l\epublic of tbe ~btlippine~

~upreme <lCourt
jf-Manila

THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 233199

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
PERALTA, J., Chairperson,
- versus - LEONEN,
GESMUNDo,•
REYES, J.C., JR.,* and
HERNANDO, JJ.

ARIEL MANABATCADENASand Promulgated:

GAUDIOSO MARTIJE,
Accused-Appellants. Novem_!>er5, 2018
x---------------------------------------------------- ~~ -...l-~~ ---x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in this appeal is the June 22, 2017 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01525-MIN, which affinried with
modifications the March 3, 2016 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 32, Lupon, Davao Oriental (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 1389-12,
finding accused-appellants Ariel Manabat Cadenas (Cadenas) and Gaudioso
Martije (Martije) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with
Homicide.

The antecedent facts are as follow:

Cadenas and Martije were indicted for Rape with Homicide in an

Information3 dated February 14, 2012, the accusatory portion of which reads:

On wellness leave.
Penned by Associate Justice Louis P. Acosta with Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren and
Associate Justice Ronaldo B. Martin, concurring; rol/o pp. 3-17.
2
Penned by Judge Emilio G. Dayanghirang III; CA rol/o, pp. 21-35. ~
Records, p. 2. . (/ 1
Decision
Decision -- 22 - G.R. No. 233199

That, on February 12, 2012, in the Municipality of -

-, Province of and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with each other,
with lewd design, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one
[AAA] against her will and, thereafter, the accused killed [AAA], to the
damage and prejudice of her legal heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, Cadenas and Martije pleaded not guilty to the charge.4
After pre-trial was terminated, trial on the merits followed.

Version of the Prosecution

As summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General, the People's

factual version is as follows:

Castillo testified that [AAA], the victim, was his live-in partner. On
February 12, 2012, from 7 a.m. to 6 p.m., he was at the copra drier together
with Dindo Escribano (Escribano). [AAA] was also with them at the copra
dryer but she left at 8 a.m. to prepare food in their house. At 9 p.m., Castillo
asked Escribano to get the food, which [AAA] prepared, at their house. But
Escribano returned to the copra drier and informed Castillo that he saw
accused-appellants Cadenas and Martije going out of their house running
away. Castillo and Escribano then went back to the house and upon arrival
thereat, they saw [AAA] already dead. [AAA] was lying on her back naked.
Her jogging pants were pulled down to her knees, and her vagina and breasts
were exposed. Her nipple and cheek have wounds and her head was broken.

Escribano corroborated Castillo's testimony.

Dr. Guiritan, the Municipal Health Officer of , Davao

Oriental, testified, as an expert witness, that he examined the cadaver of
[AAA] to determine the cause of her death. He found that the immediate
cause of [AAA]'s death was brain hemorrhage due to skull fracture
secondary to traumatic injury of the head. The weapon used was a hard blunt
object. It was probable that [AAA] was bitten as shown by the multiple
abraded wounds at the mans pubis, an area outside the vagina, and at the left
nipple area.

Bacus, the Chief Barangay Tanod of Barangay

testified that on February 12, 2012, at 5:00 a.m.,
while he was in his house, Barangay Captain Geraldo Arqueza called him.
He was told that a crime happened at
and the suspect was Cadenas. He assisted the barangay
captain in effecting the arrest of Cadenas at the latter's house. Cadenas
Decision
Decision -- 33 - G.R. No. 233199

Id.at!&.
Decision
Decision -- 44 - G.R. No. 233199

voluntarily admitted to Bacus that he, together with Martije, were the ones
who killed the victim. Bacus then turned over Cadenas to the police. 5

Version of the Defense

The defense relates accused-appellants' version of the facts in the

following manner:

Gaudioso Martije

On February 12, 2012, at around 5:00 p.m., he went to his house.at

Purok •• Barangay . In
going home, he passed by the beach to buy food. He met his co-accused
Cadenas at the beach. After arriving, he did not leave his house. He knows
the victim, [AAA]. In going to the farm, he passes by the area of the victim.
He was surprised when he was accused of killing the victim. He learned of
the death of the victim when he was arrested the following day. He was
arrested by Barangay Captain Arquiza. A warning shot was fired during his
arrest. He did not resist when he was arrested. He informed the police that
he did not commit the crime. He knows prosecution witness Dindo
Escribano.

