion of which and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
reads: the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
DISMISSED and judgment of the Trial Court is AFFIRMED in toto.
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
No costs.[20]
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
Appeals in a Resolution dated August 5, 2004. evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the

Hence, this petition raising the following issues: celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
1. The Court of Appeals failed to take into consideration the
thereto.
Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, contrary
to the guidelines decreed by the Supreme Court in the case (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
of Republic v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198. permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
2. The evidence of petitioner proved the root cause of the incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
psychological incapacity of respondent Eduardo Najera. obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like
the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children
and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
3. The factual basis of the Decision of the National Appellate psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
Matrimonial Tribunal is practically the same set of facts established own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
by petitioners evidence submitted before the trial court and
therefore the same conclusion ought to be rendered by the Court. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
4. Credence ought to be given to the conclusion mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
of Psychologist Cristina R. Gates as an expert in Psychology.[21]
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
The main issue is whether or not the totality of petitioners is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
evidence was able to prove that respondent is psychologically integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
36 of the Family Code.[22]
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Petitioner contends that her evidence established the root cause Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
of the psychological incapacity of respondent which is his and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
dysfunctional family background. With such background, regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
respondent could not have known the obligations he was obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
assuming, particularly the duty of complying with the obligations evidence and included in the text of the decision.
essential to marriage.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
The Court is not persuaded. courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
Republic v. Court of Appeals[23] laid down the guidelines in the
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code,
are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
thus:
causes of psychological nature.

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people,
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate

112
tribunal. Ideally -- subject to our law on evidence -- what is decreed A He is not in the country, sir.
as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and

purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious Q Madam Witness, this disorder that you stated in your report
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and which the respondent is allegedly affected, is this curable?
the Church -- while remaining independent, separate and apart
A The chances are nil.
from each other -- shall walk together in synodal cadence towards
the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family
as the inviolable base of the nation.
Q But it is curable?
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No A It depends actually if the established organic damage is
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues minimal.
a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the Q What is this organic damage?
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted A Composites of the brain is malfunctioning.
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.
Q How did you find out the malfunctioning since you have not
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier seen him (respondent)?
mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of
A His habitual drinking and marijuana habit possibly afflicted
Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
the respondent with borderline personality disorder. This [is]
gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." [24] The
based on his interpersonal relationships, his marred self-
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the
image and self-destructive tendencies, and his uncontrollable
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. [25] In fact, the
impulses.
root cause may be "medically or clinically identified."[26] What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of Q Did you interview the respondent in this regard?
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
A I take the words of the petitioner in this regard.[29]
person concerned need not be resorted to.[27]

In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the
totality of the evidence submitted by petitioner failed to
satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the evidence
marriage. The root cause of respondents alleged psychological presented by petitioner in regard to the physical violence or grossly
incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be abusive conduct of respondent toward petitioner and
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. respondents abandonment of petitioner without justifiable cause
for more than one year are grounds for legal separation[30]only and
not for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist Cristina Gates
conclusion that respondent was psychologically incapacitated was
based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and was not based on Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the
her personal knowledge and evaluation of respondent; thus, her Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal which her
finding is unscientific and unreliable.[28] Moreover, the trial court counsel sought to be admitted by the Court of Appeals on February
correctly found that petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the 11, 2004, twelve days before the decision was promulgated on
alleged personality disorder of respondent was incurable as may February 23, 2004. She contended that the Court of Appeals failed
be gleaned from Psychologist Cristina Gates testimony: to follow Guideline No. 7 in Republic v. Court of Appeals, thus:

Q You mentioned in your report that respondent is afflicted with a (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
borderline personality disorder. [D]id you find any organic cause? Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
A No, sir. courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
Q Do you think that this cause you mentioned existed at the time
of the marriage of the respondent?
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who
A I believe so, sir. Physically, if you examined the [respondents
are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
family] background, there was strong basis that respondent
causes of psychological nature.
developed mal-adoptive pattern.

Q Did you interview the respondents family? Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code
is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people,
A No, sir , but on the disclosure of petitioner (sic). it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as
canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
xxxx

Q Have you [seen] the respondent?

113
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious great respect by our courts. However, the Highest Tribunal
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and expounded as follows:
the Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from
each other shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code
the inviolable base of the nation
is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people,
Petitioners argument is without merit. it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed
apparently did not have the opportunity to consider the decision of as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void x x x.
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is
clear that the Court of Appeals considered the Matrimonial
Tribunals decision in its Resolution dated August 5, 2004when it
And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence
resolved petitioners motion for reconsideration. In the
states:
said Resolution, the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the very
same issues now raised before this Court and correctly held that
petitioners motion for reconsideration was devoid of merit. It
stated: The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose of which the evidence is offered must be
specified.
The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated
July 2, 2002, which was forwarded to this Court only on February
11, 2004, reads as follows: Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not
expect us to give credence to the Decision of the National
x x x The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently, it was made on
witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite a different set of evidence of which We have no way of
summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear ascertaining their truthfulness.
before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial
in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to
believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that the
husband-respondent upon contracting marriage suffered Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments must be
based on the evidence presented before the court (Manzano vs.
from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby
Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And based on the evidence on
rendering nugatory his marital contract: First, his family was
record, We find no ample reason to reverse or modify the judgment
dysfunctional in that as a child, he saw the break-up of the
of the Trial Court.[31]
marriage of his own parents; his own two siblings have broken
marriages; Second, he therefore grew up with a domineering Santos v. Santos[32] cited the deliberations during the sessions of
mother with whom [he] identified and on whom he depended for the Family Code Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to
advice; Third, he was according to his friends, already into drugs provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It
and alcohol before marriage; this affected his conduct of bipolar stated that a part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph
kind: he could be very quiet but later very talkative, peaceful but of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:
later hotheaded even violent, he also was aware of the infidelity of
his mother who now lives with her paramour, also married and a
policeman; Finally, into marriage, he continued with his drugs and
alcohol abuse until one time he came home very drunk and beat Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
up his wife and attacked her with a bolo that wounded her; this led
to final separation.
1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second
concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be
Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having considered
mutually given and accepted;
the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the
Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation 3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are
of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of
the 1983 Code of Canon Law.

It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration
of nullity of marriage by the National Appellate Matrimonial
However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions
that, other than herself, petitioner-appellant offered the testimonies causes of a psychological nature, but the second paragraph of
of the following persons only, to wit: Aldana Celedonia (petitioner- Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of
appellants mother), Sonny de la Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon, discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and
Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R. Gates (psychologist). Said obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the
witnesses testified, in particular, to the unfaithful night of July 1, pertinent portion of the decision of the National Appellate
1994 wherein the respondent allegedly made an attempt on the Matrimonial Tribunal reads:
life of the petitioner. But unlike the hearing and finding before the
Matrimonial Tribunal, petitioner-appellants sister-in-law and
friends of the opposing parties were never presented before said
The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable
Court. As to the contents and veracity of the latters testimonies,
this Court is without any clue. witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite
summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not
appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard,
hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this
True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al. (268 SCRA Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and
198), the Supreme Court held that the interpretations given by the conclude that the husband-respondent upon contacting
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of

114
judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract x x he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
x. knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed 3 in toto
Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having considered the judgment of the trial court. It held that the evidence on record
the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from
Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were incurable and
of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of already present at the inception of the marriage.4 The Court of
marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony failed to establish
the 1983 Code of Canon Law. x x x the substance of respondent's psychological incapacity; that she
failed to explain how she arrived at the conclusion that the
Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she failed to
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is similar clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening
to the facts established by petitioner before the trial court, the disabling factor or an adverse integral element in respondent's
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting and
the decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not based on complying with the essential marital obligations.5
the psychological incapacity of respondent. Petitioner, therefore,
erred in stating that the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied 6 for lack of
regarding the psychological incapacity of respondent is supported merit; thus, she filed a petition for review on certiorari with this
by the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Court. As already stated, the petition for review was denied for
failure of petitioner to show that the appellate tribunal committed
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of any reversible error.
the RTC.
Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration.7 The Court
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court required respondent Brix Ferraris to file comment 8 but failed to
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68053, dated February 23, 2004, comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived the opportunity to file
and its Resolution dated August 5, 2004, are hereby AFFIRMED. comment. Further, the Court directed the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to comment on petitioner's motion for
No costs.
reconsideration which it complied on March 2, 2006.
SO ORDERED.
After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the
OSG, the Court resolves to deny petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a

given case calling for annulment of marriage depends crucially,
more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. 9 Such
factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to
review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all
over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual
determination.10 It is a well-established principle that factual
findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
are binding on this Court,11 save for the most compelling and
cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go
beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of
the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which,
if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when
Republic of the Philippines there is a misappreciation of facts,12 which are unavailing in the
SUPREME COURT instant case.
Manila
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity
FIRST DIVISION of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration
G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006
of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, petitioner, deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
vs. matrimonial bond one is about to assume.13 As all people may
BRIX FERRARIS, respondent. have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics
associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any
RESOLUTION doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.14 It is
This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma.
for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological
Armida Perez-Ferraris of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004
experts for its understanding of the human personality. However,
denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and
the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2003 and
incapacitating nature must be fully explained, 15 which petitioner
February 24, 2004, respectively, for failure of the petitioner to
failed to convincingly demonstrate.
sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any
reversible error. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:
On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of
Branch 151 rendered a Decision1 denying the petition for marital annulment cases is the presence of evidence that can
declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris. The adequately establish respondent's psychological condition. Here,
trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to appellant contends that there is such evidence. We do not agree.
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the Indeed, the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that
evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity. Petitioner's respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity. There is
motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order2 dated April 20, absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at
2001 where the trial court reiterated that there was no evidence the inception of the marriage, or that those are incurable.
that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an extent that

115
Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner's evidence not a null and void marriage.19 No less than the Constitution
showed that respondent's alleged failure to perform his so-called recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it
marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of some deep- decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from
seated, grave, permanent and incurable psychological malady. To dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
be sure, the couple's relationship before the marriage and even are to be "protected" by the state.20
during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad.
During that relatively short period of time, petitioner was happy and Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under
contented with her life in the company of respondent. In fact, by Article 36, it must be read in conjunction with, although to be taken
petitioner's own reckoning, respondent was a responsible and as distinct from Articles 35,21 37,22 38,23 and 4124 that would
loving husband. x x x. Their problems began when petitioner likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab
started doubting respondent's fidelity. It was only when they initio, or Article 4525 that would make the marriage merely
started fighting about the calls from women that respondent began voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal
to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so- separation. Care must be observed so that these various
called marital obligations. Respondent could not understand circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law
petitioner's lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He were indifferent on the matter.26 Article 36 should not to be
thought her suspicions irrational. Respondent could not relate to confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time
her anger, temper and jealousy. x x x. the causes therefor manifest themselves.27 Neither it is to be
equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be
xxxx rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. 28
diagnosis that respondent has a mixed personality disorder called
"schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and avoidant type." In WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for
fact, Dr. Dayan's statement that one suffering from such mixed reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the
personality disorder is dependent on others for decision x x x lacks petition for review on certiorari for failure of the petitioner to
specificity; it seems to belong to the realm of theoretical sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any
speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan's information that respondent had reversible error, is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
extramarital affairs was supplied by the petitioner herself. Notably,
when asked as to the root cause of respondent's alleged SO ORDERED.
psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan's answer was vague, evasive
Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario,
and inconclusive. She replied that such disorder "can be part of his
J.J., concur.
family upbringing" x x x. She stated that there was a history of
respondent's parents having difficulties in their relationship. But FN:
this input on the supposed problematic history of respondent's
21
parents also came from petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the
demonstrate that there was really "a natal or supervening disabling beginning:
factor" on the part of respondent, or an "adverse integral element"
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age
in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from
even with the consent of parents or guardians;
accepting, and, thereby complying with, the essential marital
obligations. Of course, petitioner likewise failed to prove that (2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to
respondent's supposed psychological or mental malady existed perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with
even before the marriage. All these omissions must be held up either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing
against petitioner, for the reason that upon her devolved the onus officer had the legal authority to do so;
of establishing nullity of the marriage. Indeed, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the (3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by
indissolubility of the marital vinculum.16 the preceding Chapter;

We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the (4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under
"leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent Article 41;
tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the
abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend (5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as
more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on to the identity of the other; and
some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
22Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,17 where therein respondent
void from the beginning, whether the relationship between the
preferred to spend more time with his friends than his family on
parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
whom he squandered his money, depended on his parents for aid
and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife regarding his (1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
finances, the Court held that the psychological defects spoken of
were more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in (2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
the performance of some marital obligations and that a mere 23 Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning
showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities
for reasons of public policy:
in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties (1) Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or
as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical,
illness. (2) Between step-parents and step-children;

Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals18 that habitual (3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do
not by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void (4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
based on psychological incapacity.
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the
While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and appears adopted child;
to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy however is not
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the
always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of
adopter;
psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is

116
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter; 5, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49915, entitled
"Rosa Yap-Paras, Plaintiff-Appellant vs. Justo J. Paras,
(8) Between the adopted children of the same adopter; and Defendant-Appellee."
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo
other, killed that other person's spouse or his or her own spouse. J. Paras in Bindoy, Negros Oriental. They begot four (4) children,
24 namely: Raoul (+), Cindy Rose (+), Dahlia, and Reuel.
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993, Rosa filed
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Dumaguete City,
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo, under Article
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse 36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 10613. She
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger alleged that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to exercise the
of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of essential obligations of marriage as shown by the following
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall circumstances:
be sufficient.
(a) he dissipated her business assets and forged her signature in
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the one mortgage transaction;
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration (b) he lived with a concubine and sired a child with her;
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (c) he did not give financial support to his children; and

25Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following (d) he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a
causes, existing at the time of the marriage: father.

(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage To substantiate her charges, Rosa offered documentary and
annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, testimonial evidence.
and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the
This is her story. She met Justo in 1961 in Bindoy. She was then
parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority
a student of San Carlos University, Cebu City.5He courted her,
over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of
frequently spending time at her "Botica."6 Eventually, in 1964,
twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both
convinced that he loved her, she agreed to marry him. Their
lived together as husband and wife;
wedding was considered one of the "most celebrated" marriages
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after in Bindoy.7
coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and
After the wedding, she and Justo spent one (1) week in Davao for
wife;
their honeymoon.8 Upon returning to Bindoy, they resided at her
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless parents’ house. It was their residence for three (3) years until they
such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting were able to build a house of their own.9 For the first five (5) years
the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; of their marriage, Justo did not support her and their children
because he shouldered his sister’s schooling. 10 Consequently,
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, she was the one who spent for all their family needs, using the
intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having income from her "Botica" and store.11
disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with
the other as husband and wife; Justo lived the life of a bachelor.12 His usual routine was to spend
time with his "barkadas" until the wee hours of the morning.
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the Oftentimes, he would scold her when she sent for him during
marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and lunchtime.13 He also failed to provide for their children’s well-
appears to be incurable; or being.14 Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose was
afflicted with leukemia. It was her family who paid for her
(6) That either party was inflicted with a sexually-transmitted medication. Also, in 1984, their son Raoul was electrocuted while
disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable. Justo was in their rest house with his "barkadas." He did not heed
her earlier advice to bring Raoul in the rest house as the latter has
the habit of climbing the rooftop.15
Republic of the Philippines
To cope with the death of the children, the entire family went to the
SUPREME COURT
United States. Her sisters supported them throughout their two-
Manila
year stay there. However, after three months, Justo abandoned
FIRST DIVISION them and left for the Philippines. Upon her return to the Philippines,
she was shocked to find her "Botica" and other businesses heavy
G.R. No. 147824 August 2, 2007 in debt. She then realized Justo was a profligate. At one time, he
disposed without her consent a conjugal piece of land. 16 At other
ROSA YAP PARAS, petitioner,
times, he permitted the municipal government to take gasoline
vs.
from their gas station free of charge.
JUSTO J. PARAS, respondent.
She endured all of Justo’s shortcomings, but his act of maintaining
DECISION
a mistress and siring an illegitimate child was the last straw that
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: prompted her to file the present case. She found that after leaving
their conjugal house in 1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their
This case presents another occasion to reiterate this Court’s ruling cohabitation resulted in the birth of a baby girl, Cyndee Rose,
that the Guidelines set forth in Republic v. Court of Appeals and obviously named after her (Rosa) and Justo‘s deceased daughter
Ronidel Olaviano Molina1 "do not require that a physician should Cindy Rose Paras.17
examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated.
What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately As expected, Justo has a different version of the story.
establish the party’s psychological condition."2
He met Rosa upon his return to Bindoy after taking the bar
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of examinations in Manila.18 He frequently spent time in her
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, are the (a) store.19 Believing he loved her, he courted her and later on, they
Decision3 dated December 8, 2000 and (b) Resolution4 dated April became sweethearts. In 1963, they decided to get married.
However, it was postponed because her family demanded a

117
dowry. Their marriage took place in 1964 upon his mother’s of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts
signing a deed of conveyance involving 28 hectares of coconut concerned.
land in favor of Rosa.20
SO ORDERED.
He blamed the subsequent dissipation of their assets from the
slump of the price of sugar and not to his alleged profligacy. 21 Due On December 8, 2000 or nearly two months after this Court
to his business ventures, he and Rosa were able to acquire a 10- promulgated the Decision in A.C. No. 5333, the Court of Appeals
room family house, expand their store, establish their gasoline affirmed the RTC Decision in the present case, holding that "the
station, and purchase several properties. He also denied forging evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of the standards required
her signature in one mortgage transaction. He maintained that he by law to decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justo’s alleged
did not dispose of a conjugal property and that he and defects or idiosyncracies "were sufficiently explained by the
Rosapersonally signed the renewal of a sugar crop loan before evidence," thus:
the bank’s authorized employee.22
Certainly, we cannot ignore what is extant on the record – first, the
As to their marital relationship, he noticed the change in Rosa’s income which supported their children came from the earnings of
attitude after her return from the United States. She became their conjugal properties and not singularly from Rosa’s
detached, cold, uncaring, and overly focused on the family’s industry; second, Justo gave his share of the support to his
businesses.23 He tried to reach her but Rosa was steadfast in her children in the form of allowances, albeit smaller than that derived
"new attitudinal outlook." Before other people, he merely from the conjugal property; third, he was booted out from their
pretended that their relationship was blissful.24 conjugal dwelling after he lost his bid for re-election and as such
did not voluntarily abandon his home; and fourth, although
He did not abandon his family in the United States. It happened unjustifiable in the eyes of the law and morality, Justo’s alleged
that they only had tourist visas. When they were there, their infidelity came after he was driven out of his house by Rosa. x x x.
children’s tourist visas were converted into study visas, permitting
them to stay longer. For his part, he was granted only three (3) The Court of Appeals likewise held that Rosa’s inability to offer the
months leave as municipal mayor of Bindoy, thus, he immediately testimony of a psychologist is fatal to her case, being in violation
returned to the Philippines.25 of the tenets laid down by this Court in Molina.34 Thus, she failed
to substantiate her allegation that Justo is psychologically
He spent for his children’s education. At first, he resented incapacitated from complying with the essential obligations of
supporting them because he was just starting his law practice and marriage.35
besides, their conjugal assets were more than enough to provide
for their needs. He admitted though that there were times he failed Rosa filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence,
to give them financial support because of his lack of income.26 the instant petition for review on certiorari.

What caused the inevitable family break-out was Rosa’s act of Rosa contends that this Court’s factual findings in A.C. No. 5333
embarrassing him during his birthday celebration in 1987. She did for disbarment are conclusive on the present case.
not prepare food for the guests. When confronted, she retorted that Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in rendering contrary
she has nothing to do with his birthday. This convinced him of her factual findings. Also, she argues that she filed the instant
lack of concern.27 This was further aggravated when she denied complaint sometime in May, 1993, well before this Court’s
his request for engine oil when his vehicle broke down in a pronouncement in Molina relied upon by the Court of Appeals. She
mountainous and NPA-infested area.28 states that she could have presented an expert to prove the root
cause of Justo’s psychological incapacity had she been required
As to the charge of concubinage, he alleged that Jocelyn Ching is to do so. For relief, she prays that her marriage with Justo be
not his mistress, but her secretary in his Law Office. She was annulled on the bases of the Court’s conclusive factual findings
impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain Grelle Leccioness. in A.C. No. 5333; or in the alternative, remand this case to the
Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is not his daughter. court a quo for reception of expert testimony in the interest of due
process.
After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision
upholding the validity of the marriage. It found that: (a) Justo did In his comment on the petition, Justo asserts that the present case
not abandon the conjugal home as he was forced to leave after is a "new matter completely foreign and removed" from A.C.
Rosa posted guards at the gates of their house;29 (b) the conjugal No. 5333; hence, the factual findings of this Court therein are not
assets were sufficient to support the family needs, thus, there was conclusive on this case. Besides, no hearing was conducted in
no need for Justo to shell out his limited salary; 30 and (c) the A.C. No. 5333 as it was decided merely on the bases of pleadings
charge of infidelity is unsubstantiated.31 The RTC observed that and documents.
the relationship between the parties started well, negating the
existence of psychological incapacity on either party at the time of The parties’ opposing contentions lead us to the following three (3)
the celebration of their marriage.32 And lastly, it ruled that there vital issues:
appeared to be a collusion between them as both sought the
first, whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are
declaration of nullity of their marriage.33
conclusive on the present case;
Justo interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
second, whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of
In the interim, Rosa filed with this Court a petition for disbarment expert testimony on the root cause of Justo’s alleged
against Justo, docketed as A.C. No. 5333, premised on the same psychological incapacity is necessary; and
charges alleged in her complaint for declaration of nullity of
third, whether the totality of evidence in the case shows
marriage. On October 18, 2000, this Court rendered its Decision
psychological incapacity on the part of Justo.
finding him guilty of falsifying Rosa’s signature in bank
documents, immorality, and abandonment of his family. He The petition is bereft of merit.
was suspended from the practice of law, thus:
I
In the light of the foregoing, respondent is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) Whether the factual findings of this Court in
MONTHS on the charge of falsifying his wife’s signature in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case.
bank documents and other related loan instruments; and for ONE
(1) YEAR from the practice of law on the charges Rosa, sad to say, had made much ado about nothing. A reading
of immorality andabandonment of his own family, the penalties of the Court of Appeals’ Decision shows that she has no reason to
feel aggrieved. In fact, the appellate court even assumed that her
to be served simultaneously. Let notice of this Decision be spread
charges "are true," but concluded that they are insufficient to
in respondent’s record as an attorney, and notice of the same
declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office
incapacity. The pertinent portion of the Decision reads:

118
Applying these parameters to the sifted evidence, we find Accordingly, one’s unfitness as a lawyer does
that even if we assume Justo’s alleged infidelity, failure to not automatically mean one’s unfitness as a husband or vice
support his family and alleged abandonment of their family versa.41 The yardsticks for such roles are simply different. This is
home are true, such traits are at best indicators that he is unfit why the disposition in a disbarment case cannot be conclusive on
to become an ideal husband and father. However, by an action for declaration of nullity of marriage. While Rosa’s
themselves, these grounds are insufficient to declare the marriage charges sufficiently proved Justo’s unfitness as a lawyer, however,
void due to an incurable psychological incapacity. These grounds, they may not establish that he is psychologically incapacitated to
we must emphasize, do not manifest that he was truly incognitive perform his duties as a husband. In the disbarment case, "the real
of the basic marital covenants that he must assume and discharge question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a
as a married person. While they may manifest the "gravity" of his fit person to be allowed the privileges as such." Its purpose is "to
alleged psychological incapacity, they do not necessarily show protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of
‘incurability’, such that while his acts violated the covenants of the court." On the other hand, in an action for declaration of nullity
marriage, they do not necessarily show that such acts show an of marriage based on the ground of psychological incapacity, the
irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity which question for determination is whether the guilty party suffers a
prevents him from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in grave, incurable, and pre-existing mental incapacity that renders
the future.36 him truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. Its purpose is
to free the innocent party from a meaningless marriage. In this
The Court of Appeals pointed this out in its Resolution denying case, as will be seen in the following discussion, Justo’s acts are
Rosa’s motion for reconsideration, thus: not sufficient to conclude that he is psychologically incapacitated,
albeit such acts really fall short of what is expected from a lawyer.
Even as we are fully cognizant of the findings of the Supreme
Court in the disbarment case appellant filed against her husband, II
namely, appellee’s falsification of documents to obtain loans and
his infidelity, these facts, by themselves, do not conclusively Whether a remand of this case to the RTC is necessary.
establish appellee’s psychological incapacity as contemplated
under Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, we already went as The presentation of an expert witness to prove psychological
far as to presume the existence of such seeming depravities incapacity has its origin in Molina.42 One of the Guidelines set forth
in appellee’s character in our earlier judgment. However, as therein states:
we emphasized in our Decision, the existence of such
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
eventualities is not necessarily conclusive of an inherent
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
incapacity on the part of appellee to discern and perform the
(c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in
rudiments of marital obligations as required under Article
the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
36.37
incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its
Clearly, Rosa’s insistence that the factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
be considered "conclusive" on the present case is unmeritorious. must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
The Court of Appeals already "went as far as to presume the mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
existence" of Justo’s depravities, however, even doing so could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
not bring about her (Rosa’s) desired result. As Rosa’s prayer for them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
relief suggests, what she wants is for this Court to annul her example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
marriage on the bases of its findings in A.C. No. 5333.38Obviously, the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
she is of the impression that since her charges in A.C. No. 5333 generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
were found to be true, justifying the suspension of Justo from the psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
practice of law, the same charges are also sufficient to prove his explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
obligations.
In the 2000 case of Marcos v. Marcos,43 the Court clarified that the
Her premise is of course non-sequitur. above Guideline does not require that the respondent should be
examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua
Jurisprudence abounds that administrative cases against lawyers non for the declaration of the nullity of marriage. What is important
belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and may is "the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. The basic party’s psychological condition."
premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether
different from administrative matters, such that the Interestingly, in the same year (2000) that Marcos was decided,
disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third the Court backtracked a bit when it held inRepublic v.
and vice versa.39 The Court’s exposition in In re Almacen40 is Dagdag44 that, "the root cause of psychological incapacity
instructive, thus: must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently
proven by experts" and this requirement was not deemed
x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. complied with where no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified on
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of the alleged psychological incapacity of one party.
an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into
the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict Significantly, the New Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. Marriages,45 promulgated by this Court on March 15, 2003, geared
[They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest towards the relaxation of the requirement of expert opinion.
is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination Section 2, paragraph (d) states:
is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
(d) What to allege.- A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the
with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the
end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession
celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest
and the proper and honest administration of justice by
only after its celebration.
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct
have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations,
with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time
an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not
speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. be alleged.

119
In Barcelona v. Court of Appeals,46 this Court categorically At this juncture, it is imperative that the parties be reminded of the
explained that under the New Rules, a petition for declaration of State’s policy on marriage. Article XV of the Constitution mandates
nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code need not allege expert that:
opinion on the psychological incapacity or on its root cause. What
must be alleged are the physical manifestations indicative of SEC. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation
said incapacity. The Court further held that the New Rules, being of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
procedural in nature, apply to actions pending and unresolved at actively promote its total development.
the time of their adoption.
SEC. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
Later, in 2005, the Court reiterated the Marcos doctrine foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
in Republic v. Iyoy.47 Thus:
This State policy on the inviolability of marriage has been
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there is enshrined in Article 1 of the Family Code which states that:
no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should
ART. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union,
be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of
for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation
marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is
of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
no longer necessary to allege expert opinion in a petition under
consequences, and incidents are governed by law, and not subject
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Such
to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by
totality of the evidence presented during the trial.
this Code.
Significantly, the present case is exactly akin to Pesca v.
Given the foregoing provisions of constitutional and statutory law,
Pesca.48 Pesca stemmed from a complaint for declaration of nullity
this Court has held fast to the position that any doubt as to the
of marriage under Article 36 filed by a battered wife sometime in
validity of a marriage is to be resolved in favor of its
April 1994. The trial court, in its Decision dated November 15,
validity.52 Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.
1995, decreed the marriage void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. The Court of Of course, the law recognizes that not all marriages are made in
Appeals reversed the trial court’s Decision, applying heaven. Imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect
theGuidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of unions. Thus, when the imperfection is psychological in nature and
Appeals49 and Molina.50 When the matter was brought to this renders a person incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
Court, the wife argued that Santos and Molina should not have obligations, the State provides refuge to the aggrieved spouse
retroactive application, the Guidelines being merely advisory and under Article 36 of the Family Code which reads:
not mandatory in nature. She submitted that the proper application
of Santos and Molina warranted only a remand of her case to the ART. 36. A marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of
trial court for further proceedings, not a dismissal. The Court celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
declined to remandPesca51 on the premise that essential marital obligations of marriage shall likewise be void
the Santos and Molina Guidelines "constitute a part of the law even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
as of the date the statute is enacted," thus: solemnization.

The ‘doctrine of stare decisis,’ ordained in Article 8 of the Civil In Molina,53 the Court laid down the Guidelines for the
Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the interpretation and application of Article 36, thus:
law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
follows the settled legal maxim – ‘legis interpretado legis vim
obtinet’ that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
competent court has the force of law. The interpretation or existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. x x x.
construction placed by the courts establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the the court that the parties, or one of them, were mentally or
familiar rule of ‘lex prospicit, non replicit.’ psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
The Court then opted to examine the evidence. It affirmed that the
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
wife failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the
application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem
part of her husband. The Court then concluded that "emotional
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
immaturity and irresponsibility" cannot be equated with
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
psychological incapacity.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
Applying the foregoing cases, Marcos, Barcelona, Iyoy, clinical psychologists.
and Pesca, to the instant case, there is no reason to remand it to
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the trial court. The records clearly show that there is sufficient
the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that
evidence to establish the psychological condition of Justo.
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s."
III The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or
Whether the totality of evidence in the case prior thereto.
shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo
as to justify the declaration of nullity of marriage. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
The last issue left for this Court’s consideration is whether the absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
totality of the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
psychological incapacity on the part of Justo so as to justify the Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
dissolution of the marriage in question. of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.

120
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of To explain this anomaly, respondent presented a Special Power
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be of Attorney (SPA) executed in his favor by complainant to
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her negotiate for an agricultural or crop loan from the Bais Rural Bank
own children as an essential obligation of marriage. of Bais City. Instead of exculpating respondent, the presence of
the SPA places him in hot water. For if he was so authorized to
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability obtain loans from the banks, then why did he have to falsify his
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, wife’s signatures in the bank loan documents? The purpose of an
"mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional SPA is to especially authorize the attorney-in-fact to sign for and
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The on behalf of the principal using his own name.
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there ON THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITY AND CONCUBINAGE
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively The evidence against respondent is overwhelming. The affidavit-
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby statements of his children and three other persons who used to
complying with the obligations essential to marriage. work with him and have witnessed the acts indicative of his
infidelity more than satisfy this Court that respondent has strayed
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by from the marital path. The baptismal certificate of Cyndee Rose
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband Paras where respondent was named as the father of the child
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in (Annex "J", Rollo, p. 108); his naming the child after his deceased
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital first-born daughter Cyndee Rose; and his allowing Jocelyn Ching
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by and the child to live in their house in Dumaguete City bolster the
evidence and included in the text of the decision. allegation that respondent is carrying on an illicit affair with Ms.
Ching, the mother of his illegitimate child.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not While this Court is convinced that the charges hurled against Justo
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. by Rosa, such as sexual infidelity, falsification of her
signature, abandonment and inadequate support of children,
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and are true, nonetheless, there is nothing in the records showing that
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No they were caused by a psychological disorder on his part. In other
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues words, the totality of the evidence is not sufficient to show that
a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating Justo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case marital obligations.
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification The records indicate that the marriage between the parties had a
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted good start, resulting in the birth of their four (4) children. The early
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge days of their cohabitation were blissful and harmonious. Justo was
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under deeply in love with Rosa, even persuading his mother to give her
Canon 1095. a dowry. They were able to build a 10-room family home and
acquire several properties, thus, proving themselves to be
The foregoing Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements responsible couple. Even Rosa admitted that Justo took care of
mandated by the Court in Santos,54 to reiterate: psychological their children when they were young. Unfortunately, the passage
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical of time appeared to have taken its toll on their relationship. The
antecedence; and (c) incurability. acts committed by Justo appeared to have been the result of
irreconcilable differences between them caused by the death of
A review of the complaint, as well as the testimonial and
their two (2) children and financial difficulties due to his failure to
documentary evidence, shows that Rosa’s main grounds in
win the mayoralty election and to sustain his law practice.
seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Justo are
Furthermore, the superior business acumen of Rosa, as well as
his infidelity, profligacy which includes the falsification of her
the insolent attitude of her family towards Justo, busted his ego
signature in one of the loan documents, failure to support the
and lowered his self-esteem.
children, andabandonment of the family. Both the courts below
found the charges unsubstantiated and untrue. However, this There is no evidence that Justo’s "defects" were present at the
Court, in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment, found the evidence inception of the marriage. His "defects" surfaced only in the latter
sufficient to support Rosa’s charges of sexual infidelity, falsification years when these events took place; their two children died; he
of her signature, and abandonment of family, thus: lost in the election; he failed in his business ventures and law
practice; and felt the disdain of his wife and her family. Surely,
ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION OF COMPLAINANT’S
SIGNATURE these circumstances explain why Rosa filed the present case only
after almost 30 years of their marriage.
The handwriting examination conducted by the National Bureau of
Equally important is that records fail to indicate that Justo’s
Investigation on the signatures of complainant Rosa Yap Paras
"defects" are incurable or grave.
and respondent Justo de Jesus Paras vis-à-vis the questioned
signature "Rosa Y. Paras" appearing in the questioned bank loan The following catena of cases provides an adequate basis why the
documents, contracts of mortgage and other related instrument, marriage between Justo and Rosa should not be annulled.
yielded the following results:
In Dedel v. Court of Appeals55 which involved a promiscuous wife
CONCLUSION: who left her family to live with one of her many paramours, this
Court ruled that the acts of sexual infidelity and abandonment
1. The questioned and the standard sample signatures JUSTO J.
do not constitute psychological incapacity absent a showing
PARAS were written by one and the same person.
of the presence of such promiscuity at the inception of the
2. The questioned and the standard sample signatures ROSA YAP marriage, thus:
PARAS were not written by one and the same person. (Annex "B",
x x x. In this case, respondent’s sexual infidelity can hardly qualify
Rollo, p. 26, emphasis ours;)
as being mentally or physically ill to such an extent that she could
The NBI did not make a categorical statement that respondent not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing
forged the signatures of complainant. However, an analysis of the them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof. It appears
above findings lead to no other conclusion than that the questioned that respondent’s promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the
or falsified signatures of complainant Rosa Y. Paras were inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the
authored by respondent as said falsified signatures were the same records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later
as the sample signatures of respondent. affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children.

121
Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the
not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling
contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.
incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of (110a)
a disordered personality which make
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential Article 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of
obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal
immaturity, or sexual promiscuity. obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the
absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate
In Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,56 the wife’s inability to conceive properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or
led her husband to other women so he could fulfill his ardent wish fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from their separate
to have a child of his own flesh and blood. This Court ruled that properties. (111a)
this is not a manifestation of psychological incapacity in the
contemplation of the Family Code. In Choa v. Choa,57 this Court Article 71. The management of the household shall be the right
declared that a mere showing of irreconcilable and duty of both spouses. The expenses for such management
differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70. (115a)
psychological incapacity. And, again, in Iyoy,58 a Filipina left her 61 Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the
husband, married an American and had a family by him, which she
following grounds:
flaunted to her former husband. This Court ruled that these acts,
while embarrassing and hurting to the latter, did not (1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct
satisfactorily establish a serious or grave psychological or directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
mental defect of an incurable nature present at the time of petitioner;
marriage; and that irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility, (2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to
physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or change religious or political affiliation;
perversion, and abandonment per se do not warrant a finding
of psychological incapacity under Article 36. (3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution,
What is clear in this case is a husband who has gone astray from or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
the path of marriage because of a conflicting relationship with his
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of
wife and her family and repeated life’s setbacks. While these do
more than six years, even if pardoned;
not justify his sins, they are not sufficient to establish that he is
psychologically incapacitated. (5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 contemplates downright (6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and assume the basic
marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much (7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous
less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. 59 As this Court marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
repeatedly declares, Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time (8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
the causes thereof manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration
of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to (10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the cause for more than one year.
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital
obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 FIRST DIVISION
and 225 of the Family Code.60

Neither should Article 36 be equated with legal separation, in

LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, G.R. No. 165424
which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity
but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil Petitioner,
interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelity, and abandonment,
and the like. At best the evidence presented by petitioner refers Present:
only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage
void.61

In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
the Court of Appeals. While this Court commiserates with Rosa’s
CARPIO,*
plight, however, it has no choice but to apply the law. Dura lex sed
lex. - v e r s u s - CORONA,
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and AZCUNA and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49915
are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Chief Justice, Corona, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur. CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI
60 Supra, footnote 2, citing: and THE REPUBLIC OF THE

Article 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, PHILIPPINES,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
Respondents. Promulgated:
and support. (109a)

Article 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In April 16, 2008
case of disagreement, the court shall decide.

122
x---------------------------------------------- impulsive decision to get married despite having gone steady with
-----x respondent for only six months.

Moreover, she added that both petitioner and respondent were

psychologically incapacitated to perform their essential marital
RESOLUTION obligations as they never lived together as husband and wife. They
CORONA, J.: also never consummated their marriage. Furthermore, they
constantly fought. Their separation was inevitable as they were
both immature. Dr. Dayan then abruptly concluded that petitioner's
psychological incapacity was grave and incurable.
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeks to set aside the January 26, 2004 decision[1] and In this case, although petitioner was able to establish his
September 24, 2004 resolution[2]of the Court of Appeals (CA) in immaturity, as evidenced by the psychological report and as
CA-G.R. CV No. 60010. testified to by him and Dr. Dayan, the same hardly constituted
sufficient cause for declaring the marriage null and void on the
Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili and respondent Chona M. ground of psychological incapacity. It had to be characterized by
Santos-Halili[3] were only 21 and 19 years of age, respectively, gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. [6]
when they got married on July 4, 1995 at the City Hall of Manila.
After the wedding, they continued to live with their respective In Republic v. CA and Molina,[7] we ruled that the psychological
parents and never lived together but maintained the relationship incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect
nonetheless. in the performance of some marital obligations. A mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not
A year after, the couple started bickering constantly. Petitioner equate to psychological incapacity.[8] Proof of a natal or
stopped seeing respondent and went on dates with other women. supervening disabling factor, an adverse integral element in
It was at this time that he started receiving prank calls telling him petitioner's personality structure that effectively incapacitated him
to stop dating other women as he was already a married man. from complying with his essential marital obligations, [9] had to be
shown. In this, petitioner failed.
Thereafter, petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City, Branch 158 a petition for the declaration of nullity of the The evidence adduced by petitioner merely showed that he and
marriage on the ground that he was psychologically incapacitated respondent had difficulty getting along with each other as they
to fulfill his essential marital obligations to respondent.[4] He constantly fought over petty things.[10] However, there was no
claimed that he thought that the wedding performed at the City Hall showing of the gravity and incurability of the psychological
of Manila was a joke and that the marriage certificate he signed disorder supposedly inherent in petitioner, except for the mere
was fake. He also pointed out that he and respondent never lived statement or conclusion to that effect in the psychological report.
together as husband and wife and never consummated the The report, and even the testimonies given by petitioner and his
marriage. expert witness at the trial, dismally failed to prove that petitioner's
alleged disorder was grave enough and incurable to bring about
The RTC granted the petition and declared petitioner
his disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. Petitioner also made much of the fact that he and respondent
never lived together as husband and wife. This, however, fails to
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and
move us considering that there may be instances when, for
held that, taken in totality, the evidence for petitioner failed to
economic and practical reasons, a married couple might have to
establish his psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved for
live separately though the marital bond between them
reconsideration. The same was denied. Hence, this petition.
remains.[11] In fact, both parties were college students when they
got married and were obviously without the financial means to live
on their own. Thus, their not having lived together under one roof
The question before us is whether or not the totality of evidence did not necessarily give rise to the conclusion that one of them was
presented is sufficient to prove that petitioner suffered from psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
psychological incapacity which effectively prevented him from obligations. It is worth noting that petitioner himself admitted that
complying with his essential marital obligations. he and respondent continued the relationship after the marriage
ceremony. It was only when they started fighting constantly a year
later that he decided to file a petition to have the marriage
annulled. It appears that petitioner just chose to give up on the
We deny the petition.
marriage too soon and too easily.

Petitioner had the burden of proving the nullity of his marriage with
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The January 26,
respondent.[5] He failed to discharge the burden.
2004 decision and September 24, 2004 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010 are AFFIRMED.

The evidence for petitioner consisted of his own testimony and a Costs against petitioner.
psychological report written by Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, Ph. D., a
SO ORDERED.
clinical psychologist, who also testified on the matters contained
therein.

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

According to Dr. Dayan, petitioner was suffering from a personality
disorder characterized as a mixed personality disorder from self-
defeating personality to dependent personality disorder brought LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, G.R. No. 165424
about by a dysfunctional family background. Petitioner's father was
very abusive and domineering. Although petitioner and his siblings Petitioner,
were adequately supported by their father, a very wealthy man,
Present:
they lacked affirmation. Because of this, petitioner grew up without
self-confidence and very immature. He never really understood PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
what it meant to have a family, much less to be a husband.
According to Dr. Dayan, this was very much evident in petitioner's CORONA,

123
- v e r s u s - VELASCO, JR.,* that the evidence he presented, especially the testimony of his
expert witness, was more than enough to sustain the findings and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and conclusions of the trial court that he was and still is psychologically
incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
PERALTA,** JJ.

CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI
We grant the motion for reconsideration.
and THE REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES,
In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the
Respondents. Promulgated:
Philippines,[4] this Court reiterated that courts should interpret the
June 9, 2009 provision on psychological incapacity (as a ground for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage) on a case-to-case basis guided
x---------------------------------------------- by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
----x psychological disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals.

RESOLUTION Accordingly, we emphasized that, by the very nature of Article 36,

courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-
CORONA, J.:
making, must consider as essential the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental disposition of the parties.[5]

This resolves the motion for reconsideration of the April 16, In this case, the testimony[6] of petitioners expert witness revealed
2008 resolution of this Court denying petitioners petition for review that petitioner was suffering from dependent personality disorder.
on certiorari (under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court). The petition Thus:
sought to set aside the January 26,
2004 decision[1] and September 24, 2004 resolution[2] of the Court
of Q. Dr. Dayan, going back to the examinations and interviews which
you conducted, can you briefly tell this court your findings [and]
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010.
conclusions?

Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his A. Well, the petitioner is suffering from a personality disorder. It
marriage to respondent Chona M. Santos-Halili null and void on
is a mixed personality disorder from self-defeating personality
the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential disorder to [dependent] personality disorder and this is brought
obligations of marriage in the Regional Trial Court
about by [a] dysfunctional family that petitioner had. He also
(RTC), Pasig City, Branch 158.
suffered from partner relational problem during his marriage with
Chona. There were lots of fights and it was not truly a marriage,
sir.
He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was
a joke. After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband
and wife, but maintained the relationship. However, they started
Q. Now, what made you conclude that Lester is suffering from
fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to
psychological incapacity to handle the essential obligations of
stop seeing respondent and started dating other women.
marriage?
Immediately thereafter, he received prank calls telling him to stop
dating other women as he was already a married man. It was only
upon making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was
not fake. A. Sir, for the reason that his motivation for marriage was very
questionable. It was a very impulsive decision. I dont think he
understood what it meant to really be married and after the
marriage, there was no consummation, there was no sexual
Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed
intercourse, he never lived with the respondent. And after three
personality disorder, particularly dependent and self-defeating
months he refused to see or talk with the respondent and
personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr.
afterwards, I guess the relationship died a natural death, and he
Natividad Dayan. The court a quo held that petitioners personality
never thought it was a really serious matter at all.
disorder was serious and incurable and directly affected his
capacity to comply with his essential marital obligations to
respondent. It thus declared the marriage null and void. [3]
xx xx xx

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial
court on the ground that the totality of the evidence presented Q. Likewise, you stated here in your evaluation that Lester Halili
failed to establish petitioners psychological incapacity. Petitioner and respondent suffered from a grave lack of discretionary
moved for reconsideration. It was denied. judgment. Can you expound on this?

A. xx xx I dont think they truly appreciate the civil [rites which] they
had undergone. [It was] just a spur of the moment decision that
The case was elevated to this Court via a petition for review under they should get married xx xx I dont think they truly considered
Rule 45. We affirmed the CAs decision and resolution upholding themselves married.
the validity of the marriage.

xx xx xx
Petitioner then filed this motion for reconsideration reiterating his
argument that his marriage to respondent ought to be declared null
and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity. He stressed

124
Q. Now [from] what particular portion of their marriage were you
able to conclude xx xx that petitioner and respondent are suffering
from psychological incapacity?
Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioners personality
disorder was grave and incurable and already existent at the time
A. xx xx they never lived together[.] [T]hey never had a residence, of the celebration of his marriage to respondent. [16]
they never consummated the marriage. During the very short
relationship they had, there were frequent quarrels and so there
might be a problem also of lack of respect [for] each other and
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a
afterwards there was abandonment.
psychological condition that was grave and incurable and had a
deeply rooted cause. This Court, in the same Te case, recognized
that individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually
have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-
term.[17]Particularly, personality disorders are long-standing,
In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder[7] as inflexible ways of behaving that are not so much severe mental
disorders as dysfunctional styles of living.These disorders affect
[a] personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent
all areas of functioning and, beginning in childhood or
and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-
adolescence, create problems for those who display them and for
esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism
others.[18]
and are easily hurt by others comments. At times they actually
bring about dominance by others through a quest for
overprotection.
From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed
suffering from psychological incapacity that effectively renders him
unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood.
Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to make
declared null and void.
everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others,
may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such
as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe
they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is
their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get hereby GRANTED. The April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court and
approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when the January 26, 2004 decision andSeptember 24, 2004 resolution
alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010 are SET ASIDE.

In her psychological report,[8] Dr. Dayan stated that petitioners The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 158
dependent personality disorder was evident in the fact that dated April 17, 1998 is hereby REINSTATED.
petitioner was very much attached to his parents and depended
on them for decisions.[9] Petitioners mother even had to be the one
to tell him to seek legal help when he felt confused on what action SO ORDERED.
to take upon learning that his marriage to respondent was for
real.[10]

THIRD DIVISION
Dr. Dayan further observed that, as expected of persons suffering
from a dependent personality disorder, petitioner typically acted in
a self-denigrating manner and displayed a self-defeating EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, G.R. No. 161793
attitude. This submissive attitude encouraged other people to take
Petitioner,
advantage of him.[11] This could be seen in the way petitioner
allowed himself to be dominated, first, by his father who treated his Present:
family like robots[12] and, later, by respondent who was as
domineering as his father.[13] When petitioner could no longer take
respondents domineering ways, he preferred to hide from her
rather than confront her and tell her outright that he wanted to end - versus - YNARES-SANTIAG
their marriage.[14]
Chairperson,

AUSTRIA-MARTIN
Dr. Dayan traced petitioners personality disorder to his
ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, CHICO-NAZARIO,
dysfunctional family life, to wit:[15]
Respondent, NACHURA, and

PERALTA, JJ.
Q. And what might be the root cause of such psychological
incapacity? REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES,

Oppositor. Promulgated:
A. Sir, I mentioned awhile ago that Lesters family is dysfunctional.
The father was very abusive, very domineering. The mother has
been very unhappy and the children never had affirmation. They February 13, 2009
might [have been] x x x given financial support because the father
was [a] very affluent person but it was never an intact family. x x x
The wife and the children were practically robots. And so, I would x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
say Lester grew up, not having self-confidence, very immature and
somehow not truly understand[ing] what [it] meant to be a
husband, what [it] meant to have a real family life.

125
 but the patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would be
disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go home. [8]

After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle,

and stayed with his parents. His family then hid him from Rowena
and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him.[9]
DECISION

NACHURA, J.: In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by
his persistence that they should live with his parents, she said that
it was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted
ways.[10]
Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological
incapacity, since its incorporation in our laws, has become a clichd
subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats this
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a
case, however, with much ado, it having realized that current
petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective
Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the
by which psychological incapacity should be viewed, totally
basis of the latters psychological incapacity. This was docketed as
inconsistent with the way the concept was formulatedfree in form
Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.[11]
and devoid of any definition.

As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000,
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review
ordered the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
investigate whether there was collusion between the parties. [12] In
August 5, 2003 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General
CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the January 19, 2004
(OSG) entered its appearance and deputized the OCP to appear
Resolution[2] denying the motion for the reconsideration of the
on its behalf and assist it in the scheduled hearings.[13]
challenged decision.

