51. Casco Chemical Co.

vs Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347 (1963)

Facts: RA 2609 known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, fixed a uniform margin fee of

25% on foreign exchange transactions. On November and December 1959 Casco Philippine

Chemical purchased urea and formaldehyde, the main ingredients in manufacturing glues, and

paid corresponding margin fees. Casco sought a refund pursuant to Section 2 RA 2609, “shall

not be imposed… urea formaldehyde…” The Bank Auditor of Central Bank did not honur the

vouchers for refund and was affirmed by the Auditor General. Respondent contend that “urea

formaldehyde” is clearly a finished product and distinctly different from “urea” and

“formaldehyde.”

Issue: Whether or not there was error in printing of bill?

Decision: Decision appealed from is affirmed. If there has been any mistake in the printing of

the bill before it was certified by Congress and approved by the Executive, the remedy is by

amendment or curative legislation not by judicial decree.

FACTS: Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez
y Lopez arrived in Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine
were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons’ house. On the other
hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not
delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted
an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium.
Since the act of trading and dealing opium is against Act No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged
for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband material to the Philippines.
Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was approved while the Philippine
Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law
was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was
adjourned at 12MN on February 28, 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and
void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act
2381 was indeed made a law on February 28, 1914.

HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused
to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the
Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are,
as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the
organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a
coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate
powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons’ witnesses cannot be given due weight against the
conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the
Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the
court did not err in declining to go beyond these journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness
of the enrolled bill in this particular case.

53. Philconsa vs Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966)

Facts: RA 4134 provided for increase of salary of Senate President, Speaker of the House and

members of the Senate and House of Representatives. This took effect on 30 June 1966.
However record show that the increase was implemented on 1964.Philippine Constitution

Association assailed the validity of RA 4134, stating that this is in violation of Section 14 Article

6 of the Constitution, “No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the

expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and House of Representatives

approving such increase. Thus the petition for writ of prohibition.

Issue: Whether or not the salary increase was constitutional?

Decision: Writ of prohibition granted. Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until December 30,

1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it on June 20,

1964 will have expired. Consequently, appropriation for such increased compensation may not

be disbursed until December 30, 1969. In so far as Republic Act No. 4642 (1965-1966

Appropriation Act) authorizes the disbursement of the increased compensation prior to the date

aforesaid, it also violates the Constitution and must be held null and void.

54. Ligot vs Mathay, 56 SCRA 823 (1974)

Facts: Petitioner was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969) but

was held not entitled to the salary increase of P32,000.00 during such third term by virtue of this
Court’s unanimous decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay. He lost his next bid and filed for retirement

claim. House of Representative issued a treasury warrant using the unapproved amount.

Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant. Petitioner’s request for reconsideration was denied,

hence the petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to retirement using php 32k?

Decision: Petition denied. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms

expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per

annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office)

would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that

which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency

55. People vs Jalosjos, February 03, 2000

FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is

ISSUE: Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law by
reason of the “mandate of the sovereign will”.

RULING: NO. While the Constitution guarantees: “x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws.”, this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both
in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by the “mandate of the people”
are multifarious. The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by
public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Here, election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and
duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement
are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. Hence,
the performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly in prison.

56. Jimenez vs Cabangbang 17 SCRA 876 (1966)

FACTS:

Nicanor Jimenez, Carlos Albert and Jose Lukban– they are the persons mentioned in the open
letter of Cabangbang to the President

Bartolome Cabangbang – member of the HOR and wrote the letter to the President

A civil action was originally instituted by the petitioners in the CFI of Rizal for recovery of several
sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of
defendant Cabangbang. The letter contains information that:

1. There is an insidious plan or a massive political build up

2. There is a planned coup d’état

3. Modified #1, by trying to assuage the President and the public with a loyalty parade, in a
effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind General Arellano.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication.

2. Whether or not it is libelous.

HELD:

1. It was held that the letter is not considered a privilege communication because the
publication:

a. was an open letter,

b. the Congress was not in session

2. It was held not libelous because the letter clearly implies that the plaintiffs were not the
planners but merely tools, much less, unwittingly on their part.

The order appealed is confirmed

57. Adaza vs Pacana, Jr. 135 SCRA 431 March 18, 1985
G.R. No. L-68159

Facts: Petitioner Homobono Adaza was elected Governor of Misamis Oriental during the1980
elections. His Vice-Governor, herein respondent Fernando Pacana, Jr., waslikewise qualified
and assumed officed during their oath on March 3, 1980. Underthe law, their respective terms of
office would expire on March 3, 1986.Pacana and Adaza filed their certificates of candidacy for
the May 14, 1984 BatasanPambansa elections on March 27, 1984 and April 27, 1984
respectively. Petitionerwon and took his oath as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 9184 and
respondentlikewise took over the vacancy as Governor and took his oath of office on July
25,1984.Petitioner contends Pacana’s unlawful occupancy of the Governor’s office, hencethis
petition for prohibition with a writ of parliamentary injunction and/or restrainingorder was filed
before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Homobono Adaza can exercise and discharge hisfunctions as
Mambatas Pambansa and Provincial Governor simultaneously.

Ruling: No. Under Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, a Member of the
NationalAssembly (now Batasan Pambansa) shall not hold any other office or employment inthe
government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, includinggovernment-owned
or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the
cabinet. Petitioner Adaza, being a public officer issubject to the regulations and conditions as
the law may impose and cannotcomplain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on
his holding of morethan one office.Upon taking his oath of office as an elected Mambabatas
Pambansa, petitionersubsequently operated to vacate his former post and he can no longer
continue tooccupy the same, nor attempt to discharge its functions which makes respondent
toreassume the position of Vice-Governor and later on take oath of office as Governorfor the
unexpired term in lawful accordance with the Local Government Code.
58. Puyat vs Gusman, 113 SCRA 31 March 25, 1982
G.R. No. L-51122

Facts: In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International
Pipe Industries. The election was subsequently questioned by Eustaquio Acero (Puyat’s rival)
claiming that the votes were not properly counted – hence he filed a quo warranto case before
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on May 25, 1979. Prior to Acero’s filing of the
case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten
shares of stock of IPI from a member of Acero’s group. And during a conference held by SEC
Commissioner Sixto de Guzman, Jr. (from May 25-31, 1979) to have the parties confer with
each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected
as he argued that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to anyone)
before any administrative body (such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited
himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention
in the said SEC case for him to intervene, not as a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI shares
and as a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner
granted the motion and in effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene.

ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and intervene in
the SEC case without violating the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not appear
as counsel in such courts or bodies?

HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not
appearing as a counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation he is still barred from appearing. He bought the stocks before the litigation took
place. During the conference he presented himself as counsel but because it is clearly stated that
he cannot do so under the constitution he instead presented himself as a party of interest – which
is clearly a workaround and is clearly an act after the fact. A mere workaround to get himself
involved in the litigation. What could not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly.