OMBUDSMAN

EDWARD THOMAS F. JOSON V. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, GOV. AURELIO M. UMALI,
ALEJANDRO R. ABESAMIS, EDILBERTO M. PANCHO, MA. CHRISTINA G. ROXAS, AND
FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS

GR NO. 210220-21. APRIL 6, 2016

FACTS:

Petitioner Edward Thomas F. Joson (Joson) filed his Affidavit-Complaint,3 dated April 21, 2008,
before the Ombudsman charging the respondents, all of the Province of Nueva Ecija, with the criminal
offenses of Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, and Unlawful Appointment, defined and penalized under Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), docketed as OMB-L-C-08-0315-D, and offense of Grave Misconduct.

The filing of the above charges stemmed from the alleged appointment of Ferdinand as Consultant-
Technical Assistant in the Office of the Governor of Nueva Ecija.

Joson alleged that on July 2, 2007, the Province of Nueva Ecija, represented by Governor Umali,
entered into a contract of consultancy with Ferdinand wherein the latter was appointed or employed as
Consultant-Technical Assistant in the Office of the Governor. Joson asserted that Governor Umali
appointed Ferdinand despite his knowledge of the latter's disqualification for appointment or re-employment
in any government position. He claimed that Ferdinand was dismissed from the service as Senior State
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice for "conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service" pursuant
to Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 14, dated August 27, 1998; and that such penalty of dismissal carried
with it his perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government service. According to Joson,
because Ferdinand was meted out the penalty of dismissal from service with all accessory penalties
attached to it and that he was never granted any executive clemency, his appointment as legal consultant
was unlawful, illegal and invalid being in violation of the Administrative Code of 1987 and the Civil Service
Law, Rules and Regulations.

Ferdinand was paid on honorarium during the times that there was no consultancy contracts yet,
making the other respondent liable for the alleged crimes because of processing such honorarium in favor
of Ferdinand.

Gov. Umali argued that the consultancy services rendered by Ferdinand could not be considered
as government service within the contemplation of law and, hence, not governed by the Civil Service Law,
Rules and Regulations. He pointed out that under the twin contracts of consultancy, Ferdinand had been
engaged to render Jump sum consultancy services for a short duration of six (6) months on a daily basis
and had not been paid any salary or given any benefits enjoyed by government employees such as PERA,
COLA and RATA, but merely paid honoraria as stipulated in the contracts.

Other respondents averred that they were not liable for signing vouchers in this particular case
because it was done in the regular exercise of their ordinary course of business. It was premature
considering that the payment of honoraria to Ferdinand had not yet been subjected to post audit of COA
which had the sole authority and jurisdiction to suspend or disallow disbursements of public fund.

The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint. Joson subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but likewise denied. Hence, this certiorari.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Ombudsman had acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when he dismissed the complaint and denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

Ruling:

The petition is devoid of merit.

The Court agrees with the findings of the Ombudsman that there was no sufficient evidence to
indict the respondents for the crimes of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and unlawful appointment;
and that the charge of grave misconduct was not established by substantial evidence.

In the present petition, the Court does not perceive any showing of manifest error or grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman when it issued the assailed Joint Resolution, dated September
8, 2011 and Joint Order, dated September 23, 2013 which dismissed the criminal complaint against the
private respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and Unlawful Appointment for want of
sufficient evidence.

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a
crime has been committed and that there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused.

In this case, the allegations and evidence presented by the petitioners failed to prove that the
Ombudsman acted in such a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment in determining the non-
existence of probable cause against the private respondents. The Ombudsman dismissed the petitioner's
complaint for lack of probable cause based on its appreciation and review of the evidence presented. In the
Joint Resolution, dated September 8, 2011, the Ombudsman stated that Ferdinand was not appointed to a
public office through the contracts of consultancy because of the following factors:

The rights, authority and duties of Ferdinand arose from contract, not law;

1. Ferdinand was not vested with a portion of the sovereign authority;

2. The consultancy contracts were for a limited duration, as the same were valid for only six (6)
months each and could be terminated by a mere written notice given five (5) days prior;
3. Ferdinand did not enjoy the benefits given to government employees such as PERA, COLA
and RATA, but only received honoraria for consultancy services actually rendered; and
4. The Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and other Personnel Actions recognize that
service contracts like the subject twin contracts of consultancy were not considered
government service.

