Cases Reported: Supreme Court Reports Annotated

8/29/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 654
CASES REPORTED
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
____________________
G.R. No. 116121. July 18, 2011.*

THE HEIRS OF THE LATE RUBEN REINOSO, SR.,
represented by Ruben Reinoso Jr., petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, PONCIANO TAPALES, JOSE GUBALLA,
and FILWRITERS GUARANTY ASSURANCE
**
CORPORATION, respondent.
Actions; Docket Fees; The rule is that payment in full of the

docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory; Where the
party does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment
of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules
by paying additional docket fees when required by the court, the
liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Asuncion, 170
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
** Now Centennial Guarantee Assurance Corporation. Rollo, p. 244.
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Heirs of the Late Ruben Reinoso, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals
SCRA 274 (1989) and not the strict regulations set in Manchester
v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (1987), will apply.—The rule is
that payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed
period is mandatory. In Manchester v. Court of Appeals, 149
SCRA 562 (1987), it was held that a court acquires jurisdiction
over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.
The strict application of this rule was, however, relaxed two (2)
years after in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,
170 SCRA 274 (1989), wherein the Court decreed that where the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the applicable
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000165855bb87402719fbd003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/16
prescriptive or reglementary period. This ruling was made on the

premise that the plaintiff had demonstrated his willingness to
abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees required.
Thus, in the more recent case of United Overseas Bank v. Ros, 529
SCRA 334 (2007), the Court explained that where the party does
not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of docket
fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying
additional docket fees when required by the court, the liberal
doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., and not the
strict regulations set in Manchester, will apply.
Same; Same; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; While there
is a crying need to unclog court dockets on the one hand, there is,
on the other, a greater demand for resolving genuine disputes
fairly and equitably, for it is far better to dispose of a case on the
merit which is a primordial end, rather than on a technicality that
may result in injustice.—While there is a crying need to unclog
court dockets on the one hand, there is, on the other, a greater
demand for resolving genuine disputes fairly and equitably, for it
is far better to dispose of a case on the merit which is a primordial
end, rather than on a technicality that may result in injustice. In
this case, it cannot be denied that the case was litigated before
the RTC and said trial court had already rendered a decision.
While it was at that level, the matter of non-payment of docket
fees was never an issue. It was only the CA which motu propio
dismissed the case for said reason. Considering the foregoing,
there is a need to suspend the strict application of the rules so
that the petitioners would be able to fully and finally prosecute
their claim on the merits at the appellate level rather than fail to
secure justice on a technicality, for, indeed, the general objective
of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival
VOL. 654, JULY 18, 2011 3
claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that

procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of
justice.
Same; Same; Same; The intent of the Court is clear to afford
litigants full opportunity to comply with the new rules and to
temper enforcement of sanctions in view of the recency of the
changes introduced by the new rules.—The Court also takes into
account the fact that the case was filed before the Manchester
ruling came out. Even if said ruling could be applied retroactively,
liberality should be accorded to the petitioners in view of the
recency then of the ruling. Leniency because of recency was
applied to the cases of Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of
Appeals, 297 SCRA 30 (1998), and Spouses Jimmy and Patri
Chan v. RTC of Zamboanga, 427 SCRA 796 (2004), In the case of
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Mangubat

(Mactan), 312 SCRA 463 (1999), it was stated that the “intent of
the Court is clear to afford litigants full opportunity to comply
with the new rules and to temper enforcement of sanctions in
view of the recency of the changes introduced by the new rules.” In
Mactan, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also failed to
pay the correct docket fees on time.
Same; Same; Where the court in its final judgment awards a
claim not alleged, or a relief different from, or more than that
claimed in the pleading, the party concerned shall pay the
additional fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment in
satisfaction of said lien.—The petitioners, however, are liable for
the difference between the actual fees paid and the correct
payable docket fees to be assessed by the clerk of court which
shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2 of
Rule 141 which provides: SEC. 2. Fees in lien.—Where the court
in its final judgment awards a claim not alleged, or a relief
different from, or more than that claimed in the pleading, the
party concerned shall pay the additional fees which shall
constitute a lien on the judgment in satisfaction of said lien. The
clerk of court shall assess and collect the corresponding fees.
Same; Same; Remand of Cases; Considering that the case at
bench has been pending for more than 30 years and the records
thereof are already before this Court, a remand of the case to the
Court of Appeals (CA) would only unnecessarily prolong its
resolution—in the higher interest of substantial justice and to
spare the parties from further delay, the Court will resolve the case
on the merits.—As the Court has taken the position that it would
be grossly
unjust if petitioners’ claim would be dismissed on a strict