Ariel Cadenas

On February 12, 2012, he was in his house. He was weeding under the
coconut trees near his house. He started working at around 7:00 o'clock in
the morning and finished at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon. At around 3:30
o'clock in the afternoon, he went to the seashore to buy food for the pig and
get his share on the place where he worked. He waited for a fisherman to
buy fish. After buying fish, he went to his house and arrived at around 5:30
o'clock in the afternoon. He cooked the fish, ate it and slept. He woke upat
around 5:00 o'clock in the morning the following day. He was about to plant
banana seedlings when barangay tanods arrived. The barangay tanods told
him to go with them. He was told he was a suspect of a crime that occurred.
He was brought to the police in - near the seashore. The beating
continued. He was brought to the police station and investigated about the
killing. He knows the victim. There is a road going to the house of the victim.
He knows his co-accused Martije. He denied he was responsible for the
killing. 6

The RTC Ruling

After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated March 3, 2916, finding
accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable of the crime charged. The RTC
disposed the case as follows:

CA rollo, p. 48.
Id. at 13-14.
Decision
Decision -- 55 - G.R. No. 233199

WHEREFORE, finding accused ARIEL MANABAT CADENAS and

GAUDIOSO MARTHE guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of rape with homicide, they are hereby sentenced to suffer
RECLUSION PERPETUA without eligibility for parole under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. They are ordered to pay individually the heirs
of the victim [P]l00,000 as civil indemnity, Pl00,000 as moral and
exemplary damages, and P25,000 as temperate damages in lieu of unproven
actual damages. All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the
legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this judgment until fully
paid.

SO ORDERED.7

The RTC found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible

and sufficient. It ruled that the circumstantial evidence proffered by the
prosecution have amply established the commission of the crime of rape with
homicide and have pointed to Cadenas and Martije as the perpetrators of the
dastardly act.

Not in conformity, Cadenas and Martije appealed their conviction

before the CA.

The CA Ruling

On June 22, 201 7, the CA rendered its assailed Decision affirming the
conviction of Cadenas and Martije with modification as to the award of
damages. The fallo of which states:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED.

The judgment dated 3 March 2016 of the Regional Trial Court, 11th
Judicial Region, Branch 32, Lupon, Davao Oriental in Criminal Case No.
1389-12 for Rape with Homicide is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.

Accused-Appellants BBB and CCC shall pay, jointly and severally,

the Heirs of AAA the following:

1. civil indemnity ex delicto of Php 100,000.00;

2. moral damages of Phpl00,000.00;
3. exemplary damages of Phpl00,000.00; and
4. temperate damages of Php50,000.00.

All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%)
per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

7
Id. at 35.
Decision
Decision -- 66 - G.R. No. 233199

8
SO ORDERED.

The CA ruled that the prosecution had duly established all the elements
of the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide. According to the CA,
the horrid state of the lifeless body of AAA when she was found - her body
was found in the supine position with her pants and underwear pulled down
to her knees, exposing her vagina, and her shirt pulled up, exposing her breasts
- clearly showed that she was raped. Further, the appellate court held that the
prosecution presented credible and sufficient pieces of circumstantial evidence
that, when analyzed and taken together, would lead to the
inescapable and reasonable conclusion that Cadenas and Martije were the
authors of the crime. It debunked appellants' respective denials and alibis
declaring that the same were not adequately proven by strong and competent
evidence, and not at all persuasive when pitted against the positive and
convincing identification of them by prosecution witness Dindo Escribano
(Escribano).

Insisting on their innocence of the crime charged, Cadenas and Martije

filed the present appeal and posited the same issues they previously raised
before the CA, to wit:

I
Whether the guilt of the accused-appellants were established beyond
reasonable doubt?

II
Whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict the accused•
appellants?

III
Whether there was basis for the award of damages?"

In its Resolution 10 dated October 2, 2017, the Court directed both

parties to submit their supplemental briefs, if they so desired. On December
6, 2017, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Manifestation and Motion
(Re: Supplemental Brief)!' praying that it be excused from filing a
supplemental brief as its Appellee's Brief had sufficiently discussed all the
issues raised by the accused-appellants. On December 18, 2017, the accused•
appellants filed a Manifestation In lieu of a Supplemental Brief12 averring that
they would adopt all their arguments in their Appellants' Brief filed before the
CA where they had already ventilated all matters pertinent to their defense.