This Court has maintained its policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman's exercise of its
investigatory and prosecutory powers in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, not only out of respect
for these constitutionally mandated powers but also for practical considerations owing to the myriad
functions of the courts. In the case at bench, the Court will uphold the findings of the Ombudsman absent
a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on its part.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Jurisdiction: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., MR. NAPOLEON L. NAZARENO, AND MR. RICKY P. ISLA

v.

JOSE LENI Z. SOLIDUM

G.R. No. 197763, December 07, 2015

FACTS:

In an Employment Contract dated April 26, 2004, Smart Communications, Inc. (Smart) hired Jose
Leni Solidum (Solidum) as Department Head of Smart Prepaid/Buddy Activations under the Product
Marketing Group.

On September 21, 2005, Solidum received a Notice to Explain of even date4 from the Company
charging him with acts of dishonesty and breach of trust and confidence. In summary, he was charged with
violating "various company policies by misrepresenting and using his position and influence in his grant plot
to defraud Smart by conceptualizing fictitious marketing events, appointing fictitious advertising agencies
to supposedly carry out marketing events and submitting fictitious documents to make it appear that the
marketing events transpired.

Solidum received a copy of the Notice on the same date. Pending administrative investigation,
Solidum was placed under preventive suspension without pay for a period of thirty (30) days. However,
Smart further revealed that Solidum approved/noted several CEs covering activities for which payments
were made but did not actually carried out. Unaccredited third parties were also engaged in the
implementation of the projects. Thus, the Company issued another Notice to Explain dated October 21,
2005. Solidum was again preventively suspended for another ten (10) days.

Solidum then sent a letter dated October 24, 20058 to the Company requesting copies of the
pertinent documents so he can prepare an intelligible explanation. In another letter dated October 26, 2005,
Solidum stated that the investigation is highly suspicious and his extended suspension imposed undue
burden. He also reserved his right to present evidence. In his last letter dated October 28, 2005, Solidum
declared that he shall no longer receive or entertain notices or memorandum, except the final decision
resolving the administrative charges against him.

Smart issued a letter dated November 2, 2005, alleging that Solidum refused to accept the
documents that he had requested. Using this allegation, the Company imposed an additional preventive
suspension often (10) days on Solidum.

Based on the available evidence, the Company decided to dismiss Solidum for breach of trust in a
Notice of Decision dated November 9, 2005. Corollarily, a Notice of Termination was served on him on
November 11, 2005.

Aggrieved, Solidum filed a complaint dated November 19, 2005 for illegal suspension and dismissal
with money claims before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC claiming that his extended suspension and
subsequent termination were without just cause and due process.

Labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of Solidum. The company was ordered to reinstate
Solidum and was awarded backwages and monetary claims. He ratiocinated that the ground of breach of
trust and confidence is restricted to managerial employees.
 The Company appealed the adverse decision of the labor arbiter to the NLRC but was denied for
having been filed out of time and/or for non-perfection.

In its motion for reconsideration, the Company insisted that the appeal was filed within the
reglementary period considering that it received the labor arbiter's decision only on July 13, 2006 and not
July 10, 2006. It presented among others the Certification from Makati Central Post Office, the pertinent
page of the letter carrier's Registry Book, and the respective affidavit of the letter carrier and the Company's
receiving clerk. It added that in case of conflict between the registry receipt and the postmaster's
certification, the latter should prevail. Likewise, the Company maintained that the surety bond was secured
by its goodwill and the alleged lack of collateral or security will not render the bond invalid in view of the
surety's unequivocal commitment to pay the monetary award.

Finding merit in the motion, the NLRC issued a Resolution dated January 26, 2009 reversing its
earlier ruling and giving due course to the appeal. It upheld the certification of the postmaster over the
registry receipt and found that there was substantial compliance with the bond requirement.

Solidum appealed to the CA. The CA then rendered the assailed Decision dated April 4, 2011
affirming with modification the Decision of the NLRC. This time, both parties petitioned for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals had acted with grave abuse of discretion.

RULING:

The petitions must be denied.

Solidum’s second preventive suspension was valid. Pending the investigation, separate and
distinct set of offense committed by the respondent.

The relevant provisions regarding preventive suspensions are found in Sec. 8 and 9 of Rule XXIII,
Book V of the Omnibus Rlues Implementing the Labor Code. By preventive suspension on employer
protects itself from further harm or losses because of the erring employee.

While the Omnibus Rules limits the period of preventive suspension to thirty (30) days, such time
frame pertains only to one offense by the employee. For an offense, it cannot go beyond thirthy (30) days.
However, if the employee is charged with another offense, then the employer is entitled to impose a
preventive suspension not to exceed 30 days.

Such being the case, the court a erred in treating the 20- day suspension as an “extension”.

Furthermore, the court found that the company substantially complied with the rules on appeal
bonds.

Considering that it is the NLRC that has interpreted its own rules on this matter, the Court is inclined
to accept such interpretation. The Court has held, “By reason of the special knowledge and expertise
of administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position
to pass judgment on those matters.” Moreover, the NLRC properly relaxed the rules on appeal bonds.
The NLRC has the power and authority to promulgate rules of procedure under Article 218(a) of the Labor
Code. As such, it can suspend the rules if it finds that the interests of justice will be better served if the strict
compliance with the rules should be relaxed. In short, a substantial compliance may be allowed by the
NLRC especially in this case where the party which submitted the bond is a multibillion company which can
easily pay whatever monetary award may be adjudged against it. Even if there is no proof of security deposit
or collateral, the surety bond issued by an accredited company is adequate to answer for the liability if any
to be incurred by Smart.
 WHEREFORE, the petition of Jose Leni Z. Solidum in G.R. No. 197836 is hereby DENIED. The
petition of petitioners Smart Communications, Inc, et al. in G.R. No. 197763 is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Court of Appeals Decision dated April 4, 2011 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award
of salaries and benefits that accrued during the period of extended preventive suspension is DELETED.
Ombudsman; Jurisdiction; Given that the Ombudsman is vested with plenary and unqualified power to
investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance by a public officer or employee of the
government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, the settled rule is that courts will not
ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers without good
and compelling reason to indicate otherwise.

Gonzales vs. Serrano

G.R. No. 175433 March 11, 2015

FACTS:

This case arose from an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Maila Clemen F. Serrano
(respondent) against her direct superior, Atty. Jacinto C. Gonzales (petitioner), Chief, Legal Division of the
Philippine Racing Commission (PHILRACOM), for grave misconduct, sexual harassment and acts of
lasciviousness.

In her Complaint-Affidavit5 dated January 12, 2001, respondent alleged that on November 23,
2000, petitioner invited her, along with her officemates, Administrative Officer V Eva Bataller, Atty. III
Eugene Juanson, and Stenographer II Roman Vidal, to eat lunch at Buddy's Restaurant, at J.P. Rizal St.,
Makati City. While seated at the table waiting for their food to be served, petitioner suddenly took hold of
respondent's face and forcefully kissed her lips in the presence of Eva, Eugene, Roman and other
customers. Respondent tried to ward off petitioner by pulling her head away from him, but he persisted on
kissing her against her will. She was so shocked, terrified, and humiliated that she could hardly talk and
move. She wanted to cry, but held her tears for fear of further embarrassment. After releasing her, petitioner
said: “Ang sarap pala ng labi ni Maila...” Then, he held her hand and said “Maila sige na...” But, she took
away her hand from him. Thereafter, she immediately reported the incident to PHILRACOM Executive
Director Juan Lozano.

Respondent also alleged that prior to that “kissing” incident, petitioner had already degraded her
person on four (4) separate occasions, namely:

(1) on the very first day she met him in the office, he offered to purchase her a cell phone so that
he can text
her, which offer she straightforwardly refused;

(2) on that same day, he wanted her to join him in his car in going home, which she likewise refused;

(3) a week later, he asked her to eat out for lunch; again, she refused; and

(4) on August 23, 2000, after her sick leave from office, petitioner called her in his office and scolded
her and uttered the following unsavory remarks.

Respondent further alleged that she was constrained to elevate her complaint before the Office of
the Ombudsman because the PHILRACOM Grievance Committee had not taken any concrete action on
her administrative case which had been pending for over a month, and also because of petitioner's relatively
high position in the office.

In his Counter-Affidavit/Answer dated March 22, 2001, petitioner alleged that at the prodding of his
staff, he agreed to treat them for lunch, as it was respondent's birthday, and she had no money for a
“blowout”. While their group were talking in the restaurant, he greeted respondent and planted an innocent
birthday greeting kiss on her left cheek, near her lips. He also alleged that he first met respondent when
she applied for Attorney III; that on July 1, 2000, he summoned her to explain the complaints forwarded by
the Personnel and Administrative Division as to her frequent absence and tardiness; and that his act of
reviewing her official functions was in accordance with his duties and responsibilities as a legal counsel of
PHILRACOM.

