STATE OF MICHIGAN

WAYNE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

SHEILA HAWKINS,

Plaintiff, Case No.: 18 - -NI

Hon.:

-vs-

JONATHAN NICHOLS, an individual;

UBER TECHNOLOGIES INC., a Foreign
Corporation; RASIER LLC, a Foreign
Limited Liability Company; LYFT INC., a
Foreign Corporation,

Defendants.

James B. Rasor (P43476)

Brandon T. Wolfe (P82421)
RASOR LAW FIRM, PLLC
201 E. Fourth Street
Royal Oak, Michigan 48067-3846
PH: (248) 543-9000
FAX: (248) 543-9050
[email protected]
[email protected]

There is no other civil action between these parties arising out of the same transaction or
occurrence as alleged in this Complaint pending in this Court, nor has any such action
been previously filed and dismissed or transferred after having been assigned to a judge,
nor do I know of any other civil action, not between these parties, arising out of the same
transaction or occurrence as alleged in this Complaint that is either pending or was
previously filed and dismissed, transferred or otherwise disposed of after having been
assigned to a Judge in this Court.

/s/ Brandon T. Wolfe

Brandon T. Wolfe (P82421)

PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND

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 NOW COMES the Plaintiff, Sheila Hawkins (hereinafter “Hawkins”), by and through

her attorneys, RASOR LAW FIRM, PLLC, and for her Complaint against Defendant Jonathan

Nichols (hereinafter “Nichols”), states as follows:

JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS

1. This is an action for money damages brought pursuant to the statutes and common

law of the State of Michigan against Defendant.

2. At all times material and relevant to this lawsuit, Plaintiff was a resident of the

City of Detroit, County of Wayne in the State of Michigan.

3. At all times material and relevant to this lawsuit, Defendant Nichols was a

resident of the City of Detroit, County of Wayne in the State of Michigan.

4. At all times material and relevant to this lawsuit, Defendant Uber Technologies,

Inc., (“UBER”) is a Delaware Corporation and runs a Transportation Network Company known

as Uber, which provides various transportation options and vehicles for users of their service

throughout Michigan.

5. At all times material and relevant to this lawsuit, Defendant Rasier LLC

(“RASIER”) is a Delaware Limited Liability Company, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Uber

that partners with the ridesharing driver, here Defendant Nichols, and operates throughout

Michigan.

6. At all times material and relevant to this lawsuit, Defendant LYFT is a Delaware

Corporation and runs a Transportation Network Company that provides various transportation

options and vehicles for users of their service throughout Michigan.

7. The acts, transactions, occurrences giving rise to the injuries complained of herein

arose within the confines of the City of Detroit, County of Wayne, State of Michigan.

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 8. The amount in controversy greatly exceeds $25,000.00, exclusive of costs,

interest, and attorney fees.

9. Venue and jurisdiction are vested in this court.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

10. On or about October 17, 2017, at approximately 5:30 pm, Plaintiff was picked up

and became a passenger in a motor vehicle on a prearranged ride through the LYFT ride sharing

platform operated by driver, Defendant NICHOLS.

11. Plaintiff was being picked up from a routine chiropractic visit to be taken to her

home in Detroit, Michigan.

12. At all times relevant and material to this lawsuit, Plaintiff entered Defendant

NICHOLS’ vehicle and was seated in the back-passenger side location during her prearranged

ride.

13. UBER, RAISER and LYFT provide prearranged transportation services for

compensation using an Application (“APP”) or platform to connect persons wanting to procure

transportation with those who, utilizing their own personal vehicles, want to provide

transportation in exchange for compensation.

14. Both UBER and LYFT permit a driver to drive simultaneously under the veil of

both companies.

15. Upon information and belief, Defendant NICHOLS was a driver who was

operating his vehicle utilizing the UBER and LYFT APPs and was logged onto both

transportation network companies’ digital network platforms; i.e. UBER and LYFT while

transporting Plaintiff.