On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report

The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
stating that it could not determine if there was collusion between
the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits. [14]

Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of

respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering organized
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both
by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was
parties psychologically incapacitated, and made the following
then initially attracted to Rowenas close friend; but, as the latter
findings and conclusions:
already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court
Rowena. That was in January 1996, when petitioner was a
sophomore student and respondent, a freshman.[3]
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:

Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood

one another and developed a certain degree of closeness towards EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male
each other. In March 1996, or around three months after their first adult born and baptized Born Again Christian at Manila. He
meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he finished two years in college at AMAComputer College last 1994
refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, and is currently unemployed. He is married to and separated from
however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented himself at my office
to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money and she, for a psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for
purchasing the boat ticket.[4] Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the grounds of
psychological incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon
Street, Quezon City.
However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their
pension house accommodation and daily sustenance fast
depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and
decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncles one deceased sister. Both his parents are also in the business
house and Edward to his parents home. As his family was abroad, world by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and
and Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him that she patient. This said virtues are said to be handed to each of the
would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her family member. He generally considers himself to be quiet and
uncles place.[5] simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting
people. After 1994, he tried his luck in being a Sales Executive of
Mansfield International Incorporated. And because of job
incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay
On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get
long in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a full
married. He was then 25 years old, and she, 20.[6] The two then
servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate
continued to stay at her uncles place where Edward was treated
himself from his friends even during his childhood days as he only
like a prisonerhe was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her
loves to read the Bible and hear its message.
uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to
leave Rowena.[7] At one point, Edward was able to call home and
talk to his brother who suggested that they should stay at their
parents home and live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a
who, however, suggested that he should get his inheritance so that lazy father and a disobedient wife. She is said to have not
they could live on their own. Edward talked to his father about this,

126
finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be
moments with her boyfriend prior to that with petitioner. undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up was
caused by both parties[] unreadiness to commitment and their
young age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting
boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved with herself.
In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner
and this became the foundation of their intimate relationship. After
a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is
having problems with his family. Respondent surprisingly retorted TESTS ADMINISTERED:
that she also hates her family and that she actually wanted to get
out of their lives.From that [time on], respondent had insisted to
petitioner that they should elope and live together. Petitioner
Revised Beta Examination
hesitated because he is not prepared as they are both young and
inexperienced, but she insisted that they would somehow manage Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
because petitioner is rich. In the last week of March 1996,
respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping and she already Draw A Person Test
bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
agreed to the idea and so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are
supposed to stay at the house of a friend of respondent, but they Sachs Sentence Completion Test
were not able to locate her, so petitioner was compelled to rent an
apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but could not find any MMPI
so it was suggested by respondent that they should go back and
seek help from petitioners parents. When the parties arrived at the
house of petitioner, all of his whole family was all out of the country
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
so respondent decided to go back to her home for the meantime
while petitioner stayed behind at their home. After a few days of
separation, respondent called petitioner by phone and said she
wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately and when Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally
he arrived at their house, respondent confronted petitioner as to immature and recklessly impulsive upon swearing to their marital
why he appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally and vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on
even threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got scared so he marriage.
went home again. Respondent would call by phone every now and
then and became angry as petitioner does not know what to
do. Respondent went to the extent of threatening to file a case Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be
against petitioner and scandalize his family in the still unsure and unready so as to commit himself to marriage. He
newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he would be able to make is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He is
amends and at this point in time[,] respondent brought the idea of absconded as an introvert as he is not really sociable and displays
marriage. Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to a lack of interest in social interactions and mingling with other
pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996, respondents uncle brought individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that he finds
the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,] petitioner it boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship
was made to sign the Marriage Contract before the especially to that of respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously
Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for any Marriage License. aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and timid type of
person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and spend a solemn
time alone.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until
after arrival of the parents of petitioner. But when the parents of
petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of
home. Petitioner was threatened in so many ways with her uncle the aggressive-rebellious type of woman. She is seen to be
showing to him many guns. Respondent even threatened that if he somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and
should persist in going home, they will commission their military glamour. She is seen to take move on marriage as she thought
friends to harm his family. Respondent even made petitioner sign that her marriage with petitioner will bring her good fortune
a declaration that if he should perish, the authorities should look because he is part of a rich family. In order to have her dreams
for him at his parents[‫ ]ۥ‬and relatives[‫ ]ۥ‬houses. Sometime in June realized, she used force and threats knowing that [her] husband is
of 1996, petitioner was able to escape and he went home. He told somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization that there is really no
his parents about his predicament and they forgave him and chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the relationship.
supported him by giving him military escort. Petitioner, however,
did not inform them that he signed a marriage contract with
respondent. When they knew about it[,] petitioner was referred for
counseling. Petitioner[,] after the counseling[,] tried to contact REMARKS:
respondent. Petitioner offered her to live instead to[sic] the home
of petitioners parents while they are still studying. Respondent
refused the idea and claimed that she would only live with him if Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself
they will have a separate home of their own and be away from his and marry himself before submitting to marital vows. Marriage
parents. She also intimated to petitioner that he should already get should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious
his share of whatever he would inherit from his parents so they can institution solemnized by religious and law. In the case presented
start a new life.Respondent demanded these not knowing [that] by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both
the petitioner already settled his differences with his own parties have impulsively taken marriage for granted as they are
family. When respondent refused to live with petitioner where he still unaware of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the
chose for them to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop point of weakening their relationship by his weak behavioral
harassing the home of his parents. He told her already that he was disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is extremely exploitative and
disinherited and since he also does not have a job, he would not aggressive so as to be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly
be able to support her. After knowing that petitioner does not have uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that she
any money anymore, respondent stopped tormenting petitioner is suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of
and informed petitioner that they should live separate lives. Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder that started since
childhood and only manifested during marriage. Both parties
display psychological incapacities that made marriage a big
mistake for them to take.[15]

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 Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision[16] declaring
solemnization.
the marriage of the parties null and void on the ground that both
parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.[17] The Republic, represented by the
OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal.[18]

As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision

Committee that drafted the Family Code, Article 36 was based on
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P.
Decision[19] in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed and set aside the Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v. Court of
trial courts ruling.[20] It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the Appeals:[33]
psychological incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist
did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the
information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological
incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision
antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil
short of the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals Code Revision Commission of the UP LawCenter, I wish to add
and Molina[21] needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage some observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge
under Article 36 of the Family Code.[22] The CA faulted the lower Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil
court for rendering the decision without the required certification of Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes
the OSG briefly stating therein the OSGs reasons for its agreement Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the
with or opposition to, as the case may be, the petition. [23] The CA present Article 36 in the Family Code.
later denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in the likewise
assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution.[24]
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought
of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by
review on certiorari. On June 15, 2005, the Court gave due course the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members
to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the
memoranda.[25] spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de facto.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for
an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based
on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between
In his memorandum,[26] petitioner argues that the CA erred in the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation,
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. He posits and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree
that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is
respondents psychological incapacity, but rather due to both one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even
parties psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out that the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the
there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the
actions of the OCP because the latter represented it during the
trial; and it had been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial
court orders and notices.[27] Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee
and Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the
preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and
formulated the definition of marriage as
For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum, [28] that the
annulment petition filed before the RTC contains no statement of
the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply
with. The root cause of the psychological incapacity was likewise a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a
not alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment
identified. The purported incapacity of both parties was not shown of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose
to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the clinical nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. Thus, the subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
OSG concludes that the requirements in Molina[29] were not property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by
satisfied.[30] law.

The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional
Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the parties is concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent,
null and void.[31] inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and
society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that
I. any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the
Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom
the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in
their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and,
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting
instead, opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of
the development of jurisprudence interpreting it.
marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was
thought that such an action would not only be an acceptable
alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of
Article 36 of the Family Code[32] provides: church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the
civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was, thus, requested to again
prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of
invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of

128
provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code
and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally
Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation produced the following revised provision even before the session
of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present was over:
provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes.
The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage
in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to (7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
wit: was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes
manifest after the celebration.
(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the dropped any reference to wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage and to
made manifest after the celebration. mentally incapacitated. It was explained that these phrases refer
to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the
idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation. There
as well as the following implementing provisions: being a defect in consent, it is clear that it should be a ground for
voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent
and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there
are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable
Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and
pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34. marriage.

Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute My own position as a member of the Committee then was that
nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.

xxxxxxxxx As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term

psychological or mental impotence, Archbishop Oscar Cruz
opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term is an
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists,
today may already be dissolved or annulled on the grounds that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code
proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well of Canon Law would rather express it as psychological or mental
as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law incapacity to discharge . . . Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that
unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but
Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as another meeting with not with another.
Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint
Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church
has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of lack One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the
of due discretion for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: Such incapacity must
clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard
disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone
choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; of the same sex.
marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or
who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the
Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of
machismo among husbands are manifestations of their The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the
sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence inclusion of the phrase and is incurable but Prof. Esteban B.
upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of
dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly. [34] how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that
it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that one may be
cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after
the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice
Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to
allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
In her separate opinion in Molina,[35] she expounded:

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision
marriages, viz.:
read:

1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of
contract;
the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was 2. reasons of public policy;
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is 3. special cases and special situations.
made manifest after the celebration.

129
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under three old canons: Canon #1081 required persons to be capable
special cases and special situations, hence, its special treatment according to law in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082
in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted. required that persons be at least not ignorant of the major
elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and
fear category) required that internal and external freedom be
present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground
produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment
for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being
called lack of due discretion and lack of due competence. Lack of
psychological in nature.
due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to
give valid consent at the time of the wedding and, therefore, the
union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or
of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is she made during the wedding ceremony.
capable of ratification or convalidation.

Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s

On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and
requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning. nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the
kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment.
The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably
provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly
change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of
of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious
Canon Law. willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for
what came after 1970.Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof
of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves
shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are consent at the time of the ceremony.[36]
incapable of contracting marriage: 3. (those) who, because of
causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage provided the model for what is
now Art. 36 of the Family Code: A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it might limit the
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
manifest only after its solemnization.
generis. The Committee desired that the courts should interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding
only two types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law.[37] The law is then
voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal so designed as to allow some resiliency in its application. [38]
annuls a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void,
i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental
marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed
Yet, as held in Santos,[39] the phrase psychological incapacity is
and consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics
not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers
can only be nullified by the formal annulment process which entails
to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal
party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that
hearing.
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 [40] of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
Such so-called church annulments are not recognized by Civil Law love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. The
as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of
lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples marriage.[41] This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with that in
have found themselves in limbofreed from the marriage bonds in Canon Law, thus:
the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid
civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions,
some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in 3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp
relationships.
conceptual distinction must be made between the second and third
paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of
discretionary judgment and the incapacity to assume the essential
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the difference
anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a
decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological house to Carmela, and on the assumption that they are capable
incapacity into the Family Codeand classified the same as a according to positive law to enter such contract, there remains the
ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally inexistent object of the contract, viz, the house. The house is located in a
from the beginning. different locality, and prior to the conclusion of the contract, the
house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of them. This is
the hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of the
canon. The third paragraph does not deal with the psychological
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old
process of giving consent because it has been established a priori
Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity,
that both have such a capacity to give consent, and they both know
in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a combination of

130
well the object of their consent [the house and its 3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani
particulars].Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object of the seems to have seen his way more clearly through this tangled
consent/contract which does not exist. The contract is invalid mess, proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction between
because it lacks its formal object. The consent as a psychological the inability to give consent on the one hand, and the inability to
act is both valid and sufficient. The psychological act, however, is fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his opinion that
directed towards an object which is not available. Urbano nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage, and
Navarrete summarizes this distinction: the third paragraph deals they are usually able to evaluate its implications. They would have
not with the positing of consent but with positing the object of no difficulty with positing a free and intelligent consent.However,
consent. The person may be capable of positing a free act of such persons, capable as they are of eliciting an intelligent and
consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he free consent, experience difficulty in another sphere: delivering the
assumes as a result of the consent he elicits. object of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had likewise
treated the difference between the act of consenting and the act of
positing the object of consent from the point of view of a person
afflicted with nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in
usually leaves the process of knowing and understanding and
1941 regarding psychic incapacity with respect to marriage arising
evaluating intact. What it affects is the object of consent: the
from pathological conditions, there has been an increasing trend
delivering of the goods.
to understand as ground of nullity different from others, the
incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage,
especially the incapacity which arises from sexual
anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical 3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of
jurisprudence has studied under this rubric. Consent. From the selected rotal jurisprudence cited, supra, it is
possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine
that the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage
(that is to say, the formal object of consent) can coexist in the same
The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual
person with the ability to make a free decision, an intelligent
anomalies always and in every case imply a grave
judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing of things. The
psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of
decision coram Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed
intellect, discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual anomalies
that such a spouse can have difficulty not only with regard to the
that are purely so that is to say, they arise from certain
moment of consent but also, and especially, with regard to the
physiological dysfunction of the hormonal system, and they affect
matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes that a person
the sexual condition, leaving intact the higher faculties however,
in such a condition is incapable of assuming the conjugal
so that these persons are still capable of free human acts. The
obligation of fidelity, although she may have no difficulty in
evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are
understanding what the obligations of marriage are, nor in the
certain anomalies of a sexual nature which may impel a person
weighing and evaluating of those same obligations.
towards sexual activities which are not normal, either with respect
to its frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the
activity itself [sadism, masochism, homosexuality]. However,
these anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was
higher faculties remain intact such that a person so afflicted not unusual to refer to this ground as moral impotence or psychic
continues to have an adequate understanding of what marriage is impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific incapacity
and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose rooted in some anomalies and disorders in the personality. These
marriage freely. The question though is whether such a person anomalies leave intact the faculties of the will and the intellect. It is
can assume those responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish it from the
he may be able to understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the impotence that constitutes the impediment dealt with by
incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage issues C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject incapable
from the incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather than the of binding himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent that the
incapacity to posit consent itself. anomaly renders that person incapable of fulfilling the essential
obligations. According to the principle affirmed by the long tradition
of moral theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur.
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually
confused, in this regard. The initial steps taken by church courts
were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit xxxx
consent or incapacity to posit the object of consent. A case c.
Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that the intellect,
under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either
deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This line of reasoning
or both of the contractants are not capable of initiating or
supposes that the intellect, at the moment of consent, is under the
maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of those
influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable
cases where one of the parties is so self-centered [e.g., a
conclusion that such a decision, made as it was under these
narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to begin
circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would be
a union with the other, let alone how to maintain and sustain such
incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as this
a relationship. A second incapacity could be due to the fact that
irresistible impulse, would not be a free act. But this is precisely
the spouses are incapable of beginning or maintaining a
the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that the intellect is always
heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very substance of
and continuously under such an irresistible compulsion? It would
matrimony. Another incapacity could arise when a spouse is
seem entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to think
unable to concretize the good of himself or of the other party.The
that there are certain cases in which one who is sexually
canon speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum
hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and evaluate quite
conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of realizing or
maturely what marriage is and what it implies; his consent would
contributing to the good of the other party qua persona rather
be juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit the
than qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of contracting
object of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in a
marriage. Such would be the case of a person who may be quite
normal way and with usually regularity. It would seem more correct
capable of procuring the economic good and the financial security
to say that the consent may indeed be free, but is juridically
of the other, but not capable of realizing the bonum conjugale of
ineffective because the party is consenting to an object that he
the other. These are general strokes and this is not the place for
cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by fire.
detained and individual description.

131
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete 3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be
circumstances of the case concerns a person diagnosed to be addressed is the source of incapacity specified by the canon:
suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion
respondent may have understood, on the level of the intellect, the that the clause is a reference to the personality of the
essential obligations of marriage, he was not capable of assuming contractant. In other words, there must be a reference to the
them because of his constitutional immorality. psychic part of the person. It is only when there is something in the
psyche or in the psychic constitution of the person which impedes
his capacity that one can then affirm that the person is incapable
according to the hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A person
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person
is judged incapable in this juridical sense only to the extent that he
as regards the fulfillment of responsibilities is determined not only
is found to have something rooted in his psychic constitution which
at the moment of decision but also and especially during the
impedes the assumption of these obligations. A bad habit deeply
moment of execution of decision. And when this is applied to
engrained in ones consciousness would not seem to qualify to be
constitution of the marital consent, it means that the actual
a source of this invalidating incapacity. The difference being that
fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent
there seems to be some freedom, however remote, in the
consideration that must be factored into the question of whether a
development of the habit, while one accepts as given ones psychic
person was in a position to assume the obligations of marriage in
constitution. It would seem then that the law insists that the source
the first place. When one speaks of the inability of the party to
of the incapacity must be one which is not the fruit of some degree
assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking
of freedom.[42]
at matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially atmatrimonium in
facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz
collocated the incapacity of the respondent to assume the
essential obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-
person, precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards case basis, that should determine whether a party to a marriage is
money and his apathy as regards the rights of others that he had psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower
violated.Interpersonal relationships are invariably disturbed in the courts judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of
presence of this personality disorder. A lack of empathy (inability Appeals,[43] ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and
to recognize and experience how others feel) is common. A sense binding on the appellate courts.[44]
of entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially favorable
treatment, is usually present. Likewise common is interpersonal
exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage of in order
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its
to achieve ones ends.
decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi
v. Court of Appeals,[45]explained that when private respondent
testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-
Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence
matrimonial obligations. One of them is the right to the communio in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel
vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless
centered around the good of the spouses and of the and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital
children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not have to be obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological
necessarily incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume incapacity.
any, or several, or even all of these rights. There are some cases
in which interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some
characteristic features of inability for interpersonal relationships in
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the
marriage include affective immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial
case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted,
traits.
as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards
in Molina,[46] thus:
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear
under what rubric homosexuality was understood to be invalidating
of marriage that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating because of
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the
the inability to evaluate the responsibilities of marriage, or because
following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36
of the inability to fulfill its obligations. Progressively, however, rotal
of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of
jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity to assume the
the bench and the bar:
obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was able to
consider, with charity, homosexuality as an autonomous ground of
nullity. This is to say that a person so afflicted is said to be unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
decision, the object of matrimonial consent is understood to refer belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
not only to the jus in corpus but also the consortium totius the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
essential obligations of marriage] certainly seems to be the more Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
adequate juridical structure to account for the complex of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on
phenomenon that homosexuality is. The homosexual is not the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees
necessarily impotent because, except in very few exceptional marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution
cases, such a person is usually capable of full sexual relations with at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
the spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person so afflicted protected by the state.
does not necessarily suffer from a grave lack of due discretion
because this sexual anomaly does not by itself affect the critical,
volitive, and intellectual faculties. Rather, the homosexual person The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and
is unable to assume the responsibilities of marriage because he is the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
unable to fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract. In other solidarity.
words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the defect of consent, as
in the defect of the object of consent.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)

medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the

132
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as
must be psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
the Churchwhile remaining independent, separate and apart from
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
each othershall walk together in synodal cadence towards the
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
the inviolable base of the nation.
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
thereto.
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or Canon 1095.[47]
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. membership concurred in the ponencia of then Associate Justice
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be concurred in the result and another threeincluding, as aforesaid,
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her Justice Romerotook pains to compose their individual separate
own children as an essential obligation of marriage. opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that
each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predelictions or generalizations, but according
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all
mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains in
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there court.[48]
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, [49] the Court
complying with the obligations essential to marriage. has applied the aforesaid standards, without too much regard for
the laws clear intention that each case is to be treated
differently, as courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in church tribunals.
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision. In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to
impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all
cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs exaggeration of Article 36
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. as the most liberal divorce procedure in the world. [50] The
It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and
which became effective in 1983 and which provides: sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume
little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social
institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has
become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently
are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
causes of psychological nature. schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to
continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of
marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.[51]
is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people,
it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate

133
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy
provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this
contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a
the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the psychological expert became increasingly important in such
parties and/or fabrication of evidence.[52] The Court should rather cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after
be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were
child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape. asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental capacity
at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged
and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid
consent.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys
psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the
foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of
marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this
psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment,
essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances
It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a
addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
sociopathic personality anomaly.[53] Let it be noted that in Article
36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same
is void from the very beginning.[54] To indulge in imagery, the During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of
declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The
burial to a stillborn marriage. result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment
cases that a person who could intellectually understand the
concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry.
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a
not pose too much of a concern for the Court. First and foremost, mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary
because it is none of its business. And second, because the prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.
judicial declaration of psychological incapacity operates as a
warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the normal spouse
would have become vigilant, and never again marry a person with Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient
a personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of psychological incapacity, not only to sexual anomalies but to all
the psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the latters kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
disorder recurring in their marriage. spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of
marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right
of the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment its totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the
of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since
Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,[55] there is need to 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct
that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a person; that the spouses must be other oriented since the
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the
to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. the obligations of marriage depends, according to Church
decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A
serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to
impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the
II. essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is
not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental
relationship to the other spouse.
We now examine the instant case.

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements

The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) necessary to the mature marital relationship:
months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged
marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist
who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital
incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the
classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondents, marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3)
that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.[56] stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an
ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage,
etc.
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary
task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but,
instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological
opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:
parties.[57]

At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal

Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows: communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the

134
psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill and severe enough to cause the individual mental stress or
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal relationships and normal
its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; functioning. Personality disorders are often recognizable by
(2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of adolescence or earlier, continue through adulthood and become
sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal less obvious in middle or old age. An individual may have more
responses consistently fall short of reasonable expectations. than one personality disorder at a time.

xxxx The common factor among individuals who have personality

disorders, despite a variety of character traits, is the way in which
the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and
occupational adjustment. Some individuals with personality
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who
disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic, paranoid,
doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any
obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness of their
other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more
behaviors. Such qualities may lead to trouble getting along with
traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological
other people, as well as difficulties in other areas of life and often
category.
a tendency to blame others for their problems. Other individuals
with personality disorders are not unpleasant or difficult to work
with but tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits can
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and
detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was dissatisfaction with life.
on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of
the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health
concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out viewpoints propose a variety of causes of personality
their responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due disorders. These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due theories and brain wave activity.
competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into civil
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of
divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of
development led to certain personality types. Thus, some
someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as
disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
promised at the time the marriage was entered into.[58]
Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and
phallic character types. Demanding and dependent behavior
(dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to derive from
fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity
and emotional aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at the
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals[59] emphasizes the importance of
anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead to
presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a
shallowness and an inability to engage in intimate
partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the
relationships. However, later researchers have found little
inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos[60] asserts,
evidence that early childhood events or fixation at certain stages
there is no requirement that the person to be declared
of development lead to specific personality patterns.
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a
physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a
a finding of psychological incapacity.[61] Verily, the evidence must genetic factor involved in the etiology of antisocial and borderline
show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest personality disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of other
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. personality disorders. Some family, adoption and twin studies
suggest that schizotypal personality may be related to genetic
factors.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis,
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline
that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and
personality, researchers have found that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-
in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert,
hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with
for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable
measures of aggression and a past history of suicide
presence of psychological incapacity.[62] Parenthetically, the
attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated with low
Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in
platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
pursuit eye movement.
Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[63] an option for the trial judge
to refer the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an
independent assessment and evaluation of the psychological state
of the parties. This will assist the courts, who are no experts in the Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph
field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious (EEG) have been reported in antisocial personality for many years;
determination of the case. The rule, however, does not dispense slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A study of
with the parties prerogative to present their own expert witnesses. borderline patients reported that 38 percent had at least marginal
EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in a control group.

Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment,

which we consider as adequate, produced the findings that both Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric
parties are afflicted with personality disordersto repeat, dependent Associations Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders
personality disorder for respondent. We note that The are categorized into three major clusters:
Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses personality disorders as
follows
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality
disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear to
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are have odd or eccentric habits and traits.
characteristic of a persons recent and long-term functioning.
Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to
isolated episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive

135
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by impairments in
personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often reasoning.
appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.

According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and

Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-
passive-aggressive personality disorders. Individuals who have social personality disorder is one of the four dramatic personality
these disorders often appear anxious or fearful. disorders, the others being borderline, histrionic and
narcissistic.[66]

The DSM-III-R also lists another category, personality disorder not

otherwise specified, that can be used for other specific personality
disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify as any of the
specific personality disorders. The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders
considered, the Court, in this case, finds as decisive the
psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus,
rules that the marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have both parties psychological incapacity. We further consider that the
long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.[64] trial court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses
deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.

Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality

Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following
disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living
manner
together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help
and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without
advice from others, allows others to make most of his important
decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even
when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his
A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and
own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get
submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem
approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when
and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are
alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being
easily hurt by others comments. At times they actually bring about
abandoned.[67] As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed
dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.
everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is
insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a
person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early clear direction in life.
adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to
make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from
others, may allow others to make most of their important decisions
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the
(such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they
respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder
believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing
makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This
things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in
finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her
order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or
abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her
helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being
tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional
abandoned.[65]
behavioral limitations imposed by society. [68] Moreover, as shown
in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no
qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and
of committing suicide.

and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable

psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they
contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is
intolerant of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by a
society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years, WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
disregard for the rights of others (either through exploitiveness or on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision and the
criminal behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite commonly, January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
child or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to blame CV No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
others. There is often a faade of charm and even sophistication Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.
that masks disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others
and the need to control others.
SO ORDERED.

Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they

also may befit some individuals who are prominent in business or THIRD DIVISION
politics whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the
rights of others may be hidden prior to a public scandal.

BENJAMIN G. TING, G.R. N

During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was Petitioner,
referred to as moral insanity. The term described immoral,

136
 Present:

On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years
to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., petition before the RTC of Cebu City
Carmen filed a verified
praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on
Chairperson,
Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered
- versus - from psychological
CARPIO MORALES,*incapacity even at the time of the celebration
of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest
CHICO-NAZARIO,
thereafter. [13]
NACHURA, and

PERALTA, JJ.
In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she
was already aware that Benjamin used to drink and gamble
occasionally with his friends.[14] But after they were married,
petitioner continued to drink regularly and would go home at about
Promulgated:
midnight or sometimes in the wee hours of the morning drunk and
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, violent. He would confront and insult respondent, physically
assault her and force her to have sex with him. There were also
Respondent. March 31, 2009
instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate of their
house.[15] Because of his drinking habit, Benjamins job as
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
anesthesiologist was affected to the point that he often had to
refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass the task
to other anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped calling
him for his services because they perceived petitioner to be
unreliable. Respondent tried to talk to her husband about the
DECISION
latters drinking problem, but Benjamin refused to acknowledge the
same.[16]

NACHURA, J.:
Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to
give financial support to their family and would even get angry at
her whenever she asked for money for their children. Instead of
providing support, Benjamin would spend his money on drinking
and gambling and would even buy expensive equipment for his
hobby.[17] He rarely stayed home[18] and even neglected his
obligation to his children.[19]
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside
the November 17, 2003 Amended Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA), and its December 13, 2004 Resolution[2] in CA-G.R. Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive
CV No. 59903. The appellate court, in its assailed decision and gambling.[20] He would gamble two or three times a week and
resolution, affirmed the January 9, 1998 Decision[3] of the Regional would borrow from his friends, brothers, or from loan sharks
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City, declaring the marriage whenever he had no money. Sometimes, Benjamin would pawn
between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio pursuant his wifes own jewelry to finance his gambling.[21] There was also
to Article 36 of the Family Code.[4] an instance when the spouses had to sell their family car and even
a portion of the lot Benjamin inherited from his father just to be able
to pay off his gambling debts.[22] Benjamin only stopped going to
The facts follow. the casinos in 1986 after he was banned therefrom for having
caused trouble, an act which he said he purposely committed so
that he would be banned from the gambling establishments. [23]

Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen In sum, Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological
Velez-Ting (Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were classmates incapacity consisted of the following manifestations:
in medical school.[5]They fell in love, and they were wed on July
26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with
their first child.
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his
family relationship and his profession;

At first, they resided at Benjamins family home in 2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his
Maguikay, Mandaue City.[6] When their second child was born, the excessive and regular drinking;
couple decided to move to Carmens family home in Cebu City.[7] In
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which
September 1975, Benjamin passed the medical board
Benjamin found it necessary to sell the family car twice and the
examinations[8] and thereafter proceeded to take a residency
property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts,
program to become a surgeon but shifted to anesthesiology after
because he no longer had money to pay the same; and
two years. By 1979, Benjamin completed the preceptorship
program for the said field[9] and, in 1980, he began working 4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown
for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmens family, as member of its by his failure and refusal to give regular financial support to his
active staff,[10] while Carmen worked as the hospitals Treasurer.[11] family.[24]

The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically
December 9, 1975; James Louis, born on August 25, 1977; Agnes incapacitated. He maintained that he is a respectable person, as
Irene, born on April 5, 1981; Charles Laurence, born on July 21, his peers would confirm. He said that he is an active member of
1986; Myles Vincent, born on July 19, 1988; and Marie Corinne, social and athletic clubs and would drink and gamble only for social
born on June 16, 1991.[12] reasons and for leisure. He also denied being a violent person,

137
except when provoked by circumstances.[25] As for his alleged
failure to support his family financially, Benjamin claimed that it
was Carmen herself who would collect his professional fees Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000,
from Velez Hospital when he was still serving there as practicing the CA rendered a Decision[38] reversing the trial courts ruling. It
anesthesiologist.[26] In his testimony, Benjamin also insisted that faulted the trial courts finding, stating that no proof was adduced
he gave his family financial support within his means whenever he to support the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically
could and would only get angry at respondent for lavishly spending incapacitated at the time he married Carmen since Dr. Oates
his hard-earned money on unnecessary things.[27] He also pointed conclusion was based only on theories and not on established
out that it was he who often comforted and took care of their fact,[39] contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of
children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a Appeals[40] and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and
week.[28] Molina.[41]

During the trial, Carmens testimony regarding Benjamins drinking Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration,
and gambling habits and violent behavior was corroborated by arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this
Susana Wasawas, who served as nanny to the spouses children case since the Molina decision was promulgated only on February
from 1987 to 1992.[29] Wasawas stated that she personally 13, 1997, or more than five years after she had filed her petition
witnessed instances when Benjamin maltreated Carmen even in with the RTC.[42] She claimed that the Molina ruling could not be
front of their children.[30] made to apply retroactively, as it would run counter to the principle
of stare decisis. Initially, the CA denied the motion for
reconsideration for having been filed beyond the prescribed
period. Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation explaining
compliance with the prescriptive period but the same was likewise
denied for lack of merit. Undaunted, respondent filed a petition
Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oate, a
for certiorari[43] with this Court. In a Resolution[44] dated March 5,
psychiatrist.[31] Instead of the usual personal interview, however,
2003, this Court granted the petition and directed the CA to resolve
Dr. Oates evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of
Carmens motion for reconsideration.[45] On review, the CA decided
stenographic notes taken during Benjamins deposition because
to reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on November 17, 2003, it
the latter had already gone to work as an anesthesiologist in a
issued an Amended Decision[46] reversing its first ruling and
hospital in South Africa. After reading the transcript of
sustaining the trial courts decision.[47]
stenographic notes, Dr. Oate concluded that Benjamins
compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling and physical abuse of
respondent are clear indications that petitioner suffers from a
personality disorder.[32] A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but
the same was denied by the CA in its December 13, 2004
Resolution.[48]
To refute Dr. Oates opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Hence, this petition.
Obra, a psychiatrist and a consultant at the Department of
Psychiatry in Don Vicente SottoMemorial Medical Center, as his
expert witness.[33] Dr. Obra evaluated Benjamins psychological
behavior based on the transcript of stenographic notes, as well as
the psychiatric evaluation report prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a
psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his
For our resolution are the following issues:
(Dr. Obras) interview with Benjamins brothers.[34] Contrary to Dr.
Oates findings, Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing wrong with
petitioners personality, considering the latters good relationship
with his fellow doctors and his good track record as I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare
anesthesiologist.[35] decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth under
the Santos and Molina cases;

On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its

Decision[36] declaring the marriage between petitioner and II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of
respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oates proof of psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute
findings and the admissions made by Benjamin in the course of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been
his deposition, and found him to be psychologically incapacitated liberalized; and
to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Specifically,
the trial court found Benjamin an excessive drinker, a compulsive
gambler, someone who prefers his extra-curricular activities to his III. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage
family, and a person with violent tendencies, which character traits between petitioner and respondent null and void [is] in accordance
find root in a personality defect existing even before his marriage with law and jurisprudence.
to Carmen. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby

rendered declaring the marriage between plaintiff and defendant We find merit in the petition.
null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. x x x

I. On the issue of stare decisis.

xxxx

The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to

SO ORDERED.[37] doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is
based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to
further argument.[49] Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate

138
the same issues,[50] necessary for two simple reasons: economy as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress
and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in itself. This stance reflects both respect for Congress' role and the
Article 8 of the Civil Code.[51] need to preserve the courts' limited resources.

This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of
applied by the English courts and was later adopted by the United reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes
States. Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Punos judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise,
discussion on the historical development of this legal principle in courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its
his dissenting opinion in Lambino v. Commission on Elections[52] is application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings;
enlightening: (2) it cannot accommodate changing social and political
understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad
constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist
judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means stand
respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.
by the thing and do not disturb the calm. The doctrine started with
the English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the beginning of
the 18th century, it is an established rule to abide by former
precedents where the same points come again in litigation. As the In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to
rule evolved, early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it follow the stare decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192
would not be followed if it were plainly unreasonable; (2) where cases. The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of
courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's separate but equal
the binding force of the decision was the actual principle or doctrine. Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law requirement
principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning that races be segregated on public transportation. In Brown, the
used to reach the decision. U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that separate . . . is
inherently unequal. Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles
of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored
Americans from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting,
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by
this Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by thestare
the framers of the U.S. Constitution. According to Hamilton, strict
decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan
rules and precedents are necessary to prevent arbitrary discretion
Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling
in the courts. Madison agreed but stressed that x x x once the
that certain provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional.
precedent ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law,
Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our first
it should be rejected. Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and
ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private
Madison disagree about the countervailing policy considerations
respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the
that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent. He added that
evaluation stage of the extradition process.
their ideas reveal a deep internal conflict between the
concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility
demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that the
Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries. An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will
show that courts are agreed on the factors that should be
considered before overturning prior rulings. These are workability,
reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in fact.
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof.
In addition, courts put in the balance the following determinants:
Consovoy's observation although stare decisis developed its own
closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and its merits.
life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been
isolated by legal scholars. The first, known as vertical stare
decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions
of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The second, The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow
known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must the stare decisis rule in constitutional litigations is Planned
follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court
vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable
horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing simply in defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule
choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship
precepts set in stone in our Constitution. to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of
repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have
so far developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant
of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare
changed or come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old
decisis constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare
rule of significant application or justification.[53]
decisis. Constitutional stare decisisinvolves judicial
interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare To be forthright, respondents argument that the doctrinal
decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied
important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is
decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the no longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck
binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds down in Pesca v. Pesca,[54] and again in Antonio v. Reyes.[55] In
sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: Stare decisis is these cases, we explained that the interpretation or construction
not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The rule of stare of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the
decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is
from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine
is again called upon to consider a question once decided. In the may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have
same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: the ultimate relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in
touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non
what we have said about it. In contrast, the application of stare respicit.
decisison judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As
Justice Stevens explains: after a statute has been construed,
either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other
federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36.

139
 psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a
husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such
Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen
the Molina doctrine. (18) years ago. Accordingly, we reverse the trial courts and the
appellate courts rulings declaring the marriage between petitioner
and respondent null and void ab initio.
We have not.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of
Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu- and significance to the marriage.[61] The psychological illness that
Te,[56] we declared that, in hindsight, it may have been must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should
inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. We awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
said that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally bond he or she is about to assume.[62]
became a straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological
incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which is not only contrary
to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioners defects
respect to psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as
were present at the time of the celebration of their marriage. She
on all fours with another.[57]
merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew that
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but
it is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing
opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the
temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, evidence adduced prove such defects to be incurable.
juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological
incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not
conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the
nullity of marriage.[58] At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive evidence in determining whether to declare the marriage
decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits between the parties null and void. Sadly, however, we are not
of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is convinced that the opinions provided by these experts
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual strengthened respondents allegation of psychological incapacity.
medical or psychological examination of the person concerned The two experts provided diametrically contradicting psychological
need not be resorted to.[59] The trial court, as in any other given evaluations: Dr. Oate testified that petitioners behavior is a positive
case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely indication of a personality disorder, [63] while Dr. Obra maintained
on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the that there is nothing wrong with petitioners personality. Moreover,
totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings. there appears to be greater weight in Dr. Obras opinion because,
aside from analyzing the transcript of Benjamins deposition similar
to what Dr. Oate did, Dr. Obra also took into consideration the
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize psychological evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist
in Ngo Te that each case involving the application of Article 36 in South Africa who personally examined Benjamin, as well as his
must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a (Dr. Obras) personal interview with Benjamins
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according brothers.[64] Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr.
to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on Obras findings.
a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals. Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioners
drinking and gambling problems, or his violent outbursts against
Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation
his wife. There is no valid excuse to justify such a behavior.
of the stringent requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the
Petitioner must remember that he owes love, respect, and fidelity
explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules
to his spouse as much as the latter owes the same to him.
on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Unfortunately, this court finds respondents testimony, as well as
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
the totality of evidence presented by the respondent, to be too
02-11-10-SC), viz.:
inadequate to declare him psychologically unfit pursuant to Article
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root 36.
cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the
It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor
verified written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist
of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro
have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely
matrimonio.[65] In this case, the presumption has not been amply
affect access to justice o poor litigants. It is also a fact that there
rebutted and must, perforce, prevail.
are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the
Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a on certiorari is GRANTED. The November 17, 2003 Amended
party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the Decision and the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of
presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903 are
court during the pre-trial conference.[60] accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to SO ORDERED.
present professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing
the root cause, gravity and incurability of a partys alleged
psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be
presented and, accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding
whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.

III. On petitioners psychological incapacity.

Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence

adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is

140
Republic of the Philippines Apart from the foregoing, petitioner complained that every time
SUPREME COURT Rodolfo would get drunk he became physically violent towards her.
Manila Their sexual relationship was also unsatisfactory. They only had
sex once a month and petitioner never enjoyed it. When they
FIRST DIVISION discussed this problem, Rodolfo would always say that sex was
sacred and it should not be enjoyed nor abused. He did not even
G.R. No. 180668 May 26, 2009
want to have a child yet because he claimed he was not ready.
MARIETA C. AZCUETA Petitioner, Additionally, when petitioner requested that they move to another
vs. place and rent a small room rather than live near his parents,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE COURT OF Rodolfo did not agree. Because of this, she was forced to leave
APPEALS, Respondents. their residence and see if he will follow her. But he did not.

DECISION During the trial of the case, petitioner presented Rodolfo’s first
cousin, Florida de Ramos, as a witness. In 1993, Ramos, the niece
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: of Rodolfo’s father, was living with Rodolfo’s family. She
corroborated petitioner’s testimony that Rodolfo was indeed not
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
gainfully employed when he married petitioner and he merely
Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
relied on the allowance given by his mother. This witness also
in CA-G.R. CV No. 86162 dated August 31, 2007,1 and its
confirmed that it was respondent’s mother who was paying the
Resolution dated November 20, 2007.2
rentals for the room where the couple lived. She also testified that
Petitioner Marietta C. Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta met in 1993. at one time, she saw respondent going to his mother’s house in
Less than two months after their first meeting, they got married on business attire. She learned later that Rodolfo told petitioner that
July 24, 1993 at St. Anthony of Padua Church, Antipolo City. At he has a job but in truth he had none. She also stated that
the time of their marriage, petitioner was 23 years old while respondent was still residing at the house of his mother and not
respondent was 28. They separated in 1997 after four years of living together with petitioner.
marriage. They have no children.
Petitioner likewise presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist.
On March 2, 2002, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court Dr. Villegas testified that after examining petitioner for her
(RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 72, a petition for declaration of psychological evaluation, she found petitioner to be mature,
absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, independent, very responsible, focused and has direction and
docketed as Civil Case No. 02-6428. ambition in life. She also observed that petitioner works hard for
what she wanted and therefore, she was not psychologically
Meanwhile, respondent failed to appear and file an answer despite incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
service of summons upon him. Because of this, the trial court marriage. Dr. Villegas added that based on the information
directed the City Prosecutor to conduct an investigation whether gathered from petitioner, she found that Rodolfo showed that he
there was collusion between the parties. In a report dated August was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties and
16, 2002, Prosecutor Wilfredo G. Oca found that there was no responsibilities. Dr. Villegas concluded that he was suffering from
collusion between the parties. Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe
inadequacy related to masculine strivings.
On August 21, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General entered its
appearance for the Republic of the Philippines and submitted a She explained that persons suffering from Dependent Personality
written authority for the City Prosecutor to appear in the case on Disorder were those whose response to ordinary way of life was
the State’s behalf under the supervision and control of the Solicitor ineffectual and inept, characterized by loss of self-confidence,
General. constant self-doubt, inability to make his own decisions and
dependency on other people. She added that the root cause of this
In her petition and during her testimony, petitioner claimed that her psychological problem was a cross-identification with the mother
husband Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to comply with who was the dominant figure in the family considering that
the essential obligations of marriage. According to petitioner, respondent’s father was a seaman and always out of the house.
Rodolfo was emotionally immature, irresponsible and continually She stated that this problem began during the early stages in his
failed to adapt himself to married life and perform the essential life but manifested only after the celebration of his marriage.
responsibilities and duties of a husband. According to Dr. Villegas, this kind of problem was also severe
because he will not be able to make and to carry on the
Petitioner complained that Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job
responsibilities expected of a married person. It was incurable
and instead always asked his mother for financial assistance.
because it started in early development and therefore deeply
When they were married it was Rodolfo’s mother who found them
ingrained into his personality.
a room near the Azcueta home and it was also his mother who
paid the monthly rental. Based on petitioner’s evidence, the RTC rendered a Decision
dated October 25, 2004, declaring the marriage between petitioner
Petitioner also testified that she constantly encouraged her
and Rodolfo as null and void ab initio, thus:
husband to find employment. She even bought him a newspaper
every Sunday but Rodolfo told her that he was too old and most With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the
jobs have an age limit and that he had no clothes to wear to job court finds that respondent totally failed in his commitments and
interviews. To inspire him, petitioner bought him new clothes and obligations as a husband. Respondent’s emotional immaturity and
a pair of shoes and even gave him money. Sometime later, her irresponsibility is grave and he has no showing of improvement.
husband told petitioner that he already found a job and petitioner He failed likewise to have sexual intercourse with the wife because
was overjoyed. However, some weeks after, petitioner was it is a result of the unconscious guilt felling of having sexual
informed that her husband had been seen at the house of his relationship since he could not distinguish between the mother and
parents when he was supposed to be at work. Petitioner the wife and therefore sex relationship will not be satisfactory as
discovered that her husband didn’t actually get a job and the expected.
money he gave her (which was supposedly his salary) came from
his mother. When she confronted him about the matter, Rodolfo The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder
allegedly cried like a child and told her that he pretended to have and therefore cannot make his own decision and cannot carry on
a job so that petitioner would stop nagging him about applying for his responsibilities as a husband. The marital obligations to live
a job. He also told her that his parents can support their needs. together, observe mutual love, respect, support was not fulfilled by
Petitioner claimed that Rodolfo was so dependent on his mother the respondent.
and that all his decisions and attitudes in life should be in
conformity with those of his mother. Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show
that respondent failed to comply with his marital obligations.

141
Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed decision
declared null and void on the account of respondent’s severe and dated July 19, 2005 fo the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo
incurable psychological incapacity. City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 02-6428 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage berween petitioner-appellee Marietta C.
xxx xxx xxx Azcueta and respondent Rodolfo B. Azcueta remains
VALID.5 (emphasis ours)
Wherefore premises considered, the marriage between Marietta
Azcueta and Rodolfo B. Azcuata is hereby declared null and void The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not
abinitio pursuant to Article 36 fo the Family Code. the totality of the evidence presented is adequate to sustain a
finding that Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
The National Statistics Office and the Local Civil Registrar of
his essential marital obligations.
Antipolo City are ordered to make proper entries into the records
of the parties pursuant to judgment of the court. The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment, submits that
the appellate court correctly ruled that the "totality of evidence
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Public Prosecutor and
presented by petitioner" failed to prove her spouse’s psychological
the Solicitor General.
incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code and settled
SO ORDERED.3 jurisprudence.

On July 19, 2005, the RTC rendered an Amended Decision 4 to We grant the petition.
correct the first name of Rodolfo which was erroneously
Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our Constitution
typewritten as "Gerardo" in the caption of the original Decision.
to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous
The Solicitor General appealed the RTC Decision objecting that social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.6 Our
(a) the psychiatric report of Dr. Villegas was based solely on the family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere
information provided by petitioner and was not based on an contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally
examination of Rodolfo; and (b) there was no showing that the interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good,
alleged psychological defects were present at the inception of solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens our
marriage or that such defects were grave, permanent and social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the
incurable. concern alone of the family members.7

Resolving the appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and essentially Thus, the Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court
ruled that petitioner failed to sufficiently prove the psychological of Appeals and Molina8 stringent guidelines in the interpretation
incapacity of Rodolfo or that his alleged psychological disorder and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
existed prior to the marriage and was grave and incurable. In
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
setting aside the factual findings of the RTC, the CA reasoned that:
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
The evidence on record failed to demonstrate that respondent’s existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
alleged irresponsibility and over-dependence on his mother is dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
symptomatic of psychological incapacity as above explained. Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on
xxx xxx xxx the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
Also worthy of note is petitioner-appellee’s failure to prove that
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
respondent’s supposed psychological malady existed even before
are to be "protected" by the state.
the marriage. Records however show that the parties were living
in harmony in the first few years of their marriage and were living The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and
on their own in a rented apartment. That respondent often times the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
asks his mother for financial support may be brought about by his solidarity.
feeling of embarrassment that he cannot contribute at all to the
family coffers, considering that it was his wife who is working for (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
the family. Petitioner-appellee likewise stated that respondent (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
does not like to have a child on the pretense that respondent is not complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
yet ready to have one. However this is not at all a manifestation of explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
irresponsibility. On the contrary, respondent has shown that he that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although
has a full grasp of reality and completely understands the its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
implication of having a child especially that he is unemployed. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
only problem besetting the union is respondent’s alleged was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
irresponsibility and unwillingness to leave her (sic) mother, which could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
was not proven in this case to be psychological-rooted. knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as
The behavior displayed by respondent was caused only by his not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
youth and emotional immaturity which by themselves, do not of ejusdem generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108),
constitute psychological incapacity (Deldel vs. Court of Appeals, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
421 SCRA 461, 466 [2004]). At all events, petitioner-appellee has illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the psychologists.
part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the
contract, so immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
be equated with psychological incapacity (Pesca vs. Pesca, 356 celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
SCRA 588, 594 [2001]). As held by the Supreme Court: illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, refusal but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations, it is thereto.
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due
to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
of the marriage. (Navarro, Jr. vs. Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
162049, April 13, 2007). relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
xxx xxx xxx incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage

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obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like presented evidence in the form of testimony. 18 Significantly,
the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a petitioner’s narration of facts was corroborated in material points
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children by the testimony of a close relative of Rodolfo. Dr. Villegas likewise
and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be testified in court to elaborate on her report and fully explain the link
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her between the manifestations of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity
own children as an essential obligation of marriage. and the psychological disorder itself. It is a settled principle of civil
procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to
"mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The may indicate their candor or lack thereof. 19 Since the trial court
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a itself accepted the veracity of petitioner’s factual premises, there
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse drawn therefrom by petitioner’s expert witness.20
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby Second, the root cause of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity has
complying with the obligations essential to marriage. been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the petition,
sufficiently proven by expert testimony, and clearly explained in
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by the trial court’s decision.
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in The petition alleged that from the beginning of their marriage,
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital Rodolfo was not gainfully employed and, despite pleas from
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by petitioner, he could not be persuaded to even attempt to find
evidence and included in the text of the decision. employment; that from the choice of the family abode to the
couple’s daily sustenance, Rodolfo relied on his mother; and that
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial the couple’s inadequate sexual relations and Rodolfo’s refusal to
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not have a child stemmed from a psychological condition linked to his
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. relationship to his mother.1avvphi1
x x x.9 (Emphasis supplied)
These manifestations of incapacity to comply or assume his
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,10 the Court declared that marital obligations were linked to medical or clinical causes by an
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) expert witness with more than forty years experience from the field
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.11 It should refer to "no of psychology in general and psychological incapacity, in
less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to particular. In a portion of her psychiatric evaluation, Dr. Villegas
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that elucidated the psychodynamics of the case of petitioner and
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to Rodolfo, thus:
the marriage."12 The intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of Marietta is the eldest of 5 siblings, whose parents has very limited
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity education. Being the eldest, she is expected to be the role model
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.13 of younger siblings. In so doing, she has been restricted and
physically punished, in order to tow the line. But on the other hand,
However, in more recent jurisprudence, we have observed that she developed growing resentments towards her father and
notwithstanding the guidelines laid down in Molina, there is a need promised herself that with the first opportunity, she’ll get out of the
to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the family. When Rodolfo came along, they were married 1 ½ months
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article after they met, without really knowing anything about him. Her
36.14 Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori obsession to leave her family was her primary reason at that time
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its and she did not exercise good judgment in her decision making in
own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for marriage. During their 4 years marital relationship, she came to
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" realize that Rodolfo cannot be responsible in his duties and
with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the responsibilities, in terms of loving, caring, protection, financial
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, support and sex.
avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. 15 With
the advent of Te v. Te,16 the Court encourages a reexamination of On the other hand, Rodolfo is the 3rd among 5 boys. The father,
jurisprudential trends on the interpretation of Article 36 although who was perceived to be weak, and his two elder brothers were all
there has been no major deviation or paradigm shift from the working as seaman. Rodolfo who was always available to his
Molina doctrine. mother’s needs, became an easy prey, easily engulfed into her
system. The relationship became symbiotic, that led to a
After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find that prolonged and abnormal dependence to his mother. The mother,
there was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant the being the stronger and dominant parent, is a convenient role
annulment of the parties’ marriage under Article 36. model, but the reversal of roles became confusing that led to
ambivalence of his identity and grave dependency. Apparently, all
First, petitioner successfully discharged her burden to prove the
the boys were hooked up to his complexities, producing so much
psychological incapacity of her husband.
doubts in their capabilities in a heterosexual setting. Specifically,
The Solicitor General, in discrediting Dr. Villegas’ psychiatric Rodolfo tried, but failed. His inhibitions in a sexual relationship, is
report, highlights the lack of personal examination of Rodolfo by referable to an unconscious guilt feelings of defying the mother’s
said doctor and the doctor’s reliance on petitioner’s version of love. At this point, he has difficulty in delineating between the wife
events. In Marcos v. Marcos,17 it was held that there is no and the mother, so that his continuous relationship with his wife
requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be produces considerable anxiety, which he is unable to handle, and
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a crippled him psychologically.
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage
Based on the above clinical data, family background and outcome
based on psychological incapacity. What matters is whether the
of their marriage, it is the opinion of the examiner, that Mrs.
totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding of
Marietta Cruz-Azcueta is mature, independent and responsible
psychological incapacity.
and is psychologically capacitated to perform the duties and
It should be noted that, apart from her interview with the obligations of marriage. Due to her numerous personal problems
psychologist, petitioner testified in court on the facts upon which she has difficulty in handling her considerable anxiety, at present.
the psychiatric report was based. When a witness testified under There are strong clinical evidences that Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta is
oath before the lower court and was cross-examined, she thereby suffering from a Dependent Personality Disorder associated with

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severe inadequacy that renders him psychologically incapacitated Q: And it became manifested only after the celebration of the
to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. marriage?