Rollo, pp. 16-17.

CA rollo, p. 14.
10
Rollo, pp. 23-24.
II Id. at 34-36.
12
Id. at 40-41.
Decision
Decision -- 77 - G.R. No. 233199

Encapsulated, the issue herein focuses on the sufficiency of the

prosecution evidence to prove the commission of Rape with Homicide and the
identity of the culprits thereof.

The Court's Ruling

After a careful scrutiny of the records and evaluation of the evidence

adduced by the parties, the Court is not convinced with moral certainty that
Cadenas and Martije committed the crime charged. Reasonable doubt burdens
the conscience. Our minds cannot rest easy on the certainty of appellants'
guilt. This appeal is impressed with merit.

Every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove two things:

( 1) the fact of the crime, i.e., the presence of all the elements of the crime for
which the accused stands charged, and (2) the fact that the accused is the
perpetrator of the crime.13 When a crime is committed, it is the duty of the
prosecution to prove the identity of the perpetrator of the crime beyond
reasonable doubt for there can be no conviction even if the commission of the
crime is established. 14 Apart from showing the existence and commission of
a crime, the State has the burden to correctly identify the author of such crime.
Both facts must be proved by the State beyond cavil of a doubt onthe strength
of its evidence and without solace from the weakness of the defense.15

Our legal culture demands the presentation of proof beyond reasonable

doubt before any person may be convicted of any crime and deprived of his
life, liberty or even property. As every crime must be established beyond
reasonable doubt, it is also paramount to prove, with the same quantum of
evidence, the identity of the culprit. It is basic and elementary that there can
be no conviction until and unless an accused has been positively identified.
The hypothesis of his guilt must flow naturally from the facts proved and must
be consistent with all of them.

In the case at bench, there is no direct evidence that could link

appellants to the commission of the crime. As observed by the RTC, "nobody
witnessed the actual rape and killing of the victim."16 The RTC was, thus,
compelled to resort solely on circumstantial evidence. The. trial court
enumerated the pieces of circumstantial evidence that justified its finding of
guilt, viz.:

13
People v. Ayola, 416 Phil. 861, 871 (200 I).
14
People v. Sinco, 408 Phil. 1, 12 (2001 ).
15
People v. Limpangog, 444 Phil 691, 709 (2003).
16 Records, p. 13 5.
Decision
Decision -- 88 - G.R. No. 233199

x x x First; Cadenas and Martije were seen leaving the house of the
victim; Second: Cadenas and Martije left the house in in (sic) a hasty
manner, they ran away; Third: when Castillo and Escrebano went to the
house, they discovered the victim already dead; Fourth, the victim's pants
and panty were pulled down up to her knee level, her t-shirt was pulled up,
her breast and vagina were exposed and she was lying on her back,
indicating she was sexually assaulted; Fifth, the victim has a wound on her
cheek and her head was broken; and Sixth, the post-mortem examination
conducted by Dr. Guiritan confirmed that the the (sic) immediate cause of
death (of the) victim is brain haemorrhage due to skull fracture secondary
to traumatic injury of the head. The probable weapon used was a hard blunt
object. The victim was probably bitten causing multiple abraded wounds at
the mons pubis, an area outside the vagina, and also multiple abraded
wounds at the left nipple area. 17

Inasmuch as the case for the prosecution is largely based on

circumstantial evidence, a short discussion on the sufficiency of
circumstantial evidence to convict an accused is in order.

True, conviction is not always based on direct evidence for it may

likewise rest on purely circumstantial evidence. A rule of ancient
respectability now sculpted into tradition is that conviction may be warranted
on the basis of circumstantial evidence only if the following requisites concur:
first, there is more than one circumstance; second, the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proved; and third, the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.18
Jurisprudence teaches us that for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to
support a conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent.19 The circumstances
proven should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion 'of others, as
the guilty person. 20

