V.

PRESUMPTION IN AID OF CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION their former respective positions or any substantial equivalent positions if already filled

up, without loss of seniority right and privileges but with limited backwages of six (6)

PRESUMPTION AGAINST UNCONCONSTITUTIONALITY months. Private respondents filed a Motion For Issuance of a Writ of Execution

Laws are presumed constitutional. To justify nullification of law, there must pursuant to Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715. Petitioner and complainants filed their own
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. Appeals.
The theory is that, as the joint act of the legislative and executive authorities,
a law is supposed to have been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional Petitioner filed an Opposition to the motion for execution alleging that Section
before it was finally enacted. 12 of R.A. No. 6715 on execution pending appeal cannot be applied retroactively to cases
All laws are presumed valid and constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled
by the Court. pending at the time of its effectivity because it does not expressly provide that it shall

be given retroactive effect and to give retroactive effect to Section 12 thereof to

pending cases would not only result in the imposition of an additional obligation on
ARIS (PHIL.) INC., V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, petitioner but would also dilute its right to appeal since it would be burdened with the
ET. AL consequences of reinstatement without the benefit of a final judgment.

GR 90501 AUGUST 5, 1991

DOCTRINE: ISSUE:

Laws are presumed constitutional. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear Whether or not the provision under Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715 is constitutional.

and unequivocal breach of the constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative

implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the constitution is HELD:

clear beyond reasonable doubt. YES. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.

FACTS: RATIO:

On 11 April 1988, private respondents, who were employees of petitioner, Presumption against unconstitutionality. The validity of the questioned law is not

aggrieved by management’s failure to attend to their complaints concerning their only supported and sustained by the foregoing considerations. As contended by the

working surroundings which had become detrimental and hazardous, requested for a Solicitor General, it is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. Certainly, if the

grievance conference. Private respondents lost no time in filing a complaint for illegal right of an employer to freely discharge his employees is subject to regulation by the

dismissal against petitioner with NLRC of NCR. After due trial, Aris (Phils.), Inc. is State, basically in the exercise of its permanent police power on the theory that the

hereby ordered to reinstate within ten (10) days from receipt private respondents to preservation of the lives of the citizens is a basic duty of the State, that is more vital
than the preservation of corporate profits. Then, by and pursuant to the same power,

the State may authorize an immediate implementation, pending appeal, of a decision

reinstating a dismissed or separated employee since that saving act is designed to stop,

although temporarily since the appeal may be decided in favor of the appellant, a

continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed or

separated employee and its family.

Moreover, the questioned interim rules of the NLRC can validly be given

retroactive effect. They are procedural or remedial in character, promulgated pursuant

to the authority vested upon it under Article 218(a) of the Labor Code of the

Philippines, as amended. Settled is the rule that procedural laws may be given

retroactive effect. There are no vested rights in rules of procedure. A remedial statute

may be made applicable to cases pending at the time of its enactment.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST INJUSTICE ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic

The law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as Act No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency

this never within the legislative intent. Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?

We interpret and apply the law in consonance with justice.

HELD: NO.
Judges do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and
The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar
consequence.
as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE
SALVACION VS. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby required to
(G.R. NO. 94723. AUGUST 21, 1997) comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to release to petitioners

the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.

FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of

rape and serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and

several dollar checks and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however, award of damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to

able to escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court awarded show that the economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present;

Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorney’s fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00. and even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of

law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when

Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice

Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular and inequality such as the case before us.

No. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other

order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore

body whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw

Supreme Court. deposits from foreign lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give the latter

protection. However, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is

not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and

protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country
and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time. Considering

that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the protection of

Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment,

garnishment or other court processes.

Further, the SC said: “In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its

justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular

No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of

any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is

applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved

by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New

Civil Code which provides that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of

laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.”

___________

NOTES:

– On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and

lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment.

Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989

and was able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times each day on February

5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living nearby,

rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail.

The policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368,

Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-

108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account — China Banking Corp., US$/A#54105028-2;

4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money (P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.)

Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the complainant.

 ALONZO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PADUA the complaint, on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within

(G.R. NO. L-72873. MAY 28, 1987) thirty days from notice of the sales. Although there was no written notice, it was held

that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law.