The root cause of the above clinical condition is due to a strong A: Yes, ma’am.
and prolonged dependence with a parent of the opposite sex, to a
period when it becomes no longer appropriate. This situation Q: And can you please tell us the reason why it became
crippled his psychological functioning related to sex, self manifested with the…that the manifestation came too late?
confidence, independence, responsibility and maturity. It existed
A: The manifestation came too late because the history of Mr.
prior to marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration
Rodolfo Azcueta was very mild, no stresses, no demand on his
due to marital stresses and demands. It is considered as
life, at 24 years old despite the fact that he already finished college
permanent and incurable in nature, because it started early in his
degree of Computer Science, there is no demand on himself at
life and therefore became so deeply ingrained into his personality
least to establish his own, and the mother always would make the
structure. It is severe or grave in degree, because it hampered and
decision for him, ma’am.
interfered with his normal functioning related to heterosexual
adjustment.21 Q: Okay, Madame Witness, is this kind of psychological problem
severe?
These findings were reiterated and further explained by Dr.
Villegas during her testimony, the relevant portion of which we A: Yes ma’am.
quote below:
Q: Why do you consider this psychological problem severe,
xxx xxx xxx Madame Witness?
Q: Now, Madame Witness, after examining the petitioner, what A: Because he will not be able to make and to carry on the
was your psychological evaluation? responsibility that is expected of a married person, ma’am.
A: I’ve found the petitioner in this case, Mrs. Marietta Azcueta as Q: Is it incurable, Madame Witness?
matured, independent, very responsible, focused, she has
direction and ambition in life and she work hard for what she A: It is incurable because it started early in development and
wanted, ma’am, and therefore, I concluded that she is therefore it became so deeply ingrained into his personality, and
psychologically capacitated to perform the duties and therefore, it cannot be changed nor cured at this stage, ma’am.
responsibilities of the marriage, ma’am.
Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, that it is Permanent?
Q: How about the respondent, Madame Witness, what was your
A: It is permanent in nature, sir.
psychological evaluation with regards to the respondent?
Q: And last question as an expert witness, what is the effect of the
A: Based on my interview, I’ve found out that the husband Mr.
psychological problem as far as the marriage relationship of
Rodolfo Azcueta is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
Rodolfo Azcueta is concerned?
duties and responsibilities of marriage suffering from a psychiatric
classification as Dependent Personality Disorder associated with A: The effect of this will really be a turbulent marriage relationship
severe inadequacy related to masculine strivings, ma’am. because standard expectation is, the husband has to work, to feed,
to protect, to love, and of course, to function on (sic) the sexual
Q: In layman’s language, Madame Witness, can you please
duties of a husband to the wife, but in this case, early in their
explain to us what do you mean by Dependent Personality
marriage, they had only according to the wife, experienced once
Disorder?
sexual relationship every month and this is due to the fact that
A: Dependent Personality Disorder are (sic) those persons in because husband was so closely attached to the mother, it is a
which their response to ordinary way of life are ineffectual and result of the unconscious guilt feeling of the husband in defying the
inept characterized by loss of self confidence, always in doubt with mother’s love when they will be having heterosexual relationship
himself and inability to make his own decision, quite dependent on and therefore, at that point, he will not be able to distinguish
other people, and in this case, on his mother, ma’am. between the mother and the wife and therefore, sex relationship
will not be satisfactory according to expectation, ma’am.22
Q: And do you consider this, Madame Witness, as a psychological
problem of respondent, Rodolfo Azcueta? In Te v. Te, we held that "[b]y the very nature of Article 36, courts,
despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making,
A: Very much, ma’am. must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence
the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments
Q: Why?
of the parties."23
A: Because it will always interfered, hampered and disrupt his
Based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court clearly
duties and responsibilities as a husband and as a father, ma’am.
explained the basis for its decision, which we reproduce here for
Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness, what is the root emphasis:
cause of this psychological problem?
With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the
A: The root cause of this psychological problem is a cross court finds that respondent totally failed in his commitments and
identification with the mother who is the dominant figure in the obligations as a husband. Respondent’s emotional immaturity and
family, the mother has the last say and the authority in the family irresponsibility is grave and he has no showing of improvement.
while the father was a seaman and always out of the house, and if He failed likewise to have sexual intercourse with the wife because
present is very shy, quiet and he himself has been very submissive it is a result of the unconscious guilt felling of having sexual
and passive to the authority of the wife, ma’am. relationship since he could not distinguish between the mother and
the wife and therefore sex relationship will not be satisfactory as
Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness, under what expected.
circumstance this kind of psychological problem manifested?
The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder
A: This manifested starting his personality development and and therefore cannot make his own decision and cannot carry on
therefore, during his early stages in life, ma’am. his responsibilities as a husband. The marital obligations to live
together, observe mutual love, respect, support was not fulfilled by
Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, this kind of problem the respondent.
existed to Rodolfo Azcueta, the respondent in this case, before the
celebration of the marriage? Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show
that respondent failed to comply with his marital obligations.
A: Yes, ma’am.

144
Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be independently make decisions regarding even the most basic and
declared null and void on the account of respondent’s severe and ordinary matters that spouses face everyday; one who cannot
incurable psychological incapacity. contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-being of his
spouse is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital
Third, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was established to have obligations within the meaning of Article 36.
clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of
marriage. Contrary to the CA’s finding that the parties lived Sixth, the incurability of Rodolfo’s condition which has been deeply
harmoniously and independently in the first few years of marriage, ingrained in his system since his early years was supported by
witnesses were united in testifying that from inception of the evidence and duly explained by the expert witness.
marriage, Rodolfo’s irresponsibility, overdependence on his
mother and abnormal sexual reticence were already evident. To At this point, the Court is not unmindful of the sometimes peculiar
be sure, these manifestations of Rodolfo’s dependent personality predicament it finds itself in those instances when it is tasked to
disorder must have existed even prior to the marriage being rooted interpret static statutes formulated in a particular point in time and
in his early development and a by product of his upbringing and apply them to situations and people in a society in flux. With
family life. respect to the concept of psychological incapacity, courts must
take into account not only developments in science and medicine
Fourth, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity has been shown to be but also changing social and cultural mores, including the blurring
sufficiently grave, so as to render him unable to assume the of traditional gender roles. In this day and age, women have taken
essential obligations of marriage. on increasingly important roles in the financial and material
support of their families. This, however, does not change the ideal
The Court is wary of the CA’s bases for overturning factual findings that the family should be an "autonomous" social institution,
of the trial court on this point. The CA’s reasoning that Rodolfo’s wherein the spouses cooperate and are equally responsible for
requests for financial assistance from his mother might have been the support and well-being of the family. In the case at bar, the
due to his embarrassment for failing to contribute to the family spouses from the outset failed to form themselves into a family, a
coffers and that his motive for not wanting a child was his cohesive unit based on mutual love, respect and support, due to
"responsible" realization that he should not have a child since he the failure of one to perform the essential duties of marriage.
is unemployed are all purely speculative. There is no evidence on
record to support these views. Again, we must point out that This brings to mind the following pronouncement in Te:
appellate courts should not substitute their discretion with that of
the trial court or the expert witnesses, save only in instance where In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s
the findings of the trial court or the experts are contradicted by psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the
evidence. foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of
marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a
We likewise cannot agree with the CA that Rodolfo’s psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the
irresponsibility and overdependence on his mother can be essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond.
attributed to his immaturity or youth. We cannot overlook the fact It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence,
that at the time of his marriage to petitioner, he was nearly 29 years constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or
old or the fact that the expert testimony has identified a grave addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a
clinical or medical cause for his abnormal behavior. sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36,
there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is
In Te, the Court has had the occasion to expound on the nature of void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the
a dependent personality disorder and how one afflicted with such declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent
a disorder would be incapacitated from complying with marital burial to a stillborn marriage.26 (emphasis ours)
obligations, to wit:
In all, we agree with the trial court that the declaration of nullity of
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality the parties’ marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code is
disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living proper under the premises.
together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help
and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended Decision
advice from others, allows others to make most of his important dated July 19, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72,
decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even Antipolo City in Civil Case No. 02-6428 is REINSTATED.
when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his
own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get SO ORDERED.
approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when
Republic of the Philippines
alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. As
SUPREME COURT
clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated
Manila
to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and
gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive FIRST DIVISION
self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life. 24
G.R. No. 157649 November 12, 2012
Of course, this is not to say that anyone diagnosed with dependent
personality disorder is automatically deemed psychologically ARABELLE J. MENDOZA, Petitioner,
incapacitated to comply with the obligations of marriage. We vs.
realize that psychology is by no means an exact science and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and DOMINIC C.
medical cases of patients, even though suffering from the same MENDOZA, Respondents.
disorder, may be different in their symptoms or manifestations and
DECISION
in the degree of severity. It is the duty of the court in its evaluation
of the facts, as guided by expert opinion, to carefully scrutinize the BERSAMIN, J.:
type of disorder and the gravity of the same before declaring the
nullity of a marriage under Article 36. To entitle petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or
her marriage, the totality of the evidence must sufficiently prove
Fifth, Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the essential that respondent spouse's psychological incapacity was grave,
marital obligations embodied in Articles 68 to 71 of the Family incurable and existing prior to the time of the marriage.
Code.25 As noted by the trial court, as a result of Rodolfo’s
dependent personality disorder, he cannot make his own decisions Petitioner wife appeals the decision promulgated on March 19,
and cannot fulfill his responsibilities as a husband. Rodolfo plainly 2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the judgment
failed to fulfill the marital obligations to live together, observe of the Regional Trial Court in Mandaluyong City (RTC) declaring
mutual love, respect, support under Article 68. Indeed, one who is her marriage with respondent Dominic C. Mendoza (Dominic) as
unable to support himself, much less a wife; one who cannot null and void.

145
Antecedents her vulnerable and easy to forgive and forget. Petitioner also
believes that marriage was a partnership "for better and for worse",
Petitioner and Dominic met in 1989 upon his return to the country she gave all of herself unconditionally to respondent.
from his employment in Papua New Guinea. They had been next- Unfortunately, respondent cannot reciprocate. On the one hand,
door neighbors in the appartelle they were renting while they were respondent was found to have a personality that can be
still in college – she, at Assumption College while he, at San Beda characterized as inadequate, immature and irresponsible. His
College taking a business management course. After a month of criminal acts in the present time are mere extensions of his
courtship, they became intimate and their intimacy ultimately led misconduct established in childhood. His childhood experiences of
to her pregnancy with their daughter whom they named Allysa separations and emotional deprivation largely contributed to this
Bianca. They got married on her eighth month of pregnancy in civil antisocial (sociopathic) attitude and lifestyle.
rites solemnized in Pasay City on June 24, 1991,2 after which they
moved to her place, although remaining dependent on their She concluded that respondent had evidently failed to comply with
parents for support. what is required of him as a husband and father. Besides from his
adulterous relationship and irresponsibility, his malevolent conduct
When petitioner delivered Alyssa Bianca, Dominic had to borrow and lack of true remorse indicate that he is psychologically
funds from petitioner’s best friend to settle the hospital bills. He incapacitated to fulfill the role of a married man.7
remained jobless and dependent upon his father for support until
he finished his college course in October 1993. She took on The RTC found that all the characteristics of psychological
various jobs to meet the family’s needs, first as a part-time incapacity, i.e., gravity, antecedence and incurability, as set forth
aerobics instructor in 1992 and later, in 1993, as a full-time in Republic v. Court of Appeals (Molina),8 were attendant,
employee in Sanofi, a pharmaceutical company. Being the one establishing Dominic’s psychological incapacity, viz:
with the fixed income, she shouldered all of the family’s expenses
(i.e., rental, food, other bills and their child’s educational needs). Gravity — from the evidence adduced it can be said that
respondent cannot carry out the normal and ordinary duties of
On his part, Dominic sold Collier’s Encyclopedia for three months marriage and family shouldered by any average couple existing
after his graduation from college before he started working as a under ordinary circumstances of life and work. Respondent is
car salesman for Toyota Motors in Bel-Air, Makati in totally incapable of observing mutual love, respect and fidelity as
1994.3 Ironically, he spent his first sales commission on a well as to provide support to his wife and child. Ever since the start
celebratory bash with his friends inasmuch as she shouldered all of the marriage respondent had left all the household concerns and
the household expenses and their child’s schooling because his the care of their child to petitioner while he studied and indulged in
irregular income could not be depended upon. In September 1994, night outs with friends. This continued even when he finished his
she discovered his illicit relationship with Zaida, his co-employee studies and landed a job. He concealed his salary from the
at Toyota Motors. Eventually, communication between them petitioner and worse, had the gall to engage in sexual infidelity.
became rare until they started to sleep in separate rooms, thereby Likewise worthy of serious consideration is respondent’s
affecting their sexual relationship.4 propensity to borrow money, his deceitfulness and habitual and
continuous evasion of his obligations which (sic) more often than
In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as not had led to the filing of criminal cases against him.
a birthday present. Later on, he asked her to issue two blank
checks that he claimed would be for the car’s insurance coverage. Antecedence — Before the marriage petitioner was not aware of
She soon found out, however, that the checks were not paid for respondent’s personality disorder and it was only after marriage
the car’s insurance coverage but for his personal needs. Worse, that it begun to surface. Dr. Samson declared that respondent’s
she also found out that he did not pay for the car itself, forcing her behavioral equilibrium started at a very early age of fifteen. His
to rely on her father-in-law to pay part of the cost of the car, leaving dishonesty and lack of remorse are mere extensions of his
her to bear the balance of P120,000.00. misconduct in childhood which generally attributable to
respondent’s childhood experiences of separation and emotional
To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment deprivations. In fine, his psychological incapacity is but a product
after he ran away with P164,000.00 belonging to his employer. He of some genetic causes, faulty parenting and influence of the
was criminally charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 environment although its over manifestation appear only after the
and estafa, for which he was arrested and incarcerated. After wedding.
petitioner and her mother bailed him out of jail, petitioner
discovered that he had also swindled many clients some of whom Incurability — Respondent’s personality disorder having existed in
were even threatening petitioner, her mother and her sister him long before he contracted marriage with petitioner, there
themselves.5 appears no chance for respondent to recover any (sic) ordinary
means from such incapacity.
On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode
because petitioner asked him for "time and space to think things All told, the callous and irresponsible ways of respondent show
over." A month later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation, that he does not possess the proper outlook, disposition and
causing him to threaten to commit suicide. At that, she and her temperament necessary for marriage. Indeed, this ultimate
family immediately left the house to live in another place concealed recourse of nullity is the only way by which petitioner can be
from him. delivered from the bondage of a union that only proved to be a
mockery and brought pain and dishonor to petitioner. 9
On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the
declaration of the nullity of her marriage with Dominic based on his Ruling of the CA
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition. The Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that there was no
showing that Dominic’s personality traits either constituted
Ruling of the RTC psychological incapacity existing at the time of the marriage or
were of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code;
In the RTC, petitioner presented herself as a witness, together with that the testimony of the expert witness, while persuasive, was not
a psychiatrist, Dr. Rocheflume Samson, and Professor Marites conclusive upon the court; and that the real reason for the parties’
Jimenez. On his part, Dominic did not appear during trial and separation had been their frequent quarrels over financial matters
presented no evidence. and the criminal cases brought against Dominic.10
On August 18, 2000, the RTC declared the marriage between On March 19, 2003 the CA promulgated its assailed decision
petitioner and Dominic an absolute nullity,6 holding in part: reversing the judgment of the RTC.11 Specifically, it refused to be
bound by the findings and conclusions of petitioner’s expert
xxx. The result of Dr. Samson’s clinical evaluation as testified to
witness, holding:
by her and per Psychiatric Report she issued together with one Dr.
Doris Primero showed that petitioner appears to be mature, strong
and responsible individual. Godly, childlike trust however, makes

146
It has not been established to our satisfaction as well that Q: So you’re saying that the petitioner have an ill-feeling towards
respondent’s condition, assuming it is serious enough, was the respondent? At the time you interviewed?
present before or during the celebration of the marriage. Although
petitioner’s expert witness concluded that petitioner was A: Yes, Sir, during the first interview.
psychologically incapacitated even before the parties’ marriage,
Q: How about during the subsequent interview?
the Court refuses to be bound by such finding, in view of the fact
that the witness’ findings, admittedly, were concluded only on the A: During the subsequent interview more or less the petitioner was
basis of information given by the petitioner herself, who, at the time able to talk regarding her marital problems which is
of the examination, interview, was already head strong in her uncomfort(able), so she was able to adapt, she was able to
resolve to have her marriage with the respondent nullified, and condition herself regarding her problems, Sir.
harbored ill-feelings against respondent throughout her
consultation with Dr. Samson.12 Q: But the ill-feeling was still there?

The CA held the testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses insufficient A: But the feeling was still there, Sir.
to establish Dominic’s psychological affliction to be of such a grave
Q: Now, considering that this ill feeling of the petitioner insofar as
or serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted. Relying
the respondent is concerned, would you say that the petitioner
on the pronouncements in Republic v. Dagdag, 13 Hernandez v.
would only tell you information negative against the respondent?
Court of Appeals14 and Pesca v. Pesca,15 the CA observed:
A: Yes, may be Sir. But I do try to conduct or verify other people
In her testimony, petitioner described her husband as immature,
the facts given to me by the petitioner, Sir.
deceitful and without remorse for his dishonesty, and lack of
affection. Such characteristics, however, do not necessarily Q: And these other people were also people given to you or the
constitute a case of psychological incapacity. A person’s inability name are given to you by the petitioner, Madame Witness?
to share or take responsibility, or to feel remorse for his
misbehavior, or even to share his earnings with family members, A: Yes, Sir.17
are indicative of an immature mind, but not necessarily a medically
rooted psychological affliction that cannot be cured. In fine, the failure to examine and interview Dominic himself
naturally cast serious doubt on Dr. Samson’s findings. The CA
Even the respondent’s alleged sexual infidelity is not necessarily rightly refused to accord probative value to the testimony of such
equivalent to psychological incapacity, although it may constitute expert for being avowedly given to show compliance with the
adequate ground for an action for legal separation under Article 55 requirements set in Santos and Molina for the establishment of
of the Family Code. Nor does the fact that the respondent is a Dominic’s psychological incapacity.
criminal suspect for estafa or violation of the B.P. Blg. 22
constitutes a ground for the nullification of his marriage to The CA’s reliance on Dagdag, Hernandez and Pesca was not
petitioner. Again, it may constitute ground for legal separation misplaced. It is easy to see why.
provided the respondent is convicted by final judgment and
In Dagdag, we ruled that "Erlinda failed to comply with guideline
sentenced to imprisonment of more than six (6) years.16
No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological
Hence, this appeal by petitioner. incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently
proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified
Issues as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband."18 But
here, the expert’s testimony on Dominic’s psychological profile did
Petitioner assails the CA’s refusal to be bound by the expert not identify, much less prove, the root cause of his psychological
testimony and psychiatric evaluation she had presented in the trial incapacity because said expert did not examine Dominic in person
of the case, and the CA’s reliance on the pronouncements in before completing her report but simply relied on other people’s
Dagdag, Hernandez and Pesca, supra. She contends that the recollection and opinion for that purpose.
report on the psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Samson
more than complied with the requirements prescribed in Santos v. In Hernandez, we ruminated that:
Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA
20) and Molina. She insists that the CA should have applied the xxx expert testimony should have been presented to establish the
ruling in Marcos v. Marcos (G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, precise cause of private respondent’s psychological incapacity, if
343 SCRA 755) to the effect that personal medical or any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage.
psychological examination was not a requirement for a declaration The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon
of psychological incapacity. petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
Ruling autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of
the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
The appeal has no merit. validity of the marriage.19
We consider the CA’s refusal to accord credence and weight to the but the expert evidence submitted here did not establish the
psychiatric report to be well taken and warranted. The CA correctly precise cause of the supposed psychological incapacity of
indicated that the ill-feelings that she harbored towards Dominic, Dominic, much less show that the psychological incapacity existed
which she admitted during her consultation with Dr. Samson, at the inception of the marriage.
furnished the basis to doubt the findings of her expert witness; that
such findings were one-sided, because Dominic was not himself The Court in Pesca observed that:
subjected to an actual psychiatric evaluation by petitioner’s expert;
and that he also did not participate in the proceedings; and that the At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in
findings and conclusions on his psychological profile by her expert the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of
were solely based on the self-serving testimonial descriptions and psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the
characterizations of him rendered by petitioner and her witnesses. time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration
of nullity of the marriage.
Moreover, Dr. Samson conceded that there was the need for her
to resort to other people in order to verify the facts derived from Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot
petitioner about Dominic’s psychological profile considering the ill- be equated with psychological incapacity.20
feelings she harbored towards him. It turned out, however, that the
Apparent from the aforecited pronouncements is that it was not the
only people she interviewed about Dominic were those whom
absence of the medical expert’s testimony alone that was crucial
petitioner herself referred, as the following testimony indicated:
but rather petitioners’ failure to satisfactorily discharge the burden
Fiscal Zalameda of showing the existence of psychological incapacity at the
inception of the marriage. In other words, the totality of the

147
evidence proving such incapacity at and prior to the time of the also held that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
marriage was the crucial consideration, as the Court has reminded meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
in Ting v. Velez-Ting:21 personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. To
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, qualify as psychological incapacity as a ground for nullification of
it is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert marriage, a person’s psychological affliction must be grave and
opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological serious as to indicate an utter incapacity to comprehend and
temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, comply with the essential objects of marriage, including the rights
juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological and obligations between husband and wife. The affliction must be
incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not shown to exist at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.
conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as Accordingly, the RTC’s findings that Dominic’s psychological
decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits incapacity was characterized by gravity, antecedence and
of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is incurability could not stand scrutiny. The medical report failed to
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual show that his actions indicated a psychological affliction of such a
medical or psychological examination of the person concerned grave or serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted.
need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case His alleged immaturity, deceitfulness and lack of remorse for his
presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on dishonesty and lack of affection did not necessarily constitute
the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality psychological incapacity. His inability to share or to take
of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings. responsibility or to feel remorse over his misbehavior or to share
his earnings with family members, albeit indicative of immaturity,
Petitioner’s view that the Court in Marcos stated that the personal was not necessarily a medically rooted psychological affliction that
medical or psychological examination of respondent spouse was incurable. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility did not
therein was not a requirement for the declaration of his equate with psychological incapacity.24 Nor were his supposed
psychological incapacity22 is not entirely accurate. To be clear, the sexual infidelity and criminal offenses manifestations of
statement in Marcos ran as follows: psychological incapacity. If at all, they would constitute a ground
only for an action for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
Code.
mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) Finally, petitioner contends that the Court’s Resolution in A.M. No.
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing 02-11-10 rendered appeals by the OSG no longer required, and
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to that the appeal by the OSG was a mere superfluity that could be
be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause deemed to have become functus officio if not totally disregarded.25
may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s The contention is grossly erroneous and unfounded. The
psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence Resolution nowhere stated that appeals by the OSG were no
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological longer required. On the contrary, the Resolution explicitly required
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person the OSG to actively participate in all stages of the proceedings, to
concerned need not be resorted to. wit:

In light of the foregoing, even if the expert opinions of a) The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of
psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in the granting of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual medical Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to
examination of Dominic was to be dispensed with only if the totality the court proof of such service within the same period. 26
of evidence presented was enough to support a finding of his
psychological incapacity. This did not mean that the presentation b) The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in
of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show the consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their
psychological incapacity would have automatically ensured the respective memoranda support of their claims within fifteen days
granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. What from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the
was essential, we should emphasize herein, was the "presence of Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of
evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may
condition," as the Court said in Marcos. be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period
herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for
But where, like here, the parties had the full opportunity to present decision, with or without the memoranda.27
the professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the
root cause, gravity and incurability of the alleged psychological c) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public
incapacity, then the opinions should be presented and be weighed prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision personally
by the trial courts in order to determine and decide whether or not or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication
to declare the nullity of the marriages. failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision
shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation. 28
It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they
try, must always base their judgments not solely on the expert d) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days
opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence from notice to the parties.1âwphi1 Entry of judgment shall be
adduced in the course of their proceedings.23 made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed
by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor
We find the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioner General.29
insufficient to prove that Dominic was psychologically unfit to
discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and that he e) An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the
suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice
marriage. Accordingly, the CA did not err in dismissing the petition of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The
for declaration of nullity of marriage. appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse
parties.30
We have time and again held that psychological incapacity should
refer to no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes The obvious intent of the Resolution was to require the OSG to
a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that appear as counsel for the State in the capacity of a defensor vinculi
must concomitantly be assumed and discharged by the parties to (i.e., defender of the marital bond) to oppose petitions for, and to
the marriage that, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family appeal judgments in favor of declarations of nullity of marriage
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, to observe under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby ensuring that only the
love, respect and fidelity, and to render help and support. We have meritorious cases for the declaration of nullity of marriages based

148
on psychological incapacity-those sufficiently evidenced by Ruling of the RTC
gravity, incurability and juridical antecedence-would succeed.
The RTC granted the petition on August 9, 2000, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on
certiorari; and AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on March 19, WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this
2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68615. Honorable Court finds for the plaintiff and judgment is hereby
rendered:
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
1. Declaring the marriage between Eduardo C. de Quintos and
SO ORDERED. Catalina delos Santos de Quintos, a nullity under Article 36 of the
Family Code, as amended.

2. Ordering the Municipal Civil Registrar of Lingayen,Pangasinan

Republic of the Philippines to cancel the marriage of the parties from the Civil Register of
SUPREME COURT Lingayen, Pangasinan in accordance with this decision.
Manila
SO ORDERED.12
FIRST DIVISION
The RTC ruled that Catalina’s infidelity, her spending more time
G.R. No. 159594 November 12, 2012 with friends rather than with her family, and her incessant gambling
constituted psychological incapacity that affected her duty to
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. It held that
vs.
considering that the matter of determining whether a party was
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION), AND
EDUARDO C. DE QUINTOS, .JR., Respondents. psychologically incapacitated was best left to experts like Dr.
Reyes, the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes
DECISION was the best evidence of Catalina’s psychological incapacity. 13

BERSAMIN, J.: Ruling of the CA

The State appeals the decision promulgated on July 30, On appeal, the State raised the lone error that:
2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the declaration
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE PARTIES’
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, in Lingayen, Pangasinan
MARRIAGE NULL AND VOID, DEFENDANT CATALINA DELOS
of the nullity of the marriage between respondent Eduardo De
SANTOS-DE QUINTOS’ PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY NOT
Quintos, Jr. (Eduardo) and Catalina Delos Santos-De Quintos
HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.
(Catalina) based on the latter's psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. On July 30, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the
judgment of the RTC. The CA concluded that Eduardo proved
We find the State's appeal to be meritorious. Hence, we uphold
Catalina’s psychological incapacity, observing that the results of
once again the validity of a marriage on the ground that the alleged
the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes showed
psychological incapacity was not sufficiently established.
that Catalina had been "mentally or physically ill to the extent that
Antecedents she could not have known her marital obligations;" and that
Catalina’s psychological incapacity had been medically identified,
Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites sufficiently proven, duly alleged in the complaint and clearly
solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of Lingayen, explained by the trial court.
Pangasinan.2 The couple was not blessed with a child due to
Catalina’s hysterectomy following her second miscarriage. 3 Issue

On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of In this appeal, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General
nullity of their marriage,4 citing Catalina’s psychological incapacity (OSG), urges that the CA gravely erred because:
to comply with her essential marital obligations. Catalina did not
I
interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be given her
share in the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT CATALINA’S ALLEGED
Pangasinan.5 After conducting an investigation, the public PERSONALITY TRAITS ARE CONSTITUTIVE OF
prosecutor determined that there was no collusion between PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY EXISTING AT THE TIME OF
Eduardo and Catalina.6 MARRIAGE CELEBRATION; NOR ARE THEY OF THE NATURE
CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their house without his
consent; that she engaged in petty arguments with him; that she II
constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she spent
most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of doing the MARITAL UNFAITHFULNESS OF THE [sic] CATALINA WAS
household chores and caring for their adopted daughter; that she NOT SHOWN TO BE A SYMPTOM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
squandered by gambling all his remittances as an overseas worker INCAPACITY.
in Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned the conjugal home
in 1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her paramour.7 III

Eduardo presented the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation ABANDONMENT OF ONE’S FAMILY IS ONLY A GROUND FOR
conducted by Dr. Annabelle L. Reyes, a psychiatrist. Based on the LEGAL SEPARATION.
tests she administered on Catalina,8 Dr. Reyes opined that
IV
Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline Personality Disorder that
was no longer treatable. Dr. Reyes found that Catalina’s disorder GAMBLING HABIT OF CATALINA NOT LIKEWISE
was mainly characterized by her immaturity that rendered her ESTABLISHED TO BE A SYMPTOM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
psychologically incapacitated to meet her marital obligations.9 INCAPACITY.
Catalina did not appear during trial but submitted her V
Answer/Manifestation,10 whereby she admitted her psychological
incapacity, but denied leaving the conjugal home without THE NEUROPSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION AND TESTIMONY
Eduardo’s consent and flirting with different men. She insisted that OF DR. ANNABELLE REYES FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE
she had only one live-in partner; and that she would not give up CAUSE OF CATALINA’S INCAPACITY AND PROVE THAT IT
her share in the conjugal residence because she intended to live EXISTED AT THE INCEPTION OF MARRIAGE, IS GRAVE AND
there or to receive her share should the residence be sold. 11 INCURABLE.14

149
The OSG argues that the findings and conclusions of the RTC and xxxx
the CA did not conform to the guidelines laid down by the Court in
Republic v. Court of Appeals, (Molina);15 and that Catalina’s (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
refusal to do household chores, and her failure to take care of her celebration" of the marriage. x x x.
husband and their adopted daughter were not "defects" of a
xxxx
psychological nature warranting the declaration of nullity of their
marriage, but mere indications of her difficulty, refusal or neglect (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
to perform her marital obligations. permanent or incurable. x x x.
The OSG further argues that Catalina’s infidelity, gambling habits xxxx
and abandonment of the conjugal home were not grounds under
Article 36 of the Family Code; that there was no proof that her (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
infidelity and gambling had occurred prior to the marriage, while of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
her abandonment would only be a ground for legal separation "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
under Article 55(10) of the Family Code; that the neuro-psychiatric emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. x x x.
evaluation by Dr. Reyes did not sufficiently establish Catalina’s
xxxx
psychological incapacity; that Dr. Reyes was not shown to have
exerted effort to look into Catalina’s past life, attitudes, habits and (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
character as to be able to explain her alleged psychological Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
incapacity; that there was not even a finding of the root cause of and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
her alleged psychological incapacity; and that there appeared to regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
be a collusion between the parties inasmuch as Eduardo admitted obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
during the trial that he had given P50,000.00 to Catalina in evidence and included in the text of the decision.
exchange for her non-appearance in the trial.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
The OSG postulated that Catalina’s unsupportive in-laws and Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
Eduardo’s overseas deployment that had required him to be away controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
most of the time created the strain in the couple’s relationship and x x x.
forced her to seek her friends’ emotional support and company;
and that her ambivalent attitude towards their adopted daughter xxxx
was attributable to her inability to bear children of her own.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
Issue the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. x x x. 19

The issue is whether there was sufficient evidence warranting the The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have
declaration of the nullity of Catalina’s marriage to Eduardo based remained as the precedential guides in deciding cases grounded
on her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has
Code. declared the existence or absence of the psychological incapacity
based strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori
Ruling assumptions, predilections or generalizations. 20 Indeed, the
We grant the petition for review. incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence
presented during trial,21 making it incumbent upon the petitioner to
Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological incapacity.22
contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and
Eduardo defends the rulings of the RTC and the CA, insisting that
to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty,
they thereby explained the gravity and severity of Catalina’s
refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill
psychological incapacity that had existed even prior to the
will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the
celebration of their marriage.23
essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential
obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of We are not convinced. Both lower courts did not exact a
life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and compliance with the requirement of sufficiently explaining the
education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to gravity, root cause and incurability of Catalina’s purported
a psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet psychological incapacity. Rather, they were liberal in their
his or her responsibility and duty as a married person is not appreciation of the scanty evidence that Eduardo submitted to
enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be establish the incapacity.
incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. 16
To start with, Catalina’s supposed behavior (i.e., her frequent
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,17 we decreed that psychological gossiping with neighbors, leaving the house without Eduardo’s
incapacity should refer to a mental incapacity that causes a party consent, refusal to do the household chores and to take care of
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants such as those their adopted daughter, and gambling), were not even established.
enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code and must be Eduardo presented no other witnesses to corroborate his
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In allegations on such behavior. At best, his testimony was self-
an effort to settle the confusion that may arise in deciding cases serving and would have no serious value as evidence upon such
involving nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological a serious matter that was submitted to a court of law.
incapacity, we then laid down the following guidelines in the later
ruling in Molina,18 viz: Secondly, both lower courts noticeably relied heavily on the results
of the neuro-psychological evaluation by Dr. Reyes despite the
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs paucity of factual foundation to support the claim of Catalina’s
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the psychological incapacity. In particular, they relied on the following
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its portion of the report of Dr. Reyes, to wit:
dissolution and nullity. x x x.
REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
xxxx
Catalina is exhibiting traits of a borderline personality. This is
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) characterized, mainly by immaturity in several aspects of the
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) personality. One aspect is in the area of personal relationships,
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the where a person cannot really come up with what is expected in a
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity relationship that involves commitments. They are generally in and
must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations out of relationships, as they do not have the patience to sustain
and/or symptoms may be physical. x x x.

150
this [sic] ties. Their behavior is like that of a child who has to be We have repeatedly pronounced that the root cause of the
attended to as they might end up doing things which are often psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological
regrettable. These people however usually do not feel remorse for illness, with its incapacitating nature fully explained and
their wrongdoings. They do not seem to learn from their mistakes, established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial. 29
and they have the habit of repeating these mistakes to the
detriment of their own lives and that of their families. Owing to What we can gather from the scant evidence that Eduardo
these characteristics, people with these pattern of traits cannot be adduced was Catalina’s immaturity and apparent refusal to
expected to have lasting and successful relationships as required perform her marital obligations. However, her immaturity alone did
in marriage. It is expected that even with future relationships, not constitute psychological incapacity.30 To rule that such
things will not work out. immaturity amounted to psychological incapacity, it must be shown
that the immature acts were manifestations of a disordered
Families of these people usually reveal that parents relationship personality that made the spouse completely unable to discharge
are not also that ideal. If this be the background of the developing the essential obligations of the marital state, which inability was
child, it is likely that his or her relationships would also end up as merely due to her youth or immaturity.31
such.
Fourthly, we held in Suazo v. Suazo32 that there must be proof of
xxxx a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively
incapacitated the respondent spouse from complying with the
With all these collateral information being considered and a basic marital obligations, viz:
longitudinal history of defendant made, it is being concluded that
she was not able to come up with the minimum expected of her as It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically
a wife. Her behavior and attitude before and after the marriage is incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital
highly indicative of a very immature and childish person, rendering obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of
her psychologically incapacitated to live up and meet the a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral
responsibilities required in a commitment like marriage. Catalina element in the respondent’s personality structure that effectively
miserably failed to fulfill her role as wife and mother, rendering her incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital
incapacitated to comply with her duties inherent in marriage. In the obligations – must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in
same vein, it cannot be expected that this attitude and behavior of the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the
defendant will still change because her traits have developed spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating
through the years and already ingrained within her.24 psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences,
sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
Yet, the report was ostensibly vague about the root cause, gravity irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding
and incurability of Catalina’s supposed psychological incapacity. of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only
Nor was the testimony given in court by Dr. Reyes a source of vital be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the
information that the report missed out on. Aside from rendering a essential obligations of marriage.
brief and general description of the symptoms of borderline
personality disorder, both the report and court testimony of Dr. The only fact established here, which Catalina even admitted in
Reyes tendered no explanation on the root cause that could have her Answer, was her abandonment of the conjugal home to live
brought about such behavior on the part of Catalina. They did not with another man. Yet, abandonment was not one of the grounds
specify which of Catalina’s various acts or omissions typified the for the nullity of marriage under the Family Code. It did not also
conduct of a person with borderline personality, and did not also constitute psychological incapacity, it being instead a ground for
discuss the gravity of her behavior that translated to her inability to legal separation under Article 55(10) of the Family Code. On the
perform her basic marital duties. Dr. Reyes only established that other hand, her sexual infidelity was not a valid ground for the
Catalina was childish and immature, and that her childishness and nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, considering
immaturity could no longer be treated due to her having already that there should be a showing that such marital infidelity was a
reached an age "beyond maturity."25 manifestation of a disordered personality that made her completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of
Thirdly, we have said that the expert evidence presented in cases marriage.33 Needless to state, Eduardo did not adduce such
of declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological evidence, rendering even his claim of her infidelity bereft of factual
incapacity presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of and legal basis.
the parties by the psychologist or expert to make a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of Lastly, we do not concur with the assertion by the OSG that
psychological incapacity.26We have explained this need in Lim v. Eduardo colluded with Catalina. The assertion was based on his
Sta. Cruz-Lim,27 stating: admission during trial that he had paid her the amount of
P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal home in order to convince
The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of her not to oppose his petition or to bring any action on her part, 34 to
seven (7) hours of interview, and unsupported by separate wit:
psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and
prevent it from making its own factual finding on what happened in CROSS-EXAMINATION BY FISCAL MUERONG
this case. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does
not lie in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in Q Mr. de Quintos, also during the first part of the hearing, your
the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts wife, the herein defendant, Catalina delos Santos-de Quintos, has
that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which been religiously attending the hearing, but lately, I noticed that she
the logic of his conclusion is founded.28 is no longer attending and represented by counsel, did you talk to
your wife?
But Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina, and did not
personally seek out and meet with other persons, aside from A No, sir.
Eduardo, who could have shed light on and established the
Q And you find it more convenient that it would be better for both
conduct of the spouses before and during the marriage. For that
of you, if, she will not attend the hearing of this case you filed
reason, Dr. Reyes’ report lacked depth and objectivity, a weakness
against her, is it not?
that removed the necessary support for the conclusion that the
RTC and the CA reached about Catalina’s psychological A No, sir. I did not.
incapacity to perform her marital duties.
Q But, am I correct, Mr. de Quintos, that you and your wife had an
Under the circumstances, the report and court testimony by Dr. agreement regarding this case?
Reyes did not present the gravity and incurability of Catalina’s
psychological incapacity. There was, to start with, no evidence A None, sir.
showing the root cause of her alleged borderline personality
disorder and that such disorder had existed prior to her marriage.

151
Q And you were telling me something about an agreement that DECISION
you will pay her an amount of P50,000.00, please tell us, what is
that agreement that you have to pay her P50,000.00? BRION, J.:

A Regarding our conjugal properties, sir. We resolve the petition for review on certiorari 1 filed by petitioner
Republic of the Philippines challenging the October 7, 2005
Q Why, do you have conjugal properties that you both or acquired amended decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) that reconsidered
at the time of your marriage? its March 22, 2004 decision3(original decision) in CA-G.R. CV No.
75583. In its original decision, the CA set aside the June 5, 2002
A Yes, sir. decision4of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 47,
in Civil Case No. 95-74257, which The Factual Antecedents
Q And why did you agree that you have to give her P50,000.00?
On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita5 and the union bore two
A It is because we bought a lot and constructed a house thereat,
children, Maricar and Manny.6 To support his family, Cesar went
that is why I agreed, sir.
to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June 12, 1986,
Q Is it not a fact, Mr. witness, that your wife does not oppose this Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had been
petition for declaration of marriage which you filed against her? having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991, 7 Lolita
allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived with
A She does not opposed [sic], sir. Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On June
16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the
Q As a matter of fact, the only thing that she is concern [sic] about
declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita’s
this case is the division of your conjugal properties?
psychological incapacity.8
A Yes, sir.
Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that
Q That is why you also agreed to give her P50,000.00 as her share Alvin used to be an associate in her promotions business. She
of your conjugal properties, so that she will not pursue whatever insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she
she wanted to pursue with regards to the case you filed against left their home because of irreconcilable differences with her
her, is that correct? mother-in-law.9

A Yes, sir. At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita’s infidelity and
subsequent abandonment of the family home.10He testified that he
Q And you already gave her that amount of P50,000.00, Mr. continued to provide financial support for Lolita and their children
witness? even after he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin. 11

A Yes, sir. Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report 12 on Lolita

prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the National Center for
Q And because she has already gotten her share of P50,000.00 Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering from
that is the reason why she is no longer around here? any form of major psychiatric illness," 13 but had been "unable to
provide the expectations expected of her for a good and lasting
A Yes sir, it could be.35
marital relationship";14 her "transferring from one job to the other
Verily, the payment to Catalina could not be a manifest sign of a depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as
collusion between her and Eduardo.1âwphi1 To recall, she did not her impatience in attaining her ambitions";15 and "her refusal to go
interpose her objection to the petition to the point of conceding her with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a
psychological incapacity, but she nonetheless made it clear good marital and family relationship." 16
enough that she was unwilling to forego her share in the conjugal
The RTC Ruling
house. The probability that Eduardo willingly gave her the amount
of P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal asset out of his In its June 5, 2002 decision,17 the RTC declared Cesar’s marriage
recognition of her unquestionable legal entitlement to such share to Lolita void, finding sufficient basis to declare Lolita
was very high, so that whether or not he did so also to encourage psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
her to stick to her previously announced stance of not opposing obligations.
the petition for nullity of the marriage should by no means be of
any consequence in determining the issue of collusion between The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
the spouses. appealed to the CA.

In fine, given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the The CA Ruling
psychological incapacity of Catalina, we cannot but resolve in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against The CA originally18 set aside the RTC’s verdict, finding that Lolita’s
its dissolution and nullity.36 abandonment of the conjugal dwelling and infidelity were not
serious cases of personality disorder/psychological illness. Lolita
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari; merely refused to comply with her marital obligations which she
SET ASIDE the decision the Court of Appeals promulgated on July was capable of doing. The CA significantly observed that infidelity
30, 2003; and DISMISS the petition for the declaration of nullity of is only a ground for legal separation, not for the declaration of the
marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code for lack of merit. nullity of a marriage.

Costs to be paid by the respondent. Cesar sought reconsideration19 of the CA’s decision and, in due
course, attained his objective. The CA set aside its original
SO ORDERED. decision and entered another, which affirmed the RTC’s decision.
In its amended decision,20 the CA found two circumstances
indicative of Lolita’s serious psychological incapacity that resulted
Republic of the Philippines in her gross infidelity: (1) Lolita’s unwarranted refusal to perform
SUPREME COURT her marital obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolita’s willful and
Manila deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.

SECOND DIVISION The OSG then filed the present petition.

G.R. No. 170022 January 9, 2013 The Petition

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, The OSG argues that Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report
vs. did not disclose that Lolita had been suffering from a psychological
CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent. illness nor did it establish its juridical antecedence, gravity and

152
incurability; infidelity and abandonment do not constitute signified a reluctance to work out a good marital relationship30 is a
psychological incapacity, but are merely grounds for legal mere generalization unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a rash
separation. conclusion that this Court cannot support.

The Case for the Respondent In sum, we find that Cesar failed to prove the existence of Lolita’s
psychological incapacity; thus, the CA committed a reversible error
Cesar submits that Lolita’s infidelity and refusal to perform her when it reconsidered its original decision.1âwphi1
marital obligations established her grave and incurable
psychological incapacity. Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable social
institution31 protected by the State. Any doubt should be resolved
The Issue in favor of its existence its existence and continuation and against
its dissolution and nullity.32 It cannot be dissolved at the whim of
The case presents to us the legal issue of whether there exists
the parties nor by transgressions made by one party to the other
sufficient basis to nullify Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground
during the marriage.
of psychological incapacity.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the
The Court’s Ruling
October 7, 2005 amended decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
We grant the petition. No sufficient basis exists to annul Cesar’s G.R. CV No. 75583. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Cesar
marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity. Encelan's petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lolita
Castillo-Encelan.
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence
on Psychological Incapacity Costs against the respondent.

Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as SO ORDERED.

a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. It provides that "a
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the Republic of the Philippines
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void SUPREME COURT
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its Manila
solemnization."
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that
psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations";21 not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,
less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.22 The plaintiff bears vs.
the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability
DISSENTING OPINION
of the condition of the errant spouse.23
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Cesar failed to prove Lolita’s
psychological incapacity On September 19, 2011, this Court issued its Decision 1 denying
petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw's petition and affirming the appellate
In this case, Cesar’s testimony failed to prove Lolita’s alleged
court's determination that there is insufficient evidence of
psychological incapacity. Cesar testified on the dates when he
psychological incapacity that would render the parties' marriage
learned of Lolita’s alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment
null and void. The Court, in making its Decision, relied on the
of their home,24 as well as his continued financial support to her
experts' own proffered guideline for making their conclusions.
and their children even after he learned of the affair, 25 but he
They said that actions, such as those allegedly performed by
merely mentioned in passing Lolita’s alleged affair with Alvin and
respondent, "when performed constantly to the detriment of quality
her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.
and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife,
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of [Narcissistic
dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute psychological Personality Disorder]."2 The Court, using the experts' own
incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation.26 To guideline, reviewed the evidence to determine if there is indeed
constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the proof, before the Court, that respondent engaged in the alleged
unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a acts, that she performed them constantly, and to the detriment of
disordered personality that completely prevented the erring the quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother
spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations.27 No and wife. Considering the opposing views of the trial and appellate
evidence on record exists to support Cesar’s allegation that courts on the matter, the Court thoroughly reviewed the records of
Lolita’s infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any the case, including the psychiatrists' reports. Despite the Court's
psychological illness. considerable effort to respect and accept the psychologists'
findings, we simply found no adequate evidence of the factual
Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation premises of their diagnosis of Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
report on Lolita to prove her alleged psychological incapacity. The Thus, we agreed with the Court of Appeals (CA) that the evidence
psychological evaluation, in fact, established that Lolita did not is insufficient for a declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground
suffer from any major psychiatric illness. 28 Dr. Flores’ observation of psychological incapacity.
on Lolita’s interpersonal problems with co-workers,29 to our mind,
does not suffice as a consideration for the conclusion that she was The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR), 3 arguing
– at the time of her marriage – psychologically incapacitated to that the Court erred in finding the psychological experts'
enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time element conclusions (that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
involved, a wife’s psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply understand the demands of a marriage) unsupported by the
be equated with her professional/work relationship; workplace available evidence.
obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from their marital
The respondent, in lieu of a Comment,4 reiterated her earlier
counterparts. While both spring from human relationship, their
Manifestation that she is now conceding that petitioner, not herself,
relatedness and relevance to one another should be fully
may actually be psychologically incapacitated to perform his
established for them to be compared or to serve as measures of
essential marital obligations.5
comparison with one another. To be sure, the evaluation report Dr.
Flores prepared and submitted cannot serve this purpose. Dr.
Flores’ further belief that Lolita’s refusal to go with Cesar abroad

153
The Majority Opinion opines that the Court would be unjust to keep psychological experts, without doing its duty to make an
the parties in a marriage despite their shared opinion that their independent assessment of the evidence.
marriage is beyond repair.
To reiterate, while I agree that the trial court’s ruling on the
However, under the law, the parties’ own desire to dissolve their psychological incapacity of the parties should be final and binding
marriage is not a determining factor in assessing the existence of on the appellate courts when such ruling is based on the facts and
a groundfor annulment or declaration of nullity. Indeed, Article 48 on the opinion of the experts, I believe that the trial court’s decision
of the Family Code mandates the court to guard against the in this case was not based on facts, but solely on the opinion of
possibility of collusion between the parties: the experts. Such blind reliance by the trial court was an abdication
of its duty to go over the evidence for itself.
ARTICLE 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney While the courts may consider the assistance of the experts, the
or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps courts are duty-bound to assess not only the correctness of the
to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that experts’ conclusions, but also the factual premises upon which
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. such conclusions are based. The expert’s conclusions, like any
other opinion, are based on certain assumptions or premises. It is
xxxx the court’s job to assess whether those assumptions or premises
are in fact true or correct, and supported by evidence on record.
The Court’s Decision should rely solely on the available evidence
The soundness of experts’ conclusions lie in the quantity and
and the law.
quality of the input they received in making their conclusions. This
The Majority Opinion claims that our Decision failed to appreciate is precisely where the courts take the reins from these experts.
the evidence, as found by the trial court andby the expert The root cause of psychological incapacity must not only be
psychologists and that the trial court’s ruling on the psychological clinically identified by experts, it must also be sufficiently proven
incapacity of the parties should be final and binding on the and clearly explained in the decision.12
appellate courts when such ruling is based on the facts and on
The expertise of courts lies in determining which facts are
opinion of the qualified experts.
admissible, which are relevant, which carry weight, which have
I agree that the ruling of a lower court should be given due respect been proven, which have been debunked. In resolving legal
and finality when it is adequately explained, rests on established disputes, the courts have the expertise in evaluating the quantity,
facts, andconsiders the opinion of qualified experts. Unfortunately, quality, and relevance of the facts to the legal issue involved.
such kind of trial court ruling is not before us; hence, our Courts have to conduct its independent assessment of the quality
September 19, 2011 Decision did not see fit to adopt the findings of the facts that the psychologists relied upon in support of their
of the trial court. conclusion. It is only if, and when, the court is convinced that the
psychologists’ conclusions are strongly anchored on verifiable,
The trial court summarized the parties’ respective evidence, admissible, and relevant evidence that it can adoptthe
including the testimonies of their psychologists, inthe first six psychologists’ findings. Even petitioner’s expert witness, Fr. Healy,
pages of its decision.6 It then proceeded to quote Article 36 of the acknowledged in his testimony that it is the court’s job, not that of
Family Code and the definitions of psychological incapacity in the expert, to verify the truthfulness of the factual allegations
Santos v. Court of Appeals7 and in the Republic v. Court of regarding respondent’s alleged habits. Fr. Healy cautioned that his
Appeals.8 Without any indication of which pieces of evidence it opinion rests only on his assumption that the factual allegations
found convincing, reliable, and overwhelming, much less a are true.13
discussion of how these evidence tend to prove the existence or
non-existence of psychological incapacity – ergo, without factual It remains my opinion that the factual premises for the experts’
findings whatsoever– the trial court ruled in a terse and conclusions in this case werenot established in court. While the
unsatisfying paragraph that: experts testified that the alleged dysfunction in respondent’s family
and her subsequent actions within her marriage are indicative of a
From the evidence, it appears that parties are both suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, the court records themselves
psychological incapacity to perform their essential marital reveal no credible and preponderant evidence of the supposed
obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. The parties family dysfunction in respondent’s childhood and of her supposed
entered into a marriage without as much as understanding what it narcissistic habits later in life. There was no independent witness
entails. They failed to commit themselves to its essential presented, who is knowledgeable of respondent’s upbringing and
obligations: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the of her actions before and after the celebration of marriage. This is
rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of their detrimental in proving that the cause ofher psychological
children to become responsible individuals. Parties’psychological incapacity occurred before, or at the time of the celebration of, the
incapacity is grave, and serious such that both are incapable of marriage,14 and renders the experts’ opinion on the root cause of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. The her psychological incapacity conjectural or speculative. Also there
incapacity has been clinically established and was found to be was no evidence of respondent’s supposed obsessive desire for
pervasive, grave and incurable.9 (Emphases supplied) attention and selfishness, which obsession, according to the
experts, indicates a narcissistic personality. The most that was
The inadequacy of the trial court’s ruling and its understanding of
provenwas a single incident wherein she was found in a hotel room
the concept of psychological incapacity is
with another man (after they have separated in fact), a penchant
apparent.1âwphi1 Psychological incapacity, as a ground for the
for visiting salons and for meeting friends over a mahjonggame.
declaration of nullity, is not a lack of understanding of what
This can hardly be considered as a pattern, defined as "a reliable
marriage entails, nor is it a "failure to commit" one’s selfto the
sample of traits, acts or other observable features characterizing
essential marital and familial obligations.10 It is a downright inability
an individual,"15much less an obsession.
to understand, perform, or comply with, the said duties and
obligations.11 How can any appellate court rely on the trial court’s Much is said about respondent’s undesirability as a mother for
assessment of whether the evidence constituted psychological supposedly exposing her children to the "culture of
incapacity when there is none and its understanding of the concept gambling;"16 this, from the evidence that she brought her children
of psychological incapacity is doctrinally flawed? with her to their "aunt’s house" where she frequently played
mahjong. I find this judgment unsupported by the evidence and
The trial court then characterized the parties’ psychological
irrelevant. While it has been proven that respondent played
incapacity as grave and serious, without even going over the
mahjong, there is no evidence whatsoever that it involved
evidence upon which it relied in making such conclusion. It
gambling, which is "the act of playing a game and consciously
appears to the Court that the last sentence of the trial court’s
risking money or other stakes on its outcome." 17 Without the
decision – that "the incapacity has been clinically established" --
element of gambling, a mother’s act of bringing her kids with her
encapsulates the process by which the trial court arrived at its
when she meets with friends (which is the most that can be saidof
judgment. It relied merely and solely on the conclusions of the
this matter) can hardly be described as undesirable. Even Fr.

