664 Phil.

630

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 181626, May 30, 2011 ]
SANTIAGO PAERA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This resolves the petition for review[1] of the ruling[2] of the Regional Trial
Court of Dumaguete City[3] (RTC) finding petitioner Santiago Paera guilty of
three counts of Grave Threats, in violation of Article 282 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).

The Facts

As punong barangay of Mampas, Bacong, Negros Oriental, petitioner

Santiago Paera (petitioner) allocated his constituents' use of communal water
coming from a communal tank by limiting distribution to the residents of
Mampas, Bacong. The tank sits on a land located in the neighboring
barangay of Mampas, Valencia and owned by complainant Vicente Darong
(Vicente), father of complainant Indalecio Darong (Indalecio). Despite
petitioner's scheme, Indalecio continued drawing water from the tank. On 7
April 1999, petitioner reminded Indalecio of the water distribution scheme
and cut Indalecio's access.

The following day, petitioner inspected the tank after constituents

complained of water supply interruption. Petitioner discovered a tap from the
main line which he promptly disconnected. To stem the flow of water from
the ensuing leak, petitioner, using a borrowed bolo, fashioned a wooden
plug. It was at this point when Indalecio arrived. What happened next is
contested by the parties.

According to the prosecution, petitioner, without any warning, picked-up his

bolo and charged towards Indalecio, shouting "Patyon tikaw!" (I will kill
you!). Indalecio ran for safety, passing along the way his wife, Diosetea
Darong (Diosetea) who had followed him to the water tank. Upon seeing
petitioner, Diosetea inquired what was the matter. Instead of replying,
petitioner shouted "Wala koy gipili, bisag babaye ka, patyon tikaw!" ("I don't
spare anyone, even if you are a woman, I will kill you!"). Diosetea similarly
scampered and sought refuge in the nearby house of a relative. Unable to
pursue Diosetea, petitioner turned his attention back to Indalecio. As
petitioner chased Indalecio, he passed Vicente, and, recognizing the latter,
repeatedly thrust his bolo towards him, shouting "Bisag gulang ka, buk-on
nako imo ulo!" ("Even if you are old, I will crack open your skull!").

According to petitioner, however, it was Indalecio who threatened him with a

bolo, angrily inquiring why petitioner had severed his water connection. This
left petitioner with no choice but to take a defensive stance using the
borrowed bolo, prompting Indalecio to scamper.

Except for Vicente, who was seriously ill, the Darongs testified during trial.
Petitioner was the defense's lone witness.

The Ruling of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court

The 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Valencia-Bacong, Negros Oriental

(MCTC) found petitioner guilty as charged, ordering petitioner to serve time
and pay fine for each of the three counts.[4] The MCTC found the prosecution
evidence sufficient to prove the elements of Grave Threats under Article 282,
noting that the Darongs' persistent water tapping contrary to petitioner's
directive "must have angered" petitioner, triggering his criminal behavior.[5]
The MCTC rejected petitioner's defense of denial as "self-serving and
uncorroborated."[6]

Petitioner appealed to the RTC, reiterating his defense of denial.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC affirmed the MCTC, sustaining the latter's finding on petitioner's
motive. The RTC similarly found unconvincing petitioner's denial in light of
the "clear, direct, and consistent" testimonies of the Darongs and other
prosecution witnesses.[7]

Hence, this appeal.

Abandoning his theory below, petitioner now concedes his liability but only
for a single count of the "continued complex crime" of Grave Threats.
Further, petitioner prays for the dismissal of the case filed by Vicente as the
latter's failure to testify allegedly deprived him of his constitutional right to
confront witnesses. Alternatively, petitioner claims he is innocent of the
charges for having acted in defense of the property of strangers and in lawful
performance of duty, justifying circumstances under paragraphs 3 and 5,
Article 11 of the RPC.[8]

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) finds merit in
petitioner's concession of liability for the single count of the "continued
complex crime" of Grave Threats. The OSG, however, rejects petitioner's
prayer for the dismissal of Vicente's complaint, arguing that petitioner's guilt
was amply proven by the prosecution evidence, not to mention that
petitioner failed to raise this issue during trial. Further, the OSG finds the
claim of defense of stranger unavailing for lack of unlawful aggression on the
part of the Darongs. Lastly, the OSG notes the absence of regularity in
petitioner's performance of duty to justify his conduct.[9]

The Issue

The question is whether petitioner is guilty of three counts of Grave Threats.

The Ruling of the Court

We rule in the affirmative, deny the petition and affirm the RTC.
 Due Process Mischief in Raising
New Issues on Appeal

Although uncommented, petitioner's adoption of new theories for the first

time before this Court has not escaped our attention. Elementary principles
of due process forbid this pernicious procedural strategy - it not only catches
off-guard the opposing party, it also denies judges the analytical benefit
uniform theorizing affords. Thus, courts generally refuse to pass upon freshly
raised theories.[10] We would have applied this rule here were it not for the
fact that petitioner's liberty is at stake and the OSG partially views his cause
with favor.

