A JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

May & Sept. 1986 Volume 14 Numbers 2 & 3

155 Joseph Cropsey The Dramatic End of Plato's Socrates

177 Charles Griswold, Jr. Philosophy, Education, and Courage in Plato's Laches

195 Thomas J. Lewis Refutative Rhetoric as True Rhetoric in the Gorgias

211 Thomas F. Curley III How to Read the Consolation of Philosophy

265 Joseph Masciulli The Armed Founder versus the Catonic Hero:
Machiavelli and Rousseau on Popular Leadership
281 William Mathie Reason and Rhetoric in Hobbes's Leviathan

299 Peter Emberley Rousseau versus the Savoyard Vicar: the Profession
of Faith Considered

331 Mackubin Thomas

Owens, Jr. Alexander Hamilton on Natural Rights and Prudence

353 Peter Simpson Autonomous Morality and the Idea of the Noble

Review Essays

371 Ernest L. Fortin Faith and Reason in Contemporary Perspective

Apropos of a Recent Book

389 Joseph J. Carpino On Eco's The Name of the Rose

415 Nino Langiulli Affirmative Action, Liberalism, and Teleology: on

Nicholas Capaldi's Out of Order

431 Robert R. Sullivan The Most Recent Thinking of Jurgen Habermas

Book Reviews

441 Will Morrisey Jerusalem versus Athens by Paul Eidelberg

448 How Does the Constitution Secure Rights? edited by
Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra
Short Notices

455 Will Morrisey Freedom of Expression by Francis Canavan

456 Joan Stambaugh Philosophical Apprenticeships by
Hans-Georg Gadamer
interpretation
Volume 14 JL numbers 2 & 3

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Copyright 1986 Interpretation

Refutative Rhetoric as True Rhetoric in the Gorgias

Thomas J. Lewis
McMaster University

Plato explores the subject of rhetoric in a number of dialogues, but the Gor
gias and the Phaedrus contain the most extensive examinations of rhetoric. How
ever, the differences between these two dialogues have led to a great deal of per

plexity Plato's view of rhetoric. As Edwin Black observes, in the Gorgias

about

rhetoricis denounced in satirical, contentious, and refutative language, whereas,

in the Phaedrus, Plato offers a constructive and affirmative judgment of rhet
Black
oric.1

notes the usual two responses to these differences: That Plato

changed his mind about rhetoric between the time he wrote the Gorgias and the
"rhetoric"

Phaedrus, or ". . . that Plato did not mean by in the Gorgias what he
"rhetoric"
Phaedrus."1
meant by in the But Black rejects both responses. He
presents the two dialogues as expressions of different, but complementary, as

pects Plato's understanding of rhetoric. He argues that the Gorgias is

of

refutative, because Socrates is mainly concerned to define and to condemn false

rhetoric; and that the Phaedrus is constructive, because Socrates is engaged in
defining true rhetoric and in demonstrating at least one of its practical

applications the persuasion of a young man such as Phaedrus to commit him

philosophy.3
self to
I agree that the two different forms of rhetoric can be accounted for by the
different dramatic circumstances. In the Phaedrus Socrates is alone with one able

and inquisitive young man, who is readily attracted by an alluring image of phi
losophy. In contrast, in the Gorgias Socrates is confronted with three interlocu
Gorgias'
tors defending art, and two of these, Polus and Callicles, are willing to
Socrates'

go on the offensive to impugn character, and his way of life, if he

Gorgias' Socrates'
challenges the propriety of art. Thus, taskin the Gorgias is to
denounce and refute the defenders of the false rhetoric which serves as a compet
Socrates'

itor to philosophy. In both dialogues rhetoric, be it constructive or

refutative, is appropriate to the particular circumstances.

However, there appears to be one important fact that does not fit the view of
Socrates'
the two forms of rhetoric as complementary. In the Phaedrus rhetoric

is successful; Phaedrus is drawn to philosophy; whereas, in the Gorgias, there is

no evidence that Gorgias, Polus, or Callicles have been convinced by Socrates.
Rhetoric,"

I. Edwin Black, "Plato's View of Quarterly Journal of Speech, 44 (1958), 361-74.

2. Ibid., p. 361.

3 . Ibid. , p. 374. Black's interpretation of the use of rhetoric in the Phaedrus and the Gorgias has
served as a by Rollen Quimby and David Kaufer. See Quimby's "The Growth
basis for further work
Rhetoric,"

of Plato's Perception of Philosophy and Rhetoric. 7 (1974), 71-79; and Kaufer's "The
Rhetoric,"

Influence of Plato's Developing Psychology on his Views of Quarterly Journal of Speech,

64(1978), 63-78.
 196 Interpretation
Socrates'
At best each has been overpowered and silenced but not persuaded.

failure to persuade his interlocutors appears to lead to the conclusion that Plato is
depicting the unsuccessful use of refutative rhetoric in the Gorgias, and it is
difficult to see how unsuccessful refutative rhetoric can be the complement of

constructive rhetoric. Indeed, Charles Kauffman's assessment of the extent of the

Socrates'
failure of rhetoric in the Gorgias appears to undermine Black's view
Socrates' complementary.4

that use of refutative and constructive rhetoric are

Socrates does fail to persuade his interlocutors in the Gorgias, however, I

suggest that this fact is not itself evidence of the failure of his refutative rhetoric.
It is not evidence of failure because I believe Plato does
not portray Socrates as

attempting to persuade them; rather, he portrays Socrates as manipulating Gor

gias, Polus, and Callicles in order to persuade a very different audience the
Gorgias'

group young men who have assembled for

of display of words. In the
Socrates'
Phaedrus it is appropriate to judge the success of rhetoric by its impact
on Phaedrus, because he is both the interlocutor and the audience. But the dra
matic structure of the Gorgias is If the primary audience for
more complex.
Socrates'
refutative rhetoric is this
group of young men, then it may be sufficient
for Socrates to only silence his interlocutors in order to persuade this audience.
Gorgias'
I suggest that by silencing his interlocutors Socrates discredits rheto

ric in the eyes of the primary audience, and that this

discrediting is the initial step
in attracting the audience to philosophy. Thus, his refutative rhetoric does serve

as a complement of the constructive form of true rhetoric in the Phaedrus. In ad

dition, his refutative rhetoric illustrates his prowess in a public forum, for despite
Socrates'

disclaimers, in the Gorgias Plato portrays him as more than able to

hold his own in public debate.
Socrates'
To appreciate the intent and the force refutative rhetoric it is nec
of

essary to identify his primary audience; to articulate the shaming tactics Socrates
Gorgias'
uses to discredit art in front of this audience; and to explicate the
way
Socrates covers up his rhetoric by presenting himself as someone who speaks

only the truth regardless of the consequences.