154
Healy acknowledged that playing mahjong and spending time with The couple lived together under one roof. Glenn worked as a
friends are not disorders by themselves. They would only bartender, while Mary Grace was a production engineer.
constitute psychological incapacity if inordinate amounts of time
are spent on these activities to the detriment of one’s familial Sometime in March of 2006, Mary Grace left the home which she
duties.18 The Court, in our Decision, applied Fr. Healy’s standards. shared with Glenn. Glenn subsequently found out that Mary Grace
We concluded that respondent was not psychologically went to work in Dubai. At the time the instant petition was filed,
incapacitated because there was no proof that she spent Mary Grace had not returned yet.
inordinate amounts of time in these alleged activities or that her
kids were adversely affected.19 On the contrary, the records On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed a Petition5 for the declaration of
revealed her efforts to maintain supervision of her kids, even when nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace. He alleged that Mary
she was among her friends. Further, the kids recalled that, after Grace was insecure, extremely jealous, outgoing and prone to
respondent left the conjugal home, she would surreptitiously visit regularly resorting to any pretext to be able to leave the house.
them in their schools; and, once granted visitation rights, spent She thoroughly enjoyed the night life, and drank and smoked
weekends with them and tookcare of them at any time they got heavily even when she was pregnant. Further, Mary Grace refused
sick.20 These are hardly the actions of a woman with an inability to to perform even the most essential household chores of cleaning
understand her filial duties and obligations. and cooking. According to Glenn, Mary Grace had not exhibited
the foregoing traits and behavior during their whirlwind
It must be emphasized that the Court does not disrespect the courtship.6chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
experts’ findings when it disagrees with them; nor does it assert
that it is wiser in analyzing human behavior. It is simply performing Glenn likewise alleged that Mary Grace was not remorseful about
its duty to go over the evidence independently, consider the the death of the infant whom she delivered. She lived as if she
experts’ opinions, and apply the law and jurisprudence to the facts were single and was unmindful of her husband’s needs. She was
of the case. The Court cannot simply adhere to the experts’ opinion self-centered, selfish and immature. When Glenn confronted her
when there is an obvious dearth of factual evidence. The Court is about her behavior, she showed indifference. She eventually left
not a passive receptacle of expert opinions; otherwise, there would their home without informing Glenn. Glenn later found out that she
be no need for psychological incapacity cases to betried before the left for an overseas employment in
courts. Courts would be reduced to a mere rubber stamp for the Dubai.7chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
expert’s conclusions. That is not what the framers of Article 36
envisioned. Before Glenn decided to file a petition for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Mary Grace, he consulted the latter’s friends.
In the end, this is simply the sad story of two people who married
They informed him that Mary Grace came from a broken family
and started a family, but realized early on that they have made a
and was left to be cared for by her aunts and nannies. The
mistake. They both contributed to the demise of their marriage, as
foregoing circumstance must have contributed to her sense of
hurt people often do. Despite their brokenness, they tried to make
insecurity and difficulty in adjusting to married
the most of the situation, caring for their children while they try to
life.8chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
move on with their now separate lives. Now, in their advanced
years, they want a magical solution that would erase any trace of
To ease their marital problems, Glenn sought professional
their follies of youth; unfortunately, the provision for psychological
guidance and submitted himself to a psychological evaluation by
incapacity is not such a miraculous fix for dissolving the marriage
Clinical Psychologist Nedy Tayag (Dr. Tayag). Dr. Tayag found
bond. The policy of our 1987 Constitution continues to be to protect
him as “amply aware of his marital roles” and “capable of
and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
maintaining a mature and healthy heterosexual
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. (Art. 11,
relationship.”9chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 12, Art. XV, Secs. 1-2) The existence of any doubt should still
be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
On the other hand, Dr. Tayag assessed Mary Grace’s personality
I, therefore, submit that petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration be through the data she had gathered from Glenn and his cousin,
denied with finality. Rodelito Mayo (Rodelito), who knew Mary Grace way back in
college.

Mary Grace is the eldest among four siblings. She is a college

THIRD DIVISION
graduate. She belongs to a middle class family. Her father is an
G.R. No. 208790, January 21, 2015 overseas contract worker, while her mother is a housewife. At the
time Dr. Tayag prepared her report, Mary Grace was employed in
GLENN VIÑAS, Petitioner, v. MARY GRACE PAREL- Dubai and romantically involved with another
VIÑAS, Respondent. man.10chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

RESOLUTION According to Rodelito, Mary Grace verbally abused and physically

harmed Glenn during the couple’s fights. Mary Grace is also ill-
REYES, J.:
tempered and carefree, while Glenn is jolly, kind and family-
For review is the Decision1 rendered on January 29, 2013 and oriented.11chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Resolution2 issued on August 7, 2013 by the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96448. The CA set aside the Dr. Tayag diagnosed Mary Grace to be suffering from a
Decision3 dated January 29, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-social traits. Dr. Tayag
(RTC) of San Pablo City, Branch 30, in Civil Case No. SP- concluded that Mary Grace and Glenn’s relationship is not founded
6564(09), which declared the marriage between Glenn Viñas on mutual love, trust, respect, commitment and fidelity to each
(Glenn) and Mary Grace Parel-Viñas (Mary Grace) as null and other. Hence, Dr. Tayag recommended the propriety of declaring
void.cralawred the nullity of the couple’s marriage.12chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Antecedents In drawing her conclusions, Dr. Tayag explained

that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace, then 25 and 23 years The said disorder [of Mary Grace] is considered to be severe,
old, respectively, got married in civil rites held in Lipa City, serious, grave, permanent and chronic in proportion and is
Batangas.4 Mary Grace was already pregnant then. The infant, incurable by any form of clinical intervention. It has already
however, died at birth due to weakness and malnourishment. been deeply embedded within her system as it was found to
Glenn alleged that the infant’s death was caused by Mary Grace’s have started as early as her childhood years. Because of such, it
heavy drinking and smoking during her pregnancy. has caused her to be inflexible, maladaptive and functionally[-
]impaired especially with regards to heterosexual dealings.

155
 does not treat him as her husband. [Glenn] and [Mary Grace] are
Such disorder of [Mary Grace] is mainly characterized by separated in fact since the year 2006. [Mary Grace] abandoned
grandiosity, need for admiration and lack of empathy[,] along with [Glenn] without telling the latter where to go. x x x Had it not for the
her pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others[,] insistence of [Glenn] that he would not know the whereabouts of
which utterly distorted her perceptions and views especially in his wife. The law provides that [a] husband and [a] wife are obliged
terms of a fitting marital relationship. Such disorder manifested in to live together, [and] observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. x
[Mary Grace] through her unrelenting apathy, sense of entitlement x x For all intents and purposes, however, [Mary Grace] was in a
and arrogance. Throughout her union with [Glenn], she has quandary on what it really means. x x x.
exhibited a heightened sense of self as seen in her marked inability
to show proper respect for her husband. x x x She is too From the testimony of [Glenn], it was established that [Mary Grace]
headstrong that most of the time[,] she would do things her own failed to comply with the basic marital obligations of mutual love,
way and would not pay close attention to what her husband respect, mutual help and support. [Glenn] tried his best to have
needed. She had been a wife who constantly struggled for power their marriage saved but [Mary Grace] did not cooperate with
and dominance in their relationship and [Glenn], being too him. [Mary Grace] is x x x, unmindful of her marital obligations.
considerate to her, was often subjected to her control. x x x She is
into many vices and loved hanging out with her friends at night[,] The Court has no reason to doubt the testimony of [Dr. Tayag], a
and she even got involved in an illicit relationship[,] which was still clinical psychologist with sufficient authority to speak on the
going on up to the present time. x x x. subject of psychological incapacity. She examined [Glenn], and
was able to gather sufficient data and information about [Mary
The root cause of [Mary Grace’s] personality aberration can be Grace]. x x x This [Narcissistic] personality disorder of [Mary
said to have emanated from the various forms of unfavorable Grace] is ingrained in her personality make-up, so grave and so
factors in her milieu way back as early as her childhood years[,] permanent, incurable and difficult to treat. It is conclusive that this
which is the crucial stage in the life of a person as this is the time personal incapacity leading to psychological incapacity is already
when the individual’s character and behavior are shaped. [Mary pre-existing before the marriage and was only manifested after. It
Grace] came from a dysfunctional family with lenient and tolerating has become grave, permanent and incurable. 17 (Underlining ours
parents[,] who never impose any restrictions [upon] their and italics in the original)
children. Considering such fact, she apparently failed to feel the
love and affection of the nurturing figures that she had[,] who were The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved for
supposed to be the first to show concern [for] her. x x x She has reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC in its Order 18 dated
acquired a domineering character as she was not taught to have December 1, 2010.cralawred
boundaries in her actions because of the laxity she had from her The Appeal of the OSG and the Ruling of the CA
caregivers and also because she grew up to be the eldest in the
brood. She sees to it that she is the one always followed with
regards to making decisions and always mandates people to On appeal before the CA, the OSG claimed that no competent
submit to her wishes. She has not acquired the very essence of evidence exist proving that Mary Grace indeed suffers from a
morality [and] has certainly learned set of unconstructive traits that Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which prevents her from fulfilling
further made her too futile to assume mature roles. Morals and her marital obligations. Specifically, the RTC decision failed to cite
values were not instilled in her young mind that as she went on the root cause of Mary Grace’s disorder. Further, the RTC did not
with her life, she never learned to restrain herself from doing ill- state its own findings and merely relied on Dr. Tayag’s statements
advised things even if she is amply aware of the depravity of her anent the gravity and incurability of Mary Grace’s condition. The
actions. RTC resorted to mere generalizations and
conclusions sans details. Besides, what psychological incapacity
The psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is of a juridical contemplates is downright incapacity to assume marital
antecedence as it was already in her system even prior to the obligations. In the instant case, irreconcilable differences, sexual
solemnization of her marriage with [Glenn]. x x x. 13 (Underlining infidelity, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility were shown,
ours) but these do not warrant the grant of Glenn’s petition. Mary Grace
may be unwilling to assume her marital duties, but this does not
On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed before the RTC a Petition for
translate into a psychological
the Declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.
illness.19chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Substituted service of summons was made upon Mary Grace
through her aunt, Susana Rosita.14 Mary Grace filed no answer
Glenn, on the other hand, sought the dismissal of the OSG’s
and did not attend any of the proceedings before the RTC.
appeal.
During the trial, the testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito
On January 29, 2013, the CA rendered the herein assailed
were offered as evidence. Glenn and Rodelito described Mary
decision reversing the RTC ruling and declaring the marriage
Grace as outgoing, carefree, and irresponsible. She is the exact
between Glenn and Mary Grace as valid and subsisting. The CA
opposite of Glenn, who is conservative and preoccupied with his
stated the reasons below:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
work.15 On her part, Dr. Tayag reiterated her findings in the
psychological report dated December 29, 2008.cralawred In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that
“psychological incapacity” should refer to no less than a mental
Ruling of the RTC
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
On January 29, 2010, the RTC rendered its Decision 16 declaring assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
the marriage between Glenn and Mary Grace as null and void on so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
account of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The RTC cited the obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
following as grounds:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
The totality of the evidence presented by [Glenn] warrants [the] “psychological incapacity” to the mostserious cases of
grant of the petition. personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
Reconciliation between the parties under the circumstances is nil. marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
For the best interest of the parties, it is best that the legal bond marriage is celebrated. The psychological condition must be
between them be severed. characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability.
The testimonies of [Glenn] and his witness [Rodelito] portray the
miserable life [Glenn] had with [Mary Grace] who is a Narcissistic In the instant case, [Glenn] tried to prove that [Mary Grace]
Personality Disordered person with anti[-]social traits and who was carefree, outgoing, immature, and irresponsible which made

156
her unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. He that the alleged psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is
likewise alleged that she refused to communicate with him to save characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability;
the marriage and eventually left him to work abroad. To Our mind, and for his failure to observe the guidelines outlined in the afore-
the above actuations of [Mary Grace] do not make out a case of cited cases.
psychological incapacity on her part.
Verily, the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
While it is true that [Glenn’s] testimony was corroborated by [Dr. belongs to [Glenn]. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
Tayag], a psychologist who conducted a psychological existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
examination on [Glenn], however, said examination was dissolution and nullity. This is rooted from the fact that both our
conducted only on him and no evidence was shown that the Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] was characterized of the family.20 (Citations omitted, underlining ours and emphasis
by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. and italics in the original)

Certainly, the opinion of a psychologist would be of persuasive The CA, through the herein assailed Resolution21 dated August 7,
value in determining the psychological incapacity of a person as 2013, denied the Motion for Reconsideration22 filed by
she would be in the best position to assess and evaluate the Glenn.cralawred
psychological condition of the couple, she being an expert in this Issue
field of study of behavior. Although the psychologist stated that
respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder,
she did not fully explain the root cause of the disorder nor did she Unperturbed, Glenn now raises before this Court the issue of
make a conclusion as to its gravity or permanence. Moreover, she whether or not sufficient evidence exist justifying the RTC’s
admitted that she was not able to examine the respondent[,] declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.
hence, the information provided to her may be subjective and self-
serving. In support thereof, Glenn points out that each petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage should be judged according to its
Essential in this petition is the allegation of the root cause of the own set of facts, and not on the basis of assumptions, predilections
spouse’s psychological incapacity which should also be medically or generalizations. The RTC judge should painstakingly examine
or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly the factual milieu, while the CA must refrain from substituting its
explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to own judgment for that of the trial court. 23 Further, Glenn argues
beexisting at the time of the celebration of the marriage and that inMarcos v. Marcos,24 the Court ruled that it is not a sine qua
shown to be medically orclinically permanent or incurable. It non requirement for the respondent spouse to be personally
must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the examined by a physician or psychologist before a marriage could
parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth be declared as a nullity.25 However, if the opinion of an expert is
in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and sought, his or her testimony should be considered as decisive
such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in evidence.26 Besides, the findings of the trial court regarding the
the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision. credibility of the witnesses should be
respected.27chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Unfortunately for [Glenn], the expert testimony of his witness did
not establish the root cause of the psychological incapacity of In seeking the denial of the instant petition, the OSG emphasizes
[Mary Grace] nor was such ground alleged in the complaint. We that the arguments Glenn raise for our consideration are mere
reiterate the ruling of the Supreme Court on this score, to wit: the reiterations of the matters already resolved by the
root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or CA.28chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
clinically identified; b) alleged in the complaint; c) sufficiently
proven by experts; and d) clearly explained in the decision. Ruling of the Court

Discoursing on this issue, the Supreme Court, in Republic of the

The instant petition lacks merit.
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, has this to
say:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The lack of personal examination or assessment of the respondent
“Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must by a psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition
bepsychological – not physical, although its manifestations for the declaration of nullity of marriage. “If the totality of evidence
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have concerned need not be resorted to.”29chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of In the instant petition, however, the cumulative testimonies of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito, and the documentary evidence
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis offered do not sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity and
x x x[,] nevertheless[,] such root cause must be identified as a incurability of Mary Grace’s condition. The evidence merely shows
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. that Mary Grace is outgoing, strong-willed and not inclined to
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and perform household chores. Further, she is employed in Dubai and
clinical psychologists.” is romantically-involved with another man. She has not been
maintaining lines of communication with Glenn at the time the latter
The Supreme Court further went on to proclaim, that “Article 36 of filed the petition before the RTC. Glenn, on the other hand, is
the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts conservative, family-oriented and is the exact opposite of Mary
the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest Grace. While Glenn and Mary Grace possess incompatible
themselves”. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting personalities, the latter’s acts and traits do not necessarily indicate
a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a psychological incapacity. Rumbaua v. Rumbaua30is emphatic
malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume.” Psychological incapacity should refer to no less In Bier v. Bier, we ruled that it was not enough that respondent,
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor
– an adverse integral element in the respondent’s personality
From the foregoing, We cannot declare the dissolution of the structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his
marriage of the parties for the obvious failure of [Glenn] to show essential marital obligations – had to be shown and was not shown

157
in this cited case. We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth
and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological
In the present case, the respondent’s stubborn refusal to cohabit incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying
with the petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the
proven to be rooted in some psychological illness. x x x Likewise, root cause of the respondent’s narcissistic personality disorder
the respondent’s act of living with another woman four years into and to prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither
the marriage cannot automatically be equated with a psychological did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor
disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that show that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his
promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical,
marriage. In fact, petitioner herself admitted that respondent was nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag’s
caring and faithful when they were going steady and for a time after conclusion in her Report – i.e., that the respondent suffered
their marriage; their problems only came in later. “Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial
Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable” – is an
x x x To use the words of Navales v. unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous
Navales:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary characterization and portrayal of the respondent. While the various
tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent’s
“difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of marital condition. To make conclusions and generalizations on the
obligations or “ill will” on the part of the spouse is different from respondent’s psychological condition based on the information fed
“incapacity” rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting
illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the such evidence.
like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a x x x x
person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological A careful reading of Dr. Tayag’s testimony reveals that she failed
illness that is contemplated by said rule.31 (Citations omitted, to establish the fact that at the time the parties were married,
underlining ours and emphasis in the original) respondent was already suffering from a psychological defect that
deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties and
It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other
responsibilities of marriage. Neither did she adequately explain
for more or less seven years from 1999 to 2006. The foregoing
how she came to the conclusion that respondent’s condition was
established fact shows that living together as spouses under one
grave and incurable. x x x
roof is not an impossibility. Mary Grace’s departure from their
home in 2006 indicates either a refusal or mere difficulty, but not
x x x x
absolute inability to comply with her obligation to live with her
husband.
First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the
respondent’s exact condition except in a very general way. In
Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally examined
short, her testimony and report were rich in generalities but
by Dr. Tayag, there arose a greater burden to present more
disastrously short on particulars, most notably on how the
convincing evidence to prove the gravity, juridical antecedence
respondent can be said to be suffering from narcissistic personality
and incurability of the former’s condition. Glenn, however, failed in
disorder; why and to what extent the disorder is grave and
this respect. Glenn’s testimony is wanting in material details.
incurable; how and why it was already present at the time of the
Rodelito, on the other hand, is a blood relative of Glenn. Glenn’s
marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the respondent’s
statements are hardly objective. Moreover, Glenn and Rodelito
awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and
both referred to Mary Grace’s traits and acts, which she exhibited
responsibilities of marriage. All these are critical to the success of
during the marriage. Hence, there is nary a proof on the
the petitioner’s case.
antecedence of Mary Grace’s alleged incapacity. Glenn even
testified that, six months before they got married, they saw each
Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis
other almost everyday.32 Glenn saw “a loving[,] caring and well[-
because it was wholly based on what the petitioner related to her.
]educated person”33 in Mary Grace.
x x x If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent
means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be
Anent Dr. Tayag’s assessment of Mary Grace’s condition, the
admitted and given credit. No such independent evidence,
Court finds the same as unfounded.Rumbaua34 provides some
however, appears on record to have been gathered in this case,
guidelines on how the courts should evaluate the testimonies of
particularly about the respondent’s early life and associations, and
psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for the declaration of
about events on or about the time of the marriage and immediately
nullity of marriage, viz:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
thereafter. Thus, the testimony and report appear to us to be no
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about the more than a diagnosis that revolves around the one-sided and
respondent’s psychological incapacity were based on the meagre facts that the petitioner related, and were all slanted to
information fed to her by only one side – the petitioner – whose support the conclusion that a ground exists to justify the
bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this nullification of the marriage. We say this because only the baser
circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for qualities of the respondent’s life were examined and given focus;
reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the none of these qualities were weighed and balanced with the better
application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in the qualities, such as his focus on having a job, his determination to
manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only improve himself through studies, his care and attention in the first
diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account; six months of the marriage, among others. The evidence fails to
she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and mention also what character and qualities the petitioner brought
how he would have reacted and responded to the doctor’s probes. into her marriage, for example, why the respondent’s family
opposed the marriage and what events led the respondent to
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner’s blame the petitioner for the death of his mother, if this allegation is
narrations, and on this basis characterized the respondent to be a at all correct. To be sure, these are important because not a few
self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who “believes marriages have failed, not because of psychological incapacity of
that the world revolves around him”; and who “used love as either or both of the spouses, but because of basic
a…deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner] incompatibilities and marital developments that do not amount to
extended towards him.” x x x. psychological incapacity. x x x.35 (Citations omitted and
underlining ours)

158
In the case at bar, Dr. Tayag made general references to Mary
Grace’s status as the eldest among her siblings, 36 her father’s When Robert testified, he disclosed that Luz was already living in
being an overseas contract worker and her very tolerant mother, a California, USA, and had married an American. He also revealed
housewife.37 These, however, are not sufficient to establish and that when they were still engaged, Luz continued seeing and
explain the supposed psychological incapacity of Mary Grace dating another boyfriend, a certain Lt. Liwag. He also claimed that
warranting the declaration of the nullity of the couple’s marriage. from the outset, Luz had been remiss in her duties both as a wife
and as a mother as shown by the following circumstances: (1) it
The Court understands the inherent difficulty attendant to was he who did the cleaning of the room because Luz did not know
obtaining the statements of witnesses who can attest to the how to keep order; (2)it was her mother who prepared their meal
antecedence of a person’s psychological incapacity, but such while her sister was the one who washed their clothes because
difficulty does not exempt a petitioner from complying with what she did not want her polished nails destroyed; (3)it was also her
the law requires. While the Court also commiserates with Glenn’s sister who took care of their children while she spent her time
marital woes, the totality of the evidence presented provides sleeping and looking at the mirror; (4) when she resumed her
inadequate basis for the Court to conclude that Mary Grace is schooling, she dated different men; (5) he received anonymous
indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with her letters reporting her loitering with male students; (6) when he was
obligations as Glenn’s spouse. not home, she would receive male visitors; (7) a certain Romy
Padua slept in their house when he was away; and (6) she would
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated contract loans without his knowledge.
January 29, 2013 and Resolution dated August 7, 2013 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96448 are AFFIRMED. In addition, Robert presented the testimony of Myrna Delos Reyes
Villanueva (Villanueva), Guidance Psychologist II of Northern
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary Mindanao Medical Center.

On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending before the trial court,
Robert filed a petition for marriage annulment with the Metropolitan
Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of
SECOND DIVISION Manila (Metropolitan Tribunal).

G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015 On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal handed down a
decision declaring their marriage invalid ab initio on the ground
ROBERT F. MALLILIN, Petitioner, v. LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN
of grave lack of due discretion on the part of both parties as
AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
contemplated by the second paragraph of Canon 1095. This
DECISION decision was affirmed by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal (NAMT).
MENDOZA, J.:
Prior to that,on September 20, 2002, the RTC had rendered a
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the decision declaring the marriage null and void on the ground of
Revised Rules of Court assailing the November 20, 2009 psychological incapacity on the part of Luz as she failed to comply
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its June 1, 2010 with the essential marital obligations.
Resolution,2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78303-MIN, which reversed and
set aside the September 20, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial The State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
Court, Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City(RTC-Br. 37), declaring (OSG), interposed an appeal with the CA. The OSG argued that
the marriage between petitioner Robert F. Mallilin (Robert) and Robert failed to make a case for declaration of nullity of his
private respondent Luz G. Jamesolamin (Luz) null and void. marriage with Luz. It pointed out that the real cause of the marital
discord was the sexual infidelity of Luz. Such ground, the OSG
The Facts: contended, should not result in the nullification of the marriage
under the law, but merely constituted a ground for legal separation.
Robert and Luz were married on September 6, 1972. They begot
three (3) children. The CA, in its November 20, 2009 Decision,4 granted the petition
and reversed the RTC decision. The decision, including the
On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration of decretal portion, partially reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
nullity of marriage before the RTC, Branch 23, Cagayan de Oro
City (RTC-Br. 23). On March 7, 1996, RTC-Br. 23 denied the [W]e find that the trial court committed a reversible error. Closer
petition. Robert appealed this judgment before the CA where it was scrutiny of the records reveals, as correctly noted by the Solicitor
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 54261. On January 29, 1999, the General, sexual infidelity are not rooted on some debilitating
CA reversed the RTC-Br. 23 decision “due to lack of participation psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to
of the State as required under Article 48 of the Family Code.”3 The assume the essential obligations of marriage. x xx.
case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings and its
records were thereafter transferred from RTC-Br. 23 to RTC-Br. xxxx
37, as the latter was designated as Family Court pursuant to the
Family Code Act of 1997. In the case at bar, apart from his self-serving declarations, the
evidence adduced by Robert fell short of establishing the fact that
In the complaint, Robert alleged that at the time of the celebration at the time of their marriage, Luz was suffering from a
of their marriage, Luz was suffering from psychological and mental psychological defect which in fact deprived [her] of the ability to
incapacity and unpreparedness to enter into such marital life and assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant
to comply with its essential obligations and responsibilities. Such responsibilities.
incapacity became even more apparent during their marriage
when Luz exhibited clear manifestation of immaturity, xxxx
irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational judgment, and
inability to cope with the heavy and oftentimes demanding We commiserate with the plaintiff-appellee’s undeserved marital
obligation of a parent. plight. Yet, Our paramount duty as a court compels Us to apply the
law at all costs, however harsh it may be on whomsoever is called
Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the complaint. upon to bear its unbiased brunt.
She averred that it was Robert who manifested psychological
incapacity in their marriage. Despite due notice, however, she did FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed Decision dated September
not appear during the trial. Assistant City Prosecutor 20, 2002 in Civil Case No. 94-178 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
IsabeloSabanal appeared for the State. No costs.

159
 obligations due to outside factors other than psychological
SO ORDERED.5 incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code. The
OSG also raises the strong possibility of collusion between the
parties as shown by the events that took place after the issuance
Robert filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the of the March 7, 1996 RTC Decision. The OSG
CA in its June 1, 2010 Resolution,6stating that the arguments of wrote:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Robert were mere rehash of the same ground, arguments and
discussion previously pointed out by him, and that no new Significantly, the chronological events after the trial court issued its
substance was brought out to warrant the reconsideration or March 7, 1996 Decision unmistakably show the collusion between
reversal of its decision. the parties to obtain the reliefs pleaded. Among others,
respondent’s Retraction of Testimony was executed without the
Hence, this petition. presence of counsel sometime in 1998, a few months before she
married an American. This irregularity was even noticed by the
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54261:
cralawred

xxxx
I

The involvement and active participation of the Solicitor General

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS’ HOLDING THAT
became indispensable, in the present recourse, when, in a
THE ABSENCE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF
whirlwind turn of events, the Appellee made a VOLTE
THE WIFE UNDERSCORES THE EVIDENTIAL GAP TO
FACE executed a “Retraction of Testimony” and a “Waiver of
SUSTAIN THE DECISION OF THE RTC DECLARING THE
Custody” waiving custody of Franco Mark J Mallillin, still a minor,
MARRIAGE OF PETITIONER TO RESPONDENT NULL AND
her son by the Appellant. It bears stressing that the Appellee, in
VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE. the Court a quo, obdurately denied the material allegations of the
Appellant’s complaint and declared that it was the Appellant who
II was psychologically incapacitated. The sudden turn-about of
the appellee, in the present recourse, to the extent of
disowning her testimony in the Court a quo and even praying
THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO DECLARED BY THE for the reversal of the Decision of the Trial Court is strongly
NATIONAL APPELLATE MATRIMONIAL TRIBUNAL OF THE suggestive, if not constitutive, of collusion or a modus
CATHOLIC BISHOP’S CONFERENCE OF THE PHILIPPINES vivendi between the parties, outlawed by the Family Code of
AS GUILTY OF GRAVE LACK OF DUE DISCRETION. the Philippines and the Constitution. x x x
III
The Court’s Ruling
THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO FOUND BY THE LOWER
The main issue is whether the totality of the evidence adduced
COURT AS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO
proves that Luzwas psychologically incapacitated to comply with
COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of
their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Robert now argues that he has sufficiently proven the nullity of his
marriage even in the absence of any medical, psychiatric or The petition is bereft of merit.
psychological examination of the wife by a competent and qualified
professional. To bolster his claim, he avers that the Metropolitan A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on
Tribunal already declared that Luz exhibited grave lack of Article 36 of the Family Code which
discretion in judgment concerning the essential rights and provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
obligations mutually given and accepted in marriage. The said
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
decision was affirmed by the NAMT.
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligation of marriage, shall likewise be void even
Robert further argues that the sexual indiscretion of Luz with
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
different men coupled with the fact that she failed to function as a
home maker to her family and as a housewife to him incapacitated
her from accepting and complying with her essential marital “Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under
obligations. For said reason, he asserts that the case of Luz was Article 36of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental
not a mere case of sexual infidelity, but clearly an illness that was – not merely physical – incapacity that causes a party to be truly
rooted on some debilitating psychological condition which incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
incapacitated her to carry out the responsibilities of a married be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
woman. Robert avers that a sexmaniac is not just a mere sexual as so expressed in Article 68of the Family Code, among others,
infidel but one who is suffering from a deep psychological problem. include their mutual obligations to live together; observe love,
respect and fidelity; and render help and support. There is hardly
Position of the State a doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
The OSG argues that the CA correctly ruled that the totality of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
evidence presented by Robert was not sufficient to support a or inability to give meaning and significance to the
finding that Luz was psychologically incapacitated. His evidence marriage.7cralawlawlibrary
fell short of establishing his assertion that at the time of their
marriage, Luz was suffering from a psychological defect which Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be
deprived her of the ability to assume the essential duties of characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
With regard to the findings of the Metropolitan Tribunal and the required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the party
NAMT, the OSG claims that the same were only given persuasive antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
value and were not controlling or decisive in cases of nullity of only emerge after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it
marriage. Further, the decision was based on grave lack of were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
discretion of judgment concerning matrimonial rights and involved.8cralawlawlibrary

160
 incapacity.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo C. De Quintos,
Jr.,9the Court reiterated the well-settled guidelines in resolving The alleged failure of Luz to assume her duties as a wife and as a
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, embodied mother, as well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and
in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,10 based on Article 36 infidelity,cannot rise to the level of psychological incapacity that
of the Family Code.Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary justifies the nullification of the parties' marriage. The Court has
repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the assume the basic marital obligations," not merely the refusal,
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant
dissolution and nullity. x x x.cralawred spouse.11Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is
one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's duties is
x x x x another. Psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) marriage.12cralawlawlibrary
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or perversion and
must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations abandonment do not, by themselves, constitute grounds for
and/or symptoms may be physical. x xx.cralawred declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity.
Robert arguesthat the series of sexual indiscretion of Luz were
x x x x external manifestations of the psychological defect that she was
suffering within her person, which could be considered as
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the nymphomania or “excessive sex hunger.” Other than his
celebration" of the marriage. x x x.cralawred allegations, however, no other convincing evidence was adduced
to prove that these sexual indiscretions were considered as
x x x x nymphomania, and that it was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable
within the term of psychological incapacity embodied in Article 36.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically To stress, Robert’s testimony alone is insufficient to prove the
permanent or incurable. x xx.cralawred existence of psychological incapacity.

x x x x In Sivino A. Ligeralde v. May Ascension A. Patalinghug and the

Republic of the Philippines,13 the Court ruled that the
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability respondent’s act ofliving an adulterous life cannot
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, automatically be equated with a psychological disorder,
"mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. x x was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. The
x.cralawred petitioner must be able to establish that the respondent’s
unfaithfulness was a manifestation of a disordered personality,
x x x x which made her completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband Third, the psychological report of Villanueva, Guidance
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in Psychologist II of the Northern Mindanao Medical Center,
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital Cagayan de Oro City, was insufficient to prove the psychological
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by incapacity of Luz. There was nothing in the records that would
evidence and included in the text of the decision. indicate that Luz had either been interviewed or was subjected to
a psychological examination. The finding as to her psychological
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial incapacity was based entirely on hearsay and the self-serving
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not information provided by Robert.
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
x xx.cralawred Fourth, the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal is insufficient to
prove the psychological incapacity of Luz. Although it is true that
x x x x in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,14 the Court
stated that interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. x x x. be given great respect by our courts, still it is subject to the law on
evidence. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Guided by these pronouncements, the Court is of the considered Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code
view that Robert’s evidence failed to establish the psychological is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people,
incapacity of Luz. it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
First, the testimony of Robert failed to overcome the burden of tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law on evidence – what is
proof to show the nullity of the marriage. Other than his self- decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void x xx.
serving testimony, no other evidence was adduced to show the (Emphasis supplied)
alleged incapacity of Luz. He presented no other witnesses to
corroborate his allegations on her behavior. Thus, his testimony
was self-serving and hadno serious value as evidence. Pertinently, Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of Evidence
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Second, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of
Luz was not medically or clinically identified, and sufficiently The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
proven during the trial. Based on the records, Robert failed to offered. The purpose of which the evidence is offered must be
prove that her disposition of not cleaning the room, preparing their specified.
meal, washing the clothes, and propensity for dating and receiving
different male visitors, was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable
In this regard, the belated presentation of the decision of the NAMT
within the parameters of jurisprudence on psychological
cannot be given value since it was not offered during the trial, and

161
the Court has in no way of ascertaining the evidence considered
by the same tribunal. The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated
July 2, 2002, which was forwarded to this Court only on February
Granting that it was offered and admitted, it must be pointed out 11, 2004, reads as follows:
that the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the NAMT
was not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions [T]he FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable
causes of a psychological nature similar to Article 36 of the Family witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite
Code, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear
to those who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial
concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to
mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portions believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that the
of the NAMT decision are as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary husband-respondent upon contracting marriage suffered
from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby
The FACTS on the Case prove with the certitude required by law rendering nugatory his marital contract: First, his family was
that based on the deposition of the petitioner – the respondent dysfunctional in that as a child, he saw the break-up of the
understandably ignored the proceedings completely for which she marriage of his own parents; his own two siblings have broken
was duly cited for Contempt of Court – and premised on the marriages; Second, he therefore grew up with a domineering
substantially concordant testimonies of the Witnesses, the woman mother with whom [he] identified and on whom he depended for
Respondent demonstrated in the external forum through her action advice; Third, he was according to his friends, already into drugs
and reaction patterns, before and after the marriage-in-fact, and alcohol before marriage; this affected his conduct of bipolar
her grave lack of due discretion in judgement for marriage kind: he could be very quiet but later very talkative, peaceful but
intents and purposes basically by reason of her immaturity of later hotheaded even violent, he also was aware of the infidelity of
judgement as manifested by her emotional ambivalence x x x. his mother who now lives with her paramour, also married and a
policeman; Finally, into marriage, he continued with his drugs and
WHEREFORE, this COLLEGIAL COURT OF APPEALS, having alcohol abuse until one time he came home very drunk and beat
invoked the Divine Name and having in mind the Law, the up his wife and attacked her with a bolo that wounded her; this led
Jurisprudence and the Facts pertaining to the Case, hereby to final separation.
declares and decrees the confirmation of the nullity decision
rendered by the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second
Archdiocese of Manil on the Marriage Case MALLILIN – Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having considered
JAMISOLAMIN with Prot. N. 63/2000 on the ground provided by the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the
Canon 1095 par. 2 CIC on the part of the woman Respondent – Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation
but NOT on the part of the man Petitioner for lack of evidence. of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)15 marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of
the 1983 Code of Canon Law.
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Santos v. Santos,16the Court referred to the deliberations during However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show
the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which that, other than herself, petitioner-appellant offered the testimonies
drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the following persons only, to wit: AldanaCeledonia (petitioner-
of the Family Code. It went out to state that a part of the appellant’s mother), Sonny de la Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon,
provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R. Gates (psychologist). Said
Code of Canon Law, which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary witnesses testified, in particular, to the unfaithful night of July 1,
1994 wherein the respondent allegedly made an attempt on the
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage: life of the petitioner. But unlike the hearing and finding before the
cralawred Matrimonial Tribunal, petitioner-appellant’s sister-in-law and
friends of the opposing parties were never presented before said
1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
Court. As to the contents and veracity of the latter’s testimonies,
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of this Court is without any clue.
judgment concerning the essential matrimonial rights and
obligations to be mutually given and accepted; True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al. (268 SCRA
198), the Supreme Court held that the interpretations given by the
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
nature, are unable to assume the essential the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
obligations of marriage.(Emphasis and underscoring great respect by our courts. However, the Highest Tribunal
supplied) expounded as follows:
cralawred
In Najera v. Najera,17the Court was also confronted with a similar Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code
issue of whether to consider an annulment by the NAMT as also is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people,
covering psychological incapacity, the only ground recognized in it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
our law.In the said case, the NAMT decision was also based on persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
the second paragraph of Canon 1095. The Court ruled that it tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law on evidence – what is
was not similar to, and only annulments under the third decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void xxx.
paragraph of, Canon 1095 should be considered. Elucidating,
the Court wrote:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence
states:
Petitioner’s argument is without merit. cralawred

In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
apparently did not have the opportunity to consider the decision of offered. The purpose of which the evidence is offered must be
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is specified.
clear that the Court of Appeals considered the Matrimonial
Tribunal’s decision in its Resolution dated August 5, 2004 when it Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not
resolved petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In the said expect us to give credence to the Decision of the National
Resolution, the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the very same Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently, it was made on
issues now raised before this Court and correctly held that a different set of evidence of which We have no way of
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was devoid of merit. It ascertaining their truthfulness.
stated:

162
Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments must be Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
based on the evidence presented before the court (Manzano vs.
Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And based on the evidence on x x x x
record, We find no ample reason to reverse or modify the judgment
of the Trial Court.31cralawlawlibrary 3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Santos v. Santos18cited the deliberations during the sessions of
the Family Code Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to
provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It To hold that annulment of marriages decreed by the NAMT under
stated that a part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph the second paragraph of Canon 1095 should also be covered
of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which would be to expand what the lawmakers did not intend to include.
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary What would prevent members of other religious groups from
invoking their own interpretation of psychological incapacity?
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Would this not lead to multiple, if not inconsistent, interpretations?

1. those who lack sufficient use of reason; To consider church annulments as additional grounds for
annulment under Article 36 would be legislating from the bench.
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment As stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be Molina,20 interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church
mutually given and accepted; in the Philippines are given great respect by our courts, but they
are not controlling or decisive.
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In Republic v. Galang,21it was written that the Constitution set out
a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic
It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration social institution, and the marriage was the foundation of the
of nullity of marriage by the National Appellate Matrimonial family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State,
Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for
mentions causes of a psychological nature, but the second declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the
paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the evidence
from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of
essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of
given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portion of the a grave and serious psychological illness existing at the time it was
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal celebrated, the Court is compelled to uphold the indissolubility of
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary the marital tie.
The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable
In fine, the Court holds that the CA decided correctly. Petitioner
witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite
Robert failed to adduce sufficient and convincing evidence to
summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not
prove the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz.
appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard,
hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this
As asserted by the OSG, the allegations of the petitioner make a
Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and
case for legal separation. Hence, this decision is without prejudice
conclude that the husband-respondent upon contacting
to an action for legal separation if a party would want to pursue
marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of
such proceedings. In this disposition, the Court cannot decree a
judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract x
legal separation because in such proceedings, there are matters
x x.
and consequences like custody and separation of properties that
need to be considered and settled.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second
Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having considered
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78303-MIN, dated November 20,
Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation
2009, and its Resolution, dated June 1, 2010, are
of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of
herebyAFFIRMED, without prejudice.
marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of
the 1983 Code of Canon Law.x x x.
No costs.
Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
the facts established by petitioner before the trial court, the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming
the decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not based on Republic of the Philippines
the psychological incapacity of respondent. Petitioner, therefore, SUPREME COURT
erred in stating that the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates Manila
regarding the psychological incapacity of respondent is supported
by the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. THIRD DIVISION

In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of
the RTC. (Emphases in the original; Underscoring supplied)
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993

ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,

Hence, Robert’s reliance on the NAMT decision is misplaced. To
vs.
repeat, the decision of the NAMT was based on the second
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA
paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer
represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R.
from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning
AVERA, respondents.
essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually
given and accepted, a cause not of psychological nature under Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
Article 36 of the Family Code. A cause of psychological nature
similar to Article 36 is covered by the third paragraph of Canon De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.
1095 of the Code of Canon Law (Santos v. Santos19), which for
ready reference reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

163
ROMERO, J.: Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no
property in his possession is an issue that may be determined only
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling after trial on the merits. 1
finding no grave abuse of discretion in the lower court's order
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for declaration A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous
of nullity of marriage and separation of property. application of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS 2 and the absence of
justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the motion for
filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt
"Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" within which to file his answer.
against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil
others that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA action of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower
Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss.
Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with
one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals 3 dismissed the
and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only petition. It explained that the case of Yap v. CA 4 cited by petitioner
sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do
from January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in not have relevance in the case at bar, there being no identity of
Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only when facts because these cases dealt with the successional rights of the
she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted second wife while the instant case prays for separation of property
by her foreign employer since 1983 up to the present, he has been corollary with the declaration of nullity of marriage. It observed that
unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and the separation and subsequent distribution of the properties
subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and acquired during the union can be had only upon proper
personal properties with a total amount of approximately determination of the status of the marital relationship between said
P350,000.00, which are under the possession and administration parties, whether or not the validity of the first marriage is denied by
of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and
vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another multiplicity of suits, the declaration of nullity of marriage may be
woman; she further discovered that he had been disposing of invoked in this proceeding together with the partition and
some of her properties without her knowledge or consent; she distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52
confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her brother of the Family Code, it held that private respondent's prayer for
Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised
properties; he failed and refused to turn over the possession and together with other incidents of their marriage such as the
administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted that since the Court
and he is not authorized to administer and possess the same on has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to
account of the nullity of their marriage. The petition prayed that a dismiss is merely one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be have been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of
issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of administration an adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for
and ownership over said properties; their marriage be declared reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit. 5
null and void and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be
Hence, this petition.
declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at
the time of their void marriage and such properties be placed under The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are
the proper management and administration of the attorney-in-fact. the following.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void
stated no cause of action. The marriage being void ab initio, the marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same
petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
and unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property
which is in his possession. Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of
private respondent to recover certain real and personal properties
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. She
explained: Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon 6 and People
v. Mendoza, 7 contends that SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private
marriage by a man with another woman is illegal and void (citing respondent must be dismissed for being unnecessary and
the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no superfluous. Furthermore, under his own interpretation of Article
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void 40 of the Family Code, he submits that a petition for declaration of
marriage (citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; absolute nullity of marriage is required only for purposes of
People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no
there is no dispute that the second marriage contracted by allegation of private respondent's intention to remarry, said petition
respondent with herein petitioner after a first marriage with another should therefore, be dismissed.
woman is illegal and void. However, as to whether or not the
second marriage should first be judicially declared a nullity is not On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of
an issue in said case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage, not for
the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms, thus: purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the
separation and distribution of the properties acquired during
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court coverture.
observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to
be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private
still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of its nullity. respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage with
(37 SCRA 316, 326) one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such,
it is from the beginning. 8Petitioner himself does not dispute the
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the absolute nullity of their marriage. 9
previous rulings of the Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of
Aragon and Mendoza. The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied
upon by petitioner are cases where the Court had earlier ruled that
no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void,

164
bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating that:
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was determine for himself whether or not his marriage is valid and that
void there would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses a court action is needed. Justice Puno accordingly proposed that
to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is the provision be modified to read:
reserved to the courts. . . . 10
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in final judgment annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage
subsequent cases involving the same issue. Thus, in Gomez void, except as provided in Article 41.
v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in
the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question.
order forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed property Justice Puno, however, pointed out that, even if it is a judgment of
acquired during the second marriage, the Court stated that "if the annulment, they still have to produce the judgment.
nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the application
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial declaration thereof,
which of course contemplates an action for that purpose." The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a
final judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de
in Article 41.
Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, that
"although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared
initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still invalid, does it include the annulment of a marriage and the
subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity." declaration that the marriage is void? Justice Caguioa replied in
the affirmative. Dean Gupit added that in some judgments, even if
In Tolentino v. Paras, 12 however, the Court turned around and
the marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno
applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting
suggested that this matter be made clear in the provision.
the prayer of the first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful
surviving spouse and the correction of the death certificate of her Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to
deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage that require first a judicial declaration of a void marriage and not
he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first annullable marriages, with which the other members concurred.
spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and Judge Diy added that annullable marriages are presumed valid
effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of until a direct action is filed to annul it, which the other members
a void marriage." affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then the phrase
"absolute nullity" can stand since it might result in confusion if they
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the
change the phrase to "invalidity" if what they are referring to in the
Court reverted to the Consuegra case and held that there was "no
provision is the declaration that the marriage is void.
need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of
her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with
a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial collateral defense as well as collateral attack. Justice Caguioa
declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she explained that the idea in the provision is that there should be a
would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she final judgment declaring the marriage void and a party should not
contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel." declare for himself whether or not the marriage is void, while the
other members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are,
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the
therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that point. Prof.
conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the
Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a
assumption that the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they
cause of action or a ground for defense. 14Where the absolute
depriving one of the right to raise the defense that he has no
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
liability because the basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista
of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law
added that they cannot say that there will be no judgment on the
for said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final
validity or invalidity of the marriage because it will be taken up in
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 15
the same proceeding. It will not be a unilateral declaration that, it
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision is a void marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista
Committee 16 which drafted what is now the Family Code of the and suggested that they limit the provision to remarriage. He then
Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not proposed that Article 39 be reworded as follows:
be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may
the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of
be invoked only on the basis of final judgment . . .
their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. This is
borne out by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:
the Civil Code and Family Law Committees where the present
Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage only
B. Article 39. — on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void, except as provided in Article 41.
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the
basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, except as Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
provided in Article 41.
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be
not only void but also voidable marriages. He then suggested that invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity,
the above provision be modified as follows: except as provided in Article 41.
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . . Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad
and will not solve the objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the
only . . .
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say: basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided
in Article 41.

165
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words,
that if one enters into a subsequent marriage without obtaining a for purposes of remarriage, why should the only legally acceptable
final judgment declaring the nullity of a previous marriage, said basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a
subsequent marriage is void ab initio. final judgment declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas,
for purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go
back to the original wording of the provision as follows: Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as
an "inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for such, it "shall be protected by the State." 20 In more explicit terms,
purposes of remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment the Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of
declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
Article 41. 17 accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal, and family
life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a
peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents
marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a
his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the
matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the
judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the
person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. 18 purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on
the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract
there is a necessity for a declaration of absolute nullity of a prior of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect —
subsisting marriage before contracting another in the recent case and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution
of Terre v. Terre. 19 The Court, in turning down the defense of would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky
respondent Terre who was charged with grossly immoral conduct foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would
consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could
woman other than complainant while his prior marriage with the conceive. For such a social significant institution, an official state
latter remained subsisting, said that "for purposes of determining pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy
whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and
judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab public declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the
initio is essential." contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable
through records accessible to everyone.
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, petitioner submits that the same can be That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no
maintained only if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to impediment to a second sought to be contracted by one of the
allege this purpose, according to petitioner's theory, will warrant parties may be gleaned from new information required in the
dismissal of the same. Family Code to be included in the application for a marriage
license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and where the
Article 40 of the Family Code provides: previous marriage was dissolved and annulled." 23

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art.
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment 40 of the Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his
declaring such previous marriage void. (n) position that private respondent's failure to state in the petition that
the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result in the dismissal
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in
of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40
the provision of the word "solely." As it is placed, the same shows
resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term "solely" was in
that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous
fact anticipated by the members of the Committee.
marriage void." Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in
conveying the precise intent of the Committee members, the Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to
provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not state "The refer to "for purposes of remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only"
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for refers to "final judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say
purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case "solely" would clearly "on the basis only of a final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested
qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the that they use the legal term "solely" instead of "only," which the
phraseology been such, the interpretation of petitioner would have Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute
rendering irrelevant the clause "on the basis solely of a final nullity of marriage is unnecessary, petitioner suggests that private
judgment declaring such previous marriage void." respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the
recovery of the properties alleged to have been acquired during
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause their union. In such an eventuality, the lower court would not be
denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage acting as a mere special court but would be clothed with
void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and ownership. In
Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate
might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for or partition as the petition admits that all the properties were
purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for acquired with private respondent's money.
liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property
between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded
custody and support of their common children and the delivery of that "the prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may
the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as
must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the the separation of their properties."
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the
absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final
final judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation, partition
judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence,
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and
in the instance where a party who has previously contracted a
support of the common children, and the delivery of their
marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into another
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated
marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to
in previous judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing
prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he
therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:
may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx

166
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal with De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent
partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, and instead left the house after giving instructions to his houseboy
but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or to take care of his children.
her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal
partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children
children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by and even alienated the affection of his children for him.
a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as appearing in his 1986
if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore,
made to said donee are revoked by operation of law; he alleges that respondent caused his arrest on January 13, 1992,
after he had a heated argument with De Castro inside the latter's
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other office.
spouse who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance
policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married
to De Castro and that the filing of the administrative action was
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was
faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by disputed by De Castro.
testate and intestate succession. (n)
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad claims that he was even a witness to the withdrawal of the
faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against
reason of marriage and testamentary disposition made by one in complainant. According to him, it was the sister of De Castro who
favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n) 26 called the police to arrest complainant.

Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko,
prayer for separation of property will simply be one of the although he admits having five children with her. He alleges that
necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a
nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion that in order Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a
for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of
be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another
clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again,
one of which is the separation of property according to the regime neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned
of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and
lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is custody as a single parent.
brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental
questions regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in
respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that the Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all
lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single
petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J. because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the
decision of respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and the nullity of a previous marriage before a party thereto can enter into
Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED. a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:

SO ORDERED. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.

Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family

Code does not apply to him considering that his first marriage took
Republic of the Philippines place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the
SUPREME COURT Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and
Manila governed by the Family Code.
EN BANC Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the
date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995 Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article
vs. 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to
Court, Branch 28, Manila, respondent. his case.

