RESPONDING TO JOHN PHILOPONUS:

HYPOSTASES, PARTICULAR SUBSTANCES, AND PERICHORESIS

IN THE TRINITY

Dirk Krausmüller, Artuklu University, Mardin, Turkey

([email protected])

Abstract: This article offers an in-depth discussion of John of Damascus’ Expositio

fidei, where the concept of Trinitarian perichoresis appears for the first time. The
article identifies the sources on which John drew and describes the ways in which he
modified the positions of his predecessors. It suggests that the concept of perichoresis
is derived from Christology where two natures interpenetrate, or ‘become one’, and that
it is therefore possible that it was the Monophysites who first introduced the concept,
and that Chalcedonian theologians learnt it from them.

There has of late been a lively discussion about the concept of Trinitarian
perichoresis or interpenetration, which makes its first appearance in John of Damascus'
Expositio fidei.1 Scholars have sought to make sense of the passage in which this
concept is mentioned through comparison with other passages in John's works where
he sets out his understanding of key terms such as hypostasis and nature.2 This article
takes a different approach. It offers a close reading of the entire argument of which the
statement about Trinitarian perichoresis forms an integral part and it identifies its
antecedents.3 It argues that the starting point was discussions of the Philoponian model

1
The Pseudo-Cyrillian treatise De trinitate, which has traditionally been regarded as John's source,
has been shown to be a late compilation that makes use of John's writings, cf. V. Conticello, 'Pseudo-
Cyril’s ‘De Ss. Trinitate’: A Compilation of Joseph the Philosopher', Orientalia Christiana Periodica 61
(1995), pp. 117-129.
2
Cf. R. Cross, 'Perichoresis, Deification, and Christological Predication in John of Damascus,'
Mediaeval Studies 62 (2000), pp. 69-124.
3
The focus will be exclusively on texts that John used in order to construct his argument. The wider
pre-history of Trinitarian perichoresis will not be considered. On this topic cf. L. G. Prestige, God in
Patristic Thought (London, 1959), pp. 282-291; J. P. Egan, 'Toward Trinitarian Perichoresis: Saint
Gregory the Theologian, Oration 31.14', Greek Orthodox Theological Review 39 (1994), pp. 83-93; M.
S. Troiano, 'Il concetto di perichoresis in Gregorio di Nissa', Studi storico-religiosi 2 (1978), pp. 81-92;
Dirk Krausmüller, “Responding to John Philoponus: Hypostases, Particular Substances, and
Perichoresis in the Trinity,” Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture 9 (2015) 13-28;
ISSN: 1754-517X. Website: http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/clarc/jlarc
 RESPONDING TO JOHN PHILOPONUS 14

of the Trinity where the Father, the Son and the Spirit are conceptualised as three
particular substances and the common divine nature is declared to be a mere abstraction.
Some of Philoponus' Monophysite and Chalcedonian adversaries defended the oneness
of God but conceded that in the case of created being the one nature was indeed just a
mental construct. In order to support their argument they claimed that the multitude of
hypostatic idioms present in each individual caused the common nature to break up.
This framework was irreconcilable with traditional Trinitarian theology as defined by
Gregory of Nyssa since Gregory had not only created an analogy between the Trinity
and the human species but also argued that the substantial and hypostatic dimensions
were entirely separate. However, this does not mean that it was not 'Cappadocian'.
Indeed, it was derived from a passage in one of Gregory of Nazianzus' speeches, which
is repeatedly quoted in the later texts. John of Damascus took over this framework and
adapted it to his needs. He claimed that in created being the multitude of characteristics
separated hypostases from each other and thus prevented their being in each other. This
is a decidedly odd argument because distinction through idioms was traditionally
regarded as the hallmark of hypostasis. Unlike his predecessors John then proceeded to
create a complementary statement about God. He declared that in the case of the Trinity
the oneness of nature was real and the distinction between hypostases a mental construct
without any objective reality. This 'Sabellian' model he then combined with a statement
about perichoresis. Since Father, Son and Spirit are distinguished by far fewer
characteristics than created beings they are not separate from each other and thus can
be in each other. In the last part of the article it is argued that this 'heretical' framework
was the result of a modification of an existing model that focused on the divine nature
in Father, Son and Spirit, declaring it to be one in reality and three in thought. It is
suggested that this model was created by Monophysites who derived it from their
Christology and that it was only at a later stage adopted by Chalcedonian theologians
such as John of Damascus.

***

One of the most frequently quoted texts in the Late Patristic discourse is Gregory of
Nyssa's treatise Ad Graecos ex communibus notionibus.4 There the Cappadocian bishop

and D. F. Stramara Jr., 'Gregory of Nyssa's Terminology For Trinitarian Perichoresis', Vigiliae
Christianae, 52 (1998), pp. 257-263.
4
Gregory of Nyssa, Ad Graecos ex communibus notionibus, ed. F. Mueller, in: Gregorii Nysseni
opera dogmatica minora (Gregorii Nysseni opera, 3, pt. 1; Leiden, 1958), pp. 19-33. Quotations from
this text are found e.g. in Eutychius of Constantinople, De natura et hypostasi, tr. P. Ananian, 'L’opuscolo
di Eutichio patriarca di Constantinopoli sulla “Distinzione della natura e persona”', in: Armeniaca.
Mélanges d’Études Arméniennes, publiées à l’occasion du 250 e anniversaire de l’entrée des Pères
Mekhitaristes dans l’Île de Saint-Lazare (1717-1967) (Venice, 1969), pp. 355-382, esp. p. 365.
Dirk Krausmüller, “Responding to John Philoponus: Hypostases, Particular Substances, and
Perichoresis in the Trinity,” Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture 9 (2015) 13-28;
ISSN: 1754-517X. Website: http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/clarc/jlarc
 JLARC 9 (2015) 13-28 15

defends himself against accusations that he was teaching the existence of three gods in
the sense of three separate substances. He declares that the Father, the Son and the Spirit
are each substance but that together they are only one substance, and that one can
therefore not speak of three gods but only of one. In order to substantiate his claim he
proposes an analogy with created being. He argues that the human species also
constitutes one substance and that one can therefore say that Peter, Paul and Barnaby
are each a human being but not that they are three human beings because they would
then also be three particular substances. One of the authors who took note of Gregory's
argument was Theodore of Raithou who lived in the late sixth century. 5 In his treatise
Praeparatio Theodore not only reproduces Gregory's reasoning but also quotes the
same passages from the Bible in order to illustrate the points that he is making. 6 Thus
one might conclude that he contents himself with restating positions that had been
defined two centuries earlier. However, when one turns to the next passage of his
treatise one realises that this is not at all the case. There Theodore explains why
Scripture does on occasion speak of two or more human beings. The first reason that he
offers is already found in Gregory' text. Scripture merely makes a concession to
common usage, which is incorrect.7 By contrast, the second reason points into a
radically different direction. Questioning all that he has said so far Theodore now claims
that it is entirely justified to speak of two human beings because there are real
differences within the human nature such as the distinction between male and female.8
This leads him to the following conclusion:

Πάσῃ φύσει καὶ οὐσίᾳ τῇ μετὰ τὴν ἁγίαν τριάδα τὸ ἓν ἐπινοίᾳ καὶ μόνῃ
ὑπάρχει θεωρητόν, τὰ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ τὰ διαιροῦντα ἄλλον ἀπ' ἄλλου καὶ
αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον πράγματι καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ πέφυκεν.9

In all nature and substance after the holy Trinity oneness is seen only in the mind
whereas the many and that which separates one from the other and each one from himself
exists in reality and actuality.

5
Theodore of Raithou, Praeparatio, ed. F. Diekamp, Analecta Patristica. Texte und Abhandlungen
zur griechischen Patristik (Rome, 1938), esp. p. 210, ll. 2-21. On Theodore cf. A. Grillmeier and Th.
Hainthaler, Jesus der Christus im Glauben der Kirche, 2, pt. 3: Die Kirchen von Jerusalem und
Antiochien (Freiburg, Basel, Vienna, 2002), pp. 117-9.
6
Both authors quote Psalm 102:15: ἄνθρωπος ὡσεὶ χόρτος αἱ ἡμέραι αὐτοῦ.
7
Theodore of Raithou, Praeparatio, ed. Diekamp, p. 210, ll. 21-26.
8
Theodore of Raithou, Praeparatio, ed. Diekamp, p. 210, ll. 26 - 29
9
Theodore of Raithou, Praeparatio, ed. Diekamp, p. 211, ll. 9-14.
Dirk Krausmüller, “Responding to John Philoponus: Hypostases, Particular Substances, and
Perichoresis in the Trinity,” Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture 9 (2015) 13-28;
ISSN: 1754-517X. Website: http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/clarc/jlarc
 RESPONDING TO JOHN PHILOPONUS 16

This statement rules out the realist understanding of the common substance that
Gregory of Nyssa had advocated, at least as regards the created order. According to
Theodore only individual beings are real whereas the common nature is nothing more
than a mental construct and can therefore not bind together the individuals into a unified
whole. It is immediately evident that such a framework is in keeping with the model
that the philosopher-theologian John Philoponus had devised in the mid-sixth century.
In his treatise De trinitate Philoponus explains:

However, species and genera are posterior to particular individuals, and - to say it simply
- each common thing is constructed by our intellect from particulars. For this reason, the
ancients called such things posterior and intellectual (ἐννοηματικά). For, correctly
speaking, Peter, John and every individual man are animal and substance, and the same
goes for this horse or that ox. However, these names passed from these (particulars) to
what is called genera and species, that is, from things which subsist in substance to those
which are inferred by our intellect.10

It may come as a surprise that a Chalcedonian theologian such as Theodore of

Raithou would dismiss the seemingly unassailable authority of Gregory of Nyssa and
opt for a model that had been proposed by the universally condemned heretic John
Philoponus. In order to find an explanation one must first of all realise that Theodore's
statement is a paraphrase of a passage in Gregory of Nazianzus' Oratio 31:

Τί δαί, οὐχὶ καὶ παρ’ Ἕλλησι, φαῖεν ἄν, μία θεότης, ὡς οἱ τὰ τελεώτερα παρ’
ἐκείνοις φιλοσοφοῦντες, καὶ παρ’ ἡμῖν ἀνθρωπότης μία, τὸ γένος ἅπαν; ἀλλ’
ὅμως θεοὶ πολλοί, καὶ οὐχ εἷς, ὡς δὴ καὶ ἄνθρωποι; ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖ μὲν ἡ κοινότης
τὸ ἓν ἔχει μόνον ἐπινοίᾳ θεωρητόν· τὰ δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστον πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων
καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῇ δυνάμει μεμερισμένα.11

What then, might they say, is there not one divinity also for pagans, as those among them
say who engage in more perfect philosophy, and is there not for us one humanity, the
whole race? Nevertheless there are many gods and not one, just as there are human
beings. But there that which is common has a oneness that is seen only in the mind,

10
John Philoponus, De trinitate, fr. 1, A. Van Roey, ‘Les fragments trithéites de Jean Philopon’,
Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica 11 (1980), pp. 135-163, esp. p. 148, in the translation of C. Erismann,
‘The Trinity, Universals, and Particular Substances: Philoponus and Roscelin’, Traditio 63 (2008), pp.
277‑ 305, esp. p. 291. In his article Erismann gives a concise account of the Tritheist controversy and
John's 'nominalist' theological position. Attempts to show that John was not a nominalist have been
unsuccessful, cf. Cross, 'Perichoresis, Deification', pp. 76-77; and M. Rashed, L’héritage aristotélicien.
Textes inédits de l’Antiquité (Paris, 2007), pp. 352-357; esp. p. 356.
11
Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio 31, PG 36, 149B1-C1.
Dirk Krausmüller, “Responding to John Philoponus: Hypostases, Particular Substances, and
Perichoresis in the Trinity,” Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture 9 (2015) 13-28;
ISSN: 1754-517X. Website: http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/clarc/jlarc
 JLARC 9 (2015) 13-28 17

whereas the individuals are to a very great extent separated from each other through time
and affects and power.12

It appears that Theodore deliberately chose a statement from Gregory of Nazianzus

that conforms to Philoponus' ontological model and at the same time subverts the
validity of Gregory of Nyssa's conceptual framework. This raises the question: why did
he feel the need to take such a step? An answer presents itself when we turn to an anti-
Philoponian florilegium from the later sixth century. The anonymous Monophysite
author of this florilegium quotes the passage from Philoponus' De trinitate that I have
reproduced above and then adds a series of passages from universally recognised
teachers of the church in order to show that Philoponus strays from the Patristic
consensus. The first passage is taken from Basil of Caesarea's treatise De spiritu sancto:

Ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἂν πιστεύσαιμι εἰς τοσοῦτον αὐτοὺς παραπληξίας ἐλαύνειν, ὥστε

φάναι τὸν Θεὸν τῶν ὅλων, ὥσπερ κοινότητά τινα, λόγῳ μόνῳ θεωρητήν, ἐν
οὐδεμιᾷ δὲ ὑποστάσει τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσαν, εἰς τὰ ὑποκείμενα διαιρεῖσθαι.13

But I would not believe that they would reach such a height of madness that they say that
the God of all is divided into subjects as if he were a commonality that can only be seen
in thought but has being in no hypostasis.

