Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

ROGELIO J. JAKOSALEM and G.R. No. 175025

GODOFREDO B. DULFO
Petitioners, Present:

CORONA, C. J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus- DEL CASTILLO,
PEREZ,⃰ and
SERENO, ⃰ ⃰ JJ.

ROBERTO S. BARANGAN, Promulgated:

Respondent. February 15, 2012
x--------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This case exemplifies the age-old rule that the one who holds a Torrens title over a
lot is the one entitled to its possession.[1]

This Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assails the Decision[3] dated August 3, 2006 and the Resolution[4] dated October 4, 2006
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79283.

Factual Antecedents

On August 13, 1966, respondent Col. Roberto S. Barangan (respondent Barangan)

entered into a Land Purchase Agreement[5] with Ireneo S. Labsilica of Citadel Realty
Corporation whereby respondent Barangan agreed to purchase on installment a 300
square meter parcel of land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
165456,[6] located in Antipolo, Rizal.[7] Upon full payment of the purchase price, a Deed
of Absolute Sale[8] was executed on August 31, 1976 in his favor.[9] Consequently, the old
title, TCT No. 171453,[10] which was a transfer from TCT No. 165456,[11] was cancelled
and a new one, TCT No. N-10772,[12] was issued in his name.[13] Since then, he has been
dutifully paying real property taxes for the said property.[14] He was not, however, able to
physically occupy the subject property because as a member of the Philippine Air Force,
he was often assigned to various stations in the Philippines.[15]

On December 23, 1993, when he was about to retire from the government service,
respondent Barangan went to visit his property, where he was planning to build a
retirement home.It was only then that he discovered that it was being occupied by
petitioner Godofredo Dulfo (petitioner Dulfo) and his family.[16]

On February 4, 1994, respondent Barangan sent a letter[17] to petitioner Dulfo

demanding that he and his family vacate the subject property within 30 days. In reply,
petitioner Atty. Rogelio J. Jakosalem (petitioner Jakosalem), the son-in-law of petitioner
Dulfo, sent a letter[18] claiming ownership over the subject property.

On February 19, 1994, respondent Barangan filed with Barangay San Luis,
Antipolo, Rizal, a complaint for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 or the Anti-
Squatting Law against petitioners.[19] No settlement was reached; hence, the complaint
was filed before the Prosecutors Office of Rizal.[20] The case, however, was dismissed
because the issue of ownership must first be resolved in a civil action.[21]

On May 28, 1994, respondent Barangan commissioned Geodetic Engineer Lope

C. Jonco (Engr. Jonco) of J. Surveying Services to conduct a relocation survey of the
subject property based on the technical description appearing on respondent Barangans
TCT.[22] The relocation survey revealed that the property occupied by petitioner Dulfo
and his family is the same property covered by respondent Barangans title.[23]

On November 17, 1994, respondent Barangan filed a Complaint[24] for Recovery

of Possession, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3423, against petitioners Dulfo and
Jakosalem with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 73, Antipolo City. Respondent
Barangan prayed that petitioners Dulfo and Jakosalem be ordered to vacate the subject
property and pay a monthly rental of P3,000.00 for the use and occupancy of the subject
property from May 1979 until the time the subject property is vacated, plus moral and
exemplary damages and cost of suit.[25]
In their Answer with Counterclaim,[26] petitioners Dulfo and Jakosalem claimed that the
subject property was assigned to petitioner Jakosalem by Mr. Nicanor Samson
(Samson);[27] that they have been in possession of the subject property since May 8,
1979;[28] and that the property covered by respondent Barangans title is not the property
occupied by petitioner Dulfo and his family.[29]
During the trial, respondent Barangan testified for himself and presented three
witnesses: (1) Gregorio Estardo (Estardo), the caretaker of Villa Editha Subdivision and
Rodville Subdivision[30] employed by Citadel Realty Corporation, who stated under oath
that petitioner Dulfo used to rent the lot owned by Dionisia Ordialez (Estardos Aunt) and
that when petitioner Dulfo could no longer pay the rent, he and his family squatted on the
property of respondent Barangan;[31] (2) Candida Lawis, a representative of the Municipal
Assessor of Antipolo, Rizal, who confirmed that respondent Barangan is included in the
list of registered owners of lots in Villa Editha Subdivision III and Rodville
Subdivision[32] and; (3) Engr. Jonco, who testified that the property occupied by petitioner
Dulfo and his family and the property owned by respondent Barangan are one and the
same.[33]