DOCTRINE: Statutory Construction: Legislative Intent: The spirit, rather than the Respondent court reversed the decision of the Trial Court.

letter of a statute determines its construction, hence, a statute must be read according

to its spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the letter but although it is ISSUE:

not within the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter but not within the Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. 1088 of the New

spirit is not within the statute. Stated differently, a thing which is within the intent of Civil Code.

the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is

within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the HELD:

lawmakers. YES. Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court reinstated.

FACTS: RATIO:

Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in

registered in ‘the name of their deceased parents. One of them transferred his writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and

undivided share by way of absolute sale. A year later, his sister sold her share in a “Con ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint

Pacto de Retro Sale”. By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption.

said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions These are the justifications for this exception.

sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. with their

consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of While [courts] may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, [courts]

the enclosed area. nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so,

[courts] defer not to “the letter that killeth” but to “the spirit that vivifieth,” to give

One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to petitioners but was dismissed effect to the law maker’s will.

when it appeared that he was an American citizen. Another coheir filed her own

complaint invoking the same right of redemption of her brother. Trial court dismissed
PRESUMPTION AGAINST IMPLIED REPEALS RATIO:

The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and clear finding thereof must
surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn.
The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an “appeal shall not prevent a
In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as decision from becoming final or executory.” As worded, there is room to construe said
repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in provision as giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the execution of the
terms of the new and old laws. appealed decision. There is nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are
deprived of the authority to order a stay of the appealed order. If the intention of
Berces, Jr. vs. Executive Secretary
Congress was to repeal Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used
(G.R. No. 112099. February 21,1995) more direct language expressive of such intention.

FACTS:

Petitioner filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan two administrative cases against An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial
respondent incumbent Mayor and obtained favorable decision suspending the latter. conflict must be found between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express
Respondent Mayor appealed to the Office of the President questioning the decision and repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an
at the same time prayed for the stay of execution in accordance with Sec. 67(b) of the irreconcible inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws.
Local Government Code (LGC). The Office of the President thru the Executive
Secretary directed “stay of execution”. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but was dismissed. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court with prayer for mandatory preliminary injunction,
assailing the Orders of the Office of the President as having been issued with grave
abuses of discretion. Petitioner argued that Sec. 68 of LGC (1991) impliedly repealed
Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 (1987).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sec. 68 of R.A. No. 7160 repealed Sec. 6 of Administrative Order No.
18.

HELD:

NO. Petition was dismissed. “Stay of execution” applied.

REPEALS OF STATUTE BY IMPLICATION NOT FAVORED In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of

The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and clear finding thereof must some act in the line of duty, the Department head may in his discretion authorize the
surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. payment of the necessary hospital fees.

In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as Director Lim then forwarded petitioner’s claim, to the Secretary of Justice.
repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in Finding petitioner’s illness to be service-connected, the Committee on Physical
terms of the new and old laws.
Examination of the Department of Justice favorably recommended the payment of
MECANO vs.COA petitioner’s claim.

G.R. No. 103982; December 11, 1992 However, then Undersecretary of Justice Bello III returned petitioner’s claim

to Director Lim, having considered the statements of the Chairman of the COA to the

FACTS: Mecano is a Director II of the NBI. He was hospitalized and on account of effect that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.

which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion

claiming from the COA. No. 73, S. 1991 of then Secretary of Justice Drilon stating that “the issuance of the

In a memorandum to the NBI Director, Director Lim requested reimbursement Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abregate in its entirety the Revised

for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of the latter”.

the RAC, the pertinent provisions of which read: Director Lim transmitted anew Mecano’s claim to then Undersecretary Bello for

Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in favorable consideration; Secretary Drilon forwarded petitioner’s claim to the COA

performance of duty. — When a person in the service of the national government of a Chairman, recommending payment of the same. COA Chairman however, denied

province, city, municipality or municipal district is so injured in the performance of duty petitioner’s claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the

as thereby to receive some actual physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason that the same section was not

Department may direct that absence during any period of disability thereby occasioned restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. He commented, however,

shall be on full pay, though not more than six months, and in such case he may in his that the claim may be filed with the Employees’ Compensation Commission, considering

discretion also authorize the payment of the medical attendance, necessary that the illness of Director Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the

transportation, subsistence and hospital fees of the injured person. Absence in the case Administrative Code of 1987.

contemplated shall be charged first against vacation leave, if any there be.
Eventually, petitioner’s claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice Montenegro to The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing

Director Lim with the advice that petitioner “elevate the matter to the Supreme Court clause?

if he so desires”. It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or

Hence this petition for certiorari. designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is an example of a

general repealing provision. It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal under

ISSUE: 1. WON the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 the condition that substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. This

of the RAC latter situation falls under the category of an implied repeal.