The purpose of this quotation is clear: it is meant to disprove Philoponus' argument

that the divinity is divided into three and that the common nature is a mental construct.
The second proof text is then the passage from Gregory of Nazianzus' Oratio 31 that
served as the model for Theodore's argument. As we have seen, in this passage Gregory
makes a distinction: he declares that the ontological model championed by Philoponus
cannot be applied to God but at the same time argues that it is valid for created being.14
This allows for only one explanation. The author of the florilegium was prepared to

12
There can be no doubt that Theodore's sentence is a paraphrase of Gregory's statement. Not only
do both texts contain the same phrase, τὸ ἕν ... μόνον ἐπινοίᾳ θεωρητόν, but Theodore also quotes
the immediately following passage from Gregory's oration in the same context. Cf. Theodore of Raithou,
Praeparatio, ed. Diekamp, p. 211, ll. 5-6: πᾶσα φύσις ἡ ἀνωτάτω καὶ μετὰ τὴν τριάδα κἂν ἁπλοῖ
τινες ὦσι; and Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio 31, PG 36, 149B14-15: πᾶσα φύσις ἡ ἄνω καὶ μετὰ
τὴν τριάδα κἂν ἁπλοῖ τινες ὦσι.
13
Van Roey, ‘Les fragments trithéites', p. 138. The passage is found in Basil of Caesarea, De spiritu
sancto, PG 32, 144C3-6.
14
The two texts were clearly chosen because they correspond to each other, cf. Basil's κοινότητά
τινα, λόγῳ μόνῳ θεωρητήν and Gregory's ἡ κοινότης τὸ ἓν ἔχει μόνον ἐπινοίᾳ θεωρητόν.
Dirk Krausmüller, “Responding to John Philoponus: Hypostases, Particular Substances, and
Perichoresis in the Trinity,” Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture 9 (2015) 13-28;
ISSN: 1754-517X. Website: http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/clarc/jlarc
 RESPONDING TO JOHN PHILOPONUS 18

accept Philoponus' framework in principle and to jettison Gregory of Nyssa's argument

that the common nature is real both in God and in creation.15
In order to understand why the author of the florilegium, and Theodore in his wake,
would make this concession we need to turn to another theological work of the time,
Leontius of Jerusalem's treatise Contra Nestorianos, which most likely dates to the
early seventh century.16 Leontius' Nestorian interlocutor asks how Chalcedonian
theologians conceive of the union of the divine Word with the flesh and then presents
them with the following options:

Εἰ δὲ τὸν καθόλου ἄνθρωπον ἐθέλοιτε λέγειν, ἢ ἐννοίᾳ λαμβάνετε τοῦτον

τῷ λόγῳ αὐτὸν ἀποματτόμενοι τῆς οὐσίας ἐκ τῶν καθέκαστα καὶ νοήσει
κατέχοντες αὐτὸν ἄνευ τῆς ὑποκειμένης οὐσίας τούτῳ λέγοντες
ἐνηνθρωπηκέναι τόν θεόν· ἢ αὐτὰ πάντα τὰ καθέκαστα ὑπάρξει ἰδίᾳ
συνάγοντες ὁπότε πᾶσι σεσαρκῶσθαι δογματίζοντες τὸν ἕνα τῆς τριάδος.17

If you want to say 'the universal human being', you either consider it in thought, deriving
it through reasoning from the substance of the individuals and, having it in your thought
without the underlying substance, you say that God incarnates in it; or you bring together
all the individuals, which exist separately, and teach that the one of the Trinity is
incarnated in all of them.

Here, too, only the individuals have an objective existence whereas the common
nature is reduced to a concept that the human mind abstracts from individuals showing
the same properties. Significantly, Leontius of Jerusalem does not question this
framework in his refutation of the Nestorian argument.18 This suggests that Philoponus'
model had found wide-spread acceptance and that there was a 'nominalist' groundswell
in the Late Patristic discourse, which left no room for a 'real' immanent common nature,
at least within the created order.
Theodore's understanding of the common nature thus poses no problems to the
reader. Much less clear is what he means by 'the many'. Logic would demand that it is
the particular natures whose building plan is identical with the common nature, which

15
At the same time he rejects Philoponus' analogy between God and creation where the common
nature was considered to be a mere mental construct in both spheres.
16
On Leontius, cf. D. Krausmüller, ‘Leontius of Jerusalem, a theologian of the 7th century’, The
Journal of Theological Studies 52 (2001), pp. 637-657.
17
Leontius of Jerusalem, Contra Nestorianos II.6, PG 86, 1544D7-14. The text is possibly corrupt.
A more intelligible reading would be ἀποματτόμενοι ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τῶν καθέκαστα.
18
Leontius of Jerusalem, Contra Nestorianos II.6, 1548C7-8. Cf. also Contra Nestorianos I.20,
1485D1-2: οὕτω φαμὲν τὸν Λόγον ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας φύσεως εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν
προσλαβέσθαι φύσιν ἰδικήν τινα.
Dirk Krausmüller, “Responding to John Philoponus: Hypostases, Particular Substances, and
Perichoresis in the Trinity,” Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture 9 (2015) 13-28;
ISSN: 1754-517X. Website: http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/clarc/jlarc
 JLARC 9 (2015) 13-28 19

is derived from them. Such an interpretation is also suggested by Theodore's

modification of Gregory of Nyssa's original framework. If one accepts that one can
speak of two or three human beings then one must also accept that there are as many
substances as there are individuals. However, these substances should then be identical
in content and not different from one another. Yet Theodore speaks of differences that
distinguish a being from other beings and from itself. This can only refer to hypostases
because one person differs from another and a single person changes over time.
Accordingly the multitude of idioms found in hypostases would have an impact on the
species to which they belong, breaking up the 'oneness of nature'. Such a conceptual
framework is irreconcilable with Gregory of Nyssa's Trinitarian theology where the
number of differences between individuals has no impact on the ontological status of
the one substance since such differences are posterior to substance.19 However, this
does not mean that it was not 'Cappadocian' since its ultimate source is the passage in
Gregory of Nazianzus' Oratio 31 on which Theodore has based his argument.
The implications of this framework, and the problems caused by it, become obvious
in another passage, which is found in the treatise Expositio fidei of the eighth-century
theologian John of Damascus.20 There we read:

Χρὴ δὲ εἰδέναι, ὅτι ἕτερόν ἐστι τὸ πράγματι θεωρεῖσθαι καὶ ἄλλο τὸ λόγῳ καὶ
ἐπινοίᾳ. Ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν πάντων τῶν κτισμάτων ἡ μὲν τῶν ὑποστάσεων
διαίρεσις πράγματι θεωρεῖται· πράγματι γὰρ ὁ Πέτρος τοῦ Παύλου
κεχωρισμένος θεωρεῖται. Ἡ δὲ κοινότης καὶ ἡ συνάφεια καὶ τὸ ἓν λόγῳ
καὶ ἐπινοίᾳ θεωρεῖται. Νοοῦμεν γὰρ τῷ νῷ, ὅτι ὁ Πέτρος καὶ ὁ Παῦλος τῆς
αὐτῆς εἰσι φύσεως καὶ κοινὴν μίαν ἔχουσι φύσιν· ἕκαστος γὰρ αὐτῶν ζῷόν
ἐστι λογικὸν θνητόν, καὶ ἕκαστος σάρξ ἐστιν ἐμψυχωμένη ψυχῇ λογικῇ τε
καὶ νοερᾷ. Αὕτη οὖν ἡ κοινὴ φύσις τῷ λόγῳ ἐστὶ θεωρητή. Οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ
ὑποστάσεις ἐν ἀλλήλαις εἰσίν· ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἑκάστη καὶ ἀναμέρος ἤγουν καθ’
ἑαυτὴν κεχώρισται πλεῖστα τὰ διαιροῦντα αὐτὴν ἐκ τῆς ἑτέρας ἔχουσα· καὶ
γὰρ καὶ τόπῳ διεστήκασι καὶ χρόνῳ διαφέρουσι καὶ γνώμῃ μερίζονται καὶ
ἰσχύι καὶ μορφῇ εἴτουν σχήματι καὶ ἕξει καὶ κράσει καὶ ἀξίᾳ καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματι
καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς χαρακτηριστικοῖς ἰδιώμασι, πλέον δὲ πάντων τῷ μὴ ἐν

19
Cf. the confession of faith of the ex-Tritheite Elias, tr. R. Y. Ebied, A. van Roey and L. R. Wickham,
Peter of Callinicum, Anti-Tritheist Dossier (Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, 10; Leuven, 1981), p. 60,
ll. 21-26: 'I rely on .. Cyril, teacher of highly exact doctrines, who is by no means minded to allow talk
of several natures even in respect of us creatures divided both by will, by different places and a myriad
different things yet nevertheless attaining consubstantiality.'
20
On John of Damascus, cf. A. Louth, St. John Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine
Theology (Oxford, 2002).
Dirk Krausmüller, “Responding to John Philoponus: Hypostases, Particular Substances, and
Perichoresis in the Trinity,” Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture 9 (2015) 13-28;
ISSN: 1754-517X. Website: http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/clarc/jlarc
 RESPONDING TO JOHN PHILOPONUS 20

ἀλλήλαις ἀλλὰ κεχωρισμένως εἶναι. Ὅθεν καὶ δύο καὶ τρεῖς ἄνθρωποι
λέγονται καὶ πολλοί. Τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ πάσης ἔστιν ἰδεῖν τῆς κτίσεως.21

One needs to know that being seen in reality is something different from being seen in
thought and mind. In the case of all created beings, then, the distinction of the
hypostases is seen in reality (for Peter is in reality seen to be different from Paul)
whereas the commonality and the coherence and the one is seen in thought and
mind. For we conceive in the mind that Peter and Paul are of the same nature and have
one common nature. For each of them is a rational mortal animal and each is flesh
endowed with a rational and intellectual soul. This common nature, then, is seen in
thought. For the hypostases are not in each other, but each is on its own and distinct and
separated by itself because it has very many things that separate it from the other. For
they are distant in place and different in time and are divided as regards opinion and
strength and form, that is, shape and habit and mixture and dignity and occupation, and
all the characteristic idioms. But most of all, (sc. they are divided) insofar as they are not
in one another but separate. Therefore we speak of two and three human beings and of
many. This one can also see in the case of the entire creation.

This passage is clearly an elaboration of Theodore's argument: the complementary

phrases τὸ ἓν λόγῳ καὶ ἐπινοίᾳ θεωρεῖται and ἡ ... διαίρεσις πράγματι
θεωρεῖται correspond to the statements τὸ ἓν ἐπινοίᾳ καὶ μόνῃ ὑπάρχει
θεωρητόν and τὰ διαιροῦντα ... πράγματι καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ πέφυκεν in the earlier
text.22 Accordingly, it presents us with the same conceptual framework. Again we are
told that the common nature cannot unify members of the same species in the created
order because it is only a mental construct. This time, however, we are also informed
how this construct comes into being. It appears when the mind compares the
characteristics of concretely existing individuals and realises that some of these
individuals resemble each other. These individuals would then be particular substances

21
John of Damascus, Exposition of Faith, 8, ed. B. Kotter, Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos,
5 vols (Patristische Texte und Studien, 7, 12, 17, 22, 29, Berlin, New York, 1969-1988), II, p. 28, ll. 223-
237.
22
Cf. also τὰ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ τὰ διαιροῦντα and πλεῖστα τὰ διαιροῦντα. Alternatively the two
passages may go back to a common source of which Theodore of Raithou's version is an abbreviated
version. Here one can point out that John's ἡ δὲ κοινότης καὶ ἡ συνάφεια καὶ τὸ ἓν λόγῳ καὶ
ἐπινοίᾳ θεωρεῖται is in some respects closer to Gregory of Nazianzus' ἡ κοινότης τὸ ἓν ἔχει μόνον
ἐπινοίᾳ θεωρητόν than Theodore's τὸ ἓν ἐπινοίᾳ καὶ μόνῃ ὑπάρχει θεωρητόν. If this is the case
it is possible that John borrowed his argument wholesale from an earlier author. Cf. also the shortened
version of the argument in F. Diekamp, Doctrina Patrum de Incarnatione Verbi. Ein griechisches
Florilegium aus der Wende des siebenten und achten Jahrhunderts (Münster, 1907), p. 188, ll. 16-18:
ἐφ’ ἡμῶν μὲν καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν ὑπὸ γένεσιν ὄντων ἡ κοινότης λόγῳ καὶ ἐπινοίᾳ
θεωρεῖται, τὸ δὲ διῃρημένον πράγματι.
Dirk Krausmüller, “Responding to John Philoponus: Hypostases, Particular Substances, and
Perichoresis in the Trinity,” Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture 9 (2015) 13-28;
ISSN: 1754-517X. Website: http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/clarc/jlarc
 JLARC 9 (2015) 13-28 21