application of the Manchester doctrine, the appropriate action,
under ordinary circumstances, would be for the Court to remand
the case to the CA. Considering, however, that the case at bench
has been pending for more than 30 years and the records thereof
are already before this Court, a remand of the case to the CA
would only unnecessarily prolong its resolution. In the higher
interest of substantial justice and to spare the parties from
further delay, the Court will resolve the case on the merits.
Quasi-Delicts; Negligence; While ending up on the opposite
lane is not conclusive proof of fault in automobile collisions, the
position of the two vehicles, as depicted in the sketch of the police
officers, clearly shows that it was the truck that hit the jeepney.—
While ending up on the opposite lane is not conclusive proof of
fault in automobile collisions, the position of the two vehicles, as

depicted in the sketch of the police officers, clearly shows that it
was the truck that hit the jeepney. The evidentiary records
disclosed that the truck was speeding along E. Rodriguez, heading
towards Santolan Street, while the passenger jeepney was coming
from the opposite direction. When the truck reached a certain
point near the Meralco Post No. J9-450, the front portion of the
truck hit the left middle side portion of the passenger jeepney,
causing damage to both vehicles and injuries to the driver and
passengers of the jeepney. The truck driver should have been more
careful, because, at that time, a portion of E. Rodriguez Avenue
was under repair and a wooden barricade was placed in the
middle thereof.
Same; Same; Whenever an employee’s negligence causes
damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption
juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi
patris families in the selection or supervision of his employee.—
Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to
another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that
the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the
selection or supervision of his employee. Thus, in the selection of
prospective employees, employers are required to examine them
as to their qualification, experience and service record. With
respect to the supervision of employees, employers must
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation, and impose disciplinary meas-
VOL. 654, JULY 18, 2011 5
ures for breaches thereof. These facts must be shown by concrete

proof, including documentary evidence.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Anthony L. Po for petitioners.
F. Sumulong & Associates Law Office for respondent
Ponciano Tapales.
Jeffrey-John Zarate for respondent Jose Guballa.
Antonio Fernando for respondent Centennial
Guarantee Assurance Corp.
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the
May 20, 1994 Decision1 and June 30, 1994 Resolution2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 19395, which
set aside the March 22, 1988 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 8, Manila (RTC) for non-payment of docket

fees. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed

from is SET ASIDE and REVERSED and the complaint in this
case is ordered DISMISSED.
No costs pronouncement.
SO ORDERED.”
The complaint for damages arose from the collision of a

passenger jeepney and a truck at around 7:00 o’clock in the
evening of June 14, 1979 along E. Rodriguez Avenue,
Quezon
_______________
1 Id., at pp. 24-28. Penned by then Associate Justice Conrado M.

Vasquez, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justice Jorge S. Imperial and
Associate Justice Pacita Cañizares-Nye.
2 Id., at p. 30.

City. As a result, a passenger of the jeepney, Ruben

Reinoso, Sr. (Reinoso), was killed. The passenger jeepney
was owned by Ponciano Tapales (Tapales) and driven by
Alejandro Santos (Santos), while the truck was owned by
Jose Guballa (Guballa) and driven by Mariano Geronimo
(Geronimo).
On November 7, 1979, the heirs of Reinoso (petitioners)
filed a complaint for damages against Tapales and Guballa.
In turn, Guballa filed a third party complaint against
Filwriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation (FGAC) under
Policy Number OV-09527.
On March 22, 1988, the RTC rendered a decision in
favor of the petitioners and against Guballa. The decision
in part, reads:
“In favor of herein plaintiffs and against defendant Jose