THE PRIMARY AUDIENCE IN THE GORGIAS

The Gorgias consists of three conversations and an exhortation in which Soc

rates urges Callicles to abandon rhetoric and to take philosophy. There is
up also
a brief exchange between Polus and Chaerephon, which provides a transition be
tween the opening pleasantries surrounding the arrival of Socrates and Chaere
phon and the initial conversation between Socrates and Gorgias.
The dialogue begins with the arrival of Socrates and Chaerephon in
the inter-
4. Charles Kauffman, "Enactment as Argument in the
Gorgias"

Philosophy and Rhetoric 12

(1979), 114-29-
 Refutative Rhetoric as True Rhetoric in the Gorgias 197

Gorgias'
lude between formal demonstration of his art and the second part of his
public display where he will take
any questions from the audience. But the sec
Gorgias'
ond part of demonstration does not take place. It is replaced by the con
versations that make up the Gorgias, and these conversations take place before
the same audience. The first part of the Gorgias provides good evidence that the

presence of the audience is not incidental, but rather that Socrates wants the audi
ence to be present. He wants a public conversation, and to get it he injects him
self into the proceedings at the appropriate moment.5

Socrates'
Callicles acknowledges arrival with the comment that Socrates has
" warfare"
(447a).6
come as they say you should take part in Socrates allows

that he has arrivedlate, and Callicles informs him that he has missed a feast of
Gorgias'
words by being late for display. Socrates does not comment on Calli
cles' Gorgias'
depiction of speech as a feast, but he allows this evaluation to
stand by blaming Chaerephon for his late arrival. Chaerephon accepts his culpa

bility and offers a remedy. He claims that since he is a friend of Gorgias he can

arrange another display either now or later, whichever best suits Socrates. Calli
cles expresses his surprise: "What, Chaerephon? Is Socrates anxious to hear
Gorgias"
(447b). Chaerephon responds: "This is the very reason why we are
here" Socrates'
(447b). Clearly Callicles and Chaerephon have different views of
Gorgias'
interest in feast of words. Callicles is surprised that Socrates would be
interested; Chaerephon insists that Socrates is interested; Socrates does not com

mit himself either way.

Callicles then invites Socrates and Chaerephon to come to his home, where

Gorgias is staying on this visit to Athens, and where they will be treated to a spe

cial display of rhetoric by Gorgias (447b). Socrates thanks Callicles for this
offer, but he gently demurs. He asks whether Gorgias, instead of
providing an

exhibition, would be willing to converse with them about the nature of his art

and just what it is that he teaches (447c). Callicles suggests that Socrates ask

Gorgias himself, since Gorgias has just said he is open to all questions. Socrates
is pleased to have his concerns raised with Gorgias, but he presses Chaerephon
him"

forward in his place: "Splendid! Chaerephon, ask (447c). Chaerephon does

not know what to say and relies on Socrates to formulate the question (447d).
When Chaerephon finally does manage three questions along the lines suggested

by Socrates, Polus, who rudely injects himself into the conversation, answers in
place of Gorgias (448a-c). Socrates, not Chaerephon, states that the answers are

unsatisfactory and Gorgias asks for an explanation from Socrates for this conclu-

5. There has been disagreement about the location of the conversation. Some commentators have
Callicles'

interpreted the text to indicate that the conversations take place at home. There is now gen

eral agreement that this view was mistaken and that the conversations are at some public place. For a

for the the text see E. R. Dodds,

summary of this controversy and the basis
current agreement on

Plato's Gorgias (Oxford, 1959). P- l88-

6. Citations from the Gorgias are from the translation by W. D. Woodhead in The Collected Dia
logues of Plato, eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton, 1961).
 198 Interpretation

Polus'
sion. Socrates clarifies his criticism of answers and invites Gorgias to tell
them what his art is and what it should be called. Gorgias says it is the art of rhet

oric (449a), and the conversation between Socrates and Gorgias is underway.

What is to be made of this beginning? First, Socrates appears to have come to

meet Gorgias for his own reasons; he has not, for example, come at the instiga
tion or insistence of his companion Chaerephon. Second, Socrates has come late
with the feeble excuse that Chaerephon detained him by insisting that they stay in
the market. There seems to have been no real impediment to Socrates either com
loitering.7
ing alone or insisting that the obliging Chaerephon quit We may con

clude that Socrates has chosen to come late, which is entirely consistent with
Callicles'
expression of surprise at Chaerephon 's presumption that Socrates
Gorgias'

would be anxious to hear exhibition. Choosing to come late indicates

Gorgias'
that Socrates wants a conversation about art. Socrates says this explic

itly (447c), but what he does not say is that he wants the conversation to be in the
Gorgias'
presence of the audience that has just feasted on words. Notice that
Callicles invites Socrates and Chaerephon to a relatively by
private exhibition
Callicles'
Gorgias at home. Socrates raises the possibility of a conversation in
Callicles'
stead of an exhibition at home, and it is with that possibility in mind
that Callicles invites Socrates to question Gorgias. But the question that Socrates
has Chaerephon ask Gorgias is not whether Gorgias will discuss his art with them
Callicles'
in lieu of a second exhibition at home; instead, it is a question about
Callicles'
his art. The possibility of an exhibition or a discussion at home is not

raised again.

