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Debunking Democracy

Bob Black

April 2011

Bob Black
Debunking Democracy
April 2011

Scanned from CAL Press Pamphlet Series #2, Printed April 2011
Scanned from original

theanarchistlibrary.org
just told to believe. The arguments for democracy—which aren’t
often articulated—are so flawed and flimsy, some of them even so
silly,74 that pious democrats might be startled.75
Now, it maybe that some of these criticisms ofdemocratic gov-
ernment are really criticisms of government itself. That does not
detract from, but rather enhances, their validity. That just means
that democracy is not so special after all, and that it has been found
out.
VOTE NOBODY
NOBODY TELLS THE TRUTH.
Bob Black PO Box 3112 Albany NY 12203

74
For example, voluntary residence in a country is said to be ”tacit” consent to
its democratic government. Love it or leave it! Incredibly, most democrats fail to
notice that if voluntary residence counts as consent to be ruled, then it counts as
consent to be ruled by any government, despotic or democratic. Harry Brighouse,
”Democracy and Inequality,” in Democratic Theory Today: Challenges for the 21st
Century, ed. April Carter & Geoffrey Stokes (Cambridge, England: Polity Press,
2002), 56; J.P. Plamanatz, Consent, Freedom, and Political Obligation (2nd ed.;
London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 7-8; A. John Simmons, Moral Principles
and Political Obligations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 7374
& ch. 4. In the anthology Democratic Theory Today, the eleven contributors—all
of them college professors—solemnly discuss civic republicanism, developmental
democracy, deliberative democracy, associative democracy, etc. Not one of them
pauses to justify democracy itself.
75
See, e.g” William Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, ed. Isaac
Kramnick (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1976), 209-253;
Crispin Sartwell, Against the State (Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press, 2008), 39-96 (quoted); Bob

27
as Joel Barlow described it.71 A celebrant of Swiss direct democracy
at its height admits: ”Corruption, factionalization, arbitrariness, vi-
olence, disregard for law, and an obdurate conservatism that op-
posed all social and economic progress were pathologies to some
extent endemic to the pure democratic life form.”72 Democracy in Contents
any form is irrational, unjust, inefficient, capricious, divisive, and
demeaning. Its direct and representative versions, as we have seen,
share many vices. Neither version exhibits any clear advantage Objections to Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
over the other. Each also has vices peculiar to itself. Indeed the Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
systems differ only in degree. Either way, the worst tyranny is the
tyranny of the majority,73 as most anarchists, and some conserva-
tives, and some liberals, and even the more honest democrats, have
often said.
Is democracy nonetheless the best form of government? Even
that is not so obvious, after taking a hard look at just how bad
it is. Its theory is reducible to ruins in a few pages. The believ-
ers claim that democracy promotes dialogue, but where is the di-
alogue about democracy itself? Democrats ignore their critics, as
if democracy is such a done deal, why bother to defend it? They
just take it for granted that somebody (Locke? Rousseau? Lincoln?
Churchill?) has long since made out a strong case for democracy.
Nobody ever did. That’s why you didn’t learn it in school. You were

71
Joel Barlow, ”To His Fellow Citizens of the United States. Letter II: On Cer-
tain Political Measures Proposed for Their Consideration,” in American Political
Writing during the Founding Era, 1760-1805, ed. Charles S Hyneman & Donald S.
Lutz (2 vols.; Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1983), 2: 1106.
72
Benjamin Barber, The Death of Communal Liberty (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1974), 197.
73
e.g., Goldman,”The Individual, Society and the State,” Red Emma Speaks, 98;
see also Robert L Hoffman, Revolutionary Justice: The Social and Political Theory
oP-J. Proudhon (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1972), 187. The expression
is generally credited to Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America, 250) and it
was further popularized by John Stuart Mill; but it was used by at least one Anti-
Federalist in the Ratification debate. Wood, Creation of the American Republic,
484 & n. 19. Certainly the idea was widespread then, and since.

26 3
which Caucus stalwart Sam Adams played a key role.”66 This is
democracy in action.
What Hobbes is talking about, as he proceeds to say, is faction,
which he defines as ”a sort of effort and hard work, which they use
to fashion people.”67 James Madison famously argued that direct
democracy promotes factionalism.68 But an organization of orga-
nizers of votes serves a purpose (its own) in any assembly or leg-
islature. Parties (the euphemism for ”factions”) could play central
roles in a direct democracy, maybe greater roles than in represen-
tative democracy.°
Only regular high turnouts would minimize (not eliminate) these
capricious or manipulated reversals, since, if most citizens attend
every meeting, most of them who attend one meeting will attend
another. The polar possibilities are that all the same people, or all
different people, attend the next meeting. If it is all the same people,
it is de facto oligarchy. If it is all different people, it is chaos, the
only kind of ”anarchy” consistent with direct democracy. It will
usually turn out to be closer to oligarchy.

Conclusion
Majority rule is as arbitrary as random decision, but not nearly
as fair.69 For a voter, the only difference between the lottery70 and
an election is that he might win the lottery. Better pure chance
than ”pure democracy, or the immediate autocracy of the people,”
66
Richard Maxwell Brown, ”Violence and the American Revolution,” in Essay;
on the American Revolution, ed. Stephen G. Kurtz & James H. Hutson (Chapel
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press & New York W.W. Norton & Co.,
1973), 102.
67
Hobbes, On the Citizen, 124.
68
James Madison, The Federdist No. 10, at 56-57.
69
Wolff, In Definse ofAnarchism, 44-45.
70
Thus ”universal suffrage is in my eyes nothing but a lottery:” Pierre-Joseph
Proudhon, General Idea ofthe Revolution in the Nineteenth Century, tr. John Bev-
erley Robinson (London: Freedom Press, 1923), 141.

