Amex V Cordero
Amex V Cordero
Amex V Cordero
Issue:
Whether the lower courts gravely erred in attributing the public humiliation allegedly
suffered by Cordero to AEI – YES
Whether the lower courts gravely erred in holding Amex liable to Cordero for moral
damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees - YES
In order that an obligation based on quasi-delict may arise, there must be no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties. But there are exceptions. There
may be an action for quasi-delict notwithstanding that there is a subsisting
contract between the parties. A liability for tort may arise even under a contract,
where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an
act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source
of a quasi-delictual liability, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort,
thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply
To constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence must be the proximate cause of
the damage or injury suffered by the plaintiff. Proximate cause is that cause which,
in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred.
Proximate cause is determined by the facts of each case upon mixed considerations
of logic, common sense, policy and precedent
The Court ruled that there was no tort amounting to breach of contract in this case.
Petitioner can revoke respondent’s card without notice according to the
membership agreement.
Also, the subject card would not have been confiscated and cut had respondent
talked to petitioner’s representative and identified himself as the
genuine cardholder. As explained by respondent himself, he could have used his
card upon verification by the sales clerk of Watson that indeed he is the
authorized cardholder. That could have been accomplished had respondent talked
to petitioner’s representative, enabling the latter to determine that respondent was
indeed the true holder of the card.
Clearly, no negligence which breached the contract could have been attributed to
petitioner. If at all, the cause of respondent’s humiliation and embarrassment was
his refusal to talk to petitioner’s representative. It was thus safe to conclude that
there was no negligence on the part of petitioner and that, therefore, it cannot be
held liable to respondent for damages.