Socrates initially questions Gorgias about the art of rhetoric in a polite and

inoffensive manner (4493-4553). He then briefly summarizes what they have

covered and says that because he is not yet clear about the art of rhetoric they will
have to go at the matter in more detail (455a- c). Then he suggests a way of

thinking about his relationship to Gorgias and the audience.

And so, imagine that my interest is on your behalf, for perhaps some of those present
are anxious to become your disciples there are some, I know, quite a number in
fact who would be bashful perhaps about you. And so, just imagine that
questioning
when I inquire, they too are asking. What shall we gain, Gorgias, if we associate with
you? On what subjects shall we be able to advise the city, about right and
wrong alone,
or the subjects just mentioned by Socrates? (455cd)

Socrates offers to serve as an agent who can, if Gorgias is willing to employ

Gorgias'
him,
facilitate purpose. Gorgias wants to be questioned in order to display
his ability. He may simply wish to bask in public acclaim, but Socrates suggests
that he also wishes to recruit disciples or students. Socrates flatters Gorgias by
suggesting that his exhibition has been so impressive as to risk being self-defeat-

Commentators have generally not remarked on the problematic nature of Socrates'

7.
late arrival.
However, it is
noted by Arlene W. Saxonhouse in her recent article
"An Unspoken Theme in Plato's
'War,"
Gorgias: Interpretation, 11 (1983), p. 140.
 Refutative Rhetoric as True Rhetoric in the Gorgias 199

ing. According to Socrates, Gorgias appears that these young men are
so grand

embarrassed to question him, and thus they may be denied the opportunity of

fully appreciating the advantages of associating with him. Gorgias accepts this
method of self display as a substitute for direct questions from the audience.8

Gorgias'
audience is portrayed as young and ambitious. These young men are

interested in prominent public positions, and Gorgias responds by holding out

the achievements of Themistocles and Pericles as examples of what they can as

pire to if they master his art (455c). To be sensitive to the potential persuasive
Socrates'
ness of refutative rhetoric, we must be aware that the primary motive
honour"
for seeking public office was cpiXoxiuia, "love of the desire for recog
nition as a man who directs the city on the most important To "advise
matters.9

city"

the a man must be able to prevail in a public forum, and Gorgias claims that
his art provides the means to speak and to prevail.
Socrates'
conversation with Gorgias produces agreement on a number of as

pects of rhetoric: the scope of rhetoric is to persuade the soul of the listener

(453); there are two forms of persuasion, one that produces conviction on the ba

sis of knowledge, and another that produces conviction without knowledge; the

latter is practiced in courts of law and assemblies because the combination of

large numbers and shortness of time precludes the use of the former (454e,
455a). Socrates suggests that to the extent that rhetoric does not require a knowl

edge of the truth of its subject it is inferior to other arts and perhaps it is not an art

at all (459bcd). He also suggests that since Gorgias teaches his pupils how to
convince others about what is just and unjust and noble and base, a student must

either have knowledge of the just and unjust and the noble and base before his in
struction in rhetoric, or Gorgias must begin by instructing his students about such

matters. Otherwise one who learns rhetoric from Gorgias would appear to have

knowledge when he does not, and would appear to be a good man although he is
not (459de). Gorgias allows that he does instruct his students in this manner and

he agrees with Socrates that the true rhetorician must also be just (460c). But
then Socrates reminds Gorgias that he previously allowed that, if a student of
rhetoric were to misuse his skill, the teacher of rhetoric was not to be blamed for

he had taught the skill only for good use (457bc). Socrates concludes that Gor
gias seems to be saying that by his very nature the rhetorician must be just and do

just actions, but also to be saying that the rhetorician may misuse his skill. Since
there seems to be an inconsistency here Socrates suggests it will require a long
discussion to determine the truth of the matter (46iab). Polus sees the inconsis
Gorgias'

that arises from admission that knowledge is a necessary condi

tency
tion for He contends that Gorgias was simply
becoming a student of rhetoric.

Socrates'
interviewer Gorgias before a composite audience of the silent dramatic
8. role as an of

audience and the reader by Steven Rendall, "Dialogue, Philosophy, and Rhetoric: The Ex
is noted
Gorgias,"

ample of Plato's Philosophy and Rhetoric, io (1977), 105-79-

9. K. J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle (Oxford, 1974),
226-34.
 200 Interpretation

ashamed to say otherwise, and that Socrates is tasteless to have taken advantage
Gorgias'
of sense of shame (46icd).
Socrates displays a somewhat skeptical tone throughout his conversation with

Gorgias, but his irony is gentle and he adopts a tone of puzzlement and even a
Socrates'

spirit of camaraderie. There is an underlying mockery in words, but

overall he speaks politely to Gorgias, and Gorgias maintains the gracious and
dignified pose befitting a man of his age, experience, and reputation, who has
given yet another impressive performance.
Socrates' Socrates'
The dramatic setting provides the reason for politeness.
Gorgias'
part in the conversation is dependent on sufferance. Both by prior ar

rangement and by virtue of his impressive performance the audience belongs to

Gorgias. He is free to decline further questions or to simply invite questions from

someone else. Thus, if Socrates is not to lose access to the audience he needs
Gorgias'
auspices. If Gorgias is treated too roughly he may simply call it a day,

and Polus has already provided an adequate excuse by explaining that Gorgias
has had a long day and is tired (448a). After a fairly lengthy conversation with
Gorgias, but still with no answer to the inquiry in sight, Socrates raises the possi
Gorgias'

bility of ending their discussion. response is revealing. He says he is

willing to go on but that he is concerned that the audience may not wish to hear

more; they have already heard a long demonstration and may have other things to
Gorgias'
do (458b). concern for the audience seems exaggerated; he appears to
be looking for a graceful way to end the discussion, but he does not succeed.