25
that was made when their opponents were there in strength may For the first time in history, ”nearly everyone today professes to
be reversed when they fail to show.”63 be a democrat.”1 Professors profess democracy profusely, although
Hobbes exactly describes how Samuel Adams manipulated an- they keep it off campus. Democracy—truly, ”that word can mean
other assembly, the Boston town meeting, at prior private meet- anything.”2 Even North Korea calls itself a Democratic People’s Re-
ings of his faction at the Caucus Club: ”Caucusing involved the public. Democracy goes with everything. For champions of capital-
widest prevision of problems that might arise and the narrowest ism, democracy is inseparable from capitalism. For champions of
choice of response to each possibility; who would speak to any is- socialism, democracy is inseparable from socialism. Democracy is
sue, and what he would say; with the clubmen’s general consent even said to be inseparable from anarchism.3 It is identified with
guaranteed, ahead of time, to both choice of speaker and what the the good, the true, and the beautiful.4 There’s a flavor of democ-
speaker’s message would be.” His cousin John Adams was aston- racy for every taste: constitutional democracy, liberal democracy,
ished, after many years of attending town meetings, to learn of social democracy, Christian democracy, even industrial democracy.
this: ”There they drink flip [a rum drink], I suppose, and there they Poets (admittedly not many) have hymned its glory. And yet the
choose a moderator who puts questions to the vote regularly, and suspicion lurks that, as it seemed to another poet, Oscar Wilde,
selectmen, assessors, wardens, fire wards, and representatives are ”democracy means simply the bludgeoning of the people, by the
regularly chosen before they are chosen by the town.”64 Exactly people, and for the people. It has been found out.”5 Found out, and
the same methods of manipulation were practiced in the Athenian found to be unfounded.
assembly.65 Until the 20th century, there were few democracies. Until the
19th century, the wisdom of the ages was unanimous in condem-
Direct democracy is well suited to machine politics: ”The pow-
erful town meeting [in Boston] named the many municipal offi- 1
David Held, Models of Democrat), (2nd ed.; Stanford, CA: Stanford Univer-
cials, determined taxes and assessments, and adopted public ser- sity Press, 1996), 1; see also Tibor R. Machan, ”Introduction: The Democratic Ideal,”
Liberty and Democracy, ed. Tibor R. Machan (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute
vice projects that were a rich source of jobs and economic largesse. Press, 2002), xiii.
For years the original Caucus and its allies in the Merchants Club 2
Jacques Ellul, The Poletical Illusion, tr. Konrad Kellen (New York: Alfred A.
had acted as the unofficial directing body of the town meeting in Knopf, 1967), 181.
3
David Graeber (in the AK Press catalog 2008), quoted in Bob Black, letter to
the editors, Anarchy: A Journal of Desire Armed, No. 67 (Vol. 26, No. 2) (Spring-
63
Hobbes, On the Citizen, 124. Summer 2009), 75.
64 4
Gary Wills, Inventing America: Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence ”Democracy is made identical with intellectual freedom, with economic jus-
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1978), 20 (quoted), 23 (quoting John tice, with social welfare, with tolerance, with piety, moral integrity, the dignity
Adams). The Bostonians recreated the smoke-filled room at the Continental of man, and general civilized decency.” Robert A. Nisbet, Community and Power
Congress, where Jefferson noticed that ”[Samuel Adams] was constantly holding (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 248.
5
caucuses of distinguished men, among whom was Richard Henry Lee, at which ”The Soul of Man Under Socialism.” The First Collected Edition of the Works
the generality of the measures pursued were previously determined on, and at of Oscar Wilde, 1908-1922, ed. Robert Ross (repr. ed.; London: Pall Mall, 1969),
which the parts were assigned to the different actors who afterwards appeared in 8: 294. Wilde was a decadent anarchist dandy. Such lifestyle anarchists despise
them.” Quoted in ibid., 25. democracy. See, e.g., Octave Mirbeau, ”Voters Strike!” in Rants and Incendiary
65
R.K.Sinclair, Democracy and Participation in Ancient Athens (Cambridge: Tracts, ed. Bob Black & Adam Parfrey (New York: Amok Press & Port Townsend,
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 144-145. WA: Loompanics Unlimited, 1989), 74-78.

