G.R. No. L-15045 January 20, 1961 including corporations owned or controlled by the Government" (par. [c], see.

8), while an "employee" refers to "any person who performs services for an
IN RE: PETITION FOR EXEMPTION FROM COVERAGE BY THE SOCIAL 'employer' in which either or both mental and physical efforts are used and who
SECURITY SYSTEM. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF receives compensation for such services" (par. [d], see. 8). "Employment",
MANILA, petitioner-appellant, according to paragraph [i] of said section 8, covers any service performed by
vs. an employer except those expressly enumerated thereunder, like employment
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee. under the Government, or any of its political subdivisions, branches or
instrumentalities including corporations owned and controlled by the
Feria, Manglapus and Associates for petitioner-appellant. Government, domestic service in a private home, employment purely casual,
Legal Staff, Social Security System and Solicitor General for respondent- etc.
appellee.
From the above legal provisions, it is apparent that the coverage of the Social
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.: Security Law is predicated on the existence of an employer-employee
relationship of more or less permanent nature and extends to employment of
all kinds except those expressly excluded.
On September 1, 1958, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, thru
counsel, filed with the Social Security Commission a request that "Catholic
Appellant contends that the term "employer" as defined in the law should —
Charities, and all religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations,
following the principle of ejusdem generis — be limited to those who carry on
which are directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila," be exempted from compulsory coverage of "undertakings or activities which have the element of profit or gain, or which
are pursued for profit or gain," because the phrase ,activity of any kind" in the
Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, otherwise known as the Social Security
definition is preceded by the words "any trade, business, industry,
Law of 1954. The request was based on the claim that the said Act is a labor
undertaking." The contention cannot be sustained. The rule ejusdem
law and does not cover religious and charitable institutions but is limited to
generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the
businesses and activities organized for profit. Acting upon the recommendation
of its Legal Staff, the Social Security Commission in its Resolution No. 572, plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered and
defeated. (Grosjean vs. American Paints Works [La], 160 So. 449). In the case
series of 1958, denied the request. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,
at bar, the definition of the term "employer" is, we think, sufficiently
reiterating its arguments and raising constitutional objections, requested for
comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or entities not
reconsideration of the resolution. The request, however, was denied by the
organized for profit, like herein appellant, within its meaning. This is made
Commission in its Resolution No. 767, series of 1958; hence, this appeal taken
in pursuance of section 5(c) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended. more evident by the fact that it contains an exception in which said institutions
or entities are not included. And, certainly, had the Legislature really intended
to limit the operation of the law to entities organized for profit or gain, it would
Section 9 of the Social Security Law, as amended, provides that coverage "in not have defined an "employer" in such a way as to include the Government
the System shall be compulsory upon all members between the age of sixteen and yet make an express exception of it.
and sixty rears inclusive, if they have been for at least six months a the service
of an employer who is a member of the System, Provided, that the
Commission may not compel any employer to become member of the System It is significant to note that when Republic Act No. 1161 was enacted, services
performed in the employ of institutions organized for religious or charitable
unless he shall have been in operation for at least two years and has at the
purposes were by express provisions of said Act excluded from coverage
time of admission, if admitted for membership during the first year of the
thereof (sec. 8, par. [j] subpars. 7 and 8). That portion of the law, however, has
System's operation at least fifty employees, and if admitted for membership the
been deleted by express provision of Republic Act No. 1792, which took effect
following year of operation and thereafter, at least six employees x x x." The
term employer" as used in the law is defined as any person, natural or juridical, in 1957. This is clear indication that the Legislature intended to include
domestic or foreign, who carries in the Philippines any trade, business, charitable and religious institutions within the scope of the law.
industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses the services of another
person who is under his orders as regards the employment, except the In support of its contention that the Social Security Law was intended to cover
Government and any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, only employment for profit or gain, appellant also cites the discussions of the
Senate, portions of which were quoted in its brief. There is, however, nothing Neither may it be validly argued that the enforcement of the Social Security
whatsoever in those discussions touching upon the question of whether the law Law impairs appellant's right to disseminate religious information. All that is
should be limited to organizations for profit or gain. Of course, the said required of appellant is to make monthly contributions to the System for
discussions dwelt at length upon the need of a law to meet the problems of covered employees in its employ. These contributions, contrary to appellant's
industrializing society and upon the plight of an employer who fails to make a contention, are not in the nature of taxes on employment." Together with the
profit. But this is readily explained by the fact that the majority of those to be contributions imposed upon the employees and the Government, they are
affected by the operation of the law are corporations and industries which are intended for the protection of said employees against the hazards of disability,
established primarily for profit or gain. sickness, old age and death in line with the constitutional mandate to promote
social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people.
Appellant further argues that the Social Security Law is a labor law and,
consequently, following the rule laid down in the case of Boy Scouts of the IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Resolutions Nos. 572 kind 767, series of
Philippines vs. Araos (G.R. No. L-10091, January 29, 1958) and other cases1, 1958, of the Social Security Commission are hereby affirmed. So ordered with
applies only to industry and occupation for purposes of profit and gain. The costs against appellant.
cases cited, however, are not in point, for the reason that the law therein
involved expressly limits its application either to commercial, industrial, or Paras, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
agricultural establishments, or enterprises. . Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Barrera, JJ., concur in the result.
Bengzon, J., reserves his vote.
Upon the other hand, the Social Security Law was enacted pursuant to the
"policy of the Republic of the Philippines to develop, establish gradually and
perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the
people throughout the Philippines and shall provide protection to employees
against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death." (See. 2,
Republic Act No. 1161, as amended.) Such enactment is a legitimate exercise
of the police power. It affords protection to labor, especially to working women
and minors, and is in full accord with the constitutional provisions on the
"promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of
all the people." Being in fact a social legislation, compatible with the policy of
the Church to ameliorate living conditions of the working class, appellant
cannot arbitrarily delimit the extent of its provisions to relations between capital
and labor in industry and agriculture.

There is no merit in the claim that the inclusion of religious organizations under
the coverage of the Social Security Law violates the constitutional prohibition
against the application of public funds for the use, benefit or support of any
priest who might be employed by appellant. The funds contributed to the
System created by the law are not public funds, but funds belonging to the
members which are merely held in trust by the Government. At any rate,
assuming that said funds are impressed with the character of public funds,
their payment as retirement death or disability benefits would not constitute a
violation of the cited provisions of the Constitution, since such payment shall
be made to the priest not because he is a priest but because he is an
employee.
G.R. No. L-26298 September 28, 1984 the monthly salaries of the employees in its logging business. However, on
October 9, 1958, petitioner demanded the refund of the said amount, claiming
CMS ESTATE, INC., petitioner, that it is not yet subject to compulsory coverage with respect to its logging
vs. business. The request was denied by respondent System on the ground that
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SOCIAL SECURITY the logging business was a mere expansion of petitioner's activities and for
COMMISSION, respondents. purposes of the Social Security Act, petitioner should be considered a member
of the System since December 1, 1952 when it commenced its real estate
Sison Dominguez & Cervantes for petitioner. business.

The Legal Counsel for respondent SSS. On November 10, 1958, petitioner filed a petition with the Social Security
Commission praying for the determination of the effectivity date of the
compulsory coverage of petitioner's logging business.

After both parties have submitted their respective memoranda, the

CUEVAS, J.: Commission issued on January 14, 1960, Resolution No. 91, 2 the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
This appeal by the CMS Estate, Inc. from the decision rendered by the Social
Security Commission in its Case No. 12, entitled "CMS Estate, Inc. vs. Social Premises considered, the instant petition is hereby denied and
Security System, declaring CMS subject to compulsory coverage as of petitioner is hereby adjudged to be subject to compulsory
September 1, 1957 and "directing the Social Security System to effect such coverage as of Sept. 1, 1957 and the Social Security System
coverage of the petitioner's employees in its logging and real estate business is hereby directed to effect such coverage of petitioner's
conformably to the provision of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended was employees in its logging and real estate business conformably
certified to Us by the defunct Court of Appeals 1 for further disposition to the provisions of Rep. Act No. 1161, as amended.
considering that purely questions of law are involved.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation organized primarily for the purpose of
engaging in the real estate business. On December 1, 1952, it started doing
business with only six (6) employees. It's Articles of Incorporation was Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in Resolution No. 609 of the
Commission.
amended on June 4, 1956 in order to engage in the logging business. The
Securities and Exchange Commission issued the certificate of filing of said
amended articles on June 18, 1956. Petitioner likewise obtained an ordinary These two (2) resolutions are now the subject of petitioner's appeal. Petitioner
license from the Bureau of Forestry to operate a forest concession of 13,000 submits that respondent Commission erred in holding —
hectares situated in the municipality of Baganga, Province of Davao.
(1) that the contributions required of employers and employees
On January 28, 1957, petitioner entered into a contract of management with under our Social Security Act of 1954 are not in the nature of
one Eufracio D. Rojas for the operation and exploitation of the forest excise taxes because the said Act was allegedly enacted by
concession The logging operation actually started on April 1, 1957 with four Congress in the exercise of the police power of the State, not
monthly salaried employees. As of September 1, 1957, petitioner had 89 of its taxing power;
employees and laborers in the logging operation. On December 26, 1957,
petitioner revoked its contract of management with Mr. Rojas. (2) that no contractee — independent contractor relationship
existed between petitioner and Eufracio D. Rojas during the
On August 1, 1958, petitioner became a member of the Social Security System time that he was operating its forest concession at Baganga,
with respect to its real estate business. On September 6, 1958, petitioner Davao;
remitted to the System the sum of P203.13 representing the initial premium on
 (3) that a corporation which has been in operation for more legitimate exercise of the police power of the State. As held in the case
than two years in one business is immediately covered with of Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., et al. vs. SSS 3 —
respect to any new and independent business it may
subsequently engage in; Membership in the SSS is not a result of bilateral, concensual
agreement where the rights and obligations of the parties are
(4) that a corporation should be treated as a single employing defined by and subject to their will, RA 1161 requires
unit for purposes of coverage under the Social Security Act, compulsory coverage of employees and employers under the
irrespective of its separate, unrelated and independent System. It is actually a legal imposition on said employers and
business established and operated at different places and on employees, designed to provide social security to the
different dates; and workingmen. Membership in the SSS is therefore, in
compliance with the lawful exercise of the police power of the
(5) that Section 9 of the Social Security Act on the question of State, to which the principle of non-impairment of the
compulsory membership and employers should be given a obligation of contract is not a proper defense.
liberal interpretation.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent, on the other hand, advances the following propositions, inter alia:
The taxing power of the State is exercised for the purpose of raising revenues.
(1) that the Social Security Act speaks of compulsory coverage However, under our Social Security Law, the emphasis is more on the
of employers and not of business; promotion of the general welfare. The Act is not part of out Internal Revenue
Code nor are the contributions and premiums therein dealt with and provided
for, collectible by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The funds contributed to the
(2) that once an employer is initially covered under the Social
System belong to the members who will receive benefits, as a matter of right,
Security Act, any other business undertaken or established by
the same employer is likewise subject in spite of the fact that whenever the hazards provided by the law occur.
the latter has not been in operation for at least two years;
All that is required of appellant is to make monthly
contributions to the System for covered employees in its
(3) that petitioner's logging business while actually of a
employ. These contributions, contrary to appellant's
different, distinct, separate and independent nature from its
real estate business should be considered as an operation contention, are not 'in the nature of taxes on employment.'
Together with the contributions imposed upon employees and
under the same management;
the Government, they are intended for the protection of said
employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age
(4) that the amendment of petitioner's articles of incorporation, and death in line with the constitutional mandate to promote
so as to enable it to engage in the logging business did not social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of
alter the juridical personality of petitioner; and all the people.4

(5) the petitioner's logging operation is a mere expansion of its Because of the broad social purpose of the Social Security Act, all doubts in
business activities. construing the Act should favor coverage rather than exemption.

The Social Security Law was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government Prior to its amendment, Sec. 9 of the Act provides that before an employer
"to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which could be compelled to become a member of the System, he must have been in
shall be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines, and operation for at least two years and has at the time of admission at least six
shall provide protection against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and employees. It should be pointed out that it is the employer, either natural, or
death" (Sec. 2, RA 1161, as amended). It is thus clear that said enactment judicial person, who is subject to compulsory coverage and not the business. If
implements the general welfare mandate of the Constitution and constitutes a the intention of the legislature was to consider every venture of the employer
as the basis of a separate coverage, an express provision to that effect could business; and he is not free from the control and direction of his employer in
have been made. Unfortunately, however, none of that sort appeared provided matter connected with the performance of his work. These factors clearly
for in the said law. indicate that Rojas is not an independent contractor but merely an employee of
petitioner; and should be entitled to the compulsory coverage of the Act.
Should each business venture of the employer be considered as the basis of
the coverage, an employer with more than one line of business but with less The records indubitably show that petitioner started its real estate business on
than six employees in each, would never be covered although he has in his December 1, 1952 while its logging operation was actually commenced on
employ a total of more than six employees which is sufficient to bring him April 1, 1957. Applying the provision of Sec. 10 of the Act, petitioner is subject
within the ambit of compulsory coverage. This would frustrate rather than foster to compulsory coverage as of December 1, 1952 with respect to the real estate
the policy of the Act. The legislative intent must be respected. In the absence business and as of April 1, 1957 with respect to its logging operation.
of an express provision for a separate coverage for each kind of business, the
reasonable interpretation is that once an employer is covered in a particular WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. With
kind of business, he should be automatically covered with respect to any new costs against petitioner.
name. Any interpretation which would defeat rather than promote the ends for
which the Social Security Act was enacted should be eschewed. 5
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner contends that the Commission cannot indiscriminately combine for

purposes of coverage two distinct and separate businesses when one has not
yet been in operation for more than two years thus rendering nugatory the
period for more than two years thus rendering nugatory the period of
stabilization fixed by the Act. This contention lacks merit since the amendatory
law, RA 2658, which was approved on June 18, 1960, eliminated the two-year
stabilization period as employers now become automatically covered
immediately upon the start of the business.

Section 10 (formerly Sec. 9) of RA 1161, as amended by RA 2658 now

provides:

Sec. 10. Effective date of coverage. — Compulsory coverage

of the employer shall take effect on the first day of his
operation, and that of the employee on the date of his
employment. (Emphasis supplied)

As We have previously mentioned, it is the intention of the law to cover as

many persons as possible so as to promote the constitutional objective of
social justice. It is axiomatic that a later law prevails over a prior statute and
moreover the legislative in tent must be given effect. 6

Petitioner further submits that Eufrancio Rojas is an independent contractor

who engages in an independent business of his own consisting of the
operation of the timber concession of the former. Rojas was appointed as
operations manager of the logging consession; 7 he has no power to appoint or
hire employees; as the term implies, he only manages the employees and it is
petitioner who furnishes him the necessary equipment for use in the logging
G.R. No. L-21642 July 30, 1966 Section 13, Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by Republic Act No. 1792, in
force at the time Petronilo Davac's death on April 5, 1959, provides:
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner-appellee,
vs. 1. SEC. 13. Upon the covered employee's death or total and
CANDELARIA D. DAVAC, ET AL., respondents; permanent disability under such conditions as the Commission may
LOURDES Tuplano, respondent-appellant. define, before becoming eligible for retirement and if either such death
or disability is not compensable under the Workmen's Compensation
J. Ma. Francisco and N. G. Bravo for respondent-appellant. Act, he or, in case of his death, his beneficiaries, as recorded by his
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason employer shall be entitled to the following benefit: ... . (emphasis
and E. T. Duran for petitioner-appellee. supplied.)