Guballa:
1. For the death of Ruben Reinoso, P30,000.00

Sr……………….
2. Loss of earnings (monthly income at the time 120,000.00
of death (P2,000.00 Court used P1,000.00 only per
month (or P12,000.00 only per year) & victim then
being 55 at death had ten (10) years life
expectancy …
3. Mortuary, Medical & funeral expenses and all 15,000.00
incidental expenses in the wake in serving those
who
condoled……………………………………………….
…….
4. Moral damages ………………….. 50,000.00
…………………...
5. Exemplary damages ……………... 25,000.00
………………….
6. Litigation expenses 15,000.00
………………………………….
7. Attorney’s fees ………………………. 25,000.00
……………….
Or a total of P250,000.00
For damages to property:
In favor of defendant Ponciano Tapales and against
defendant Jose Guballa:
VOL. 654, JULY 18, 2011 7

1. Actual damages for repair is already awarded to

defendant-cross-claimant Ponciano Tapales by Br.
9, RTC-Malolos, Bulacan (Vide: Exh. 1-G-Tapales);
hence, cannot recover twice
……………………………..
2. Compensatory damages (earnings at P150.00 per P9,000.00
day) and for two (2) months jeepney stayed at the
repair shop……………….………….
……….....................
3. Moral damages ……………….…………. 10,000.00
……….........
4. Exemplary damages ……………..…. 10,000.00
…………………
5. Attorney’s 15,000.00
fees…………………………………………..
or a total of P44,000.00
Under the 3rd party complaint against 3rd party
defendant Filwriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, the
Court hereby renders judgment in favor of said 3rd party
plaintiff by way of 3rd party liability under policy No. OV-
09527 in the amount of P50,000.00 undertaking plus
P10,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees.
For all the foregoing, it is the well considered view of the
Court that plaintiffs, defendant Ponciano Tapales and 3rd
Party plaintiff Jose Guballa established their claims as
specified above, respectively. Totality of evidence
preponderance in their favor.
JUDGMENT
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
In favor of plaintiffs for the death of Ruben Reinoso,
Sr………………………………………………………….P250,000.00;
In favor of defendant Ponciano Tapales due to damage of his

passenger jeepney…………………………………….…P44,000.00;
In favor of defendant Jose Guballa under Policy No. OV-
09527………………………………………………....P60,000.00;
All the specified accounts with 6% legal rate of interest per
annum from date of complaint until fully paid (Reformina vs.
Tomol, 139 SCRA 260; and finally;

Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.”3
On appeal, the CA, in its Decision dated May 20, 1994,

set aside and reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the
complaint on the ground of non-payment of docket fees
pursuant to the doctrine laid down in Manchester v. CA.4 In
addition, the CA ruled that since prescription had set in,
petitioners could no longer pay the required docket fees.5
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA
decision but it was denied in a resolution dated June 30,
1994.6 Hence, this appeal, anchored on the following
GROUNDS:
A. The Court of Appeals MISAPPLIED THE RULING of
the Supreme Court in the case of Manchester Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals to this case.
B. The issue on the specification of the damages
appearing in the prayer of the Complaint was NEVER
PLACED IN ISSUE BY ANY OF THE PARTIES IN THE
COURT OF ORIGIN (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT) NOR IN
THE COURT OF APPEALS.
C. The issues of the case revolve around the more
substantial issue as to the negligence of the private
respondents and their culpability to petitioners.”7
The petitioners argue that the ruling in Manchester

should not have been applied retroactively in this case,
since it was filed prior to the promulgation of the
Manchester decision in 1987. They plead that though this
Court stated that failure to state the correct amount of
damages would lead to the dis-
_______________
3 Rollo, pp. 54-56.