Chaerephon indicates that the audience is eager to hear more (458c). The word
Gorgias'

ing of agreement to continue indicates his waning enthusiasm. "It

would be disgraceful of me to refuse, when I personally volunteered to meet any
put" Gorgias'
question that might be (458d). concern for his public reputation

makes it possible for Socrates to oblige him to continue.10

Socrates has first
Gorgias'
wheedled his way in front of audience and then by appealing to that au

dience he has made it difficult for Gorgias to dismiss him.

Socrates' Gorgias'
effort to gain access to audience has a clear parallel in the

Gorgias'
10. For a similar conclusion about character, see Adele Spitzer, "The Self-reference of
Gorgias,"
the Philosophy and Rhetoric, 8 (1975), 1-22. She contends that overweening concern
Gorgias'
about how he appears to others is at the core of character, and that his gentleness is only a
result of his fear
offending his audience (7-9). Kauffman recognizes this aspect of
of char
Gorgias'

Gorgias'
acter but he contends that it does not encompass later comments at 497 and 506 where
Gorgias urges that the conversation be pressed on to a conclusion. to Kauffman these pasAccording
sages provide evidence that Gorgias is interested in the truth he had
(458), even if
as earlier claimed
the pursuit of truth reflects badly on his reputation. Gorgias does
Kauffman claims, and what
speak as
he says appears to indicate a different aspect of his character. However, the
truth-seeking Gorgias can
be reconciled with Spitzer's position if, as I have argued, Gorgias is not
only expert at knowing what
pleases an audience, but also if he has a sufficient degree of self-control
to put this knowledge to use
by always appearing as pleasing as possible. Unlike Polus and Callicles he has the good sense not to
make matters worse
by appearing to be a poor loser. Furthermore, he is sensitive to the audience's de
sire to hear and so he gives them what want, especially if he
they can extricate himself, as he does,
Socrates'
from directly suffering cross-examination.
 Refutative Rhetoric as True Rhetoric in the Gorgias 201

first part of the Phaedrus (227-2300). Phaedrus has been impressed Lysias'

by
speech, just as the audience in the Gorgias has been impressed
Gorgias'
dis
by
play. As a friend
Socrates Phaedrus would normally welcome his
of company.

But because Phaedrus wishes to practice the speech and then use it to
display his
Socrates'
own rhetorical ability, he does not
entirely welcome presence. Only af
ter Socrates notices that Phaedrus is hiding a copy of the speech under his cloak
and surmises what Phaedrus is up to does Phaedrus up his intended
give
decep
tion. Socrates accosts Phaedrus, insists on hearing Lysias'

speech, and to insure

an uninterrupted conversation he suggests they leave the city and walk along the
river to a quiet spot.

The importance Socrates attaches to

influencing Phaedrus is soon made clear
Socrates'

by unfamiliarity with the terrain. He describes himself as a stranger to

the area and refers to Phaedrus as his guide (23od). Phaedrus responds that

Socrates is the oddest of men because he so seldom sets foot outside the walls,
Lysias'
and Socrates jokes that with speeches such as for bait Phaedrus could

lead him all around Attica or anywhere else (230c). Knowing what Socrates
Lysias'

really thinks of speech we may conclude that in order to counter the

effect of the speech on his friend, Socrates might be willing to be dragged around
Phaedrus'
Attica. Nonetheless, given interest in rhetoric, his friendship for Soc
rates, and the absence of any complicating third party, it is relatively easy for
Phaedrus'
Socrates to capture attention; whereas in the Gorgias Socrates cannot
Gorgias'
lead the audience away physically. If he is to counter effect on the audi

ence, he must do so in the presence of, indeed, with the participation of, the de
fenders of rhetoric.

PORTRAYING RHETORIC AS INDECENT

Gorgias'
To counter the effect of display Socrates manipulates the conversa
Gorgias'
tion to associate rhetoric with shamelessness or indecency. There are

two stages to this manipulation. First, Socrates induces Polus and then Callicles
Gorgias'
to enter the conversation on behalf of rhetoric. Second, he provokes

Callicles to say things, which appear to violate the city's sense of decency.
As this process of manipulation unfolds a further complication about the audi
ence arises. I suggest that what Socrates says to each of the interlocutors is de
signed to influence the assembled audience the primary audience. However,
throughout the conversation with Gorgias there is a secondary audience of Polus
and Callicles, and what is said by Socrates is in part calculated to draw Polus into

the conversation. Similarly, Gorgias and Callicles are the secondary audience

during the conversation with Polus. But it is clear that Socrates is playing mainly
to Callicles rather Gorgias,
than for it is Callicles who is so astonished and frus
trated by what he hears that he thrusts himself into the conversation brushing
Polus aside.
 202 Interpretation

The process of drawing Polus into the conversation overlaps somewhat with
Socrates'
effort to establish himself in front primary audience. Earlier
of the

Polus displayed his eagerness to enter the conversation. But the unsatisfactory
nature of his responses moved Gorgias to intervene. Now, however, Gorgias is
looking for
way a out and appears to welcome the chance to pass the conversa
tion to Polus. The sequence of events is important. It is at 457e that Gorgias
claims that he teaches rhetoric only for good use and so he is not to be blamed if
it is misused by a student. Socrates suggests that there may be aninconsistency
somewhere; at the very least it will require a lengthy cross-examination to clarify
what Gorgias has said. But Socrates does not launch into the cross-examination.

Instead, he suggests that Gorgias may not want to continue, prompting the pri

mary audience as well as Chaerephon and Callicles to press for a continuation,

Gorgias'
and eliciting agreement to go on for it would be disgraceful to do oth

erwise (458e). Only after he has this agreement can Socrates afford to press hard
on the inconsistency, giving Gorgias a good reason to withdraw but now without

the freedom to close the conversation down.