The defense moved for the dismissal of the case on demurrer to evidence but was
denied by the RTC.[34] Thus, the defense presented petitioner Jakosalem who maintained
that he acquired the subject property by assignment from its previous owner,
Samson.[35] The defense likewise requested an ocular inspection of the subject property to
show that it is not the property covered by respondent Barangans title.[36] However,
instead of granting the request, the RTC issued an Order[37] dated September 15, 2000
directing Engr. Romulo Unciano of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Antipolo City to conduct a resurvey or replotting of land based on the
title of respondent Barangan and to submit a report within 15 days.[38] The resurvey,
however, did not push through because the defense in an Omnibus Motion[39] dated
September 20, 2000 abandoned its request for an ocular inspection claiming that it was
no longer necessary.[40]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On March 19, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision[41]against respondent Barangan for
failure to present sufficient evidence to prove his claim.[42] The RTC further said that
even if the subject property is owned by respondent Barangan, prescription and laches
have already set in; thus, respondent Barangan may no longer recover the same.[43] The
dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, for insufficiency of evidence

judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant and against the
plaintiff. By way of counterclaim, the plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay
defendant Jakosalem the following amounts:

a. P100,000 for moral damages;

b. P50,000 as actual damages;
c. P25,000 as exemplary damages;
d. P20,000 for litigation expenses; and
e. Costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[44]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the CA reversed the findings of the RTC. It found respondent Barangan
entitled to recover possession of the subject property because he was able to sufficiently
prove the identity of the subject property and that the same is owned by him, as
evidenced by TCT No. N-10772.[45] And since respondent Barangan was deprived of
possession of the subject property, the CA ruled that he is entitled to reasonable
compensation for the use of the property with interest, as well as the payment of moral,
temperate or moderate damages, and attorneys fees,[46] to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The

Decision dated 19 March 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City,
Branch 73 in Civil Case No. 94-3423 is hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE and a new one is rendered declaring, as follows:

1. Appellant Roberto S. Barangan is entitled to the possession of the

subject property-Lot 11, Block 5, of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-60846
situated in Rodville Subdivision, Barangay San Luis, Antipolo, Rizal, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-10772 of the Registry of Deeds for
the Province of Rizal;
 2. Appellees and all persons deriving rights under them who are
occupants of the subject property are ordered to vacate the subject property
and surrender peaceful possession thereof to appellant;

3. Appellees and all persons deriving rights under them who are
occupants of the subject property are ordered to pay to appellant reasonable
compensation for the use of the subject property in the amount of Php3,000.00
per month from 17 November 1994 until they vacate the subject property and
turn over the possession to appellant, plus legal interest of 12% per annum,
from the date of promulgation of this Decision until full payment of all said
reasonable compensation; and

4. Appellees are ordered to pay to appellant the amount of

Php100,000.00 as moral damages, Php50,000.00 as temperate or moderate
damages, and Php50,000.00 as attorneys fees.
Cost against appellees.
SO ORDERED.[47]

Issues

Hence, the instant petition with the following issues:

1. WHETHER X X X [BARANGAN] WAS ABLE TO IDENTIFY

THE EXACT LOCATION OF HIS PROPERTY DESCRIBED
UNDER TCT NO. N-10772 [AND WHETHER] THE PROPERTY
OCCUPIED BY DULFO [IS] THE SAME PROPERTY CLAIMED
BY [BARANGAN];

2. WHETHER X X X [BARANGAN] HAS FULLY SATISFIED

THE REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE 434 OF THE CIVIL CODE
X X X;

3. WHETHER X X X THE AMOUNT OF PHP3,000.00 AS

MONTHLY LEASE RENTAL OR COMPENSATION FOR THE
USE OF THE PROPERTY IS REASONABLE;