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 16. During Plaintiff’s prearranged ride with LYFT, Defendant NICHOLS was

traveling on Eastbound I-696 and using either UBER or LYFT’s digital network APP on his

communications device.

17. As a result of this use of his communications device while driving, Defendant

NICHOLS was distracted and was not paying proper attention to the roadway and violently

slammed into a semi-truck that was stopped while his vehicle was traveling approximately

seventy (70) miles per hour.

18. At the time of the collision, Defendant NICHOLS was viewing, monitoring,

and/or interacting with his wireless communications device/smartphone/GPS so as to accept

and/or respond to another passenger’s request on the UBER and/or LYFT APP.

19. When a potential customer requests a ride, the UBER/LYFT APP alerts nearby

drivers (here Defendant Nichols), who must timely indicate their acceptance of the customer’s

pickup request by manually interfacing with the APP on the driver’s phone.

20. The UBER/LYFT APP requires a driver to constantly interface with the APP and

is not hands-free in that the driver must interface with the APP while transporting customers,

such as Plaintiff.

21. The nature of UBER and LYFT’s APP is both visual and tactile: Drivers must

monitor their wireless communications device/smartphone/GPS as to be aware of the location of

other UBER/LYFT vehicles so they can position themselves near areas of high user demand. The

APP also provides for texting and phone calling and instant messaging between the Driver and

customer.

22. UBER/LYFT drivers must respond quickly to a pickup request by physically

interfacing with the APP thereby leading to distraction while a driver, such as Defendant

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NICHOLS, monitors and/or uses the App on his or her wireless communications

device/smartphone/GPS.

23. Defendants UBER, RASIER and LYFT knew or should have known use of the

App by drivers, including but not limited to Defendant NICHOLS, in the manner intended and

actually required by UBER and/or RASIER and/or LYFT, would be a serious distraction and in

violation of Michigan driving ordinances, including but not limited to Michigan’s distracted

driving statute (MCL § 257.602b).

24. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant NICHOLS failed to stop within a safe and

assured distance in violation of Michigan law.

25. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant NICHOLS should have seen the semi-

truck directly in his path.

26. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant NICHOLS neglected to and/or failed to

drive in a reasonable manner in violation of Michigan law.

27. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant NICHOLS neglected to and/or failed to

keep a proper observation of other vehicles in front of him on the roadway in violation of

Michigan law.

28. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant NICHOLS neglected to and/or failed to

comply with Michigan’s distracted driver statute.

29. Plaintiff Hawkins did not do anything to cause or contribute to this incident and

was not otherwise comparatively at fault in any way.

30. Defendant NICHOLS’ failure to operate his vehicle in a lawful manner or

otherwise non-negligent manner caused him to strike the semi-truck from behind in violation of

MCL 257.402.

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 31. Defendant NICHOLS received a traffic citation in violation of MCL 257.627 for

not operating the vehicle at a careful and prudent speed and failing to stop within the assured,

clear distance ahead.

32. As a result of the collision, Plaintiff Hawkins suffered serious and permanent

injuries all amounting to a serious impairment of a body function as contemplated under MCL

500.3135.

33. Defendant NICHOLS position as an UBER/LYFT driver, including but not

limited to the use and/or monitoring of the APP and its interface, was a proximate cause of this

collision including but not limited to causing Defendant NICHOLS to be distracted and/or in a

hurry while driving.

34. The design of the UBER/LYFT APP and driver interface requires drivers to use

the APP in such a manner as to violate Michigan law as well cause distracted driving, and

further, Defendant NICHOLS’ distraction was a substantial factor in causing the underlying

collision and resultant harm.

35. As a proximate result of the actions of the Defendants, Plaintiff sustained

economic and non-economic damages.

COUNT I
NEGLIGENCE, GROSS NEGLIGENCE, WILLFUL AND WANTON MISCONDUCT
OF DEFENDANT NICHOLS

36. Plaintiff hereby restates and re-alleges each and every allegation contained in the

foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

37. At all times relevant hereto, and pursuant to Michigan law, Defendant NICHOLS

owed a duty to act with ordinary care for the safety of the public and specifically to Plaintiff,

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which duty includes but is not limited to, obeying the law, statutes and city ordinances while

driving subject vehicle on public roads.

38. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant NICHOLS had a duty to act as a

reasonably careful person would act under the same or similar circumstances as existed at the

time of the subject collision.

39. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant NICHOLS breached the duties that he

owed to Plaintiff including, but not limited to, the followings ways:

a. Failure to pay attention to the roadway;

b. Failure to operate his motor vehicle upon the highway at a

speed not greater than would permit him to bring the vehicle
to a stop within an assured clear distance ahead in violation
of MCL § 257.627;

c. Failure to drive with due care and/or caution as required

under the circumstance in violation of MCL § 257.627(1);

d. Negligently driving a vehicle upon a public highway in

willful or wanton disregard for the safety of others, in
violation of MCL § 257.625;

e. Driving in a careless manner in violation of MCL §

257.626b;

f. Negligent failure to keep a sharp and careful lookout and to

be attentive to existing traffic condition in violation of MCL
§ 257.648;

g. Failure to yield to traffic in violation of MCL § 257.649;

h. Failure to take evasive action so as to avoid the collision;

i. Failure to see the vehicles in front of him from a reasonable

distance which would have prevented from colliding with
the vehicles in front of him;

j. Driving a vehicle at rates in excess of established speed in

violation of § 257.627;

k. Failure to obey all applicable statutes and/or city ordinances;

l. All other breaches of duty identified in deposition testimony

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 and/or answers to interrogatories and/or all other discovery,
all of which is hereby adopted by reference; and

m. Any and all breaches that become known through litigation.

40. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence and/or gross negligence and/or

willful and wanton misconduct of Defendant NICHOLS, Plaintiff has suffered excess economic

losses, including but not limited to excess wage loss and excess replacement services, which do

not require a showing of a serious and permanent injury pursuant to MCL 500.3135.

41. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence and/or gross negligence and/or

willful and wanton misconduct of Defendant NICHOLS, Plaintiff has suffered serious and

permanent injuries and damages in the following manners, including but not limited to:

a. Brain, head, neck, back, hip and lumbar injuries;

b. Aggravation of preexisting brain, neck, back, hip, cervical

spine and lumbar injuries;

c. Traumatic brain injury where it was verified by medical

diagnostic equipment that she suffered areas of bleeding in
her brain as verified by follow-up medical diagnostic
studies;

d. Post-concussion syndrome;

e. Temporomandibular joint disorder;

f. Future medical treatment;

g. Outpatient treatment/physical therapy;

h. Physical pain and suffering;

i. Mental anguish;

j. Emotional distress;

k. Fright and shock;

l. Denial of social pleasures and enjoyment;

m. Humiliation and mortification;

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 n. Various musculoskeletal injuries, bruises, and
scarring;

o. Serious impairment of body function pursuant to

MCL § 500.3135;

p. Potential permanent serious disfigurement pursuant

to MCL § 500.3135;

q. Excess of economic loss including excess

replacement services and excess wage loss; and

r. Any and all other damages allowed under Michigan

law.

42. Other such further injuries and damages which are presently unknown, but which

may manifest themselves in the future and/or become apparent during the course of discovery

and/or trial herein.

43. That Plaintiff was free from any contributory or comparative negligence in that she

was unaware and powerless over any danger created by third party.

44. That if it is found that Plaintiff suffered from any pre-existing condition, then the

incident described herein aggravated and/or exacerbated said pre-existing condition.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Honorable Court enter a judgment

in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in whatever amount this Honorable Court deems just

and fair in excess of $25,000.00 plus interest, costs and attorney fees.

COUNT II
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY – AGAINST UBER AND/OR RASIER, LLC,
AND/OR LYFT

45. Plaintiffs hereby restates and re-alleges each and every allegation contained in the

foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

46. Upon information and belief, Defendant UBER and/or RASIER and/or LYFT

designed and/or manufactured and/or distributed the APP and/or GPS interface/system that
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UBER/LYFT drivers, such as Defendant NICHOLS, were required to use and furthermore trained

or failed to adequately train them how to use the APP and interface.