Socrates'
Although Gorgias is replaced by Polus as main interlocutor, Soc
Gorgias'
rates continues to treat presence as a constraint on what he can say. He
invites Polus to question him about rhetoric but indicates that he is hesitant to
Gorgias'
give frank answers for fear offending Gorgias, and he waits to obtain
of

permission to proceed (463). Only then does Socrates present his analysis of

rhetoric as part of a general typology of flattery. Rhetoric, he says, is the false

form of justice just as medicine is impersonated by cooking, gymnastic by beau-
tification, and legislation by sophistry (463-466). Finally Socrates obtains
Polus'
reluctant admission that the knack or technique of rhetoric can be of no
use to any man except to accuse oneself and one's friends and relatives of wrong
doing in order to expose one's wickedness and ensure punishment. Also, if it
were right to harm enemies, rhetoric could be used to protect one's enemies from

being punished for their wickedness (48o-48ib).

These assertions provoke Callicles to ask Chaerephon whether Socrates is se
Callicles'
rious or simply joking (481b). question expresses the same mixture of

surprise and skepticism as in his initial question about whether Socrates really
Gorgias'
wished to hear demonstration (447b). As before, Chaerephon responds
that Socrates is quite serious and he invites Callicles to confirm this
by asking
Socrates (481b). Socrates responds to Callicles'
question with a
long speech
(4810-4820) affirming his radical assertions about rhetoric. This is too much for
Callicles; he has run out of patience with Socrates, Gorgias, and Polus. Jokes
and spoofs are one thing, but if Socrates persists in spouting nonsense and nei
ther Gorgias nor Polus can expose it for what it is, then he, Callicles, will. Here,
Socrates'
as at the beginning of the dialogue, Chaerephon takes words literally.
Socrates initially took advantage of Chaerephon's apparently guileless nature to
make excuses for arriving late, but now Chaerephon's trusting and literal accep-
 Refutative Rhetoric as True Rhetoric in the Gorgias 203
Socrates'
tance of assertions about rhetoric further irritates Callicles and pro
vokes him to set things straight.
Callicles agrees with Polus that Gorgias became entangled in inconsistencies
because he was ashamed to assert what he really believed. However, Callicles
contends that Polus has fallen into the same trap. He was obliged to agree with
Socrates'
ludicrous assertions about rhetoric only because he agreed to the prem
ise that it is better to suffer injustice than to do it; and he agreed with this premise
not because he believed it but because he ashamed to it (348de).
was
deny
Callicles boasts that he cannot be ensnared Socrates in this way because he
by
has the courage to admit the consequences of his assertions. Callicles has
finally
taken the bait; he has been goaded into the conversation, and he has been induced
to say what he thinks without concern for public decency. The stage is set for the

association of rhetoric with shamelessness.

Socrates'
Callicles rightly understands assertions about rhetoric to be extreme
or radical. If true, ". then surely the life of us mortals must be turned upside
down and apparently we are everywhere
doing the opposite of what we
should"

Socrates'
(481c). view of rhetoric rests on the radical notion that it is better to
Socrates'
suffer wrong than to do it. Callicles feels obliged to match radical as

sertion with an equally extreme assertion:

Anyone who is to live aright should suffer his appetites to grow to the greatest extent

and not check them, and through courage and intelligence should be competent to

minister to them at their greatest and to satisfy every appetite with what it craves
(492)."

Any opposition to this way of living on the basis of justice or shamefulness is,
according to Callicles, simply an attempt by the inferior to constrain the superior

and to conceal their own inferiority (492bc). Callicles does not accuse Socrates
of having to invoke a sense of shame to hide his inferiority. On the contrary, he
says that Socrates is potentially a superior man who has been blinded to the right
or natural form of human life by his preoccupation with philosophy (484cd). If
Callicles'
Socrates would only abandon philosophy he would see the truth of

words, and he would allow his superior nature to develop fully. Indeed, if only
Socrates would study and employ rhetoric he could become a useful and re

spected member of the community. Whereas, Callicles contends, without a

1 1 . The views expressed by Callicles are closely related to those of Thrasymachus in the Repub

lic (336b- 354a). Both Callicles and Thrasymachus are frustrated and angered by what Socrates has
obliged his previous interlocutors to agree to, and both thrust themselves into the conversation to set

matters straight. Both are

consciously provoked by Socrates to assert the benefits of radical hedonism
and tyranny. In the Gorgias these views serve to associate rhetoric with political indecency for the be
Thrasymachus'

nefit of the audience, whereas in the Republic speech serves to draw out Glaucon,
Thrasymachus'

who restates position in praise of the unjust life and insists that Socrates respond to it.
Socrates triggers the reckless eloquence of Thrasymachus, which in turn provokes Glaucon to set out

the basic position examined throughout the night by Socrates. But because there is no Glaucon pres

ent in the Gorgias there is no scope for a sustained examination of rhetoric.

 204 Interpretation

knowledge of rhetoric Socrates can be of use to no one. He can not even protect

himself from those who would drag him into court on false charges (486bc).
Callicles'
At the core of assertion is the premise that pleasure is the satisfac

tion of appetites and that no distinctions can be drawn between pleasures that are

good and pleasures that are evil. Callicles affirms this premise by allowing that
he is thinking of appetites such as hunger and thirst and the pleasure that results
from eating and drinking, and by analogy he extends this meaning to all other ap
petites (494bc). Socrates urges Callicles to hold to this position and not to falter
through shame. He adds that he too will have to throw shame aside (494c).
Socrates then asks whether someone suffering from an appetite such as an itch
which never ceases and can be scratched forever can be said to be happy. The
possibility of one such appetite as the basis of happiness is diminished as absurd
by Callicles. However, having equated all appetites, Callicles is obliged to affirm
that such a man would be happy (494d). Socrates presses Callicles still further:

socrates If it was only his head that he wanted to scratch or can I push the

question further? Think what you will answer, Callicles, if anyone should ask all the

questions that naturally follow. And as a climax of all such cases, the life of a

catamite is shocking and shameful and miserable? Will you dare to say that
not that

such people are happy, if they have what they desire in abundance?
callicles Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to drag our discussion into such

topics?

socrates Is it I who do this, my noble friend, or the man who says so unequivo
cally that pleasure, whatever its nature, is the key to happiness, and does not distin
guish between pleasures good and evil? But enlighten me further as to whether you say
that the pleasant and the good are identical, or that there are some pleasures which are

not good.