since each of them contains the full definition of being. This interpretation finds further
corroboration in the statement that there are 'two and three human beings'. Here the
reference to human beings in the plural shows again that this is a deliberate modification
of Gregory of Nyssa's conceptual framework where 'the human being' denoted the
common nature.23
Significantly, however, John makes no use of the term 'particular nature' at all.
Instead he identifies the individual consistently with the hypostasis, which encompasses
all the characteristics that distinguish one member of a species from other members of
the same species. The hypostases are then blamed for the lack of a unifying bond. It is
declared that such a bond cannot be real because individual differences are too great.
This argument, which gainsays the conceptual framework of Gregory of Nyssa, is not
new. As we have seen it is already found in the treatise of Theodore of Raithou. More
original is John's further claim that there is no real common nature because the
hypostases are 'separate by themselves', καθ’ ἑαυτὴν κεχώρισται, and not 'in each
other', ἐν ἀλλήλαις. This claim is decidedly odd because there was universal
agreement that hypostasis is by definition 'separate' and 'by itself'. Leontius of
Byzantium had expressed this consensus when he stated that 'the hypostases indicate
what is divided .. and what exists by itself', τῶν ὑποστάσεων τὸ διῃρημένον ... καὶ
τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ ὑφεστὼς δηλουσῶν.24 If one takes these characteristics away the
hypostases cease to exist and one is left with an undistinguished nature.
When we turn to the next part of John's argument we find that these problems are
not resolved but rather compounded:

Ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἁγίας καὶ ὑπερουσίου καὶ πάντων ἐπέκεινα καὶ ἀλήπτου τριάδος
τὸ ἀνάπαλιν. Ἐκεῖ γὰρ τὸ μὲν κοινὸν καὶ ἓν πράγματι θεωρεῖται διά τε τὸ
συναΐδιον καὶ τὸ ταυτὸν τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας καὶ τοῦ θελήματος καὶ
τὴν τῆς γνώμης σύμπνοιαν τήν τε τῆς ἐξουσίας καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τῆς
ἀγαθότητος ταυτότητα—οὐκ εἶπον ὁμοιότητα, ἀλλὰ ταυτότητα—καὶ τὸ ἓν
ἔξαλμα τῆς κινήσεως· μία γὰρ οὐσία, μία ἀγαθότης, μία δύναμις, μία
θέλησις, μία ἐνέργεια, μία ἐξουσία, μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οὐ τρεῖς ὅμοιαι ἀλλήλαις,
ἀλλὰ μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ κίνησις τῶν τριῶν ὑποστάσεων. Ἓν γὰρ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν

23
This interpretation has recently been rejected by Cross on the grounds that it would contradict
John's other statements about nature and hypostasis, cf. Cross, 'Perichoresis, Deification', p. 85. However,
such an argument presupposes that John has developed a coherent ontological model that he then sets
out in his various writings. As will be evident from the evidence presented so far it is rather the case that
John draws on multiple sources and that he does not necessarily succeed in making the theories he adapts
conform with his personal convictions. Thus it is more fruitful to reconstruct the original argument and
only then to determine how John has modified it.
24
Leontius of Byzantium, Solutiones, PG 86, 1933A4-6.
Dirk Krausmüller, “Responding to John Philoponus: Hypostases, Particular Substances, and
Perichoresis in the Trinity,” Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture 9 (2015) 13-28;
ISSN: 1754-517X. Website: http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/clarc/jlarc
 RESPONDING TO JOHN PHILOPONUS 22

ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον οὐχ ἧττον ἢ πρὸς ἑαυτό, τουτέστιν ὅτι κατὰ πάντα ἕν
εἰσιν ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα πλὴν τῆς ἀγεννησίας καὶ τῆς
γεννήσεως καὶ τῆς ἐκπορεύσεως· ἐπινοίᾳ δὲ τὸ διῃρημένον. Ἕνα γὰρ θεὸν
γινώσκομεν, ἐν μόναις δὲ ταῖς ἰδιότησι τῆς τε πατρότητος καὶ τῆς υἱότητος
καὶ τῆς ἐκπορεύσεως κατά τε τὸ αἴτιον καὶ αἰτιατὸν καὶ τὸ τέλειον τῆς
ὑποστάσεως ἤτοι τὸν τῆς ὑπάρξεως τρόπον τὴν διαφορὰν ἐννοοῦμεν. Οὔτε
γὰρ τοπικὴν διάστασιν ὡς ἐφ’ ἡμῶν δυνάμεθα ἐπὶ τῆς ἀπεριγράπτου λέγειν
θεότητος—ἐν ἀλλήλαις γὰρ αἱ ὑποστάσεις εἰσίν, οὐχ ὥστε συγχεῖσθαι, ἀλλ’
ὥστε ἔχεσθαι κατὰ τὸν τοῦ κυρίου λόγον· «Ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ πατρί, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν
ἐμοί», φήσαντος—οὔτε θελήματος διαφορὰν ἢ γνώμης ἢ ἐνεργείας ἢ
δυνάμεως ἤ τινος ἑτέρου, ἅτινα τὴν πραγματικὴν καὶ δι’ ὅλου ἐν ἡμῖν
γεννῶσι διαίρεσιν.25

In the case of the holy and supra-substantial and completely transcendent and
incomprehensible Trinity the opposite applies. For there the common and one is seen
in reality because of the co-eternity and the identity of substance and operation and will
and the agreement of opinion and the identity of power and strength and goodness - I did
not say similarity, but identity - and the one eruption of movement. For (sc. there is) one
nature, one goodness, one strength, one will, one operation, one power, one and the same,
not three that are similar to each other, but one and the same movement of the three
hypostases. For each of them is one as regards the other and as regards itself, that is, the
Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are in all respects one apart from ingeneracy and
generation and procession. However, what is distinguished is only in the mind. For we
know one God and conceptualise the difference only in the properties of paternity and
filiality and procession according to cause and result and the completeness of the
hypostasis, that is, the mode of existence. For we cannot speak of spatial separation in
the case of the uncircumscribed divinity as we can in our case - for the hypostases are in
each other, not so as to be confused but so as to hang on each other according to the word
of the Lord who said: 'I am in the Father and the Father is in me', - nor (sc. can we speak
of) a difference of will or opinion or operation or power or anything else, which produces
the real and complete separation in us.