24 5
nation of democracy. All the sages of ancient Greece denounced has ever seriously tried to make direct democracy work. For exam-
it, especially the sages of democratic Athens.6 As Hegel wrote: ple, the assembly voted to give the Mytilenians, whose revolt had
”Those ancients who as members of democracies since their youth, been crushed, the Melian treatment: death for all the men, slavery
had accumulated long experience and reflected profoundly about for the women and children. The judgment was reversed the next
it, held different views on popular opinion from those more a pri- day, the second ship dispatched to Mytilene happily arrived first,
ori views prevalent today.” **7 The Framers of the U.S. Constitution and so only the Mytilenians held mainly responsible—over 1,000 of
rejected democracy.8 So did their opponents, the Anti-Federalists.9 them—were executed.60 Better, of course, to reverse a bad decision
The democracy which was then universally despised is what is now than stick to it; but people are reluctant to publicly admit they were
called direct democracy, government by the people over the peo- wrong.
ple. ”People” in ”by the people” meant the citizens: a minority con- It is bad enough if the composition of the assembly fluctuates ran-
sisting of some of the adult males. ”People” in ”over the people” domly or because of politically extraneous factors, as the weather,
meant everybody. The citizenry assembled at intervals to wield for instance, influences American election outcomes by influenc-
state power by majority vote. This system no longer exists any- ing voter turnout61 (higher proportions of Democrats turn out in
where, and that makes it easier to believe in it, as Hegel observed. good weather). But it might well turn on deliberate mobilization
Democracy only became respectable, in the 19th century, when by a faction. This, too, happened in Athens. The general Nicias, ad-
its meaning changed. Now it meant representative democracy, in dressing the assembly in opposition to the proposed Sicilian ex-
which the citizenry—now an electorate, but still a minority—from pedition, stated: ”It is with real alarm that I see this young man’s
time to time choose some of its rulers by majority vote (or rather, [Alcibiades’] party sitting at his side in this assembly all called in
to support him, and I, on my side, call for the support of the older
6
Ernest Barker, The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle (New York Dover, men among you.” A line by the satiric playwright Aristophanes also
1959), 13; M.I. Finley, Democrat.; Ancient and Modern (2nd ed.; London: Hogarth attests to bloc voting in the assembly.62
Press, 1985), 5, 29; David Held, ”Democracy: From City-States to a Cosmopoli- Hobbes observed that ”when the votes are sufficiently close for
tan Order,” in Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology, ed. Robert E.
Goodin & Philip Pettit (Malden, Mk Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 80.
the defeated to have hopes of winning a majority at a subsequent
7
G.W.F. Hegel, ”On the English Reform Bill,” Political Writings, ed. Laurence meeting if a few men swing round to their way of thinking, their
Dickey & H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 235. leaders get them all together, and they hold a private discussion on
8
Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cam- how to revoke the measure that has just been passed. They resolve
bridge*. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967), 282284; Gordon S.
among themselves to attend the next meeting in large numbers and
Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 17761787 (New York & London:
W.W. Norton & Company, 1972), 222-223, 409-413; see, e.g, The Federalist, ed. Ja- to be there first; they arrange what each should say and in what or-
cob E. Cooke (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), 61 (No. 10) (James der, so that the question may be brought up again, and the decision
Madison); The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, ed. Max Farrand (New
60
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1911), 1: 2627 (Edmund Randolph), 48 (Elbridge Finley, Democracy, 52; Hegel, ”On the English Reform Bill,” 235; Thucydides,
Gerry), 49 (George Mason), 288 (Alexander Hamilton). Randolph blamed Amer- Peloponnesian War, 212-223.
61
ica’s problems on ”the turbulence and follies of democracy:” Records, 1:5 1. Russell Hardin, Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought, ”Participation.”
9 62
Herbert J. Storing, What the Antifidenalists Were For (Chicago, IL & London: Thucydides, Peloponnesian War, 417 (quoted); ”Ecclesiazusai,” Aristophanes:
University of Chicago Press, 1981), 29. Plays II, tr. Patric Dickinson (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 2: 256.

6 23
when the Athenian assembly voted for the disastrous Sicilian ex- by the majority of those actually voting—which is not the same
pedition: ”The result of this excessive enthusiasm of the majority thing). The elected rulers appoint the rest of the rulers. As always,
was that the few who were actually opposed to the expedition were some rule, and all are ruled. In the 19th century, when this system
afraid of being thought unpatriotic if they voted against it, and prevailed in only a few nations, it acquired a few intellectually able
therefore kept quiet.”58 proponents, such as John Stuart Mill, but it also evoked some in-
17. A specific, experimentally validated emotional influence viti- tellectually able opponents, such as HerbertSpencer, Pierre-Joseph
ating democracy is group pressure to conform. Proudhon, and Friedrich Nietzsche. Democracy, as one of the as-
This was strikingly demonstrated in a famous experiment by so- cendant political ideologies of the age, accommodated itself to the
cial psychologist Solomon Asch. Each of seven to nine experimen- others: to liberalism, nationalism, socialism, and even Christianity.
tal subjects was asked to compare a series of lines, and in each They in turn accommodated it, usually. Improbably, the doctrines
case identify the two lines that were equal in length. For each legitimated one another, usually.
comparison it was obvious, indeed extremely obvious, which lines The announced popularity of democracy is surely exaggerated.
matched— but time after time, every member of the group gave the It’s a mile wide and an inch deep. Aversion to authoritarian regimes
same wrong answer—except the only subject who was unaware of is not necessarily enthusiasm for democracy. In some of the post-
the real purpose of the experiment. In these circumstances, fifty- Communist democracies, democracy has already lost its charm.10
eight percent of the test subjects changed their answer to agree In others, such as Russia, democracy itself is already lost. Older
with the unanimous majority. Even when subjects were each given democracies persist more from apathy and force of habit than from
one ally, thirteen percent of the subjects agreed with the group in- genuine conviction. John Zerzan reasonably asks: ”Has there ever
stead of the evidence of their senses.59 Some of the conformists been so much incessant yammer about democracy, and less real
actually changed their perceptions, but most of them simply de- interest in it?”11 Well, has there?
cided that the group must be right, no matter how strong was the The idea of democracy has never been justified, merely glorified.
evidence to the contrary. None of the older criticisms of democracy has been refuted, and
18. Another inherent flaw in direct democracy partly (not en- neither has any of the newer ones. They come from left, right, and
tirely) a consequence of the previous one, is the inconstancy ofpol- center. Some of these criticisms follow. They establish that democ-
icy. racy is irrational, inefficient, unjust, and antithetical to the very
This really covers two related arguments against democracy. values claimed for it: liberty, equality, and fraternity. It does not
What the assembly does at one meeting it may undo at the next, even, for instance, imply liberty.12 Rather, the instinctive tendency
whether because citizens have had sober second thoughts (a good of democracy is ”to despise individual rights and take little account
reason) or because a different mix of people shows up (a bad rea-
10
son). This often happened in classical Athens, the only polity which Ralf Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe (New Brunswick,
NJ & London: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 168.
58 11
Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, tr. Rex Warner (London: Rea- John Zerzan, ”No Way Out,” Running on Emptiness: The Pathology of Civi-
gan Books, 1951), 425. lization (Los Angeles, CA: Feral House 2002), 204.
59 12
Solomon E. Asch, Social Psychology (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Bertrand Russell, ”The Prospects of Democracy,” Mortals and Others: Amer-
1952), 458, 477. ican Essays 1929-1935, ed. Henry Ruja (London & New York: Routledge, 1996), 2:

22 7
of them.”13 Democracy not only subverts community, it insults dig- answer to the question. The answer is no. A direct democrat who
nity, and it affronts common sense. Not all of these violated values claims that an overarching confederal system produces majority
are important to everyone, but some of them are important to any- decisions,53 affirms the impossible as an act of faith.
one, except to someone to whom nothing is important. That is why 16. Direct democracy, to an even greater degree than represen-
post-modernists are democrats. tative democracy, encourages emotional, irrational decision mak-
ing.54
In recent years, some intellectuals (academics and former radi-
The face-to-face context of assembly politics engenders strong
cals) have tried to revive direct democracy as an ideal, and set it
interpersonal psychological influences which are, at best, extrane-
up as a viable alternative to representative democracy. Their stren-
ous to decision making on the merits. The crowd is susceptible to
uous exertions interest only themselves. Their efforts fail, for at
orators and stars, and intolerant of contradiction.55 The speakers,
least two reasons.
in the limited time allotted to them, tend to sacrifice reasoning to
The first reason is that, as a matter of fact, ”there is no reason to persuasion whenever they have to choose, if they want to win. As
believe that there has ever been an urban, purely direct democracy Hobbes wrote, the speakers begin not from true principles but from
or even a reasonable approximation of one. Every known instance ”commonly accepted opinions, which are for the most part usually
has involved a considerable admixture of representative democracy false, and they do not try to make their discourse correspond to
which has sooner or later usually subordinated [direct] democracy the nature of things but to the passions of men’s hearts. The result
where it didn’t eliminate it altogether.”14 There is no space to prove is that votes are cast not on the basis of correct reasoning but on
it here, but the evidence is ample.15 Direct democracy is merely an emotional impulse.”56 ”Pure democracy, like pure rum, easily pro-
abstract ideal, a fantasy really, with no basis in historical experi- duces intoxication, and with it a thousand mad pranks and fool-
ence. According to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who is falsely claimed ishness.”57 Dissenters feel intimidated, as they were, for instance,
to be an advocate of direct democracy, ”however small any State 53
E.g., Murray Bookchin, Anarchism, Marxism, and the Future of the Left, 1993-
1998 (Edinburgh, Scotland & San Francisco, CA: A.K. Press, 1999), 314.
54
”The general characteristics of crowds are to be met with in parliamentary
assemblies: Intellectual simplicity, irritability, suggestibility, the exaggeration of
24; James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty Equality Fraternity (Chicago IL & London: the sentiments and the preponderating influence of a few leaders.” Le Bon, The
University of Chicago Press, 1991), 168. Crowd, 187. Automatic word wrap
13 55
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. J.P. Mayer, tr. George Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical
Lawrence (Garden City, New York Doubleday & Company, Anchor Books, 1969), Tendencies of Modern Democracy (New York The Free Press & London: Collier-
699. Macmillan Limited, 1962), 64, 98-102. For anyone who has doubts about democ-
14
Bob Black, Anarchy after Leftism (Columbia, MO: C.A.L. Press, 1997), 71. racy, this is the first book to read.
56
Representative democracy can also incorporate minor elements of direct democ- Hobbes, The Citizen, 123; see also Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the
racy, as it does, in the United States, with trial by jury. But representative officials Analysis of the Ego, tr. & ed. James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
(judges) severely circumscribe the jury. Robert C. Black, ”FIJA: Monkeywrench- 1959), 9; Le Bon, The Crowd 187.
57
ing the Justice System?,” UMKC Law Review 66(1) (Fall 1997), 12-13. John Jay quoted in Lift of john fax ed. William Jay (New York J. & J. Harper,
15
Bob Black, Nightmares of Reason (2010), chs. 14 & 15, available online from 1833), 2: 315. Jay, co-author of The Federalist, was the first Chief Justice of the U.S.
The Anarchist Library. Supreme Court.