The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants'
rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending
QUIASON, J.:
actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
Appearance of Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The
Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila. reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor
arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
Castro, who are living together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air
Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He
he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila. made a mockery of the institution of marriage and employed deceit
to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw
respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was
was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the time he went through

167
the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the
lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any law Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been deputized to assist
student would know that a marriage license is necessary before the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued,
one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity to first, that Nolasco did not possess a "well-founded belief that the
correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were absent spouse was already dead," 2 and second, Nolasco's
married for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was
license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and a "cunning attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage. 3
bad faith.
During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman
It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in
fitness for membership in the legal profession. a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that
chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they
appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral and illegal returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19
act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he November 1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On 15
was already in the judiciary. January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San
Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge
in the Cathedral of San Jose.
must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his
performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior as a Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage
private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is celebration, he obtained another employment contract as a
also judged by his private life. A judge, in order to promote public seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique.
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent
behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica
duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet
self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately
demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual asked permission to leave his ship to return home. He arrived in
than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing v. Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690 Antique in November 1983.
[1994]).
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless. He also
forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and with prejudice to stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No.
reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the
government, including government-owned and controlled bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him.
corporations. This decision is immediately executory. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too
had no news of Janet Monica.
SO ORDERED.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with
and later married Janet Monica Parker despite his lack of
knowledge as to her family background. He insisted that his wife
continued to refuse to give him such information even after they
were married. He also testified that he did not report the matter of
Janet Monica's disappearance to the Philippine government
authorities.

Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his

witness. She testified that her daughter-in-law Janet Monica had
expressed a desire to return to England even before she had given
birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7 December 1982. When asked why her
daughter-in-law might have wished to leave Antique, respondent's
Republic of the Philippines mother replied that Janet Monica never got used to the rural way
SUPREME COURT of life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that she had
Manila tried to dissuade Janet Monica from leaving as she had given birth
to her son just fifteen days before, but when she (Alicia) failed to
THIRD DIVISION
do so, she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before
she left on 22 December 1982 for England. She further claimed
that she had no information as to the missing person's present
G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993 whereabouts.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12
vs. October 1988 the dispositive portion of which reads:
GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209, July 6, 1987, as
amended by Executive Order No. 227, July 17, 1987) this Court
Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.
hereby declares as presumptively dead Janet Monica Parker
RESOLUTION Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance. 4

The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the

trial court erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively
FELICIANO, J.: dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there
existed a well founded belief for such declaration.
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding
declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, that respondent had sufficiently established a basis to form a belief
invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that that his absent spouse had already died.
respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the
alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void. 1

168
The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this Macario Biasbas was charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up
Court on a Petition for Review where the following allegations are the defense of a good faith belief that his first wife had already
made: died. The Court held that defendant had not exercised due
diligence to ascertain the whereabouts of his first wife, noting that:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding
that there existed a well-founded belief on the part of Nolasco that While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries
Janet Monica Parker was already dead; and concerning the whereabouts of his wife, he fails to state of whom
he made such inquiries. He did not even write to the parents of his
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial Court's first wife, who lived in the Province of Pampanga, for the purpose
declaration that the petition was a proper case of the declaration of securing information concerning her whereabouts. He admits
of presumptive death under Article 41, Family Code. 5 that he had a suspicion only that his first wife was dead. He admits
that the only basis of his suspicion was the fact that she had been
The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is
absent. . . . 13
"[w]hether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is
already dead." 6 In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation
allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article
Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the
41 of the Family Code which provides that:
basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior or of the British Embassy, 14 he secured another seaman's
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of
the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent inhabitants, to look for her there.
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there
Q After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, did you exert efforts to
is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
inquire the whereabouts of your wife?
provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient. A Yes, Sir.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the Court:
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration How did you do that?
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis supplied). A I secured another contract with the ship and we had a trip to
London and I went to London to look for her I could not find
When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil her (sic). 15 (Emphasis supplied)
Code, which it superseded, 7 the following crucial differences
emerge. Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused
arise has been shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need London for Liverpool and this casts doubt on his supposed efforts
for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse to locate his wife in England. The Court of Appeal's justification of
present to remarry. 8 Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes the mistake, to wit:
a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code
. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know the
merely requires either that there be no news that such absentee is
geographical difference between London and Liverpool, for a
still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be
humble seaman like Gregorio the two places could mean one —
dead andbelieved to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed
place in England, the port where his ship docked and where he
dead under Article 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. 9 The Family
found Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they leave home
Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded
to visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan City, or Parañaque, would
belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
announce to friends and relatives, "We're going to Manila." This
declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
apparent error in naming of places of destination does not appear
As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) to be fatal. 16
requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41
is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its
of the Family Code:
neighboring cities, on one hand, and London and Liverpool, on the
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around
years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred three hundred fifty (350) kilometers apart. We do not consider that
where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with a simple
in Article 391, Civil Code; hope of somehow bumping into one particular person there —
which is in effect what Nolasco says he did — can be regarded as
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry; a reasonably diligent search.

3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica
absentee is dead; and declined to give any information as to her personal background
even after she had married respondent 17 too convenient an
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. 10 the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which
respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he
Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these
had lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.
requirements. 11
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare
Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that
assertion that he had inquired from their friends of her
respondent failed to prove that he had complied with the third
whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those
requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the
friends in his testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the
absent spouse is already dead.
prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial, it is good
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature, be
search for his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not synonymous with
"well-founded belief" that she is dead. credibility. 18 As noted before, there are serious doubts to
respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as evidence,
United States v. Biasbas, 12 is instructive as to degree of diligence said testimony merely tended to show that the missing spouse had
required in searching for a missing spouse. In that case, defendant

169
chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and
and not that she was dead. both Decisions are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Costs
against respondent.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's
letter sometime in January 1983, he cut short his employment Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
contract to return to San Jose, Antique. However, he did not
explain the delay of nine (9) months from January 1983, when he Gutierrez, Jr. J., is on leave.
allegedly asked leave from his captain, to November 1983 when
be finally reached San Jose. Respondent, moreover, claimed he
married Janet Monica Parker without inquiring about her parents # Footnotes
and their place of residence. 19 Also, respondent failed to explain
why he did not even try to get the help of the police or other 1 Petition, p. 2; Record, p. 7.
authorities in London and Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The
2 Records, p. 13.
circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and respondent's
subsequent behavior make it very difficult to regard the claimed 3 Records, p. 14.
belief that Janet Monica was dead a well-founded one.
4 Trial Court Decision, p. 4; Records, p. 39.
In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, 20 the Court stressed that:
5 Petition, p. 9; Rollo, p. 13.
. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity
the public is deeply interested. It is a relationship for life and the 6 Id.
parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any
contract they make. . . . . 21 (Emphasis supplied) 7 Pertinent portions of Article 83 of the Civil Code reads:

By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
simple expedient of agreeing that one of them leave the conjugal during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any other
abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from
laws on marriage. The Court notes that respondent even tried to its performance, unless:
have his marriage annulled before the trial court in the same
xxx xxx xxx
proceeding.
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years
In In Re Szatraw, 22 the Court warned against such collusion
at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present
between the parties when they find it impossible to dissolve the
having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though
marital bonds through existing legal means.
he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally
While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present
Gerry Nolasco, for maternal care, still the requirements of the law at the time of the contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the
must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The
requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial declaration of marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until
presumptive death must be denied. The law does not view declared null and void by a competent court.
marriage like an ordinary contract. Article 1 of the Family Code
emphasizes that.

. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a

man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
familyand an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject
to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by
this Code. (Emphasis supplied)

In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 23 the Court stressed strongly

the need to protect.

. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the

preservation of which the State bas the strongest interest; the
public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind. In THIRD DIVISION
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the
[G.R. No. 136467. April 6, 2000]
following basic state policy:
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner, vs. MARIETTA
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
CALISTERIO, respondent.
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.
... DECISION
The same sentiment bas been expressed in the Family Code of VITUG, J.:
the Philippines in Article 149:
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving
The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social several parcels of land with an estimated value of P604,750.00.
institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein respondent Marietta
Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no Calisterio. Esm
custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be
recognized or given effect. 24 Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had
previously been married to James William Bounds on 13 January
In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded 1946 at Caloocan City. James Bounds disappeared without a trace
belief required by law that his absent wife was already dead that on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven
would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica years later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having priorly
Parker presumptively dead. secured a court declaration that James was presumptively
dead. Esmsc
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23
February 1990, affirming the trial court's decision declaring Janet

170
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, such; otherwise, to determine who among the deceased's next of
a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court kin is competent and willing to become the administrator of the
("RTC") of Quezon City, Branch 104, a petition entitled, "In the estate."[3]
Matter of Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y
Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter On 23 November 1998, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's
alia, the sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage motion for reconsideration, prompting her to interpose the present
between the latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio appeal. Petitioner asseverates:
being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void. She prayed
"It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the Court of
that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be appointed administrator,
Appeals reversing and setting aside the decision of the trial court
without bond, of the estate of the deceased and that the
is not in accord with the law or with the applicable decisions of this
inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the
Honorable Court."[4]
estate would have been settled.
It is evident that the basic issue focuses on the validity of the
Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her
marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent
first marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the
Marietta, that, in turn, would be determinative of her right as a
latter's absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for more than
surviving spouse. Exsm
eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with
Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse of Teodorico, The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent
she sought priority in the administration of the estate of the Marietta was solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force at that
decedent. Esmmis time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect
only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code[5] itself
On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing
limited its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby
jointly Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., and respondent Marietta
would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
administrator and administratrix, respectively, of the intestate
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
estate of Teodorico.
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy
On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in
is Article 83 of the New Civil Code which provides: Kyle
favor of petitioner Antonia; it adjudged:
"Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding for the
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
petitioner and against the oppositor whereby herein petitioner,
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from
Antonia Armas y Calisterio, is declared as the sole heir of the
its performance, unless:
estate of Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos."[1]
"(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
Respondent Marietta appealed the decision of the trial court to the
Court of Appeals, formulating that- "(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years
at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present
"1. The trial court erred in applying the provisions of the Family
having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though
Code in the instant case despite the fact that the controversy arose
he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally
when the New Civil Code was the law in force.
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present
"2. The trial court erred in holding that the marriage between at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the
oppositor-appellant and the deceased Teodorico Calisterio is absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391.
bigamous for failure of the former to secure a decree of the The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases
presumptive death of her first spouse. until declared null and void by a competent court."

"3. The trial court erred in not holding that the property situated at Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted
No. 32 Batangas Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, is during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab
the conjugal property of the oppositor-appellant and the deceased initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved.
Teodorico Calisterio. Esmso Paragraph (2) of the law gives exceptions from the above rule. For
the subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases
"4. The trial court erred in holding that oppositor-appellant is not a therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse present (not the
legal heir of deceased Teodorico Calisterio. absentee spouse) so contracting the later marriage must have
done so in good faith.[6] Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or
"5. The trial court erred in not holding that letters of administration some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong - it partakes of
should be granted solely in favor of oppositor-appellant."[2] the nature of fraud, a breach of a known duty through some motive
of interest or ill will.[7] The Court does not find these circumstances
On 31 August 1998, the appellate court, through Mr. Justice
to be here extant. Kycalr
Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., promulgated its now assailed decision,
thus: A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not
necessary[8] as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from
is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases
is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and a new one entered declaring
are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until
as follows:
declared null and void by a competent court." It follows that the
"(a) Marietta Calisterio's marriage to Teodorico remains valid; burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing
the second marriage. Calrky
"(b) The house and lot situated at #32 Batangas Street, San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, belong to the conjugal In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a
partnership property with the concomitant obligation of the subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered
partnership to pay the value of the land to Teodorico's estate as of valid, the following conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior
the time of the taking; spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for four
consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death
"(c) Marietta Calisterio, being Teodorico's compulsory heir, is under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at
entitled to one half of her husband's estate, and Teodorico's sister, the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-
herein petitioner Antonia Armas and her children, to the other founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c)
half; Msesm there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can
"(d) The trial court is ordered to determine the competence of
institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration.
Marietta E. Calisterio to act as administrator of Teodorico's estate,
The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the
and if so found competent and willing, that she be appointed as
requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so

171
provided in Article 41[9], in relation to Article 40,[10] of the Family
Code. Mesm
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent ----x
Marietta's first husband, James William Bounds, had been absent
or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered
into a second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico DECISION
Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contracted during
the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid
notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of
presumptive death of James Bounds. CALLEJO, SR., J.:

The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of
having been adduced to indicate another property regime between the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26877, affirming the
the spouses, pertains to them in common. Upon its dissolution with Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City,
the death of Teodorico, the property should rightly be divided in Branch 3, convicting Eduardo P. Manuel of bigamy in Criminal
two equal portions -- one portion going to the surviving spouse and Case No. 19562-R.
the other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse. The
Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on
successional right in intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net
November 7, 2001, the accusatory portion of which reads:
estate[11] of the deceased, concurring with legitimate brothers and
sisters or nephews and nieces (the latter by right of That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio,
representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the brothers and Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
sisters or nephews and nieces, being entitled to the other half. above-named accused EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being then
Nephews and nieces, however, can only succeed by right of previously and legally married to RUBYLUS [GAA] and without the
representation in the presence of uncles and aunts; alone, upon said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there
the other hand, nephews and nieces can succeed in their own right willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with
which is to say that brothers or sisters exclude nephews and TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein complainant, who does not
nieces except only in representation by the latter of their parents know the existence of the first marriage of said EDUARDO P.
who predecease or are incapacitated to succeed. The appellate MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaa].
court has thus erred in granting, in paragraph (c) of the dispositive
portion of its judgment, successional rights, to petitioner's children, CONTRARY TO LAW. [3]
along with their own mother Antonia who herself is invoking
successional rights over the estate of her deceased brother. Slx The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo
was married to Rubylus Gaa before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Coin of Appeals in Makati, which was then still a municipality of the Province of
CA G.R. CV No. 51574 is AFFIRMED except insofar only as it Rizal.[4] He met the private complainant Tina B. Gandalera in
decreed in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion thereof that the Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan,
children of petitioner are likewise entitled, along with her, to the Dagupan City for two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21
other half of the inheritance, in lieu of which, it is hereby years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39.
DECLARED that said one-half share of the decedent's estate Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually,
pertains solely to petitioner to the exclusion of her own children. as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where, despite
No costs. Tinas resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her.
Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her
SO ORDERED. that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio
City to meet Tinas parents, and was assured by them that their
son was still single.

Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of

March 1996. They were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge
Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City,
Branch 61.[5] It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo
was single.

SECOND DIVISION
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married
life. Through their joint efforts, they were able to build their home
in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999,
Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only
twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, G.R. No. 165842 money from Eduardo, he would slap her.[6] Sometime in January
2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse,
Petitioner,
he stopped giving financial support.
Present:

PUNO, J., Chairman,

Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, - versus - CALLEJO, SR., inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where
she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. She
TINGA, and secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract.[7] She
was so embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.
Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged their
Promulgated: own vows.[8]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent. November 29, 2005 For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995
in a bar where she worked as a Guest Relations Officer (GRO).

172
He fell in love with her and married her. He informed Tina of his However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty
previous marriage to Rubylus Gaa, but she nevertheless agreed imposed by the trial court was erroneous and sought the
to marry him. Their marital relationship was in order until this one affirmance of the decision appealed from with modification.
time when he noticed that she had a love-bite on her neck. He then
abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he declared he was
single in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in
On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the
good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that
decision of the RTC with modification as to the penalty of the
he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage
accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all the
before marrying Tina.
elements of bigamy. Contrary to the contention of the appellant,
Article 41 of the Family Code should apply. Before Manuel could
lawfully marry the private complainant, there should have been a
Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first judicial declaration of Gaas presumptive death as the absent
wife because she threatened to commit suicide unless he did so. spouse. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court
Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter in Mercado v. Tan[15] and Domingo v. Court of Appeals[16] to
imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months and never saw support its ruling. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first
marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from
Rubylus for more than 20 years.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision
promulgated on July 31, 2002 is hereby MODIFIED to reflect, as it
hereby reflects, that accused-appellant is sentenced to an
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. He was day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and of prision mayor as maximum. Said Decision is AFFIRMED in all
ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, and other respects.
directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina Gandalera the
amount of P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs of
suit.[9]
SO ORDERED.[17]

Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on
The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond certiorari, insisting that:
reasonable doubt all the elements of bigamy under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code. It declared that Eduardos belief, that his
first marriage had been dissolved because of his first wifes 20-year I
absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from liability for
bigamy. Citing the ruling of this Court in People v. Bitdu,[10] the trial THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
court further ruled that even if the private complainant had known OF LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS FIRST WIFE
that Eduardo had been previously married, the latter would still be CANNOT BE LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD UNDER ARTICLE
criminally liable for bigamy. 390 OF THE CIVIL CODE AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL
DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS PROVIDED FOR
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the
private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any
malicious intent. He maintained that at the time that he married the
II
private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first
marriage no longer subsisted. He insisted that conformably to THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice for one OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE AWARD OF PHP200,000.00
to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by malice AS MORAL DAMAGES AS ITHAS NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN
in marrying the private complainant because he did so only out of LAW.[18]
his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He posited that
the trial court should have taken into account Article 390 of the
New Civil Code. To support his view, the appellant cited the rulings
of this Court in United States v. Pealosa[11] and Manahan, Jr. v. The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the
Court of Appeals.[12] second element of the felony, i.e., that the marriage has not been
legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead under the Civil Code. He
avers that when he married Gandalera in 1996, Gaa had been
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardos absent for 21 years since 1975; under Article 390 of the Civil Code,
defense of good faith and reliance on the Courts ruling in United she was presumed dead as a matter of law. He points out that,
States v. Enriquez[13]were misplaced; what is applicable is Article under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who
41 of the Family Code, which amended Article 390 of the Civil has been absent for seven years, whether or not he/she is still
Code. Citing the ruling of this Court in Republic v. alive, shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for
Nolasco,[14] the OSG further posited that as provided in Article 41 succession, while the second paragraph refers to the rule on legal
of the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration of presumption of death with respect to succession.
presumptive death of the absent spouse to enable the present
spouse to marry. Even assuming that the first marriage was void,
the parties thereto should not be permitted to judge for themselves
the nullity of the marriage; The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution. spouse arises by operation of law upon the satisfaction of two
Moreover, the OSG maintained, the private complainants requirements: the
knowledge of the first marriage would not afford any relief since specified period and the present spouses reasonable belief that
bigamy is an offense against the State and not just against the the absentee is dead. He insists that he was able to prove that he
private complainant. had not heard from his first wife since 1975 and that he had no
knowledge of her whereabouts or whether she was still alive;
hence, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the presumptive death
of Gaa had arisen by operation of law, as the two requirements of

173
Article 390 of the Civil Code are present. The petitioner concludes first marriage.[23] Viada avers that a third element of the crime is
that he should thus be acquitted of the crime of bigamy. that the second marriage must be entered into with fraudulent
intent (intencion fraudulente) which is an essential element of a
felony by dolo.[24] On the other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view
that there are only two elements of bigamy: (1) the existence of a
The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences
marriage that has not been lawfully dissolved; and (2) the
provided for in Article 390 of the Civil Code, the rule therein on
celebration of a second marriage. It does not matter whether the
legal presumptions remains valid and effective. Nowhere under
first marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have
Article 390 of the Civil Code does it require that there must first be
juridical effects until lawfully dissolved by a court of competent
a judicial declaration of death before the rule on presumptive death
jurisdiction.[25] As the Court ruled in Domingo v. Court of
would apply. He further asserts that contrary to the rulings of the
Appeals[26] and Mercado v. Tan,[27] under the Family Code of the
trial and appellate courts, the requirement of a judicial declaration
Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is only a
is a defense.
requirement for the validity of the subsequent or second marriage.
In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the
same view as Viada and declared that there are three (3) elements
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred of bigamy: (1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a new marriage; and
in awarding moral damages in favor of the private complainant. (3) fraudulent intention constituting the felony of the act. [28] He
The private complainant was a GRO before he married her, and explained that:
even knew that he was already married. He genuinely loved and
This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is
took care of her and gave her financial support. He also pointed
undoubtedly incorporated in the principle antedating all codes,
out that she had an illicit relationship with a lover whom she
and, constituting one of the landmarks of our Penal Code, that,
brought to their house.
where there is no willfulness there is no crime. There is no
willfulness if the subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this
In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the must be supported by very strong evidence, and if this be
decision of the CA affirming the petitioners conviction is in accord produced, the act shall be deemed not to constitute a crime. Thus,
with the law, jurisprudence and the evidence on record. To bolster a person who contracts a second marriage in the reasonable and
its claim, the OSG cited the ruling of this Court in Republic v. well-founded belief that his first wife is dead, because of the many
Nolasco.[19] years that have elapsed since he has had any news of her
whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors to find her, cannot be
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy, because there is no
fraudulent intent which is one of the essential elements of the
crime.[29]
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and
penalizes bigamy, reads: As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is
charged with bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is
deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is
upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, voluntary.[30] Although the words with malice do not appear in
or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. word voluntary.[31]

The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an
Code, to wit: overt act without legal excuse or justification from which another
suffers injury.[32] When the act or omission defined by law as a
felony is proved to have been done or committed by the accused,
El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse the law presumes it to have been intentional.[33] Indeed, it is a legal
legtimamente disuelto el anterior, ser castigado con la pena de presumption of law that every man intends the natural or probable
prision mayor. xxx consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the
contrary, and such presumption must prevail unless a reasonable
doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence. [34]
The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and
ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by law. [20] The
phrase or before the absent spouse had been declared For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the confluence of both an evil act and an evil intent. Actus non facit
proper proceedings was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code reum, nisi mens sit rea.[35]
because the drafters of the law were of the impression that in
consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption
of death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was
declaration of presumed death like annulment of married to Gaa in 1975, and such marriage was not judicially
marriage should be a justification for bigamy.[21] declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to
subsist.[36] The prosecution also proved that the petitioner married
the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is Family Code.
burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she has been legally married;
and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former
marriage having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or when he married the private complainant. As a general rule,
subsequent marriage.[22] It is essential in the prosecution for mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a
bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse

174
because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis
neminem excusat.
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide

It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when
he married the private complainant in 1996, he was of the well- Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown
grounded belief whether or not, the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for all purposes, except for those of succession.
for more than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in
evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the
presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of
Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he
Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five
acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be
when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, opened.
he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner,
however, failed to discharge his burden.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
including the division of the estate among the heirs:
The phrase or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered on the
proceedings in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an
aggroupment of empty or useless words. The requirement for a
aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four
judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the
years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the
consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she (2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war,
could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good and has been missing for four years;
faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other
circumstances and his existence has not been known for four
years.
The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the
State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the State
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. Marriage is a social institution of the highest The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for
importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still
require that the marital relation should be surrounded with every lives, is created by law and arises without any necessity of judicial
safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed and declaration.[42] However, Article 41 of the Family Code, which
the causes specified by law.[37] The laws regulating civil marriages amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death, reads:
are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or
general welfare of the community and the parties can waive
nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
over transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the community.
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger
willing spouses and an approving State. On marriage, the parties of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
assume new relations to each other and the State touching nearly Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall
on every aspect of life and death. The consequences of an invalid be sufficient.
marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so
serious that the law may well take means calculated to ensure the
procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the first
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent spouse [38] after
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such
summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the declaration
means is the requirement of the declaration by a competent court
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
of the presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.[43]
present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-
grounded belief of the death of the first spouse. Indeed, men
readily believe what they wish to be true, is a maxim of the old
jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first because With the effectivity of the Family Code,[44] the period of seven years
one of the parties believed the other to be dead would make the under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was
existence of the marital relation determinable, not by certain reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse
extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must
but by the subjective condition of individuals. [39] Only with such institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the
proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit second presumptive death of the absentee spouse,[45] without prejudice to
marriages.[40] Thus, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse. As
made the dissolution of marriage dependent not only upon the explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio:[46]
personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily
capable of accurate judicial cognizance, [41] namely, a judgment of
the presumptive death of the absent spouse. In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a
subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered
valid, the following conditions must concur,viz.: (a) The prior
The petitioners sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for four
basis for his acquittal for bigamy is misplaced. consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death
under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at

175
the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well- court proceedings, the subsequent marriage is bigamous. He
founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) maintains that the supposition is not true.[53] A second marriage is
there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive bigamous only when the circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of
death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can Article 83 of the Civil Code are not present.[54] Former Senator
institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. Ambrosio Padilla was, likewise, of the view that Article 349 seems
The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the to require judicial decree of dissolution or judicial declaration of
requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so absence but even with such decree, a second marriage in good
provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code. faith will not constitute bigamy. He posits that a second marriage,
if not illegal, even if it be annullable, should not give rise to
bigamy.[55] Former Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand, was
of the view that in the case of an absent spouse who could not yet
The Court rejects petitioners contention that the requirement of
be presumed dead according to the Civil Code, the spouse present
instituting a petition for declaration of presumptive death under
cannot be charged and convicted of bigamy in case he/she
Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely to enable the
contracts a second marriage.[56]
spouse present to contract a valid second marriage and not for the
acquittal of one charged with bigamy. Such provision was
designed to harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned by the rulings The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the
of this Court and comments of eminent authorities on Criminal amendments of Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code to conform
Law. to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a case where
a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse
may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a
judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to
As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v.
avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse
Hortiguela[47] that, for purposes of the marriage law, it is not
will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that
necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an
the absent spouse was already dead.[57] Such judgment is proof of
absentee before the spouse present may contract a subsequent
the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent
marriage. It held that the declaration of absence made in
marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole
bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted
purpose the taking of the necessary precautions for the
of the crime. As explained by former Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:
administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of
civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former
spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time
of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal
or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is Code providing that the present spouse must first ask for a
generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse in order not
at the time of the celebration of the marriage.[48] In In Re to be guilty of bigamy in case he or she marries again.
Szatraw,[49] the Court declared that a judicial declaration that a
person is presumptively dead, because he or she had been
unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris
The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for
tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of
the purpose of the present spouse contracting a second marriage,
finality or become final; and that proof of actual death of the person
he or she must file a summary proceeding as provided in the Code
presumed dead being unheard from in seven years, would have to
for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee,
be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally
without prejudice to the latters reappearance. This provision is
determined. The Court ruled that if a judicial decree declaring a
intended to protect the present spouse from a criminal prosecution
person presumptively dead because he or she had not been heard
for bigamy under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code because with
from in seven years cannot become final and executory even after
the judicial declaration that the missing spouses presumptively
the lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may
dead, the good faith of the present spouse in contracting a second
be taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains
marriage is already established.[58]
subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is
useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the
petitioner. The Court stated that it should not waste its valuable
time and be made to perform a superfluous and meaningless
act.[50] The Court also took note that a petition for a declaration of
Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now
the presumptive death of an absent spouse may even be made in
Undersecretary of Justice) who wrote that things are now clarified.
collusion with the other spouse.
He says judicial declaration of presumptive death is now
authorized for purposes of
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary
In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,[51] the Court declared that proceeding for declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
the words proper proceedings in Article 349 of the Revised Penal where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial will not be followed.
Code can only refer to those authorized by law such as Articles Affidavits will suffice, with possible clarificatory examinations of
390 and 391 of the Civil Code which refer to the administration or affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full grasp of the facts.
settlement of the estate of a deceased person. InGue v. Republic The judgment declaring an absentee as presumptively dead is
of the Philippines,[52] the Court rejected the contention of the without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said
petitioner therein that, under Article 390 of the Civil Code, the absentee.
courts are authorized to declare the presumptive death of a person
after an absence of seven years. The Court reiterated its rulings
in Szatraw, Lukban and Jones.
Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is
that the clause before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead x x x should be disregarded because of Article
Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that the 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. With the new law, there is a
provision of Article 349 or before the absent spouse has been need to institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of the
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment reached in presumptive death of the absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy.[59]
the proper proceedings is erroneous and should be considered as
not written. He opined that such provision presupposes that, if the
prior marriage has not been legally dissolved and the absent first
spouse has not been declared presumptively dead in a proper

176
According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only
an eminent authority on Criminal Law, in some cases where an in criminal cases enumerated in Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4,
absentee spouse is believed to be dead, there must be a judicial 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous cases, viz.:
declaration of presumptive death, which could then be made only
in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate. [60] Before such Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
declaration, it was held that the remarriage of the other spouse is analogous cases.
bigamous even if done in good faith.[61] Justice Regalado opined
that there were contrary views because of the ruling in Jones and
the provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil Code, which, however, (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
appears to have been set to rest by Article 41 of the Family Code,
which requires a summary hearing for the declaration of (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
presumptive death of the absent spouse before the other spouse
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
can remarry.
(4) Adultery or concubinage;

(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration
of the presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of (6) Illegal search;
the Family Code may be filed under Articles 239 to 247 of the same
Code.[62] (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8) Malicious prosecution;

On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court (9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
and the CA for awarding moral damages in favor of the private
complainant. The petitioner maintains that moral damages may be (10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
awarded only in any of the cases provided in Article 2219 of the 32, 34 and 35.
Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of them. The petitioner asserts
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused,
that the appellate court failed to apply its ruling in People v.
referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral
Bondoc,[63] where an award of moral damages for bigamy was
damages.
disallowed. In any case, the petitioner maintains, the private
complainant failed to adduce evidence to prove moral damages. The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters
may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article in the order
named.
The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private
Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be
complainant on its finding that she adduced evidence to prove the
awarded in all cases where the aggrieved party has suffered
same. The appellate court ruled that while bigamy is not included
mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched reputation,
in those cases enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, it is
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar
not proscribed from awarding moral damages against the
injury arising out of an act or omission of another, otherwise, there
petitioner. The appellate court ruled that it is not bound by the
would not have been any reason for the inclusion of specific acts
following ruling in People v. Bondoc:
in Article 2219[67] and analogous cases (which refer to those cases
bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some others or
resembling, in other respects, as in form, proportion, relation,
... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daos, ello se debi etc.)[68]
indedublamente porque el articulo 2219 del Cdigo Civil de Filipinas
autoriza la adjudicacin de daos morales en los delitos de estupro, Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article
rapto, violacin, adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin 2219 of the Civil Code in which the offender may be ordered to pay
incluir en esta enumeracin el delito de bigamia. No existe, por moral damages to the private complainant/offended party.
consiguiente, base legal para adjudicar aqu los daos de P5,000.00 Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the private complainant for
arriba mencionados.[64] moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and
21 of the Civil Code.

According to Article 19, every person must, in the exercise of his

The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based rights and in the performance of his act with justice, give everyone
on the evidence and the law. The OSG, likewise, avers that the CA his due, and observe honesty and good faith. This provision
was not bound by its ruling in People v. Rodeo. contains what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, and sets certain standards which must be observed not only
in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones
The Court rules against the petitioner. duties. The standards are the following: act with justice; give
everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith. The
elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty;
(b) exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, or injuring another.[69]
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they of law which do not especially provide for its own sanction. When
are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the
omission.[65] An award for moral damages requires the confluence standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to
of the following conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the wrongdoer must be responsible.[70] If the provision does not
claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission factually provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under
established; third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.
the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; Article 20 provides that every person who, contrary to law, willfully
and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter
cases stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil Code. [66] for the same. On the other hand, Article 21 provides that any
person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for damages. The latter provision

177
is adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of
leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they another to do an act which, in consequence of such
have actually suffered material and moral injury should vouchsafe misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor immoral,
adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs but which is in fact a criminal offense, he has a right of action
which it is impossible for human foresight to prove for specifically against the person so inducing him for damages sustained by him
in the statutes. Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has in consequence of his having done such act. Burrows v. Rhodes,
been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E.
of the Civil Code or other applicable provisions of law depends 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court said that a false representation
upon the circumstances of each case.[71] by the defendant that he was divorced from his former wife,
whereby the plaintiff was induced to marry him, gave her a remedy
In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant in tort for deceit. It seems to have been assumed that the fact that
and proposed to marry her. He assured her that he was single. He she had unintentionally violated the law or innocently committed a
even brought his parents to the house of the private complainant crime by cohabiting with him would be no bar to the action, but
where he and his parents made the same assurance that he was rather that it might be a ground for enhancing her damages. The
single. Thus, the private complainant agreed to marry the injury to the plaintiff was said to be in her being led by the promise
petitioner, who even stated in the certificate of marriage that he to give the fellowship and assistance of a wife to one who was not
was single. She lived with the petitioner and dutifully performed her husband and to assume and act in a relation and condition that
her duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful proved to be false and ignominious. Damages for such an injury
husband. For two years or so until the petitioner heartlessly were held to be recoverable in Sherman v. Rawson, 102 Mass.
abandoned her, the private complainant had no inkling that he was 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.
already married to another before they were married.
Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her
Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the cause of action upon any transgression of the law by herself but
petitioners chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud consisting upon the defendants misrepresentation. The criminal relations
not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by which followed, innocently on her part, were but one of the
day, he maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband to incidental results of the defendants fraud for which damages may
the private complainant, who be assessed.
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost
the consortium, attributes and support of a single man she could [7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter
have married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, into the marriage relation have been maintained in other
being bound to a man who it turned out was not her lawful jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17
husband.[72] L.R. A. (N.S.) 819; Larson v. McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170 P. 324;
Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747; Morril v.
The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A. 411. Considerations of
deceit before, during and after his marriage with the private public policy would not prevent recovery where the circumstances
complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused are such that the plaintiff was conscious of no moral turpitude, that
injury to the latter. That she did not sustain any physical injuries is her illegal action was induced solely by the defendants
not a bar to an award for moral damages. Indeed, inMorris v. misrepresentation, and that she does not base her cause of action
Macnab,[73] the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled: upon any transgression of the law by herself. Such considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to
lend its aid to the enforcement of a contract illegal on its face or to
xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an
physical injuries, damages for shame, humiliation, and mental illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded. Szadiwicz v.
anguish are not recoverable where the actor is simply negligent. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49 A. L. R. 958.[76]
See Prosser, supra, at p. 180; 2 Harper & James, Torts, 1031
Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court
(1956). But the authorities all recognize that where the wrong is
finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and
willful rather than negligent, recovery may be had for the ordinary,
reasonable.
natural, and proximate consequences though they consist of
shame, humiliation, and mental anguish. See Spiegel v. Evergreen IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition
Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Kuzma is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here the
defendants conduct was not merely negligent, but was willfully and SO ORDERED.
maliciously wrongful. It was bound to result in shame, humiliation,
and mental anguish for the plaintiff, and when such result did
ensue the plaintiff became entitled not only to compensatory but SECOND DIVISION
also to punitive damages. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery
Co., supra; Kuzma v Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF.
Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 Harv. L. Rev.
517 (1957). The plaintiff testified that because of the defendants
bigamous marriage to her and the attendant publicity she not only
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 159614
was embarrassed and ashamed to go out but couldnt sleep but
couldnt eat, had terrific headaches and lost quite a lot of weight. Petitioner,
No just basis appears for judicial interference with the jurys
reasonable allowance of $1,000 punitive damages on the first Present:
count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super 249, 117 A.2d 298
(App. Div.[74] 1955). - versus - PUNO, J., Chairman,

The Court thus declares that the petitioners acts are against public AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a social
CALLEJO, SR.,
institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of
society. THE HONORABLE COURT OF TINGA, and
Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the APPEALS (TENTH DIVISION) CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
petitioners perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages.
Besides, even considerations of public policy would not prevent and ALAN B. ALEGRO,
her from recovery. As held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald:[75]
Respondents.

178
Promulgated: On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Leas disappearance to the local
police station.[15] The police authorities issued an Alarm Notice on
July 4, 2001.[16]Alan also reported Leas disappearance to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on July 9, 2001. [17]
December 9, 2005

x-----------------------------------------------
---x Barangay Captain Juan Magat corroborated the testimony of Alan.
DECISION He declared that on February 14, 1995, at 2:00 p.m., Alan inquired
from him if Lea passed by his house and he told Alan that she did
CALLEJO, SR., J.: not. Alan also told him that Lea had disappeared. He had not seen
Lea in the barangay ever since.[18] Leas father, who was
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional his compadre and the owner of Radio DYMS, told him that he did
Trial Court (RTC) of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, for the not know where Lea was.[19]
declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) A.
Julaton.

In an Order[1] dated April 16, 2001, the court set the petition for After Alan rested his case, neither the Office of the Provincial
hearing on May 30, 2001 at 8:30 a.m. and directed that a copy of Prosecutor nor the Solicitor General adduced evidence in
the said order be published once a week for three (3) consecutive opposition to the petition.
weeks in the Samar Reporter, a newspaper of general circulation
in the Province of Samar, and
that a copy be posted in the courts bulletin board for at least three On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the
weeks before the next scheduled hearing. The court also directed petition. The fallo of the decision reads:
that copies of the order be served on the Solicitor General, the
Provincial Prosecutor of Samar, and Alan, through counsel, and
that copies be sent to Lea by registered mail. Alan complied with
all the foregoing jurisdictional requirements.[2] WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, petitioners absent
spouse ROSALIA JULATON is hereby declared
PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD for the purpose of the petitioners
subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code of the
On May 28, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Philippines, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion to said absent spouse.
Dismiss[3] the petition, which was, however, denied by the court for
failure to comply with Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. [4]

SO ORDERED.[20]

At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were

married on January 20, 1995 in Catbalogan, Samar.[5] He testified
that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA)
and he berated her for being always out of their house. He told her which rendered judgment on August 4, 2003, affirming the
that if she enjoyed the life of a single person, it would be better for decision of the RTC.[21] The CA cited the ruling of this Court
her to go back to her parents.[6] Lea did not reply. Alan narrated in Republic v. Nolasco.[22]
that, when he reported for work the following day, Lea was still in
the house, but when he arrived home later in the day, Lea was
nowhere to be found.[7] Alan thought that Lea merely went to her The OSG filed a petition for review on certiorari of the CAs
parents house in Bliss, Sto. Nio, Catbalogan, Samar. [8] However, decision alleging that respondent Alan B. Alegro failed to prove
Lea did not return to their house anymore. that he had a well-founded belief that Lea was already dead.[23] It
averred that the respondent failed to exercise reasonable and
diligent efforts to locate his wife. The respondent even admitted
Alan further testified that, on February 14, 1995, after his work, he that Leas father told him on February 14, 1995 that Lea had been
went to the house of Leas parents to see if she was there, but he to their house but left without notice. The OSG pointed out that the
was told that she was not there. He also went to the house of Leas respondent reported his wifes disappearance to the local police
friend, Janeth Bautista, at Barangay Canlapwas, but he was and also to the NBI only after the petitioner filed a motion to
informed by Janettes brother-in-law, Nelson Abaenza, that Janeth dismiss the petition. The petitioner avers that, as gleaned from the
had left for Manila.[9] When Alan went back to the house of his evidence, the respondent did not really want to find and locate Lea.
parents-in-law, he learned from his father-in-law that Lea had been Finally, the petitioner averred:
to their house but that she left without notice. [10] Alan sought the
In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of
help of Barangay Captain Juan Magat, who promised to help him
the Family Code for the declaration of presumptive death of ones
locate his wife. He also inquired from his friends of Leas
spouse, the degree of due diligence set by this Honorable Court in
whereabouts but to no avail.[11]
the above-mentioned cases in locating the whereabouts of a
missing spouse must be strictly complied with. There have been
times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted to by
Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, parties wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged
but his mother asked him to leave after the town fiesta of missing spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that those
Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the fiesta. Alan who cannot have their marriages x x x
agreed.[12] However, Lea did not show up. Alan then left for Manila declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code resort
on August 27, 1995. He went to a house in Navotas where Janeth, to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of the x x x
Leas friend, was staying. When asked where Lea was, Janeth told summary nature of its proceedings.
him that she had not seen her.[13] He failed to find out Leas
whereabouts despite his repeated talks with Janeth. Alan decided
to work as a part-time taxi driver. On his free time, he would look
It is the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as
for Lea in the malls but still to no avail. He returned to Catbalogan
a basic social institution. Marriage is the foundation of the family.
in 1997 and again looked for his wife but failed.[14]
Since marriage is an inviolable social institution that the 1987
Constitution seeks to protect from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. For respondents failure to prove that he had a well-

179
founded belief that his wife is already from whom he allegedly made inquiries about Lea to corroborate
dead and that he exerted the required amount of diligence in his testimony. On the other hand, the respondent admitted that
searching for his missing wife, the petition for declaration of when he returned to the house of his parents-in-law on February
presumptive death should have been denied by the trial court and 14, 1995, his father-in-law told him that Lea had just been there
the Honorable Court of Appeals.[24] but that she left without notice.

The respondent declared that Lea left their abode on February 7,

1995 after he chided her for coming home late and for being
The petition is meritorious. always out of their house, and told her that it would be better for
her to go home to her parents if she enjoyed the life of a single
person. Lea, thus, left their conjugal abode and never returned.
Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines reads: Neither did she communicate with the respondent after leaving the
conjugal abode because of her resentment to the chastisement
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the she received from him barely a month after their marriage. What is
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless so worrisome is that, the respondent failed to make inquiries from
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior his parents-in-law regarding Leas whereabouts before filing his
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced the credibility of the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse respondent had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger Leas whereabouts considering that Leas father was the owner of
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 Radio DYMS.
of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

The respondent did report and seek the help of the local police
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the authorities and the NBI to locate Lea, but it was only an
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a afterthought. He did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration his petition in the RTC.
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.[25] In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to
prove that he had a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition
in the RTC, that his spouse Rosalia (Lea) Julaton was already
dead.

The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse
has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED.
absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73749
contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is is REVERSED andSET ASIDE. Consequently, the Regional Trial
meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that es Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27,
menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos is ORDERED to DISMISS the respondents petition.
racionales.[26]

SO ORDERED.
Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an
overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial
evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the
Republic of the Philippines
inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any
SUPREME COURT
fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions,
Manila
attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control
the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so THIRD DIVISION
far as it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or
throw light on their intentions,[27] competence evidence on the G.R. No. 165545 March 24, 2006
ultimate question of his death.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,
vs.
TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, Respondent.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and
honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the DECISION
whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse
is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present CARPIO MORALES,J.:
acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse
The Court of Appeals Decision1 dated June 23, 20042 and
depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
Resolution dated September 28, 20043 reversing the Resolution
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the
dated April 2, 20034 and Order dated June 4, 20035 of the Social
absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by
Security Commission (SSC) in SSC Case No. 4-15149-01 are
present spouse.[28]
challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari.

On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz

Although testimonial evidence may suffice to prove the well- (Alice) contracted marriage in Barcelona, Sorsogon.6
founded belief of the present spouse that the absent spouse is
More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before
already dead, in Republic v. Nolasco,[29] the Court warned against
the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sorsogon a petition 7 to
collusion between the parties when they find it impossible to
declare Alice presumptively dead.
dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means. It is also
the maxim that men readily believe what they wish to be true. By Order of December 10, 1970,8 the CFI granted the petition,
disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, there being no opposition filed against the petition

In this case, the respondent failed to present a witness other
notwithstanding the publication of the Notice of Hearing in a
than Barangay Captain Juan Magat. The respondent even failed
newspaper of general circulation in the country, Alice Diaz is
to present Janeth Bautista or Nelson Abaenza or any other person

180
hereby declared to [sic] all legal intents and purposes, except for wife, and a voidable marriage [sic], to speak of. 21 (Underscoring
those of succession, presumptively dead. supplied)

SO ORDERED.9 (Underscoring supplied) In the meantime, the SSS Sorsogon Branch, by letter of August
16, 2000,22 advised respondent that as Cecilia and Norma were
Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively the ones who defrayed Bailon’s funeral expenses, she should
dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon contracted marriage with return the P12,000 paid to her.
Teresita Jarque (respondent) in Casiguran, Sorsogon.10
In a separate letter dated September 7, 1999, 23 the SSS advised
On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social respondent of the cancellation of her monthly pension for death
Security System (SSS) since 1960 and a retiree pensioner thereof benefits in view of the opinion rendered by its legal department that
effective July 1994, died.11 her marriage with Bailon was void as it was contracted while the
latter’s marriage with Alice was still subsisting; and the December
Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits, and was
10, 1970 CFI Order declaring Alice presumptively dead did not
granted P12,00012 by the SSS.
become final, her "presence" being "contrary proof" against the
Respondent filed on March 11, 1998 an additional claim for death validity of the order. It thus requested respondent to return the
benefits13 which was also granted by the SSS on April 6, 1998.14 amount of P24,000 representing the total amount of monthly
pension she had received from the SSS from February 1998 to
Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of May 1999.
Bailon and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa) contested before the SSS the
release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She Respondent protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for
claimed that Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the death benefits by letter to the SSS dated October 12, 1999. 24 In a
first with Alice, the second with her mother Elisa, and the third with subsequent letter dated November 27, 199925 to the SSC, she
respondent, all of whom are still alive; she, together with her reiterated her request for the release of her monthly pension,
siblings, paid for Bailon’s medical and funeral expenses; and all asserting that her marriage with Bailon was not declared before
the documents submitted by respondent to the SSS in support of any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful, hence, it remained
her claims are spurious. valid and subsisting for all legal intents and purposes as in fact
Bailon designated her as his beneficiary.
In support of her claim, Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon
Chavez (Norma) submitted an Affidavit dated February 13, The SSS, however, by letter to respondent dated January 21,
199915 averring that they are two of nine children of Bailon and 2000,26 maintained the denial of her claim for and the
Elisa who cohabited as husband and wife as early as 1958; and discontinuance of payment of monthly pension. It advised her,
they were reserving their right to file the necessary court action to however, that she was not deprived of her right to file a petition
contest the marriage between Bailon and respondent as they with the SSC.
personally know that Alice is "still very much alive."16
Respondent thus filed a petition27 against the SSS before the SSC
In the meantime, on April 5, 1999, a certain Hermes P. Diaz, for the restoration to her of her entitlement to monthly pension.
claiming to be the brother and guardian of "Aliz P. Diaz," filed
In the meantime, respondent informed the SSS that she was
before the SSS a claim for death benefits accruing from Bailon’s
returning, under protest, the amount of P12,000 representing the
death,17 he further attesting in a sworn statement18 that it was
funeral benefits she received, she alleging that Norma and her
Norma who defrayed Bailon’s funeral expenses.
siblings "forcibly and coercively prevented her from spending any
Elisa and seven of her children19 subsequently filed claims for amount during Bailon’s wake."28
death benefits as Bailon’s beneficiaries before the SSS. 20
After the SSS filed its Answer29 to respondent’s petition, and the
Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS Bicol parties filed their respective Position Papers, one Alicia P. Diaz
Cluster, Naga City recommended the cancellation of payment of filed an Affidavit30 dated August 14, 2002 with the SSS Naga
death pension benefits to respondent and the issuance of an order Branch attesting that she is the widow of Bailon; she had only
for the refund of the amount paid to her from February 1998 to May recently come to know of the petition filed by Bailon to declare her
1999 representing such benefits; the denial of the claim of Alice on presumptively dead; it is not true that she disappeared as Bailon
the ground that she was not dependent upon Bailon for support could have easily located her, she having stayed at her parents’
during his lifetime; and the payment of the balance of the five-year residence in Barcelona, Sorsogon after she found out that Bailon
guaranteed pension to Bailon’s beneficiaries according to the was having an extramarital affair; and Bailon used to visit her even
order of preference provided under the law, after the amount after their separation.
erroneously paid to respondent has been collected. The pertinent
By Resolution of April 2, 2003, the SSC found that the marriage of
portions of the Memorandum read:
respondent to Bailon was void and, therefore, she was "just a
1. Aliz [sic] Diaz never disappeared. The court must have been common-law-wife." Accordingly it disposed as follows,
misled by misrepresentation in declaring the first wife, Aliz [sic] quoted verbatim:
Diaz, as presumptively dead.
WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds, that
xxxx petitioner Teresita Jarque-Bailon is not the legitimate spouse and
primary beneficiary of SSS member Clemente Bailon.
x x x the Order of the court in the "Petition to Declare Alice Diaz
Presumptively Dead," did not become final. The presence of Aliz Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby ordered to refund to the SSS
[sic] Diaz, is contrary proof that rendered it invalid. the amount of P24,000.00 representing the death benefit she
received therefrom for the period February 1998 until May 1999 as
xxxx well as P12,000.00 representing the funeral benefit.
3. It was the deceased member who abandoned his wife, Aliz [sic] The SSS is hereby ordered to pay Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz-
Diaz. He, being in bad faith, and is the deserting spouse, his Bailon the appropriate death benefit arising from the demise of
remarriage is void, being bigamous. SSS member Clemente Bailon in accordance with Section 8(e)
and (k) as well as Section 13 of the SS Law, as amended, and its
xxxx
prevailing rules and regulations and to inform this Commission of
In this case, it is the deceased member who was the deserting its compliance herewith.
spouse and who remarried, thus his marriage to Teresita Jarque, SO ORDERED.31 (Underscoring supplied)
for the second time was void as it was bigamous. To require
affidavit of reappearance to terminate the second marriage is not In so ruling against respondent, the SSC ratiocinated.
necessary as there is no disappearance of Aliz [sic] Diaz, the first

181
After a thorough examination of the evidence at hand, this determining the actual and lawful beneficiaries of its members.
Commission comes to the inevitable conclusion that the petitioner Notwithstanding its opinion as to the soundness of the findings of
is not the legitimate wife of the deceased member. the RTC, it should extend due credence to the decision of the RTC
absent of [sic] any judicial pronouncement to the contrary. x x x
xxxx
x x x [A]ssuming arguendo that respondent SSS actually
There is x x x ample evidence pointing to the fact that, contrary to possesses the authority to declare the decision of the RTC to be
the declaration of the then CFI of Sorsogon (10th Judicial District), without basis, the procedure it followed was offensive to the
the first wife never disappeared as the deceased member principle of fair play and thus its findings are of doubtful quality
represented in bad faith. This Commission accords credence to considering that petitioner Teresita was not given ample
the findings of the SSS contained in its Memorandum dated opportunity to present evidence for and her behalf.
August 9, 1999,32revealing that Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz never left
Barcelona, Sorsogon, after her separation from Clemente Bailon x xxxx
x x.
Respondent SSS is correct in stating that the filing of an Affidavit
As the declaration of presumptive death was extracted by the of Reappearance with the Civil Registry is no longer practical
deceased member using artifice and by exerting fraud upon the under the premises. Indeed, there is no more first marriage to
unsuspecting court of law, x x x it never had the effect of giving the restore as the marital bond between Alice Diaz and Clemente
deceased member the right to marry anew. x x x [I]t is clear that the Bailon was already terminated upon the latter’s death. Neither is
marriage to the petitioner is void, considering that the first marriage there a second marriage to terminate because the second
on April 25, 1955 to Alice Diaz was not previously annulled, marriage was likewise dissolved by the death of Clemente Bailon.
invalidated or otherwise dissolved during the lifetime of the parties
thereto. x x x as determined through the investigation conducted However, it is not correct to conclude that simply because the filing
by the SSS, Clemente Bailon was the abandoning spouse, not of the Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil Registry where
Alice Diaz Bailon. parties to the subsequent marriage reside is already inutile, the
respondent SSS has now the authority to review the decision of
xxxx the RTC and consequently declare the second marriage null and
void.36(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It having been established, by substantial evidence, that the
petitioner was just a common-law wife of the deceased member, it The SSC and the SSS separately filed their Motions for
necessarily follows that she is not entitled as a primary beneficiary, Reconsideration37 which were both denied for lack of merit.
to the latter’s death benefit. x x x
Hence, the SSS’ present petition for review on
xxxx certiorari38 anchored on the following grounds:

It having been determined that Teresita Jarque was not the I

legitimate surviving spouse and primary beneficiary of Clemente
Bailon, it behooves her to refund the total amount of death benefit THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS
she received from the SSS for the period from February 1998 until CONTRARY TO LAW.
May 1999 pursuant to the principle of solutio indebiti x x x
II
Likewise, it appearing that she was not the one who actually
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED
defrayed the cost of the wake and burial of Clemente Bailon, she
ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.39
must return the amount of P12,000.00 which was earlier given to
her by the SSS as funeral benefit.33(Underscoring supplied) The SSS faults the CA for failing to give due consideration to the
findings of facts of the SSC on the prior and subsisting marriage
Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration34having been denied
between Bailon and Alice; in disregarding the authority of the SSC
by Order of June 4, 2003, she filed a petition for review35 before
to determine to whom, between Alice and respondent, the death
the Court of Appeals (CA).
benefits should be awarded pursuant to Section 5 40 of the Social
By Decision of June 23, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the Security Law; and in declaring that the SSS did not give
April 2, 2003 Resolution and June 4, 2003 Order of the SSC and respondent due process or ample opportunity to present evidence
thus ordered the SSS to pay respondent all the pension benefits in her behalf.
due her. Held the CA:
The SSS submits that "the observations and findings relative to the
x x x [T]he paramount concern in this case transcends the issue of CFI proceedings are of no moment to the present controversy, as
whether or not the decision of the then CFI, now RTC, declaring the same may be considered only as obiter dicta in view of the
Alice Diaz presumptively dead has attained finality but, more SSC’s finding of the existence of a prior and subsisting marriage
importantly, whether or not the respondents SSS and Commission between Bailon and Alice by virtue of which Alice has a better right
can validly re-evaluate the findings of the RTC, and on its own, to the death benefits."41
declare the latter’s decision to be bereft of any basis. On similar
The petition fails.
import, can respondents SSS and Commission validly declare the
first marriage subsisting and the second marriage null and void? That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with respect to
SSS coverage, benefits and contributions, there is no doubt. In so
xxxx
exercising such power, however, it cannot review, much less
x x x while it is true that a judgment declaring a person reverse, decisions rendered by courts of law as it did in the case
presumptively dead never attains finality as the finding that "the at bar when it declared that the December 10, 1970 CFI Order was
person is unheard of in seven years is merely a presumption juris obtained through fraud and subsequently disregarded the same,
tantum," the second marriage contracted by a person with an making its own findings with respect to the validity of Bailon and
absent spouse endures until annulled. It is only the competent Alice’s marriage on the one hand and the invalidity of Bailon and
court that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article 87 of respondent’s marriage on the other.
the Civil Code and upon the reappearance of the missing spouse,
In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the SSC
which action for annulment may be filed. Nowhere does the law
virtually acted as an appellate court. The law does not give the
contemplates [sic] the possibility that respondent SSS may validly
SSC unfettered discretion to trifle with orders of regular courts in
declare the second marriage null and void on the basis alone of its
the exercise of its authority to determine the beneficiaries of the
own investigation and declare that the decision of the RTC
SSS.
declaring one to be presumptively dead is without basis.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior
Respondent SSS cannot arrogate upon itself the authority to
to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the Family Code, the
review the decision of the regular courts under the pretext of

182
applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the
was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. 42 subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action,
such absentee’s mere reappearance, even if made known to the
Article 83 of the Civil Code43 provides: spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such
marriage.50 Since the second marriage has been contracted
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
presumption continues inspite of the spouse’s physical
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from
reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be
its performance, unless:
regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or terminated as provided by law.51

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an
at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present affidavit of reappearance or by judicial declaration but by death of
having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though either spouse as in the case at bar, Tolentino submits:
he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally
x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present
of either spouse, the effects of dissolution of valid marriages shall
at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the
arise. The good or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be
absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and
raised, because, as in annullable or voidable marriages, the
391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the
marriage cannot be questioned except in a direct action for
three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
annulment.52(Underscoring supplied)
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Similarly, Lapuz v. Eufemio53 instructs:
Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a subsequent
marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab
and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or initio but only voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil
dissolved or contracted under any of the three exceptional Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the
circumstances. It bears noting that the marriage under any of these first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or
exceptional cases is deemed valid "until declared null and void by when she had been generally believed dead, still the action for
a competent court." It follows that the onus probandi in these cases annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the three
rests on the party assailing the second marriage.44 persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2,
of the Code, requiring that the action for annulment should be
In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for
brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved.
15 consecutive years45 when Bailon sought the declaration of her
And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that
presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not even a
might have resulted from such voidable marriage must be carried
requirement then for purposes of remarriage. 46
out "in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
Eminent jurist Arturo M. Tolentino (now deceased) commented: spouse," as expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule
73, and not in the annulment proceeding.54 (Emphasis and
Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a underscoring supplied)
presumption arises in favor of the validity of the second marriage,
and the burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed
marriage to prove that the first marriage had not been dissolved; it collaterally except in a direct proceeding. Consequently, such
is not enough to prove the first marriage, for it must also be shown marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties
that it had not ended when the second marriage was and not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their
contracted. The presumption in favor of the innocence of the offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly
defendant from crime or wrong and of the legality of his second valid.55 Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be
marriage, will prevail over the presumption of the continuance of impeached, and is made good ab initio.56
life of the first spouse or of the continuance of the marital relation
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance
with such first spouse.47(Underscoring supplied)
with law, Bailon’s and respondent’s marriage prior to the former’s
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, 48 it death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-
is terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case instituted beneficiary of Bailon.
by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses
In light of the foregoing discussions, consideration of the other
in the subsequent marriage.
issues raised has been rendered unnecessary.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus Article 42 thereof
provides: No costs.
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding SO ORDERED.
Article shall be automatically terminated by therecording of the
affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a SEC. 5. Settlement of Disputes. – (a) Any dispute arising under
judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab this Act with respect to coverage, benefits, contributions and
initio. penalties thereon or any other matter related thereto, shall be
cognizable by the Commission, and any case filed with respect
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance thereto shall be heard by the Commission, or any of its members,
shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties or by hearing officers duly authorized by the Commission and
to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested decided within the mandatory period of twenty (20) days after the
person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent submission of the evidence. The filing, determination and
marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being settlement of disputes shall be governed by the rules and
judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis and regulations promulgated by the Commission.
underscoring supplied)
xxxx
The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided
41
by the above-quoted provision of the Family Code does not Rollo, p. 28.
preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance
42
of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or Article 256 of the Family Code itself limited its retroactive
termination of the subsequent marriage.49 governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws.

183
43 Article 41 of the Family Code now provides:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the NACHURA, J.:
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the Regional Trial
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac dated November 12, 2007
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger dismissing petitioner Angelita Valdezs petition for the declaration
of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of of presumptive death of her husband, Sofio Polborosa (Sofio).
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall
be sufficient.
The facts of the case are as follows:
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the Petitioner married Sofio on January 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal. On
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. December 13, 1971, petitioner gave birth to the spouses only child,
Nancy. According to petitioner, she and Sofio argued constantly
47I A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil because the latter was unemployed and did not bring home any
Code of the Philippines 282 (1999 ed.). (Citations omitted) money. In March 1972, Sofio left their conjugal dwelling. Petitioner
48
and their child waited for him to return but, finally, in May 1972,
Art. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following
petitioner decided to go back to her parents home in Bancay 1 st,
causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
Camiling, Tarlac. Three years passed without any word from Sofio.
xxxx In October 1975, Sofio showed up at Bancay 1 st. He and petitioner
talked for several hours and they agreed to separate. They
(2) In a subsequent marriage under Article 83, Number 2, that the executed a document to that effect. [1] That was the last time
former husband or wife believed to be dead was in fact living and petitioner saw him. After that, petitioner didnt hear any news of
the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force; Sofio, his whereabouts or even if he was alive or not. [2]

x x x x (Underscoring supplied)

Art. 87. The action for annulment of marriage must be commenced Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio
by the parties and within the periods as follows: Reyes on June 20, 1985.[3] Subsequently, however, Virgilios
application for naturalization filed with the United States
xxxx Department of Homeland Security was denied because petitioners
marriage to Sofio was subsisting.[4] Hence, on March 29, 2007,
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 85, by the spouse
petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac
who has been absent, during his or her lifetime; or by either spouse
seeking the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
of the subsequent marriage during the lifetime of the other;

xxxx
The RTC rendered its Decision[5] on November 12, 2007,
dismissing the Petition for lack of merit. The RTC held that Angelita
THIRD DIVISION was not able to prove the well-grounded belief that her husband
Sofio Polborosa was already dead. It said that under Article 41 of
the Family Code, the present spouse is burdened to prove that her
spouse has been absent and that she has a well-founded belief
ANGELITA VALDEZ, G.R. No. 180863
that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse
Petitioner, may contract a subsequent marriage. This belief, the RTC said,
must be the result of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse.
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
The RTC found that, byJ., petitioners own admission, she did not try
to find her husband anymore in light of their mutual agreement to
Chairperson,
live separately. Likewise, petitioners daughter testified that her
mother prevented her from looking for her father. The RTC also
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
said there is a strong possibility that Sofio is still alive, considering
that he would
VELASCO, JR., have been only 61 years old by then, and people
who have reached their 60s have not become increasingly low in
NACHURA,
health andandspirits, and, even assuming as true petitioners
testimony that Sofio was a chain smoker and a drunkard, there is
PERALTA, JJ.
no evidence that he continues to drink and smoke until now.

Promulgated:
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. [6] She argued that it is
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, the Civil Code that applies in this case and not the Family Code
since petitioners marriage to Sofio was celebrated on January 11,
Respondent. 1971, long8,before
September 2009 the Family Code took effect. Petitioner further
argued that she had acquired a vested right under the provisions
of the Civil Code and the stricter provisions of the Family Code
should not be applied against her because Title XIV of the Civil
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Code, where Articles 384 and 390 on declaration of absence and
presumption of death, respectively, can be found, was not
expressly repealed by the Family Code. To apply the stricter
provisions of the Family Code will impair the rights petitioner had
acquired under the Civil Code.
DECISION

184
 respectively, were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil
Code.
The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution
dated December 10, 2007.[7] The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83:

Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of the Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
RTC Decision and Motion for Reconsideration. during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from
In its Manifestation and Motion,[8] the Office of the Solicitor its performance, unless:
General (OSG) recommended that the Court set aside the
assailed RTC Decision and grant the Petition to declare Sofio
presumptively dead. The OSG argues that the requirement of well-
founded belief under Article 41 of the Family Code is not applicable (1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
to the instant case. It said that petitioner could not be expected to
comply with this requirement because it was not yet in existence
during her marriage to Virgilio Reyes in 1985. The OSG further (2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years
argues that before the effectivity of the Family Code, petitioner at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present
already acquired a vested right as to the validity of her marriage to having news of the absentee being alive, of if the absentee, though
Virgilio Reyes based on the presumed death of Sofio under the he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally
Civil Code. This vested right and the presumption of Sofios death, considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present
the OSG posits, could not be affected by the obligations created at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the
under the Family Code.[9] absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391.
The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases
until declared null and void by a competent court.
Next, the OSG contends that Article 390 of the Civil Code was not
repealed by Article 41 of the Family Code.[10] Title XIV of the Civil
Code, the OSG said, was not one of those expressly repealed by
the Family Code. Moreover, Article 256 of the Family Code
provides that its provisions shall not be retroactively applied if they Article 390 of the Civil Code states:
will prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights.[11]
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown
whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead
for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The RTC Decision, insofar as it dismissed the Petition, is affirmed.
However, we must state that we are denying the Petition on
grounds different from those cited in the RTC Decision.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of
opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he
disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five
Initially, we discuss a procedural issue. Under the Rules of Court, years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be
a party may directly appeal to this Court from a decision of the trial opened.
court only on pure questions of law. A question of law lies, on one
hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on
a certain set of facts; on the other hand, a question of fact exists
when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of
the alleged facts. Here, the facts are not disputed; the controversy The Court, on several occasions, had interpreted the above-
merely relates to the correct application of the law or jurisprudence quoted provision in this wise:
to the undisputed facts.[12]

For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to

The RTC erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code and have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The
holding that petitioner needed to prove a well-founded belief that declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of
Sofio was already dead. The RTC applied Article 41 of the Family the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the
Code, to wit: necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the
absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law
only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the
of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In marriage.[13]
case of disappearance where there is danger under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

Further, the Court explained that presumption of death cannot be

the subject of court proceedings independent of the settlement of
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the
the absentees estate.
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. In re Szatraw[14] is instructive. In that case, petitioner contracted
marriage with a Polish national in 1937. They lived together as
husband and wife for three years. Sometime in 1940, the husband,
on the pretext of visiting some friends, left the conjugal abode with
their child and never returned. After inquiring from friends,
It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of petitioner to petitioner found that her husband went to Shanghai, China.
Sofio and Virgilio on January 11, 1971 and June 20, 1985, However, friends who came from Shanghai told her that the

185
husband was not seen there. In 1948, petitioner filed a petition for other hand, the antecedents in Gue v. Republic[17] are similar
the declaration of presumptive death of her husband arguing that to Szatraw. On January 5, 1946, Angelina Gues husband
since the latter had been absent for more than seven years and left Manila where they were residing and went to Shanghai, China.
she had not heard any news from him and about her child, she From that day on, he had not been heard of, had not written to her,
believes that he is dead. In deciding the case, the Court said: nor in anyway communicated with her as to his whereabouts.
Despite her efforts and diligence, she failed to locate him. After 11
years, she asked the court for a declaration of the presumption of
death of Willian Gue, pursuant to the provisions of Article 390 of
The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Szatraw, because it does not appear that he possessed property
brought to the marriage and because he had acquired no property
during his married life with the petitioner. The rule invoked by the
latter is merely one of evidence which permits the court to presume In both cases, the Court reiterated its ruling in Szatraw. It held that
that a person is dead after the fact that such person had been a petition for judicial declaration that petitioner's husband is
unheard from in seven years had been established. This presumed to be dead cannot be entertained because it is not
presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either authorized by law.[18]
in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by,
and submitted for decision to, a competent court. Independently
of such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of
From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that, under the Civil Code,
death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an
the presumption of death is established by law[19] and no court
action or special proceeding. In this case, there is no right to be
declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is
enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner against
presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of
her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final
absence,[20] Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982.
determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of a
particular fact (Hagans v. Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880), for the petition
does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is
dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead Consequently, at the time of petitioners marriage to Virgilio, there
because he had been unheard from in seven years. If there is any existed no impediment to petitioners capacity to marry, and the
pretense at securing a declaration that the petitioner's husband is marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.
dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because it is
unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration that the petitioner's
husband is presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of
judicially made, would not improve the petitioner's situation, well-founded belief is not required. Petitioner could not have been
because such a presumption is already established by law. A expected to comply with this requirement since the Family Code
judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The
executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is enactment of the Family Code in 1988 does not change this
still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the conclusion. The Family Code itself states:
subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the
only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a
competent court has to pass. The latter must decide finally the
controversy between the parties, or determine finally the right or Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does
status of a party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
certain rights and obligations arise or may arise; and once such the Civil Code or other laws.
controversy is decided by a final judgment, or such right or status
determined, or such particular fact established, by a final decree,
then the judgment on the subject of the controversy, or the decree
upon the right or status of a party or upon the existence of a
particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring
attack, except in a few rare instances especially provided by law. petitioner to exhibit well-founded belief will, ultimately, result in the
It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the time it
presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in was celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable and would
seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject go against the objectives that the Family Code wishes to achieve.
to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become
final. Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead because
he had been unheard from in seven years, would have to be made In sum, we hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no
in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally decree on the presumption of Sofios death can be granted under
determined. If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively the Civil Code, the same presumption having arisen by operation
dead, because he had not been heard from in seven years, cannot of law. However, we declare that petitioner was capacitated to
become final and executory even after the lapse of the marry Virgilio at the time their marriage was celebrated in 1985
reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such and, therefore, the said marriage is legal and valid.
presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary
proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless,
unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner.[15]
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition
is DENIED.

In Lukban v. Republic,[16] petitioner Lourdes G. Lukban contracted SO ORDERED.

marriage with Francisco Chuidian on December 10, 1933. A few
days later, on December 27, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent
quarrel. She did not hear from him after that day. Her diligent
SECOND DIVISION
search, inquiries from his parents and friends, and search in his
last known address, proved futile. Believing her husband was G.R. No. 187061, October 08, 2014
already dead since he had been absent for more than twenty
years, petitioner filed a petition in 1956 for a declaration that she CELERINA J. SANTOS, Petitioner, v. RICARDO T.
is a widow of her husband who is presumed to be dead and has SANTOS, Respondent.
no legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage. On the

186
DECISION and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not furnished copies
of Ricardo's petition.26chanrobleslaw
LEONEN, J.:
The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28,
The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death
2008, dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for
obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the judgment. An
being a wrong mode of remedy.27 According to the Court of
affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the
Appeals, the proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before
person declared presumptively dead has never been absent.
the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance with
Article 42 of the Family Code.28chanrobleslaw
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Celerina J. Santos,
assailing the Court of Appeals' resolutions dated November 28,
Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals'
2008 and March 5, 2009. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
resolution dated November 28, 2008.29 The Court of Appeals
petition for the annulment of the trial court's judgment declaring her
denied the motion for reconsideration in the resolution dated
presumptively dead.
March 5, 2009.30chanrobleslaw
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared
Hence, this petition was filed.
petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina) presumptively dead after
her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a
The issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the
dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being
purpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007.1 Ricardo remarried on
a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring
September 17, 2008.2chanrobleslaw
presumptive death.
In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death,
Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under
Ricardo alleged that he and Celerina rented an apartment
Article 42 of the Family Code is appropriate only when the spouse
somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila; after they had gotten
is actually absent and the spouse seeking the declaration of
married on June 18, 1980.3 After a year, they moved to Tarlac City.
presumptive death actually has a well-founded belief of the
They were engaged in the buy and sell business. 4chanrobleslaw
spouse's death.31 She added that it would be inappropriate to file
an affidavit of reappearance if she did not disappear in the first
Ricardo claimed that their business did not prosper. 5 As a result,
place.32 She insisted that an action for annulment of judgment is
Celerina convinced him to allow her to work as a domestic helper
proper when the declaration of presumptive death is obtained
in Hong Kong.6 Ricardo initially refused but because of Celerina's
fraudulently.33chanrobleslaw
insistence, he allowed her to work abroad. 7 She allegedly applied
in an employment agency in Ermita, Manila, in February 1995. She
Celerina further argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance
left Tarlac two months after and was never heard from
under Article 42 of the Family Code would not be a sufficient
again.8chanrobleslaw
remedy because it would not nullify the legal effects of the
judgment declaring her presumptive death.34chanrobleslaw
Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate
Celerina.9 He went to Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon City,
In Ricardo's comment,35 he argued that a petition for annulment of
but they, too, did not know their daughter's whereabouts.10 He also
judgment is not the proper remedy because it cannot be availed
inquired about her from other relatives and friends, but no one
when there are other remedies available. Celerina could always
gave him any information.11chanrobleslaw
file an affidavit of reappearance to terminate the subsequent
marriage. Ricardo iterated the Court of Appeals' ruling that the
Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his
remedy afforded to Celerina under Article 42 of the Family Code is
Regional Trial Court petition since Celerina left. He believed that
the appropriate remedy.
she had passed away.12chanrobleslaw
The petition is meritorious.
Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only
sometime in October 2008 when she could no longer avail the
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other
Court's judgment, order, or resolution has become final, and the
appropriate remedies.13chanrobleslaw
"remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other
appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of
On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of
the petitioner."36chanrobleslaw
judgment14 before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived
The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and
her day in court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true
lack of jurisdiction.37 This court defined extrinsic fraud
residence, misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of
in Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi:38chanrobleslaw
Tarlac City.15 According to Celerina, her true residence was in
Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon City. 16 This For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to
residence had been her and Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts pertain
1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008.17 As a result of Ricardo's to an issue involved in the original action or where the acts
misrepresentation, she was deprived of any notice of and constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated, It is
opportunity to oppose the petition declaring her presumptively extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the
dead.18chanrobleslaw trial which prevents a parly from having a real contest, or from
presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission of
Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also never the controversy.39 (Emphasis supplied)
left and worked as a domestic helper abroad. 20 Neither did she go
to an employment agency in February 1995.21 She also claimed
that it was not true that she had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo Celerina alleged in her petition for annulment of judgment that
was aware that she never left their conjugal dwelling in Quezon there was fraud when Ricardo deliberately made false allegations
City.22 It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to in the court with respect to her residence.40 Ricardo also falsely
cohabit with another woman.23 Celerina referred to a joint affidavit claimed that she was absent for 12 years. There was also no
executed by their children to support her contention that Ricardo publication of the notice of hearing of Ricardo's petition in a
made false allegations in his petition.24chanrobleslaw newspaper of general circulation.41 Celerina claimed that because
of these, she was deprived of notice and opportunity to oppose
Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition to declare her presumptively
Ricardo's petition because it had never been published in a dead.42chanrobleslaw
newspaper.25 She added that the Office of the Solicitor General

187
Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting Ricardo's petition for absent or presumptively dead spouse's reappearance (1) if the first
declaration of presumptive death were false.43 Celerina further marriage has already been annulled or has been declared a nullity;
claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the (2) if the sworn statement of the reappearance is not recorded in
Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's the civil registry of the subsequent spouses' residence; (3) if there
Office were not given copies of Ricardo's petition.44chanrobleslaw is no notice to the subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of
reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of law, and no
These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. judgment is yet rendered confirming, such fact of reappearance.
Celerina alleged in her petition with the Court of Appeals sufficient
ground/s for annulment of judgment. When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial
declaration of presumptive death, a presumption arises that the
Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment45 on first spouse is already dead and that the second marriage is legal.
November 17, 2008. This was less than two years from the July This presumption should prevail over the continuance of the
27, 2007 decision declaring her presumptively dead and about a marital relations with the first spouse. 48 The second marriage, as
month from her discovery of the decision in October 2008. The with all marriages, is presumed valid.49 The burden of proof to
petition was, therefore, filed within the four-year period allowed by show that the first marriage was not properly dissolved rests on
law in case of extrinsic fraud, and before the action is barred by the person assailing the validity of the second
laches, which is the period allowed in case of lack of marriage.50chanrobleslaw
jurisdiction.46chanrobleslaw
This court recognized the conditional nature of reappearance as a
There was also no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina at cause for terminating the subsequent marriage in Social Security
the time of her discovery of the fraud perpetrated on her. System v. Vda. de Bailon.51 This court noted52 that mere
reappearance will not terminate the subsequent marriage even if
The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with the parties to the subsequent marriage were notified if there was
them certain admissions, presumptions, and conditions. "no step . . . taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by
[filing an] affidavit [of reappearance] or by court action[.]" 53 "Since
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a the second marriage has been contracted because of a
spouse for four consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption
belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already continues inspite of the spouse's physical reappearance, and
dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage during by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an
the subsistence of another marriage.47chanrobleslaw absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided
by law."54chanrobleslaw
The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in
danger of being terminated by the presumptively dead spouse The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of
when he or she reappears. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary determining the status of the second marriage and the liabilities of
the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed that the other spouse was
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding absent.
Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the
affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However,
judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab a bigamous subsequent marriage may be considered valid when
initio. the following are present:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance 1) The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;
shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties
to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested 2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage spouse was already dead;
and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially
3) There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of
determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis supplied)
presumptive death of the absent spouse; and

4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent

In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead
spouse.55
spouse with the remedy of terminating the subsequent marriage
by mere reappearance.
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was
The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the contracted after a court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the
part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to the present requirement of a well-founded belief56 that the spouse is already
spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or dead. The first marriage will not be considered as. validly
presumptively dead. terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a
subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and
Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the void.57 Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is
termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is protected by law.
subject to several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a judgment
annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (2) Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in
recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the bad faith is also not immune from an action to declare his
subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and subsequent marriage void for being bigamous. The prohibition
circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of against marriage during the subsistence of another marriage still
the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4) the applies.58chanrobleslaw
fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially
determined. If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when he filed his
petition to declare her presumptively dead and when he contracted
The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does the subsequent marriage, such marriage would be considered void
not always immediately cause the subsequent marriage's for being bigamous under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. This is
termination. Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead because the circumstances lack the element of "well-founded
spouse will cause the termination of the subsequent marriage only belief under Article 41 of the Family Code, which is essential for
when all the conditions enumerated in the Family Code are the exception to the rule against bigamous marriages to
present. apply.59chanrobleslaw

Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to

188
effect the termination of the subsequent marriage does not The case was originally raffled to Branch 155 presided over by
preclude the spouse who was declared presumptively dead from Judge Luis R. Tongco, who voluntarily inhibited from hearing the
availing other remedies existing in law. This court had, in fact, case upon the respondent's motion.7 The case was later re-raffled
recognized that a subsequent marriage may also be terminated by to Branch 268 in the sala of Judge Amelia C. Manalastas (Judge
filing "an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee Manalastas).8chanrobleslaw
and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the
subsequent marriage."60chanrobleslaw Subsequently, the petitioner filed a Motion for
Inhibition,9 Supplemental Motion for Inhibition,10 and Second
Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not Supplemental Motion for Inhibition,11 (collectively, Motions for
merely the termination of the subsequent marriage but also the Inhibition) to disqualify Judge Manalastas, on the following
nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance is not a grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the subsequent
marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration of her (i) That defendant Villamor [petitioner] has obtained information
presumptive death and the subsequent marriage. that the presiding Judge [Judge Manalastas] has stood,
together with plaintiff [respondent], as godparents to a child of
Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage common friend; and
under Article 42 of the Family Code is valid until terminated, the
"children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the
property relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be the (ii) That the Law Firm of Ponce Enrile Reyes and Manalastas, for
same as in valid marriages."61 If it is terminated by mere and in behalf of their client Mr. Hernando Balmores, wrote
reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived defendant Villamor [petitioner] on a purported claim which
before the termination shall still be considered appears to be the very same claims asserted by plaintiff
legitimate.62 Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is [respondent].12
a defense against prosecution for bigamy.63chanrobleslaw
Judge Manalastas issued Omnibus Order13 dated October 17,
It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the 2005, which denied, among others, the Motions for Inhibition,
subsequent marriage may nullify the effects of the subsequent thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
marriage, specifically, in relation to the status of children and the
The allegations of defendant-movant [petitioner] in seeking
prospect of prosecuting a respondent for bigamy.
inhibition of the presiding Judge fall short of the proof required to
overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake her noble
However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
role to dispense justice according to law and evidence without fear
Marriages may be filed solely by the husband or wife." 64 This
and favor.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
means that even if Celerina is a real party in interest who stands
to be benefited or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the On November 7, 2005, the petitioner filed a Petition
second marriage,65 this remedy is not available to her. for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the
Omnibus Order insofar as it denied his Motions for
Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent Inhibition.14chanrobleslaw
marriage but also of nullifying the effects of the declaration of
presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an The petitioner claimed that Judge Manalastas's
affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's choice to file resolutions,15not pertaining to his Motions for Inhibition, were not
an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie. included in the Petition for Certiorari as they were the subject of
a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Lift Order of
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals Default (MR with Motion to Lift Default Order)16 filed with the RTC
for determination of the existence of extrinsic fraud, grounds for on November 3, 2005.
nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of the
petition. On November 16, 2005, the CA issued a resolution requiring
respondent to comment on the petition. The respondent filed his
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary comment on December 14, 2005.17chanrobleslaw

The parties, however, had already filed with the CA the following
SECOND DIVISION manifestations and motions before the issuance of the November
16, 2005 resolution:
G.R. No. 171247, July 22, 2015
1. On November 11, 2005, the respondent filed a
ALFREDO L. VILLAMOR, JR., Petitioner, v. HON. AMELIA C. Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss Petition on the
MANALASTAS, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC-PASIG CITY, ground of forum shopping, pointing out the pendency of
BRANCH 268, AND LEONARDO S. UMALE [DECEASED] the MR with Motion to Lift Default Order filed by the
SUBSTITUTED BY HIS SPOUSE, CLARISSA VICTORIA petitioner with the RTC assailing Judge Manalastas's
UMALE, Respondents. Omnibus Order.
DECISION 2. The petitioner filed his comment in opposition to the
Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss Petition. He argued
BRION, J.:
that the MR with Motion to Lift Default Order did not
We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari1 assailing include the subject matter of the Petition for Certiorari,
the January 31, 2006 resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in i.e., the refusal of Judge Manalastas to inhibit from
CA-G.R. SP No. 91940. hearing the civil case.18chanrobleslaw

Factual Antecedents 3. Meanwhile, the petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for
Inhibition of Presiding Judge on Account of
Institution of Administrative Case (Motion for Inhibition
This case stemmed from the complaint3 filed by Leonardo S. on Account of Administrative Case)19 on November 12,
Umale4 (respondent) against Alfredo L. Villamor, Jr. (petitioner) 2005, on the basis of an Administrative Complaint for
and others5 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure and for Bias
complaint sought to compel the petitioner to account for, pay, and and Partiality (administrative complaint)20 filed with this
deliver to the respondent the rental payments allegedly in the Court through the Office of the Court Administrator on
petitioner's possession.6chanrobleslaw November 11, 2005. In this regard, the petitioner filed
with the CA a Manifestation of Filing of Administrative

189
 Complaint for Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure Respondent's Comment23
and for Bias and Partiality on November 14, 2005.

Subsequently, on November 18, 2005, the respondent filed a The respondent raises the sole issue of whether the petitioner
Supplemental Manifestation/Motion to Dismiss Petition (reiterating engaged in forum shopping.
his claim that the petitioner engaged in forum shopping and
praying for the dismissal of the Petition for Certiorari) since Judge The respondent argues that the petitioner engaged in forum
Manalastas's inhibition had also been raised as an issue in the shopping when he availed of three separate remedies, namely: (1)
Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case filed with the MR with Motion to Lift Default Order filed with the RTC; (2) the
the RTC. Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA; and (3) the Motion for
Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case, also filed with the
The petitioner later filed with the CA a Manifestation dated RTC; praying for the same relief, i.e., the inhibition of Judge
November 22, 2005, to the effect that in view of his filing of an Manalastas from hearing the case.
administrative complaint against Judge Manalastas, he filed with
the RTC a Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case. The respondent asserts that a party is guilty of forum shopping
when he repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different
On December 1, 2005, the petitioner filed another Manifestation courts all substantially founded on the same transactions and the
with the CA stating that he had filed an administrative complaint same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
against Judge Manalastas with the Office of the Court substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved
Administrator. adversely by some other court.24chanrobleslaw

The CA Resolution21 Petitioner's Reply25

The CA dismissed the petition on the ground of forum shopping. It The petitioner reiterates in his reply all the arguments he raised in
noted that contrary to the petitioner's claim, the MR with Motion to the petition.
Lift Default Order prayed that the entire Omnibus Order be
reconsidered and set aside without excluding the issue of Judge Additionally, he wants this Court to rule on the propriety of Judge
Manalastas's inhibition. Manalastas's refusal to inhibit herself from hearing the RTC case.
He points out that considerable time has already elapsed, and to
Moreover, the petitioner later filed with the RTC the Motion for serve the ends of justice, the controversy must finally and totally
Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case. The CA observed be laid to rest.26chanrobleslaw
that the administrative case referred to by the petitioner in support
of the motion was based on the very same grounds he raised in Issues
his previous motions for inhibition.
Two issues thus arise for this Court'
The CA also found that the Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA
resolution:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
and the pending motions in the RTC prayed for the same relief;
this, to the CA, was a plain and simple case of forum shopping. I. Whether the petitioner engaged in forum shopping; and

The dispositive portion of the CA resolution II. Whether Judge Manalastas's decision to continue
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary hearing the civil case was improper.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the private respondent's Our Ruling

motion and supplemental motion to dismiss the petition
are GRANTED. The instant petition is herebyDISMISSED.
The petition is without merit.
SO ORDERED.
We rule that (1) the petitioner engaged in forum shopping, and (2)
The Petition Judge Manalastas's decision to continue hearing the civil case
is not improper.

The petitioner seeks the reversal of the CA resolution on the The Petitioner Engaged in Forum Shopping
following grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As a rule, forum shopping is committed by a party who, having
1. "THE COURT OF APPEALS, BY ITS RESOLUTION
received an adverse judgment in one forum, seeks another opinion
DATED JANUARY 31, 2006, xxx HAS DEPARTED
in another court other than by appeal or the special civil action
FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF
ofcertiorari. Conceptually, forum shopping is the institution of two
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, WHEN IT ACTED UPON
or more suits in different courts, either simultaneously or
MOTIONS TO DISMISS FILED, WITHOUT LEAVE OF
successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on the same or
COURT, BY RESPONDENT IN VIOLATION OF SEC. 5,
related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same
RULE 46, AND ITS OWN RESOLUTION DATED
reliefs.27chanrobleslaw
NOVEMBER 16, 2005 REQUIRING PETITIONER [sic]
TO FILE A COMMENT TO THE PETITION AND NOT A
Forum shopping also exists when, as a result of an adverse
MOTION TO DISMISS, AND THEREAFTER,
decision in one forum or in anticipation thereof, a party seeks a
DISMISSING THE PETITION IN CA-G.R. S.P. NO.
favorable opinion in another forum through means other than an
91940 ON THE GROUND OF FORUM SHOPPING; AND
appeal orcertiorari.28chanrobleslaw
2. "THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS, BY ITS
RESOLUTION SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED HEREIN, There is likewise forum shopping when the elements of litis
SANCTIONED THE DEPARTURE BY THE TRIAL pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will
COURT, MORE PARTICULARLY ITS PRESIDING amount to res judicata in another.29chanrobleslaw
JUDGE AMELIA C. MANALASTAS, FROM THE
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL Litis pendentia is a Latin term meaning "a pending suit" and is
PROCEEDINGS IN THE MATTER OF INHIBITION, SO variously referred to in some decisions as Lis pendens and auter
AS TO CALL FOR THE EXERCISE BY THIS action pendant. As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, it
HONORABLE COURT OF ITS POWER OF refers to the situation where two actions are pending between the
SUPERVISION OVER THE COURT OF APPEALS AND same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them
THE TRIAL COURT."22 becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on the policy

190
against multiplicity of suits.30chanrobleslaw the reversal and setting aside of the Omnibus Order in its entirety.
For all intents and purposes, the MR with Motion to Lift Default
There is litis pendentia when the following requisites are present: Order necessarily included the relief also prayed for in the Petition
identity of the parties in the two actions; substantial identity in the for Certiorari.
causes of action and in the reliefs sought by the parties; and the
identity between the two actions should be such that any judgment Even if we accept the petitioner's explanation that the MR with
that may be rendered in one case, regardless of which party is Motion to Lift Default Order did not raise the issue of Judge
successful, would amount to res judicata in the Manalastas's inhibition, and that it was meant to be a partial
other.31chanrobleslaw reconsideration of the Omnibus Order, the petitioner still cannot
deny that he engaged in forum shopping.
Otherwise stated, the test is whether the two (or more) pending
cases have identity of parties, of rights or causes of action, and of We find it undisputed that during the pendency of the Petition
the reliefs sought. Willful and deliberate violation of the rule against for Certiorari in the CA and the MR with Motion to Lift Default
it is a ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may also Order in the RTC, the petitioner filed with the RTC his Motion
constitute direct contempt.32chanrobleslaw for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case.

Appeals and petitions for certiorari are normally outside the scope The petitioner's claim that he did not engage in forum shopping
of forum shopping because of their nature and purpose; they grant completely crumbles when this new Motion is considered. Three
a litigant the remedy of elevating his case to a superior court for remedies were then pending in two separate tribunals, all
review. praying for the same relief: the inhibition of Judge
Manalastas.
It is assumed, however, that the filing of the appeal or petition
for certiorari is properly or regularly invoked in the usual First, the Petition for Certiorari, prayed among others, that
course of judicial proceedings, and not when the relief sought,
through a petition for certiorari or appeal, is still pending with or xxx after proceedings duly had, render
has yet to be decided by the respondent court or court of origin, judgment:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
tribunal, or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial authority,e.g.,
a still pending motion for reconsideration of the order assailed via (i) ANNULLING the Omnibus Order dated October 17, 2005
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.33chanrobleslaw insofar as public respondent judge therein denied petitioner's
Motion For Inhibition dated March 1. 2005, Supplemental
Forum Shopping at the Court of Appeals Motion For Inhibition dared April 12, 2005 and Second
Supplemental Motion For Inhibition dated June 21, 2005;
We agree with the CA that the petitioner engaged in forum
shopping.
(ii) ORDERING the inhibition of public respondent judge in
At the time the petitioner filed the Petition for Certiorari with the Civil Case No. 70251 xxx36
CA, the RTC had yet to resolve the MR with Motion to Lift Default
Order earlier filed with the RTC.34chanrobleslaw Second, the Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative
Case prayed:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The petitioner took pains to explain that the MR with Motion to Lift
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that the Honorable Presiding
Default Order did not include Judge Manalastas's denial of his
Judge inhibit herself from further proceeding with the instant
Motions for Inhibition.
case.37
The petitioner fails to convince us of the merits of this claim. Third (and as already explained), the MR with Motion to Lift Default
Order prayed that Judge Manalastas set aside the Omnibus Order
Although the arguments supporting the MR with Motion to Lift in its entirety, which would logically result in her inhibition from
Default Order pertained solely to the issue of declaration of default, hearing the case.
the prayer was direct and plain.
The petitioner, however, insists that the filing of the Motion for
It read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case was the necessary
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable consequence of the administrative complaint. The petitioner
Court that the Omnibus Order dated October 17, 2005, be argues that the pendency of the administrative complaint should
RECONSIDERED AND SET ASIDE, and that defendant result in Judge Manalastas's inhibition. 38chanrobleslaw
Villamor's Motion to Dismiss dated February 18, 2005, and
He asserts that the basis of the Motion for Inhibition on Account of
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss dated February 18, 2005, BE
Administrative Case was Judge Manalastas's gross ignorance of
GRANTED. It is further prayed that the order of default issued
against Villamor be lifted or set aside.35 the law, and bias and partiality while the basis of the Motions for
Inhibitions — denied by Judge Manalastas and later the subject of
The petitioner prayed that the Omnibus Order be reconsidered and the Omnibus Order elevated to the CA through the Petition
set aside, period. He did not pray that it be partially reconsidered for Certiorari — was Judge Manalastas's grave abuse of discretion
and set aside only insofar as the order of default was concerned. in refusing to inhibit from hearing the civil case because of bias
With respect to the "order of default," the petitioner further prayed and prejudice.
that this order "be lifted or set aside," thus implying that the
petitioner asked for more than the lifting of this order. The petitioner argues that the grounds relied upon in the Petition
for Certiorari were different and distinct from those in support of
Notably, the motion's preliminary statements were also the Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case. 39 In
unambiguous. The petitioner stated in clear terms that he was sum, the petitioner claims that the remedies were based on
moving for the reconsideration of the Omnibus Order; again, different grounds and that they should not be treated as praying
without qualification. Nowhere in the preliminary statements did for the same relief.
the petitioner indicate that he was only moving for a partial
reconsideration of the Omnibus Order. We do not find the petitioner's position persuasive.

The petitioner's failure to state in unequivocal terms that he was A perusal of the administrative complaint40 would show that the
only moving for the partial reconsideration of the Omnibus Order petitioner raised, as one of the grounds for imputing gross
may or may not have been intentional. But, regardless of the ignorance of the law to Judge Manalastas, her refusal to inhibit. In
petitioner's intention, the result is the same: the motion prayed for fact, the petitioner copied the allegations from the Motions for

191
Inhibitions and generally pasted them on the administrative petition when the administrative complaint, and very likely, the
complaint.41chanrobleslaw Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case were both
pending.
Glaringly, the petitioner used the same ground to support the
Petition for Certiorari and the Motion for Inhibition on Account of Again, the Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case
Administrative Case. As earlier stated, the petitioner likewise and the present petition prayed for the same relief.
prayed for the same relief in both of these remedies.
We note that the Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative
These only lead to one inevitable conclusion: the petitioner Case prays "that the Honorable Presiding Judge inhibit herself
engaged in forum shopping by simultaneously raising the same from further proceeding with the instant case,"46 while the
issues in different tribunals, relying on the same ground founded present petition prays that -
on the same facts, hoping that both or either court would grant his
prayer. xxx (b) after proceeding duly had, render
judgment:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Further, in anticipation of an adverse ruling in the MR with Motion
(i) SETTING ASIDE the Resolution dated January 31, 2006 x x x
to Lift Default Order, the petitioner, without waiting for Judge
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 91940...
Manalastas's resolution, filed the Petition for Certiorari with the CA
hoping to obtain a favorable ruling.

To reiterate, the petitioner filed the Petition for Certiorari while the (ii) <B>ORDERING the inhibition of Presiding Judge Amelia C.
MR with Motion to Lift Default Order was pending. This violates Manalastas</B> of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 268, Pasig
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which provides that the City, in Civil Case No. 70251 xxx47
availability of a remedy in the ordinary course of law precludes the
Plainly, the petitioner, in an attempt to increase the chances of
filing of a petition for certiorari; under this rule, the petition's
preventing Judge Manalastas from hearing the case, successively
dismissal is the necessary consequence if recourse to Rule 65 is
filed the administrative complaint, the Motion for Inhibition on
prematurely taken.42chanrobleslaw
Account of Administrative Case, and the present action.
Had the petitioner waited for the resolution of the MR with Motion
Significantly, this Court's First Division in its Resolution48 dated
to Lift Default Order, the Petition forCertiorari would have been
July 5, 2006, dismissed the administrative complaint against
regularly and properly invoked in the usual course of judicial
Judge Manalastas.
proceedings and should not have been dismissed by the CA.
With respect to the petitioner's claim that Judge Manalastas's
In fact, if the CA had strictly applied Rule 65, it could have
refusal to inhibit herself from hearing the civil case constitutes
summarily dismissed the Petition forCertiorari on another
gross ignorance of the law, we emphasize that judges must be free
ground in addition to forum shopping.
to judge, without pressure or influence from external sources or
factors; they should not be subject to intimidation or to the fear of
One of the essential requisites of a petition for certiorari is that
civil, criminal, or administrative sanctions for acts they do and
there is neither appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
dispositions they make in the performance of their duties and
remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose annulling or
functions.
modifying the questioned proceeding.43chanrobleslaw
Try as the petitioner might to characterize and label these
There was a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy to annul or
remedies as separate, independent, and distinct from each other,
modify the Omnibus Order. The petitioner should have expressly
the unavoidable reality is that their ultimate aim is the same, they
included in the MR with Motion to Lift Default Order the denial of
involve the same parties, and they rely on the same grounds. In
his Motions for Inhibition so that Judge Manalastas could have
short, all the badges of forum shopping are present.
properly reconsidered her Omnibus Order in its entirety.
In Montes v. Court of Appeals,49 we found that the petitioner
In the end, it was the petitioner's precipitate resort to the
therein engaged in forum shopping when he filed with this Court a
extraordinary remedy of certiorari that was his own undoing.
petition for prohibition while his motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal of his petition for certiorari was still pending in the CA.
Forum Shopping in this Court
Although the purpose of a petition for prohibition is different from
that of a petition for certiorari, we ruled that there was forum
The petitioner likewise committed forum shopping when he
shopping because the reliefs sought were the same — to restrain
submitted for this Court's resolution an issue still pending with the
a government official from implementing the same order.
RTC.
In like manner, it does not matter that the apparent purpose of the
We do not know if the Motion for Inhibition on Account of
administrative complaint (the source of the Motion for Inhibition on
Administrative Case was still pending with or had been resolved
Account of Administrative Case) is distinct from that of the Petition
by the RTC when the petitioner filed the present petition. The
for Certiorari (the source of the present petition). The controlling
petitioner kept silent on its status, in violation of his commitment
consideration is that they are both geared towards achieving the
under the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping he
same goal: the inhibition of Judge Manalastas from hearing the
had filed.44chanrobleslaw
civil case.
What we know is that the administrative complaint, the basis of the
The petitioner cannot hide under the cloak of characterization and
said motion, was still pending when the present petition was
labels to escape from the consequences of his actions. If we allow
filed.45chanrobleslaw
this, the evil sought to be prevented by the rule against forum
shopping would result.
To recap, the petitioner anchored his administrative complaint on
Judge Manaiastas's gross ignorance of the law. Among the
We remind the petitioner and his lawyer that forum shopping
grounds relied upon was Judge Manaiastas's bias and partiality,
constitutes abuse of court processes, which tends to degrade
the same ground used in the Motions for Inhibition, which later
the administration of justice, to wreak havoc upon orderly
became the subject of the Petition for Certiorari(the CA's
juridical procedure, and to add to the congestion of the
resolution dismissing the Petition for Certiorari is now subject of
already burdened dockets of the courts.50chanrobleslaw
the present petition). The petitioner subsequently filed with the
RTC the Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case.
Further, the rule proscribing forum shopping seeks to foster candor
and transparency between lawyers and their clients in appearing
The series of events shows that the petitioner filed the present

192
before the courts — to promote the orderly administration of
justice, prevent undue inconvenience upon the other party, and This Petition for Review on Certiorari3 assails the October 24,
save the precious time of the courts. It also aims to prevent the 2011 Decision4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. SP No.
embarrassing possibility of two or more courts or agencies 04158-MIN dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner
rendering conflicting resolutions or decisions upon the same Republic of the Philippines (Republic).
issue.51chanrobleslaw
Factual Antecedents
Judge Manalastas's Decision to Continue Hearing the Case
was Not Improper On November 4, 2008, respondent Jose B. Sarefiogon, Jr. (Jose)
filed a Petition5 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Although we hold that the petitioner engaged in forum shopping Ozamiz6 City-Branch 15 the declaration of presumptive death of
for reasons already explained, we nevertheless consider the issue his wife, Netchie S.7 Sareñogon
of Judge Manalastas's refusal to inhibit from hearing the case to (Netchie).8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
finally settle the matter.
In an Amended Order dated Februrary 11, 2009, the RTC set the
First, Judge Manalastas's inhibition from the civil case Petition for initial hearing on April 16, 2009. It likewise directed the
is discretionary. The grounds relied upon by the petitioner do not publication of said Order in a newspaper of general circulation in
fall under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of the cities of Tangub, Ozamiz and Oroquieta, all in the province of
Court which enumerates the grounds for compulsory inhibition. We Misamis Occidental. Nobody opposed the Petition.9 Trial then
have held that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter followed.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge
based on his or her rational and logical assessment of the Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis
case.52chanrobleslaw Occidental in 1991,11 They later became sweethearts and on
August 10,1996, they got married in civil rites at the Manila City
Second, bare allegations of bias and prejudice are not enough, in Hall.12 However, they lived together as husband and wife for a
the absence of clear and convincing evidence, to overcome the month only because he left to work as a seaman while Netchie
presumption that a judge will undertake his noble role to dispense went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. 13 For three months, he
justice according to law and evidence without fear or did not receive any communication from Netchie.14 He likewise
favor.53 Nothing on record shows that the petitioner ever submitted had no idea about her whereabouts.15 While still abroad, he tried
evidence of bias and prejudice. to contact Netchie''s parents, but failed, as the latter had allegedly
left Clarin, Misamis Occidental.16 He returned home after his
Villamor's claims that Judge Manalastas's impartiality was contract expired.17 He then inquired from Netchie''s relatives and
allegedly compromised because (1) she and the respondent stood friends about her whereabouts, but they also did not know where
as godparents to a child of a common friend, and (2) that her she was.18 Because of these, he had to presume that his wife
husband was a partner of a law firm which represented a client Netchie was already dead.19 He filed the Petition before the RTC
whose claim against the petitioner was similar to the respondent's, so he could contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the
do not suffice to overthrow the presumption that Judge Manalastas Family Code.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
will dispense justice according to law and evidence without fear or
favor. Jose''s testimony was corroborated by his older brother Joel
Sareñogon, and by Netchie''s aunt, Consuelo Sande. 21 These two
Because this act is discretionary, Judge Manalastas is in the best witnesses testified that Jose and Netchie lived together as
position to determine whether or not there was a need to inhibit husband and wife only for one month prior to their leaving the
from the case; thus, her decision to hear the case, in the higher Philippines for separate destinations abroad. 22These two added
interest of justice, equity, and public interest, should be respected. that they had no information regarding Netchie''s
location.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
While a party has the right to seek the inhibition or disqualification
of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
impartial, and independent in handling the case, this right must be
weighed with her duty to decide cases without fear or In its Decision24 dated January 31,2011 in Spec. Proc. No. 045-
pressure.54chanrobleslaw 08, the RTC held that Jose had established by preponderance of
evidence that he is entitled to the relief prayed for under Article 41
In these lights, we see no reason to reverse Judge Manalastas's of the Family Code.25 The RTC found that Netchie had
decision to proceed with hearing the case. disappeared for more than four years, reason enough for Jose to
conclude that his wife was indeed already dead. 26 The dispositive
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition portion of the Decision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
and AFFIRM the January 31, 2006 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R.SP No. 91940. VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is
hereby rendered declaring respondent presumptively dead for
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary purposes of remarriage of petitioner.