4. WHETHER X X X THE GRANT OF XXX MORAL,

TEMPERATE OR MODERATE [DAMAGES] AND ATTORNEYS
FEES, X X X IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH EVIDENCE AND
LAW;
 5. WHETHER X X X LACHES AND PRESCRIPTION [HAVE]
BARRED THE FILING OF THIS CASE.[48]

Petitioners Arguments

Petitioners Dulfo and Jakosalem contend that the CA erred in reversing the
findings of the RTC as respondent Barangans property was not properly
identified.[49] They claim that the relocation survey conducted by Engr. Jonco violated the
agreement they made before the Barangay that the survey should be conducted in the
presence of both parties.[50] They also claim that the title number stated in the Land
Purchase Agreement is not the same number found in the Deed of Absolute Sale.[51] They
likewise insist that laches and prescription barred respondent Barangan from filing the
instant case.[52] Lastly, they contend that the damages ordered by the CA are exorbitant,
excessive and without factual and legal bases.[53]

Respondents Arguments

Respondent Barangan, on the other hand, argues that being the registered owner of the
subject property, he is entitled to its possession.[54] He maintains that his Torrens title
prevails over the Assignment of a Right[55] presented by petitioners.[56] Moreover, laches
and prescription do not apply against him as there was no delay on his part to assert his
right to the property.[57]

Our Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Respondent Barangan is entitled to recover

the subject property

Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that [i]n an action to recover, the property
must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the
weakness of the defendants claim. In other words, in order to recover possession, a
person must prove (1) the identity of the land claimed, and (2) his title.[58]

In this case, respondent Barangan was able to prove the identity of the property
and his title. To prove his title to the property, he presented in evidence the following
documents: (1) Land Purchase Agreement;[59] (2) Deed of Absolute Sale;[60] (3) and
a Torrens title registered under his name, TCT No. N-10772.[61] To prove the identity of
the property, he offered the testimonies of Engr. Jonco, who conducted the relocation
survey,[62] and Estardo, the caretaker of the subdivision, who showed respondent
Barangan the exact location of the subject property.[63] He likewise submitted as evidence
the Verification Survey Plan of Lot 11, Block 5, (LRC) Psd-60846, which was plotted
based on the technical description appearing on respondent Barangans title.[64]

Petitioners contention that the relocation survey was done in violation of their
agreement deserves scant consideration. Petitioners were informed[65] beforehand of the
scheduled relocation survey on May 29, 1994 but they opted not to attend. In fact, as
testified by respondent Barangan and Engr. Jonco, the relocation survey had to be
postponed several times because petitioners refused to participate.[66] By refusing to
attend and participate in the relocation survey, they are now estopped from questioning
the results of the relocation survey.[67]

Records also show that during the trial, the RTC ordered the DENR to conduct a
resurvey of the subject property; but petitioners moved that the same be abandoned
claiming that the resurvey would only delay the proceedings.[68] To us, the persistent
refusal of petitioners to participate in the relocation survey does not speak well of their
claim that they are not occupying respondent Barangans property. In fact, their
unjustified refusal only shows either of two things: (1) that they know for a fact that the
result would be detrimental to their case; or (2) that they have doubts that the result would
be in their favor.
Neither is there any discrepancy between the title number stated in the Land
Purchase Agreement and the Deed of Absolute Sale. As correctly found by the CA, TCT
No. 171453, the title stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale, is a transfer from TCT No.
165456, the title stated in the Land Purchase Agreement.[69] Hence, both TCTs pertain to
the same property.
Respondent Barangan is entitled to actual and
moral damages as well as attorneys fees

Since respondent Barangan was deprived of possession of the subject property, he

is entitled to reasonable compensation in the amount of P3,000.00[70] per month from
November 17, 1994, the date of judicial demand, up to the time petitioners vacate the
subject property. The legal interest of which shall be at the rate of 6% per annum from
November 17, 1994 and at the rate of 12% per annum from the time the judgment of this
Court becomes final and executory until the obligation is fully satisfied.[71]