BARRERA, J.: Under this provision, the beneficiary "as recorded" by the employee's employer
is the one entitled to the death benefits. In the case of Tecson vs. Social
Security System, (L-15798, December 28, 1961), this Court, construing said
This is an appeal from the resolution of the Social Security Commission
Section 13, said:
declaring respondent Candelaria Davac as the person entitled to receive the
death benefits payable for the death of Petronilo Davac.
It may be true that the purpose of the coverage under the Social
The facts of the case as found by the Social Security Commission, briefly are: Security System is protection of the employee as well as of his family,
but this purpose or intention of the law cannot be enforced to the
The late Petronilo Davac, a former employee of Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc.
extent of contradicting the very provisions of said law as contained in
became a member of the Social Security System (SSS for short) on
Section 13, thereof, ... . When the provision of a law are clear and
September 1, 1957. As such member, he was assigned SS I.D. No. 08-
explicit, the courts can do nothing but apply its clear and explicit
007137. In SSS form E-1 (Member's Record) which he accomplished and filed
with the SSS on November 21, 1957, he designated respondent Candelaria provisions (Velasco vs. Lopez, 1 Phil, 270; Caminetti vs. U.S., 242
Davac as his beneficiary and indicated his relationship to her as that of "wife". U.S. 470, 61 L. ed. 442).
He died on April 5, 1959 and, thereupon, each of the respondents (Candelaria
Davac and Lourdes Tuplano) filed their claims for death benefit with the SSS. It But appellant contends that the designation herein made in the person of the
appears from their respective claims and the documents submitted in support second and, therefore, bigamous wife is null and void, because (1) it
thereof, that the deceased contracted two marriages, the first, with claimant contravenes the provisions of the Civil Code, and (2) it deprives the lawful wife
Lourdes Tuplano on August 29, 1946, who bore him a child, Romeo Davac, of her share in the conjugal property as well as of her own and her child's
and the second, with Candelaria Davac on January 18, 1949, with whom he legitime in the inheritance.
had a minor daughter Elizabeth Davac. Due to their conflicting claims, the
processing thereof was held in abeyance, whereupon the SSS filed this petition As to the first point, appellant argues that a beneficiary under the Social
praying that respondents be required to interpose and litigate between Security System partakes of the nature of a beneficiary in life insurance policy
themselves their conflicting claims over the death benefits in and, therefore, the same qualifications and disqualifications should be applied.
question.1äwphï1.ñët
Article 2012 of the New Civil Code provides:
On February 25, 1963, the Social Security Commission issued the resolution
referred to above, Not satisfied with the said resolution, respondent Lourdes ART. 2012. Any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation
Tuplano brought to us the present appeal. under Article 739 cannot be named beneficiary of a life insurance
policy by the person who cannot make any donation to him according
The only question to be determined herein is whether or not the Social Security to said article.
Commission acted correctly in declaring respondent Candelaria Davac as the
person entitled to receive the death benefits in question. And Article 739 of the same Code prescribes:
 ART. 739. The following donations shall be void: be noted, constitutes only an insignificant portion thereof. Then, the benefits
are specifically declared not transferable,6 and exempted from tax legal
(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or processes, and lien.7Furthermore, in the settlement of claims thereunder the
concubinage at the time of the donation; procedure to be observed is governed not by the general provisions of law, but
by rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission. Thus, if the money is
payable to the estate of a deceased member, it is the Commission, not the
xxx xxx xxx
probate or regular court that determines the person or persons to whom it is
payable.8 that the benefits under the Social Security Act are not intended by
Without deciding whether the naming of a beneficiary of the benefits accruing the lawmaking body to form part of the estate of the covered members may be
from membership in the Social Security System is a donation, or that it creates gathered from the subsequent amendment made to Section 15 thereof, as
a situation analogous to the relation of an insured and the beneficiary under a follows:
life insurance policy, it is enough, for the purpose of the instant case, to state
that the disqualification mentioned in Article 739 is not applicable to herein
SEC. 15. Non-transferability of benefit. — The system shall pay the
appellee Candelaria Davac because she was not guilty of concubinage, there
being no proof that she had knowledge of the previous marriage of her benefits provided for in this Act to such persons as may be entitled
thereto in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Such benefits are
husband Petronilo.1
not transferable, and no power of attorney or other document executed
by those entitled thereto in favor of any agent, attorney, or any other
Regarding the second point raised by appellant, the benefits accruing from individual for the collection thereof in their behalf shall be recognized
membership in the Social Security System do not form part of the properties of except when they are physically and legally unable to collect
the conjugal partnership of the covered member. They are disbursed from a personally such benefits: Provided, however, That in the case of death
public special fund created by Congress in pursuance to the declared policy of benefits, if no beneficiary has been designated or the designation there
the Republic "to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security of is void, said benefits shall be paid to the legal heirs in accordance
system which ... shall provide protection against the hazards of disability, with the laws of succession. (Rep. Act 2658, amending Rep. Act
sickness, old age and death."2 1161.)

The sources of this special fund are the covered employee's contribution In short, if there is a named beneficiary and the designation is not invalid (as it
(equal to 2-½ per cent of the employee's monthly compensation);3 the is not so in this case), it is not the heirs of the employee who are entitled to
employer's contribution (equivalent to 3-½ per cent of the monthly receive the benefits (unless they are the designated beneficiaries themselves).
compensation of the covered employee);4 and the Government contribution It is only when there is no designated beneficiaries or when the designation is
which consists in yearly appropriation of public funds to assure the void, that the laws of succession are applicable. And we have already held that
maintenance of an adequate working balance of the funds of the the Social Security Act is not a law of succession.9
System.5 Additionally, Section 21 of the Social Security Act, as amended by
Republic Act 1792, provides:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing considerations, the resolution of the Social
Security Commission appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
SEC. 21. Government Guarantee. — The benefits prescribed in this appellant.
Act shall not be diminished and to guarantee said benefits the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines accepts general
So ordered.
responsibility for the solvency of the System.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar

From the foregoing provisions, it appears that the benefit receivable under the
and Sanchez, concur.
Act is in the nature of a special privilege or an arrangement secured by the law,
pursuant to the policy of the State to provide social security to the workingmen.
The amounts that may thus be received cannot be considered as property
earned by the member during his lifetime. His contribution to the fund, it may
G.R. No. 119891 August 21, 1995 The People, through the Solicitor General, filed in the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing the order of
BEN STA. RITA, petitioner, dismissal issued by the trial court. Respondent appellate court granted the
vs. petition and ordered the Presiding Judge of the trial court to reinstate the
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE criminal case against petitioner. A motion for reconsideration thereof was
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, respondents. denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 17 April 1995.

RESOLUTION Thereafter, petitioner filed in this Court a motion for extension of thirty (30)
days from the expiration of reglementary period within which to file a petition
for review on certiorari. The Court granted the motion and gave petitioner until
9 June 1995 to file the petition with warning that no further extension will be
given. Despite the warning, the petition was filed only on 13 June 1995 or four
FELICIANO, J.: (4) days after the due date. Moreover, it failed to comply with requirement no. 2
of Circular No. 1-88, as amended and Circular No. 19-91 of the Court as it did
This is a Petition for Review an Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of not contain an affidavit of service of copies thereof to respondents. It was only
Appeals ("CA") in CA-G.R. SP. No. 34384 which ordered the Regional Trial on 14 July 1995, through an ex-parte manifestation, that the affidavit of service
Court ("RTC"), Branch 92, Quezon City, to reinstate Criminal Case No. Q-92- was belatedly submitted to this Court.
35426 filed against petitioner Ben Sta. Rita.
In the Petition for Review, petitioner Sta. Rita contends that the Filipino
Petitioner Sta. Rita was charged in the RTC with violating Section 2(a) in seafarers recruited by B. Sta. Rita Co. and deployed on board foreign vessels
relation to Sections 22(d) and 28(e) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, outside the Philippines are exempt from the coverage of R.A. No. 1161 under
otherwise known as the Social Security Law. The Information alleged that Section 8 (j) (5) thereof:
petitioner, "as President/General Manager of B. Sta. Rita Co., Inc. a
compulsorily (sic) covered employer under the Social Security Law, as Terms Defined
amended, did then and there willfully and unlawfully fail, neglect and refuse
and still fails, neglects and refuses to remit to the Social Security System
EMPLOYMENT — Any service performed by an employee for his
contributions for SSS, Medicare and Employees Compensation for its covered
employer, except —
employees."1

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner Sta. Rita moved to dismiss said criminal case on the following
grounds:
(5) Service performed on or in connection with an alien vessel by an
1. That the facts charged do not constitute an offense, and; employee if he is employed when such vessel is outside the
Philippines.
2. That the RTC has no jurisdiction over this case. 2
xxx xxx xxx
The RTC sustained petitioner's motion and dismissed the criminal case filed
According to petitioner, the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the
against him. It ruled that the Memorandum of Agreement entered into between
DOLE and the SSS is null and void as it has the effect of amending the
the Department of Labor and Employment ("DOLE") and the Social Security
aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 1161 by expanding its coverage. This
System ("SSS") extending the coverage of Social Security, Medical Care and
allegedly cannot be done as only Congress may validly amend legislative
Employment Compensation laws to Filipino seafarers on board foreign vessels
was null and void as it was entered into by the Administrator of the SSS enactments.
without the sanction of the Commission and approval of the President of the
Philippines, in contravention of Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 1161, as amended.3
Petitioner prays that the Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals What the Memorandum of Agreement did was to record the understanding
ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Case No. Q-92-35426 and that the between the SSS on the one hand and the DOLE on the other hand that the
Order of the RTC dismissing the same be upheld. latter would include among the provisions of the Standard Contract of
Employment required in case of overseas employment, a stipulation providing
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that the right to appeal is a statutory right and for coverage of the Filipino seafarer by the SSS. The Memorandum of
a party who seeks to avail of the right must comply with the rules. 4 These rules, Agreement is not an implementing rule or regulation of the Social Security
particularly the statutory requirement for perfecting an appeal within the Commission which, under Section 4 (a) abovequoted, is subject to the
reglementary period laid down by law, must be strictly followed as they are approval of the President. Indeed, as a matter of strict law, the participation of
considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly the SSS in the establishment by the DOLE of a uniform stipulation in the
discharge of judicial business.5 Petitioner's failure to seasonably file the Standard Contract of Employment for Filipino seafarers was not necessary; the
Petition and its failure to comply with the aforequoted Circulars of the Court Memorandum of Agreement related simply to the administrative convenience
necessitate the denial of the Petition. of the two (2) agencies of government.

Besides, even if the Petition had been filed on time and had complied with the Moreover, the Court finds no merit in petitioner's contention that Section 8 (j)
Circulars, it would still have to be denied as petitioner has failed to show that (5) of R.A. No. 1161, as amended, absolutely exempts Filipino seafarers on
respondent appellate court committed any reversible error in rendering the board foreign vessels from the coverage of the SSS statute. Section 8 (j) (5)
assailed decision. simply defines the term "employment" and does not in any way relate to the
scope of coverage of the Social Security System. That coverage is, upon the
The Court agrees with the CA that the Information filed against petitioner was other hand, set out in Section 9 of R.A. No. 1161 as amended, which defines
sufficient as it clearly stated the designation of the offense by the statute, i.e. the scope of SSS coverage in the following terms:
violation of the Social Security Law, and the acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense, i.e., petitioner's failure to remit his contributions to Sec. 9 Compulsory Coverage. — (a) Coverage in the SSS shall be
the SSS. The CA found that there is prima facie evidence to support the compulsory upon all employees not over sixty years of age and their
allegations in the Information and to warrant the prosecution of petitioner. employers; Provided, . . . .

Respondent appellate court correctly upheld the validity of the Memorandum of (b) Fillpinos recruited in the Philippines by foreign employers for
Agreement entered into between the DOLE and the SSS. Upon the one hand, employment abroad may be covered by the SSS on a voluntary
contrary to the trial court's finding, the Memorandum of Agreement was basis. (As amended by Sec. 2, P.D. No. 177, S-1973 and Sec. 6, P.D.
approved by the Social Security Commission per the Commission's Resolution No. 735-S-1975) (Emphasis supplied)
No. 437, dated 14 July 1988.6 Upon the other hand, the Memorandum of
Agreement is not a rule or regulation enacted by the Commission in the It will be seen that the Memorandum of Agreement is in line with paragraph 9
exercise of the latter's quasi-legislative authority Under Section 4 (a) of R.A. (b) of the Social Security statute quoted above. The Memorandum of
No. 1161, as amended, which reads as follows: Agreement provides, inter alia, that:

Sec. 4. Powers and Duties of the Commission. — For the attainment of xxx xxx xxx
its main objectives as set forth in section two hereof, the Commission
shall have the following powers and duties: NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing
premises, the parties hereto agree and stipulate that one of the
(a) To adopt, amend and rescind, subject to the approval of the conditions that will be imposed by the Department of Labor and
President, such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry Employment is the contract for overseas employment is the
out the provisions and purposes of this Act. registration for coverage of seafarers with the Social Security System,
through the manning agencies as the authorized representatives of the
xxx xxx xxx foreign employers in conformity with Section 9, paragraph (b) of the
 Social Security Law (R.A. No. 1161, as amended), subject to the whether "local or overseas."9 Nullification of the SSS stipulation in those
following terms and conditions: individual employment contracts, through nullification of the Memorandum of
Agreement, constituted serious reversible error on the part of the trial court.
xxx xxx xxx7 That petitioner should seek to deprive his countrymen of social security
protection after his foreign principal had agreed to such protection, is cause for
dismay and is to be deplored.
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the Standard Contract of Employment to be entered into between foreign The Court of Appeals properly held that the reinstatement of the criminal case
against petitioner did not violate his right against double jeopardy since the
shipowners and Filipino seafarers is the instrument by which the former
dismissal of the information by the trial court had been effected at his own
express their assent to the inclusion of the latter in the coverage of the Social
instance. 10 There are only two (2) instances where double jeopardy will attach
Security Act. In other words, the extension of the coverage of the Social
notwithstanding the fact that the case was dismissed with the express consent
Security System to Filipino seafarers arises by virtue of the assent given in the
contract of employment signed by employer and seafarer; that same contract of the accused. The first is where the ground for dismissal is insufficiency of
binds petitioner Sta. Rita or B. Sta. Rita Company, who is solidarily liable with evidence for the prosecution; and the second is where the criminal
proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in violation of the accused's
the foreign shipowners/employers.
right to speedy trial. 11 Neither situation exists in the case at bar. There is no
legal impediment to the reinstatement of Criminal Case No. Q-92-35426
It may be noted that foreign shipowners and manning agencies had generally against petitioner Sta. Rita.
expressed their conformity to the inclusion of Filipino seafarers within the
coverage of the Social Security Act even prior to the signing of the DOLE-SSS
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DENY the Petition for having been filed
Memorandum of Agreement. Thus, the Whereas clauses of the Memorandum
late, for failure to comply with applicable Court Circulars and for lack of merit.
of Agreement state that:
The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Cost
against petitioner.
WHEREAS, in the 74th Maritime Session (ILO) held from September
24 to October 9, 1987 in Geneva, it was agreed that as an
Romero, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.
internationally accepted principle, seafarers shall have the right to
social security protection;