Here John makes an important qualification. The framework that he has set out so
far is only valid for the created order, it cannot be applied to God. Such a claim had
already been made by Theodore. However, unlike his predecessor, John explains to his
readers why the Trinity constitutes a case apart. He claims that in the Trinity the one

25
John of Damascus, Exposition of Faith 8, ed. Kotter, II, p. 28, l. 237-p. 29, l. 258.
Dirk Krausmüller, “Responding to John Philoponus: Hypostases, Particular Substances, and
Perichoresis in the Trinity,” Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture 9 (2015) 13-28;
ISSN: 1754-517X. Website: http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/clarc/jlarc
 JLARC 9 (2015) 13-28 23

nature is real whereas the distinction into hypostases only exists in the human mind.
This is a simple reversal of the previous juxtaposition: ἡ μὲν τῶν ὑποστάσεων
διαίρεσις πράγματι θεωρεῖται and ἡ δὲ κοινότης καὶ ἡ συνάφεια καὶ τὸ ἓν
λόγῳ καὶ ἐπινοίᾳ θεωρεῖται has become τὸ μὲν κοινὸν καὶ ἓν πράγματι
θεωρεῖται and ἐπινοίᾳ δὲ τὸ διῃρημένον. The consequence of this reversal is
obvious: the three divine hypostases are denied any objective reality. Such a conceptual
framework is not reconcilable with orthodox Trinitarian theology. Indeed it is likely
that contemporaries would have regarded it as Sabellian.26 In a second step John then
claims that the divine hypostases are not separate but in each other. As we have already
seen this denies the hypostases the function that they had traditionally been given in
Trinitarian theology. However, John does not then declare that there are no
characteristic idioms, which would distinguish Father, Son and Spirit from one another.
Instead he argues that in the divine hypostases there are fewer characteristic marks than
in created beings, which therefore have no impact on the substantial dimension. This,
too, constitutes a departure from traditional Trinitarian theology where it was argued
that even if there is only one hypostatic idiom in each case it would be sufficient to
establish separate hypostases and thus preclude their being 'in each other'.27 Even more
problematic is the fact that the two parts of John's argument cannot be reconciled with
one another. If the hypostatic differences are real then the distinction between
hypostases should also be real and cannot only be a product of the human mind.28
In order to understand how John could come up with such an extraordinarily confused
and manifestly heretical position we need to turn to a creedal statement by Patriarch
Sophronius, which is directed against the Sabellians:

Τέλειος θεὸς ὁ πατήρ, τέλειος θεὸς ὁ υἱός, τέλειος θεὸς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον,
ἐπειδὴ τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μίαν ἕκαστον πρόσωπον ἀμέριστον καὶ ἀνελλιπῆ καὶ

26
This was still the case in the tenth century when Stephen of Nicomedia asked his enemy Symeon
the New Theologian how one should distinguish the Father from the Son, in thought or rather in thought.
Symeon refused to accept either possibility because he was aware that they were equally heretical. Cf.
D. Krausmüller, ‘Reconfiguring the Trinity: Symeon the New Theologian, the “Holy Spirit”, and the
Imago Trinitatis’, Byzantion, 81 (2011), pp. 212-236, esp. p. 234.
27
This point is repeatedly made by Leontius of Jerusalem, cf. e.g. Contra Nestorianos I.28, PG 86,
1493D1-10. However, cf. De universalibus et trinitate, 8, ed. Rashed, p. 371, ll. 53-59.
28
The argument that I have presented so far is entirely at odds with the interpretation offered by
Cross, 'Perichoresis, Deification', p. 85: 'There is no sense in which the distinction of the divine persons
is only conceptual; likewise, therefore, there is no sense in which the commonness of a created nature is
only conceptual'. This interpretation flies in the face of the evidence. The juxtaposition is even clearer in
the passage in the Doctrina patrum to which I have referred in note 22: ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν ὑπὸ γένεσιν
ὄντων ἡ κοινότης λόγῳ καὶ ἐπινοίᾳ θεωρεῖται, τὸ δὲ διῃρημένον πράγματι· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς
θεότητος τὸ ἀνάπαλιν. ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν πράγματι τὸ ἓν εὑρίσκεται ..., ἐπινοίᾳ δὲ τὸ
διῃρημένον..
Dirk Krausmüller, “Responding to John Philoponus: Hypostases, Particular Substances, and
Perichoresis in the Trinity,” Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture 9 (2015) 13-28;
ISSN: 1754-517X. Website: http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/clarc/jlarc
 RESPONDING TO JOHN PHILOPONUS 24

τελείαν ἔχει θεότητα· καὶ ὡς μὲν θεὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καθέστηκεν ἕκαστον καθ’
ἑαυτὸ θεωρούμενον τοῦ νοῦ χωρίζοντος τὰ ἀχώριστα· ὡς δὲ πατὴρ καὶ υἱὸς
καὶ πνεῦμα πανάγιον ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον λέγεται.29

The Father is complete god, the Son is complete god, the Holy Spirit is complete god,
because each person has one and the same divinity, which cannot be divided into parts
and is not lacking anything and is complete, and as god each of them when seen by itself
is the same, with only the mind separating that which cannot be separated, but as Father
and Son and All-Holy Spirit it is called another and another and another.