4 233 Phil. 579; 149 SCRA 562 (1987).
5 Rollo, pp. 24-28.
6 Id., at p. 30.
7 Id., at pp. 15-19.
VOL. 654, JULY 18, 2011 9

missal of the complaint, said doctrine should be applied

prospectively.
Moreover, the petitioners assert that at the time of the
filing of the complaint in 1979, they were not certain of the
amount of damages they were entitled to, because the
amount of the lost income would still be finally determined
in the course of the trial of the case. They claim that the
jurisdiction of the trial court remains even if there was
failure to pay the correct filing fee as long as the correct
amount would be paid subsequently.
Finally, the petitioners stress that the alleged defect was
never put in issue either in the RTC or in the CA.
The Court finds merit in the petition.
The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees within
the prescribed period is mandatory.8 In Manchester v.
Court of Appeals,9 it was held that a court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. The strict application of this rule
was, however, relaxed two (2) years after in the case of Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,10 wherein the Court
decreed that where the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the court
may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable period of
time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. This ruling was made on the premise
that the plaintiff had demonstrated his willingness to abide
by the rules by paying the additional docket fees
required.11 Thus, in the more recent case of United
Overseas Bank v. Ros,12 the Court explained that where the
party does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in
payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to
abide by the
_______________
8 Pedrosa v. Hill, 327 Phil. 153, 158; 257 SCRA 373, 377 (1996).
9 Supra note 4.
10 252 Phil. 280; 170 SCRA 274 (1989).
11 Id., at p. 291; p. 285.
12 G.R. No. 171532, August 7, 2007, 529 SCRA 334, 353.
10

rules by paying additional docket fees when required by the

court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd., and not the strict regulations set in
Manchester, will apply. It has been on record that the
Court, in several instances, allowed the relaxation of the
rule on non-payment of docket fees in order to afford the
parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the
merits. In the case of La Salette College v. Pilotin,13 the
Court stated:
“Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the
requirement of payment of appellate docket fees, we also
recognize that its strict application is qualified by the
following: first, failure to pay those fees within the
reglementary period allows only discretionary, not
automatic, dismissal; second, such power should be used by
the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound
discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair
play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in
consideration of all attendant circumstances.”14
While there is a crying need to unclog court dockets on
the one hand, there is, on the other, a greater demand for
resolving genuine disputes fairly and equitably,15 for it is
far better to dispose of a case on the merit which is a
primordial end, rather than on a technicality that may
result in injustice.
In this case, it cannot be denied that the case was
litigated before the RTC and said trial court had already
rendered a decision. While it was at that level, the matter
of non-payment of docket fees was never an issue. It was
only the CA which motu propio dismissed the case for said
reason.
Considering the foregoing, there is a need to suspend the
strict application of the rules so that the petitioners would
be able to fully and finally prosecute their claim on the
merits at the appellate level rather than fail to secure
justice on a technicality, for, indeed, the general objective
of procedure is to
_______________
13 463 Phil. 785; 418 SCRA 380 (2003).

14 Id., at p. 794; p. 387.
15 Santos v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 762, 770; 253 SCRA 632, 639
(1996).
11
VOL. 654, JULY 18, 2011 11

facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of

contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure
is not to hinder but to promote the administration of
justice.16
The Court also takes into account the fact that the case
was filed before the Manchester ruling came out. Even if
said ruling could be applied retroactively, liberality should
be accorded to the petitioners in view of the recency then of
the ruling. Leniency because of recency was applied to the
cases of Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of
Appeals17 and Spouses Jimmy and Patri Chan v. RTC of
Zamboanga.18 In the case of Mactan Cebu International
Airport Authority v. Mangubat (Mactan),19 it was stated
that the “intent of the Court is clear to afford litigants full
opportunity to comply with the new rules and to temper
enforcement of sanctions in view of the recency of the
changes introduced by the new rules.” In Mactan, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also failed to pay the
correct docket fees on time.
We held in another case:
“x x x It bears stressing that the rules of procedure are merely

tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They were
conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the
dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of
technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice,
courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously
guided by the norm that, on the balance, technicalities take a
backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way
around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to
frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within the
power of the Court to suspend the Rules, or except a particular
case from its operation.”20
_______________
16 Bautista v. Unangst, G.R. No. 173002, July 4, 2008, 557 SCRA 256,
271.
17 G.R. No. 130150, October 1, 1998, 297 SCRA 30.
18 G.R. No. 149253, April 15, 2004, 427 SCRA 796.
19 371 Phil. 393; 312 SCRA 463 (1999).
20 Cua, Jr. v. Tan, G.R. Nos. 181455-56, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA
645, 687.
12