callicles To avoid inconsistency if I say they are different, I assert they are the

same.

socrates Then you ruin your earlier statement, Callicles, and you can no longer
properly investigate the truth with me, if you speak contrary to your opinions (494e,
495a)-

Although Callicles is pressed to affirm his position that all pleasures are the

same, he does so without conviction and only to avoid inconsistency. Callicles is

repelled by his sense of shame from affirming the consequence of his assertion,
and like any decent person he rebukes Socrates for dragging a polite conversation
into indecency. Callicles knows that he has been trapped
by Socrates. Both
Gorgias and Polus managed to avoid the trap; they chose is for
decency at what
public purposes the small price of logical inconsistency. Callicles, on the other
hand, distanced himself from Gorgias and Polus with the claim that he could not
be shamed into inconsistency. Further, he claimed that not to be bound shame by
was the mark of the superior man the man who understood that the morality
that gave rise to feelings of shame was
simply an instrument of the inferior man.
 Refutative Rhetoric as True Rhetoric in the Gorgias 205

According to Callicles, all conventional

morality is a false morality, a protective

device used by theimpotent many to chain the energy of the superior man.
For a public man like Callicles, whom Socrates describes as "in love with the
demos"
because of his need to pander to it, the description of the demos as the
home of a sheep morality is a very imprudent statement. The aspiring politician
can seldom afford to make such views public whatever his private views. But
Callicles'
anger and frustration have driven him to air these views. Further, al

though Callicles
initially Gorgias
by criticizing Socrates, he finds him
sides with
Gorgias'
selfindirectly attacking Gorgias by associating polite and decent behav

iour with a sheep morality. However, having staked out this ground in order to
best Socrates, Callicles now finds that his rash claims about the life of the supe
rior man have led him to affirm the happiness of the life of a catamite. He is dou

bly ashamed: First, like any decent and conventional Athenian for seeming to ap
prove of such a way of life; second, because of his claim of
being above
conventional morality, he is also ashamed of being ashamed. He is humiliated.
To this point the conversations with the three defenders of rhetoric display a

common element. In each case the defense of rhetoric is shown to require a

premise that is shameful or indecent, a premise that offends the morality of the

community, and each is offered a choice between rhetoric and decency. Both
Gorgias and Polus instinctively chose decency and seemed to be largely unaware

that they had undercut the type of rhetoric they had intended to defend. To his
chagrin, Callicles, determined not to be beaten by Socrates, is goaded into
indecency.12 Socrates'

choosing Forcing this choice is a central part of attempt

Gorgias'
to dissuade audience from following Gorgias. They see rhetoric as a

route for able and ambitious men to take in order to gain access to public office
and public acclaim (455d). But success in public life requires respectability; one
must publicly embrace the community's norms whatever they may be. Only then
can a community entrust its decisions to honour him for his services.
a man and

If rhetoric is to be the route chosen by ambitious young men and their families it
must appear respectable, otherwise it will not serve their purposes. Both analyt

ically and dramatically Socrates has stripped off the respectable face of rhe
toric.13

Gorgias,'

George Klosko, "The Refutation of Callicles in Plato's

12. Greece and Rome, xxxi,
Callicles'

(1984), 126-39, argues that hedonism is far more extreme than is necessary to support his
view of natural justice. Thus, he is more easily refuted than had he advanced the more moderate argu

ments suggested by Klosko. I concur with Klosko that Plato puts these extreme arguments into
Callicles'
mouth in orderSocrates to deal effectively with hedonism. However, Klosko stops
to allow
with the logical defeat of Callicles. He does not explore how the shaming tactics used on Gorgias and

Polus are preliminary to the more ruthless use of these tactics on Callicles, leading to the dramatic de
feat of Callicles.
13. The need for a foreign teacher to take care to appear acceptable to the community he visits is
explained in the Protagoras (316C-317C). Protagoras also pats himself on the back for successfully
warfar

managing this problem for so many years. In the Euthydemus Plato lampoons the "wordy of

Euthydemus and his brother Dionysodorus in much the same manner as Aristophanes characterizes
 206 Interpretation

Socrates has offered an analysis of rhetoric as indecent pandering, and

through his questioning of Gorgias, Polus and Callicles he has associated rheto

ric with ideas that violate the norms of political decency, but in so doing he has
provoked the allegations that he is shameless (461c, 483c, 489b, 494c, 494e),

that he speaks unfairly or deceptively, and that he harangues like a mob orator

(482c, 4836, 489c, 489c, 494d, 5i9d). At first Socrates ignores the charges.

However, when he eventually admits that there may be something to them, he

claims that he is not at fault; he is obliged to speak like thisby the ideas or be
haviour of others (494c, 494c, 5i9d). The final part of the conversation with

Callicles (521-522) and the concluding exhortation (523-527) serve to meet

presenting Socrates as respectable and pious, and philosophy as

these charges by
a respectable alternative to rhetoric.

The conversation has been long and very difficult for Callicles. He has lost all

enthusiasm for it, and he gives no sign of wishing to restate the reasons he
had originally given in urging Socrates to abandon philosophy for rhetoric. But
Callicles'

Socrates persists; he evokes earlier advice and urges him to specify

Socrates'
role in the city and what need he will have for rhetoric.

socrates Then distinguish for me what kind of care for the city you recommend

to me, that of doing battle with the Athenians, like a doctor, to make them as good as

possible, or to serve and minister to their pleasure? Tell me the truth, Callicles, for it is
only fair that, as you spoke your mind frankly to me at first, you should continue to say
what you think. And so speak up truly and bravely now.

callicles I say then, to serve and minister.

socrates Then you invite me, my noble friend, to play the flatterer?

callicles Yes, if you prefer the most offensive term, for if you do not .

(521).