8 21
all.”50 Even if as currently in the United States, districts are required may be, civil societies are always too populous to be under the im-
to be nearly equal in population, gerrymandering—the drawing of mediate government of all their members.”16
their boundaries so as to favor some candidate or party is a stand- The second reason is that the major objections to representative
ing temptation. Especially since the incumbents do the drawing. democracy also apply to direct democracy, even if the latter is re-
Using the latest liberatory technology— the computer—it’s easy to garded as an ideal form of pure majoritarian democracy. Some ob-
devise gerrymandered but mathematically equal districts. jections apply to one version, some to the other, but most apply to
15. Direct democracy trying to avert this evil, embraces federal- both. There are more than enough reasons to reject every version
ism, which increases inequality of democracy. Let us, then, consider some of these objections.
If the neighborhood or face-to-face basic units were autarchic—
self-governing and self-sufficient—it would be nobody’s business
but theirs which people they included and how many. They could Objections to Democracy
go to hell in their own way. But schemes for direct democracy
typically call for a federal system with layers of ”mandated and
1. The majority isn’t always right.
revocable delegates, responsible to the base” by which the deci-
As (among many others) Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Henry David
sions of assemblies are reconciled. Some delegates to the higher
Thoreau, Mikhail Bakunin, Benjamin Tucker, Errico Malatesta, and
levels will potentially speak for a different number of citizens than
Emma Goldman said—and does anybody disagree?—democracy
other delegates but cast equal votes. In a federal system of units
does not assure correct decisions. ”The only thing special about
of unequal population, voting equality for the units means vot-
majorities is that they are not minorities.”17 There is no strength
ing inequality for individuals. The federalist—but single-member—
in numbers, or rather, there is nothing but strength in numbers.
simple-plurality system evidently contemplated by most direct
Parties, families, corporations, unions, nearly all voluntary associ-
democrats, including the syndicalists, is the least proportionate of
ations are, by choice, oligarchic.18 Indeed, in assemblies whether
all voting systems.51
direct or representative, in electorates as in legislatures, the whole
The inequality will be compounded at every higher level. The
is less—even less—than the sum of its parts. It is even mathemati-
majority; the majority of the majority; the majority of the majority
cally demonstrable (but not by me) that majority decision-making
of the majority—the higher up you go, the greater the inequality.
The more often you multiply by a fraction, the smaller the number 16
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ”Discourse on Political Economy,” The Social Con-
you arrive at. ”It is not possible,” it is said, ”to find a general an-
tract and Discourses, tr. G.D.H. Cole (New York: E.P. Dutton and Sons & London:
swer to the question of to what extent federalism may legitimately J.M. Dent and Sons, 1950), 313.
be allowed to outweigh democracy.”52 Actually, there is a general 17
Loren E. Lomasky, ”Default and Dynamic Democracy,” in Liberty and
Democracy, 3.
50 18
H.L. Mencken, Notes on Democracy (New York: Alfred A, Knopf, 1926), 89 Clark Kerr, Unions and Union Leaders of Their Own Choosing (New York
(quoted); see also Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy, 83-84. The Fund for the Republic, 1957), 12. Similarly, Switzerland’s democracy is the
51
Sally Burch, Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought, q/v ”Electoral Systems.” most participatory in the world, but the Swiss are not ” particularly participative
52
Linder, Swiss Democracy, 84. In the Swiss system, the vote of one citizen in in economic and social life.” Wolf Linder, Swiss Democracy (3rd ed., rev. & upci.;
Uri, a small rural canton, outweighs the votes of 34 citizens in Zurich. Ibid., 81. Basingstoke, Hamps., England & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 127.

20 9
generates inefficient, socially wasteful, more or less self-defeating them and act them out in everyday life. Elections are undesirable
decisions.19 everywhere, but nowhere would they be more destructive of com-
Besides, after all, why should you, why should anyone, accept munity than in face-to-face assemblies and neighborhoods.
a decision that you know is wrong? Surely the quality of its deci- 13. Another source of majority irresponsibility and minority in-
sions has something to do with the quality of the decision-making dignity is the felt frivolity of voting its element of chance and arbi-
process. trariness.
As Thoreau (quoted by Emma Goldman) put it, ’All voting is a
2. Democracy does not as is promised, give everyone the right to
sort of gaming, like checquers or backgammon, with a slight moral
influence the decisions affecting her, because a person who voted
tinge to it, a playing with right and wrong, with moral questions;
on the losing side had no influence on that decision.
and betting naturally accompanies it.”49 Majority rule is majority
As Henry David Thoreau wrote, ”a minority is powerless while roulette. The popularity of student government and Model UN con-
it conforms to the majority; it is not even a minority then.”20 It is, in firms that there is a ludic, playing-around element to deliberative
fact, powerless, it is nothing. Thomas Hobbes anticipated Thoreau: decision making which is independent of its consequences. Here is
”And if the Representative consist of many men, the voyce of the an interest the delegates share with each other, but not with their
greater number, must be considered as the voyce of them all. For constituents. Voting is a contest, officially umpired by the major-
if the lesser number pronounce (for example) in the Affirmative, ity, with sometimes high stakes. To the extent that the assembled
and the greater in the Negative, there will be Negatives more than citizens are playing games with each other, or that winning for its
enough to destroy the Affirmatives; and thereby the excesse of Neg- own sake (or for how you play the game, for that matter) plays any
atives, standing uncontradicted, are the onely voyce the Represen- part in their motivation, the quality of decision making is reduced
tative hath.”21 ”The numerical majority,” wrote John C. Calhoun, ”is still further and the humiliation of submission to majority rule is
as truly a single power—and excludes the negative as completely that much deepened.
as the absolute government of one or a few.”22 14. Under representative democracy with electoral districts,
malapportionment—the creation of districts with unequal
populations—is possible and, even if they are equal, gerry-
19
Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (New York Vin- mandering is almost inevitable.
tage Books, 1966), 120-127; James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus
of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor, MI: Modern democrats agree with H.L. Mencken that ”it must be
University of Michigan Press, 1962), 169; Elaine Spitz, Majority Rule (Chatham, plain that a community whose votes, man for man, count for only
NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1982); 153; Michael Taylor, Community Anarchy half as much as the votes of another community is one in which
and Liberty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 54-55.
20 half of the citizens are, to every practical intent, unable to vote at
Henry David Thoreau, ”Civil Disobedience,” in Walden and Civil Disobedi-
ence (New York: Signet Classics, 1960), 231.
21 49
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C.B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth, Middle- Thoreau, ”Civil Disobedience,” 226, quoted in ”Anarchism: What It Really
sex, England: Pelican Books, 1968), 221. Stands For,” Emma Goldman, Red Emma Speaks: Selected Writings and Speeches,
22
John C. Calhoun, Disquisitions on Government and Selections from the Dis- ed. Alix Kates Shulman (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), 60; Waldron, Dignity
courses (Indianapolis, IN & New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1953), 29. of Legislation, 126-127.

