14.

YUMANG vs RPN 9
GR No. 201016
June 22, 2016

Facts: Petitioner Yumang was an employee of respondent RPN, and was a member of RPNEU which had
an effective CBA with the said respondent company.

The issue arose from the discovery that the new Toyota Revo driven by RPNEU President Siozon was
registered under the RPN General Manager's name. 15 union members, including Yumang, filed a
complaint and is calling for an investigation regarding the matter. The Med-Arbiter first ruled in favor of
the union members and resolved that an inquiry be conducted. But the BLR Director reserved the former's
decision.

This led to the respondents filing a complaint against the union members, filing it with the Grievance and
Investigation Committee (GIC). At first, the union members attended the first hearings, but decided not to
attend the later meetings due to suspected animosity and impartialty of the proceedings. The GIC
Committee ruled in favor of the respondents and recommended that the union members be expelled from
the union.

Due to their expulsion from the union, with regards to the existing CBA, the RPNEU leaders asked for the
termination of employment of the 15 union members due to the Union Security Clause, which was granted
by the respondent company herein.

This led to Yumang filing a complaint for illegal dismissal and unpaid benefits and wage in the Labor
Arbiter. The LA first ruled in favor of Yumang, but this was reversed by the NLRC. The CA also affirmed
NLRC's decision. Hence this petition.

ISSUES:

(1) W/N the petitioner is illegally dismissed

(2) W/N Yumang violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

(3) W/N Yumang is guilty of malicious attack against the union officers

HELD:

(1) YES. Yumang was illegally dismissed.

Contrary to the respondents' claim that an inquiry on the validity of the expulsion of the union members
was conducted, the records show otherwise. The union members were expelled from their union without an
independent investigation and thus was deprived of due process. This is consistent to the ruling in Serrano
vs NLRC, RPN vs Yap et al, and RPN vs Delantar, which were also cases involving the same union
members expelled in the same subject inquiry herein.

The company, although they may valildly expel the expelled union members due to the union security
clause, this must not be done hastily and must be done in accordance to the right to due process, self-
organization, and security of tenure. The Company must also look at whether the expulsion of the members
were valid, before terminating their employment due to a union security clause.
(2) NO. Yumang does not need to go through the administrative remedies available to her due to its
impending ineffectiveness.

Yumang was correct that the administrative remedies to her are illusory, since the Committee to investigate
the matter will be decided by the Board of Directors, whom are the respondents herein.

(3) NO. Under Art. 250 of the Labor Code, as amended, it is well within her right to be informed of the
activities of the union, especially on how the union funds are being handled and the negotiation and
implementation of the CBA. The facts of the case show that the 15 union members herein were not informed
of the following matters, which led to them calling for an inquiry to seek justice and demand answers from
the union leaders. Yumang was merely exercising her right as a union member.

DECISION: Petition GRANTED. Yumang ordered to be reinstated or be paid backwages and separation
pay, as the case may be.

15. Barrio Fiesta Restaurant vs. Beronia

GR No. 206690, July 11, 2016

Brion J.,

Doctrine : It is well-settled that judgments or orders become final and executory by operation of law and
not by judicial declaration. The finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary
period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or [no] motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed." "The court
need not even pronounce the finality of the order as the same becomes final by operation of law. In fact, it
could not even validly entertain a motion for reconsideration after the lapse of the period for taking an
appeal x x x The subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration cannot disturb the finality of the judgment
or order.

FACTS: Helen C. Beronia was working as a cashier of the Barrio Fiesta Restaurant. On Aug. 17, 2009,
respondent Helen C. Beronia filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims against petitioners
Barrio Fiesta Restaurant, et al. The petitioners, denied the claims prayed for.

The labor arbiter (LA) declared that Beronia had been illegally dismissed.The LA ruled that the dismissal
penalty on Beronia was grossly disappropriate to the wrong she committed because the petitioners failed to
prove that the former was motivated by bad faith. The P582.00 shortage was a negligible amount, thus, her
alleged violation of the unwritten policy on "offsetting of shortages" could be considered to have been done
in good faith.

The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the LA’s ruling. Beronia moved for
reconsideration of the NLRC decision. The NLRC pointed out that Beronia was hired as cashier of Barrio
Fiesta restaurant - a position of utmost trust and confidence. Prior to the offsetting incident, she had already
been warned for releasing cash to a person without prior authority from the management. Thus, the NLRC
concluded that the wrong Beronia committed rendered her unworthy of the utmost trust and confidence
reposed on her by the petitioners justifying her dismissal from the service. That the amount involved was
"only" P594.00 did not mean that Beronia did not breach the petitioners' trust and confidence.

The Court of Appeals (CA) reinstated the LA decision. The petitioners filed with the CA an entry of
appearance with manifestation and motion for reconsideration. The CA denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration for being 138 days late, pointing out that petitioners’ counsel has long received a copy of
its June 21, 2012 decision. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners asked for a liberal application of the
procedural rules, reasoning that they believed all the while that they were being represented by their former
counsel, Ligon, et. al., through Atty. Chua. They argued that the procedural lapse before the CA was clearly
due to a miscommunication with the law firm for which they should not be made to suffer, in the interest
of substantial justice.

ISSUES: Whether the CA erred in denying the petitioners’s MR for belated filing. 2. Whether the CA
erred in upholding the LA Arbiter’s decision finding Beronia illegally dismissed.

HELD: The Supreme Court denied the petitioners claim.

As the petitioners failed to timely seek reconsideration or appeal within the fifteen-day reglementary period,
the CA's June 21, 2012 decision automatically became final and executory after the lapse of this fifteen-
day period.

"It is well-settled that judgments or orders become final and executory by operation of law and not by
judicial declaration. The finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of
appeal if no appeal is perfected or [no] motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed." "The court need
not even pronounce the finality of the order as the same becomes final by operation of law. In fact, it could
not even validly entertain a motion for reconsideration after the lapse of the period for taking an appeal x x
x The subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration cannot disturb the finality of the judgment or
order."chanrobleslaw

Once a decision becomes final and executory, it is "immutable and unalterable, and can no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court
rendering it or by the highest court of the land."chanrobleslaw

The CA in this case lost jurisdiction when the petitioners failed to file the motion for reconsideration within
the fifteen-day reglementary period. The petitioners' subsequent filing of the motion for reconsideration
138 days after the deadline did not and could no longer disturb the finality of the June 21, 2012 decision
nor restore jurisdiction which had already been lost.chanrobleslaw

Accordingly, the CA did not err in refusing to admit and act on the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
At the time the petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration, the decision subject of this motion had
already become final.

Consequently, we can no longer review nor modify in any way the CA's June 21, 2012 decision. With this
conclusion, we see no reason for us to resolve the petitioners' other issues.

16. G.R. No. 204693, July 13, 2016

GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES, Petitioner, v. GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES
FACULTY LABOR UNION AND GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES NON-TEACHING AND
MAINTENANCE LABOR UNION, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the September 26, 2012 Decision1 and December 3, 2012
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 120669, which respectively denied for lack
of merit the Petition for Certiorari filed therewith by petitioner Guagua National Colleges (GNC) and the
motion for reconsideration thereto.

Factual Antecedents
On April 3, 2009, the Presidents of both GNCFLU and GNCNTMLU, wrote the President of GNC, to
inform him of the former's intention to open the negotiation for the renewal of the existing CBA which
would expire on May 31, 2009.9 Attached to the said letter was respondents' proposal for the next CBA.

Instead of serving upon respondents a reply/counter-proposal within 10 days from its receipt of respondents'
proposal, GNC wrote respondents on calling for a meeting at 10:00 a.m. of May 15, 2009 regarding CBA
negotiations. While the said meeting took place, no agreement was reached except that GNC would notify
respondents of the next negotiation meeting. However, what respondents later received from GNC's
Corporate Secretary, Atty. Ricardo M. Sampang (Atty. Sampang) was not a notice of meeting but a letter
which, among others, stated that the "management is not inclined to grant the economic/monetary-related
proposals in [respondents'] letter of April 3, 2009."

Still, respondents on June 1, 2009, requested for a conference with GNC to discuss the ground rules.13GNC
granted respondents' request and scheduled a meeting at 1:00 p.m. of June 11, 2009 at the GNC
boardroom.14

As to the events that transpired thereafter, the parties have conflicting claims.

Proceedings before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board

Again, the parties differ in their account of what transpired before the NCMB.

Respondents alleged that after several mediation meetings, the parties finally agreed on the details regarding
the grant of signing bonus. Hence, they undertook to compose the final draft of the 2009-2014 CBA which
it submitted to the NCMB on May 14, 2010 and copy furnished GNC on May 21, 2010. To their dismay,
however, no signing of the CBA took place. Instead, Atty. Sabino Jose M. Padilla III (Atty. Padilla)
appeared before the NCMB on behalf of GNC and requested for 10 days or until June 7, 2010 within which
to submit GNC's Comment/Counter-Proposal to the "Union[s'] CBA draft." Although disappointed that
Atty. Padilla merely referred to the supposed "final draft" of the parties as the "Union[s'] CBA draft,"
respondents agreed to the period requested by GNC to give the latter time to go over it. Respondents,
however, manifested that they would want the parties to meet again on June 1, 2010. Come the said date,
no one appeared on behalf of GNC. Thus, respondents filed on the same day a Notice of Strike22 charging
GNC with bad faith bargaining, violation of its duty to bargain, gross violations of the provisions of the
CBA, and gross and blatant diminution of benefits. Subsequent to this, GNC allegedly stopped the grant of
certain benefits to its employees.

In view of the notice of strike, the NCMB called for a conciliation conference on June 4, 2010 which was
later set for continuation on June 9, 2010. Meanwhile on June 7, 2010, GNC filed with the NCMB its
counter-proposal25cralawred to respondents' purported final CBA draft.

In the afternoon of the same day, respondents conducted their respective Strike Votes wherein majority
voted in favor of a strike.27 They then informed the NCMB of the strike vote results on June 21, 2010.

Since the NCMB had not yet acted upon GNC's Motion to Strike Out Notice of Strike and to Refer Dispute
to Grievance Machinery and Voluntary Arbitration Pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement
despite the looming strike of respondents, GNC urged the Secretary of Labor and Employment to assume
jurisdiction over the dispute.29 In an Order32 dated June 28, 2010, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, after finding the subject labor dispute as one affecting national interest, assumed jurisdiction
over the case; certified the same to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for immediate
compulsory arbitration; and, accordingly enjoined the intended strike.

Proceedings before the National Labor Relations Commission

In their Position Paper,33 respondents recounted that GNC at the plant level had already failed to reply or
furnish them a timely counter-proposal. While GNC asked for three weeks to submit its counter-proposal
in the meeting of June 16, 2009, no such counter-proposal was submitted. Instead, GNC opted to orally
discuss with respondents the terms of the CBA. Yet, after the conduct of a series of meetings/negotiations
and at a time when the parties had already substantially agreed on the terms of the new CBA, respondents
received from Atty. Sampang on December 21, 2009 GNC's counter-proposal to respondents' purported
"latest proposal." Respondents denied the existence of any "latest proposal" which requires a "counter-
proposal" from GNC.
As to the charge of unfair labor practice on account of its alleged bad faith bargaining and violation of duty
to bargain, GNC argued that the same is belied by the fact that since the very beginning, the parties were
negotiating. This continued during the mediation and conciliation proceedings before the NCMB. And had
not for respondents' impatience which caused them to file a notice of strike, such negotiations would have
progressed. To GNC, respondents' move of filing a notice of strike was uncalled for and was only intended
to compel GNC to hastily concede to their proposals. What respondents refused to see, however, was GNC's
critical financial status that hindered it from readily agreeing with their economic proposals.

The NLRC rendered a Decision finding Petitioner to have committed unfair labor practice, and
subsequently denied its MR.

Since GNC's Motion for Reconsideration41 thereto was denied for lack of merit in the NLRC
Resolution42dated May 25, 2011, it sought recourse from the CA through a Petition for Certiorari.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Decision44 dated September 26, 2012, the CA did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of
NLRC in issuing its assailed orders. Hence, it denied the Petition for lack of merit.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS XXX COMMITTED GRIEVOUS AND IRREVERSIBLE

ERROR WHEN, IN ITS DECISION DATED 26 SEPTEMBER 2012 AND RESOLUTION DATED 3
DECEMBER 2012, IT DISMISSED [GNC's] PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION[,] RESPECTIVELY[,] FOR LACK OF MERIT, THEREBY AFFIRMING THE
DECISION DATED 31 MARCH 2011 AND RESOLUTION DATED 25 MAY 2011 OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION XXX47

Essential to the determination of the issue raised is the resolution of the following:

Whether the subject labor dispute should have been ordered submitted to voluntary arbitration by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment pursuant to the parties' CBA and not certified to the NLRC for
compulsory arbitration;
Whether GNC is guilty of bad faith bargaining and thus violated its duty to bargain;
Whether the final CBA draft submitted by respondents to the NCMB was correctly declared to be the
parties' CBA for the period June 1, 2009 to May 31, 2014.

Our Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

The Secretary of Labor and Employment

correctly certified the subject labor
dispute to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration.
Indeed, the parties through their CBA, agreed to a "no-strike, no lock-out" policy and to resolve their
disputes through grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration. Despite these, respondents were justified
in filing a notice of strike in light of the facts of this case. It is settled that a "no strike, no lock-out" provision
in the CBA "may [only] be invoked by [an] employer when the strike is economic in nature or one which
is conducted to force wage or other agreements from the employer that are not mandated to be granted by
law. It [is not applicable when the strike] is grounded on unfair labor practice."48 Here, while respondents
enumerated four grounds in their notice of strike, the facts of the case reveal that what primarily impelled
them to file said notice was their perception of bad faith bargaining and violation of the duty to bargain
collectively by GNC - charges which constitute unfair labor practice under Article 248(g) of the Labor
Code.

The parties hereto agree on the principle that all disputes between labor and management may be settled
through friendly negotiations, that the parties have the same interest in the continuity of work until all
matters in dispute shall have been discussed and settled in a manner to the mutual benefit of the parties
herein, that an open conflict in any form involves losses to the parties, hence, all efforts must be exerted to
avoid such an open conflict. In the furtherance of the foregoing principle, the parties agree to establish a
procedure for the adjustment of any grievance to provide the widest opportunity for discussion of any
dispute, request or complaint and establish the procedure for the processing and settlement of grievances.

A grievance is defined as any protest, misunderstanding or difference of opinion or dispute affecting the
COLLEGE and the UNION or affecting any employee covered by this Agreement with respect to:
Meaning, interpretation, implementation or violation of any of the provisions of this Agreement;
Any matter directly relating or affecting the terms and conditions of employment including all personnel
policies;
Dismissal, suspension and/or any other disciplinary action;
Any other matter or dispute which may arise and is not settled by means other than the grievance machinery.
x x x x55

Plainly, a charge of unfair labor practice does not fall under the first three definition of grievance as above-
quoted. Neither can it be considered as embraced by the fourth which at first blush, appears to be a "catch-
all" definition of grievance because of the phrase "[a]ny other matter or dispute". It has been held that while
the phrase "all other labor dispute" or its variant "any other matter or dispute" may include unfair labor
practices, it is imperative, however, that the agreement between the union and the company states in
unequivocal language that the parties conform to the submission of unfair labor practices to voluntary
arbitration.

In trie absence here of an express stipulation in the CBA that GNC and respondents agreed to submit cases
of unfair labor practice to their grievance machinery and eventually to voluntary arbitration, jurisdiction
over the parties' dispute does not vest upon the voluntary arbitrator. The reason behind the ruling
in University of San Agustin is therefore not attendant in this case and so does not find any application
here. As it stands, the parties' dispute which centers on the charge of unfair labor practice is the proper
subject of compulsory arbitration. In fact, GNC itself acknowledged in its June 24, 2010 letter to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment that a charge of unfair labor practice in a notice of strike is ordinarily
certified for compulsary arbitration.

In view of the above discourse, the Court finds that the Secretary of Labor and Employment correctly
certified the parties' dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.

17. HSY MARKETING LTD vs. VILLASTIQUE

G.R. # 219569 17 AUG 2016

FACTS
The petitioner hired respondent as a field driver for Fabulous Jeans & Shirt & General Merchandise
(Fabulous Jeans). While the respondent was driving, he accidentally bumped a pedestrian, Dorataryo.
Fabulous Jeans shouldered the hospitalization and medical expenses of Dorataryo, which respondent was
asked to reimburse, but to no avail. When the respondent reported for duty, he was allegedly asked to sign
a resignation letter, which he refused to do. When he tried to collect his salary for the week, he was told
that it was withheld because of his refusal to sign the letter. Convinced that he was already terminated, he
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against petitioner and Fabulous Jeans. In their
defense, petitioner contended that respondent had committed several violations in the course of his
employment, including the vehicular mishap for being negligent and reckless. Further, it was the respondent
who voluntarily severed his own employment for refusal to report for work.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint due to lack of evidence, maintained the employer-
employee relationship and awarded the respondent with service incentive leave pay against petitioner. The
complaint against Fabulous Jeans was dismissed due to lack of factual and evidentiary basis. Upon appeal,
the NLRC affirmed the LA’s decision granted the respondent with separation pay. The motion for
reconsideration was denied. Also, Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of NLRC Resolutions
and subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, the instant case.

ISSUE
WON (1) employee-employer relationship existed between the parties, (2) the separation pay is
valid, and (3) the service incentive leave pay is valid.

HELD
The Court affirmed the decision with modification.
The issue is essentially a question of fact. It is settled that the Court is not a trier of facts and that the Court
will uphold the factual findings of the lower tribunals if there are not conflicting. Since LA, NLRC and CA
ruled that there exist an employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and respondent, the Court
sees no compelling reason to depart from their judgement.
The Court also upholds the findings of the lower tribunals that neither there was illegal dismissal nor
voluntary resignation present in the case due to lack of evidence. Hence, the appropriate course of action is
to reinstate the respondent. However, the award of separation pay is unjustified. It is hereby understood that
liability for the payment of separation pay is a legal consequence of illegal dismissal where reinstatement
is no longer viable or feasible. It must be given to the employee only as an alternative to reinstatement
emanating from illegal dismissal. When there is no illegal dismissal, even if the relations are strained,
separation pay has no legal basis.
The Court has already held that company drivers who are under the control and supervision of management
officers – like respondent herein – are regular employees entitled to benefits including service incentive
leave pay. It is a right which accrues to every employee who has served for one year which he may use as
leave days or its equivalent monetary value.

18. PENINSULA EMPLOYEES UNION (PEU) vs. ESQUIVEL

GR No. 218454
December 1, 2016

FACTS:
On December 13, 2007, Peninsula Employees Union' (PEU) Board of Directors passed Local Board
Resolution No. 12, series of 20078 authorizing, among others, the affiliation of PEU with NUWHRAIN,
and the direct membership of its individual members thereto. On the same day, the said act was submitted
to the general membership, and was duly ratified by 223 PEU members. Beginning January 1, 2009, PEU-
NUWHRAIN sought to increase the union dues/agency fees from one percent (1% ) to two percent (2%)
of the rank and file employees' monthly salaries, brought about by PEU's affiliation with NUWHRAIN,
which supposedly requires its affiliates to remit to it two percent (2%) of their monthly salaries.

The non-PEU members objected to the assessment of increased agency fees arguing that: (a) the new CBA
is unenforceable since no written CBA has been formally signed and executed by PEU-NUWHRAIN and
the Hotel; (b) the 2% agency fee is exorbitant and unreasonable; and (c) PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to
comply with the mandatory requirements for such increase.

ISSUE:
Whether PEU-NUWHRAIN has right to collect the increased agency fees.
Whether PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply with the mandatory requirements for such increase.
Whether the agency is exorbitant and unreasonable.

HELD:
Yes. The recognized collective bargaining union which successfully negotiated the CBA with the employer
is given the right to collect a reasonable fee called “agency fee” from nonunion members who are employees
of the appropriate bargaining unit, in an amount equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by union
members, in case they accept the benefits under the CBA. While the collection of agency fees is recognized
by Article 259 (formerly Article 248) of the Labor Code, as amended, the legal basis of the union’s right to
agency fees is neither contractual nor statutory, but quasi-contractual, deriving from the established
principle that nonunion employees may not unjustly enrich themselves by benefiting from employment
conditions negotiated by the bargaining union. In the present case, PEU-NUWHRAIN’s right to collect
agency fees is not disputed.

Yes. Case law interpreting Article 250(n) and (o) (formerly Article 241) of the Labor Code, as amended,
mandates the submission of three (3) documentary requisites in order to justify a valid levy of increased
union dues. These are: (a) an authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the members at the
general membership meeting duly called for the purpose; (b) the secretary’s record of the minutes of the
meeting, which shall include the list of all members present, the votes cast, the purpose of the special
assessment or fees and the recipient of such assessment or fees; and (c) individual written authorizations
for check off duly signed by the employees concerned. In the present case, however, PEU-NUWHRAIN
failed to show compliance with the foregoing requirements. It attempted to remedy the “inadvertent
omission” of the matter of the approval of the deduction of two percent (2%) union dues from the monthly
basic salary of each union member.

While the matter of implementing the two percent (2%) union dues was taken up during the PEU-
NUWHRAIN's 8th General Membership Meeting on October 28, 2008, there was no sufficient showing
that the same had been duly deliberated and approved. The minutes of the Assembly itself belie PEU-
NUWHRAIN's claim that the increase in union dues and the corresponding check-off were duly approved
since it merely stated that "the [two percent (2%)] Union dues will have to be implemented," meaning, it
would still require the submission of such matter to the Assembly for deliberation and approval.

Yes. Having failed to establish due deliberation and approval of the increase in union dues from one percent
( 1 % ) to two percent (2% ), as well as the deduction of the two percent (2%) union dues during PEU-
NUWHRAIN's 8th General Membership Meeting on October 28, 2008, there was nothing to confirm,
affirm, or ratify through the July 1, 2010 GMR. Contrary to the ruling of the OSEC in its March 6, 2012
Order, the July 1 2010 GMR, by itself, cannot justify the collection of two percent (2%) agency fees from
the non-PEU members beginning July 2010. The Assembly was not called for the purpose of approving the
proposed increase in union dues and the corresponding check-off, but merely to "confirm and affirm" a
purported prior action which PEU-NUWHRAIN, however, failed to establish.

Corollarily, no individual check-off authorizations can proceed therefrom, and the submission of the
November 2008 check-off authorizations becomes inconsequential. Jurisprudence states that the express
consent of the employee to any deduction in his compensation is required to be obtained in accordance with
the steps outlined by the law, which must be followed to the letter; however, PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to
comply. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that there is no legal basis to impose union dues and agency fees more
than that allowed in the expired CBA, i.e., at one percent (1 %) of the employee's monthly basic salary.

19. People’s Security, Inc. and Nestor Racho vs. Julius S. Flores and Esteban S. Tapiru
G.R. No. 211312. December 5, 2016

Facts
Julius Flores and Esteban Tapiru were security guards previously employed by People's Security, Inc. (PSI).
The respondents were assigned at the various facilities of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT) pursuant to a security services agreement between PSI and PLDT. On October 2001, however,
PSI's security services agreement with PLDT was terminated and, accordingly, PSI recalled its security
guards assigned to PLDT including the respondents. Thereafter, the respondents, together with several other
security guards employed by PSI, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with NLRC against PLDT and PSI,
claiming that they are PLDT employees.
Thereafter, PSI assigned the respondents to the facilities of its other clients such as the warehouse of a
certain Marivic Yulo in Sta. Ana, Manila and Trinity College's Elementary Department in Quezon City.
Meanwhile, the respondents were relieved from their respective assignments pursuant to Special Order No.
200310108 issued by Col. Leonardo L. Aquino, the Operations Manager of PSI. Accordingly, Flores and
Tapiru, filed with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC, a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of service incentive leave pay and cash bond, with prayer for separation pay, against PSI and its
President Racho.
The LA rendered a Decision finding that the respondents were illegally from their employment and, thus,
directing the petitioners jointly and severally liable to pay the former separation pay and backwages. On
appeal, the NLRC, in its Decision reversed the LA Decision. However, the CA rendered the herein assailed
Decision, reversing the NLRC's Decision and Resolution. In finding that the respondents were illegally
dismissed, the CA found that the petitioners failed to prove that the respondents had abandoned their work
and that their defense of abandonment was negated by the filing of a case for illegal dismissal.
Issue:
Whether respondents were illegally dismissed.

Ruling
Yes. a As rule, employment cannot be terminated by an employer without any just or authorized cause. No
less than the 1987 Constitution in Section 3, Article 13 guarantees security of tenure for workers and
because of this, an employee may only be terminated for just or authorized causes that must comply with
the due process requirements mandated by law. Hence, employers are barred from arbitrarily removing
their workers whenever and however they want.

What is more, PSI did not afford the respondents due process. The validity of the dismissal of an employee
hinges not only on the fact that the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause, but also on the very manner
of the dismissal itself. It is elementary that the termination of an employee must be effected in accordance
with law. It is required that the employer furnish the employee with two written notices: (1) a written notice
served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving to said employee
reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side; and (2) a written notice of termination served on
the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established
to justify his termination.
Beyond dispute is the fact that no written notice was sent by PSI informing the respondents that they had
been terminated due to abandonment of work. This failure on the part of PSI to comply with the twin-notice
requirement, indeed, placed the legality of the dismissal in question, at the very least, doubtful, rendering
the dismissal illegal.

20. MARINA’S CREATION ENTERPRISES VS. ANCHETA

G.R. NO. 21833
07 DECEMBER 2016

FACTS: Petitioner Marina's Creation Enterprises (Marina) is engaged in the business of making shoes and
bags. Marina hired Romeo V. Ancheta (Ancheta) as a sole attacher in Marina. After sometime Ancheta
suffered an intra-cranial hemorrhage (stroke) and was placed under home care. Ancheta suffered a second
stroke and was confined at St. Victoria Hospital in Marikina City for four days.
Ancheta filed a Sickness Notification with the Social Security System (SSS) and was paid sickness benefits
in the amount of Eight Thousand One Hundred Pesos. The physician who physically examined Ancheta
stated that Ancheta would be fit to resume work after ninety (90) days.

On 13 August 2011, Ancheta reported for work. Marina, however, wanted Ancheta to submit a new medical
certificate before he could resume his work in Marina. Ancheta did not comply and was not able to resume
his work in Marina. As a result, Ancheta filed a complaint w for illegal dismissal and non-payment of
separation pay.

Contention of MARINA: Marina claimed that Ancheta was employed on a piece rate basis and was not
terminated but instead was refused job assignments due to his failure to submit a medical clearance showing
that he was fit to resume his work. Marina claimed that the medical certificate was a precautionary measure
imposed by the company to avoid any incident that could happen to Ancheta who already had a pre-existing
medical condition.
LABOR ARBITER: Dismissed the illegal dismissal complaint. Brary
NLRC: Affirmed the dismissal of the illegal complaint.

COURT OF APPEALS: Reversed the decision of the NLRC. The CA ruled that Ancheta was illegally
dismissed by Marina. The CA held that the fact of Ancheta's dismissal was established through Marina's
own admission in its position paper that the company had refused to give Ancheta job assignments due to
Ancheta's failure to submit a medical certificate.

The CA ruled that the absence of a medical certificate did not justify Marina's refusal to furnish Ancheta
work assignments. The CA considered the certification by Ancheta's examining physician attached to
Ancheta's SSS Sickness Notification as proof that Ancheta was fit to resume his work in Marina on 12
August 2011. The CA held that according to the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, it was Marina and
not Ancheta who had the burden of proving that Ancheta's disease could not be cured within a period of at
least six months in order to justify Ancheta's dismissal. Finally, the CA ruled since Ancheta was illegally
dismissed, Ancheta was entitled to backwages and separation pay from Marina.

ISSUE: WHETHER ANCHETA WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED BY MARINA

RULING: YES.

Article 280 of the Labor Code provides for the two types of regular employees, to wit: (1) employees who
have been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer, and (2) employees who have rendered at least one year of service, whether such
service is continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which they are employed. This Court held
that the test of determining the regular status of an employee is whether the employee performs work which
is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be
determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular
business or trade. Also, if the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the
performance is not continuous or merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated and continuing need for
its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of the activity to the business.

Applying Article 280 of the Labor Code, Ancheta was a regular employee of Marina. Ancheta, who was
working in Marina as a sole attacher, was performing work that was usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of Marina which was engaged in the business of making shoes and bags. Moreover,
Ancheta had been performing work as a sole attacher in Marina since January 2010 up to March 2011 when
he suffered his first stroke. Thus, Ancheta had acquired regular employment status by performing work in
Marina for at least one year.

On the contention of MArina that the company's action of requiring Ancheta to undergo a medical
examination and to submit a medical certificate was a valid exercise of management prerogative. Marina's
contention is not correct. Article 279 of the Labor Code provides: "In cases of regular employment, the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this
title. x x x." Since Ancheta was a regular employee of Marina, Ancheta's employment can only be
terminated by Marina based on just or authorized causes provided in the Labor Code.

Section 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal. - Where the employee suffers from a disease and his continued
employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-employees, the
employer shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by a competent public health
authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six
(6) months even with proper medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be cured within the period, the
employer shall not terminate the employee but shall ask the employee to take a leave. The employer shall
reinstate the employee to his former position immediately upon the restoration of his normal health.
(Emphasis supplied)

The Implementing Rules of the Labor Code impose upon the employer the duty not to terminate an
employee until there is a certification by a competent public health authority that the employee's disease is
of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six months even with proper
medical treatment. In this case, Marina terminated Ancheta from employment without seeking a prior
certification from a competent public health authority that Ancheta's disease is of such nature or at such a
stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six months even with proper medical treatment. Hence,
Ancheta was illegally dismissed by Marina.

21. WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY-PHILIPPINES vs. MAGLAYA, SR.

G.R. No. 212774. January 23, 2017
Ponente: PERALTA, J.

FACTS:

WUP is a nonstock, nonprofit, nonsectarian educational corporation duly organized and existing under the
Philippine laws on April 28, 1948.

Respondent Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya, Sr. (Maglaya) was appointed as a corporate member on January
1, 2004, and was elected as a member of the Board of Trustees (Board) on January 9, 2004 — both for a
period of five (5) years. On May 25, 2005, he was elected as President of the University for a five-year
term. He was reelected as a trustee on May 25, 2007.

In a Memorandum dated November 28, 2008, the incumbent Bishops of the United Methodist Church
(Bishops) apprised all the corporate members of the expiration of their terms on December 31, 2008, unless
renewed by the former. The said members, including Maglaya, sought the renewal of their membership in
the WUP’s Board, and signified their willingness to serve the corporation.

On January 10, 2009, Dr. Dominador Cabasal, Chairman of the Board, informed the Bishops of the
cessation of corporate terms of some of the members and/or trustees since the bylaws provided that the
vacancy shall only be filled by the Bishops upon the recommendation of the Board.

On March 25, 2009, Maglaya learned that the Bishops created an Ad Hoc Committee to plan the efficient
and orderly turnover of the administration of the WUP in view of the alleged “gentleman’s agreement”
reached in December 2008, and that the Bishops have appointed the incoming corporate members and
trustees. He clarified that there was no agreement and any discussion of the turnover because the corporate
members still have valid and existing corporate terms.

On April 24, 2009, the Bishops, through a formal notice to all the officers, deans, staff, and employees of
WUP, introduced the new corporate members, trustees, and officers. In the said notice, it was indicated that
the new Board met, organized, and elected the new set of officers on April 20, 2009. Manuel Palomo
(Palomo), the new Chairman of the Board, informed Maglaya of the termination of his services and
authority as the President of the University on April 27, 2009.

Thereafter, Maglaya and other former members of the Board (Plaintiffs) filed a Complaint for Injunction
and Damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan City but the RTC dismissed the case
for being a nuisance or harassment suit prohibited under Section 1(b), Rule 1 of the Interim Rules for Intra-
Corporate Controversies. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, and dismissed the petition for certiorari
filed by the plaintiffs for being the improper remedy.
Thereafter, Maglaya filed on March 22, 2011 the present illegal dismissal case against WUP, Palomo,
Bishop Lito C. Tangonan (Tangonan), and Bishop Leo A. Soriano (Soriano). Meanwhile, this Court, denied
the petition for review on certiorari filed by Maglaya and the other former members of the Board for failure
to show any reversible error in the decision of the CA.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of WUP. The LA held that the action between employers and
employees where the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental is within the exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the regular courts. Since he was appointed as President of the University by the
Board, Maglaya was a corporate officer and not a mere employee. The instant case involves intra-corporate
dispute which was definitely beyond the jurisdiction of the labor tribunal.

The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed and set aside the Decision of the LA stating
that the reasons for his termination cited by WUP were not among the just causes provided under Article
282 (now Article 297) of the Labor Code, Maglaya was illegally dismissed. Thereafter, the NLRC denied
the motion for reconsideration filed by WUP in a Resolution dated February 11, 2013. The CA dismissed
the petition for certiorari filed by WUP. The CA noted that the decision and resolution of the NLRC became
final and executory on March 16, 2013. Upon denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, WUP elevated the
case before this Court.

ISSUE:

1. Whether Maglaya is a corporate officer or a mere employee.

2. Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case filed by Maglaya.

HELD:

Maglaya is a corporate officer. It is apparent from the bylaws of WUP that the president was one of the
officers of the corporation, and was an honorary member of the Board. He was appointed by the Board and
not by a managing officer of the corporation. We held that one who is included in the bylaws of a
corporation in its roster of corporate officers is an officer of said corporation and not a mere employee. The
alleged “appointment” of Maglaya instead of “election” as provided by the bylaws neither convert the
president of university as a mere employee, nor amend its nature as a corporate officer. With the office
specifically mentioned in the bylaws, the NLRC erred in taking cognizance of the case, and in concluding
that Maglaya was a mere employee and subordinate official because of the manner of his appointment, his
duties and responsibilities, salaries and allowances, and considering the Identification Card, the
Administration and Personnel Policy Manual which specified the retirement of the university president, and
the check disbursement as pieces of evidence supporting such finding.

2. No. NLRC has no jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case. The A corporate officer’s dismissal is
always a corporate act, or an intra-corporate controversy which arises between a stockholder and a
corporation, and the nature is not altered by the reason or wisdom with which the Board of Directors may
have in taking such action.59 The issue of the alleged termination involving a corporate officer, not a mere
employee, is not a simple labor problem but a matter that comes within the area of corporate affairs and
management and is a corporate controversy in contemplation of the Corporation Code.

The long-established rule is that the jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law.61 Perforce,
Section 5(c) of PD 902-A, as amended by Subsection 5.2, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8799, which
provides that the regional trial courts exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all controversies in the election
or appointment of directors, trustees, officers or managers of corporations, partnerships or associations,
applies in the case at bar.
To emphasize, the determination of the rights of a corporate officer dismissed from his employment, as
well as the corresponding liability of a corporation, if any, is an intra-corporate dispute subject to the
jurisdiction of the regular courts.

22. G.R. No. 207156, January 16, 2017

TURKS SHAWARMA COMPANY/GEM ZEÑAROSA, Petitioners, v. FELICIANO Z. PAJARON
AND LARRY A. CARBONILLA, Respondent.

Facts: Petitioners hired pajaron as service crew and carbonilla as head crew. Pajaron and Carbonilla filed
their respective Complaints for constructive and actual illegal dismissal, non-payment of overtime pay,
holiday pay, holiday premium, rest day premium, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay against
petitioners. Both Complaints were consolidated. Pajaron alleged that Zeñarosa asked him to sign a piece of
paper stating that he was receiving an exact amount of wages but he refused to sign. Due to his refusal, he
was dismissed by Zeñarosa. On the other hand, Carbonilla had an altercation with his supervisor. Due to
the altercation, Zeñarosa dismissed Carbonilla. Petitioners denied having dismissed Pajaron and Carbonilla;
they averred that they actually abandoned their work. They alleged that Pajaron would habitually absent
himself from work for an unreasonable length of time without notice; and while they rehired him several
times whenever he returned, they refused to rehire him this time after he abandoned work in April 2009.
As for Carbonilla, he was reprimanded and admonished several times for misbehavior and disobedience of
lawful orders and was advised that he could freely leave his work if he could not follow instructions. The
Labor Arbiter found credible Pajaron and Carbonilla's version and held them constructively and illegally
dismissed. Then, petitioners appealed before the NLRC. However, Zefiarosa failed to post in full the
required appeal bond. Thus, petitioners' appeal was dismissed by the NLRC for non-perfection. They filed
a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the
CA. However, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the Petition for Certiorari. It held that the NLRC did
not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners' appeal for non-perfection. Hence, this
present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the NLRC's decision in dismissing petitioners’ appeal
for non-perfection
HELD: No. The CA did not err in affirming the NLRC's decision in dismissing petitioners’ appeal for non-
perfection. The Court has time and again held that "[t]he right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a
component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the
requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost." It is clear from both the Labor Code
(Article 223) and the NLRC Rules of Procedure (Sections 4 and 6 of Rule VI) that there is legislative and
administrative intent to strictly apply the appeal bond requirement, and the Court should give utmost regard
to this intention."21 The posting of cash or surety bond is therefore mandatory and jurisdictional; failure to
comply with this requirement renders the decision of the Labor Arbiter final and executory.22 This
indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal ''is to assure the workers that if they finally prevail
in the case[,] the monetary award will be given to them upon the dismissal of the employer's appeal [and]
is further meant to discourage employers from using the appeal to delay or evade payment of their
obligations to the employees. Stated otherwise, petitioners' case will still fail on its merits even if we are to
allow their appeal to be given due course. After scrupulously examining the contracting positions and
arguments of the parties, we find that the Labor Arbiter's decision declaring Pajaron and Carbonilla illegally
dismissed was supported by substantial evidence. All told, we find no error on the part of the CA in ruling
that the NLRC did not gravely abused its discretion in dismissing petitioners' appeal for no perfection due
to noncompliance with the requisites of filing a motion to reduce bond.