Here we are told that the divinity present in each of the three hypostases is one but
that the mind can make a distinction between the divinity in the Father, the divinity in
the Son and the divinity in the Spirit.30 Thus we have a distinction between πράγματι
and ἐπινοίᾳ as we have already encountered in John. However, the conceptual
framework set out by Sophronius is radically different. Now it is the divine nature that
is one 'in reality' and three 'in thought'. Accordingly, the oneness of the common nature
is real whereas the distinction between particular substances only exists in the mind. In
this juxtaposition the hypostatic idioms play no role at all. They belong to a different
plane of being and can therefore be three 'in reality' without endangering the oneness
of the divine nature. Such a model is both coherent and orthodox. By contrast, John has
confused the divinity present in each of the three hypostases with the hypostases
themselves and thus created a Sabellian framework, seemingly without being aware of
what he has done.31 It may well be that he was aware of Sophronius' position and that
he modified it in order to make it fit the overall framework that he had inherited from
earlier theologians or possibly also because he rejected the notion of a particular nature
even if it was defined as a mere mental construct.
Sophronius does not speak about interpenetration but such a notion could be easily
accommodated within his framework. Its function would have been to dispel any
lingering fears that the distinction between the three particular substances of Father,
Son and Spirit might exist not just in the mind. John himself affords us a glimpse of this
argument in the following passage:

29
Sophronius' Ad Sergium patriarcham, PG 87, 3158AB; quoted from Acts of the Sixth Ecumenical
Council (681), ed. R. Riedinger, Acta conciliorum oecumenicorum, II.2: Concilium universale
Constantinopolitanum tertium, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1990-1992), I, p. 426, ll. 9-12.
30
The phrase τοῦ νοῦ χωρίζοντος τὰ ἀχώριστα is borrowed from Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio
23, PG 35, 1164A10.
31
One should note that John was not the only author to speak of interpenetration of hypostases, cf.
Anastasius of Antioch, Sermo I.66, ed. Sakkos, p. 37, ll. 14-16: ἅμα δὲ θεωροῦνται σὺν ἀλλήλαις
αἱ ὑποστάσεις καὶ ἐν ἀλλήλαις ἀχωρίστως τῆς αὐτῆς δόξης ὑπάρχουσαι. Unlike John,
however, Anastasius emphasises that hypostases are 'in each other' because of their consubstantiality.
Dirk Krausmüller, “Responding to John Philoponus: Hypostases, Particular Substances, and
Perichoresis in the Trinity,” Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture 9 (2015) 13-28;
ISSN: 1754-517X. Website: http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/clarc/jlarc
 JLARC 9 (2015) 13-28 25

Διὸ οὐδὲ τρεῖς θεοὺς λέγομεν τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα,
ἕνα δὲ μᾶλλον θεόν, τὴν ἁγίαν τριάδα, εἰς ἓν αἴτιον υἱοῦ καὶ
πνεύματος ἀναφερομένων, οὐ συντιθεμένων οὐδὲ συναλειφομένων κατὰ
τὴν Σαβελλίου συναίρεσιν—ἑνοῦνται γάρ, ὡς ἔφημεν, οὐχ ὥστε συγχεῖσθαι,
ἀλλ’ ὥστε ἔχεσθαι ἀλλήλων· καὶ τὴν ἐν ἀλλήλαις περιχώρησιν ἔχουσι δίχα
πάσης συναλοιφῆς καὶ συμφύρσεως—οὐδὲ ἐξισταμένων ἢ κατ’ οὐσίαν
τεμνομένων κατὰ τὴν Ἀρείου διαίρεσιν.32

Therefore we do not call the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit three Gods, but rather
one God, the holy Trinity, where the Son and the Spirit refer back to one cause, and are
not composed or mixed up according to the confusion of Sabellius - for, as we have said,
they are united not so as to be confused but so as to hang on each other, and they have
the penetration in each other without any confusion and mingling - nor are they different
or divided as regards substance according to the separation of Arius.

What we have here is a clear distinction between a static model - the three elements
are contiguous - and a dynamic model - the three elements penetrate each other. It is
claimed that these two models together can fend off the Tritheist danger. One can see
why mere contiguity might not have been considered sufficient: it resembled
uncomfortably closely the unacceptable notion of a mere 'putting-next-to-each-other',
παράθεσις, of otherwise separate components.33 As a consequence one could still
make out points within the divinity where one element ends and another element begins.
Interpenetration breaks down such boundaries and thus reinforces the notion of a
continuous divine substance.
In order fully to understand the concept of interpenetration we need to consider that
John uses it not only in Trinitarian theology but also in Christology.

Διὰ γὰρ τὴν καθ’ ὑπόστασιν ἕνωσιν ἡ σὰρξ τεθεῶσθαι λέγεται καὶ θεὸς
γενέσθαι καὶ ὁμόθεος τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ὁ θεὸς λόγος σαρκωθῆναι καὶ ἄνθρωπος
γενέσθαι καὶ κτίσμα λέγεσθαι καὶ ἔσχατος καλεῖσθαι, οὐχ ὡς τῶν δύο
φύσεων μεταβληθεισῶν εἰς μίαν φύσιν σύνθετον (ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἐν μιᾷ
φύσει ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία φυσικὰ γενέσθαι), ἀλλ’ ὡς τῶν δύο φύσεων καθ’

32
John of Damascus, Exposition of Faith 8, ed. Kotter, II, p. 29, ll. 258-265.
33
Cf. e.g. Leontius of Jerusalem, Contra Nestorianos VI.2, PG 86, 1753C11-12: τοπικῇ τε
παραθέσει πέρατος θατέρου πρὸς θάτερον ἕνωται ἀλλήλοις.
Dirk Krausmüller, “Responding to John Philoponus: Hypostases, Particular Substances, and
Perichoresis in the Trinity,” Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture 9 (2015) 13-28;
ISSN: 1754-517X. Website: http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/clarc/jlarc
 RESPONDING TO JOHN PHILOPONUS 26

ὑπόστασιν ἑνωθεισῶν καὶ τὴν εἰς ἀλλήλας περιχώρησιν ἀσύγχυτον καὶ

ἀμετάβλητον ἐχουσῶν.34

Because of the union within the hypostasis the flesh is said to be divinised and to become
god and equal god with the Word and the God-Word (is said) to be incarnated and to
become a human being and to be called creature and to be called the last, not because
two natures are changed into one composite nature (for it is impossible for opposite
natural qualities to be present at the same time in one nature), but because the two natures
are united within a hypostasis and have the penetration into each other in an unconfused
and unchangeable manner.