We do not subscribe, however, with the RTC and the CA 'that the
foregoing circumstantial evidence inexorably lead to the conclusion that
Cadenas and Martije raped and killed AAA. The circumstantial evidence
invoked by the RTC, particularly as to the identification of the perpetrators,
raises doubt rather than moral certainty as to the guilt of the appellants for the
special complex crime of Rape with Homicide. To the mind of the Court, these
circumstances, harnessed to establish the criminal liability of Cadenas and
Martije, are miserably inadequate in weight and anemic in value to affirm their
conviction. v'
17
Id.
18 Zabala v. People, 752 Phil. 59, 65 (2015).
19
People v. Lopez, 371 Phil. 852, 860 (1999).
20 Espineli v. People, 735 Phil. 530, 533 (2014).
Decision
Decision -- 99 - G.R. No. 233199

To begin with, the RTC gave much weight on the testimony of

prosecution witness Escribano that he had seen Cadenas and Martije running
away from the house of Michael Castillo (Castillo) and AAA where the
latter's lifeless body was found, and ergo, the suspicion that they were the
authors of the crime of Rape with Homicide. Escribano testified in this wise:

Direct Examination - Prosecutor Neil C. Pudpud

Q: So, what happened when AAA went home?

A: I was asked by Michael Castillo to go to their house.

Q: To follow AAA in their house?

A: Yes, sir to get the food for dinner at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening.

Q: Were you able to reach the house of Michael Castillo?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What happened, if any, when you arrived at the house of Michael

Castillo?
A: I saw this Gaudioso Martije and Ariel Cadenas.

Q: You saw Gaudioso and Ariel?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where?
A: In the house.

Q: Whose house?
A: Of Michael Castillo.

Q: What were they doing when you saw them?

A: I saw them going out of the house.

Q: Where did they proceed from the house of Michael Castillo?

A: They ran away.

Q: Running away from the house?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What did you do when you saw them?

A: I returned back to Michael Castillo to the copra-dryer.

Q: And what did you tell Michael Castillo, if any?

A: I told him, uncle there is somebody in your house.

Q: And what happened after informing Michael Castillo there were persons
in his house?
A: He asked me what is the name of the persons and I answered Dondon
Cadenas and Martije.

Q: What is the real name of Dondon?

A: Ariel.
Decision
Decision -- 10
10 -- G.R. No. 233199

Q: What happened after you informed Michael Castillo that Ariel Cadenas
and Martije was in their house?
A: We went to their house.

Q: And when you arrived in their house, what did you discover, if any?
A: When we reached the house of Michael Castillo, we saw that his wife is
already dead.21

The RTC, as well as the CA, immediately rushed to the conclusion that
the presence of the appellants at the crime scene (they were seen running away
from the house of Castillo and AAA) as sufficient to incriminate them to the
commission of the crime charged. Admittedly, this circumstance. may raise a
speculation, as, in fact, inevitably made Cadenas and Martije the prime
suspects, but it is far too inadequate to support a conviction. It is a mere
conjecture that can be refuted by other equally conceivable and· rational
inferences. The testimony of Escribano does not conclusively connect Cadenas
and Martije to the rape-slay of AAA, but merely arouse suspicion against
them. The Court has consistently stressed that mere suspicions and
speculations can never be the bases of conviction in a criminal case. 'In People v.
Lugod,22 the Court wrote:

In the present case. much emphasis was placed by the trial court on
the discovery of the pair of rubber slippers at the victim's house and the
black T-shirt hanging on a guava twig near the cadaver of Nairube which
were allegedly worn by accused-appellant the day before Nairube's
disappearance. The trial court also relied on the fact that there was an
eyewitness who saw accused-appellant leaving Villa Anastacia, the place
where the body of the victim was found, in the morning after the
disappearance of the victim. However, the combination of the above•
mentioned circumstances does not lead to the irrefutably logical conclusion
that accused-appellant raped and murdered Nairube. At most, these
circumstances, taken with the testimonies of the other prosecution
witnesses, merely establish the accused-appellant's whereabouts on that
fateful evening and places accused-appellant at the scene of the crime and
nothing more. The evidence of the prosecution does not provide a link which
would enable this Court to conclude that he in fact killed and raped Nairube.
It must be stressed that although not decisive for the determination of the
guilt of the accused-appellant, the prosecution did not present any evidence
to establish that he was at any time seen with the victim at or about the time
of the incident. Neither was there any other evidence which could single him
out to the exclusion of any other as being responsible for the crime.23