Having pressed Callicles to reiterate his initial position, Socrates labels Cal
licles' term,"

advice with the "most offensive curtly interrupts Callicles, and

goes on to summarize the dire consequences that Callicles had previously said

would befall him. Then Socratesdramatically rejects rhetoric and claims that he
is well aware that this leaves him helpless in defending himself in a court of law,
and that if brought to court his trial would be like that of a doctor prosecuted by a

pastry cook before a jury of children (52ie, 522a). He claims that all he could do
in court would be to tell the truth and as a result anything might happen to him.
But he insists that he would rather meet his death than save his life through the
use of flattering rhetoric (522d). Socrates concludes with a tale about the afterlife

and an exhortation. He claims to believe the tale and he contends that it demon
strates the correctness of his decision to reject rhetoric. The tale also provides a
basis for equating philosophy with piety and justice, for the assertion that philos-

Socrates as a sophist in the Clouds. The Euthydemus also exhibits the contempt and disgust of re

spectable Athenians for sophistry when its practitioners fail to exercise the prudence of Protagoras
(Euthydemus 304d~305b, 3o6d~307e).
 Refutative Rhetoric as True Rhetoric in the Gorgias 207

ophy provides the only true qualification for public life (527d), and for the claim
that philosophy is the way to happiness in this life and the life hereafter (526c,
527c)-

In his original recommendation that Socrates abandon philosophy for rhetoric

(484c -486e), Callicles emphasized the great difference between philosophy and
rhetoric in order to show how misguided was
Socrates'
preoccupation with phi
losophy. Socrates does nothing to close this
gap between philosophy and rhet

oric; instead, he uses it to advantage. Socrates portrays rhetoric as indecent,

Callicles'
allows claim that there is virtually nothing in common between philos

ophy and rhetoric, and then embellishes the easy, although perhaps misleading,
inference that philosophy as the antithesis of rhetoric must be respectable, de
cent, and at one with the community's sense of justice. Therefore, a man who

chooses philosophy chooses the welfare of his fellow citizens and he finds favor
Socrates' Gorgias'
with the Gods. message to admirers is clear. Gorgias is really
only Polus and Callicles wrapped in a veneer of respectability. Gorgias and his
art are fundamentally disreputable; you follow him at your peril.

SOCRATES'
REPUTATION FOR SPEAKING THE TRUTH

When accused by Callicles of employing the very techniques of mob oratory

that he condemns, Socrates responds by depicting himself and philosophy as pi
ous and respectable, and he
his courageous devotion to philosophy
emphasizes

with the claim that he it for pandering rhetoric even at the cost
will not abandon
life.14
of his But the anomaly pointed out by Callicles is now compounded.
Socrates has wrapped himself in the cloak of public morality by using to good
effect the manipulative techniques of persuasion in the sphere of opinion. He has
used these techniques to portray himself as a man who speaks the truth and es

chews such techniques. If refutative rhetoric is to be understood as part of true

Socrates'

rhetoric, use of manipulative speech to establish a reputation as a

Socrates'
speaker of truth requires further analysis. The initial part of conversa

tion with Gorgias provides a way to approach this issue.

Early in the conversation Gorgias offered two examples to illustrate the power

of rhetoric (456b-c). First, he recalled the many times he had employed rhetoric
to convince patients to submit to the medical treatment prescribed by their physi

cians. In his second example, Gorgias considered the situation of an orator con

tending with a doctor before an audience. Gorgias held that the orator would al

ways prevail over the doctor, or indeed, over the master of any other art or craft
Gorgias'
in a public forum. The second example is the one of interest to audi-

14. Aristotle remarks on the rhetorical force of being seen to choose the honourable as opposed
Achilles'

to the expedient, and cites decision to kill Hector as a powerful example, Rhetoric I, 3,
1358b-
1359a. In the Gorgias, Socrates makes his choice with no explicit reference to Achilles,
whereas in the Apology (28cd) he does invoke the example of Achilles.
 208 Interpretation
Gorgias'

ence, for as Socrates has just indicated (455c-d), they are interested in
art as a means to a successful public career. Socrates characterizes the second use

of rhetoric as ignorance prevailing over knowledge (459b), and throughout the

Gorgias'
dialogue he castigates art as ignorance prevailing over knowledge by
pandering to the ignorance of an audience. Socrates does not mention the fact
Gorgias'
that in first example the techniques of rhetoric are in the service of

knowledge knowledge of the body. But for this very reason the example is
worth examining. The use of the techniques of rhetoric to implant the conviction

necessary to improve the body appears to be another example of the constructive

Socrates'
rhetoric found in the Phaedrus, where rhetoric implants the conviction

necessary to lead Phaedrus to philosophy and to a healthier soul.

Gorgias'
In first example of the power of rhetoric the knowledge of the physi
cian cannot be used for the welfare of his patient unless the patient is convinced

that he should undergo the treatment. The physician's conviction that the treat
ment should be administered rests on his knowledge qua physician, but the pa

tient does not share this knowledge so he must be convinced on the basis of opin
"truth"
ion or belief rather than knowledge. The physician is able to speak the
within the scope of his art, but because of the patient's lack of knowledge the
physician is not capable of implanting the required conviction; thus, the need for
the rhetorician. The rhetorician is assumed not to have the knowledge of the phy

sician, and therefore he cannot speak the truth in the sphere of medical knowl
edge. The rhetorician, like the patient, is confined to the realm of opinion or ig
norance, and the rhetorician must implant conviction on the basis not of his
is" be," be"
knowledge of "what but of "what seems to or "appears to even
not."

though it "is What then is the rhetorician to say? Presumably he emphasizes

the seriousness of the patient's condition and the bleakness of the prognosis if left
untreated, minimizes the distasteful aspects of the treatment and the convales
cence, and holds out the expectation of the best possible, and therefore some
what unlikely, recovery. In addition the rhetorician can go beyond the areas of
diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis, and pander to the patient's particular appe
tites or desires. For example, he may appeal to the patient's
vanity by emphasiz
ing the great improvement to be expected in his appearance, or to his desire for
honour and wealth by showing how his successful treatment will enhance his
ability to secure both. In short, the rhetorician's persuasiveness is based on set

ting the prescribed treatment within the context of what the patient would like to
avoid and/or obtain, and then showing the patient how the treatment would sat

isfy his desires.