The parallelism between the two models is evident. Here, too, natures are contiguous
and penetrate each other.35 In Christology the concept of perichoresis had a long history
whereas in Trinitarian theology it makes its first appearance in John's Expositio fidei.
Even Maximus from whom John borrows so much never employs it.36 How do we
account for this time-lag? Comparison between the two models suggests an answer. It
shows that the resemblance between them is not particularly close because in the case
of the incarnation the natures themselves are entirely separate and indeed not even
consubstantial. Thus one could argue that as long as the divinity was conceived of as
one nature the possibility of a transposition did not present itself or alternatively that it
was considered problematic because it would have implied a division of the divinity
into three natures. This suggests that it was engagement with the Tritheist model that
made theologians for the first time see a parallel between the two spheres. Once the
bond between the 'divinities' in Father, Son and Spirit had been loosened composition
and interpenetration of natures were the natural ways in which to overcome separation
and establish unity within God.37
However, it needs to be said that the parallel between Christology and Trinitarian
theology is not all that obvious within the Chalcedonian theological framework. In the
incarnation two natures penetrate each other but remain two whereas in the Trinity three

34
John of Damascus, Exposition of Faith 91, ed. Kotter, II, p. 214, ll. 54-59.
35
For a detailed discussion cf. J. Stead, 'Perichoresis in the Christological chapters of the "De
trinitate" of Pseudo-Cyril of Alexandria', Dominican Studies 6 (1953), pp. 12-20.
36
Cf. Cross, 'Perichoresis, Deification', pp. 87-88. When exactly the term perichoresis was first used
in the sense of interpenetration is a subject of debate. Cf. G. L. Prestige, 'Περιχωρέω and περιχώρησις
in the Fathers,' Journal of Theological Studies 29 (1928), pp. 242-252; and V. Harrison, 'Perichoresis in
the Greek Fathers', St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly 35 (1991), pp. 53-65. For perichoresis in
Maximus, cf. also Stead, 'Perichoresis', pp. 18-19.
37
Significantly, he complements this notion with the 'hanging-on-each-other of operations',
ἀλληλουχία τῶν ἐνεργειῶν, in order to exclude any Tritheist misunderstanding, cf. Sermo I.25, ed.
Sakkos, p. 38, l. 25. Here one is reminded of Anastasius' attempts to establish the unity of the hypostasis
of Christ at the level of operation, cf. Grillmeier and Hainthaler, Jesus der Christus, 2, pt. 3, pp. 398-400.
Dirk Krausmüller, “Responding to John Philoponus: Hypostases, Particular Substances, and
Perichoresis in the Trinity,” Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture 9 (2015) 13-28;
ISSN: 1754-517X. Website: http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/clarc/jlarc
 JLARC 9 (2015) 13-28 27

quasi-natures penetrate each other and become one. The resemblance is much closer in
the case of the Monophysite framework, which is briefly summarised in Leontius of
Byzantium's treatise Solutiones:

Τὰς φύσεις μὲν τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ καὶ ἡμεῖς θεωροῦμεν· ἑνώσαντες μὲν οὖν ταύτας
λοιπὸν μίαν ἄμφω φύσιν καὶ ταύτην σύνθετον εἶναί τε καὶ καλεῖσθαί
φαμεν.38

We, too, see the natures only in thought. Having, then, united them, we henceforth speak
of and call both one nature, which is furthermore composite.

Here, too, the one nature exists 'in reality' and the distinction between the two natures
only exists in the mind. Thus it can be argued that it was Monophysite enemies of
Philoponus who first declared that not only in the incarnation but also in the Trinity
several 'natures' unite to form one nature, statically through contiguity and dynamically
through interpenetration.39

***

This article has offered an in-depth discussion of a passage in John of Damascus'

Expositio Fidei in which the concept of Trinitarian perichoresis appears for the first
time. It has identified the sources on which John drew and described the ways in which
John modified the positions of his forebears. John's argument consists of two parts,
which closely correspond to one another. In the first part he declares that in creation
only concretely existing individuals are real whereas the oneness of nature is a mere
mental construct. The ultimate source for this distinction is the writings of John
Philoponus who had denied universals an objective existence. Some of Philoponus'
Monophysite and Chalcedonian adversaries were prepared to accept the validity of this
framework for the created order. In taking this step they distanced themselves from the
position of Gregory of Nyssa who had contended that the species had a reality of its
own. Curiously enough the argument with which they supported their position is not
derived from Philoponus at all. They claimed that it was the multitude of hypostatic
idioms present in individuals that broke up the oneness of nature. Such mixing of the
hypostatic and substantial dimensions went against the Patristic consensus, which had
been defined by Gregory of Nyssa and which was accepted even by Philoponus. It

38
Leontius of Byzantium, Solutiones, PG 86, 1929D6-9.
39
This affinity was sensed by Stead, 'Perichoresis', pp. 16-17.
Dirk Krausmüller, “Responding to John Philoponus: Hypostases, Particular Substances, and
Perichoresis in the Trinity,” Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture 9 (2015) 13-28;
ISSN: 1754-517X. Website: http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/clarc/jlarc
 RESPONDING TO JOHN PHILOPONUS 28

ultimately goes back to a statement of Gregory of Nazianzus to which Philoponus'

adversaries had recourse because Gregory, unlike Philoponus, had denied that this
framework was valid for the divinity as well. This same point is made in the second
part of John's argument. Although no direct antecedents can be identified for the
particular form that this argument takes it is clearly derived from the earlier discussion.
John simply reverses the original framework, claiming that in God the oneness of nature
is real and the distinction into Father, Son and Spirit only exists in the mind, and then
adds that this is so because in the case of God the number of hypostatic idioms is so
small that it does not divide the substance. It is evident that this argument is highly
problematic because it denies the three divine hypostases objective existence.
It is within this framework that John develops his thoughts about perichoresis. He
claims that because of the multitude of idioms created hypostases are separate from
each other and not in each other whereas the small number of idioms in Father, Son and
Spirit precludes such separation and thus permits their being in one another. This is a
very odd argument because traditionally separation was regarded as the principal
function of hypostatic idioms. It is not found in the texts analysed in the first part of this
article. It is likely that at this point John adapted another source that was also engaging
with Philoponus' theology. The author of this text would have claimed that the divine
nature was one in reality but divided into three in thought. In such a framework the
hypostatic idioms play no role. John would then have changed this model by replacing
the divinities of Father, Son and Spirit with the hypostases themselves, with the result
that his framework took on a 'Sabellian' character. It can further be argued that the
concept of perichoresis was derived from Christology where two natures interpenetrate.
In the same manner the divinity could be understood as three natures that interpenetrate
although these natures are not really but only conceptually distinguished from each
other. The similarities are particularly obvious in Monophysite Christology where two
natures become one, which would be the exact counterpart for the Trinity where three
'natures' become one. Thus it may be that it was the Monophysites who first introduced
the concept of perichoresis and that Chalcedonian theologians learnt it from them.

Dirk Krausmüller, “Responding to John Philoponus: Hypostases, Particular Substances, and

Perichoresis in the Trinity,” Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture 9 (2015) 13-28;
ISSN: 1754-517X. Website: http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/clarc/jlarc