The alleged presence of Cadenas and Martije at the locus criminis does
not necessarily mean that they authored the crime. At best, such presence at
the crime scene merely debunks appellants' alibi that they were in their
respective houses at around 9 o'clock in the evening on February 12, 2012.
Moreover, the prosecution has not completely ruled out the probability that
21
TSN, January 21, 2014, pp. 7-9.
22
405 Phil. 125 (2001).
23 Id. at 149. (Underscoring ours.)
Decision
Decision -- 11
11 -- G.R. No. 233199

another person/s may have committed the crime. Indeed, it was not established
that the appellants were with the victim inside the subject house at the time
the crime was committed, if at all. The proof against Cadenas and Martije
must pass the crucible of reasonable doubt; suspicion alone, no matter how
strong it may be, is inadequate to sustain a conviction. Truly, the sea of
suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without rudder
or compass.24

For sure, we can only speculate at this stage on who perpetrated the
crime as there is nothing on the records to provide us with any better clue than
what has heretofore been surmised. However, the Court is not called upon to
speculate on who committed the crime and how it was committed. Our task is
confined in resolving whether the prosecution has adduced sufficient evidence
to prove that the crime alleged in the Information was committed and that the
accused-appellants are the culprits thereof. Unfortunately, the prosecution
failed to discharge the onus of proving the identity of the malefactors.

Further, the Court finds Escribano' s identification of the appellants as

the persons whom he allegedly saw running away from the house of Castillo
and AAA to be inconclusive and untrustworthy. Consider the following
testimony of Escribano on this score:

Cross Examination-Atty. Apple Cherrie Amolata-Javier

Q: Can you describe to us the place going to the house of AAA?

A: There are big trees around.

Q: And you will agree with me that the house of AAA is located at the
mountainous area?
A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And you will agree with me also that there are no electricity in the house
of AAA?
A: Yes, ma' am.

Q: And along the way going to the house of AAA there were no electric
light?
A: None, ma'am.

Q: You earlier testified that you allegedly saw the accused run from the
house of AAA. Where were you when you saw them?
A: I was already under the house of AAA.

Q: You were already under the house when you saw them run away?
A: Yes, ma'am, because the house is a two-storey house.

Q: Exactly where were you when you first saw them?

A: On the terrace.

24
People v. Asis, 439 Phil. 707, 728 (2002).
Decision
Decision -- 12
12 -- G.R. No. 233199

Q: That was the first time you saw them?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And the two were running from the house when you saw them?
A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And then you said you immediately informed Michael Castillo that
there were persons in his house. It goes to say upon seeing these two
accused you immediately went back to Michael Castillo without entering
the house?
A: Yes, ma'am, I did not enter the house.25

A nexus of related circumstances, however, rendered the above

testimony of Escribano as highly suspect. Somehow, the Court cannot help
but doubt the reliability of the identification made by the said witness. It was
as if it was merely contrived to pin criminal culpability upon Cadenas and
Martije.

First, the condition of visibility at the time Escribano allegedly saw

Cadenas and Martije running away from the house, did not favor said witness,
a factor that failed to lend credence to his testimony. The incident happened
at 9 o'clock in the evening outside the house ofAAA, in a remote barangay
located at a mountainous area covered with big trees, and there is no electric
lighting from the surroundings and even in the said house. No shred of
evidence is on record that could show the existence of a source of light then
which may have provided Escribano with enough illumination that enabled
him to recognize who the two persons were. The distance between Escribano
and the said two persons was not disclosed either. Even granting that the area
was sufficiently lighted, the prosecution still failed to explain how Escribano
was able to get a glimpse of the faces of the two persons because if the latter
were running away from the house, it is safe to assume that their backs were
turned against said witness. Also, the incident was so swift for ample
observation. Under these circumstances, the positive identification of
appellants by Escribano as the two persons running away from the house of
AAA is elusive and hazy.

Secondly, Escribano's story, that after seeing the two persons run away,
he did not enter the house (although he was already at the terrace thereof) but
instead, he opted to take a long walk back to Castillo at the copra dryer just to
tell the latter of what he saw, simply does not make sense. It appears strange
that Escribano should return back to Castillo when natural instinct and reason
would dictate that he should have entered the house to see if anything bad
happened to his friend's live-in partner or at least called for AAA's name from
outside the house just to check her condition. His reaction was unnatural and
contrary to ordinary human experience. The. failure of Escribano to lend a

25 TSN, January 21, 2014, pp. 12-14.

Decision
Decision -- 13
13 -- G.R. No. 233199

touch of realism to his tale leads to the conclusion that he was either
withholding an incriminating information or was not telling the truth.