23. G.R. No. 196110

PNCC SKYWAY CORPORATION (PSC), Petitioner
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT, PNCC SKYWAY TRAFFIC
MANAGEMENT, and SECURITY DIVISION WORKERS ORGANIZATION, Respondents
FACTS:
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) was awarded franchise of constructing, operating
and maintaining the north and south expressways, including the South Metro Manila Skyway (Skyway).
PNCC created Skyway Corporation (PSC) for taking charge of its traffic safety, maintaining its facilities
and collecting toll.
Under the build and transfer scheme, Citra Metro Manila Tollway Corporation (Citra) private investor
entered into an agreement with PNCC to transfer the operation of the Skyway from PSC to Skyway O &
M Corporation (SOMCO). On the transfer there is a five-month transition period until the full turnover of
Skyway at 10:00 p.m. of December 31, 2007 upon which petitioner PSC will close its operation. Three days
before the full transfer of operations PSC sent termination letters to its employees, many of whom were
members of PNCC Skyway Traffic Management and Security Division Worker's Organization (Union).
The union immediately upon receipt of the termination letters, filed a Notice of Strike before the DOLE
alleging that the closure of the operation of PSC is tantamount to union-busting because it is a means of
terminating employees who are members of union. Then, the notices of termination were served on its
employees three (3) days before petitioner PSC ceases its operations violating the employees' right to due
process. PSC insists that there was substantial compliance with the procedural requirements that the alleged
effectivity of the termination was made one (1) month from the notice of termination and that the affected
employees were paid for the said month.
The Secretary of Labor rendered judgement , that there is lawful cause to terminate employees because of
the valid cessation of PSC's operation. Dismissing the charge of Unfair labor practice and union busting for
lack of basis, as well as the charge of illegal of illegal strike against the union. However, because of the
failure of PNCC to comply with procedural requirements under Art 283 PNCC was ordered to pay
indemnity of 30,000 each dismissed employee.
Issue: Whether or Not PSC complied with the procedural requirement under Art. 283?
Ruling: NO. Under Article 283 of the Labor Code, that is, by serving notices of termination upon the
employees and the DOLE at least one (1) month before the intended date. The required written notice under
Article 283 of the Labor Code is to inform the employees of the specific date of termination or closure of
business operations, and must be served upon them at least one (1) month before the date of effectivity to
give them sufficient time to make the necessary arrangements. The purpose of this requirement is to give
employees time to prepare for the eventual loss of their jobs, as well as to give DOLE the opportunity to
ascertain the veracity of the alleged cause of termination. Thus, considering that the notices of termination
were given merely three (3) days before the cessation of the PSC's operation, it defeats the very purpose of
the required notice and the mandate of Article 283 of the Labor Code.
While PSC had an authorized ground to terminate its employees by virtue of the closure of its business, its
failure to comply with the proper procedure for termination renders it liable to pay the employees nominal
damages for such omission.

24. PJ LHUILLIER, INC. vs. HECTOR OREIL CIMAGALA CAMACHO

G.R. No. 223073
February 22, 2017

FACTS:
Petitioner P.J. Lhuillier, Inc., the owner and operator of the "Cebuana Lhuillier" chain of pawnshops, hired
petitioner Feliciano Vizcarra as PLJI's Regional Manager for Northern and Central Luzon pawnshop
operations and respondent Hector Oriel Cimagala Camacho as Area Operations Manager (AOM) for Area
213, covering the province of Pangasinan. Camacho was assigned to administer and oversee the operations
of PJLI's pawnshop branches in the area.
On May 15, 2012, Vizcarra received several text messages from some personnel assigned in Area 213,
reporting that Camacho brought along an unauthorized person, a non-employee, during the QTP operation
(pull-out of "rematado" pawned items) from the different branches of Cebuana Lhuillier Pawnshop in
Pangasinan. On May 18, 2012, Vizcarra issued a show cause memorandum directing Camacho to explain
why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for violating PJLI's Code of Conduct and Discipline
which prohibited the bringing along of non-employees during the QTP operations. Camacho, in his
Memorandum, apologized and explained that the violation was an oversight on his part for lack of sleep
and rest. With busy official schedules on the following day, he requested his mother's personal driver, Jose
Marasigan (Marasigan) to drive him back to Pangasinan. He admitted that Marasigan rode with him in the
service vehicle during the QTP operations.

During the formal investigation on June 1, 2012, Camacho admitted that he brought along a non-employee,
Marasigan, during the QTP operations on May 15, 2012. The Formal Investigation Committee issued the
Report of Formal Investigation, concluded that Camacho was guilty as charged. It could not accept his
explanation that the confidentiality of the QTP operation slipped his mind because of his exhausting travel
to Manila and, thus, recommended that his services be terminated. According to the report, his act of
bringing along an unauthorized person, a non-employee, during the QTP operation was a clear violation of
an established company policy designed to safeguard the pawnshop against robberies and untoward
incidents. His act was a "willful neglect of duty which cause[d] prejudice to the Company."