The award of temperate damages in the amount of P50,000.00, representing the

expenses for the relocation survey, however, must be deleted as these expenses were not
alleged in the complaint.[72]

For the mental anguish, sleepless nights, and serious anxiety suffered by
respondent Barangan, he is entitled to moral damages under Article 2217[73] of the Civil
Code but in the reduced amount of P50,000.00, which is the amount prayed for in the
complaint.[74]

Although not alleged in the complaint, we sustain the CAs award of P50,000.00 as
attorneys fees because it is sanctioned by law, specifically, paragraphs 2 and 11 of Article
2208[75]of the Civil Code.[76]

Laches and prescription do not apply

Finally, as to the issue of laches and prescription, we agree with the CA that these
do not apply in the instant case. Jurisprudence consistently holds that prescription and
laches can not apply to registered land covered by the Torrens system because under the
Property Registration Decree, no title to registered land in derogation to that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.[77]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated

August 3, 2006 and the Resolution dated October 4, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 79283 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The award of
moral damages is REDUCED to P50,000.00 while the award of temperate damages
is DELETED. The reasonable monthly rental of P3,000.00 shall earn legal interest of six
percent (6%) per annum from November 17, 1994, and at the rate of twelve percent
(12%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until the obligation is fully satisfied.
SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 141614. August 14, 2002]

TERESITA BONGATO, petitioner, vs. Spouses SEVERO A. MALVAR

and TRINIDAD MALVAR, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

An action for forcible entry is a quieting process that is summary in nature. It is

designed to recover physical possession in speedy proceedings that are restrictive in
nature, scope and time limits. The one-year bar within which to bring the suit is
prescribed to complement its summary nature. Thus, after the one-year period has
lapsed, plaintiffs can no longer avail themselves of the summary proceedings in the
municipal trial court but must litigate, in the normal course, in the regional trial court in
an ordinary action to recover possession, or to recover both ownership and possession.

Statement of the Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the December 16, 1998 Decision[1] and the September 1, 1999 Resolution [2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 34204. The decretal portion of the Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner.
[3]

The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The CA sustained the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City
(Branch 4), which had disposed thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby affirms the decision of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2 penned by the Honorable Santos Rod.
Cedro and the Writ of Execution issued on the 24th day of August 1993 upon order of
the Honorable Rosarito F. Dabalos (Record, p. 42, Folio II) can now be served on the
defendant. [4]

The Facts

The factual antecedents of the case are summarized by the Court of Appeals as
follows:

The spouses Severo and Trinidad Malvar filed a complaint for forcible entry against
petitioner Teresita Bongato, alleging that petitioner Bongato unlawfully entered a
parcel of land covered by TCT No. RT-16200 belonging to the said spouses and
erected thereon a house of light materials. The petitioner filed a motion for extension
of time to file an answer which the MTCC denied; it being proscribed under the Rule
on Summary Procedure, and likewise containing no notice of hearing. With a new
counsel, Atty. Viador C. Viajar, petitioner filed an answer which the MTCC
disregarded, the same having been filed beyond the ten-day reglementary
period. Later, with still another counsel, Atty. Jesus G. Chavez of the Public Attorneys
Office, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss which the MTCC denied as being contrary
to the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Thereafter, the MTCC rendered a decision ordering petitioner to vacate the land in
question, and to pay rentals, attorneys fees, and the costs of the suit. The decision was
affirmed by respondent RTC judge.Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.

On March 4, 1994, respondent Judge issued an order granting the motion for
reconsideration only insofar as to determine the location of the houses involved in this
civil case so that the Court will know whether they are located on one and the same
lot or a lot different from that involved in the criminal case for Anti-Squatting. In the
same order, respondent Judge disallowed any extension and warned that if the survey
is not made, the court might consider the same abandoned and the writ of execution
would be issued.

The criminal case for anti-squatting (Crim. Case No. 4659) was filed by private
respondents Malvar against petitioner Bongato. The case is still pending with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch I, Butuan City.

On March 28, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for extension of the March 29, 1994
deadline for the submission of the relocation survey and to move the deadline to April
15, 1994, as the engineer concerned, Engr. Lumarda, could not conduct his survey
during the Holy Week, he being a lay minister and parish council member.