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREAS, after a series of consultations with seafaring unions and

manning agencies, it was the consensus that Philippine social security
coverage be extended to seafarers under the employ of vessels flying
foreign flags;

xxx xxx xxx8

(Emphasis supplied)

It is, finally, worthy of special note that by extending the benefits of the Social
Security Act to Filipino seafarers on board foreign vessels, the individual
employment agreements entered into with the stipulation for such coverage
contemplated in the DOLE-SSS Memorandum of Agreement, merely give
effect to the constitutional mandate to the State to afford protection to labor
G.R. No. 165546 February 27, 2006 Romeo C. dela Peña; and Rosanna left the deceased six years before his
death and lived with Romeo while she was still pregnant with Jenelyn, who was
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner, born on October 29, 1991. Mariquita also confirmed that Pablo was not
vs. capable of having a child as he was under treatment.
ROSANNA H. AGUAS, JANET H. AGUAS, and minor JEYLNN H. AGUAS,
represented by her Legal Guardian, ROSANNA H. AGUAS, Respondents. On the basis of the report and an alleged confirmation by a certain Dr. Manuel
Macapinlac that Pablo was infertile, the SSS denied Rosanna’s request to
DECISION resume the payment of their pensions. She was advised to refund to the SSS
within 30 days the amount of ₱10,350.00 representing the total death benefits
CALLEJO, SR., J.: released to her and Jenelyn from December 1996 to August 1997 at ₱1,150.00
per month.8
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66531 and its Resolution denying the motion Rosanna and Jeylnn, through counsel, requested for a reconsideration of the
said decision.9 However, in its Letter dated February 6, 1998, the SSS denied
for reconsideration thereof.
the claim.10
The antecedents are as follows:
This prompted Rosanna and Jeylnn to file a claim/petition for the
Restoration/Payment of Pensions with the Social Security Commission (SSC)
Pablo Aguas, a member of the Social Security System (SSS) and a pensioner, on February 20, 1998.11 Janet H. Aguas, who also claimed to be the child of
died on December 8, 1996. Pablo’s surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed the deceased and Rosanna, now joined them as claimant. The case was
a claim with the SSS for death benefits on December 13, 1996. Rosanna docketed as SSC Case No. 3-14769-98.
indicated in her claim that Pablo was likewise survived by his minor child,
Jeylnn, who was born on October 29, 1991.2 Her claim for monthly pension
was settled on February 13, 1997.3 The claimants appended to their petition, among others, photocopies of the
following: (1) Pablo and Rosanna’s marriage certificate; (2) Janet’s certificate
of live birth; (3) Jeylnn’s certificate of live birth; and (4) Pablo’s certificate of
Sometime in April 1997, the SSS received a sworn letter4 dated April 2, 1997 death.
from Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablo’s sister, contesting Rosanna’s claim for
death benefits. She alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family abode
In its Answer, the SSS averred that, based on the sworn testimonies and
approximately more than six years before, and lived with another man on
documentary evidence showing the disqualification of the petitioners as
whom she has been dependent for support. She further averred that Pablo had
primary beneficiaries, the claims were barren of factual and legal basis; as
no legal children with Rosanna, but that the latter had several children with a
such, it was justified in denying their claims.12
certain Romeo dela Peña. In support of her allegation, Leticia enclosed a
notarized copy of the original birth certificate5 of one Jefren H. dela Peña,
showing that the latter was born on November 15, 1996 to Rosanna Y. In their Position Paper, the claimants averred that Jeylnn was a legitimate child
Hernandez and Romeo C. dela Peña, and that the two were married on of Pablo as evidenced by her birth certificate bearing Pablo’s signature as
November 1, 1990. Jeylnn’s father. They asserted that Rosanna never left Pablo and that they
lived together as husband and wife under one roof. In support thereof, they
As a result, the SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna and Jeylnn’s monthly attached a Joint Affidavit13 executed by their neighbors, Vivencia Turla and
pension in September 1997. It also conducted an investigation to verify Carmelita Yangu, where they declared that Rosanna and Pablo lived together
as husband and wife until the latter’s death. In Janet’s birth certificate, which
Leticia’s allegations. In a Memorandum 6 dated November 18, 1997, the Social
was registered in the Civil Registry of San Fernando, it appears that her father
Security Officer who conducted the investigation reported that, based on an
was Pablo and her mother was Rosanna. As to the alleged infertility of Pablo,
interview with Mariquita D. Dizon, Pablo’s first cousin and neighbor, and Jessie
the claimants averred that Dr. Macapinlac denied giving the opinion precisely
Gonzales (also a neighbor). She learned that the deceased had no legal
children with Rosanna; Jenelyn7 and Jefren were Rosanna’s children with one because he was not an expert on such matters, and that he treated the
deceased only for tuberculosis. The claimant likewise claimed that the knew about this because at that time their mother was sick, and she would
information the SSS gathered from the doctor was privileged communication.14 often visit her at their ancestral home, where Pablo and Rosanna were also
staying; Rosanna was no longer living in their ancestral home but Janet
In compliance with the SSC’s order, the SSS secured Confirmation resided therein; she did not know where Rosanna was staying now but she
Reports15 signed by clerks from the corresponding civil registers confirming (1) knew that the latter and Romeo dela Peña were still living together.24
the fact of marriage between Pablo and Rosanna on December 4, 1977; (2)
the fact of Jefren dela Peña’s birth on November 15, 1996; (3) the fact of Subsequently, Mariquita Dizon and Jessie Gonzales were also summoned for
Jeylnn’s birth on October 29, 1991; and (4) the fact of Pablo’s death on clarificatory questions.25 During the hearing, Mariquita brought with her
December 8, 1996. photocopies of two baptismal certificates: that of Jeylnn Aguas, 26 child of Pablo
Aguas and Rosanna Hernandez born on October 29, 1991, and that of Jenelyn
The SSC decided to set the case for hearing. It also directed the SSS to verify H. dela Peña,27 child of Romeo dela Peña and Rosanna Hernandez, born on
the authenticity of Pablo’s signature as appearing on Jeylnn’s birth certificate January 29, 1992.
from his claim records, particularly his SSS Form E-1 and retirement benefit
application.16 The SSS complied with said directive and manifested to the SSC On March 14, 2001, the SSC rendered a decision denying the claims for lack
that, based on the laboratory analysis conducted, Pablo’s signature in the birth of merit and ordering Rosanna to immediately refund to the SSS the amount of
certificate was made by the same person who signed the member’s record and ₱10,350.00 erroneously paid to her and Jeylnn as primary beneficiaries of the
other similar documents submitted by Pablo.17 deceased. The SSC likewise directed the SSS to pay the death benefit to
qualified secondary beneficiaries of the deceased, and in their absence, to his
The SSC then summoned Vivencia Turla, Carmelita Yangu and Leticia Aguas- legal heirs.28
Macapinlac for clarificatory questions with regard to their respective sworn
affidavits.18 Vivencia testified that she had known Pablo and Rosanna for more The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as primary beneficiary, it
than 30 years already; the couple were married and lived in Macabacle, appearing that she had contracted marriage with Romeo dela Peña during the
Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga; she was a former neighbor of the subsistence of her marriage to Pablo. The SSC based its conclusion on the
spouses, but four years after their marriage, she (Vivencia) and her family birth certificate of Jefren dela Peña stating that his mother, Rosanna, and
moved to Sto. Niño Triangulo, San Fernando, Pampanga; she would often visit father, Romeo dela Peña, were married on November 1, 1990. The SSC
the two, especially during Christmas or fiestas; the spouses’ real child was declared that Rosanna had a child with Romeo dela Peña while she was still
Jeylnn; Janet was only an adopted child; the spouse later transferred married to Pablo (as evidenced by the baptismal certificate of Jenelyn H. dela
residence, not far from their old house, and Janet, together with her husband Peña showing that she was the child of Rosanna Hernandez and Romeo dela
and son, remained in the old house.19 Peña and that she was born on January 29, 1992). The SSC concluded that
Rosanna was no longer entitled to support from Pablo prior to his death
On the other hand, Carmelita testified that she had been a neighbor of Pablo because of her act of adultery. As for Jeylnn, the SSC ruled that, even if her
and Rosanna for 15 years and that, up to the present, Rosanna and her birth certificate was signed by Pablo as her father, there was more compelling
children, Janet, Jeylnn and Jefren, were still her neighbors; Janet and Jeylnn evidence that Jeylnn was not his legitimate child. The SSC deduced from the
were the children of Pablo and Rosanna but she did not know whose child records that Jeylnn and Jenelyn was one and the same person and concluded,
Jefren is.20 based on the latter’s baptismal certificate, that she was the daughter of
Rosanna and Romeo dela Peña. It also gave credence to the testimonies of
Leticia and Mariquita that Jeylnn was the child of Rosanna and Romeo dela
According to Leticia, Janet was not the real child of Pablo and Rosanna; she
Peña. As for Janet, the SSC relied on Leticia’s declaration that she was only
was just taken in by the spouses because for a long time they could not have
adopted by Pablo and Rosanna.29
children;21 however, there were no legal papers on Janet’s adoption.22Later on,
Rosanna got pregnant with Jeylnn; after the latter’s baptism, there was a
commotion at the house because Romeo dela Peña was claiming that he was The claimants filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision but their
the father of the child and he got mad because the child was named after motion was denied by the SSC for lack of merit and for having been filed out of
Pablo; the latter also got mad and even attempted to shoot Rosanna; he drove time.30 The claimants then elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review
them away from the house; since then, Pablo and Rosanna separated;23 she under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
On September 9, 2003, the CA rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. The ERRED IN HOLDING THAT JANET AGUAS AND JEYLNN AGUAS
fallo of the decision reads: ARE ENTITLED TO THE PENSION BENEFIT ACCRUING FROM
THE DEATH OF PABLO AGUAS.34
WHEREFORE, the resolution and order appealed from are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is entered DECLARING Petitioner invokes Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by
petitioners as ENTITLED to the SSS benefits accruing from the death of Pablo Presidential Decree No. 735, which defines a dependent spouse as "the
Aguas. The case is hereby REMANDED to public respondent for purposes of legitimate spouse dependent for support upon the employee." According to
computing the benefits that may have accrued in favor of petitioners after the petitioner, Rosanna forfeited her right to be supported by Pablo when she
same was cut and suspended in September 1997. engaged in an intimate and illicit relationship with Romeo dela Peña and
married the latter during her marriage to Pablo. Such act constitutes
SO ORDERED.31 abandonment, which divested her of the right to receive support from her
husband. It asserts that her act of adultery is evident from the birth certificate of
In so ruling, the CA relied on the birth certificates of Janet and Jeylnn showing Jefren H. dela Peña showing that he was born on November 15, 1996 to
that they were the children of the deceased. According to the appellate court, Rosanna and Romeo dela Peña. Petitioner submits that Rosanna cannot be
considered as a dependent spouse of Pablo; consequently, she is not a
for judicial purposes, these records were binding upon the parties, including
primary beneficiary.35
the SSS. These entries made in public documents may only be challenged
through adversarial proceedings in courts of law, and may not be altered by
mere testimonies of witnesses to the contrary. As for Rosanna, the CA found As for Janet and Jeylnn, petitioner maintains that they are not entitled to the
no evidence to show that she ceased to receive support from Pablo before he pension because, based on the evidence on record, particularly the
died. Rosanna’s alleged affair with Romeo dela Peña was not properly proven. testimonies of the witnesses, they are not the legitimate children of Pablo. It
In any case, even if Rosanna married Romeo dela Peña during her marriage to argues that, in the exercise of its quasi-judicial authority under Section 5(a) of
Pablo, the same would have been a void marriage; it would not have ipso facto the Social Security Act, the SSC can pass upon the legitimacy of respondents’
made her not dependent for support upon Pablo and negate the presumption relationship with the member to determine whether they are entitled to the
that, as the surviving spouse, she is entitled to support from her husband.32 benefits, even without correcting their birth certificates.36

The SSS filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, which the CA Respondents, for their part, assert that petitioner failed to prove that Rosanna
denied for lack of merit.33 Hence, this petition. committed acts of adultery or that she married another man after the death of
her husband. They contend that Janet and Jeylnn’s legitimacy may be
Petitioner seeks a reversal of the decision of the appellate court, contending impugned only on the grounds stated in Article 166 of the Family Code, none
of which were proven in this case.37
that it