Petitioner Liable for Three Counts

of Grave Threats

To limit his liability to one count of Grave Threats, petitioner tries to fit the
facts of the case to the concept of "continued crime" (delito continuado)
which envisages a single crime committed through a series of acts arising
from one criminal intent or resolution.[11] To fix the penalty for his supposed
single continued crime, petitioner invokes the rule for complex crime under
Article 48 of the RPC imposing the penalty for the most serious crime,
applied in its maximum period.

The nature of the crime of Grave Threats and the proper application of the
concepts of continued and complex crimes preclude the adoption of
petitioner's theory.

Article 282 of the RPC holds liable for Grave Threats "any person who shall
threaten another with the infliction upon the person x x x of the latter or his
family of any wrong amounting to a crime[.]" This felony is consummated "as
soon as the threats come to the knowledge of the person threatened."[12]

Applying these parameters, it is clear that petitioner's threat to kill Indalecio

and Diosetea and crack open Vicente's skull are wrongs on the person
amounting to (at the very least) homicide and serious physical injuries as
penalized under the RPC. These threats were consummated as soon as
Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente heard petitioner utter his threatening
remarks. Having spoken the threats at different points in time to these three
individuals, albeit in rapid succession, petitioner incurred three separate
criminal liabilities.

Petitioner's theory fusing his liability to one count of Grave Threats because
he only had "a single mental resolution, a single impulse, and single
intent"[13] to threaten the Darongs assumes a vital fact: that he had
foreknowledge of Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente's presence near the water
tank in the morning of 8 April 1999. The records, however, belie this
assumption. Thus, in the case of Indalecio, petitioner was as much surprised
to see Indalecio as the latter was in seeing petitioner when they chanced
upon each other near the water tank. Similarly, petitioner came across
Diosetea as he was chasing Indalecio who had scampered for safety. Lastly,
petitioner crossed paths with Vicente while running after Indalecio. Indeed,
petitioner went to the water tank not to execute his "single intent" to
threaten Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente but to investigate a suspected
water tap. Not having known in advance of the Darongs' presence near the
water tank at the time in question, petitioner could not have formed any
intent to threaten any of them until shortly before he inadvertently came
across each of them.

The importance of foreknowledge of a vital fact to sustain a claim of

"continued crime" undergirded our ruling in Gamboa v. Court of Appeals.[14]
There, the accused, as here, conceded liability to a lesser crime - one count
of estafa, and not 124 as charged - theorizing that his conduct was animated
by a single fraudulent intent to divert deposits over a period of several
months. We rejected the claim -

[f]or the simple reason that [the accused] was not possessed of any fore-
knowledge of any deposit by any customer on any day or occasion and which
would pass on to his possession and control. At most, his intent to
misappropriate may arise only when he comes in possession of the deposits
on each business day but not in futuro, since petitioner company operates
only on a day-to-day transaction. As a result, there could be as many acts of
misappropriation as there are times the private respondent abstracted and/or
diverted the deposits to his own personal use and benefit.[15] x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, petitioner's intent to threaten Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente with

bodily harm arose only when he chanced upon each of his victims.

Indeed, petitioner's theory holds water only if the facts are altered - that is,
he threatened Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente at the same place and at the
same time. Had this been true, then petitioner's liability for one count of
Grave Threats would have rested on the same basis grounding our rulings
that the taking of six roosters[16] or 13 cows[17] found at the same place and
taken at the same time results in the commission of only one count of theft
because -

[t]here is no series of acts committed for the accomplishment of different

purposes, but only of one which was consummated, and which determines
the existence of only one crime. The act of taking the roosters [and heads of
cattle] in the same place and on the same occasion cannot give rise to two
crimes having an independent existence of their own, because there are not
two distinct appropriations nor two intentions that characterize two separate
crimes.[18] (Emphasis in the original)

Having disposed of petitioner's theory on the nature of his offense, we see no

reason to extensively pass upon his use of the notion of complex crime to
avail of its liberal penalty scheme. It suffices to state that under Article 48 of
the RPC, complex crimes encompass either (1) an act which constitutes two
or more grave or less grave offenses; or (2) an offense which is a necessary
means for committing another[19] and petitioner neither performed a single
act resulting in less or less grave crimes nor committed an offense as a
means of consummating another.