On April 7, 1994, respondent Judge noted that no survey report was submitted and
ordered the record of the case returned to the court of origin for disposal. (Citations
[5]

omitted)

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA held that the lot referred to in the present controversy was different from
that involved in the anti-squatting case.[6] It further ruled that the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) had jurisdiction, and that it did not err in rejecting petitioners Motion to
Dismiss. The appellate court reasoned that the MTCC had passed upon the issue of
ownership of the property merely to determine possession -- an action that did not oust
the latter of its jurisdiction.[7]
Unsatisfied with the CA Decision, petitioner lodged this Petition.[8]

Issues
 In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for this Courts
consideration:
I

Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in not finding that
the trial court lacked jurisdiction since the Complaint was filed beyond the one-year
period from date of alleged entry;
II

Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the
Motion to Dismiss was a prohibited pleading. [9]

This Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:
MTCC Jurisdiction

Petitioner claims that the MTCC had no jurisdiction, because the Complaint for
forcible entry was filed only in 1992 or beyond the one-year period provided under the
Rules of Civil Procedure.[10] She avers that in Criminal Case No. 4659 for anti-squatting,
Respondent Severo Malvar alleged in his Sworn Statement that petitioner had illegally
entered his land sometime in the first week of January 1987. [11]
On the other hand, respondents contend that the subject of the anti-squatting case
is different from the parcel of land involved here.[12]
Before tackling the issue directly, it is worthwhile to restate three basic legal
principles. First, in forcible entry, one employs force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth to deprive another of physical possession of land or building. [13] Thus, the plaintiff
must allege and prove prior physical possession of the property in litigation until
deprived thereof by the defendant.[14] This requirement implies that the possession of the
disputed land by the latter was unlawful from the beginning. [15] The sole question for
resolution hinges on the physical or material possession (possession de facto) of the
property. Neither a claim of juridical possession (possession de jure) nor an averment of
ownership[16] by the defendant can outrightly prevent the court from taking cognizance of
the case.[17] Ejectment cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership, and the
plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation
thereof.[18]
Second, as a general rule, courts do not take judicial notice of the evidence
presented in other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the
same court or before the same judge.[19] There are exceptions to this rule. Ordinarily, an
appellate court cannot refer to the record in another case to ascertain a fact not shown
in the record of the case before it,[20] yet, it has been held that it may consult decisions in
other proceedings, in order to look for the law that is determinative of or applicable to
the case under review.[21] In some instances, courts have also taken judicial notice of
proceedings in other cases that are closely connected to the matter in
controversy.[22] These cases may be so closely interwoven, or so clearly interdependent,
as to invoke a rule of judicial notice.[23]
Third, factual findings of trial courts, especially when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court. Indeed, the review of such findings is not a
function that this Court normally undertakes.[24] However, this Rule is not absolute; it
admits of exceptions, such as (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when a lower courts inference from its factual
findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the findings of the appellate court go
beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case,
or fail to notice certain relevant facts which -- if properly considered -- will justify a
different conclusion; (5) when there is a misappreciation of facts; (6) when the findings
of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are
based, are premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on
record.[25]
Respondents in the present Petition filed three cases against petitioner: (1) Criminal
Case No. 4659 for violation of PD No. 772[26] (filed on October 2, 1991), in which
petitioner was acquitted on the ground of good faith; (2) Civil Case No. 5681 for forcible
entry (filed on July 10, 1992) which was resolved by the MTCC on October 26,
1992.[27] (3) Criminal Case No. 5734 for Violation of PD No. 1096[28] (filed on July 15,
1993), wherein petitioner was again acquitted.
We agree with respondents that Lot 10-A, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. RT-16200[29] and registered under the name of Severo Malvar, is different
from Lot 1 which is covered by TCT No. RT-15993[30] and registered under the name of
Severo Malvar also. However, we cannot ignore the Decision[31] dated April 30, 1996 in
Criminal Case No. 4659 for violation of PD 772; or the Decision[32] dated November 26,
1997 in Criminal Case No. 5734 for violation of PD 1096. The property involved in these
two criminal cases and in the instant case for forcible entry is one and the same --
petitioners house.
The allegation of petitioner that there is only one house involved in these three
cases has not been controverted by respondents. Neither was there evidence
presented to prove that, indeed, she had constructed one house on Lot 1 and another
on Lot 10-A. On the contrary, she correctly points out that the house involved in these
three cases is found on one and the same location. Verily, in his Sworn
Statement[33] submitted in Criminal Case No. 4659, Respondent Severo Malvar stated
that petitioners house was located in front of the Museum and just behind the City Hall.
On the other hand, in the Complaint[34] for forcible entry, the subject property was said to
be located along Doongan Road and right in front of the Regional National Museum and
not far behind the City Hall of Butuan City. Lastly, the Decision[35] in Criminal Case No.
5734 stated that the building inspector, Engineer Margarita Burias, had responded to a
verbal complaint involving a structure built near the Museum in Upper Doongan, Butuan
City.
Based on these factual antecedents, there is cogent basis for petitioners contention
that the MTCC lacked jurisdiction in this case.
First, respondents allege that the subject house was built by petitioner on Lot 10-A
covered by TCT No. 16200. This allegation is belied by the sketch plan[36] dated June 16,
1994, submitted by Engineer Regino A. Lomarda Jr. To recall, in an Order[37] dated
March 4, 1994, the RTC had required petitioner to submit a relocation survey of Lot 10-
A to determine the location of the house and to ascertain if it was the same house
involved in Criminal Case No. 4659 for anti-squatting. However, because of the Holy
Week, petitioner failed to submit the relocation survey within the period provided by the
RTC. In the said sketch plan that was offered in evidence as Exhibit 5 in the anti-
squatting case, Engineer Lomarda Jr. certified that the hut of Teresita Bongato is not
within Lot 10-A as shown in this plan as relocated by the undersigned based [o]n TCT
No. RT-1576 of Benjamin Eva, et al. and [o]n TCT No. RT-16200 of Lot 10-A of Severo
Malvar.
Second, according to the Decision in Criminal Case No. 4659, petitioners house is
actually located on Lot 1, the parcel of land previously covered by TCT No. RT-15993
and subject of the anti-squatting case. The RTC Judge in said case ruled:

The lot on which accuseds house is standing was formerly covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-15993 dated January 24, 1983 in the name of Severo
Malvar, and superseded by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-24589 dated
December 3, 1991 in the name of Butuan Land Developers Group, Inc. [38]

Third, petitioners house had actually been in existence prior to February 1992, the
alleged date of illegal entry. Thus, in Criminal Case No. 5734 for violation of PD 1096,
the RTC Judge opined as follows:

Firstly, the prosecution has not proven that the accused had constructed or for that
matter was constructing the questioned house in February of 1992, since it was never
stated that when the complaint was lodged with the City Engineers Office, that the
house occupied by the accused was under construction or under renovation. The fact
that Engr. Burias even admitted that she had no knowledge of when the structure was
built implicitly indicates that the same was completely erected or constructed before
Engr. Burias visit, or even for that matter, before the complaint was filed. [39]

That the house of petitioner had been constructed by her father and that she had
merely continued to reside therein was upheld by the Decision, which we quote:
Suffice it to state, however, that We are convinced, given the testimonial evidence
offered that the house in question was not built by the accused, but by her father,
Jacinto Bongato sometime in 1935; that accused merely lived in the house as a
member of Jacinto Bongatos family until the death of her parents, whereupon, she
continued to reside in the said house and now claims to be its owner. [40]