The issue to be resolved in this case is whether Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet
I
are entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo.
GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ROSANNA AGUAS IS
The petition is partly meritorious.
ACTUALLY DEPENDENT FOR SUPPORT UPON THE MEMBER
DURING HIS LIFETIME TO QUALIFY AS PRIMARY BENEFICIARY
WITHIN THE INTENDMENT OF SECTION 8(e), IN RELATION TO The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised by the parties and
SECTION (k) OF THE SSS LAW, AS AMENDED. passed upon by the Court in petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.38 In an appeal via certiorari, the Court may not review the factual
findings of the CA.39 It is not the Court’s function under Rule 45 to review,
II
examine, and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence
presented.40 However, the Court may review findings of facts in some
instances, such as, when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts, when the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court or
quasi-judicial agency, or when the findings of facts of the CA are premised on Whoever claims entitlement to such benefits should establish his or her right
the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.41 The thereto by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence, the quantum of
Court finds these instances present in this case. evidence required to establish a fact in cases before administrative or quasi-
judicial bodies, is that level of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
At the time of Pablo’s death, the prevailing law was Republic Act No. 1161, as might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.42
amended by Presidential Decree No. 735. Section 13 of the law enumerates
those who are entitled to death benefits: The Court has reviewed the records of the case and finds that only Jeylnn has
sufficiently established her right to a monthly pension.
Sec.13. Death benefits. – Effective July 1, 1975, upon the covered employee’s
death, (a) his primary beneficiaries shall be entitled to the basic monthly Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears
pension, and his dependents to the dependent’s pension: Provided, That he the signature of Pablo. Petitioner was able to authenticate the certification from
has paid at least thirty-six monthly contributions prior to the semester of death: the Civil Registry showing that she was born on October 29, 1991. The records
Provided, further, That if the foregoing condition is not satisfied, or if he has no also show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on December 4, 1977 and
primary beneficiaries, his secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump the marriage subsisted until the latter’s death on December 8, 1996. It is
sum benefit equivalent to thirty times the basic monthly pension: Provided, therefore evident that Jeylnn was born during Rosanna and Pablo’s marriage.
however, That the death benefit shall not be less than the total contributions
paid by him and his employer on his behalf nor less than five hundred pesos: It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived
Provided, finally, That the covered employee who dies in the month of or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. This Court, in De
coverage shall be entitled to the minimum benefit. Jesus v. Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon,43 extensively discussed this
presumption –
Section 8(k) and (e), in turn, defines dependents and primary beneficiaries of
an SSS member as follows: There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and
founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
SECTION 8. Terms defined. – For the purposes of this Act the following terms presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption
shall, unless the context indicates otherwise, have the following meanings: indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical
impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the
xxxx 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the
physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b)
the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such way that sexual
(e) Dependent. – The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted child who is
intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which
unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over twenty-one years of age
absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration
provided that he is congenitally incapacitated and incapable of self-support
of the periods set forth in Article 170,44 and in proper cases Article 171,45 of the
physically or mentally; the legitimate spouse dependent for support upon the
employee; and the legitimate parents wholly dependent upon the covered Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the
employee for regular support. legitimacy of the child would no longer be legally feasible and the status
conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.46
xxxx
Indeed, impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the
husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs.47 In this case, there is no showing
(k) Beneficiaries. – The dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent that Pablo challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime. Hence,
children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the Jeylnn’s status as a legitimate child of Pablo can no longer be contested.
dependent parents and, subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent
children, the legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who shall be the
The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed by her birth
secondary beneficiaries. In the absence of any of the foregoing, any other
person designated by the covered employee as secondary beneficiary. certificate bearing Pablo’s signature, which was verified from his specimen
signature on file with petitioner. A birth certificate signed by the father is a support upon the member or pensioner." In that case, the Court found it
competent evidence of paternity.48 obvious that a wife who abandoned the family for more than 17 years until her
husband died, and lived with other men, was not dependent on her husband
The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164, however, can not extend to for support, financial or otherwise, during that entire period. Hence, the Court
Janet because her date of birth was not substantially proven. Such denied her claim for death benefits.
presumption may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis
therefor, i.e., that the child’s parents were legally married and that his/her The obvious conclusion then is that a wife who is already separated de facto
conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage.49 It should from her husband cannot be said to be "dependent for support" upon the
be noted that respondents likewise submitted a photocopy of Janet’s alleged husband, absent any showing to the contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that
birth certificate. However, the Court cannot give said birth certificate the same the husband and wife were still living together at the time of his death, it would
probative weight as Jeylnn’s because it was not verified in any way by the civil be safe to presume that she was dependent on the husband for support,
register. It stands as a mere photocopy, without probative weight. Unlike unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for herself.
Jeylnn, there was no confirmation by the civil register of the fact of Janet’s birth
on the date stated in the certificate. Rosanna had the burden to prove that all the statutory requirements have been
complied with, particularly her dependency on her husband for support at the
In any case, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts time of his death. Aside from her own testimony, the only evidence adduced by
contained therein.50 Here, the witnesses were unanimous in saying that Janet Rosanna to prove that she and Pablo lived together as husband and wife until
was not the real child but merely adopted by Rosanna and Pablo. Leticia also his death were the affidavits of Vivencia Turla and Carmelita Yangu where they
testified that Janet’s adoption did not undergo any legal proceedings; hence, made such declaration.
there were no papers to prove it. Under Section 8(e) of Republic Act No. 1161,
as amended, only "legally adopted" children are considered dependent Still, the affidavits of Vivencia and Carmelita and their testimonies before the
children. Absent any proof that the family has legally adopted Janet, the Court SSC will not prevail over the categorical and straightforward testimonies of the
cannot consider her a dependent child of Pablo, hence, not a primary other witnesses who testified that Rosanna and Pablo had already separated
beneficiary. for almost six years before the latter died. Except for the bare assertion of
Carmelita that the couple never separated, there was no further statement
On the claims of Rosanna, it bears stressing that for her to qualify as a primary regarding the witnesses’ assertion in their affidavits that the couple lived
beneficiary, she must prove that she was "the legitimate spouse dependent for together until Pablo’s death. On the contrary, Leticia narrated that the two
support from the employee." The claimant-spouse must therefore establish two separated after Jeylnn’s baptism as a result of an argument regarding Romeo
qualifying factors: (1) that she is the legitimate spouse, and (2) that she is dela Peña. According to Leticia, there was a commotion at their ancestral
dependent upon the member for support. In this case, Rosanna presented house because Romeo dela Peña was grumbling why Jeylnn was named after
proof to show that she is the legitimate spouse of Pablo, that is, a copy of their Pablo when he was the father, and as a result, Pablo drove them away. The
marriage certificate which was verified with the civil register by petitioner. But SSC’s observation and conclusion on the two baptismal certificates of Jeylnn
whether or not Rosanna has sufficiently established that she was still and Jenelyn convinces this Court to further believe Leticia’s testimony on why
dependent on Pablo at the time of his death remains to be resolved. Indeed, a Pablo and Rosanna separated. As noted by the SSC:
husband and wife are obliged to support each other,51 but whether one is
actually dependent for support upon the other is something that has to be It appears from the records that Jeylnn Aguas and Jenelyn H. dela Peña are
shown; it cannot be presumed from the fact of marriage alone. one and the same person. Jeylnn Aguas, born on October 29, 1991 was
baptized at the Metropolitan Cathedral of San Fernando, Pampanga, on
In a parallel case52 involving a claim for benefits under the GSIS law, the Court November 24, 1991 as the child of Pablo Aguas and Rosanna Hernandez.
defined a dependent as "one who derives his or her main support from Jenelyn H dela Peña, on the other hand, was born on January 29, 1992 to
another. Meaning, relying on, or subject to, someone else for support; not able spouses Rosanna Hernandez and Romeo dela Peña and baptized on
to exist or sustain oneself, or to perform anything without the will, power, or aid February 9, 1992. It will be noted that Jenelyn dela Peña was born
of someone else." It should be noted that the GSIS law likewise defines a approximately three months after the birth of Jeylnn Aguas. It is physically
dependent spouse as "the legitimate spouse dependent for impossible for Rosanna to have given birth successively to two children in so
short a time. x x x The testimony of Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac that Rosanna while Rosanna was the legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as
was driven away by Pablo after the baptism of Jeylnn because of the a primary beneficiary since she failed to present any proof to show that at the
commotion that was created by Romeo dela Peña who wanted Jeylnn to be time of his death, she was still dependent on him for support even if they were
baptized using his name explains why Jeylnn was again baptized in the Parish already living separately.
of Sto. Niño in San Fernando using the name Jenelyn dela Peña. They
changed her date of birth also to make it appear in the record of the parish that IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
she is another child of Rosanna.53 The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. Only Jeylnn H. Aguas is declared entitled to the SSS death
On the other hand, Mariquita categorically affirmed that Rosanna was no benefits accruing from the death of Pablo Aguas.
longer living at Pablo’s house even before he died, and that she is still living
with Romeo dela Peña up to the present. Mariquita testified as follows: SO ORDERED.

Hearing Officer: Nagsama ba si Rosanna at Romeo?

Mrs. Dizon: Ngayon at kahit na noon.
Hearing Officer: Kailan namatay si Pablo?
Mrs. Dizon: 1996.
Hearing Officer: Noong bago mamatay si Pablo?
Mrs. Dizon: Nagsasama na sila Romeo at Rosanna noon.
Hearing Officer: So, buhay pa si Pablo ……
Mrs. Dizon: …. nagsasama na sila ni Romeo.
Hearing Officer: Kailan nagkahiwalay si Romeo at Rosanna?
Mrs. Dizon: Hindi na sila nagkahiwalay.
Hearing Officer: Hindi, ibig ko sabihin si Pablo at Rosana?
Mrs. Dizon: Hindi ko alam kasi hindi ako madalas pumunta sa kanila eh, dahil
namatay na yung nanay ni Kuya Pabling, yung tiyahin ko, kapatid ng nanay ko.
Noon madalas ako noong buhay pa yung nanay ni Kuya Pabling dahil kami
ang nag aalaga sa kanya.
Hearing Officer: Bago namatay si Pablo, nagsasama ba sina Romeo at
Rosanna?
Mrs. Dizon: Oo.
Hearing Officer: Sa ngayon, may alam ka pa ba kung nagsasama pa sila
Romeo at Rosanna?
Mrs. Dizon: Oo, nagsasama sila, may bahay sila.
Hearing Officer: Saan naman?
Mrs. Dizon: Doon sa malapit sa amin sa may riles ng tren.54

In conclusion, the Court finds that, among respondents, only Jeylnn is entitled
to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo, as it was
established that she is his legitimate child. On the other hand, the records
show that Janet was merely "adopted" by the spouses, but there are no legal
papers to prove it; hence, she cannot qualify as a primary beneficiary. Finally,
G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014 The denial was appealed tothe Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC),
which affirmed the ruling of the SSS La Union Branch through the assailed
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner, Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the claim is hereby
INC., Respondents. dismissed for lack of merit.

DECISION SO ORDERED.6

VELASCO, JR., J.: In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled against
petitioner’s entitlement to the death benefits sought after under PD 626 on the
Nature of the Case ground she can no longer be considered John’s primary beneficiary. As culled
from the records, John and his sister Elizabeth were adopted by their great
grandfather, petitioner’s grandfather, Cornelio Colcol (Cornelio), by virtue of the
This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul the
Decision7 in Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the Regional Trial Court in Laoag City
March 17, 2010 Decision1 of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC)
dated February 4, 1985, which decree of adoption attained
in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, entitled Bernardina P. Bartolome v.
Social Security System (SSS) [Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.}, declaring that finality.8 Consequently, as argued by the agencies, it is Cornelio who qualifies
petitioner is not a beneficiary of the deceased employee under Presidential as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner. Neither, the ECC reasoned, would
petitioner qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary even if it wereproven that
Decree No. (PD) 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines,
Cornelio has already passed away. As the ECC ratiocinated:
as amended by PD 626.2

The Facts Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic) that beneficiaries
are the "dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are
the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parentsand subject
John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and
Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville, since legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided; that the
February 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the government's Employees' dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary
Compensation Program (ECP).3 Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and
occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to eligible for monthly income benefit."
his untimely death the following day.4
The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates to the
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner legitimate parent of the covered member, as provided for by Rule XV, Section
Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole 1 (c) (1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation. This
remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the Commission believes that the appellant is not considered a legitimate parent of
Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union. However, the the deceased, having given up the latter for adoption to Mr. Cornelio C. Colcol.
SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June 10, 20095 addressed to petitioner, Thus, in effect, the adoption divested her of the statusas the legitimate parent
denied the claim, stating: of the deceased.

We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your claim because xxxx
you are no longer considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was
legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL based on documents you submitted
In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological parent of the
to us.
adopted child shall now be upon the adopting parent. Hence, in this case, the
legal parent referred to by P.D. 626, as amended, as the beneficiary, who has
the right to file the claim, is the adoptive father of the deceased and not herein well, and as such, is the one entitled to claim the benefit being the primary
appellant.9 (Emphasis supplied) beneficiary of the deaceased. Thus, assuming that appellant is indeed a
qualified beneficiary under the Social Security law, in view of her status as
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise other beneficiary, she cannot claim the benefit legally provided by law to the
denied by the ECC.10 Hence, the instant petition. primary beneficiary, in this case the adoptive father since he is still alive.

The Issues We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.

Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition: Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded
great respect, if not finality, by the courts by reason of the special knowledge
and expertise of said administrative agenciesover matters falling under their
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
jurisdiction.12 However, in the extant case, the ECC had overlooked a crucial
piece of evidence offered by the petitioner – Cornelio’s death certificate.13
I. The Honorable ECC’s Decision is contrary to evidence on record.
Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears that John’s adoptive father
II. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in denying the just, due died on October 26, 1987,14 or only less than three (3) years since the decree
and lawful claims of the petitioner as a lawful beneficiary of her of adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained finality. 15 As such, it was error
deceased biological son. for the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven that the adoptive parent,
Cornelio, has already passed away.
III. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in not
giving due course/denying petitioner’s otherwise meritorious motion for The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to
reconsideration.11 law

In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the biological parents of the This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the
covered, but legally adopted, employee considered secondary beneficiaries death benefits claim in view of John’s work-related demise. The pertinent
and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive the benefits under the provision, in this regard, is Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended,
ECP? which reads:

The Court's Ruling ART. 167. Definition of terms. - Asused in this Title unless the context indicates
otherwise:
The petition is meritorious.
xxxx
The ECC’s factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on record
(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and
To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied petitioner’s claim for dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the
death benefits is that eventhough she is John’s biological mother, it was dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent
allegedly not proven that his adoptive parent, Cornelio, was no longer alive. As children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the
intimated by the ECC: secondary beneficiaries; Provided, that the dependent acknowledged natural
child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other
Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to whether the legally dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit.
adoptive parent, Mr. Colcol, is dead, which would immediately qualify the (Emphasis supplied)
appellant [petitioner] for Social Security benefits. Hence, absent such proof of
death of the adoptive father, this Commission will presume him to be alive and
Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c) supervising the ECC rules. As held by the ECC, the adoption decree severed the relation between
"[T]o approve rules and regulations governing the processing of claims and the John and petitioner, effectively divesting her of the status of a legitimate
settlement of disputes arising therefrom as prescribed by the System," the parent, and, consequently, that of being a secondary beneficiary.
ECC has issued the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation,
interpreting the above-cited provision as follows: We disagree.

RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES a. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation
deviates from the clear language of Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended
SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary,
and determined atthe time of employee’s death. Examining the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation in light of the
Labor Code, as amended, it is at once apparent that the ECC indulged in an
(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary: unauthorized administrative legislation. In net effect, the ECC read into Art. 167
of the Code an interpretation not contemplated by the provision. Pertinent in
(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time elucidating on this point isArticle 7 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which
of the employee’s death until he remarries; and reads:

(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or
natural children, who are unmarried not gainfully employed, non-observance shall not beexcused by disuse, or custom or practice to the
not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that contrary.
he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to
physicalor mental defect which is congenital or acquired during When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
minority; Provided, further, that a dependent acknowledged former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary only
when there are no other dependent children who are qualified Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only
and eligible for monthly income benefit; provided finally, that if when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.(Emphasis supplied)
there are two or more acknowledged natural children, they
shall be counted from the youngest and without substitution, As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune
but not exceeding five.
Tobacco Corporation16 that:

(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:

As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to details
for regulating the mode or proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it
(1) The legitimate parentswholly dependent upon the has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory
employee for regular support; requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative
regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because
(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of
are unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over 21 years the basic law. (Emphasis supplied)
of age, or over 21 years of age providedthat he is
incapacitated and incapable of self - support dueto physical or Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on
mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority. Employees’ Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a
(Emphasis supplied) substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted
the phrase "dependent parents" to refer to "legitimate parents."
Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that she is
no longer the deceased’s legitimate parent, as required by the implementing
It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was resolved by parents" was intended to cover all parents – legitimate, illegitimate or parents
this Court in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court17 in this wise: by nature or adoption.