In addition to the knowledge of the patient's hopes, aspirations, and desires,
and the knowledge of how to present the treatment to make it appear to satisfy
these desires, the rhetorician must also know how to secure and maintain a repu
tation as a person who can be trusted to give concerned and helpful advice that
can be relied upon. The rhetorician needs the reputation of
being a man who can
be trusted, a man who would not manipulate others through distortion and decep-
 Refutative Rhetoric as True Rhetoric in the Gorgias 209
Gorgias'
tion. Thus, example of the power of rhetoric in the service of knowl
edge indicates two somewhat different tasks for rhetoric: first, the persuasion of
the patient, and second, the maintenance of the rhetorician's public reputation.

Because the effectiveness of the persuasion of the patient is at least in part depen
dent on having a reputation as a man who would not resort to the use of the tech
niques of persuasion, the rhetorician must attempt to implant the conviction in
others that he would not attempt to do what he in fact does do. He must appear to
be other than he is in order to be an effective servant of knowledge.
Gorgias' Socrates'
In order to apply example of the use of rhetoric to manner

of speaking, one detail must be modified without changing the essential proper
Gorgias'
ties of the example. In example the role of rhetorician and physician are

each assumed by a different person. Let us suppose that the two roles are as
"art"
sumed by one person who has mastered both the art of medicine and the of

implanting conviction in the realm of opinion. Thus, the doctor can function as
both a practitioner of an art based on knowledge, and as a practitioner of the
technique of implanting the necessary conviction in his patients to ensure they
benefit from his knowledge, all the time taking care to polish his reputation as an

honest and trustworthy person who would not deceive.

Now, despite his condemnation of rhetoric in the Gorgias, Socrates does al

low that there is a true art of rhetoric analogous to the art of medicine. The object

of this art is the improvement of men's souls or characters, just as the object of

the art of medicine is the improvement of their bodies. The true art of rhetoric

uses words, not to gratify men, but to improve them (502e, 503a). The true art of

rhetoric is the basis of statemanship, but according to Socrates it is seldom prac

ticed (517a) and he suggests that he may be the sole practitioner (52ide). Also,
"

he claims that to practice this true rhetoric is comparable to doing battle

possible

with the Athenians like a doctor to make them as good as (521a). But
he also claims that a commitment to this true rhetoric precludes the use of, or the

knowledge of, the techniques of the flattering false rhetoric, thus, his fate at the

hands of a jury of children prosecuted by a pastry cook.

Socrates'
If commitment to a true rhetoric is analogous to medicine, then like
the doctor he too is faced with the problem of convincing his patients (fellow citi
Gorgias'

zens) to submit to the necessary treatment. presence and his attractive

ness to the audience increases the difficulty of convincing these young men to un
dergo the requisite treatment, thus, the need for refutative rhetoric: a rhetoric
Socrates'

which manipulates and then silences his three interlocutors. However,

manipulation of Callicles goes beyond the immediate purpose of weaning the au
Socrates'

dience away from Gorgias. Callicles sees a good deal of persuasive

technique and repeatedly accuses Socrates of engaging in mob oratory. This ac

cusation forces Socrates to defend his reputation. Accordingly, he undertakes the

task of defending his reputation for honest and plain speech regardless of the

consequences.
Callicles'
astuteness and aggressiveness makes this defensive
Socrates'

rhetoric necessary, for otherwise persuasive effort may be undermined

 210 Interpretation
Socrates'
However, Callicles
Callicles'

by exposure of techniques of persuasion.

also provides the raw material for Socrates defense of his reputation. Socrates
manages to associate the rhetoric of Gorgias with the shameless statements of

Callicles and then to piously reject this pandering rhetoric.

Socrates uses refutative rhetoric to dissuade the audience from following

Gorgias, and he continues to manipulate his interlocutors to polish his reputation

as someone who has no use for rhetoric.By rejecting rhetoric Socrates claims the
high ground of public morality devotion to the commonweal regardless of

the personal costs. He wraps himself in the warm embrace of civic virtue; like
Achilles, he will do the noble thing come what may.

CONCLUSION

Refutative rhetoric and constructive rhetoric are complementry parts of true

rhetoric. The refutative rhetoric of the Gorgias serves to dissuade the audience
from the false rhetoric of Gorgias; whereas, the constructive rhetoric of the
Phaedrus creates an alluring image which draws Phaedrus towards philosophy.

The heavy reliance on refutative rhetoric in the Gorgias is necessary because of

the sustained defense of false rhetoric mounted by Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles.
Gorgias'
Socrates arrives in the middle of demonstration and finds a way to insert
Gorgias'
himself between Gorgias and his audience. Socrates then uses presence

to press his denunciation through to its conclusion. Callicles mounts a deter

mined defense of rhetoric, but Socrates transforms this determination into reck
Gorgias' Callicles'
lessness, and then discredits
by associating it with art shame

ful hedonism. Although Callicles is eventually humiliated and silenced, he

Socrates is using the very techniques of persuasion that he
notices that claims to
eschew, and Socrates finally does move to meet the charge of being a mob ora

tor. To polish his reputation as a man who speaks

only the truth no matter what,
Callicles'
Socrates embellishes distinction between rhetoric and philosophy, and
portrays the philosopher as a man who would gladly face death rather than stoop
to the deceptive techniques of false rhetoric.
Socrates'
There is no direct evidence of the effect of refutative rhetoric on the

audience, but there is a basis for inference. The desire for public honour has
drawn the audience to Gorgias, from whom they hope to learn the art of prevail
Socrates'
ing in public debate. But due to intervention they are treated to the
spectacle of the defenders of the art shamed into silence by what they are pressed
to say. Plato leaves us to draw our own conclusion about the impact of this spec
tacle on the audience.