There are two categories of repeal by implication.

HELD: The Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is hereby ordered to Where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an

give due course to petitioner’s claim for benefits. NO irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied

The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a repeal of the earlier one.

subsequent law is a matter of legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a 2. If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly

law by incorporating therein a repealing provision which expressly and specifically cites intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.

the particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed. A Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor attempt

declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific law, to cover the entire subject matter of the old Code. There are several matters treated

identified by its number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others are implied in the old Code which are not found in the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries

repeals public, the leave law, the public bonding law, military reservations, claims for sickness

In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of benefits under Section 699, and still others.

whether or not it was the intent of the legislature to supplant the old Code with the new According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears

Code partly depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new Code. This clear is the intent to cover only those aspects of government that pertain to

provision is found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code administration, organization and procedure, understandably because of the many

of 1987 which reads: changes that transpired in the government structure since the enactment of the RAC

Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or decades of years ago.

portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes

accordingly. on the matter of the subject claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can
be no such conflict because the provision on sickness benefits of the nature being 2. Regarding COA contention that recovery under this subject section (699) shall bar

claimed by petitioner has not been restated in the Administrative Code of 1987. the recovery of benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program, the same cannot

Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of be upheld. The second sentence of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on

statutes by implication are not favored. 20 The presumption is against inconsistency and Employees’ Compensation and State Insurance Fund), Book IV of the Labor Code, as

repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that “the payment of compensation under this

not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the

Revised Administrative Code . . . whose benefits are administered by the system

NOTES: (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the government.”

1. The COA would have Us consider that the fact that Section 699 was not restated in

the Administrative Code of 1987 meant that the same section had been repealed. The

COA anchored this argument on the whereas clause of the 1987 Code, which states:

WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced by a new

Administrative Code which incorporate in a unified document the major structural,

functional and procedural principles and rules of governance; and

xxx xxx xxx

It argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code — the Administrative

Code of 1987. This contention is untenable.

The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an

earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act,

since the new statute may merely be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. What is

necessary is a manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST INEFFECTIVE under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningless,

In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption inoperative or nugatory.
that the legislature intended to enact an effective statute.

PARAS VS. COMELEC

(G.R. NO. 123169. NOVEMBER 4, 1996)

FACTS:

A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong Barangay.

The recall election was deferred due to Petitioner’s opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA

No. 7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the date of the official’s

assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election. Since

the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no

recall may be instituted.

ISSUE:

W/N the SK election is a local election.

HELD:

No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context, and it

must be considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. The evident

intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall once during his term, as

provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines

its construction. Thus, interpreting the phrase “regular local election” to include SK

election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall election

rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court assumed that the

legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should be avoided

PRESUMPTION AGAINST ABSURDITY

Statutes must receive a sensible construction such as will give effect to the The Commissioner argued the tax credit of P221,033.00 was approved only on
legislative intention so as to avoid an unjust and absurd conclusion. year 1964, it could not be availed of in reduction of ESSOs earlier tax
Presumptions against undesirable consequences were never intended by a
deficiency for the year 1960; as of that year, 1960, there was as yet no tax
legislative measure.
credit to speak of, which would reduce the deficiency tax liability for 1960. In
CIR vs ESSO Standard Eastern
support of his position, the Commissioner invokes the provisions of Section 51 of
(G.R. No. L-28502-03. April 18, 1989)
the Tax Code.