Thirdly, the Court finds it disturbing how Barangay Captain

Gerald Arquiza (Arquiza) of Barangay -' was able to identify Cadenas
and Martije as the sexual ravishers and killers of AAA. Nowhere in the
prosecution evidence does it show that Castillo and/or Escribano reported the
incident and identified ( or at least described), the perpetrator/s to Arquiza at
any time after the discovery of the body of the victim. Yet, at around 5 o'clock
in the mom.ing of the following day (February 13, 2012), Arquiza informed Joel
Bacus, a barangay tanod member of Barangay -· that he (Arquiza) had
already arrested Martije, and requested the latter (Bacus) to apprehend
Cadenas, who is allegedly another suspect to the rape and killing of AAA.26
Curiously, Arquiza was not called to the witness stand to shed light on this gray
area in the case of the prosecution.

Finally, there is a paucity of evidence to show that appellants have

motive to rape or kill the victim. The gruesome attack on AAA, who sustained
a traumatic injury to the head which fractured her skull causing brain
hemorrhage, clearly manifested the intention of the perpetrator/s to bring death
upon the victim. There was no evidence, however, that Cadenas and Martije
carried a grudge or had an axe to grind against the victim or her live• in partner,
Castillo. Cadenas categorically declared that he knew AAA to be
30 years of age, but did not find her attractive.27

We are aware that the motive of the accused in a criminal case is

generally held to be immaterial, not being an element of the offense. However,
motive assumes importance when, as in this case, the evidence on the
commission of the crime and the identity of the perpetrator is purely
circumstantial. As held in Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan:28

Motive is generally held to be immaterial because it is not an element

of the crime. However, motive becomes important when the evidence on the
commission of the crime is purely circumstantial or inconclusive. Motive is,
thus, vital in this case. ·

In the face of the deficiency in the proof submitted by the prosecution

anent the identity of the offenders, the respective alibis of Cadenas and Martije
assume credence and importance. While the defense of alibi is by nature a
weak one, it assumes commensurate significance and strength where the
evidence for the prosecution is also intrinsically weak.29 At any rate, even if
the defense of the appellants may be weak, the same is inconsequential if, in
the first place, the prosecution failed to discharge the onus of their identity
26
27
28
29
TSN, November 19, 2013; Joint Affidavit, records, p. 8.
TSN, April 21, 2015, p. 5.
495 Phil. 718, 745 (2005).
People v. Canlas, 423 Phil. 665, 678 (200 I).
cl
Decision
Decision -- 14
14 -- G.R. No. 233199

and culpability." Let it be underscored that conviction must be based on the

strength of the prosecution evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence
for the defense, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused and not the accused to prove his innocence.31

The Court denounces the senseless and gruesome crime committed

against AAA and sincerely commiserates with the emotional sufferings of her
bereaved family. However, the pieces of circumstantial evidence of the
prosecution fails to prove indubitably the appellants' authorship of the crime
of Rape with Homicide. The conviction of the appellants cannot stand on the
basis of sketchy and doubtful circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court
must uphold the primacy of the presumption ofinnocence in favor of Cadenas
and Martije.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The June 22, 2017

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01525-MIN is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants Ariel Manabat Cadenas
and Gaudioso Martije are ACQUITTED of the crime of Rape with Homicide
on the ground of reasonable doubt.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED.to cause the

IMMEDIATE RELEASE of the accused-appellants unless lawfully held for
another cause, and to INFORM this Court of the date of their release, or the
ground for their continued confinement, within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof. ·

SO ORDERED.

30
People v. Sinco, supra note 14, at 19.
31 People v. Mama/ias, 385 Phil. 499, 514 (2000).
 Decision
Decision -- 15
15 -- G.R. No. 233199

WE CONCUR:

/ Associate Justice

On wellness leave On wellness leave

ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO JOSEC. REYES, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

RAMO~:ii;;:1. ~EID/ANDO
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

Associate ustice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court's Division.

~~
ANTONIO T. ,CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, Republic Act
No. 296, The Judiciary Act of

c1-F'~
1948, as amended)

I} t ·, , -, •. , '. i, '.;, •