LA sustained Camacho's termination. Reasoning that he violated the rules and regulations of the
Respondents by bringing along his driver, a non-employee and an unauthorized person, during the "QTP"
operations, despite being fully aware that the same was prohibited, the Respondents were clearly justified
to terminate the employment of the Complainant on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.

The NLRC reversed and set aside the Decision of the LA. It declared the dismissal of Camacho as illegal.

CA reversed the NLRC resolutions. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE: Whether respondent Camacho was illegally dismissed

RULING : No. The parties do not dispute that Camacho was hired by PJLI as AOM of Area 213 which
covered the province of Pangasinan. He was primarily responsible for administering and controlling the
operations of branches in his assigned area, ensuring cost efficiency, manpower productivity and
competitiveneness. He was also responsible for overseeing/monitoring the overall security and integrity in
the area, including branch personnel safety, in coordination with PJLI's Security Services Division. In fact,
as stated by the CA, his position required the utmost trust and confidence as it entailed the custody,
handling, or care and protection of PJLI's property. Furthermore, as AOM, he was among those employees
authorized to participate in the QTP operations. He was tasked in overseeing the safe transport and handling
of company assets during the said operations.
Clearly from the foregoing, it can be deduced that Camacho held a managerial position and, therefore,
enjoyed the full trust and confidence of his superiors. As a managerial employee, he was "bound by more
exacting work ethics" and should live up to this high standard of responsibility."

Camacho, as AOM, was a managerial employee. As such, he could be terminated on the ground of loss of
confidence by mere existence of a basis for believing that he had breached the trust of his employer. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt is not required. It would already be sufficient that there is some basis for such loss
of confidence, such as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the concerned employee is
responsible for the purported misconduct and the nature of his participation therein. This distinguishes a
managerial employee from a fiduciary rank-and-file where loss of trust and confidence, as ground for valid
dismissal, requires proof of involvement in the alleged events in question, and that mere uncorroborated
assertion and accusation by the employer will not be sufficient.

25. G.R. No. 208459

JULIETA B. STA. ANA, Petitioner vs. MANILA JOCKEY CLUB, INC., Respondent
DECISION
FACTS:
In May 1977, MJCI, a domestic corporation with legislative franchise to operate horse race betting, hired
Julieta B. Sta. Ana (Sta. Ana) as outlet teller of its off-track betting (OTB) station in Tayuman, Manila
(OTB Tayuman). Because horse racing was not on a daily basis, Sta. Ana's work schedule was only for 12
days per month with shifts from 5 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. on weekdays, and 1 p.m. to 7 p.m. on weekends.
As teller, Sta. Ana performed, among others, the following duties and functions:
Processes cash payments through terminal registers; balances registers and makes daily ticket sales reports
after the races.
Handles cash and transactions with due diligence and honesty to the bettors and to the company as well.
Submits or remits the cash sales for the day to the official collection team and/or to the assigned banks with
night depository box.
On Nov13, 2008, MTCI issued a Memo stating that its Treasury Department was discovered to have been
illegally appropriating funds and lending it out to the employees of MJCI. On Dec 21, 2008, MJCI’s Internal
Auditing Department (IAD) discovered that its Agudo OTB Branch (OTB Agudo) had unaccounted check
remittances amounting to ₱44,377,455.00 for the period January 10, 2008 to November 30, 2008. On
January 8, 2009, MJCI, through its Special Disciplinary Committee (SOC), formally charged11 Sta. Ana
with the following infractions:
DISHONESTY AND OTHER FRAUDULENT ACTS
Stealing or attempting to steal corporate property or money/corporate assets - 1st offense: dismissal
Malversation - 1st offense; dismissal
Engaging/conniving in anomalous transactions - 1st offense: dismissal
In her Explanation, Sta. Ana denied committing any offense. She contended that even prior to the takeover
of the new management of MJCI, she had been engaged in the lending business to augment her income.
She then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
The Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and CA all ruled in favor of MJCI - They ruled that MJCI validly dismissed
Sta. Ana for loss of trust and confidence; that although Sta. Ana might not have been directly involved in
the discrepancies of the remittances and in the preparation of reports to cover up such discrepancies, she
was nonetheless a recipient of the stolen money which she used in her lending business; that Sta. Ana's
claim that her lending business was funded by the sale of her fishing vessels two years ago contradicted her
declaration that she commenced her business 15 years earlier; and that Sta. Ana's statement, anent her co-
employees who had loans from her, did not indicate the dates when the borrowers obtained their loans from
Sta. Ana.
ISSUE:
Whether Sta. Ana was validly dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.
HELD:
No. The uniform finding of the LA, NLRC, and CA that Sta. Ana was validly dismissed is unjustified
because salient facts were overlooked, which, if properly considered, will prove the absence of just cause
in dismissing her from work.
It is settled that the employer has the right to dismiss an employee for just causes, which include willful
breach of trust and confidence. Complementary to such right is the burden of the employer to prove that
the employee's dismissal is for a just cause, and the employer afforded the latter due process before
termination.
In this regard, to legally dismiss an employee on the ground of loss of trust, the employer must establish
that:
the employee occupied a position of trust and confidence, or has been routinely charged with the care and
custody of the employer's money or property;
the employee committed a willful breach of trust based on clearly established facts; and,
such loss of tn1st relates to the employee's performance of duties. In fine, there must be actual breach of
duty on the part of the employee to justify his or her dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.
While Sta. Ana occupied a position of trust and confidence and MJCI afforded her procedural due process,
her dismissal is still unwarranted because MJCI failed to discharge its burden of proving that she willfully
breached its trust, and such loss of trust relates to Sta. Ana's performance of duties.
MJCI’s allegations were not supported by clear and convincing evidence.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 11, 2012 and Resolution dated July
31, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 114861 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Julieta B. Sta. Ana is declared to have been illegally dismissed from service. Accordingly, Manila Jockey
Club, Inc. is ordered to pay Julieta B. Sta. Ana the following: 1) full backwages inclusive of allowances
and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from February 16, 2009, the date of her dismissal,
until the finality of this Decision; 2) separation pay equivalent to one month pay per year of service in lieu
of reinstatement; 3) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; 4) ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and, 5) attorney's
fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary awards. These awards shall also earn legal interest at the rate
of 6% per annum from the finality of this Decision until its full satisfaction.