In her Reply-Affidavit, respondent stated that she never solicited any favor from petitioner, let alone
obliged him to spend money for her birthday “blowout”; that his birthday lunch treat was part of a
premeditated evil plan to have her submit to his sexual desire; that she never allowed him to kiss her on
the cheek, much less on the lips; that in the course of her employment with petitioner as her supervisor, he
had often made sexual advances and gestures towards her, but she still tried to keep their relationship on
a strictly professional level; that the alleged work-related incidents of tardiness, inefficiency and laziness
were all intended to harass her; and that because of the administrative case she filed against him, she lost
her job.

In an Order dated June 27, 2001, the parties were directed to appear for the preliminary conference
of the administrative case. Both parties appeared as directed and agreed to submit the case for decision
based on the evidence on record and pleadings filed.

A Resolution dated July 17, 2001 was approved by then Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P.
Gervacio, Jr., finding sufficient evidence that supports the conclusion that the crime of violation of Section
3(a), Republic Act No. 7877, otherwise known as “An Act Declaring Sexual Harassment Unlawful in the
Employment, Education, or Training Environment, and for other purposes,” was committed probably by the
herein respondent. Let therefore, the appropriate information be filed against Jacinto C. Gonzales before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City.

On March 19, 2002, the Office of the Ombudsman Administrative Adjudication Bureau, through
Graft Investigation Officer Marlon T. Molina, issued a Decision finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Ombudsman Administrative Adjudication Bureau
denied.

However, on January 3, 2003, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman approved the Memorandum issued
by Graft Investigation Officer II Julita M. Calderon, stating that the previous charges be modified from
GRAVE MISCONDUCT to SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and from DISMISSAL to ONE (1) MONTH
SUSPENSION without pay.

Aggrieved, respondent brought the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, attributing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman. On August 16, 2006, the CA sustained respondent and rendered the
herein assailed decision.

Thereafter, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for
Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in a Resolution dated October 4, 2006 for being a prohibited motion.

Hence, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.

RULING:

There is no merit in the petition.

The Court shall first delve on the procedural issue of the case. In Imperial v. Court of Appeals, 588
SCRA 401 (2009), the Court ruled: In a long line of cases starting with Habaluyas Enterprises v. Japzon,
we have laid down the following guideline: Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution,
the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and
the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court
as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.
Thus, the general rule is that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration is allowed.
This rule is consistent with the rule in the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals that unless an appeal
or a motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed within the 15-­day reglementary period, the CA’s decision
becomes final. Thus, a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration does not stop the
running of the 15-day period for the computation of a decision’s finality. At the end of the period, a CA
judgment becomes final, immutable and beyond our power to review. This rule, however, admits of
exceptions based on a liberal reading of the rule, so long as the petitioner is able to prove the existence of
cogent reasons to excuse its nonobservance. No such reasons were shown to obtain in this case.
Petitioner’s reasons of pressures of work attending to numerous court trials, preparation of court orders and
decisions, and large volume of case load, are foreseeable and perennial problems of most trial court judges.
Such reasons are inexcusable, as ordinary prudence should have prompted him to secure the services of
an independent counsel to defend his administrative case.

While the CA was correct in denying his Urgent Motion for Extension to File Motion for
Reconsideration for being a prohibited motion, the Court, in the interest of justice, looked into the merits of
the case, and opted to suspend the prohibition against such motion for extension after it found that a
modification of the CA Decision is warranted by the law and the jurisprudence on administrative cases
involving sexual harassment. The emerging trend of jurisprudence, after all, is more inclined to the liberal
and flexible application of procedural rules. Rules of procedure exist to ensure the orderly, just and speedy
dispensation of cases; to this end, inflexibility or liberality must be weighed. Thus, the relaxation or
suspension of procedural rules, or exemption of a case from their operation is warranted only by compelling
reasons or when the purpose of justice requires it.

Given that the Ombudsman is vested with plenary and unqualified power to investigate any
malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance by a public officer or employee of the government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, the settled rule is that courts will not ordinarily interfere with
the Ombudsman’s exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reason
to indicate otherwise. As discussed above, the Court finds such good and compelling reasons based on
law and jurisprudence as would warrant the modification of the CA decision, as well as the Memorandum-
Order of Overall Deputy Office of the Ombudsman.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Ombudsman’s power to directly impose, not merely recommend, administrative sanctions against erring
public officials or employees.

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Quimbo,

G.R. No. 173277 February 25, 2015

FACTS:

The present controversy stemmed from the administrative complaint lodged by Gilda D. Daradal
(Daradal), a clerk in the Provincial Engineering Office of Catbalogan, Samar, against private respondent
Engr. Prudencio C. Quimbo (Quimbo), Provincial Engineer of Samar, with the Office of the Ombudsman-
Visayas (Ombudsman-Visayas) for Sexual Harassment and Oppression.