10 19
but because it is convinced that it is a minority.”45 Literally having 3. Democracy especially in small constituencies, lends itself to
to face an opponent publicly may provoke aggression, anger, and the disempowerment of permanent minorities, who occupy the
competitive feelings46 same position in the democracy as they would in a despotism.
In a winner-take-all system there is no incentive to compensate It isn’t always the same momentary majority that rules, but often
or conciliate defeated minorities, who have been told, in effect, that it is, and shifting majorities only make it less likely, not unlikely,
not only are they not to get their way, they are also stigmatized as for some group to be always opposed to the winning gang.23 Un-
wrong. The unaccountable majority is arrogant; the defeated mi- der American democracy, it has long been well-known, even to
nority is resentful.47 Coercive voting promotes polarization and the U.S. Supreme Court in 1938, that ”discrete and insular minori-
hardens positions. Deliberation ”can bring differences to the sur- ties” are at a political disadvantage beyond the mere fact (which is
face, widening rather than narrowing them.”48 These consequences, disadvantage enough) that they are minorities.24 And the smaller
muted in systems of large-scale, secret voting in not-too-frequent the constituency, the more likely it is that many interests may be
elections, are accentuated in the imagined communal combination represented ”by numbers so small as to be less than the minimum
of very small electorates, extremely frequent elections, and public necessary for defense of those interests in any setting.”25
voting. Citizens will take their animosities and ulcers home with
4. Majority rule ignores the urgency of preferences.
45
Stephen, Liberty Equalioc Fraternity, 70. Preference varies in intensity, but consent does not. Preference
46
Spitz, Majority Rule, 192 (quoted); Arend Lijphart, Encyclopedia of Demo-
is more or less, consent is yes or no. The vote of a person who
cratic Thought, q/v ”Consensus Democracy” (majoritarian democracy is ”ex-
clusive, competitive and adversarial”); Jane L. Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary has only a slight preference for a candidate or measure counts
Democracy (New York: Basic Books, 1980), 273. Mansbridge adds that because the same as the vote of someone passionately opposed, and so: ”A
it is distressing to face a hostile majority, the meeting exerts pressure for con- majority with slight preferences one way may outvote almost as
formity. Highly motivated militants may just wear down and outlast the others:
many strong preferences the other way.” There could even be, as
”The Lower and Weaker Faction, is the firmer in Conjunction: And it is often scene,
that a few, that are Stiffe, doe tire out, a greater Number, that are more Moder- just noted, a permanently frustrated minority, which is a source of
ate.” Francis Bacon, ”Of Faction,” The Essayes or Counsels, Civil! and Moral, ed. instability, or even oppression. To put it another way, the opportu-
Michael Kiernan (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1985), 155 (essay no. LI.). nity to influence a decision is not proportionate to one’s legitimate
Not the least of the many serious inequalities which inhere in the assembly is the interest in the outcome.26
inequality between extraverts and introverts. Assembly government discourages
attendance by the kind of person who does not like to be in the same room with,
23
say, Murray Bookchin or Peter Staudenmeier. Spitz, Majority Rule, 183; Juerg Steiner, ”Decision-Making,” in Encyclopedia
47
”To see the proposal of a man whom we despise preferred to our own; to of Democratic Thought, ed. Paul Barry Clarke & Joe Foweracker (London & New
see our wisdom ignored before our eyes; to incur certain enmity in an uncertain York Routledge, 2001), q/v ”Decision-Making.”
24
struggle for empty glory; to hate and be hated because of differences of opinion United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n. 4 (1938).
25
(which cannot be avoided, whether we win or lose); to reveal our plans and wishes MacConnell, Private Power and American Democracy, 105 (quoted), 109.
26
when there is no need to and to get nothing by it; to neglect our private affairs. John Burnheim, Is Democracy Possible? Alternatives to Electoral Politics
These, I say, are disadvantages.” Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen, ed. & tr. Richard (Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 1985), 83 (quoted); Jeremy Waldron, The Dig-
Tuck & Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 120. nity ofLegislation (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999),
48
Ian Shapiro, ”Optimal Participation?” journal of Political Philosophy 10(2) 132, 142-143; Buchanan & Tullock, Calculus of Consent, 125-127, 132-133; Robert
(June 2002), 198-199. A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago

18 11
 Democratic theorists usually ignore the issue or, like John Rawls, Consider a typical political issue, the building of a highway. (A
wave it away by dogmatizing that ”this criticism rests upon the mis- power plant or a garbage dump might be an even better example.)
taken view that the intensity of desire is a relevant consideration Everyone wants a road, but no one wants it in his back yard. If three
in enacting legislation.”27 But, however embarrassing to democrats, groups want a road—but not in their back yards, thank you—they
”the intensity question is absolutely vital to the stability of demo- will gang up to scotch the project.42 The road that everyone wants
cratic systems”—and it’s a question to which pure majoritarian somewhere will not be built anywhere. That is an even worse out-
democracy has no answer.28 Rousseau at least recognized the prob- come than with logrolling, where at least the road gets built some-
lem, although his solution is impractical. He thought that ”the more where, and might be of some use to somebody. It isn’t easy to say
grave and important the questions discussed, the nearer should the which is worse, a democracy that doesn’t govern, or a democracy
opinion that is to prevail approach unanimity.”29 But there is no that does.
way in which to decide a priori the importance of a question. First 12. Democracy, especially direct democracy, promotes disharmo-
you have to decide how important the question is, and the majority nious, antisocial feelings.
may well rule a question to be unimportant to make sure that the The psychology of the ekklesia (assembly) is the psychology of
question will be answered as that majority wishes. the agora (marketplace): ”Voters and customers are essentially the
5. There are no self-evident democratic voting rules. same people. Mr. Smith buys and votes; he is the same man in
Majority or plurality? Proxy voting? Quorums? Are supermajori- the supermarket and the voting booth.”43 Capitalism and democ-
ties (three-fifths? two-thirds?) required for all, some, or none of the racy rose to dominance together as the goals of the same class,
decisions? Who sets the agenda? Are motions from the floor enter- the bourgeoisie. Together they made a common world of selfish
tained? Who decides who gets to speak, and for how long, and who individualism—an arena of competition, not a field of cooperation.
gets the first or last word? Who schedules the meeting? Who ad- Democracy, like litigation, is an adversarial decision method: ”Ma-
journs it? And who decides, and by what rules, the answers to all jority rule belongs to a combat theory of politics. It is a contest
these questions? ”If the participants disagree on the voting rules, between opposing forces, and the outcome is victory for one side
they may first have to vote on these rules. But they may disagree and defeat for the other.” Indeed, as Georg Simmel noticed, major-
on how to vote on the voting rules, which may make voting impos- ity rule is really the substituted equivalent of force.44 ”We agree
to try strength by counting heads instead of breaking heads. The
minority gives way not because it is convinced that it is wrong,
Press, 1956), 91-99; Robert A. Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy
42
vs. Control (New Haven, CT & London: Yale University Press, 1982), 88-89. Nicholas Rescher, ”Risking D: Problems of Political Decision,” Public Affairs
27
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (rev. ed.; Cambridge: Harvard University Quarterly 13(4) (Oct. 1999), 298.
43
Press, Belnap Press, 1999), 230. Tullock, Vote Motive, 5. Moral considerations aside (where they belong), ma-
28
Benjamin Barber, The Conquest of Politics: Liberal Philosophy in Democratic jority rule with logrolling may lead to inefficient outcomes—peak efficiency re-
Times (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 79 (quoted); Willmoore quires, surprisingly, supermajorities: ”Majority rule is thus generally not optimal.”
Kendall & George W. Carey, ”The ’Intensity’ Problem and Democratic Theory,” Ibid., 51-55, 55 (quoted).
44
American Political Science Review 62(1) (March 1968): 5-24. ”The Phenomenon of Outvoting,” The Sociology of Georg Simmel, ed. Kurt
29
Rousseau, ”The Social Contract,” 7he Social Contract and Discourses, 107. H. Wolff (New York: The Free Press & London: Collier-Macmillan, 1950), 241-242.

12 17
 Logrolling is an exchange of votes between factions. Each group sible as the decision on how to vote is pushed further and further
votes for the other group’s measure, a measure which would other- back.”30
wise be defeated because each group is in the minority. (Note that 6. Collective, all-or-nothing balloting is irrational A decision
this is not a compromise because the measures are unrelated.39 The made on a momentous matter by a single vote is as valid as a
factions aren’t splitting the difference.) In a sense, logrolling facil- unanimous vote on a trifle. That extreme rarity, the one time
itates some accommodation of the urgency of preferences, since a one vote, one person’s will, makes a difference, is the very same
faction only trades its votes for votes it values more highly—but situation—monarchy, dictatorship, one-man rule—that democracy
it does so by bribery and to the detriment of deliberative democ- is supposed to be an improvement on!
racy. No majority really approves of either measure enacted by At all other times, of all the votes for the winning side, only one
logrolling, since if it did, there would be no need for logrolling. is decisive, so the votes of all but one of the winners, like the votes
And those whose votes are unnecessary can be excluded from the of all of the losers, might as well not have been cast.
logrolling process.40 The practice is common to representative and 7. Majority rule is not even what it purports to be: it rarely means
direct democracies.41 literally the majority of the people.31
11. In the unlikely event a legislative body eschews logrolling, it Many people (such as children, foreigners, lunatics, transients,
may succumb to gridlock. and felons) are everywhere denied the right to vote. The disenfran-
chised are never much short of being the majority, and sometimes
39
Buchanan & Tullock, Calculus of Consent, 132-133; Burnheim, Is Democra), they are the majority. And since it rarely happens that every one
Possible?, 6; McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy, 111-112.
40 of the eligible voters votes every time, usually the resulting major-
John T. Noonan, Jr., Bribery (New York: Macmillan & London: Collier
Macmillan Publishers, 1984), 580; Clayton P. Gillette, ”Equality and Variety in ity of a majority means plurality rule,32 in other words, the rule
the Delivery of Municipal Services,” Harvard Law Review 100(1) (Nov. 1986), 959. of the momentarily largest minority, which might be rather small.
In 12th century Italy, Genoa and Pistoia prohibited logrolling in consular elec- The majority of a majority is often, and the majority of a minor-
tions. Lauro Martines, Power and Imagination: City-States in Renaissance Italy
ity is always, a minority. In order to cobble together majorities out
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 29. Such laws are in vain: ”The laws against
logrolling (probably passed in part through logrolling) have substantially no ef- of incoherent assemblies, leaders usually wield literally decisive
fect on the functioning of democracy in countries which have adopted them.” power.33 Under any possible government, a minority governs.
Gordon Tullock, The Vote Motive (n.p.: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1976),
30
41. They only invite secrecy and hypocrisy. The two-thirds majority of states for Steiner, ”Decision-Making,” 130.
31
the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution abolishing Spitz, Majority Rule, 3.
32
slavery was obtained by logrolling. Noonan, Bribery, 456-458. John Stuart Mill, ”Representative Government,” in Utilitarianism, Liberty
41
See, e.g., Tullock, The Vote Motive, 45-46. Referenda, another expression of and Representative Government (New York: E.P. Dutton and Company & London:
direct democracy, provide ”the dearest example” of logrolling, putting to a sin- J.M. Dent and Sons, 1951), 346-347; Harold Barday, People Without Government
gle vote unrelated measures grouped together to appeal to a majority. Ibid., 48- An Anthropology of Anarchism (London: Kahn & Averill with Cienfuegos Press,
49. Some state constitutions try to prohibit induding more than one subject in 1982), 118; Linder, Swiss Democracy, 110.
33
each ballot proposal. These provisions are notoriously ineffective They are also ”The necessity for these leaders is evident, since, under the name of heads
undemocratic themselves, because the judiciary is then the final arbiter. In a po- of groups, they are met with in the assemblies of every country. They are the real
litical system without checks and balances, democracy is tyranny. But a political rulers of an assembly.” Gustav Le Bon, The Crowd (New York: Compass Books,
system with checks and balances is not a democracy. 1960), 189.