It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’
general acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say: Compensation is in contravention of the equal protection clause

The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an affront
In accordancetherefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should to the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws for the rule,
beunderstood to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is as worded, prevents the parents of an illegitimate child from claiming benefits
a general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the law does under Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended by PD 626. To Our mind,
not make a distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec such postulation cannot be countenanced.
nos distinguera debemus. xxx
As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all persons
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
more restrictive sense thanit is used and intended is not warranted by any rule and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat
ofinterpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law intends to use the similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.18 In other words, the concept
termin a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it
in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code. may not drawdistinctions between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. 19
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it
embraces not only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the universal
spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
limited sense — which as already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at simply requires isequality among equals as determined according to a valid
bar. (Emphasis supplied) classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The
In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is usedand ought to be taken in (2) It is germane tothe purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as what conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
the ECC did. The phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore, include all "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."20
parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or by
adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate
Plainly, "dependent parents" are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, against illegitimate parents. Simply put, the above-cited rule promulgated by
biological or by adoption,who are in need of support or assistance. the ECC that limits the claim of benefits to the legitimate parents miserably
failed the test of reasonableness since the classification is not germane to the
Moreover, the same Article 167 (j),as couched, clearly shows that Congress law being implemented. We see no pressing government concern or interest
did not intend to limit the phrase "dependent parents" to solely legitimate that requires protection so as to warrant balancing the rights of unmarried
parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article 167 provides that "in their parents on one hand and the rationale behind the law on the other. On the
absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its mandate, and the policy of PD 626 – that
dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who employees and their dependents may promptly secure adequate benefits in the
are secondary beneficiaries." Had the lawmakers contemplated "dependent event of work-connected disability or death - will be better served if Article 167
parents" to mean legitimate parents, then it would have simply said (j) of the Labor Code is not so narrowly interpreted.
descendants and not "legitimate descendants." The manner by which the
provision in question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase "dependent There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries to the
legitimate ones, there can be no other course of action to take other than to
strikedown as unconstitutional the phrase "illegitimate" as appearing in Rule The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the
XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation. restoration of custody is concerned.1âwphi1 The manner herein of terminating
the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for rescission,23 justifies the
Petitioner qualifies as John’s dependent parent retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the
adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the
biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a
In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the adverted rule, the
minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.
ECC extended illegitimate parents an opportunity to file claims for and receive
death benefitsby equating dependency and legitimacy to the exercise of
parental authority. Thus, as insinuated by the ECC in its assailed Decision, had To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since RA
petitioner not given up John for adoption, she could have still claimed death 8552 was enacted after Cornelio’s death. Truth be told, there is a lacuna in the
benefits under the law. law as to which provision shall govern contingencies in all fours with the factual
milieu of the instant petition. Nevertheless, We are guided by the catena of
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate cases and the state policies behind RA 855224 wherein the paramount
parents" pertain to those who exercise parental authority over the employee consideration is the best interest of the child, which We invoke to justify this
disposition. It is, after all, for the best interest of the child that someone will
enrolled under the ECP. Itwas only in the assailed Decision wherein such
remain charged for his welfare and upbringing should his or her adopter fail or
qualification was made. In addition, assuming arguendothat the ECC did not
is rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a time the
overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor Code provision to the
adoptee isstill in his formative years, and, to Our mind, in the absence or, as in
deceased’s legitimate parents, and that the commission properly equated
legitimacy to parental authority, petitioner can still qualify as John’s secondary this case, death of the adopter, no one else could reasonably be expected to
beneficiary. perform the role of a parent other than the adoptee’s biological one.

Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about two (2) years old,
authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the
petitioner’s parental authority over John was severed. However, lest it be
overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological
parents, insome instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be
that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption
gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:
decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.

John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be
case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to governed by the following rules:
have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account
Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are xxx
no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption,21 who was then left to care for the
minor adopted child if the adopter passed away? (2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of
the adopted concur withthe adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the tobe inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;
biological parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No.
855222 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides: xxx

Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is (6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the
granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply.
or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a
minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s)
and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished. (emphasis added)
Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the Moreover, John, in his SSS application,28 named petitioner as one of his
effectivity of the Family Code, the governing provision is Art. 984 of the New beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the "Social
Civil Code, which provides: Security Law." While RA 8282 does not cover compensation for work-related
deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries who are
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or not related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626, John’s deliberate act of
descendants, his parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a way,
shall be his legal heirs. considered petitioner as his dependent. Consequently, the confluence of
circumstances – from Cornelio’s death during John’s minority, the restoration
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights ofpetitioner’s parental authority, the documents showing singularity of address,
and John’s clear intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary - effectively
of succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While
made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary
the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form
beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent parent.
part of the estateof the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or
intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological
parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal basis.
adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the
relation, so too should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent
of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the
offspring’s adoptive parent. We cannot leave undetermined the fate of a minor parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the Employees'
child whose second chance ata better life under the care of the adoptive Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John's sole
parents was snatched from him by death’s cruel grasp. Otherwise, the adopted remaining beneficiary.
child’s quality of life might have been better off not being adopted at all if he
would only find himself orphaned in the end. Thus, We hold that Cornelio’s WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2010
death at the time of John’sminority resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission, in ECC Case No. SL-
parental authority over the adopted child. 18483-0218-10, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ECC is hereby directed
to release the benefits due to a secondary beneficiary of the deceased covered
On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of petitioner’s employee John Colcol to petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome.
dependence on John can be established from the documentary evidence
submitted to the ECC. As it appears in the records, petitioner, prior to John’s No costs.
adoption, was a housekeeper. Her late husband died in 1984, leaving her to
care for their seven (7) children. But since she was unable to "give a bright SO ORDERED.
future to her growing children" as a housekeeper, she consented to Cornelio’s
adoption of Johnand Elizabeth in 1985.

Following Cornelio’s death in 1987, so records reveal, both petitioner and John
repeatedly reported "Brgy. Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos Norte" as their
residence. In fact, this veryaddress was used in John’s Death
Certificate25 executed in Brazil, and in the Report of Personal Injury or Loss of
Life accomplished by the master of the vessel boarded by John.26 Likewise,
this is John’s known address as per the ECC’s assailed Decision. 27Similarly,
this same address was used by petitioner in filing her claim before the SSS La
Union branch and, thereafter, in her appeal with the ECC. Hence, it can be
assumed that aside from having been restored parental authority over John,
petitioner indeed actually execised the same, and that they lived together
under one roof.
G.R. No. 164790 August 29, 2008 Antonio retired from his employment on March 1, 1996, and from then on
began receiving monthly pension. He died of respiratory failure on May 15,
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and LORELIE B. SOLIDUM, Branch Manager, 1999. Upon his death, Cirila applied for and began receiving his SSS pension
Cubao Branch,petitioner, benefit, beginning December 1999.
vs.
GLORIA DE LOS SANTOS, respondent. On December 21, 1999, Gloria filed a claim for Antonio’s death benefits with
the SSS Cubao Branch. Her claim was denied because she was not a qualified
DECISION beneficiary of Antonio. The SSS letter of denial dated September 1, 2000
stated:
REYES, R.T., J.:
We regret to inform you that your claim is denied for the following
AN ESTRANGED wife who was not dependent upon her deceased husband reason/s:
for support is not qualified to be his beneficiary.
We received documents showing that you have remarried in the United
The principle is applied in this petition for review on certiorari of the States to one Larry T. Constant. You were also the one who filed for
petition for dissolution of your marriage with the deceased member,
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), awarding benefits to respondent Gloria
de los Santos. which was in fact granted by the Superior Court of California, County
of Orange.
The Facts
These circumstances are sufficient ground for denial as the SSS law
specifically defines beneficiaries as "the dependent spouse, until he or
Antonio de los Santos and respondent Gloria de los Santos, both Filipinos, she remarries, the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted
were married on April 29, 1964 in Manila. Less than one (1) year after, in and illegitimate children who shall be the primary beneficiary." x x x2
February 1965, Gloria left Antonio and contracted another marriage with a
certain Domingo Talens in Nueva Ecija. Sometime in 1969, Gloria went back to
SSC Disposition
Antonio and lived with him until 1983. They had three children: Alain Vincent,
Arlene, and Armine.
Gloria elevated her claim to the Social Security Commission (SSC). On
February 12, 2001, she filed a petition to claim death benefits, with a prayer
In 1983, Gloria left Antonio and went to the United States (US). On May 8,
that she be declared the rightful beneficiary of the deceased Antonio.3
1986, she filed for divorce against Antonio with the Superior Court of Orange,
Sta. Ana, California. On May 21, 1983, she executed a document waiving all
her rights to their conjugal properties and other matters. The divorce was The SSC motu proprio impleaded Cirila as respondent in the case, it appearing
granted on November 5, 1986. that she was another claimant to the death benefits of Antonio. Upon receipt of
the summons, Cirila moved to dismiss the petition of Gloria. She argued that
Gloria had no personality to sue because the latter is neither a dependent nor
On May 23, 1987, Antonio married Cirila de los Santos in Camalig, Albay.
a beneficiary of Antonio, as evidenced by the E-4 form accomplished and
Their union produced one child, May-Ann N. de los Santos, born on May 15,
1989. On her part, Gloria married Larry Thomas Constant, an American citizen, submitted by him when he was still alive. Gloria had also remarried an
on July 11, 1987, in the US. American citizen in the US. And that she, Cirila, was the true and legal wife of
Antonio.
On May 15, 1989, Antonio amended his records at the Social Security System
Cirila likewise reasoned out that the authority to determine the validity of the
(SSS). He changed his beneficiaries from Mrs. Margarita de los Santos to
Cirila de los Santos; from Gloria de los Santos to May-Ann de los Santos; and two marriages of Antonio lay with the regular courts. Since Gloria had already
from Erlinda de los Santos to Armine de los Santos. filed for settlement of the intestate estate of Antonio before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), the petition she filed with the SSC should be considered as forum of marital dissolution from an American court, now wishes to invoke
shopping. the very invalidity of her divorce and subsequent marriage in order to
lay hands on the benefit she seeks. It is sheer folly, if not downright
Gloria opposed the motion to dismiss. She contended that her marriage to reprehensible, for the petitioner to seek to profit from committing an act
Larry Constant was not the subsequent marriage contemplated under the considered as unlawful under Philippine law. This Commission will not
Social Security Law (SS Law)4 that would disqualify her as a beneficiary; that allow itself to be used as an instrument to subvert the policies laid
the decree of divorce issued by a foreign state involving Filipino citizens has no down in the SS Law which it has sworn to uphold at all times. x x
validity and effect under Philippine law. Lastly, Gloria remonstrated that there x7 (Emphasis added)
was no forum shopping because the petition she filed before the RTC did not
involve the issue of her entitlement to SSS benefits. The SSC added that since the marriage of Antonio to Cirila was void, the latter
was likewise not a qualified beneficiary. The fruit of their union, May-Ann, was
The SSC denied the motion to dismiss. After submission of position papers considered as an illegitimate child and qualified as a secondary beneficiary.
from both sides, it issued a Resolution, dated February 13, 2002,5 dismissing May-Ann was entitled to 50% of the share of the legitimate children of Antonio
Gloria’s petition with the following disposition: in accordance with Section 8(k) of the SS Law.8 However, considering that the
legitimate children of Antonio have reached the age of majority, May-Ann is the
only remaining qualified beneficiary and was thus entitled to 100% of the
WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds, that May-Ann de
benefit.
los Santos, daughter of Antonio and private respondent Cirila de los
Santos is the secondary beneficiary of the former and as such, she is
entitled to the balance of her father’s five-year guaranteed pension. R.A. No. 8282, which is the law in force at the time of retiree Antonio’s death
on May 15, 1999, provides as follows:
Accordingly, the SSS is hereby ordered to compute the balance of the
five-year guaranteed pension less the amount of P21,200 representing "Section 12-B. Retirement Benefits. x x x
the total of the monthly pensions and dependent’s pension previously
received by private respondent Cirila Nimo and minor May-Ann de los (d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary
Santos, respectively, and to pay the latter, through her natural beneficiaries as of the date of his retirement shall be entitled to
guardian Cirila Nimo, the difference between the two amounts, if any. If receive the monthly pension. Provided, That if he has no
there was overpayment of pension, the private respondent is hereby primary beneficiaries and he dies within sixty (60) months from
ordered to forthwith refund the amount thereof to the SSS. the start of his monthly pension, his secondary
beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. to the total monthly pensions corresponding to the balance of
the five-year guaranteed period, excluding the dependents’
pension." (Emphasis supplied)
SO ORDERED.6

