DST MOVERS CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.

PEOPLE'S GENERAL INSURANCE

FACTS:

An accident occurred involving a Honda civic driven by Adeline Yuboco Dela Cruz, a truck allegedly
belonging to DST Movers, and a Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Harrison Tuquero Valdez . It was alleged
that the truck hit the Honda Civic and pushed it forward, thereby hitting the Mitsubishi Lancer. The
driver of the truck then allegedly escaped.

An investigation report was prepared by PO2 Tomas describing the involved Honda civic and Mitsubishi
Lancer, their drivers, and damaged sustained but on the trucks description the driver was stated as
unidentified and the damaged was undetermined.

The Honda Civic was covered by PGIC’s insurance and paid its owner the entire amount of the insurance.
PGIC then filed a complaint for sum of money against DST movers.

In its answer DST Movers acknowledged that it was the owner of the truck, however it claimed that the
truck did not make any trips on the day of the alleged accident. They supported their claims with copies
of invoices and receipts and vouchers relating to repairs and maintenance procedures that were
undertaken on the truck on specific dates which included the date when the accident occurred.

The MTC Manila ruled in favor of PGIC. On appeal the MTC manila ruling was affirmed by the RTC Manila
in favor of PGIC. DST Movers then filed before the CA a petition for review under Rule 42. The CA denied
DST Movers’ Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, DST Movers filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 before the SC. In the petition
DST Movers insisted that its liability was not established by a preponderance of evidence. Specifically, it
faults the Metropolitan Trial Court for ruling in favor of PGIC despite how its version of events was
supported by nothing more the Traffic Accident Investigation Report. It asserts that reliance on this
Report was misplaced as it was supposedly "improperly identified [and] uncorroborated.”

ISSUE:

hether petitioner DST Movers Corporation’s liability was established by a preponderance of evidence.
Subsumed in this is whether it was an error for the Metropolitan Trial Court to admit and lend
evidentiary weight to the piece of evidence chiefly relied upon by respondent People’s General
Insurance Corporation: the Traffic Accident Investigation Report prepared by PO2 Tomas.

RULING:

No. The Traffic Accident Investigation Report prepared by PO2 Tomas should not have been admitted
and accorded weight by the Metropolitan Trial Court as it was "improperly identified [and]
uncorroborated." Petitioner, in effect, asserts that the non-presentation in court of PO2 Tomas, the
officer who prepared the report, was fatal to respondent’s cause.

In the first place, this Report should not have been admitted as evidence for violating the Hearsay Rule.
Bereft of evidentiary basis, the conclusion of the lower courts cannot stand as it has been reduced to
conjecture. Thus, we reverse this conclusion.

Rule 130, Section 36 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the Hearsay Rule. It renders
inadmissible as evidence out-of-court statements made by persons who are not presented as witnesses
but are offered as proof of the matters stated.
SECTION 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. — A witness can
testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his
own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.

SECTION 44. Entries in official records. — Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty
by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

Respondent, the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, and the Court of Appeals are all of
the position that the Report prepared by PO2 Tomas satisfies these requisites. Thus, they maintain that
it is admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts it states. This despite the admitted fact that neither
PO2 Tomas, nor the person who supposedly reported the events of February 28, 2002 to PO2 Tomas –
the person identified as "G. Simbahon of PNCC/SLEX" – gave a testimony in support of the Report.

They are in serious error.

The statements made by this court in Standard Insurance are on point:

[F]or the Traffic Accident Investigation Report to be admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated, the following requisites must be present:

. . . (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do
so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had
sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or
through official information.

Regrettably, in this case, petitioner failed to prove the third requisite cited above. As correctly noted by
the courts below, while the Traffic Accident Investigation Report was exhibited as evidence, the
investigating officer who prepared the same was not presented in court to testify that he had sufficient
knowledge of the facts therein stated, and that he acquired them personally or through official
information. Neither was there any explanation as to why such officer was not presented. We cannot
simply assume, in the absence of proof, that the account of the incident stated in the report was based
on the personal knowledge of the investigating officer who prepared it.

Thus, while petitioner presented its assured to testify on the events that transpired during the vehicular
collision, his lone testimony, unsupported by other preponderant evidence, fails to sufficiently establish
petitioner's claim that respondents' negligence was, indeed, the proximate cause of the damage
sustained by Cham's vehicle.

Respondent presented proof of the occurrence of an accident that damaged Fidel Yuboco’s Honda Civic
sedan, that the sedan was insured by respondent, and that respondent paid Fidel Yuboco’s insurance
claims. As to the identity, however, of the vehicle or of the person responsible for the damage sustained
by the sedan, all that respondent relies on is the Report prepared by PO2 Tomas.

It is plain to see that the matters indicated in the Report are not matters that were personally known to
PO2 Tomas. The Report is candid in admitting that the matters it states were merely reported to PO2
Tomas by "G. Simbahon of PNCC/SLEX." It was this "G. Simbahon," not PO2 Tomas, who had personal
knowledge of the facts stated in the Report. Thus, even as the Report embodies entries made by a public
officer in the performance of his duties, it fails to satisfy the third requisite for admissibility for entries in
official records as an exception to the Hearsay Rule.

To be admitted as evidence, it was thus imperative for the person who prepared the Report—PO2
Tomas—to have himself presented as a witness and then testify on his Report. However, even as the
Report would have been admitted as evidence, PO2 Tomas’ testimony would not have sufficed in
establishing the identity of the motor vehicle and/or the person responsible for the damage sustained
by the sedan. For this purpose, the testimony of G. Simbahon was necessary.

As the sole evidence relied upon by respondent as to the identity of the responsible motor vehicle or
person has been rendered unworthy of even the slightest judicial consideration, there is no basis for
holding-as the Metropolitan Trial Court did-that the motor vehicle responsible for the damage sustained
by the sedan was owned by petitioner. Not only this, petitioner has even adduced proof that on
February 28, 2002, its Isuzu Elf truck with plate number UAL-295 was undergoing repairs and
maintenance and, thus, could not have been at the South Luzon Expressway. The weight of evidence is
clearly in petitioner's favor.