16 13
 8. Whether voting by electoral districts or in popular assemblies, no mere theoretical possibility: it has happened in real votes. There
decisions are arbitrary because the boundaries of the districts de- are, in fact, a number of these voting paradoxes. Under ideal con-
termine the composition of their electorates, which determines the ditions, majority rule almost always produces these cyclical pref-
decisions. erence orders. For this and other reasons, ”the various equilibrium
In a democracy, ”the definition of the constituency within which conditions for majority rule are incompatible with even a very mod-
the count is taken is a matter of primary importance,” but demo- est degree of heterogeneity of tastes, and for most purposes are not
cratic theory is unable to say who should be included in an elec- significantly less restrictive than the extreme condition of complete
torate.34 Redraw the boundaries and the majority becomes a mi- unanimity of individual preferences.”36
nority or vice versa, although no one has changed his mind. The What that means is that whoever controls the agenda controls
politicians who draw and redraw the boundaries understand this the vote, or, at least, ”that making agendas seems just about as sig-
very well. nificant as actually passing legislation.”37 It is fitting that a 19th
9. Then there is the Voter’s Paradox, a technical but very real con- century mathematician who wrote on this phenomenon (which he
tradiction in democracy discovered by Condorcet before the French called ”cyclical majorities”) is better known under his pen name,
Revolution. Lewis Carroll.38 He came by his sense of the absurd honestly.
In every situation where two or more voters choose from three 10. Another well-known method for thwarting majority rule
or more alternatives, if the voters choose consistently, the major- with voting is logrolling.
ity preference may be determined solely by the order in which the
alternatives are voted on. It can happen that A is preferred to B, B ever to recover fully.” William R. Keech, ”Thinking About the Length and Renewa-
is preferred to C, yet C is by the majority preferred toA!35 This is bility of Electoral Terms,” in Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, 104.
36
William H. Riker & Barry R. Weingast, ”Constitutional Regulation of Leg-
34
Peter J. Taylor, Graham Gudgin, & R.I. Johnston, ”The Geography of Rep- islative Choice: The Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures,”
resentation: A Review of Recent Findings,” in Electoral Laws and Their Political Working Papers in Political Science No. P-86-11 (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution,
Consequences, ed. Bernard Grofman Aren Lijphart (New York: Agathon Press, 1986), 13-18 (real-life examples of perpetual cyclical majorities); Hanno Nurmi,
1986), 183-184; McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy, 92 (quoted); Voting Paradoxes and How to Deal With Mem (Berlin, Germany: Springer, 1999);
Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy, 97-99; Bruce E. Cain, The Reapportion- Peter C. Fishburn, ”Paradoxes of Voting,” American Political Science Review 68(2)
ment Puzzle (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), 36-37. (June 1974): 537-546 (five more paradoxes); Gerald H. Kramer, ”On a Class of
35
Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (2d ed.; New York: John Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule,” Econometrica 41(2) (March 1973), 285
Wiley & Sons, 1963), 2-3, 94-95; An Essay on the Application of Probability The- (quoted). The only reason cyclical preference orders are not more common in real
ory to Plurality Decision-Making (1785),” in Condorcet: Foundations of Social life is the influence of other undemocratic practices such as logrolling (see below).
37
Choice and Political Theory, tr. & ed. lain McLean & Fiona Hewitt (Aldershot, Ian Shapiro, ”Three Fallacies Concerning Majorities, Minorities, and Demo-
Hants., England & Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1994), 120130. A cer- cratic Politics,” in NOMOSXXIII.* Majorities and Minorities, ed. John W Chapman
tain Rev. Dodgson invented the notion of ”None of the Above” as a ballot option. & Alan Wertheimer (New York & London: New York University Press, 1990), 97;
”A Method of Taking Votes on More Than Two Issues,” in The Political Pamphlets William H. Riker, ”Introduction,” Agenda Formation, ed. William H. Riker (Ann
and Letters of Charles Lutwidge Dodgson and Related Pieces: A Mathematical Ap- Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 1 (quoted).
38
proach, ed. Francine F. Abeles (New York: Lewis Carroll Society of North America, ”Method of Taking Votes on More Than Two Issues,” 46-58; Robert Paul Wolff,
2001), 95. Since Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, ”the theoretical case that elec- In Defense of Anarchism (New York Harper Torchbooks, 1970), 59-63; Arrow, So-
tions can assure desirable outcomes was dealt a blow from which it is unlikely cial Choice and Individual Values, 94.

14 15