Since Antonio de los Santos retired on March 1, 1996, and began

The SSC deemed that Gloria abandoned Antonio when she obtained a divorce
receiving monthly pension since then, the determination of who his
against him abroad and subsequently married another man. She thus failed to
primary beneficiaries were at that times should be based on the
satisfy the requirement of dependency required of primary beneficiaries under
relevant provisions of the applicable prevailing law then, R.A. No.
the law. The Commission likewise rejected her efforts to use the invalidity of
the divorce, which she herself obtained, to claim benefits from the SSS for her 1161, as amended, which is quoted hereunder:
personal profit.
"Section 8. Terms Defined. x x x
However, despite all the sophistry with which petitioner, through her
counsel, sought to justify her acts in the USA, the petition must fail. xxxx
The petitioner, who was primarily responsible for obtaining the decree
 (k) Beneficiaries. – The dependent spouse until he remarries The controversy revolves on who between respondent Gloria, the first wife who
and dependent children who shall be the primary beneficiaries. divorced Antonio in the US, or Cirila, the second wife, is his primary beneficiary
In their absence, the dependent parents, and subject to the entitled to claim death benefits from the SSS.
restrictions imposed on dependent children, the legitimate
descendants and illegitimate children who shall be Our Ruling
the secondary beneficiaries. In the absence of any of the
foregoing, any other person designed by the covered At the outset, let it be recalled that in 2005, this Court ruled in Dycaico v. Social
employee as secondary beneficiary." (Emphasis supplied) Security System12that the proviso "as of the date of retirement" in Section 12-
B(d) of Republic Act No. 8282,13 which qualifies the term "primary
Applying these provisions to the case at hand, May-Ann de los Santos beneficiaries," is unconstitutional for it violates the due process and equal
as the illegitimate child of Antonio and Cirila is considered her father’s protection clauses. For ready reference, the concerned provision is reproduced
secondary beneficiary who, in the absence of a primary beneficiary x x below:
x, becomes entitled to the balance of the five-year guaranteed pension
as Antonio died just three (3) years after he began receiving his SECTION 12-B. Retirement Benefits. – (a) A member who has paid at
retirement pension, pursuant to Section 12-B par. (d) of the SS Law,
least one hundred twenty (120) monthly contributions prior to the
as amended.9
semester of retirement and who (1) has reached the age of sixty (60)
years and is already separated from employment or has ceased to be
CA Decision self-employed or (2) has reached the age of sixty-five (65) years, shall
be entitled for as long as he lives to the monthly pension; Provided,
Gloria appealed the above SSC Resolution to the CA. She insisted that she, as That he shall have the option to receive his first eighteen (18) monthly
the legal wife, was the qualified beneficiary to Antonio’s death benefits. pensions in lump sum discounted at a preferential rate of interest to be
determined by the SSS.
The CA agreed with the SSC in its determination that the marriage of Gloria
and Antonio subsisted until his death and the subsequent marriages contracted xxxx
by both of them were void for being bigamous. But contrary to findings of the
SSC, the CA found that being the legal wife, Gloria was entitled by law to (d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as
receive support from her husband. Thus, her status qualified Gloria to be a of the date of his retirement shall be entitled to receive the monthly
dependent and a primary beneficiary under the law. The dispositive portion of pension; Provided, That if he has no primary beneficiaries and he dies
the CA decision reads: within sixty (60) months from the start of his monthly pension, his
secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Petition for Review is equivalent to the total monthly pensions corresponding to the balance
GRANTED and the appealed Resolution dated February 13, 2003, is of the five-year guaranteed period, excluding the dependents’ pension.
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent SSS is DIRECTED (Emphasis added)
to compute the amount of benefits to which petitioner is entitled under
the law.10 In deciding that death benefits should not be denied to the wife who was
married to the deceased retiree only after the latter’s retirement, this Court in
Issues Dycaico reasoned:

Petitioner SSS and the concerned Branch head present a lone issue for Our x x x In particular, the proviso was apparently intended to prevent
consideration: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED sham marriages or those contracted by persons solely to enable one
IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS STILL QUALIFIED AS A PRIMARY spouse to claim benefits upon the anticipated death of the other
BENEFICIARY OF DECEASED SSS MEMBER ANTONIO, UNDER SECTION spouse.
12-B IN RELATION TO SECTION 8(e) and (k) OF THE SS LAW.11
 x x x However, classifying dependent spouses and determining their further, That in the absence of the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally
entitlement to survivor’s pension based on whether the marriage was adopted children of the member, his/her dependent illegitimate children shall
contracted before or after the retirement of the other spouse, be entitled to one hundred percent (100%) of the benefits. In their absence, the
regardless of the duration of the said marriage, bears no relation to the dependent parents who shall be the secondary beneficiaries of the member. In
achievement of the policy objective of the law, i.e., "provide meaningful the absence of all of the foregoing, any other person designated by the
protection to members and their beneficiaries against the hazard of member as his/her secondary beneficiary.
disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death and other contingencies
resulting in loss of income or financial burden." x x x 14 As found by both the SSC and the CA, the divorce obtained by respondent
against the deceased Antonio was not binding in this jurisdiction. Under
That said, the reckoning point in determining the beneficiaries of the deceased Philippine law, only aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid
Antonio should be the time of his death. There is no need to look into the time according to their national law.15 The divorce was obtained by respondent
of his retirement, as was the course followed by the SSC in resolving the claim Gloria while she was still a Filipino citizen and thus covered by the policy
of respondent. We note, however, that considering the circumstances of this against absolute divorces. It did not sever her marriage ties with Antonio.
case, the Dycaico ruling does not substantially affect the determination of
Antonio’s beneficiaries. However, although respondent was the legal spouse of the deceased, We find
that she is still disqualified to be his primary beneficiary under the SS Law.
The SS Law clearly and expressly provides who are the qualified beneficiaries She fails to fulfill the requirement of dependency upon her deceased husband
entitled to receive benefits from the deceased: Antonio.

"Section 8. Terms Defined. – For the purposes of this Act, the following terms Social Security System v. Aguas16 is instructive in determining the extent of the
shall, unless the context indicates otherwise, have the following meanings: required "dependency" under the SS Law. In Aguas, the Court ruled that
although a husband and wife are obliged to support each other, whether one is
xxxx actually dependent for support upon the other cannot be presumed from the
fact of marriage alone.17
(e) Dependents – The dependents shall be the following:
Further, Aguas pointed out that a wife who left her family until her husband
died and lived with other men, was not dependent upon her husband for
(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;
support, financial or otherwise, during the entire period.
(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is
Said the Court:
unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one years (21)
of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a
minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, In a parallel case involving a claim for benefits under the GSIS law, the Court
physically or mentally; and defined a dependent as "one who derives his or her main support from
another. Meaning, relying on, or subject to, someone else for support; not able
to exist or sustain oneself, or to perform anything without the will, power, or aid
(3) The parent who is receiving regular support from the member.
of someone else." It should be noted that the GSIS law likewise defines
a dependent spouse as "the legitimate spouse dependent for support upon the
xxxx member or pensioner." In that case, the Court found it obvious that a wife who
abandoned the family for more than 17 years until her husband died, and lived
(k) Beneficiaries – The dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the with other men, was not dependent on her husband for support, financial or
dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children, otherwise, during that entire period. Hence, the Court denied her claim for
who shall be the primary beneficiaries of the member: Provided, That the death benefits.
dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to fifty percent (50%) of the
share of the legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children: Provided,
The obvious conclusion then is that a wife who is already separated de
facto from her husband cannot be said to be "dependent for support" upon the
husband, absent any showing to the contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that
the husband and wife were still living together at the time of his death, it would
be safe to presume that she was dependent on the husband for support,
unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for herself. 18

Respondent herself admits that she left the conjugal abode on two (2) separate
occasions, to live with two different men. The first was in 1965, less than one
year after their marriage, when she contracted a second marriage to Domingo
Talens. The second time she left Antonio was in 1983 when she went to the
US, obtained a divorce, and later married an American citizen. In fine, these
uncontroverted facts remove her from qualifying as a primary beneficiary of her
deceased husband.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed

Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Social Security
Commission is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
YOLANDA SIGNEY, G.R. No. 173582 children namey, Ginalyn Servano (Ginalyn), born on 13 April 1996,
Petitioner, and RodelynSigney (Rodelyn), born on 20 April 2000.[6]
Present:
Petitioners declaration was confirmed when Gina herself filed a claim
QUISUMBING, for the same death benefits on 13 July 2001 in which she also declared that
- versus - both she and petitioner were common-law wives of the deceased and
that Editha Espinosa (Editha) was the legal wife.
Chairperson,
CARPIO, In addition, in October 2001, Editha also filed an application for death
CARPIO MORALES, benefits with the SSS stating that she was the legal wife of the deceased.[7]
TINGA, and
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, VELASCO, JR., JJ. The SSS, through a letter dated 4 December 2001,[8] denied the death
EDITHA ESPINOSA-CASTILLO, benefit claim of petitioner. However, it recognized Ginalyn and Rodelyn, the
and GINA SERVANO, represen- Promulgated: minor children of the deceased with Gina, as the primary beneficiaries under
tative of GINALYN and RODELYN the SSS Law. The SSS also found that the 20 March 1992 marriage between
SIGNEY, petitioner and the deceased was null and void because of a prior subsisting
Respondents. January 28, 2008 marriage contracted on 29 October 1967 between the deceased and Editha, as
confirmed with the Local Civil Registry of Cebu City.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition[9] with the SSC in which she
attached a waiver of rights[10] executed by Editha whereby the latter waived
DECISION any/all claims from National Trucking Forwarding Corporation (NTFC) under
TINGA, J: the supervision of National Development Corporation (NDC), Social Security
System (SSS) and other (i)nsurance(b)enefits due to the deceased
We are called to determine who is entitled to the social security Rodolfo Signey Sr., who died intestate on May 21, 2001 at Manila Doctors, and
benefits of a Social Security System (SSS) member who was survived not only further declared that I am legally married to Mr. Aquilino Castillo and not to Mr.
by his legal wife, but also by two common-law wives with whom he had six Rodolfo P. Signey Sr.[11]
children.
In a Resolution[12] dated 29 January 2003, the SSC affirmed the
decision of the SSS. The SSC gave more weight to the SSS field investigation
and the confirmed certification of marriage showing that the deceased was
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the 1997 married to Editha on 29 October 1967, than to the aforestated declarations
Rules of Civil Procedure assails the 31 March 2004 Decision[2] of the Court of of Editha in her waiver of rights. It found that petitioner only relied on the waiver
Appeals affirming the resolution of the Social Security Commission (SSC),[3] as of Editha, as she failed to present any evidence to invalidate or otherwise
well as the 23 July 2004 Resolution[4] of the same court denying petitioners controvert the confirmed marriage certificate. The SSC also found, based on
motion for reconsideration. the SSS field investigation report dated 6 November 2001 that even
if Editha was the legal wife, she was not qualified to the death benefits since
The facts as culled from the records are as follows: she herself admitted that she was not dependent on her deceased husband for
support inasmuch as she was cohabiting with a certain Aquilino Castillo.[13]
Rodolfo Signey, Sr., a member of the SSS, died on 21 May 2001. In
his members records, he had designated Yolanda Signey (petitioner) as Considering that petitioner, Editha, and Gina were not entitled to the
primary beneficiary and his four children with her as secondary beneficiaries. death benefits, the SSC applied Section 8(e) and (k) of Republic Act (RA) No.
On 6 July 2001, petitioner filed a claim for death benefits with the public 8282, the SSS Law which was in force at the time of the members death on 21
respondent SSS.[5] She revealed in her SSS claim that the deceased had a May 2001, and held that the dependent legitimate and illegitimate minor
common-law wife, Gina Servano (Gina), with whom he had two minor children of the deceased member were also considered primary beneficiaries.
The records disclosed that the deceased had one legitimate child, Ma. provision vested the right of the benefit to his illegitimate minor
Evelyn Signey, who predeceased him, and several illegitimate children with children, Ginalyn and Rodelyn, irrespective of any proof that they had been
petitioner and with Gina. Based on their respective certificates of live birth, the dependent on the support of the deceased.[18]
deceased SSS members four illegitimate children with petitioner could no
longer be considered dependents at the time of his death because all of them Petitioner appealed the judgment of the SSC to the Court of Appeals
were over 21 years old when he died on 21 May 2001, the youngest having by filing a Petition for Review[19] under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
been born on 31 March 1978. On the other hand, the deceased SSS members Procedure. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the SSC in its 31
illegitimate children with Gina were qualified to be his primary beneficiaries for March 2004 Decision. Resolving the determinative question of who between
they were still minors at the time of his death, Ginalyn having been born on 13 petitioner and the illegitimate children of the deceased are the primary
April 1996, and Rodelyn on 20 April 2000.[14] beneficiaries lawfully entitled to the social security benefits accruing by virtue of
the latters death, it held that based on Section 8(e) of R. A. No. 8282, a
The SSC denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in an surviving spouse claiming death benefits as a dependent must be the legal
Order[15] dated 9 April 2003. This order further elaborated on the reasons for spouse. Petitioners presentation of a marriage certificate attesting to her
the denial of petitioners claims. It held that the mere designation of petitioner marriage to the deceased was futile, according to the appellate court, as said
and her children as beneficiaries by the deceased member was not the marriage is null and void in view of the previous marriage of the deceased
controlling factor in the determination of beneficiaries. Sections 13, 8(e) and to Editha as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City.
8(k) of the SSS Law, as amended, provide that dependent legal spouse
entitled by law to receive support from the member and dependent legitimate, The appellate court also held that the law is clear that for a child to be
legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children of the member shall be qualified as dependent, he must be unmarried, not gainfully employed and
the primary beneficiaries of the latter.[16] Based on the certification dated 25 must not be 21 years of age, or if over 21 years of age, he is congenitally or
July 2001 issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, the while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-
marriage of the deceased and Editha on 29 October 1967 at the Metropolitan support, physically or mentally. And in this case, only the illegitimate children of
Cathedral, Cebu City was duly registered under LCR Registry No. 2083 on 21 the deceased with Gina namely, Ginalyn and Rodelyn, are the qualified
November 1967. The SSS field investigation reports verified the authenticity of beneficiaries as they were still minors at the time of the death of their father.
the said certification.[17] Considering petitioner is disqualified to be a beneficiary and the absence of
any legitimate children of the deceased, it follows that the dependent
The SSC did not give credence to the waiver executed by Editha, illegitimate minor children of the deceased should be entitled to the death
which manifested her lack of interest in the outcome of the case, considering benefits as primary beneficiaries, the Court of Appeals concluded.[20]
that she was not entitled to the benefit anyway because of her admitted
cohabitation with Aquilino Castillo. Moreover, the SSC held that considering The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration of
that one of the requisites of a valid waiver is the existence of an actual right petitioner in a Resolution[21] dated 23 July 2004. It found that there was no new
which could be renounced, petitioner in effect recognized that Editha had a matter of substance which would warrant a modification and/or reversal of
right over the benefits of the deceased thereby enabling her to renounce said the 31 March 2004 Decision.
right in favor of petitioner and her children. The declaration by Editha that she
was not married to the deceased is not only contrary to the records of the Local Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Civil Registrar of Cebu City which state that they were married on 29 October
1967 but also renders nugatory the waiver of right itself, for if she was not Petitioner raises issues similar to the ones which have been
married to the deceased then she would have no rights that may be waived. adequately resolved by the SSC and the appellate court. The first issue is
whether petitioners marriage with the deceased is valid. The second issue is
Petitioner had argued that the illegitimate children of the deceased with whether petitioner has a superior legal right over the SSS benefits as against
Gina failed to show proof that they were indeed dependent on the deceased for the illegitimate minor children of the deceased.
support during his lifetime. The SSC observed that Section 8(e) of the SSS
Law, as amended, provides among others that dependents include the There is no merit in the petition.
legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is
unmarried, not gainfully employed, and has not reached 21 years of age. The
 We deemed it best not to disturb the findings of fact of the SSS which 2) The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted,
are supported by substantial evidence[22] and affirmed by the SSC and the and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully
Court of Appeals. Moreover, petitioner ought to be reminded of the basic rule employed and has not reached twenty-one years (21) of
that this Court is not a trier of facts.[23] age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally
or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and
It is a well-known rule that in proceedings before administrative bodies, incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; and
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not binding. [24] The important
consideration is that both parties were afforded an opportunity to be heard and 3) The parent who is receiving regular support from
they availed themselves of it to present their respective positions on the matter the member.
in dispute.[25] It must likewise be noted that under Section 2, Rule 1[26] of the
SSC Revised Rules of Procedure, the rules of evidence prevailing in the courts xxx
of law shall not be controlling. In the case at bar, the existence of a prior
subsisting marriage between the deceased and Editha is supported by (k) Beneficiaries The dependent spouse until he or
substantial evidence. Petitioner, who has fully availed of her right to be heard, she remarries, the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally
only relied on the waiver of Editha and failed to present any evidence to adopted, and illegitimate children, who shall be the primary
invalidate or otherwise controvert the confirmed marriage certificate registered beneficiaries of the member: Provided, That the dependent
under LCR Registry No. 2083 on 21 November 1967. She did not even try to illegitimate children shall be entitled to fifty percent (50%) of
allege and prove any infirmity in the marriage between the deceased the share of the legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted
and Editha. children: Provided, further, That in the absence of the
dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children of
As to the issue of who has the better right over the SSS death benefits, the member, his/her dependent illegitimate children shall be
Section 8(e) and (k) of R. A. No. 8282 [27] is very clear. Hence, we need only entitled to one hundred percent (100%) of the benefits. In their
apply the law. Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is absence, the dependent parents who shall be the secondary
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and beneficiaries of the member. In the absence of all of the
applied without attempted interpretation. This plain meaning rule or verba legis, foregoing, any other person designated by the member as
derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of his/her secondary beneficiary.
intention), rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the
legislature in a statute correctly express its intent by the use of such words as SEC. 13. Death Benefits. Upon the death of a member
are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or, from the words of who has paid at least thirty-six (36) monthly contributions prior
a statute there should be no departure.[28] to the semester of death, his primary beneficiaries shall be
entitled to the monthly pension: Provided, That if he has no
Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282 provides: primary beneficiaries, his secondary beneficiaries shall be
entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to thirty-six (36) times
SEC. 8. Terms Defined.For the purposes of this Act, the monthly pension. If he has not paid the required thirty-six
the following terms shall, unless the context indicates (36) monthly contributions, his primary or secondary
otherwise, have the following meanings: beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent
to the monthly pension times the number of monthly
xxx contributions paid to the SSS or twelve (12) times the monthly
pension, whichever is higher. (Emphasis supplied).
(e) Dependents The dependent shall be the following:
Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should
(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence. Since petitioner is
support from the member; disqualified to be a beneficiary and because the deceased has no legitimate
child, it follows that the dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased
shall be entitled to the death benefits as primary beneficiaries. The SSS Law is
clear that for a minor child to qualify as a dependent,[29] the only requirements
are that he/she must be below 21 years of age, not married nor gainfully
employed.[30]