FACTS:
ISSUE:
Respondent overpaid its 1959 income tax by P221,033.00. It was granted a tax
Whether or not the interest on delinquency should be applied on the full tax
credit by the Commissioner accordingly on 1964. However, ESSOs payment of
deficiency of P367,994.00 despite the existence of overpayment in the amount
its income tax for 1960 was found to be short by P367,994.00. The
of P221,033.00.
Commissioner (of Internal Revenue) wrote to ESSO demanding payment of the

deficiency tax, together with interest thereon for the period from 1961 to
HELD:
1964. ESSO paid under protest the amount alleged to be due, including the
NO. Petition was denied. Decision of CTA was affirmed.
interest as reckoned by the Commissioner. It protested the computation of

interest, contending it was more than that properly due. It claimed that it
RATIO:
should not have been required to pay interest on the total amount of the
The fact is that, as respondent Court of Tax Appeals has stressed, as early as
deficiency tax, P367,994.00, but only on the amount of P146,961.00—
1960, the Government already had in its hands the sum of P221,033.00
representing the difference between said deficiency, P367,994.00, and ESSOs
representing excess payment. Having been paid and received by mistake, as
earlier overpayment of P221,033.00 (for which it had been granted a tax
petitioner Commissioner subsequently acknowledged, that sum unquestionably
credit). ESSO thus asked for a refund. The Internal Revenue Commissioner
belonged to ESSO, and the Government had the obligation to return it to ESSO
denied the claim for refund. ESSO appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals which
That acknowledgment of the erroneous payment came some four (4) years
ordered payment to ESSO of its refund-claim representing overpaid interest.
afterwards in nowise negates or detracts from its actuality. The obligation to

return money mistakenly paid arises from the moment that payment is made, and

not from the time that the payee admits the obligation to reimburse.The

obligation to return money mistakenly paid arises from the moment that

payment is made, and not from the time that the payee admits the obligation to

reimburse. The obligation of the payee to reimburse an amount paid to him

results from the mistake, not from the payee’s confession of the mistake or

recognition of the obligation to reimburse.

A literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd

results. Statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect

to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion.

 CESARIO URSUA VS COURT OF APPEALS HELD: No. Ursua should be acquitted. The Supreme Court ruled that a strict

G.R No. 112170; April 10, 1996 application of C.A. No. 142, as amended, in this case only leads to absurdity –

FACTS: something which could not have been intended by the lawmakers.

In 1989, Cesario Ursua was charged with bribery and dishonesty. His Under C.A. No. 142, as amended, save for some instances, a person is not

lawyer then asked him to get a copy of the complaint against him from the allowed to use a name or an alias other than his registered name or that which

Office of the Ombudsman. His lawyer asked him that because the law firm’s he was baptized. Under the law, what makes the use of alias illegal is the fact

messenger, a certain Oscar Perez, was unable to go to the Ombudsman. that it is being used habitually and publicly in business transactions without

Before going to the Ombudsman, Ursua talked to Perez. He revealed to prior authorization by competent authority. In this case, Ursua merely used the

him that he feels uncomfortable asking for a copy of the complaint because he name “Oscar Perez” once, it was not used in a business transaction, the use of

is the respondent in the said case. Perez then told him than he can go there as the name was with the consent of Oscar Perez himself, and even if he used a

“Oscar Perez” so that he does not have to reveal his true identity. different name, in this instance, he was not even required to disclose his

At the Office of the Ombudsman, Ursua signed the logbook there as identity at the Office of the Ombudsman. When he was requesting a copy of

“Oscar Perez”. When he was handed a copy of the complaint, he signed the the complaint, he need not disclose his identity because the complaint is a public

receipt as “Oscar Perez”. However, a staff of the Ombudsman was able to learn record open to the public.

that he was in fact Cesario Ursua. The staff then recommended that a criminal In short, the evils sought to be avoided by the C.A. No. 142 was not

case be filed against Ursua. Eventually, Ursua was sentenced to three years in brought about when Ursua used a name other than his name. A strict application

prison for violating C.A. No. 142, as amended, otherwise known as “An Act To of the law is not warranted. When Ursua used the name of Oscar Perez, no

Regulate The Use Of Aliases”. fraud was committed; there was no crime committed punishable under C.A. No.

142. The purpose of the law is to punish evils defined therein so when no such

ISSUE: Whether or not Cesario Ursua’s conviction is proper. evil was produced by Ursua’s act, said law need not be applied.
PRESUMPTION AGAINST VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Philippines as democratic and republican state adopts the generally

accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and
amity with all nations. (Art. II, Sec. 2, 1987 Phil. Constitution).