SO ORDERED.27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

SECOND DIVISION On April 19,2011, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), elevated the judgment of the RTC to the CA via a
G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016
Petition for Certiorari28, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. JOSE B. Court.
SAREÑOGON, JR., Respondent.
In its Decision29 of October 24, 2011, the CA held that the Republic
DECISION used the wrong recourse by instituting a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
perceived no error at all in the RTC''s judgment granting Jose''s
A petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is Petition for the declaration of the presumptive death of his wife,
the proper remedy to challenge a trial court''s declaration of Netchie. The CA thus held in effect that the Republic''s appeal
presumptive death under Article 41 of The Family Code of the sought to correct or review the RTC''s alleged misappreciation of
Philippines1(Family Code).2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary evidence which could not translate into excess or lack of

193
jurisdiction amounting to grave abuse of discretion. 30 The CA that the CA did not correctly weigh or calibrate the evidence on
noted that the RTC properly caused the publication of the Order record, or assigned to the evidence its due worth, import or
setting the case for initial hearing.31 The CA essentially ruled that, significance; and that such a ground does not avail in a petition
"[a] writ of certiorari may not be used to correct a lower court''s for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.43 Jose
evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. In other words, it also contends that the Republic should have instead filed a motion
is not a remedy for mere errors of judgment, which are correctible for reconsideration44 of the RTC''s Decision of January 31, 2011,
by an appeal,"32 The CAthendisposed of the case in this reasoning out that a motion for reconsideration is a plain, speedy
wise:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary and adequate remedy in law. Jose furthermore submits that the
RTC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in granting his petition
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. because it even dutifully complied with the publication
requirement.45 He moreover argues that to sustain the present
SO ORDERED.33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary petition would allow the executive branch to unduly make inroads
Issues into judicial territory.46 Finally, he insists that the trial court''s
factual findings are entitled to great weight and respect as these
were arrived after due deliberation.47chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Republic filed the instant Petition34 raising the following
This Court''s Ruling
issues:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A

This Court finds the Republic''s petition meritorious.
QUESTION OF LAW IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION
BECAUSE:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
I the proper remedy to question the RTC''s Decision in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON
A QUESTION OF LAW IN DISMISSING THE REPUBLIC''S In the 2005 case of Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,48 we held that
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65, the RTC''s Decision on a Petition for declaration of presumptive
ON THE GROUND THAT THE PROPER REMEDY SHOULD death pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code is immediately final
HAVE BEEN TO APPEAL THE RTC DECISION, BECAUSE and executory. Thus, the CA has no jurisdiction to entertain a
IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENTS OR notice of appeal pertaining to such judgment.49 Concurring in the
DECISIONS ARE NOT APPEALABLE UNDER THE EXPRESS result, Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban further
PROVISION OF LAW.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary therein pointed out that the correct remedy to challenge the RTC
Decision was to institute a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65, and
II
not a petition for review under Rule
45.50chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
THE ALLEGED EFFORTS OF RESPONDENT IN LOCATING HIS
MISSING WIFE DO NOT SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORT A "WELL- We expounded on this appellate procedure in Republic v.
FOUNDED BELIEF" THAT RESPONDENT''S ABSENT WIFE X X Tango:51chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
X IS PROBABLY DEAD.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on
Petitioner''s Arguments appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the
Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions
The Republic insists that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of thereon,
the Revised Rules of Court is the proper remedy to challenge an
RTC''s immediately final and executory Decision on a presumptive Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY
death.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the
rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family
The Republic claims that based on jurisprudence, Jose''s alleged Code:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
efforts in locating Netchie did not engender or generate a well-
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural
founded belief that the latter is probably dead. 37 It maintains that
rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code
even as Jose avowedly averred that he exerted efforts to locate
requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be
Netchie, Jose inexplicably failed to enlist the assistance of the
decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical
relevant government agencies like the Philippine National Police,
rules.
the National Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Foreign
Affairs, the Bureau of Immigration, the Philippine Overseas In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered
Employment Administration, or the Overseas Workers Welfare by the rules in chapters two and three of the same title. It
Administration.38 It likewise points out that Jose did not present states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
any disinterested person to corroborate his allegations that the
latter was indeed missing and could not be found. 39 It also ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall
contends that Jose did not advert to circumstances, events, likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51,
occasions, or situations that would prove that he did in fact make 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable. (Emphasis
a comprehensive search for Netchie.40 The Republic makes the supplied.)
plea that courts should ever be vigilant and wary about the
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title
propensity of some erring spouses in resorting to Article 41 of the
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Family Code for the purpose of terminating their
marriage.41chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary ART. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and
executory.
Finally, the Republic submits that Jose did not categorically assert
that he wanted to have Netchie declared presumptively dead By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a
because he intends to get married again, an essential premise of summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As
Article 41 of the Family Code.42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial
court''s judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
Respondent''s Arguments presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the
Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved
Jose counters that the CA properly dismissed the Republic''s party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of
Petition because the latter''s petition is erected upon the ground discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be

194
filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of 4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the
Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court''s original declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.58 (Underscoring
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs supplied)
and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does
not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum, x x With respect to the third element (which seems to be the element
x52 (Citation omitted; Underscoring supplied) that in this case invites extended discussion), the holding is that
the -
"In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the
file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in law), or lack of news that such absentee is still alive, failure to
rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse communicate [by the absentee spouse or invocation of the]
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the Decision general presumption on absence under the Civil Code [would] not
of the C A, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41
via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of
Court."53chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary proving the additional and more stringent requirement of "well-
founded belief which can only be discharged upon a due showing
In fact, in Republic v. Narceda,54 we held that the OSG availed of of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain
the wrong remedy when it filed a notice of appeal under Rule 42 not only the absent spouse''s whereabouts but, more importantly,
with the CA to question the RTCs Decision declaring the that the absent spouse is [either] still alive or is already dead.
presumptive death of Marina B.
Narceda.55chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary xxxx

Above all, this Court''s ruling in Republic v. Cantor56 made it crystal The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It
clear that the OSG properly availed of a petition for certiorari under depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. Its
Rule 65 to challenge the RTCs Order therein declaring Jerry determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To
Cantor as presumptively dead. be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must
prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the Republic correctly efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based
availed of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
in assailing before the CA the aforesaid RTCs Decision. circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires
exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one). 59 (Emphasis
The "well-founded belief" requisite under Article 41 of the omitted; underscoring supplied)
Family Code is complied with only upon a showing that
In the case at bar, the RTC ruled that Jose 1ms "well-founded
sincere honest-to-goodness efforts had indeed been made to
belief that Netchie was already dead upon the following grounds:
ascertain whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already
dead
(1) Jose allegedly tried to contact Netchie''s parents while he was
still out of the country, but did not reach them as they had allegedly
We now proceed to determine whether the RTC properly granted
left Clarin, Misamis Occidental;
Jose''s Petition. Article 41 of the Family Code pertinently provides
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(2) Jose believed/presumed that Netchie was already dead
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the because when he returned home, he was not able to obtain any
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless information that Netchie was still alive from Netchie''s relatives and
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior friends;
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse (3) Jose''s testimony to the effect that Netchie is no longer alive,
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger hence must be presumed dead, was corroborated by Jose''s older
of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of brother, and by Netchie''s aunt, both of whom testified that he
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall (Jose) and Netchie lived together as husband and wife only for one
be sufficient. month and that after this, there had been no information as to
Netchie''s whereabouts.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary In the above-cited case of Republic v. Cantor,60 this Court held
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of that the present spouse (Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor) merely
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect conducted a "passive search" because she simply made
of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a) unsubstantiated inquiries from her in-laws, from neighbors and
friends. For that reason, this Court stressed that the degree of
In Republic v. Cantor,57 we further held diligence and reasonable search required by law is not met (1)
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary when there is failure to present the persons from whom the present
spouse allegedly made inquiries especially the absent spouse''s
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, relatives, neighbors, and friends, (2) when there is failure to report
it must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent the missing spouse''s purported disappearance or death to the
for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well- police or mass media, and (3) when the present spouse''s
founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under evidence might or would only show that the absent spouse chose
Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four essential requisites not to communicate, but not necessarily that the latter was indeed
for the declaration of presumptive dead.61 The rationale for this palpably stringent or rigorous
death:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary requirement has been marked out
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive
years,or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred xxx [T]he Court fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in
where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down nullifying their marriage, has consistently applied the "strict
in Article 391 of the Civil Code; standard" approach. This is to ensure that a petition for declaration
of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry; used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws. Courts should
never allow procedural shortcuts and should ensure that the
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the stricter standard required by the Family Code is met. xxx
absentee is dead; and,
The application of this stricter standard becomes even more

195
imperative if we consider the State''s policy to protect and The antecedent facts are as follows:
strengthen the institution of marriage. Since marriage serves as
the family''s foundation and since it is the state''s policy to protect Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia
and strengthen the family as a basic social institution, marriage Canalita-Villanueva got married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto
should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the parties. Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the
xxx trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that
threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who
xxx [I]t has not escaped this Court''s attention that the strict was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the
standard required in petitions for declaration of presumptive death marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and
has not been fully observed by the lower courts. We need only to that he later learned that private respondent's child died during
cite the instances when this Court, on review, has consistently delivery on August 29, 1988.4
ruled on the sanctity of marriage and reiterated that anything less
In her answer with compulsory counterclaim,5 Lilia prayed for the
than the use of the strict standard necessitates a denial. To rectify
dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner freely and
this situation, lower courts are now expressly put on notice of the
voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan
strict standard this Court requires in cases under Article 41 of the
for almost a month after their marriage; that petitioner wrote letters
Family Code." (Citations omitted)62chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
to her after he returned to Manila, during which private respondent
Given the Court''s imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a visited him personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family of her pregnancy, which ended in their son being born prematurely.
Code, it must follow that there was no basis at all for the RTC''s Private respondent also prayed for the payment of moral and
finding that Jose''s Petition complied with the requisites of Article exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs.
41 of the Family Code, in reference to the "well-founded belief
On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the
standard. If anything, Jose''s pathetically anemic efforts to locate
dispositive portion of which states:
the missing Netchie are notches below the required degree of
stringent diligence prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from his WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
bare claims that he had inquired from alleged friends and relatives
as to Netchie''s whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand 1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and
specific individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw or met in
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages in the
the course of his search or quest for the allegedly missing Netchie.
amount of P100,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of
Neither did he prove that he sought the assistance of the pertinent
P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00, plus
government agencies as well as the media, Nor did he show mat
the costs of suit.
he undertook a thorough, determined and unflagging search for
Netchie, say for at least two years (and what those years were), SO ORDERED.6
and naming the particular places, provinces, cities, barangays or
municipalities that he visited, or went to, and identifying the specific The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the
persons he interviewed or talked to in the course of his search. petition and the award of attorney’s fees and costs, but reduced
the award of moral and exemplary damages to P50,000.00 and
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, The Decision dated P25,000.00, respectively. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s
October 24, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. SP No. motion for reconsideration, hence, the instant petition for review
04158-MN is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The respondent''s based on the following assigned errors:
Petition in said Spec. Proc. No. 045-08 is
accordingly DISMISSED. I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING THE
SO ORDERED. ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE THE CONSENT OF THE
PETITIONER HAVING BEEN OBTAINED BY FRAUD,
INTIMIDATION AND UNDUE AND IMPROPER PRESSURE AND
INFLUENCE PLUS THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO
Republic of the Philippines COHABITATION WHATSOEVER BETWEEN PETITIONER AND
SUPREME COURT PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
Manila
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
FIRST DIVISION GROSS ERROR IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006 DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES, SAID AWARDS
NOT BEING THOSE ALLOWED BY LAW.7
ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner,
The issues for resolution are (a) whether the subject marriage may
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA CANALITA- be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent; and (b) whether
VILLANUEVA, respondents. petitioner should be liable for moral and exemplary damages as
well as attorney’s fees and costs.

The petition is partly granted.

Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide

DECISION
with those of the trial court, as in the instant case, are generally
binding on this Court.8 We affirm the findings of the Court of
Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily married private
respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: compelled him to do so, thus –
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails To begin with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance that
the January 26, 1998 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. despite the alleged coerced consent which supposedly
CV No. 51832, affirming with modification the Decision 2 dated characterized his marriage with Lilia on April 13, 1988, it was only
January 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro on November 17, 1992 or after a span of not less than four (4)
Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 (a) dismissing years and eight (8) months when Orlando took serious step to
petitioner's petition for the annulment of his marriage to private have the same marriage annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged
respondent and (b) ordering him to pay moral and exemplary inaction evidently finds basis in Lilia’s allegation that this
damages, attorney’s fees and costs. Also assailed is the March 5, annulment suit was filed by Orlando solely in the hope that a
1998 Resolution3 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. favorable judgment thereon would bolster his defense, if not
altogether bring about his acquittal in the criminal case for bigamy

196
which was then already pending against him. Unfortunately, failure to attribute the latter’s pregnancy to any other man,
however, let alone the fact that the criminal case was admittedly appellant cannot complain that he was deceived by the appellee
decided ahead with a judgment of conviction against Orlando x x into marrying her.
x even the very outcome of the present case disappointed his
expectation. At this late, with his appeal in the bigamy case still Appellant also puts in issue the lower court’s appreciation of the
pending with this Court x x x Orlando must be hoping against hope letters allegedly written by him to the appellee. During his cross-
that with a decree of annulment ensuing from this Court, he may examination, when confronted with thirteen (13) letters, appellant
yet secure an acquittal in the same bigamy charge. Viewed in this identified the seven (7) letters that he sent to the appellee, but
perspective, the instant appeal is, therefore, understandable. denied the remaining six (6) x x x. The letters admitted by the
appellant contained expressions of love and concern for his wife,
But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have to fall. and hardly the rantings of a man under duress. During the re-direct
examination, however, appellant suddenly changed mind and
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage denied authorship of those seven (7) letters, claiming that he was
on the ground that he did not freely consent to be married to the forced to admit them because he was threatened with harm by the
appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a appellee. If he was laboring under duress when he made the
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave admission, where did he find the temerity to deny his involvement
danger to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from with the remaining six (6) letters? The recantation can only be
the appellee and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three motivated by a hindsight realization by the appellant of the
men at the premises of the University of the East after his classes evidentiary weight of those letters against his case.
thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a
supposed member of the New People’s Army whom appellant As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that
claimed to have been hired by appellee and who accompanied him his marriage should be annulled due to the absence of
in going to her home province of Palawan to marry her. cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per
se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a
The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can
danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure
will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the
that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such
as a security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time, as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue
it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to
self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself cohabit with the appellee on any of those grounds, the validity of
out of harm’s way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were his marriage must be upheld.9
indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the fact that he
never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his school We also agree that private respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees.
nor the police regarding the activities of those who were Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code provides that attorney’s may be
threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his awarded where the court deems it just and equitable under the
predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage. circumstances, as in the instant case.

Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was We, however, delete the award of moral and exemplary damages
made to believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his for lack of factual and legal basis. There is nothing in the records
child when they were married. Appellant’s excuse that he could not or in the appealed decision that would support an award of moral
have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an damages. In justifying the award, the Court of Appeals merely said
erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at thus:
worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to
copulate with the appellee. His counsel also conceded before the It is not difficult to imagine the suffering of the appellee from the
lower court that his client had a sexual relationship with the baseless portrayal of her by the appellant as the perpetrator of
appellee x x x. He also narrated x x x that sometime in January fraudulent schemes to trap an unwilling mate. x x x10
1988, he and the appellee went to a hotel where "the sexual act
However, the aforesaid finding is only a supposition as it has no
was consummated, with the defendant on top" x x x.
reference to any testimony of private respondent detailing her
Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying his alleged physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
wife, appellant resorted to undermining the credibility of the latter besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
by citing her testimony that her child was born, and died, on August humiliation, and similar injury as would entitle her to moral
29, 1989, a year off from August 29, 1988, the date of fetal death damages.
as appearing in the registry of deaths of the Office of the Civil
In Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr.,11 we held that:
Registrar of Puerto Princesa City x x x.
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be
To Our mind, appellant cannot make capital of the lapse because
pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and
it is inconsequential, as there is no controversy regarding the date
the like. While respondent alleged in his complaint that he suffered
of death of appellee’s fetus. Nevertheless, during the continuation
mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral
of the cross-examination of the appellee, she declared that her
shock, he failed to prove them during the trial. Indeed, respondent
child was prematurely born on August 29, 1988, matching the date
should have taken the witness stand and should have testified on
in the certification of the Civil Registrar x x x. The Court is not
the mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and other
prepared to disbelieve the appellee and throw overboard her entire
emotional and mental suffering he purportedly suffered to sustain
testimony simply on account of her confusion as to the exact date
his claim for moral damages. Mere allegations do not suffice; they
of the death of the fetus, especially when she herself had
must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof. No other
presented documentary evidence that put August 29, 1988 as the
person could have proven such damages except the respondent
date her fetus died.
himself as they were extremely personal to him.
Appellant’s propensity to rely on his perceived weakness of the
As private respondent is not entitled to moral damages, a fortiori,
appellee’s evidence continues in his argument that if indeed there
she is not entitled to exemplary damages. This is clear in Article
is truth to her claim that she was impregnated sometime in
2234 of the Civil Code, which provides:
December 1987, then she could not have a premature delivery on
August 29, 1988, as she had testified during the trial, because the ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not
35-week period of pregnancy is complete by that time. Whether be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral,
the appellee’s impression that she had delivered prematurely is temperate or compensatory damages before the court may
correct or not will not affect the fact that she had delivered a fetus consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages
on August 29, 1988. In the light of appellant’s admission that he should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have been agreed
had a sexual intercourse with his wife in January 1988, and his

197
upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their
liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the frequent fights as a couple.7 Leonida complained that this was in
court may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his
to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would mother. Manuel's deep attachment to his mother and his
be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it dependence on her decision-making were incomprehensible to
not for the stipulation for liquidated damages. Leonida.8

Hence, exemplary damages is allowed only in addition to moral Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his
damages such that no exemplary damages can be awarded homosexuality. Her suspicions were first aroused when she
unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to moral noticed Manuel's peculiar closeness to his male companions. For
damages.12 In the instant case, private respondent failed to instance, she caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation
satisfactorily establish her claim for moral damages, thus she is manifesting his affection for a male caller.9She also found several
not likewise entitled to exemplary damages. pornographic homosexual materials in his possession.10 Her
worse fears were confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed another
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January man on the lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales.11 When she
26, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida
51832 affirming with modification the January 12, 1996 Decision took her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel
of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch stopped giving support to their children.12
172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 dismissing petitioner’s petition for
the annulment of his marriage with private respondent, Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was
is AFFIRMED. However, the award of moral and exemplary presented to prove Leonida's claim. Dr. del Fonso Garcia testified
damages is DELETED for lack of basis. that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of
psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a one-time interview
SO ORDERED. with Manuel and face-to-face interviews with Ma. Paulina Corrinne
(the eldest child).13 She concluded that Manuel is psychologically
incapacitated.14Such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it
Republic of the Philippines existed even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable.
SUPREME COURT
Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some petty
Manila
arguments here and there. He, however, maintained that their
THIRD DIVISION marital relationship was generally harmonious. The petition for
annulment filed by Leonida came as a surprise to him.
G.R. No. 179620 August 26, 2008
Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonida's hostility against
MANUEL G. ALMELOR, petitioner, him was their professional rivalry. It began when he refused to
vs. heed the memorandum15 released by Christ the King Hospital. The
THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, memorandum ordered him to desist from converting his own lying-
BRANCH 254, and LEONIDA T. ALMELOR, respondents. in clinic to a primary or secondary hospital. 16 Leonida's family
owns Christ the King Hospital which is situated in the same
DECISION
subdivision as Manuel's clinic and residence. 17 In other words, he
REYES, R.T., J.: and her family have competing or rival hospitals in the same
vicinity.
MARRIAGE, in its totality, involves the spouses' right to the
community of their whole lives. It likewise involves a true Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father to their
intertwining of personalities.1 children. He denied maltreating them. At most, he only imposed
the necessary discipline on the children.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) denying the petition for annulment of He also defended his show of affection for his mother. He said
judgment and affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial there was nothing wrong for him to return the love and affection of
Court (RTC), Las Piñas, Branch 254. The CA dismissed outright the person who reared and looked after him and his siblings. This
the Rule 47 petition for being the wrong remedy. is especially apt now that his mother is in her twilight
years.18 Manuel pointed out that Leonida found fault in this
The Facts otherwise healthy relationship because of her very jealous and
possessive nature.19
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida
Trinidad (Leonida) were married on January 29, 1989 at the Manila This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel to
Cathedral.3 Their union bore three children: (1) Maria Paulina avoid the company of female friends. He wanted to avoid any
Corinne, born on October 20, 1989; (2) Napoleon Manuel, born on further misunderstanding with his wife. But, Leonida instead
August 9, 1991; and (3) Manuel Homer, born on July 4, conjured up stories about his sexual preference. She also
1994.4 Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners, an fabricated tales about pornographic materials found in his
anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively.5 possession to cast doubt on his masculinity.20

After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G.
the RTC in Las Piñas City to annul their marriage on the ground Almelor. Jesus narrated that he usually stayed at Manuel's house
that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his during his weekly trips to Manila from Iriga City. He was a witness
marital obligations. The case, docketed as LP-00-0132 was raffled to the generally harmonious relationship between his brother
off to Branch 254. Manuel and sister-in-law, Leonida. True, they had some quarrels
typical of a husband and wife relationship. But there was nothing
During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel in 1981 similar to what Leonida described in her testimony. 21
at the San Lazaro Hospital where they worked as medical student
clerks. At that time, she regarded Manuel as a very thoughtful Jesus further testified that he was with his brother on the day
person who got along well with other people. They soon became Leonida allegedly saw Manuel kissed another man. He denied that
sweethearts. Three years after, they got married. 6 such an incident occurred. On that particular date, 22 he and
Manuel went straight home from a trip to Bicol. There was no other
Leonida averred that Manuel's kind and gentle demeanor did not person with them at that time, except their driver. 23
last long. In the public eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect
husband and father. This was not the case in his private life. At Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso Garcia's
home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, findings by presenting his own expert witness. However, no
unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuel's unreasonable psychiatrist was presented.

198
RTC Disposition but an ordinary appeal. An error of judgment may be reversed or
corrected only by appeal.
By decision dated November 25, 2005, the RTC granted the
petition for annulment, with the following disposition: What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of
jurisdiction, which is properly the subject of an ordinary appeal.
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered: In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of the lower court but he
claims excess in the exercise thereof. "Excess" assuming there
1. Declaring the marriage contracted by herein parties on 29 was is not covered by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
January 1989 and all its effects under the law null and void from Procedure. The Rule refers the lack of jurisdiction and not the
the beginning; exercise thereof.28
2. Dissolving the regime of community property between the same Issues
parties with forfeiture of defendant's share thereon in favor of the
same parties' children whose legal custody is awarded to plaintiff Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse via Rule 45,
with visitorial right afforded to defendant; assigning to the CA the following errors:

3. Ordering the defendant to give monthly financial support to all I

the children; and
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
4. Pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC: TREATING THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
AS A PETITION FOR REVIEW IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE
a. Directing the Branch Clerk of this Court to enter this Judgment OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND IN THE INTEREST OF
upon its finality in the Book of Entry of Judgment and to issue an JUSTICE;
Entry of Judgment in accordance thereto; and
II
b. Directing the Local Civil Registrars of Las Piñas City and Manila
City to cause the registration of the said Entry of Judgment in their THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
respective Books of Marriages. UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS
REGARDS THE ORDER DECLARING THE MARRIAGE AS
Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be issued. NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PETITIONER'S
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;
SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis supplied)
III
The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article
36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. It ratiocinated: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS
x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the surrounding
REGARDS THE ORDER TO FORFEIT THE SHARE OF
circumstances of the allegations in the complaint and of the
PETITIONER IN HIS SHARE OF THE CONJUGAL ASSETS.29
evidence presented in support thereof (sic) reveals that in this case
(sic) there is more than meets the eyes (sic). Our Ruling
Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed, I. The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve
generally incompatible with hetero sexual marriage. This is reason the demands of substantial justice and in the Court's exercise
enough that in this jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes marriage as of equity jurisdiction.
a special contract exclusively only between a man and a woman x
x x and thus when homosexuality has trespassed into marriage, Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA
the same law provides ample remedies to correct the situation by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.30 This is
[Article 45(3) in relation to Article 46(4) or Article 55, par. 6, Family to prevent the party from benefiting from one's neglect and
Code]. This is of course in recognition of the biological fact that no mistakes. However, like most rules, it carries certain
matter how a man cheats himself that he is not a homosexual and exceptions. After all, the ultimate purpose of all rules of
forces himself to live a normal heterosexual life, there will surely procedures is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as
come a time when his true sexual preference as a homosexual possible.31
shall prevail in haunting him and thus jeopardizing the solidity,
honor, and welfare of his own family.25 Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a last remedy. It can not
be resorted to if the ordinary remedies are available or no longer
Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied due available through no fault of petitioner.32 However, in Buenaflor v.
course. Undaunted, he filed a petition for annulment of judgment Court of Appeals,33 this Court clarified the proper appreciation for
with the CA.26 technical rules of procedure, in this wise:

Manuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in excess Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat,
of the lower court's jurisdiction; that it had no jurisdiction to dissolve substantial justice and, therefore, they should not be applied
the absolute community of property and forfeit his conjugal share in a very rigid and technical sense. The exception is that while
in favor of his children. the Rules are liberally construed, the provisions with respect
to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals
CA Disposition are strictly applied. As an exception to the exception, these
rules have sometimes been relaxed on equitable
On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as follows:
considerations. Also, in some cases the Supreme Court has
WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment is given due course to an appeal perfected out of time where a
hereby DENIED. The Court AFFIRMS in toto the Decision (dated stringent application of the rules would have denied it, but only
November 25, 2005) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 254), in when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and
Las Piñas City, in Civil Case No. LP-00-0132. No costs.27 in the exercise of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.34(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by filing
the extraordinary remedy of petition for annulment of judgment. For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed
Said the appellate court: exceptions to the stringent rules governing appeals. 35 It has, in the
past, refused to sacrifice justice for technicality. 36
It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning the propriety of the
decision rendered by the lower Court. But the remedy assuming After discovering the palpable error of his petition, Manuel seeks
there was a mistake is not a Petition for Annulment of Judgment the indulgence of this Court to consider his petition before the CA
instead as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

199
A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed grave Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a
abuse of discretion to the lower court for annulling his marriage on technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on the
account of his alleged homosexuality. This is not the first time that merits to attain the ends of justice.46
this Court is faced with a similar situation. In Nerves v. Civil Service
Commission,37 petitioner Delia R. Nerves elevated to the CA a Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of Manuel's
Civil Service Commission (CSC) decision suspending her for six counsel that prejudiced his right to appeal. His counsel, Atty.
(6) months. The CSC ruled Nerves, a public school teacher, is Christine Dugenio, repeatedly availed of inappropriate remedies.
deemed to have already served her six-month suspension during After the denial of her notice of appeal, she failed to move for
the pendency of the case. Nevertheless, she is ordered reinstated reconsideration or new trial at the first instance. She also
without back wages. On appeal, Nerves stated in her petition, inter erroneously filed a petition for annulment of judgment rather than
alia: pursue an ordinary appeal.

1. This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article IX-A, These manifest errors were clearly indicative of counsel's
Section 7 of the Constitution of the Philippines and under Rule 65 incompetence. These gravely worked to the detriment of Manuel's
of the Rules of Court. appeal. True it is that the negligence of counsel binds the client.
Still, this Court has recognized certain exceptions: (1) where
2. But per Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1- reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due
95 (Revised Circular No. 1-91) petitioner is filing the instant petition process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright
with this Honorable Court instead of the Supreme deprivation of the client's liberty and property; or (3) where the
Court.38(Underscoring supplied) interest of justice so require.47

The CA dismissed Nerves' petition for certiorari for being the The negligence of Manuel's counsel falls under the exceptions.
wrong remedy or the inappropriate mode of appeal. 39 The CA Ultimately, the reckless or gross negligence of petitioner's former
opined that "under the Supreme Court Revised Administrative counsel led to the loss of his right to appeal. He should not be
Circular No. 1-95 x x x appeals from judgments or final orders or made to suffer for his counsel's grave mistakes. Higher interests
resolutions of CSC is by a petition for review." 40 of justice and equity demand that he be allowed to ventilate his
case in a higher court.
This Court granted Nerves petition and held that she had
substantially complied with the Administrative Circular. The Court In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,48 this Court explained
stated: thus:

That it was erroneously labeled as a petition for certiorari under It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is only a minor procedural lapse, not based on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the
fatal to the appeal. x x x scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of
his client. However, where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance,
More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to be impressed negligence and dereliction of duty, which resulted in the client's
with merit. Hence, the Court of Appeals should have overlooked being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is
the insubstantial defects of the petition x x x in order to do justice deprived of his day in court and the judgment may be set aside on
to the parties concerned. There is, indeed, nothing sacrosanct such ground. In the instant case, higher interests of justice and
about procedural rules, which should be liberally construed in equity demand that petitioners be allowed to present evidence on
order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining their defense. Petitioners may not be made to suffer for the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action or lawyer's mistakes. This Court will always be disposed to grant
proceeding. As it has been said, where the rigid application of the relief to parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless
rules would frustrate substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a inattention and downright incompetence of lawyers, which
legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a has the consequence of depriving their clients, of their day in
particular case from the operation of the rules.41 (Underscoring court.49 (Emphasis supplied)
supplied)
Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case from
Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,42 petitioner the operation of the rule whenever the demands of justice require
Joy G. Tan availed of a wrong remedy by filing a petition for review it. With more conviction should it wield such power in a case
on certiorari instead of a motion for new trial or an ordinary appeal. involving the sacrosanct institution of marriage. This Court is
In the interest of justice, this Court considered the petition, pro hac guided with the thrust of giving a party the fullest opportunity to
vice, as a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65. establish the merits of one's action.50
This Court found that based on Tan's allegations, the trial court The client was likewise spared from counsel's negligence
prima facie committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering a in Government Service Insurance System v. Bengson Commercial
judgment by default. If uncorrected, it will cause petitioner great Buildings, Inc.51 and Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon.52 Said the
injustice. The Court elucidated in this wise: Court in Bengson:
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its
miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance
Rules, we will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions
substantial justice.43 (Underscoring supplied) thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In other words, the
court has the power to except a particular case from the operation
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better served
of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it. 53
by giving due course to the present petition and treating
petitioner's CA petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, II. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to
considering that what is at stake is the validity or non-validity of a annul a marriage, not homosexuality per se.
marriage.
Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains
In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,44 citing Labad v. University of of his marriage. Persistent in his quest, he fought back all the
Southeastern Philippines, this Court reiterated: heavy accusations of incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity
thrown at him.
x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is
frowned upon. While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural The trial court declared that Leonida's petition for nullity had "no
right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and basis at all because the supporting grounds relied upon can not
courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of legally make a case under Article 36 of the Family Code." It
the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has went further by citing Republic v. Molina:54
the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his
cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.45

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Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable he deliberately hid such fact to his wife.60 It is the concealment of
differences, incessant quarrels and/or beatings, unpredictable homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the
mood swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and difficulty, consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes
neglect, or failure in the performance of some marital obligations bad faith and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to
do not suffice to establish psychological incapacity. 55 the marriage.

If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid,
for not meeting the guidelines set in Molina. What Leonida it must be freely given by both parties. An allegation of vitiated
attempted to demonstrate were Manuel's homosexual consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The
tendencies by citing overt acts generally predominant among Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list of
homosexual individuals.56 She wanted to prove that the perceived circumstances61 constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is not
homosexuality rendered Manuel incapable of fulfilling the essential among those cited, but its concealment.
marital obligations.
This distinction becomes more apparent when we go over the
But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the deliberations62 of the Committees on the Civil Code and Family
marriage between Manuel and Leonida on the ground of vitiated Law, to wit:
consent by virtue of fraud. In support of its conclusion, the lower
court reasoned out: Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground should be eliminated in
the provision on the grounds for legal separation. Dean Gupit,
As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 December 2003), when however, pointed out that in Article 46, they are talking only of
there is smoke surely there is fire. Although vehemently denied by "concealment," while in the article on legal separation, there is
defendant, there is preponderant evidence enough to establish actuality. Judge Diy added that in legal separation, the ground
with certainty that defendant is really a homosexual. This is the existed after the marriage, while in Article 46, the ground existed
fact that can bededuced from the totality of the marriage life at the time of the marriage. Justice Reyes suggested that, for
scenario of herein parties. clarity, they add the phrase "existing at the time of the marriage"
at the end of subparagraph (4). The Committee approved the
Before his marriage, defendant knew very well that people around suggestion.63
him even including his own close friends doubted his true sexual
preference (TSN, pp. 35-36, 13 December 2000; pp. 73-75, 15 To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal
December 2003). After receiving many forewarnings, plaintiff told separation. It is its concealment that serves as a valid ground to
defendant about the rumor she heard but defendant did not do annul a marriage.64 Concealment in this case is not simply a
anything to prove to the whole world once and for all the truth of blanket denial, but one that is constitutive of fraud. It is this
all his denials. Defendant threatened to sue those people but fundamental element that respondent failed to prove.
nothing happened after that. There may have been more important
matters to attend to than to waste time and effort filing cases In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a
against and be effected by these people and so, putting more basis for divorce. It indicates that questions of sexual identity strike
premiums on defendant's denials, plaintiff just the same married so deeply at one of the basic elements of marriage, which is the
him. Reasons upon reasons may be advanced to either exculpate exclusive sexual bond between the spouses. 65 In Crutcher v.
or nail to the cross defendant for his act of initially concealing his Crutcher,66 the Court held:
homosexuality to plaintiff, but in the end, only one thing is certain
Unnatural practices of the kind charged here are an infamous
- even during his marriage with plaintiff, the smoke of doubt about
indignity to the wife, and which would make the marriage relation
his real preference continued and even got thicker, reason why
so revolting to her that it would become impossible for her to
obviously defendant failed to establish a happy and solid family;
discharge the duties of a wife, and would defeat the whole purpose
and in so failing, plaintiff and their children became his innocent
of the relation. In the natural course of things, they would cause
and unwilling victims.
mental suffering to the extent of affecting her health.67
Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, like herein defendant,
However, although there may be similar sentiments here in the
he is meticulous over even small details in the house (sic) like
Philippines, the legal overtones are significantly different. Divorce
wrongly folded bed sheets, etc. or if a man is more authoritative in
is not recognized in the country. Homosexuality and its alleged
knowing what clothes or jewelry shall fit his wife (pp. 77-81, TSN,
incompatibility to a healthy heterosexual life are not sanctioned as
15 December 2003); but these admissions of defendant taken in
grounds to sever the marriage bond in our jurisdiction. At most, it
the light of evidence presented apparently showing that he had
is only a ground to separate from bed and board.
extra fondness of his male friends (sic) to the extent that twice on
separate occasions (pp. 4-7, TSN, 14 February 2001) he was What was proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively blissful
allegedly seen by plaintiff kissing another man lips-to-lips plus the marital union for more than eleven (11) years, which produced
homosexual magazines and tapes likewise allegedly discovered three (3) children. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
underneath his bed (Exhibits "L" and "M"), the doubt as to his real marriage rests on Leonida. Sadly, she failed to discharge this
sex identity becomes stronger. The accusation of plaintiff versus onus.
thereof of defendant may be the name of the game in this case;
but the simple reason of professional rivalry advanced by the The same failure to prove fraud which purportedly resulted to a
defendant is certainly not enough to justify and obscure the vitiated marital consent was found inVillanueva v. Court of
question why plaintiff should accuse him of such a very untoward Appeals.68 In Villanueva, instead of proving vitiation of consent,
infidelity at the expense and humiliation of their children and family appellant resorted to baseless portrayals of his wife as a
as a whole.57 perpetrator of fraudulent schemes. Said the Court:

Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide
allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed with those of the trial court, as in the instant case, are generally
this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court binding on this Court. We affirm the findings of the Court of
considered the public perception of Manuel's sexual preference Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily married private
without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence
Manuel's peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality. compelled him to do so, thus -

Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage
the lower court cannot appreciate it as a ground to annul his on the ground that he did not freely consent to be married to the
marriage with Leonida. The law is clear - a marriage may be appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a
annulled when the consent of either party was obtained by reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave
fraud,58 such as concealment of homosexuality.59Nowhere in the danger to his life and safety. x x x
said decision was it proven by preponderance of evidence that
Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that

201
The Court is not convinced that appellant's apprehension of SO ORDERED.
danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the
will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed
that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked
as a security guard in a bank. Given the rudiments of self-defense,
or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm's
way. x x x

Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was

made to believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his Republic of the Philippines
child when they were married. Appellant's excuse that he could not SUPREME COURT
have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an Manila
erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at
SECOND DIVISION
worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to
copulate with the appellee. x x x G.R. No. 145370 March 4, 2004
xxxx MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner,
vs.
x x x The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a
RODOLFO S. ANCHETA, respondent.
result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the
marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, DECISION
intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to
justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of these CALLEJO, SR., J.:
grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld. 69
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution1 of the
Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, not Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 which dismissed the
only by solely taking into account petitioner's homosexuality per se petitioner’s petition under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
and not its concealment, but by declaring the marriage void from Procedure to annul the Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Naic,
its existence. Cavite, Branch 15 in Special Proceedings No. NC-662 nullifying
the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent Rodolfo S.
This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and Ancheta, and of the resolution of the appellate court denying the
strengthen the family as the basicautonomous social institution motion for reconsideration of the said resolution.
and marriage as the foundation of the family.70 The State and the
public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of This case arose from the following facts:
these social institutions against desecration by fabricated
evidence.71 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the After their marriage on March 5, 1959, the petitioner and the
validity of marriage. respondent resided in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. They had eight
children during their coverture, whose names and dates of births
III. In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer are as follows:
and enjoy their community or conjugal property.
a. ANA MARIE B . ANCHETA – born October 6, 1959
Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute community
property, provides: b. RODOLFO B. ANCHETA, JR. – born March 7, 1961

Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community c. VENANCIO MARIANO B. ANCHETA – born May 18, 1962
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
d. GERARDO B. ANCHETA – born April 8, 1963
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must e. KATHRINA B. ANCHETA – born October 29, 1965
be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision. f. ANTONIO B. ANCHETA – born March 6, 1967

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable g. NATASHA MARTINA B. ANCHETA - born August 2, 1968
to participate in the administration of the common properties, the
h. FRITZIE YOLANDA B. ANCHETA – born November 19, 19703
other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance On December 6, 1992, the respondent left the conjugal home and
without the authority of the court or the written consent of the other abandoned the petitioner and their children. On January 25, 1994,
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the petitioner Marietta Ancheta filed a petition with the Regional Trial
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the Court of Makati, Branch 40, against the respondent for the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of dissolution of their conjugal partnership and judicial separation of
the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected property with a plea for support and support pendente lite. The
as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-3735. At that time, the
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or petitioner was renting a house at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM
both offerors. Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila. 4
A similar provision, Article 12472 prescribes joint administration On April 20, 1994, the parties executed a Compromise
and enjoyment in a regime of conjugal partnership. In a valid Agreement5 where some of the conjugal properties were
marriage, both spouses exercise administration and enjoyment of adjudicated to the petitioner and her eight children, including the
the property regime, jointly. following:
In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the b. A parcel of land (adjoining the two lots covered by TCT Nos.
community property of Manuel and Leonida. In the same breath, 120082 and TCT No. 120083-Cavite) located at Bancal, Carmona,
the trial court forfeited Manuel's share in favor of the children. Cavite, registered in the name of the family Ancheta. Biofood
Considering that the marriage is upheld valid and subsisting, the Corporation under TCT No. 310882, together with the resort
dissolution and forfeiture of Manuel's share in the property regime Munting Paraiso, Training Center, four-storey building, pavilion,
is unwarranted. They remain the joint administrators of the swimming pool and all improvements. All of the shares of stocks
community property. of Ancheta Biofoods Corporation were distributed one-third (1/3)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision to the petitioner and the eight children one-twelfth (1/12) each.6
is REVERSED and SET ASIDEand the petition in the trial court to The court rendered judgment based on the said compromise
annul the marriage is DISMISSED. agreement. Conformably thereto, the respondent vacated, on

202
June 1, 1994, the resort Munting Paraiso and all the buildings and for the trial court’s finding that she was suffering from
improvements thereon. The petitioner, with the knowledge of the psychological incapacity. Finally, the petitioner averred that she
respondent, thenceforth resided in the said property. learned of the Order of the RTC only on January 11, 2000.
Appended to the petition, inter alia, were the affidavits of the
In the meantime, the respondent intended to marry again. On June petitioner and of Venancio M.B. Ancheta III.
5, 1995, he filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Naic,
Cavite, Branch 15, for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with The petitioner prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be
the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity. The case rendered in her favor, thus:
was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. NC-662. Although the respondent
knew that the petitioner was already residing at the resort Munting WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays this Honorable Court
Paraiso in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, he, nevertheless, alleged in to render Judgment granting the Petition.
his petition that the petitioner was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue
1. Declaring null and void the Order dated June 7, 1995 (of the
corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Naic, Cavite).
Manila, "where she may be served with summons." 7 The clerk of
court issued summons to the petitioner at the address stated in the 2. Ordering respondent to pay petitioner
petition.8 The sheriff served the summons and a copy of the
petition by substituted service on June 6, 1995 on the petitioner’s a. P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his residence in Bancal,
b. P500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
Carmona, Cavite.9
c. P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus P7,500.00 per diem for
On June 21, 1995, Sheriff Jose R. Salvadora, Jr. submitted a
every hearing;
Return of Service to the court stating that the summons and a copy
of the petition were served on the petitioner through her son d. P100,000.00 as litigation expenses;
Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III on June 6, 1995:
e. Costs of suit.14
RETURN OF SERVICE
On July 13, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the
This is to certify that the summons together with the copy of the petition on the following ground:
complaint and its annexes was received by the herein defendant
thru his son Venancio M.B. Ancheta [III] as evidenced by the We cannot give due course to the present petition in default or in
signature appearing on the summons. Service was made on June the absence of any clear and specific averment by petitioner that
6, 1995. the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of
June 21, 1995, Naic, Cavite. petitioner. Neither is there any averment or allegation that the
present petition is based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and
(Sgd.) JOSE R. SALVADORA, JR.
lack of jurisdiction. Nor yet that, on the assumption that extrinsic
Sheriff10
fraud can be a valid ground therefor, that it was not availed of, or
The petitioner failed to file an answer to the petition. On June 22, could not have been availed of, in a motion for new trial, or petition
1995, the respondent filed an "Ex-Parte Motion to Declare for relief.15
Defendant as in Default" setting it for hearing on June 27, 1995 at
The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said
8:30 a.m. During the hearing on the said date, there was no
resolution, appending thereto an amended petition in which she
appearance for the petitioner. The public prosecutor appeared for
alleged, inter alia, that:
the State and offered no objection to the motion of the respondent
who appeared with counsel. The trial court granted the motion and 4. This petition is based purely on the grounds of extrinsic fraud
declared the petitioner in default, and allowed the respondent to and lack of jurisdiction.
adduce evidence ex-parte. The respondent testified in his behalf
and adduced documentary evidence. On July 7, 1995, the trial 5. This petition has not prescribed; it was filed within the four-year
court issued an Order granting the petition and declaring the period after discovery of the extrinsic fraud.
marriage of the parties void ab initio.11 The clerk of court issued a
Certificate of Finality of the Order of the court on July 16, 1996. 12 6. The ground of extrinsic fraud has not been availed of, or could
not have been availed of in a motion for new trial or petition for
On February 14, 1998, Valentine’s Day, the respondent and relief.
Teresita H. Rodil were married in civil rights before the municipal
mayor of Indang, Cavite.13 7. The ground of lack of jurisdiction is not barred by laches and/or
estoppel.
On July 7, 2000, the petitioner filed a verified petition against the
respondent with the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules 8. The ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
of Court, as amended, for the annulment of the order of the RTC other appropriate remedies were no longer available through no
of Cavite in Special Proceedings No. NC-662. The case was fault of petitioner; neither has she ever availed of the said
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59550. The petitioner alleged, inter remedies. This petition is the only available remedy to her. 16
alia, that the respondent committed gross misrepresentations by
The petitioner also alleged therein that the order of the trial court
making it appear in his petition in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 that she
nullifying her and the respondent’s marriage was null and void for
was a resident of No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF
the court a quo’s failure to order the public prosecutor to conduct
Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, when in truth and in
an investigation on whether there was collusion between the
fact, the respondent knew very well that she was residing at
parties, and to order the Solicitor General to appear for the State.
Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. According to the
petitioner, the respondent did so to deprive her of her right to be On September 27, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution denying the
heard in the said case, and ultimately secure a favorable judgment said motion.
without any opposition thereto. The petitioner also alleged that the
respondent caused the service of the petition and summons on her The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court
by substituted service through her married son, Venancio Mariano alleging that the CA erred as follows:
B. Ancheta III, a resident of Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, where the
1. In failing to take into consideration the kind of Order which was
respondent was a resident. Furthermore, Venancio M.B. Ancheta
sought to be annulled.
III failed to deliver to her the copy of the petition and summons.
Thus, according to the petitioner, the order of the trial court in favor 2. In finding that the Petition was procedurally flawed.
of the respondent was null and void (1) for lack of jurisdiction over
her person; and (2) due to the extrinsic fraud perpetrated by the 3. In not finding that the Petition substantially complied with the
respondent. She further contended that there was no factual basis requirements of the Rules of Court.

203
4. In failing to comply with Section 5, Rule 47, Rules of Court. the trial court over the person of the petitioner because of the
failure of the sheriff to serve on her the summons and a copy of
5. In not even considering/resolving Petitioner’s Motion to Admit the complaint. She claimed that the summons and complaint were
the Amended Petition; and in not admitting the Amended Petition. served on her son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, who,
however, failed to give her the said summons and complaint.
6. In failing to apply the Rules of Procedure with liberality. 17
Even a cursory reading of the material averments of the original
The petition is meritorious.
petition and its annexes will show that it is, prima facie meritorious;
An original action in the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the hence, it should have been given due course by the Court of
Rules of Court, as amended, to annul a judgment or final order or Appeals.
resolution in civil actions of the RTC may be based on two
In Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japzon,24 we held that
grounds: (a) extrinsic fraud; or (b) lack of jurisdiction. If based on
jurisdiction is acquired by a trial court over the person of the
extrinsic fraud, the remedy is subject to a condition precedent,
defendant either by his voluntary appearance in court and his
namely, the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
submission to its authority or by service of summons. The service
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
of summons and the complaint on the defendant is to inform him
through no fault of the petitioner.18 The petitioner must allege in
that a case has been filed against him and, thus, enable him to
the petition that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition
defend himself. He is, thus, put on guard as to the demands of the
for relief from judgment, under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court are
plaintiff or the petitioner. Without such service in the absence of a
no longer available through no fault of hers; otherwise, the petition
valid waiver renders the judgment of the court null and
will be dismissed. If the petitioner fails to avail of the remedies of
void.25 Jurisdiction cannot be acquired by the court on the person
new trial, appeal or relief from judgment through her own fault or
of the defendant even if he knows of the case against him unless
negligence before filing her petition with the Court of Appeals, she
he is validly served with summons.26
cannot resort to the remedy under Rule 47 of the Rules; otherwise,
she would benefit from her inaction or negligence.19 Summons and complaint may be served on the defendant either
by handing a copy thereof to him in person, or, if he refuses to
It is not enough to allege in the petition that the said remedies were
receive and sign for it, by tendering it to her.27 However, if there is
no longer available through no fault of her own. The petitioner must
impossibility of prompt service of the summons personally on the
also explain and justify her failure to avail of such remedies. The
defendant despite diligent efforts to find him, service of the
safeguard was incorporated in the rule precisely to avoid abuse of
summons may be effected by substituted service as provided in
the remedy.20 Access to the courts is guaranteed. But there must
Section 7, Rule 14 of the said Rules:
be limits thereto. Once a litigant’s rights have been adjudicated in
a valid final judgment of a competent court, he should not be SEC. 7. Substituted service.— If, for justifiable causes, the
granted an unbridled license to sue anew. The prevailing party defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided
should not be vexed by subsequent suits.21 in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some
In this case, the petitioner failed to allege in her petition in the CA
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b)
that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, and petition for
by leaving the copies of defendant’s office or regular place of
relief, were no longer available through no fault of her own. She
business with some competent person in charge thereof.28
merely alleged therein that she received the assailed order of the
trial court on January 11, 2000. The petitioner’s amended petition In Miranda v. Court of Appeals,29 we held that the modes of
did not cure the fatal defect in her original petition, because service should be strictly followed in order that the court may
although she admitted therein that she did not avail of the acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Thus, it is
remedies of new trial, appeal or petition for relief from judgment, only when a defendant cannot be served personally within a
she did not explain why she failed to do so. reasonable time that substituted service may be made by stating
the efforts made to find him and personally serve on him the
We, however, rule that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing
summons and complaint and the fact that such effort failed.30 This
the original petition and denying admission of the amended
statement should be made in the proof of service to be
petition. This is so because apparently, the Court of Appeals failed
accomplished and filed in court by the sheriff. This is necessary
to take note from the material allegations of the petition, that the
because substituted service is a derogation of the usual method of
petition was based not only on extrinsic fraud but also on lack of
service. It has been held that substituted service of summons is a
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, on her claim that the
method extraordinary in character; hence, may be used only as
summons and the copy of the complaint in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662
prescribed and in the circumstances categorized by statutes.31
were not served on her. While the original petition and amended
petition did not state a cause of action for the nullification of the As gleaned from the petition and the amended petition in the CA
assailed order on the ground of extrinsic fraud, we rule, however, and the annexes thereof, the summons in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662
that it states a sufficient cause of action for the nullification of the was issued on June 6, 1995.32 On the same day, the summons
assailed order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over was served on and received by Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta
the person of the petitioner, notwithstanding the absence of any III,33 the petitioner’s son. When the return of summons was
allegation therein that the ordinary remedy of new trial or submitted to the court by the sheriff on June 21, 1995, no
reconsideration, or appeal are no longer available through no fault statement was made on the impossibility of locating the defendant
of the petitioner. therein within a reasonable time, or that any effort was made by
the sheriff to locate the defendant. There was no mention therein
In a case where a petition for the annulment of a judgment or final
that Venancio Mariano Ancheta III was residing at No. 72 CRM
order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is
Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas,
grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
where the petitioner (defendant therein) was allegedly residing. It
defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action,
turned out that Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III had been residing
the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary
at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, and that his father merely showed
remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or
him the summons and the complaint and was made to affix his
judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no
signature on the face of the summons; he was not furnished with
fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final
a copy of the said summons and complaint.
order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and
may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or 4. From the time my father started staying at Munting Paraiso,
by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, I have been residing on the adjoining
proceeding whenever it is invoked,22 unless barred by laches.23 land consisting of two (2) lots later apportioned to my father as his
share of the conjugal partnership. Since then, I have been residing
In this case, the original petition and the amended petition in the
therein up to the present.
Court of Appeals, in light of the material averments therein, were
based not only on extrinsic fraud, but also on lack of jurisdiction of

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5. On June 6, 1995, at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite (at my residence requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the
situated on my father’s lot), my father came to see me and then exposure of an invalid one as well.42
asked me to sign and I did sign papers which he (my father) and
the Sheriff did not allow me to read. Apparently, these papers are A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is
for the Summons to my mother in the case for annulment of fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for
marriage filed by my father against her. I was not given any copy annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation,
of the Summons and/or copy of the complaint/petition.34 the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of
the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the
We, thus, rule that the Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily in parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or
dismissing the original petition of the petitioner and the amended suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint,
petition for annulment of the assailed order grounded on lack of the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists
between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may
The action in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court does not involve the oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through
merits of the final order of the trial court. However, we cannot but the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof
express alarm at what transpired in the court a quo as shown by adduced is dubious and fabricated.
the records. The records show that for the petitioner’s failure to file
an answer to the complaint, the trial court granted the motion of Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the
the respondent herein to declare her in default. The public family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the
prosecutor condoned the acts of the trial court when he interposed policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution
no objection to the motion of the respondent. The trial court in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no
forthwith received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The
rendered judgment against the petitioner without a whimper of break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence,
protest from the public prosecutor. The actuations of the trial court their preservation is not the concern of the family members
and the public prosecutor are in defiance of Article 48 of the Family alone.43 Whether or not a marriage should continue to exist or a
Code, which reads: family should stay together must not depend on the whims and
caprices of only one party, who claims that the other suffers
Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute psychological imbalance, incapacitating such party to fulfill his or
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney her marital duties and obligations.
or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps
to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED.
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated July 13, 2000 and
September 27, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 are hereby SET
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment ASIDE and REVERSED. Let the records of CA-G.R. SP No. 59550
shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings
judgment.35 conformably with the Decision of this Court and Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court, as amended.
The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18,
Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of SO ORDERED.
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which provides:

Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal

separation.— If the defendant in an action for annulment of SECOND DIVISION
marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a
collusion between the parties exits, and if there is no collusion, to
intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated.36

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,37 this Court laid down

the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the
Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the State:

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues
a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.38

This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin39 reiterated its

pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals,40regarding the
role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the State.41 The trial court, abetted by the
ineptitude, if not sheer negligence of the public prosecutor, waylaid
the Rules of Court and the Family Code, as well as the rulings of
this Court.