In this case, the minor illegitimate children Ginalyn and Rodelyn were
born on 13 April 1996 and 20 April 2000, respectively. Had the legitimate child
of the deceased and Editha survived and qualified as a dependent under the
SSS Law, Ginalyn and Rodelyn would have been entitled to a share equivalent
to only 50% of the share of the said legitimate child. Since the legitimate child
of the deceased predeceased him, Ginalyn and Rodelyn, as the only qualified
primary beneficiaries of the deceased, are entitled to 100% of the benefits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals is AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, G.R. No. 165545 or on August 8, 1983, Bailon contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque
Petitioner, (respondent) in Casiguran, Sorsogon.[10]
Present:
On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social
QUISUMBING, Chairperson,* Security System (SSS) since 1960 and a retiree pensioner thereof effective
-versus- CARPIO, Acting Chairperson, July 1994, died.[11]
CARPIO MORALES, and
TINGA, JJ. Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits, and was
granted P12,000[12] by the SSS.
TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON,
Respondent. Promulgated: Respondent filed on March 11, 1998 an additional claim for death
benefits[13] which was also granted by the SSS on April 6, 1998.[14]
March 24, 2006
x----------------------------------------------x Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon
and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa) contested before the SSS the release to
DECISION respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She claimed that Bailon
contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the first with Alice, the second with
CARPIO MORALES, J.: her mother Elisa, and the third with respondent, all of whom are still alive; she,
together with her siblings, paid for Bailons medical and funeral expenses; and
The Court of Appeals Decision[1] dated June 23, 2004[2] and Resolution all the documents submitted by respondent to the SSS in support of her claims
dated September 28, 2004[3] reversing the Resolution dated April 2, 2003[4] and are spurious.
Order dated June 4, 2003[5] of the Social Security Commission (SSC) in SSC
Case No. 4-15149-01 are challenged in the present petition for review on In support of her claim, Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon Chavez
certiorari. (Norma) submitted an Affidavit dated February 13, 1999[15] averring that they
are two of nine children of Bailon and Elisa who cohabited as husband and
On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz wife as early as 1958; and they were reserving their right to file the necessary
(Alice) contracted marriage in Barcelona, Sorsogon.[6] court action to contest the marriage between Bailon and respondent as they
personally know that Alice is still very much alive.[16]
More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sorsogon a petition [7] to In the meantime, on April 5, 1999, a certain Hermes P. Diaz, claiming
declare Alice presumptively dead. to be the brother and guardian of Aliz P. Diaz, filed before the SSS a claim for
death benefits accruing from Bailons death,[17] he further attesting in a sworn
By Order of December 10, 1970,[8] the CFI granted the petition, statement[18] that it was Norma who defrayed Bailons funeral expenses.
disposing as follows:
Elisa and seven of her children[19] subsequently filed claims for death
WHEREFORE, there being no opposition filed against benefits as Bailons beneficiaries before the SSS.[20]
the petition notwithstanding the publication of the Notice of
Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the country, Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS Bicol Cluster,
Alice Diaz is hereby declared to [sic] all legal intents and Naga City recommended the cancellation of payment of death pension benefits
purposes, except for those of succession, presumptively dead. to respondent and the issuance of an order for the refund of the amount paid to
her from February 1998 to May 1999 representing such benefits; the denial of
SO ORDERED.[9] (Underscoring supplied) the claim of Alice on the ground that she was not dependent upon Bailon for
support during his lifetime; and the payment of the balance of the five-year
guaranteed pension to Bailons beneficiaries according to the order of
preference provided under the law, after the amount erroneously paid to Respondent protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for
respondent has been collected. The pertinent portions of the Memorandum death benefits by letter to the SSS dated October 12, 1999.[24] In a subsequent
read: letter dated November 27, 1999[25] to the SSC, she reiterated her request for
the release of her monthly pension, asserting that her marriage with Bailon was
1. Aliz [sic] Diaz never disappeared. The court must not declared before any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful, hence, it
have been misled by misrepresentation in declaring the first remained valid and subsisting for all legal intents and purposes as in fact
wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz, as presumptively dead. Bailon designated her as his beneficiary.

xxxx The SSS, however, by letter to respondent dated January 21,

2000,[26] maintained the denial of her claim for and the discontinuance of
x x x the Order of the court in the Petition to Declare payment of monthly pension. It advised her, however, that she was not
Alice Diaz Presumptively Dead, did not become final. The deprived of her right to file a petition with the SSC.
presence of Aliz [sic] Diaz, is contrary proof that rendered it
invalid. Respondent thus filed a petition[27] against the SSS before the SSC for
xxxx the restoration to her of her entitlement to monthly pension.

3. It was the deceased member who abandoned his In the meantime, respondent informed the SSS that she was returning,
wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz. He, being in bad faith, and is the deserting under protest, the amount of P12,000 representing the funeral benefits she
spouse, his remarriage is void, being bigamous. received, she alleging that Norma and her siblings forcibly and coercively
prevented her from spending any amount during Bailons wake.[28]
xxxx
After the SSS filed its Answer[29] to respondents petition, and the
In this case, it is the deceased member who was the parties filed their respective Position Papers, one Alicia P. Diaz filed an
deserting spouse and who remarried, thus his marriage to Affidavit[30] dated August 14, 2002 with the SSS Naga Branch attesting that she
Teresita Jarque, for the second time was void as it was is the widow of Bailon; she had only recently come to know of the petition filed
bigamous. To require affidavit of reappearance to terminate by Bailon to declare her presumptively dead; it is not true that she disappeared
the second marriage is not necessary as there is no as Bailon could have easily located her, she having stayed at her parents
disappearance of Aliz [sic] Diaz, the first wife, and a voidable residence in Barcelona, Sorsogon after she found out that Bailon was having
marriage [sic], to speak of.[21](Underscoring supplied) an extramarital affair; and Bailon used to visit her even after their separation.

By Resolution of April 2, 2003, the SSC found that the marriage of

In the meantime, the SSS Sorsogon Branch, by letter of August 16, respondent to Bailon was void and, therefore, she was just a common-law-
2000,[22] advised respondent that as Cecilia and Norma were the ones who wife. Accordingly it disposed as follows, quoted verbatim:
defrayed Bailons funeral expenses, she should return the P12,000 paid to her.
WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds,
In a separate letter dated September 7, 1999,[23] the SSS advised that petitioner Teresita Jarque-Bailon is not the legitimate
respondent of the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits in spouse and primary beneficiary of SSS member Clemente
view of the opinion rendered by its legal department that her marriage with Bailon.
Bailon was void as it was contracted while the latters marriage with Alice was
still subsisting; and the December 10, 1970 CFI Order declaring Alice Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby ordered to refund
presumptively dead did not become final, her presence being contrary proof to the SSS the amount of P24,000.00 representing the death
against the validity of the order. It thus requested respondent to return the benefit she received therefrom for the period February 1998
amount of P24,000 representing the total amount of monthly pension she had until May 1999 as well as P12,000.00 representing the funeral
received from the SSS from February 1998 to May 1999. benefit.
 entitled as a primary beneficiary, to the latters death
The SSS is hereby ordered to pay Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) benefit. x x x
Diaz-Bailon the appropriate death benefit arising from the
demise of SSS member Clemente Bailon in accordance with xxxx
Section 8(e) and (k) as well as Section 13 of the SS Law, as
amended, and its prevailing rules and regulations and to It having been determined that Teresita Jarque was
inform this Commission of its compliance herewith. not the legitimate surviving spouse and primary beneficiary of
Clemente Bailon, it behooves her to refund the total amount of
SO ORDERED.[31] (Underscoring supplied) death benefit she received from the SSS for the period from
February 1998 until May 1999 pursuant to the principle
of solutio indebiti x x x
In so ruling against respondent, the SSC ratiocinated.
Likewise, it appearing that she was not the one who
After a thorough examination of the evidence at hand, actually defrayed the cost of the wake and burial of Clemente
this Commission comes to the inevitable conclusion that Bailon, she must return the amount of P12,000.00 which was
the petitioner is not the legitimate wife of the deceased earlier given to her by the SSS as funeral
member. benefit.[33] (Underscoring supplied)

xxxx
Respondents Motion for Reconsideration[34] having been denied by
There is x x x ample evidence pointing to the fact Order of June 4, 2003, she filed a petition for review[35] before the Court of
that, contrary to the declaration of the then CFI of Sorsogon Appeals (CA).
(10th Judicial District), the first wife never disappeared as the
deceased member represented in bad faith. This Commission By Decision of June 23, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the April
accords credence to the findings of the SSS contained in its 2, 2003 Resolution and June 4, 2003 Order of the SSC and thus ordered the
Memorandum dated August 9, 1999,[32] revealing that Alice SSS to pay respondent all the pension benefits due her. Held the CA:
(a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz never left Barcelona, Sorsogon, after her
separation from Clemente Bailon x x x. x x x [T]he paramount concern in this case transcends
As the declaration of presumptive death was extracted the issue of whether or not the decision of the then CFI, now
by the deceased member using artifice and by exerting fraud RTC, declaring Alice Diaz presumptively dead has attained
upon the unsuspecting court of law, x x x it never had the finality but, more importantly, whether or not the respondents
effect of giving the deceased member the right to marry SSS and Commission can validly re-evaluate the findings of
anew. x x x [I]t is clear that the marriage to the petitioner is the RTC, and on its own, declare the latters decision to be
void, considering that the first marriage on April 25, 1955 to bereft of any basis.On similar import, can respondents SSS
Alice Diaz was not previously annulled, invalidated or and Commission validly declare the first marriage subsisting
otherwise dissolved during the lifetime of the parties and the second marriage null and void?
thereto. x x x as determined through the investigation
conducted by the SSS, Clemente Bailon was the abandoning xxxx
spouse, not Alice Diaz Bailon.
x x x while it is true that a judgment declaring a person
xxxx presumptively dead never attains finality as the finding that the
person is unheard of in seven years is merely a
It having been established, by substantial evidence, presumption juris tantum, the second marriage contracted by
that the petitioner was just a common-law wife of the a person with an absent spouse endures until annulled. It is
deceased member, it necessarily follows that she is not only the competent court that can nullify the second
marriage pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code and upon the The SSC and the SSS separately filed their Motions for
reappearance of the missing spouse, which action for Reconsideration[37] which were both denied for lack of merit.
annulment may be filed. Nowhere does the law contemplates
[sic] the possibility that respondent SSS may validly declare Hence, the SSS present petition for review on certiorari[38] anchored
the second marriage null and void on the basis alone of its on the following grounds:
own investigation and declare that the decision of the RTC
declaring one to be presumptively dead is without basis. I

Respondent SSS cannot arrogate upon itself the THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF
authority to review the decision of the regular APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
courts under the pretext of determining the actual and lawful
beneficiaries of its members. Notwithstanding its opinion as to II
the soundness of the findings of the RTC, it should extend due
credence to the decision of the RTC absent of [sic] any judicial THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
pronouncement to the contrary. x x x ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION.[39]
x x x [A]ssuming arguendo that respondent SSS
actually possesses the authority to declare the decision of the
RTC to be without basis, the procedure it followed was The SSS faults the CA for failing to give due consideration to the
offensive to the principle of fair play and thus its findings are of findings of facts of the SSC on the prior and subsisting marriage between
doubtful quality considering that petitioner Teresita was not Bailon and Alice; in disregarding the authority of the SSC to determine to
given ample opportunity to present evidence for and her whom, between Alice and respondent, the death benefits should be awarded
behalf. pursuant to Section 5[40] of the Social Security Law; and in declaring that the
SSS did not give respondent due process or ample opportunity to present
xxxx evidence in her behalf.

Respondent SSS is correct in stating that the filing of The SSS submits that the observations and findings relative to the CFI
an Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil Registry is no proceedings are of no moment to the present controversy, as the same may be
longer practical under the premises. Indeed, there is no more considered only as obiter dicta in view of the SSCs finding of the existence of a
first marriage to restore as the marital bond between Alice prior and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice by virtue of which Alice
Diaz and Clemente Bailon was already terminated upon the has a better right to the death benefits.[41]
latters death. Neither is there a second marriage to terminate
because the second marriage was likewise dissolved by the The petition fails.
death of Clemente Bailon.
That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with respect to SSS
However, it is not correct to conclude that simply coverage, benefits and contributions, there is no doubt. In so exercising such
because the filing of the Affidavit of Reappearance with the power, however, it cannot review, much less reverse, decisions rendered by
Civil Registry where parties to the subsequent marriage reside courts of law as it did in the case at bar when it declared that the December 10,
is already inutile, the respondent SSS has now the authority to 1970 CFI Order was obtained through fraud and subsequently disregarded the
review the decision of the RTC and consequently declare the same, making its own findings with respect to the validity of Bailon and Alices
second marriage null and void.[36] (Emphasis and marriage on the one hand and the invalidity of Bailon and respondents
underscoring supplied) marriage on the other.