47. In doing the above, UBER and/or RASIER and/or LYFT placed the APP and GPS

system into use on the market and into the stream of commerce.

48. Defendants’ APP and/or user interface, which Defendant Nichols was required to

use and was using at the time of the incident, was designed so that Defendants UBER and/or

RASIER and/or LYFT knew the location and speed of the vehicle due to the application of GPS

and geolocating technology, so that the Defendant knew that NICHOLS was traveling at a high

rate of speed on an interstate highway while a passenger was in the vehicle while they were

notifying him of future economic gain by using the APP, and they knew he was interfacing with

the APP while operating a motor vehicle with a passenger at a high rate of speed.

49. UBER and/or RASIER and/or LYFT had, or should have had, knowledge that the

APP and/or GPS interface would be used without inspection for defects and would be used in such

a way as to violate Michigan law and/or create distracted drivers and/or create a significant risk of

the type of harm suffered by the Plaintiff in this matter.

50. The UBER/LYFT APP is defective in its design as it requires a driver, such as

Defendant NICHOLS, to engage in distracted driving including but not limited to conduct

requiring the driver to monitor and interact with the APP and its associated hardware for incoming

ride requests, to respond and communicate through the UBER/LYFT APP with prospective

passengers, which causes the driver to redirect his or her attention from the roadway.

51. The UBER/LYFT APP designers and/or manufacturers designed/manufactured the

APP without eliminating or minimizing the foreseeable risk of UBER/LYFT drivers interfacing

with the APP and distracting themselves.

52. UBER and/or RASIER and/or LYFT had, or should have had, knowledge that the
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APP and/or GPS interface would be used by drivers while operating their vehicles and cause

drivers such as Defendant NICHOLS to be distracted.

53. The risk caused by distracted drivers is unreasonable for passengers of UBER

and/or RASIER and/or LYFT and was reasonably foreseeable by the same.

54. That if NICHOLS use of the APP constituted a misuse of the APP, then the misuse

was foreseeable to UBER and/or RASIER and/or LYFT.

55. That UBER and/or RASIER and/or LYFT knew or should have known of the risk

occasion by the use of the APP by drivers, as they had previously become aware of numerous

incidents of distracted driving by their drivers caused by the APP and resulting in personal injury

to passengers.

56. The defects in the APP and/or GPS interface were the direct and proximate cause

of harm to Plaintiff including the physical and emotional injuries suffered by her.

57. The APP and/or GPS interface was defective for the above-referenced reasons.

58. The UBER/LYFT APP failed to perform as safely as the ordinary consumer would

expect, or have a right to expect, when using the product in an intended or reasonably foreseeable

manner.

59. As a proximate result of the defective product, Plaintiff suffered significant general

and special damages.

60. There are reasonable, feasible, alternative designs available to Defendant UBER

and/or RASIER and/or LYFT for its APP, which would require a minimal financial cost to

implement; for example, restricting the drivers, such as Defendant NICHOLS, from interfacing

with the APP and distracting oneself while the car is in motion.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Honorable Court enter a judgment

in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in whatever amount this Honorable Court deems just
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and fair in excess of $25,000.00 plus interest, costs and attorney fees.

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Brandon T. Wolfe

James B. Rasor (P43476)
Brandon T. Wolfe (P82421)
RASOR LAW FIRM, PLLC
201 East Fourth Street
Royal Oak, Michigan 48067
(248) 543-9000
[email protected]
[email protected]

Dated: August 30, 2018

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff by and through his attorneys, RASOR LAW FIRM, hereby request trial by jury

in the above-captioned matter.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Brandon T. Wolfe

James B. Rasor (P43476)
Brandon T. Wolfe (P82421)
THE RASOR LAW FIRM, PLLC
201 East Fourth Street
Royal Oak, Michigan 48067
(248) 543-9000
[email protected]
[email protected]

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