The petitioners, however, are liable for the difference

between the actual fees paid and the correct payable docket
fees to be assessed by the clerk of court which shall

constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2 of
Rule 141 which provides:
“SEC. 2. Fees in lien.—Where the court in its final judgment

awards a claim not alleged, or a relief different from, or more than
that claimed in the pleading, the party concerned shall pay the
additional fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment in
satisfaction of said lien. The clerk of court shall assess and collect
the corresponding fees.”
As the Court has taken the position that it would be

grossly unjust if petitioners’ claim would be dismissed on a
strict application of the Manchester doctrine, the
appropriate action, under ordinary circumstances, would be
for the Court to remand the case to the CA. Considering,
however, that the case at bench has been pending for more
than 30 years and the records thereof are already before
this Court, a remand of the case to the CA would only
unnecessarily prolong its resolution. In the higher interest
of substantial justice and to spare the parties from further
delay, the Court will resolve the case on the merits.
The facts are beyond dispute. Reinoso, the jeepney
passenger, died as a result of the collision of a jeepney and
a truck on June 14, 1979 at around 7:00 o’clock in the
evening along E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City. It was
established that the primary cause of the injury or damage
was the negligence of the truck driver who was driving it at
a very fast pace. Based on the sketch and spot report of the
police authorities and the narration of the jeepney driver
and his passengers, the collision was brought about
because the truck driver suddenly swerved to, and
encroached on, the left side portion of the road in an
attempt to avoid a wooden barricade, hitting the passenger
jeepney as a consequence. The analysis of the RTC appears
in its decision as follows:
13
VOL. 654, JULY 18, 2011 13

“Perusal and careful analysis of evidence adduced as well as

proper consideration of all the circumstances and factors bearing
on the issue as to who is responsible for the instant vehicular
mishap convince and persuade this Court that preponderance of
proof is in favor of plaintiffs and defendant Ponciano Tapales. The
greater mass of evidence spread on the records and its influence
support plaintiffs’ plaint including that of defendant Tapales.
The Land Transportation and Traffic Rule (R.A. No. 4136),
reads as follows:
“Sec. 37. Driving on right side of highway.—Unless a

different course of action is required in the interest of the
safety and the security of life, person or property, or
because of unreasonable difficulty of operation in
compliance therewith, every person operating a motor
vehicle or an animal drawn vehicle on highway shall pass to
the right when meeting persons or vehicles coming toward
him, and to the left when overtaking persons or vehicles
going the same direction, and when turning to the left in
going from one highway to another, every vehicle shall be
conducted to the right of the center of the intersection of the
highway.”
Having in mind the foregoing provision of law, this Court is
convinced of the veracity of the version of the passenger jeepney
driver Alejandro Santos, (plaintiffs’ and Tapales’ witness) that
while running on lane No. 4 westward bound towards Ortigas
Avenue at between 30-40 kms. per hour (63-64 tsn, Jan. 6, 1984)
the “sand & gravel” truck from the opposite direction driven by
Mariano Geronimo, the headlights of which the former had seen
while still at a distance of about 30-40 meters from the wooden
barricade astride lanes 1 and 2, upon reaching said wooden block
suddenly swerved to the left into lanes 3 and 4 at high speed
“napakabilis po ng dating ng truck.” (29 tsn, Sept. 26, 1985) in the
process hitting them (Jeepney passenger) at the left side up to
where the reserve tire was in an oblique manner “pahilis” (57 tsn,
Sept. 26, 1985). The jeepney after it was bumped by the truck due
to the strong impact was thrown “resting on its right side while
the left side was on top of the Bangketa (side walk)”. The
passengers of the jeepney and its driver were injured including
two passengers who died. The left side of the jeepney suffered
considerable damage as seen in the picture (Exhs. 4 & 5-Tapales,
pages 331-332, records) taken while at the repair shop.
14