The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution

requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma
compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution

205
MARIO SIOCHI, G.R. No. 169900 on 31 august 1993, while the legal separation case was still
pending, alfredo and mario siochi (mario) entered into an
Petitioner, agreement to buy and sell[5] (agreement) involving the property for
the price of p18 million. among the stipulations in the agreement
were that alfredo would: (1) secure an affidavit from elvira that the
property is alfredos exclusive property and to annotate the
agreement at the back of tct no. 5357; (2) secure the approval of
- versus - the cavite rtc to exclude the property from the legal separation
case; and (3) secure the removal of the notice oflis
pendens pertaining to the said case and annotated on tct no. 5357.
however, despite repeated demands from mario, alfredo failed to
comply with these stipulations. after paying the p5 million earnest
ALFREDO GOZON, money as partialpayment of the purchase price, mario took
possession of the property in september 1993. on 6 september
WINIFRED GOZON, GIL 1993, the agreement was annotated on tct no. 5357.
TABIJE, INTER-DIMENSIONAL
REALTY, INC., and ELVIRA meanwhile, on 29 june 1994, the cavite rtc rendered a
GOZON, decision[6] in the legal separation case, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
Respondents.

wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the legal

x----------------------- separation between petitioner and respondent. accordingly,
x petitioner elvira robles gozon is entitled to live separately from
respondent alfredo gozon without dissolution of their marriage
bond. the conjugal partnership of gains of the spouses is hereby
G.R. NO. 169977
INTER-DIMENSIONAL declared dissolved and liquidated. being the offending spouse,
REALTY, Present: respondent is deprived of his share in the net profits and the same
is awarded to their child winifred r. gozon whose custody is
INC., awarded to petitioner.
Petitioner, CARPIO, J., CHAIRPERSON,

BRION, furthermore, said parties are required to mutually support their

child winifred r. gozon as her needs arises.
- versus- DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD, AND
so ordered.[7]
MARIO SIOCHI, ELVIRA PEREZ, JJ.
GOZON,

ALFREDO GOZON, AND as regards the property, the cavite rtc held that it is deemed
Promulgated: conjugal property.
WINIFRED GOZON,
MARCH 18, 2010
Respondents.
on 22 august 1994, alfredo executed a deed of donation over the
X----------------------------------------------
property in favor of their daughter, winifred gozon (winifred). the
----X
register of deeds of malabon, gil tabije, cancelled tct no. 5357 and
issued tct no. m-10508[8] in the name of winifred, without
annotating the agreement and the notice of lis pendens on tct
RESOLUTION no. m-10508.

CARPIO, J.: on 26 october 1994, alfredo, by virtue of a special power of

attorney[9] executed in his favor by winifred, sold the property to
inter-dimensional realty, inc. (idri) for p18 million.[10] idri paid
alfredo p18 million, representing full payment for the
This is a consolidation of two separate petitions for
property.[11] subsequently, the register of deeds of malabon
review,[1] assailing the 7 July 2005 Decision[2] and the 30
cancelled tct no. m-10508 and issuedtct no. m-10976[12] to idri.
September 2005 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 74447.

mario then filed with the malabon regional trial court (malabon rtc)
a complaint for specific performance and damages, annulment of
this case involves a 30,000 sq.m. parcel of land (property) covered
donation and sale, with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
by tct no. 5357.[4] the property is situated inmalabon, metro manila
injunction and/or temporary restraining order.
and is registered in the name of alfredo gozon (alfredo), married
to elvira gozon (elvira).

on 3 april 2001, the malabon rtc rendered a decision, [13] the

dispositive portion of which reads:
on 23 december 1991, elvira filed with the cavite city regional trial
court (cavite rtc) a petition for legal separation against her
husband alfredo. on 2 january 1992, elvira filed a notice of lis
pendens, which was then annotated on tct no. 5357. wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:

01. on the preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction:

206
1.1 the same is hereby made permanent by: 11.6 the above awards are subject to set off of plaintiffs obligation
in paragraph 9 hereof.
1.1.1 enjoining defendants alfredo gozon, winifred gozon, inter-
dimensional realty, inc. and gil tabije, their agents, representatives 12. defendants alfredo gozon and winifred gozon are hereby
and all persons acting in their behalf from any attempt of ordered to pay inter-dimensional realty, inc. jointly and severally
commission or continuance of their wrongful acts of further the following:
alienating or disposing of the subject property;
12.1 eighteen million pesos (p18,000,000.00) which constitute the
1.1.2. enjoining defendant inter-dimensional realty, inc. from amount the former received from the latter pursuant to their deed
entering and fencing the property; of absolute sale dated 26 october 1994, with legal interest
therefrom;
1.1.3. enjoining defendants alfredo gozon, winifred gozon, inter-
dimensional realty, inc. to respect plaintiffs possession of the 12.2 one million pesos (p1,000,000.00) as moral damages;
property.
12.3 five hundred thousand pesos (p500,000.00) as exemplary
02. the agreement to buy and sell dated 31 august 1993, between damages; and
plaintiff and defendant alfredo gozon is hereby approved,
excluding the property and rights of defendant elvira robles-gozon 12.4 one hundred thousand pesos (p100,000.00) as attorneys
to the undivided one-half share in the conjugal property subject of fees.
this case.
13. defendants alfredo gozon and winifred gozon are hereby
03. the deed of donation dated 22 august 1994, entered into by ordered to pay costs of suit.
and between defendants alfredo gozon and winifred gozon is
hereby nullified and voided.
so ordered.[14]
04. the deed of absolute sale dated 26 october 1994, executed by
defendant winifred gozon, through defendant alfredo gozon, in
favor of defendant inter-dimensional realty, inc. is hereby nullified
and voided.

05. defendant inter-dimensional realty, inc. is hereby ordered to on appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the malabon rtcs decision
deliver its transfer certificate of title no. m-10976 to the register of with modification. the dispositive portion of the court of appeals
deeds of malabon, metro manila. decision dated 7 july 2005 reads:

06. the register of deeds of malabon, metro manila is hereby wherefore, premises considered, the assailed decision dated april
ordered to cancel certificate of title nos. 10508 in the name of 3, 2001 of the rtc, branch 74, malabon is hereby affirmed with
winifred gozon and m-10976 in the name of inter-dimensional modifications, as follows:
realty, inc., and to restore transfer certificate of title no. 5357 in the
name of alfredo gozon, married to elvira robles with the agreement
to buy and sell dated 31 august 1993 fully annotated therein is 1. the sale of the subject land by defendant alfredo gozon to
hereby ordered. plaintiff-appellant siochi is declared null and void for the following
reasons:
07. defendant alfredo gozon is hereby ordered to deliver a deed of
absolute sale in favor of plaintiff over his one-half undivided share a) the conveyance was done without the consent of defendant-
in the subject property and to comply with all the requirements for appellee elvira gozon;
registering such deed.
b) defendant alfredo gozons one-half () undivided share has been
08. ordering defendant elvira robles-gozon to sit with plaintiff to forfeited in favor of his daughter, defendant winifred gozon, by
agree on the selling price of her undivided one-half share in the virtue of the decision in the legal separation case rendered by the
subject property, thereafter, to execute and deliver a deed of rtc, branch 16, cavite;
absolute sale over the same in favor of the plaintiff and to comply
with all the requirements for registering such deed, within fifteen 2. defendant alfredo gozon shall return/deliver to plaintiff-appellant
(15) days from the receipt of this decision. siochi the amount of p5 million which the latter paid as earnest
money in consideration for the sale of the subject land;
09. thereafter, plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay defendant alfredo
gozon the balance of four million pesos (p4,000,000.00) in his one- 3. defendants alfredo gozon, winifred gozon and gil tabije are
half undivided share in the property to be set off by the award of hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant siochi jointly and
damages in plaintiffs favor. severally, the following:

10. plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay the defendant elvira robles- a) p100,000.00 as moral damages;
gozon the price they had agreed upon for the sale of her one-half
undivided share in the subject property. b) p100,000.00 as exemplary damages;

11. defendants alfredo gozon, winifred gozon and gil tabije are c) p50,000.00 as attorneys fees;
hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally, the
d) p20,000.00 as litigation expenses; and
following:
e) the awards of actual and compensatory damages are hereby
11.1 two million pesos (p2,000,000.00) as actual and
ordered deleted for lack of basis.
compensatory damages;
4. defendants alfredo gozon and winifred gozon are hereby
11.2 one million pesos (p1,000,000.00) as moral damages;
ordered to pay defendant-appellant idri jointly and severally the
11.3 five hundred thousand pesos (p500,000.00) as exemplary following:
damages;
a) p100,000.00 as moral damages;
11.4 four hundred thousand pesos (p400,000.00) as attorneys
b) p100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
fees; and
c) p50,000.00 as attorneys fees.
11.5 one hundred thousand pesos (p100,000.00) as litigation
expenses.

207
defendant winifred gozon, whom the undivided one-half share of property, that other spouses written consent to the sale is still
defendant alfredo gozon was awarded, is hereby given the option required by law for its validity.[18] the agreement entered into by
whether or not to dispose of her undivided share in the subject alfredo and mario was without the written consent of elvira. thus,
land. the agreement is entirely void. as regards marios contention that
the agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by
elviras acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the
property was subsequently donated by alfredo to winifred and then
the rest of the decision not inconsistent with this ruling stands.
sold to idri clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.

so ordered.[15]
however, we disagree with the finding of the court of appeals that
the one-half undivided share of alfredo in the property was already
forfeited in favor of his daughter winifred, based on the ruling of
the cavite rtc in the legal separation case. the court of appeals
misconstrued the ruling of the cavite rtc that alfredo, being the
offending spouse, is deprived of his share in the net profits and the
same is awarded to winifred.

only mario and idri appealed the decision of the court of appeals.
in his petition, mario alleges that the agreement should be treated
the cavite rtc ruling finds support in the following provisions of the
as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the acceptance of
family code:
the other spouse before the offer is withdrawn. since elviras
conduct signified her acquiescence to the sale, mario prays for the
court to direct alfredo and elvira to execute a deed of absolute sale
over the property upon his payment of p9 million to elvira. art. 63. the decree of legal separation shall have the following
effects:

(1) the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each

on the other hand, idri alleges that it is a buyer in good faith and other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed;
for value. thus, idri prays that the court should uphold the validity
of idris tct no. m-10976 over the property. (2) the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall
be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall
have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall
we find the petitions without merit. be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of article 43(2);

(3) the custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the

this case involves the conjugal property of alfredo and elvira. since innocent spouse, subject to the provisions of article 213 of this
the disposition of the property occurred after the effectivity of the code; and
family code, the applicable law is the family code. article 124 of the
the offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the
family code provides:
innocent spouse by intestate succession. moreover, provisions in
favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent
spouse shall be revoked by operation of law.
art. 124. the administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. in case
of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to
art. 43. the termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in
the recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which
the preceding article shall produce the following effects:
must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision. xxx

(2) the absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership,

as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either
in the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
the net profits of the community property or conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common
administration. these powers do not include the powers of
children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of
a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;
the court or the written consent of the other spouse. in the
(emphasis supplied)
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. however, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding thus, among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending
by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned
(emphasis supplied) by the conjugal partnership. it is only alfredos share in the net
profits which is forfeited in favor of winifred. article 102(4) of the
family code provides that [f]or purposes of computing the net
profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with article 43, no. (2)
in this case, alfredo was the sole administrator of the property
and 63, no. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value
because elvira, with whom alfredo was separated in fact, was
between the market value of the community property at the time of
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property.
the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of
however, as sole administrator of the property, alfredo still cannot
its dissolution. clearly, what is forfeited in favor of winifred is not
sell the property without the written consent of elvira or the
alfredos share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in
authority of the court. without such consent or authority, the sale is
the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.
void.[16] the absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders
the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property
pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale.[17] even if the
other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the

208
with regard to idri, we agree with the court of appeals in holding
that idri is not a buyer in good faith. as found by the rtc malabon
and the court of appeals, idri had actual knowledge of facts and CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
circumstances which should impel a reasonably cautious person
to make further inquiries about the vendors title to the property. the - versus - BRION,
representative of idri testified that he knew about the existence of PEREZ,
the notice of lis pendens on tct no. 5357 and the legal separation
case filed before the cavite rtc. thus, idri could not feign ignorance SERENO, and
of the cavite rtc decision declaring the property as conjugal.
REYES, JJ.

RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C.

furthermore, if idri made further inquiries, it would have known that QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO,
the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens was highly PETCHIE C. QUIAO,
irregular. under section 77 of presidential decree no. 1529,[19] the represented by their mother
Promulgated:
notice of lis pendens may be cancelled (a) upon order of the court, RITA QUIAO,
or (b) by the register of deeds upon verified petition of the party July 4, 2012
who caused the registration of the lis pendens. in this case, Respondents.
the lis pendens was cancelled by the register of deeds upon the
request of alfredo. there was no court order for the cancellation of x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
the lis pendens. neither did elvira, the party who caused the ----x
registration of the lis pendens, file a verified petition for its
cancellation.
DECISION

besides, had idri been more prudent before buying the property, it
would have discovered that alfredos donation of the property to REYES, J.:
winifred was without the consent of elvira. under article 125[20] of
the family code, a conjugal property cannot be donated by one
spouse without the consent of the other spouse.clearly, idri was
not a buyer in good faith. The family is the basic and the most important institution of
society. It is in the family where children are born and molded
either to become useful citizens of the country or troublemakers in
the community. Thus, we are saddened when parents have to
nevertheless, we find it proper to reinstate the order of separate and fight over properties, without regard to the message
the malabon rtc for the reimbursement of the p18 million paid by they send to their children. Notwithstanding this, we must not shirk
idri for the property, which was inadvertently omitted in from our obligation to rule on this case involving legal separation
the dispositive portion of the court of appeals decision. escalating to questions on dissolution and partition of properties.
wherefore, we deny the petitions. we affirm the 7 july 2005 The Case
decision of the court of appeals in ca-g.r. cv no. 74447 with the
followingmodifications: This case comes before us via Petition for Review
on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner
seeks that we vacate and set aside the Order [2] dated January 8,
2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Butuan City. In
(1) we delete the portions regarding the forfeiture of
lieu of the said order, we are asked to issue a Resolution defining
alfredo gozons one-half undivided share in favor of
the net profits subject of the forfeiture as a result of the decree of
winifred gozon and the grant of option to winifred gozon whether
legal separation in accordance with the provision of Article 102(4)
or not to dispose of her undivided share in the property; and
of the Family Code, or alternatively, in accordance with the
provisions of Article 176 of the Civil Code.

(2) we order alfredo gozon and winifred gozon to pay inter-

dimensional realty, inc. jointly and severally the eighteen million
Antecedent Facts
pesos (p18,000,000) which was the amount paid by inter-
dimensional realty, inc. for the property, with legal interest
computed from the finality of this decision.
On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed
so ordered. a complaint for legal separation against herein petitioner Brigido
B. Quiao (Brigido).[3]Subsequently, the RTC rendered a
Decision[4] dated October 10, 2005, the dispositive portion of which
Republic of the Philippines provides:

Supreme Court

Manila WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing considerations,

judgment is hereby rendered declaring the legal separation of
plaintiff Rita C. Quiao and defendant-respondent Brigido B. Quiao
pursuant to Article 55.

SECOND DIVISION
As such, the herein parties shall be entitled to live separately from
each other, but the marriage bond shall not be severed.
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, G.R. No 176556

Petitioner, Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of legal age, the three minor
children, namely, Kitchie, Lotis and Petchie, all surnamed Quiao
Present:

209
shall remain under the custody of the plaintiff who is the innocent stated in the afore-quoted DECISION [sic], together with your
spouse. lawful fees in the service of this Writ, all in the Philippine Currency.

Further, except for the personal and real properties already

foreclosed by the RCBC, all the remaining properties, namely:
But if sufficient personal property cannot be found whereof to
satisfy this execution and your lawful fees, then we command you
that of the lands and buildings of the said [petitioner], you make
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte; the said sums in the manner required by law. You are enjoined to
strictly observed Section 9, Rule 39, Rule [sic] of the 1997 Rules
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
of Civil Procedure.
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;

4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;

You are hereby ordered to make a return of the said proceedings
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full
in Tungao, Butuan City; in consonance with Section 14, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.[10]
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares
located in Manila de Bugabos, Butuan City;

7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in

Tungao, Butuan City;
On July 6, 2006, the writ was partially executed with the petitioner
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City; paying the respondents the amount of P46,870.00, representing
the following payments:

shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and

[petitioner] subject to the respective legitimes of the children and (a) P22,870.00 as petitioner's share of the payment of the conjugal
the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities of [P]45,740.00. share;

(b) P19,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

[Petitioners] share, however, of the net profits earned by the (c) P5,000.00 as litigation expenses.[11]
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children.

On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the

He is further ordered to reimburse [respondents] the sum of promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a
[P]19,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses of Motion for Clarification,[12]asking the RTC to define the term Net
[P]5,000.00[.] Profits Earned.

SO ORDERED.[5] To resolve the petitioner's Motion for Clarification, the RTC issued
an Order[13] dated August 31, 2006, which held that the phrase
NET PROFIT EARNED denotes the remainder of the properties of
the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the]
spouse and the debts.[14] The Order further held that after
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in
the period provided for under Section 17(a) and (b) of the Rule on favor of the common children because the offending spouse does
Legal Separation.[6] not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant
to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.[15] The
dispositive portion of the Order states:

On December 12, 2005, the respondents filed a motion for

execution[7] which the trial court granted in its Order dated
December 16, 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, there is no blatant disparity when the sheriff
intends to forfeit all the remaining properties after deducting the
payments of the debts for only separate properties of the
defendant-respondent shall be delivered to him which he has
Wherefore, finding the motion to be well taken, the same is hereby none.
granted. Let a writ of execution be issued for the immediate
enforcement of the Judgment.

The Sheriff is herein directed to proceed with the execution of the

Decision.
SO ORDERED.[8]

IT IS SO ORDERED.[16]

Subsequently, on February 10, 2006, the RTC issued a Writ of

Execution[9] which reads as follows:

Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration[17] on September 8, 2006. Consequently, the
NOW THEREFORE, that of the goods and chattels of the RTC issued another Order[18] dated November 8, 2006, holding
[petitioner] BRIGIDO B. QUIAO you cause to be made the sums that although the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become
final and executory, it may still consider the Motion for Clarification

210
because the petitioner simply wanted to clarify the meaning of net the issue of the finality of the Decision dated October 10, 2005 and
profit earned.[19] Furthermore, the same Order held: subsequently discuss the matters that we can clarify.

ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated August 31, 2006 is hereby The Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and
ordered set aside. NET PROFIT EARNED, which is subject of executory at the time the Motion for Clarification was filed on
forfeiture in favor of [the] parties' common children, is ordered to July 7, 2006.
be computed in accordance [with] par. 4 of Article 102 of the
Family Code.[20]

Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

On November 21, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for

Reconsideration,[21] praying for the correction and reversal of the
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken
Order dated November 8, 2006. Thereafter, on January 8,
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order
2007,[22] the trial court had changed its ruling again and granted
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
the respondents' Motion for Reconsideration whereby the Order
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within
dated November 8, 2006 was set aside to reinstate the Order
thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
dated August 31, 2006.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for

Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed on new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file
February 27, 2007 this instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
of the Rules of Court, raising the following:

Issues
In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[25] we clarified that to standardize
the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, we held that it would be practical
I to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. [26]
IS THE DISSOLUTION AND THE CONSEQUENT LIQUIDATION
OF THE COMMON PROPERTIES OF THE HUSBAND AND
WIFE BY VIRTUE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION In Neypes, we explained that the "fresh period rule" shall also
GOVERNED BY ARTICLE 125 (SIC) OF THE FAMILY CODE? apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts
to the RTCs; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTCs to the
Court of Appeals (CA); Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the CA and Rule 45 governing appeals bycertiorari to
II
the Supreme Court. We also said, The new rule aims to regiment
or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of
the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE NET PROFITS EARNED BY reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP FOR PURPOSES OF resolution.[27] In other words, a party litigant may file his notice of
EFFECTING THE FORFEITURE AUTHORIZED UNDER appeal within a fresh 15-day period from his receipt of the trial
ARTICLE 63 OF THE FAMILY CODE? court's decision or final order denying his motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. Failure to avail of the fresh 15-day
III
period from the denial of the motion for reconsideration makes the
WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE PROPERTY RELATIONS decision or final order in question final and executory.
BETWEEN THE HUSBAND AND WIFE WHO GOT MARRIED IN
1977? CAN THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES BE
GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT FOR PURPOSES OF In the case at bar, the trial court rendered its Decision on October
DETERMINING THE NET PROFITS SUBJECT OF FORFEITURE 10, 2005. The petitioner neither filed a motion for reconsideration
AS A RESULT OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION nor a notice of appeal.On December 16, 2005, or after 67 days
WITHOUT IMPAIRING VESTED RIGHTS ALREADY ACQUIRED had lapsed, the trial court issued an order granting the
UNDER THE CIVIL CODE? respondent's motion for execution; and on February 10, 2006, or
after 123 days had lapsed, the trial court issued a writ of
IV
execution. Finally, when the writ had already been partially
WHAT PROPERTIES SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE executed, the petitioner, on July 7, 2006 or after 270 days had
FORFEITURE OF THE SHARE OF THE GUILTY SPOUSE IN lapsed, filed his Motion for Clarification on the definition of the net
THE NET CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP AS A RESULT OF THE profits earned. From the foregoing, the petitioner had clearly slept
ISSUANCE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION?[23] on his right to question the RTCs Decision dated October 10,
2005. For 270 days, the petitioner never raised a single issue until
Our Ruling the decision had already been partially executed. Thus at the time
the petitioner filed his motion for clarification, the trial courts
decision has become final and executory. A judgment becomes
final and executory when the reglementary period to appeal lapses
While the petitioner has raised a number of issues on the
and no appeal is perfected within such period. Consequently, no
applicability of certain laws, we are well-aware that the
court, not even this Court, can arrogate unto itself appellate
respondents have called our attention to the fact that the Decision
jurisdiction to review a case or modify a judgment that became
dated October 10, 2005 has attained finality when the Motion for
final.[28]
Clarification was filed.[24] Thus, we are constrained to resolve first

211
The petitioner argues that the decision he is questioning is a void (c) The dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership; [40]
judgment. Being such, the petitioner's thesis is that it can still be
disturbed even after 270 days had lapsed from the issuance of the
decision to the filing of the motion for clarification. He said that a
(d) The forfeiture of the petitioner's right to any share of the net
void judgment is no judgment at all. It never attains finality and
profits earned by the conjugal partnership;[41]
cannot be a source of any right nor any obligation.[29] But what
precisely is a void judgment in our jurisdiction? When does a
judgment becomes void?
(e) The award to the innocent spouse of the minor children's
custody;[42]
A judgment is null and void when the court which rendered it had
no power to grant the relief or no jurisdiction over the subject
matter or over the parties or both.[30] In other words, a court, which (f) The disqualification of the offending spouse from inheriting from
does not have the power to decide a case or that has no the innocent spouse by intestate succession;[43]
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties, will issue a void
judgment or a coram non judice.[31]
(g) The revocation of provisions in favor of the offending spouse
made in the will of the innocent spouse;[44]
The questioned judgment does not fall within the purview of a void
judgment. For sure, the trial court has jurisdiction over a case
involving legal separation. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369 confers (h) The holding that the property relation of the parties is conjugal
upon an RTC, designated as the Family Court of a city, the partnership of gains and pursuant to Article 116 of the Family
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide, among others, Code, all properties acquired during the marriage, whether
complaints or petitions relating to marital status and property acquired by one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal
relations of the husband and wife or those living together. [32] The unless the contrary is proved;[45]
Rule on Legal Separation[33] provides that the petition [for legal
separation] shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city
where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at
least six months prior to the date of filing or in the case of a non- (i) The finding that the spouses acquired their real and personal
resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at properties while they were living together;[46]
the election of the petitioner.[34] In the instant case, herein
respondent Rita is found to reside in Tungao, Butuan City for more
than six months prior to the date of filing of the petition; thus, the (j) The list of properties which Rizal Commercial Banking
RTC, clearly has jurisdiction over the respondent's petition Corporation (RCBC) foreclosed;[47]
below. Furthermore, the RTC also acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of both parties, considering that summons and a copy of
the complaint with its annexes were served upon the herein
(k) The list of the remaining properties of the couple which must
petitioner on December 14, 2000 and that the herein petitioner filed
his Answer to the Complaint on January 9, 2001. [35] Thus, without be dissolved and liquidated and the fact that respondent Rita was
doubt, the RTC, which has rendered the questioned judgment, has the one who took charge of the administration of these
jurisdiction over the complaint and the persons of the parties. properties;[48]

(l) The holding that the conjugal partnership shall be liable to

From the aforecited facts, the questioned October 10, 2005
judgment of the trial court is clearly not void ab initio, since it was matters included under Article 121 of the Family Code and the
conjugal liabilities totalingP503,862.10 shall be charged to the
rendered within the ambit of the court's jurisdiction. Being such,
income generated by these properties;[49]
the same cannot anymore be disturbed, even if the modification is
meant to correct what may be considered an erroneous conclusion
of fact or law.[36] In fact, we have ruled that for [as] long as the
public respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by (m) The fact that the trial court had no way of knowing whether the
him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than petitioner had separate properties which can satisfy his share for
an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by the support of the family;[50]
appeal.[37] Granting without admitting that the RTC's judgment
dated October 10, 2005 was erroneous, the petitioner's remedy
should be an appeal filed within the reglementary
(n) The holding that the applicable law in this case is Article
period. Unfortunately, the petitioner failed to do this. He has
129(7);[51]
already lost the chance to question the trial court's decision, which
has become immutable and unalterable. What we can only do is
to clarify the very question raised below and nothing more.
(o) The ruling that the remaining properties not subject to any
encumbrance shall therefore be divided equally between the
petitioner and the respondent without prejudice to the children's
For our convenience, the following matters cannot anymore be
legitime;[52]
disturbed since the October 10, 2005 judgment has already
become immutable and unalterable, to wit:

(p) The holding that the petitioner's share of the net profits earned
by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common
(a) The finding that the petitioner is the offending spouse since he
children;[53] and
cohabited with a woman who is not his wife;[38]

(q) The order to the petitioner to reimburse the respondents the

(b) The trial court's grant of the petition for legal separation of
sum of P19,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses
respondent Rita;[39]
of P5,000.00.[54]

212
After discussing lengthily the immutability of the Decision dated
October 10, 2005, we will discuss the following issues for the
enlightenment of the parties and the public at large. We respond in the negative.

Indeed, the petitioner claims that his vested rights have been
impaired, arguing: As earlier adverted to, the petitioner acquired
Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present case vested rights over half of the conjugal properties, the same being
since the parties' property relation is governed by thesystem owned in common by the spouses. If the provisions of the Family
of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains. Code are to be given retroactive application to the point of
authorizing the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the net
remainder of the conjugal partnership properties, the same impairs
his rights acquired prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.[59] In
other words, the petitioner is saying that since the property
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of
Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner
confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal
other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code,
earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation. which provides: All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is
owned in common by the husband and wife. [60]Thus, since he is
one of the owners of the properties covered by the conjugal
partnership of gains, he has a vested right over half of the said
Offhand, the trial court's Decision dated October 10, 2005 held that
properties, even after the promulgation of the Family Code; and he
Article 129(7) of the Family Code applies in this case. We agree
insisted that no provision under the Family Code may deprive him
with the trial court's holding.
of this vested right by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code which
prohibits retroactive application of the Family Code when it will
prejudice a person's vested right.
First, let us determine what governs the couple's property
relation. From the record, we can deduce that the petitioner and
the respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at
However, the petitioner's claim of vested right is not one which is
the time of the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was
written on stone. In Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[61] we define and
the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did
explained vested right in the following manner:
not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations between
the petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains. [55] Article 119 of the
Civil Code provides: A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not
depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder, or to the
exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and
perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. The term
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements
vested right expresses the concept of present fixed interest which,
agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon
in right reason and natural justice, should be protected against
complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the
enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as
individual rights, cannot deny.
established in this Code, shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.

To be vested, a right must have become a titlelegal or equitableto

the present or future enjoyment of property.[62] (Citations omitted)

Thus, from the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that what governs
the property relations of the petitioner and of the respondent is
conjugal partnership of gains. And under this property relation, the
husband and the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their In our en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for ABAKADA
separate property and the income from their work or Guro Party List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon.
industry.[56] The husband and wife also own in common all the Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita,[63] we also explained:
property of the conjugal partnership of gains.[57]

The concept of vested right is a consequence of

Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the constitutional guaranty of due process that expresses a
the respondent's marriage the operative law is already the Family present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is
Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or
in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions
liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation from new obligations created after the right has become
to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment
applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family Code is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed
[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not and irrefutable.[64] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
the Civil Code or other law.[58]

From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived
Now, the petitioner asks: Was his vested right over half of the
of his vested right, he may lose the same if there is due process
common properties of the conjugal partnership violated when the
and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
trial court forfeited them in favor of his children pursuant to Articles
63(2) and 129 of the Family Code?

213
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due immutability and unalterability of a final judgment prevents us from
process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in disturbing the Decision dated October 10, 2005 because final and
her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to executory decisions can no longer be reviewed nor reversed by
her.[65] In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial this Court.[71]
court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the
respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the
accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the
From the above discussions, Article 129 of the Family Code clearly
parties.[66] Second, when the Decision dated October 10, 2005
applies to the present case since the parties' property relation is
was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court's
governed by the system of relative community or conjugal
ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as net profits, pursuant
partnership of gains and since the trial court's Decision has
to Article 129(7) of the Family Code.[67] Thus, the petitioner cannot
attained finality and immutability.
claim being deprived of his right to due process.

The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the
Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the
fruits of the separate properties of the spouses and the
petitioner's vested right is one founded, not only in the provisions
products of their labor and industry.
of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil Code. This
provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the
forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share in the conjugal partnership
profits. The said provision says: The petitioner inquires from us the meaning of net profits earned
by the conjugal partnership for purposes of effecting the forfeiture
authorized under Article 63 of the Family Code. He insists that
since there is no other provision under the Family Code, which
Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit
defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal
his or her share of the conjugal partnership profits, which shall be
separation, then Article 102 of the Family Code applies.
awarded to the children of both, and the children of the guilty
spouse had by a prior marriage. However, if the conjugal What does Article 102 of the Family Code say? Is the computation
partnership property came mostly or entirely from the work or of net profits earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same
industry, or from the wages and salaries, or from the fruits of the with the computation of net profits earned in the absolute
separate property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall not community?
apply.

Now, we clarify.
In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled
to all the net profits.
First and foremost, we must distinguish between the applicable
law as to the property relations between the parties and the
applicable law as to the definition of net profits. As earlier
discussed, Article 129 of the Family Code applies as to the
From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no
property relations of the parties. In other words, the computation
basis considering that even under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his
and the succession of events will follow the provisions under
share of the conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is
Article 129 of the said Code. Moreover, as to the definition of net
the guilty party in a legal separation case. Thus, after trial and after
profits, we cannot but refer to Article 102(4) of the Family Code,
the petitioner was given the chance to present his evidence, the
since it expressly provides that for purposes of computing the net
petitioner's vested right claim may in fact be set aside under the
profits subject to forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63,
Civil Code since the trial court found him the guilty party.
No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In this provision, net profits shall be
the increase in value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the
More, in Abalos v. Dr. Macatangay, Jr.,[68] we reiterated our long- market value at the time of its dissolution.[72] Thus, without any iota
standing ruling that: of doubt, Article 102(4) applies to both the dissolution of the
absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code,
and to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under
Article 129 of the Family Code. Where lies the difference? As
[P]rior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of
earlier shown, the difference lies in the processes used under the
each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere
dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of
expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable
the Family Code, and in the processes used under the dissolution
estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears that there are
of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family
assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and
Code.
settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net
remainder or remanente liquido (haber ganancial) resulting from
the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its
dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the Let us now discuss the difference in the processes between the
conjugal assets does not vest until the absolute community regime and the conjugal partnership regime.
dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after
dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after
settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which
On Absolute Community Regime:
can be divided between the spouses or their respective
heirs.[69] (Citations omitted)

When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the

husband and the wife becomes joint owners of all the properties of
Finally, as earlier discussed, the trial court has already decided in
the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the
its Decision dated October 10, 2005 that the applicable law in this
marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those
case is Article 129(7) of the Family Code.[70] The petitioner did not
excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common
file a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. Thus, the
mass of the couple's properties. And when the couple's marriage
petitioner is now precluded from questioning the trial court's
or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between
decision since it has become final and executory. The doctrine of

214
the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion Article 63, No. (2) of the Family Code, relative to the provisions on
the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one Legal Separation.
may have originally owned.[73]

Now, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal

Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of partnership of gains under Article 142 of the Civil Code, the
marriage, an inventory is prepared, listing separately all the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their
properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties separate property and income from their work or industry, and
of each; then the debts and obligations of the absolute community divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the
are paid out of the absolute community's assets and if the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by
community's properties are insufficient, the separate properties of either spouse during the marriage. [76] From the foregoing
each of the couple will be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance. provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and
Whatever is left of the separate properties will be delivered to each debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of
of them. The net remainder of the absolute community is its net those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it
assets, which shall be divided between the husband and the wife; establishes a complete separation of capitals.[77]
and for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture,
said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value
of the community property at the time of the celebration of the
Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under
marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution. [74]
the Family Code, Article 129 of the same Code applies in the
liquidation of the couple's properties in the event that the conjugal
partnership of gains is dissolved, to wit:
Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the net profits requires
that we first find the market value of the properties at the time of
the community's dissolution. From the totality of the market value
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime,
of all the properties, we subtract the debts and obligations of the
the following procedure shall apply:
absolute community and this result to the net assets or net
remainder of the properties of the absolute community, from which
we deduct the market value of the properties at the time of
marriage, which then results to the net profits.[75] (1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the
properties of the conjugal partnership and the exclusive properties
of each spouse.
Granting without admitting that Article 102 applies to the instant
case, let us see what will happen if we apply Article 102:
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of
personal debts and obligations of either spouse shall be credited
to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof.
(a) According to the trial court's finding of facts, both husband and
wife have no separate properties, thus, the remaining properties in
the list above are all part of the absolute community. And its
market value at the time of the dissolution of the absolute (3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her
community constitutes the market value at dissolution. exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for the value of his
or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has been vested
by law in the conjugal partnership.
(b) Thus, when the petitioner and the respondent finally were
legally separated, all the properties which remained will be liable
for the debts and obligations of the community. Such debts and (4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be
obligations will be subtracted from the market value at dissolution. paid out of the conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said
assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance
with their separate properties, in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph (2) of Article 121.
(c) What remains after the debts and obligations have been paid
from the total assets of the absolute community constitutes the net (5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses
remainder or net asset.And from such net asset/remainder of the shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
petitioner and respondent's remaining properties, the market value
at the time of marriage will be subtracted and the resulting totality (6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source,
constitutes the net profits. the loss or deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the
family, belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous event,
shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any.
(d) Since both husband and wife have no separate
properties, and nothing would be returned to each of them, what
will be divided equally between them is simply the net (7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall
profits. However, in the Decision dated October 10, 2005, the trial constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between
court forfeited the half-share of the petitioner in favor of his husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was
children.Thus, if we use Article 102 in the instant case (which agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been
should not be the case), nothing is left to the petitioner since both a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this
parties entered into their marriage without bringing with them any Code.
property.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be
On Conjugal Partnership Regime: delivered upon the partition in accordance with Article 51.

Before we go into our disquisition on the Conjugal Partnership (9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the
Regime, we make it clear that Article 102(4) of the Family Code lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by
applies in the instant casefor purposes only of defining net the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority
profit. As earlier explained, the definition of net profits in Article of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age
102(4) of the Family Code applies to both the absolute community of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the
regime and conjugal partnership regime as provided for under court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the

215
court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of SO ORDERED.
said children.

In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the
liquidation of the properties of the spouses: FIRST DIVISION

(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made, [G.R. No. 139789. May 12, 2000]
separately listing the couple's conjugal properties and their
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER
separate properties.[78] In the instant case, the trial court found
and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE and JANE
that the couple has no separate properties when they
DOE, respondents. Mesm
married.[79] Rather, the trial court identified the following conjugal
properties, to wit: [G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000]

POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and

SYLVIA ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
DECISION
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
PARDO, J.:
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in to live with her in conjugal bliss? The answer is no. Marital rights
Tungao, Butuan City; including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be
enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located
in Manila de Bugabos, Butuan City; A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement
or detention,[1] or by which the rightful custody of a person is
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in withheld from the one entitled thereto.[2] Slx
Tungao, Butuan City;
"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another,
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City.[80] commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a
designated time and place, with the day and cause of his capture
(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the court
partnership during the marriage is returned in equal amount to the or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf." [3]
assets of the conjugal partnership;[81] and if the community is
enriched at the expense of the separate properties of either It is a high prerogative, common-law writ, of ancient origin, the
spouse, a restitution of the value of such properties to their great object of which is the liberation of those who may be
respective owners shall be made.[82] imprisoned without sufficient cause.[4] It is issued when one is
deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented from exercising legal
custody over another person.[5]
(c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the The petition of Erlinda K. Ilusorio[6] is to reverse the decision[7] of
debts of the conjugal partnership; while the debts and obligation of the Court of Appeals and its resolution[8] dismissing the application
each of the spouses shall be paid from their respective separate for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband, lawyer
properties. But if the conjugal partnership is not sufficient to pay all Potenciano Ilusorio and enforce consortium as the wife.
its debts and obligations, the spouses with their separate
properties shall be solidarily liable.[83] On the other hand, the petition of Potenciano Ilusorio[9] is to annul
that portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals giving Erlinda
K. Ilusorio visitation rights to her husband and to enjoin Erlinda and
the Court of Appeals from enforcing the visitation rights.
(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of
the husband and of the wife shall be returned to each of them.[84] In The undisputed facts are as follows: Scslx
the instant case,since it was already established by the trial
court that the spouses have no separate properties,[85] there Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.
is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above
are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of
what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many years,
equally between the spouses and/or their respective lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was Chairman of the Board and
heirs.[86] However, since the trial court found the petitioner the President of Baguio Country Club.
guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal
On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant
contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of thirty (30)
to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused,
years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed
like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to
reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave.,
the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there
Makati City when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse,
is no separate property which may be accounted for in the
Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other
guilty party's favor.
hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
In the discussions above, we have seen that in both instances,
Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children, namely:
the petitioner is not entitled to any property at all. Thus, we cannot
Ramon Ilusorio (age 55); Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52); Maximo
but uphold the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the trial
(age 50); Sylvia (age 49); Marietta (age 48); and Shereen (age 39).
court. However, we must clarify, as we already did above, the
Order dated January 8, 2007. On December 30, 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from the United
States, he stayed with Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the
City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that during this
Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Butuan City
time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead
is AFFIRMED. Acting on the Motion for Clarification dated July 7,
of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor
2006 in the Regional Trial Court, the Order dated January 8, 2007
in New York, U.S.A. As a consequence, Potencianos health
of the Regional Trial Court is hereby CLARIFIED in accordance
deteriorated.
with the above discussions.

216
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court, Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to
Antipolo City a petition[10] for guardianship over the person and make choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his
property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latters advanced age, residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices
frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. he made may not appeal to some of his family members but these
are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano. He made it
On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not prevented from
City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and instead leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration, and
lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati. Slxsc absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to
reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice,
Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that respondents [11]refused Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights
petitioners demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right
Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City. to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental
constitutional right. Es m
After due hearing, on April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered
decision the dispositive portion of which reads: The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded
visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions,
even prayed for such right. The ruling is not consistent with the
judgment is hereby rendered:
finding of subjects sanity.
"(1) Ordering, for humanitarian consideration and upon petitioners
When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also
manifestation, respondents Erlinda K. Ilusorio Bildner and Sylvia
emphasized that the same shall be enforced under penalty of
Ilusorio-Yap, the administrator of Cleveland Condominium or
contempt in case of violation or refusal to comply. Such assertion
anywhere in its place, his guards and Potenciano Ilusorios staff
of raw, naked power is unnecessary.
especially Ms. Aurora Montemayor to allow visitation rights to
Potenciano Ilusorios wife, Erlinda Ilusorio and all her children, The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve
notwithstanding any list limiting visitors thereof, under penalty of the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to
contempt in case of violation of refusal thereof; xxx visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see his wife for
private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any
"(2) ORDERING that the writ of habeas corpus previously issued
penalty attached to the exercise of his right.
be recalled and the herein petition for habeas corpus be DENIED
DUE COURSE, as it is hereby DISMISSED for lack of unlawful No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband
restraint or detention of the subject of the petition. to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion
of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other
"SO ORDERED."[12]
mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is
Hence, the two petitions, which were consolidated and are herein best left to the man and womans free choice.
jointly decided.
WHEREFORE, in G. R. No. 139789, the Court DISMISSES the
As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases petition for lack of merit. No costs.
of illegal confinement or detention,[13] or by which the rightful
In G. R. No. 139808, the Court GRANTS the petition and nullifies
custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is
the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it gives visitation
available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one
rights to respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio. No costs.
or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due
process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are SO ORDERED.
unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid
has later become arbitrary.[14] It is devised as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the
best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. [15] Jksm SECOND DIVISION

The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is [G.R. No. 146683. November 22, 2001]
to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a
CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA.
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.[16]
DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS C.
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be TABANCURA, LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C.
an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. [17] The TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE, BERNADETTE A.
illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely COMILLE, and ABNER A. COMILLE,respondents.
nominal or moral.[18]
DECISION
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective
MENDOZA, J.:
detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios liberty that
would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Petitioner Cirila Arcaba seeks review on certiorari of the
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. modification the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10,
Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in Civil Case No. 4593,
on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions. declaring as void a deed of donation inter vivos executed by the
late Francisco T. Comille in her favor and its subsequent
After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was
resolution[3] denying reconsideration.
no unlawful restraint on his liberty.
The facts are as follows:
The Court of Appeals also observed that lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorio did not request the administrator of the Cleveland On January 16, 1956, Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima
Condominium not to allow his wife and other children from seeing Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A
or visiting him. He made it clear that he did not object to seeing located at the corner of Calle Santa Rosa (now Balintawak Street)
them. and Calle Rosario (now Rizal Avenue) in Dipolog City, Zamboanga
del Norte. The total area of the lot was 418 square meters.[4] After
As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios mental state, the Court of
the death of Zosima on October 3, 1980, Francisco and his
Appeals observed that he was of sound and alert mind, having
mother-in-law, Juliana Bustalino Montallana, executed a deed of
answered all the relevant questions to the satisfaction of the court.
extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter

217
waived her share consisting of one-fourth (1/4) of the property to 2. Ordering the defendant to deliver possession of the house and
Francisco.[5] On June 27, 1916, Francisco registered the lot in his lot subject of the deed unto the plaintiffs within thirty (30) days after
name with the Registry of Deeds.[6] finality of this decision; and finally

Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, 3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorneys fees in the sum
Francisco asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo, [7] the latters cousin, of P10,000.00.
Luzviminda Paghacian,[8] and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, then a
widow, to take care of his house, as well as the store inside.[9] SO ORDERED.[25]

Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered on
relationship between Cirila and Francisco. Leticia Bellosillo said June 19, 2000 the decision subject of this appeal. As already
Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same stated, the appeals court denied reconsideration. Its conclusion
room,[10] while Erlinda Tabancura,[11] another niece of Francisco, was based on (1) the testimonies of Leticia, Erlinda, and Cirila; (2)
claimed that the latter had told her that Cirila was his the copies of documents purportedly showing Cirilas use of
mistress.[12] On the other hand, Cirila said she was a mere helper Franciscos surname; (3) a pleading in another civil case
who could enter the masters bedroom only when the old man mentioning payment of rentals to Cirila as Franciscos common-law
asked her to and that Francisco in any case was too old for wife; and (4) the fact that Cirila did not receive a regular cash
her. She denied they ever had sexual intercourse.[13] wage.

It appears that when Leticia and Luzviminda were married, only Petitioner assigns the following errors as having been committed
Cirila was left to take care of Francisco. [14] Cirila testified that she by the Court of Appeals:
was a 34-year old widow while Francisco was a 75-year old
(a) The judgment of the Court of Appeals that petitioner was the
widower when she began working for the latter; that he could still
common-law wife of the late Francisco Comille is not correct and
walk with her assistance at that time;[15] and that his health
is a reversible error because it is based on a misapprehension of
eventually deteriorated and he became bedridden.[16]Erlinda
facts, and unduly breaks the chain of circumstances detailed by
Tabancura testified that Franciscos sole source of income
the totality of the evidence, its findings being predicated on totally
consisted of rentals from his lot near the public streets. [17] He did
incompetent or hearsay evidence, and grounded on mere
not pay Cirila a regular cash wage as a househelper, though he
speculation, conjecture or possibility. (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33
provided her family with food and lodging. [18]
SCRA 243 and other cases; cited in Quiason, Philippine Courts
On January 24, 1991, a few months before his death, Francisco and their Jurisdictions, 1993 ed., p. 604)
executed an instrument denominated Deed of Donation Inter
(b) The Court of Appeals erred in shifting the burden of evidence
Vivos, in which he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A, consisting of 150
from the plaintiff to defendant. (Bunyi v. Reyes, 39 SCRA 504;
square meters, together with his house, to Cirila, who accepted the
Quiason, id.)
donation in the same instrument. Francisco left the larger portion
of 268 square meters in his name. The deed stated that the (c) The Court of Appeals decided the case in a way probably not
donation was being made in consideration of the faithful services in accord with law or with the applicable jurisprudence in
[Cirila Arcaba] had rendered over the past ten (10) years. The Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 20 SCRA 908, and Liguez v. CA, 102 Phil.
deed was notarized by Atty. Vic T. Lacaya, Sr. [19] and later 577, 584.[26]
registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.[20]
The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals correctly
On October 4, 1991, Francisco died without any children. In 1993, applied Art. 87 of the Family Code to the circumstances of this
the lot which Cirila received from Francisco had a market value case. After a review of the records, we rule in the affirmative.
of P57,105.00 and an assessed value of P28,550.00.[21]
The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a
On February 18, 1993, respondents filed a complaint against petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, subject only
petitioner for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos, to certain exceptions: (a) when the conclusion is a finding
recovery of possession, and damages. Respondents, who are the grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (b)
decedents nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
succession, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of impossible; (c) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when
Francisco and the donation inter vivos made by Francisco in her the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the
favor is void under Article 87 of the Family Code, which provides: findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect,
same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except
appellee; (g) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary
moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the
to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings of fact are
occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
persons living together as husband and wife without a valid
based; (i) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
marriage.
premised on the supposed absence of evidence but is
On February 25, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment in favor contradicted by the evidence on record; and (j) when the Court of
of respondents, holding the donation void under this provision of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
the Family Code. The trial court reached this conclusion based on by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
the testimony of Erlinda Tabancura and certain documents bearing different conclusion.[27] It appearing that the Court of Appeals
the signature of one Cirila Comille. The documents were (1) an based its findings on evidence presented by both parties, the
application for a business permit to operate as real estate lessor, general rule should apply.
dated January 8, 1991, with a carbon copy of the signature Cirila
In Bitangcor v. Tan,[28] we held that the term cohabitation or living
Comille;[22] (2) a sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor
together as husband and wife means not only residing under one
with a health certificate showing the signature Cirila Comille in
roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse.Cohabitation, of
black ink;[23] and (3) the death certificate of the decedent with the
course, means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one
signature Cirila A. Comille written in black ink. [24] The dispositive
of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in
portion of the trial courts decision states:
sex. At the very least, cohabitation is thepublic assumption by a
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered: man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as
man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as
1. Declaring the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed by the late such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even
Francisco Comille recorded as Doc. No. 7; Page No. 3; Book No. if often repeated, do not constitute such kind of cohabitation; they
V; Series of 1991 in the Notarial Register of Notary Public Vic T. are merely meretricious.[29] In this jurisdiction, this Court has
Lacaya (Annex A to the Complaint) null and void; considered as sufficient proof of common-law relationship the

218
stipulations between the parties,[30] a conviction of
concubinage,[31] or the existence of illegitimate children.[32]

Was Cirila Franciscos employee or his common-law wife? Cirila

admitted that she and Francisco resided under one roof for a long
time. It is very possible that the two consummated their
relationship, since Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic massage and
Leticia said they slept in the same bedroom. At the very least, their
public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of
caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to
husband and wife.

Aside from Erlinda Tabancuras testimony that her uncle told her
that Cirila was his mistress, there are other indications that Cirila
and Francisco were common-law spouses. Seigfredo Tabancura
presented documents apparently signed by Cirila using the
surname Comille. As previously stated, these are an application
for a business permit to operate as a real estate lessor, [33] a
sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor with a health
certificate,[34] and the death certificate of Francisco.[35] These
documents show that Cirila saw herself as Franciscos common-
law wife, otherwise, she would not have used his last
name. Similarly, in the answer filed by Franciscos lessees in
Erlinda Tabancura, et al. vs. Gracia Adriatico Sy and Antonio Sy,
RTC Civil Case No. 4719 (for collection of rentals), these lessees
referred to Cirila as the common-law spouse of Francisco. Finally,
the fact that Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular cash
wage is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver-
employee, but Franciscos common law spouse. She was, after all,
entitled to a regular cash wage under the law. [36] It is difficult to
believe that she stayed with Francisco and served him out of pure
beneficence. Human reason would thus lead to the conclusion that
she was Franciscos common-law spouse.

Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that

Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a
valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation
made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the
Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the

decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

219