The Prosecution Proved the Commission

of Grave Threats Against Vicente

We find no reversible error in the RTC's affirmance of the MCTC's ruling,

holding petitioner liable for Grave Threats against Vicente. The prosecution's
evidence, consisting of the testimonies of Indalecio, Diosetea and two other
corroborating witnesses,20 indisputably show petitioner threatening Vicente
with death.[21] Vicente's inability to take the stand, for documented medical
reason,[22] does not detract from the veracity and strength of the prosecution
evidence. Petitioner's claim of denial of his constitutional right to confront
witnesses is untenable as he had every opportunity to cross-examine the
four prosecution witnesses. No law requires the presentation of the private
complainant as condition for finding guilt for Grave Threats, especially if, as
here, there were other victims and witnesses who attested to its commission
against the non-testifying complainant. Significantly, petitioner did not raise
Vicente's non-appearance as an issue during the trial, indicating that he saw
nothing significant in the latter's absence.

No Justifying Circumstances Attended Petitioner's

Commission of Grave Threats

There is likewise no merit in petitioner's claim of having acted to "defend[]

and protect[] the water rights of his constituents" in the lawful exercise of his
office as punong barangay.[23] The defense of stranger rule under paragraph
3, Article 11 of the RPC, which negates criminal liability of -

[a]nyone who acts in the defense of the person or rights of a stranger,

provided that the first and second requisites mentioned in the first
circumstance of this article are present and that the person defending be not
induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive.

requires proof of (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3)
absence of evil motives such as revenge and resentment.[24] None of these
requisites obtain here. Not one of the Darongs committed acts of aggression
against third parties' rights when petitioner successively threatened them
with bodily harm. Indeed, all of them were performing ordinary, peaceful
acts - Indalecio was standing near the water tank, Diosetea was walking
towards Indalecio and Vicente was standing in the vegetable garden a few
meters away. With the element of unlawful aggression absent, inquiry on the
reasonableness of the means petitioner used to prevent or repel it is
rendered irrelevant. As for the third requisite, the records more than support
the conclusion that petitioner acted with resentment, borne out of the
Darongs' repeated refusal to follow his water distribution scheme, causing
him to lose perspective and angrily threaten the Darongs with bodily harm.

Lastly, the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or exercise of office

under the 5th paragraph of Article 11 of the RPC lies upon proof that the
offense committed was the necessary consequence of the due performance
of duty or the lawful exercise of office.[25] Arguably, petitioner acted in the
performance of his duty to "ensure delivery of basic services"[26] when he
barred the Darongs' access to the communal water tank. Nevertheless,
petitioner exceeded the bounds of his office when he successively chased the
Darongs with a bladed weapon, threatening harm on their persons, for
violating his order. A number of options constituting lawful and due discharge
of his office lay before petitioner[27] and his resort to any of them would have
spared him from criminal liability. His failure to do so places his actions
outside of the ambit of criminally immune official conduct. Petitioner ought to
know that no amount of concern for the delivery of services justifies use by
local elective officials of violence or threats of violence.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 28
November 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 39.

SO ORDERED.

Nachura, Peralta, Abad, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

[1]
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

[2]
Dated 28 November 2007, penned by Judge Arlene Catherine A. Dato.

[3]
Branch 39.

[4]
The dispositive portion of the MCTC's ruling provides (Rollo, p. 171):

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Santiago Paera

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Grave Threats under
paragraph 2, Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in all the
above-entitled cases, and the Court hereby sentences him the penalty of two
(2) months and one (1) day to four (4) months of arresto mayor and FINE of
Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) for each case.

[5]
Id. at 170.

[6]
Id. at 171.

[7]
Id. at 39.

[8]
Id. at 21-28.

[9]
Id. at 190-200.

[10]
Heirs of Lorenzo and Carmen Vidad v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 166461, 30 April 2010, 619 SCRA 609.

[11]
Santiago v. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 109266, 2 December 1993, 228 SCRA
214, 224, citing Padilla, Criminal Law 53-54 (1988).

[12]
People v. Villanueva, Nos. 3133-3144-R, 27 February 1950, 48 O.G. 1376
(No. 4), 1381.

[13]
Rollo, p. 22.

[14]
160-A Phil. 962 (1975).

[15]
Id. at 971.

[16]
People v. Jaranilla, 154 Phil. 516 (1974). See also People v. De Leon, 49
Phil. 437 (1926) (involving conviction for one count of theft for the taking of
two roosters).

[17]
People v. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320 (1939).
[18]
Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, supra note 14 at 970 (internal citations
omitted).

[19]
Article 48 provides: "Penalty for complex crimes. - When a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period."

[20]
Pedro Salvoro and Roberto Pontonilla.

[21]
Rollo, p. 169.

[22]
The prosecution presented in evidence the certification of Dr. Fe V.
Tagimacruz, municipal health officer of Valencia, Negros Oriental, attesting
that Vicente suffered from Alzheimer's disease (id.).

[23]
Rollo, pp. 24-25.

[24]
The first two requisites correspond to the first two requirements under
the first paragraph of the provision.

[25]
People v. Pajenado, 161 Phil. 234 (1976).

[26]
Republic Act No. 7160, Section 389(b)(12).

[27]
Among others, petitioner could have given the Darongs a final warning or,
dispensing with such, immediately sought injunctive relief from the courts.

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