In her complaint, Daradal alleged that on July 19, 1996, at about 10:00 o’clock in the morning at
the Motor Pool Division of the Provincial Engineering Department, Catbalogan, Samar, Quimbo asked her
to massage his forehead and nape. In the course thereof, he said, “You had been lying to me you have
already seen my manhood. When shall I have to see yours?” She was appalled as the utterance was made
in the presence of her co-employees. She added that by virtue of a Memorandum, dated August 6, 1996,
Quimbo ordered her detail to the Civil Service Commission in Catbalogan, Samar, to perform the tasks of
a male utility personnel. Her name was removed from the payroll of the personnel of the Provincial
Engineering Office from August 16-31, 1996 because of her refusal to submit to his sexual advances.

In his defense, Quimbo retorted that the charge instituted against him was fictitious. He claimed
that Daradal enjoyed a “very important person” (VIP) treatment for a long period of time and, when required
to work, rebelled against him. He asserted that the charge of sexual harassment and oppression was
intended to embarrass and ridicule him and that the discretion to order her detail was validly exercised.

On March 26, 1996, Daradal filed a motion for withdrawal of the complaint. The motion, however,
was denied by the Ombudsman-Visayas in its Order, dated August 11, 1998.

Engr. Quimbo moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied by the Ombudsman-Visayas
in its Order, dated April 15, 1999. Aggrieved, Quimbo elevated the case before the CA by way of a petition
for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

On January 21, 2005, the CA reversed the December 9, 1998 Resolution and the April 15, 1999
Order of the Ombudsman-Visayas. In reversing the said ruling, the CA:

The Office of the Ombudsman has no power to directly impose sanctions against
government officials and employees who are subject of its investigation as its power
is only limited to recommend the appropriate sanctions but not directly to impose
the same.

On February 14, 2005, the Ombudsman filed an omnibus motion for intervention and
reconsideration of the CA decision, dated January 21, 2005. In its Resolution, dated May 2, 2006, the CA
denied the said motion.

Not in conformity with the pronouncement of the CA, the Ombudsman instituted a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the CA.

In its Memorandum, the Ombudsman stressed that, as the champion of the people, it had the right
and legal interest to seek redress on the apparent erroneous reversal by the CA of its decision in an
administrative disciplinary case. It insisted that, as the disciplining authority, it has the power and
prerogative to directly impose any administrative penalty.

Quimbo, in his Memorandum, contended that the Ombudsman had no legal standing to intervene
or to seek reconsideration of the assailed CA decision because the real party in interest was Daradal.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in declaring that the Ombudsman lacks the power to directly
impose administrative penalties against erring public officials or employees.

RULING:

The Court grants the Ombudsman’s petition.

The Ombudsman has the power to directly impose administrative penalties against public officials
or employees.

In the case of Ombudsman v. Apolonio, 667 SCRA 583 (2012), the Court categorically delineated
the Ombudsman’s power to directly impose, not merely recommend, administrative sanctions against erring
public officials or employees, viz.: The Ombudsman has the power to impose the penalty of removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee, in the exercise of its
administrative disciplinary authority. The challenge to the Ombudsman’s power to impose these penalties,
on the allegation that the Constitution only grants it recommendatory powers, had already been rejected by
this Court

The import of the Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 465 SCRA 437 (2005), ruling is crystal clear.
Although the tenor of the text in Section 13(3), Article XI of the Constitution merely indicates a
“recommendatory” function, this does not divest Congress of its plenary legislative power to vest the
Ombudsman powers beyond those stated in the Constitutional provision. Pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Ombudsman is legally authorized to
directly impose administrative penalties against errant public servants. Further, the manifest intent of the
lawmakers was to bestow on the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority in accord with the
constitutional deliberations. Unlike the Ombudsman-like agencies of the past, the powers of which extend
to no more than making findings of fact and recommendations, and the Ombudsman or Tanodbayan under
the 1973 Constitution who might file and prosecute criminal, civil or administrative cases against public
officials and employees only in cases of failure of justice, the current Ombudsman, under the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 6770, is intended to play a more active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-
graft and corrupt practices and other offenses committed by public officers and employees. The
Ombudsman is to be an “activist watchman,” not merely a passive one. He is vested with broad powers to
enable him to implement his own actions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.