The Court is convinced of the narration of Santos to the effect

that the “gravel & sand” truck was running in high speed on the
good portion of E. Rodriguez Avenue (lane 1 & 2) before the
wooden barricade and (having in mind that it had just delivered
its load at the Corinthian Gardens) so that when suddenly
confronted with the wooden obstacle before it had to avoid the
same in a manner of a reflex reaction or knee-jerk response by
forthwith swerving to his left into the right lanes (lanes 3 & 4). At
the time of the bumping, the jeepney was running on its right
lane No. 4 and even during the moments before said bumping,
moving at moderate speed thereon since lane No. 3 was then
somewhat rough because being repaired also according to
Mondalia who has no reason to prevaricate being herself one of
those seriously injured. The narration of Santos and Mondalia are
convincing and consistent in depicting the true facts of the case

untainted by vacillation and therefore, worthy to be relied upon.
Their story is forfeited and confirmed by the sketch drawn by the
investigating officer Pfc. F. Amaba, Traffic Division, NPD, Quezon
City who rushed to the scene of the mishap (Vide: Resolution of
Asst. fiscal Elizabeth B. Reyes marked as Exhs. 7, 7-A, 7-B-
Tapales, pp. 166-168, records; the Certified Copy found on pages
598-600, ibid, with the attached police sketch of Pfc. Amaba,
marked as Exh. 8-Tapales on page 169, ibid; certified copy of
which is on page 594, ibid) indicating the fact that the bumping
indeed occurred at lane No. 4 and showing how the ‘gavel & sand’
truck is positioned in relation to the jeepney. The said police
sketch having been made right after the accident is a piece of
evidence worthy to be relied upon showing the true facts of the
bumping-occurrence. The rule that official duty had been
performed (Sec. 5(m), R-131, and also Sec. 38, R-a30, Rev. Rules of
Court)—there being no evidence adduced and made of record to
the contrary—is that said circumstance involving the two vehicles
had been the result of an official investigation and must be taken
as true by this Court.”21
While ending up on the opposite lane is not conclusive

proof of fault in automobile collisions,22 the position of the
two vehicles, as depicted in the sketch of the police officers,
clearly
_______________
21 Records, Vol. I, pp. 698-699.

22 Macalinao v. Ong, 514 Phil. 127, 137; 477 SCRA 740, 751 (2005).
15
VOL. 654, JULY 18, 2011 15

shows that it was the truck that hit the jeepney. The
evidentiary records disclosed that the truck was speeding
along E. Rodriguez, heading towards Santolan Street,
while the passenger jeepney was coming from the opposite
direction. When the truck reached a certain point near the
Meralco Post No. J9-450, the front portion of the truck hit
the left middle side portion of the passenger jeepney,
causing damage to both vehicles and injuries to the driver
and passengers of the jeepney. The truck driver should
have been more careful, because, at that time, a portion of
E. Rodriguez Avenue was under repair and a wooden
barricade was placed in the middle thereof.
The Court likewise sustains the finding of the RTC that
the truck owner, Guballa, failed to rebut the presumption
of negligence in the hiring and supervision of his employee.
Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code,

provides:
“Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to

another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
xxxx
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is
demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damage caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when
the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.”
16

Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or

injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption
juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise
diligentissimi patris families in the selection or supervision
of his employee.23 Thus, in the selection of prospective
employees, employers are required to examine them as to
their qualification, experience and service record. With
respect to the supervision of employees, employers must
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for
breaches thereof. These facts must be shown by concrete
proof, including documentary evidence.24 Thus, the RTC
committed no error in finding that the evidence presented
by respondent Guballa was wanting. It ruled:
“x x x. As expected, defendant Jose Guballa, attempted to

overthrow this presumption of negligence by showing that he had
exercised the due diligence required of him by seeing to it that the
driver must check the vital parts of the vehicle he is assigned to
before he leaves the compound like the oil, water, brakes,
gasoline, horn (9 tsn, July 17, 1986); and that Geronimo had been
driving for him sometime in 1976 until the collision in litigation
came about (5-6 tsn, ibid); that whenever his trucks gets out of
the compound to make deliveries, it is always accompanied with
two (2) helpers (16-17 tsn, ibid). This was all which he considered
as selection and supervision in compliance with the law to free

himself from any responsibility. This Court then cannot consider
the foregoing as equivalent to an exercise of all the care of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of his driver
Mariano Geronimo.”25
Following the guidelines enunciated in the case of

Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,26
petitioners are entitled to the payment of 12% legal
interest per annum on
_______________
23 Id.
24 Pleyto v. Lomboy, 476 Phil. 373, 386; 432 SCRA 329, 338 (2004).
25 Records, Vol. I, pp. 701-702.
26 G.R. No. 97412, 12 July 1994, 234 SCRA 78.
17
VOL. 654, JULY 18, 2011 17

the total amount awarded to be computed from the time of

finality of judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 20,
1994 Decision and June 30, 1994 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the March
22, 1988 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8,
Manila, is REINSTATED, with the MODIFICATION that
the private respondents should, as they are hereby ordered
to, pay interest at the rate of 12% per annum reckoned
from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, or his duly authorized deputy, is hereby ordered to
compute the correct docket fees and to enforce the
judgment lien by collecting the additional fees from the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio,*** Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Peralta and

Abad, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and

set aside.
Notes.—In this case, the principle of social justice—that

she who has less in life should have more in law—ought to
find a measure of relevance more weighty than
technicalities. (Brutas vs. Court of Appeals, 369 SCRA 8
[2001])
Payment of docket fees is not necessary for a court to

acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of a compulsory
counterclaim. (Mercado vs. Court of Appeals, 569 SCRA 503
[2008])
——o0o——
_______________
*** Designated as additional member of the Third Division per Special

Order No. 1042 dated July 6, 2011.
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8/29/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 654

G.R. No. 116121. July 18, 2011.*

Actions; Docket Fees; The rule is that payment in full of the

** Now Centennial Guarantee Assurance Corporation. Rollo, p. 244.

2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of the Late Ruben Reinoso, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals

prescriptive or reglementary period. This ruling was made on the

VOL. 654, JULY 18, 2011 3

Heirs of the Late Ruben Reinoso, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals

claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that

Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Mangubat

4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of the Late Ruben Reinoso, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals

unjust if petitioners’ claim would be dismissed on a strict

fault in automobile collisions, the position of the two vehicles, as

VOL. 654, JULY 18, 2011 5

Heirs of the Late Ruben Reinoso, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals

ures for breaches thereof. These facts must be shown by concrete

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

Court, Branch 8, Manila (RTC) for non-payment of docket

“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed

The complaint for damages arose from the collision of a

1 Id., at pp. 24-28. Penned by then Associate Justice Conrado M.

6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

City. As a result, a passenger of the jeepney, Ruben

“In favor of herein plaintiffs and against defendant Jose

1. For the death of Ruben Reinoso, P30,000.00

VOL. 654, JULY 18, 2011 7

1. Actual damages for repair is already awarded to

In favor of defendant Ponciano Tapales due to damage of his

8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

On appeal, the CA, in its Decision dated May 20, 1994,

The petitioners argue that the ruling in Manchester

3 Rollo, pp. 54-56.

7 Id., at pp. 15-19.

VOL. 654, JULY 18, 2011 9

missal of the complaint, said doctrine should be applied

10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of the Late Ruben Reinoso, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals

rules by paying additional docket fees when required by the

13 463 Phil. 785; 418 SCRA 380 (2003).

VOL. 654, JULY 18, 2011 11

facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of

“x x x It bears stressing that the rules of procedure are merely

12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The petitioners, however, are liable for the difference

fees to be assessed by the clerk of court which shall

“SEC. 2. Fees in lien.—Where the court in its final judgment

As the Court has taken the position that it would be

VOL. 654, JULY 18, 2011 13

“Perusal and careful analysis of evidence adduced as well as

“Sec. 37. Driving on right side of highway.—Unless a

14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Court is convinced of the narration of Santos to the effect

convincing and consistent in depicting the true facts of the case

While ending up on the opposite lane is not conclusive

21 Records, Vol. I, pp. 698-699.

VOL. 654, JULY 18, 2011 15

Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code,