Fourth, Respondent Severo Malvar admitted in Criminal Case No. 4659 that he had
knowledge of petitioners house since January 1987. We quote from his testimony:
Q Earlier, Judge Malvar, you told this Honorable Court that you discovered sometime in
January 1987, the accused was occupying your property consisting of 348 square
meters. What did you do upon discovering that the accused already occupied a portion
of your property without your knowledge?
A I want to demolish her house. I told her that I am the owner of the land and she is looking
for the hectare that was not sold by her father to me.
Q And upon being informed by Teresita Bongato that they were looking for the hectare lot
which was not sold to you by her father, what did you say to her?
A I told her to remove her house. Then after that, I was so busy with the squatters along
Satorre Street of the Malvar Village that kept me so busy. It was only last year that we
were able to attend to this.[41]
It is wise to be reminded that forcible entry is a quieting process, and that the
restrictive time bar is prescribed to complement the summary nature of such
process.[42] Indeed, the one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry
is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land. However, when entry is
made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff
learned about it.[43] After the lapse of the one-year period, the party dispossessed of a
parcel of land may file either an accion publiciana,which is a plenary action to recover
the right of possession; or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover
ownership as well as possession.[44]
On the basis of the foregoing facts, it is clear that the cause of action for forcible
entry filed by respondents had already prescribed when they filed the Complaint for
ejectment on July 10, 1992.[45] Hence, even if Severo Malvar may be the owner of the
land, possession thereof cannot be wrested through a summary action for ejectment of
petitioner, who had been occupying it for more than one (1) year. [46] Respondents should
have presented their suit before the RTC in an accion publiciana or
an accion reivindicatoria, not before the MTCC in summary proceedings for forcible
entry.[47] Their cause of action for forcible entry had prescribed already, and the MTCC
had no more jurisdiction to hear and decide it.[48]

Second Issue:
Motion to Dismiss
 Petitioner further argues that a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter is not a prohibited pleading, but is allowed under Sec. 19(a) of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.[49] We agree.
The Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated specifically to achieve an
expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases.[50] The speedy resolution of
unlawful detainer cases is a matter of public policy,[51] and the Rule should equally apply
with full force to forcible entry cases, in which possession of the premises is already
illegal from the start.[52] For this reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and prohibits
altogether the filing of motions for extension of time. Consistently, Section 6 was added
to give the trial court the power to render judgment, even motu proprio, upon the failure
of a defendant to file an answer within the reglementary period.[53] However, as forcible
entry and detainer cases are summary in nature and involve disturbances of the social
order, procedural technicalities should be carefully avoided[54] and should not be allowed
to override substantial justice.[55]
Pursuant to Section 36[56] of BP 129,[57] the Court on June 16, 1983, promulgated the
Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases.[58] Under this Rule, a motion to dismiss
or quash is a prohibited pleading. Under the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure,
however,[59] a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter is an exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings:

SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings, motions, or
petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:

(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or

information except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section;

xxxxxxxxx

Further, a courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the
parties or cured by their silence, acquiescence or even express consent.[60] A party may
assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and
even on appeal.[61] That the MTCC can take cognizance of a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, even if an answer has been belatedly filed we likewise
held in Bayog v. Natino:[62]

The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, as well as its predecessor, do not provide
that an answer filed after the reglementary period should be expunged from the
records. As a matter of fact, there is no provision for an entry of default if a defendant
fails to answer. It must likewise be pointed out that MAGDATOs defense of lack of
jurisdiction may have even been raised in a motion to dismiss as an exception to the
rule on prohibited pleadings in the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Such a
motion is allowed under paragraph (a) thereof, x x x.
 In the case at bar, the MTCC should have squarely ruled on the issue of jurisdiction,
instead of erroneously holding that it was a prohibited pleading under the Rule on
Summary Procedure.[63] Because the Complaint for forcible entry was filed on July 10,
1992, the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was applicable.
Finally, the MTCC should have taken into account petitioners Answer,[64] in which
she averred that she had been in constant occupation on said land in question since
birth on March 17, 1941 up to the present, being an heir of the late Emiliana Eva-
Bongato, who inherited said property from her father Raymundo Eva with considerable
improvements thereon. It should have heard and received the evidence adduced by the
parties for the precise purpose of determining whether or not it possessed jurisdiction
over the subject matter.[65] And after such hearing, it could have dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction.[66] In this way, the long, drawn out proceedings that took place in this
case could have been avoided.[67]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed
Decision ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint for forcible entry
is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.