In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the SSC virtually
acted as an appellate court. The law does not give the SSC unfettered
discretion to trifle with orders of regular courts in the exercise of its authority to Where a person has entered into two successive
determine the beneficiaries of the SSS. marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the validity of the
second marriage, and the burden is on the party attacking the
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the validity of the second marriage to prove that the first marriage
effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the Family Code, the applicable law to had not been dissolved; it is not enough to prove the first
determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time marriage, for it must also be shown that it had not ended when
of their celebration.[42] the second marriage was contracted. The presumption in
favor of the innocence of the defendant from crime or wrong
Article 83 of the Civil Code[43] provides: and of the legality of his second marriage, will prevail over the
presumption of the continuance of life of the first spouse or of
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any the continuance of the marital relation with such first
person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person spouse.[47] (Underscoring supplied)
with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal
and void from its performance, unless:
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable,[48] it is
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the absent
spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the subsequent
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven marriage.
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without
the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent
or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than marriage is necessary. Thus Article 42 thereof provides:
seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to
be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by
according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent
contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous
declared null and void by a competent court. (Emphasis and marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
underscoring supplied)
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of
reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the
Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a subsequent residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the
marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab instance of any interested person, with due notice to the
initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved or contracted spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice
under any of the three exceptional circumstances. It bears noting that the to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case
marriage under any of these exceptional cases is deemed valid until declared such fact is disputed. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
null and void by a competent court. It follows that the onus probandi in these
cases rests on the party assailing the second marriage.[44]
The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by
In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15 the above-quoted provision of the Family Code does not preclude the filing of
consecutive years[45] when Bailon sought the declaration of her presumptive an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a
death, which judicial declaration was not even a requirement then for declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.[49]
purposes of remarriage.[46]

Eminent jurist Arturo M. Tolentino (now deceased) commented: If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the
subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action, such absentees
mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in the subsequent been perfectly valid.[55] Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be
marriage, will not terminate such marriage.[50] Since the second marriage has impeached, and is made good ab initio.[56]
been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead,
such presumption continues inspite of the spouses physical reappearance, In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with
and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee law, Bailons and respondents marriage prior to the formers death in 1998,
until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.[51] respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.

If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an In light of the foregoing discussions, consideration of the other issues
affidavit of reappearance or by judicial declaration but by death of either raised has been rendered unnecessary.
spouse as in the case at bar, Tolentino submits:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved
by the death of either spouse, the effects of dissolution of valid No costs.
marriages shall arise. The good or bad faith of either spouse
can no longer be raised, because, as in annullable SO ORDERED.
or voidable marriages, the marriage cannot be questioned
except in a direct action for annulment.[52] (Underscoring
supplied)

Similarly, Lapuz v. Eufemio[53] instructs:

In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been

void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2,
of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been
contracted with the first wife having been an absentee for
seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally
believed dead, still the action for annulment became
extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved
had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code,
requiring that the action for annulment should be brought
during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And
furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that
might have resulted from such voidable marriage must be
carried out in the testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse, as expressly provided in Section 2 of the
Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment
proceeding.[54] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed

collaterally except in a direct proceeding. Consequently, such marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after the death of either,
in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had
 Republic of the Philippines 4. In turn, the defendant suggested two (2) options to AG&P, either to
SUPREME COURT pay by installment or through "dacion en pago";
Manila
5. AG&P chose to settle its obligation with the SSS under the second
SECOND DIVISION option, that is through dacion en pago of its 5,999 sq. m. property
situated in Baguio City covered by TCT No. 3941 with an appraised
G.R. No. 175952 April 30, 2008 value of about P80.0 Million. SSS proposes to carve-out from the said
property an area sufficient to cover plaintiffs’ delinquencies. AG&P,
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner, however, is not amenable to subdivide its Baguio property;
vs.
ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY OF MANILA, INC. and 6. AG&P then made another proposal to SSS. This time, offering as
SEMIRARA COAL CORPORATION, respondents. payment a portion of its 58,153 square meter-lot, situated in F.S.
Sebastian, Sto. Niño, San Pascual, Batangas. In addition, SSS
DECISION informed AG&P of its decision to include other companies within the
umbrella of DMCI group with arrearages with the SSS. In the process
of elimination of the companies belonging to the DMCI group with
TINGA, J.: possible outstanding obligation with the SSS, it was only SEMIRARA
which was left with outstanding delinquencies with the SSS. Thus,
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of SEMIRARA’s inclusion in the proposed settlement through dacion en
Civil Procedure, petitioner Republic of the Philippines represented by the pago;
Social Security System (SSS) assails the Decision2
7. AG&P was, thereafter, directed by the defendant to submit certain
dated 31 August 2006 of the Eleventh Division of the Court of Appeals and its documents, such as Transfer Certificate of Title, Tax Declaration
Resolution3 dated 19 December 2006 denying petitioner’s Motion for covering the subject lot, and the proposed subdivision plan, which
Reconsideration. requirements AG&P immediately complied;

Following are the antecedents culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals: 8. On April 4, 2001, SSS, in its Resolution No. 270, finally approved
AG&P’s proposal to settle its and SEMIRARA’s delinquencies
On 13 February 2004, Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. (AG & through dacion en pago, which as of March 31, 2001 amounted
P) and Semirara Coal Corporation (SEMIRARA) (collectively referred to as to P29,261,902.45. Approval of AG&P’s proposal was communicated
private respondents) filed a complaint for specific performance and damages to it by Ms. Aurora E.L. Ortega, Vice-President, NCR-Group of the
against SSS before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 3, SSS in a letter dated April 23, 2001. … ;
docketed as Civil Case No. 7441. The complaint alleged that:
9. As a result of the approval of the dacion en pago, posting of
xxx contributions and loan amortization to individual member accounts,
both for AG&P and SEMIRARA employees, was effected immediately
3. Sometime in 2000, plaintiff informed the SSS in writing of its thereafter. Thus, the benefits of the member-employees of both
premiums and loan amortization delinquencies covering the period companies were restored;
from January 2000 to May 2000 amounting to P7.3 Million. AG&P
proposed to pay its said arrears by end of 2000, but requested for the 10. From the time of the approval of AG&P’s proposal up to the
condonation of all penalties; present, AG&P is (sic) religiously remitting the premium contributions
and loan amortization of its member-employees to the defendant;
 11. To effect the property transfer, a Deed of Assignment has to be length and breadth of the complaint as perused, boils down to the
executed between the plaintiffs and the defendant. Because of SSS questions of premium and loan amortization delinquencies of the
failure to come up with the required Deed of Assignment to effect said plaintiff, the option taken for the payment of the same in favor of the
transfer, AG&P prepared the draft and submitted it to the Office of the defendant and the disagreement between the parties as to the amount
Vice-President – NCR thru SSS Baclaran Branch in July 2001. of the unpaid contributions and salary loan repayments. In other
Unfortunately, the defendant failed to take any action on said Deed of words, said questions are directly related to the collection of
Assignment causing AG&P to re-submit it to the same office of the contributions due the defendant. Republic Act No. 1161 as amended
Vice-President – NCR in December 2001. From its original submission by R.A. No. 8282, specifically provides that any dispute arising under
of the Deed of Assignment in July 2001 to its re-submission in the said Act shall be cognizable by the Commission and any case filed
December 2001, and SSS returning of the revised draft in February 28, with respect thereto shall be heard by the Commission. Hence, a
2003 AG&P was consistent in its regular follow ups with SSS as to the procedural process mandated by a special law.
status of its submitted Deed of Assignment;
Observingly, the running dispute between plaintiffs and defendant
12. On February 28, 2003, or more than a year after the approval of originated from the disagreement as to the amount of unpaid
AG&P’s proposal, defendant sent the revised copy of the Deed of contributions and the amount of the penalties imposed appurtenant
Assignment to AG&P. However, the amount of the plaintiffs’ obligation thereto. The alleged dacion en pago is crystal clear manifestation of
appearing in the approved Deed of Assignment has offering a special form of payment which to the mind of the court will
ballooned from P29,261,902.45 to P40,846,610.64 allegedly because produce effect only upon acceptance by the offeree and the
of the additional interests and penalty charges assessed on plaintiffs’ observance and compliance of the required formalities by the parties.
outstanding obligation from April 2001, the date of approval of the No matter in what form it may be, still the court believes that the
proposal, up to January 2003; subject matter is the payment of contributions and the corresponding
penalties which are within the ambit of Sec. 5 (a) of R.A. No. 1161, as
13. AG&P demanded for the waiver and deletion of the additional amended by R.A. No. 8282.
interests on the ground that delay in the approval of the deed and the
subsequent delay in conveyance of the property in defendant’s name WHEREFORE, the Court having no jurisdiction over the subject matter
was solely attributable to the defendant; hence, to charge plaintiffs with of the instant complaint, the motion is granted and this case is hereby
additional interests and penalties amounting to more ordered DISMISSED.
than P10,000,000.00, would be unreasonable….;
SO ORDERED.4
14. AG&P and SEMIRARA maintain their willingness to settle their
alleged obligation of P29,261,902.45 to SSS. Defendant, however, Private respondents moved for the reconsideration of the order but the same
refused to accept the payment through dacion en pago, unless was denied in an Order dated 15 September 2004.
plaintiffs also pay the additional interests and penalties being charged;
Consequently, private respondents filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals
xxx alleging that the trial court erred in its pronouncement that it had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the complaint and in granting the motion to dismiss.
Instead of filing an answer, SSS moved for the dismissal of the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. In an order The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court’s challenged order,
dated 28 July 2004, the trial court granted SSS’s motion and dismissed private granted private respondents’ appeal and ordered the trial court to proceed with
respondents’ complaint. The pertinent portions of the assailed order are as the civil case with dispatch. From the averments in their complaint, the
follows: appellate court observed that private respondents are seeking to implement
the Deed of Assignment which they had drafted and submitted to SSS
Clearly, the motion is triggered on the issue of the court’s jurisdiction sometime in July 2001, pursuant to SSS’s letter addressed to AG& P dated 23
over the subject matter and the nature of the instant complaint. The April 2001 approving AG&P and SEMIRARA’S delinquencies through dacion
en pago, which as of 31 March 2001, amounted to P29,261,902.45. The From the allegations of respondents’ complaint, it readily appears that there is
appellate court thus held that the subject of the complaint is no longer the no longer any dispute with respect to respondents’ accountability to the SSS.
payment of the premium and loan amortization delinquencies, as well as the Respondents had, in fact, admitted their delinquency and offered to settle them
penalties appurtenant thereto, but the enforcement of the dacion en by way of dacion en pago subsequently approved by the SSS in Resolution
pago pursuant to SSS Resolution No. 270. The action then is one for specific No. 270-s. 2001. SSS stated in said resolution that "the dacion en pago
performance which case law holds is an action incapable of pecuniary proposal of AG&P Co. of Manila and Semirara Coals Corporation to pay their
estimation falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.5 liabilities in the total amount of P30,652,710.71 as of 31 March 2001 by
offering their 5.8 ha. property located in San Pascual, Batangas, be, as it is
SSS filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision but the hereby, approved.."9 This statement unequivocally evinces its consent to
same was denied in a Resolution dated 19 December 2006. the dacion en pago. In Vda. de Jayme v. Court of Appeals,10 the Court ruled
significantly as follows:
Now before the Court, SSS insists on the Social Security Commission’s (the
Commission) jurisdiction over the complaint pursuant to Section 5 (a) of Dacion en pago is the delivery and transmission of ownership of a
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8282. SSS maintains the Commission’s jurisdiction thing by the debtor to the creditor as an accepted equivalent of the
over all disputes arising from the provisions of R.A. No. 1161, amended by performance of the obligation. It is a special mode of payment where
R.A. No. 8282 to the exclusion of trial courts.6 the debtor offers another thing to the creditor who accepts it as
equivalent of payment of an outstanding debt. The undertaking really
partakes in one sense of the nature of sale, that is the creditor is really
The main issue in this case pertains to which body has jurisdiction to entertain
a controversy arising from the non-implementation of a dacion en pago agreed buying the thing or property of the debtor, payment for which is to be
upon by the parties as a means of settlement of private respondents’ liabilities. charged against the debtor’s debt. As such, the essential elements of a
contract of sale, namely, consent, object certain, and cause or
consideration must be present. In its modern concept, what actually
At the outset, it is well to restate the rule that what determines the nature of the takes place in dacion en pago is an objective novation of the obligation
action as well as the tribunal or body which has jurisdiction over the case are where the thing offered as an accepted equivalent of the performance
the allegations in the complaint.7 of an obligation is considered as the object of the contract of sale,
while the debt is considered as the purchase price. In any case,
The pertinent provision of law detailing the jurisdiction of the Commission is common consent is an essential prerequisite, be it sale or novation, to
Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 1161, as amended by R.A. No. 8282, otherwise known have the effect of totally extinguishing the debt or obligation.11
as the Social Security Act of 1997, to wit:
The controversy, instead, lies in the non-implementation of the approved and
SEC. 5. Settlement of Disputes.– (a) Any dispute arising under this Act agreed dacion en pago on the part of the SSS. As such, respondents filed a
with respect to coverage, benefits, contributions and penalties thereon suit to obtain its enforcement which is, doubtless, a suit for specific
or any other matter related thereto, shall be cognizable by the performance and one incapable of pecuniary estimation beyond the
Commission, and any case filed with respect thereto shall be heard by competence of the Commission.12 Pertinently, the Court ruled in Singson v.
the Commission, or any of its members, or by hearing officers duly Isabela Sawmill,13 as follows:
authorized by the Commission and decided within the mandatory
period of twenty (20) days after the submission of the evidence. The In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is
filing, determination and settlement of disputes shall be governed by not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the
the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission. criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the
The law clearly vests upon the Commission jurisdiction over "disputes arising claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
under this Act with respect to coverage, benefits, contributions and penalties jurisdiction in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance
thereon or any matter related thereto..." Dispute is defined as "a conflict or would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic
controversy."8 issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money,
 where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of,
the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as
cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms
of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance
(now Regional Trial Courts).14

In fine, the Court finds the decision of the Court of Appeals in accord with law
and jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 31 August 2006 of

the Court of Appeals Eleventh Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 83775 AFFIRMED.

Let the case be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing,Chairperson Carpio-Morales, Chico-Nazaio, Velasco*, Jr.,

JJ., concur.