The Great Depression by Lionel Robbins

THE GREAT DEPRESSION
THE GREAT
DEPRESSION
BY
LIONEL ROBBINS
BOOKS FOR LIBRARIES PRESS

FREEPORT, NEW YORK
First Published 1934
Reprinted 1971
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TO
I. E. K.
PREFACE
THE following pages make no claim to present an ex-
haustive account of the events with which they deal.
Nor do they set out in full rigour the various analytical
theorems upon which they are based. They are merely
an attempt, with the aid of what is sometimes called
"orthodox" economics, to furnish a succinct commen-
tary on the more conspicuous features of the slump
and its antecedents. In doing this I have been most
acutely aware of the difficulties of the task I have
undertaken. The subject is highly controversial, and
many of the conclusions to which I have been led run
counter to opinions wrhich have been widely held, at
any rate in this country. I put them forward, not
with any confidence whatever in the superiority of
my own judgment, but in the belief that the point of
view from which they spring, which is not specifically
my own but is the heritage of generations of subtle
and disinterested thought, is a point of view whose
applicability to the interpretation of the bewildering
problems with which we are now confronted has not
as yet been sufficiently recognised.
I have to acknowledge indebtedness to the various
friends who have been kind enough to favour me with
the benefit of their advice and criticism. My main
vii
viii THE GREAT DEPRESSION
debt, however, is to Mr. Stanley Tucker, Rockefeller
Research Assistant in the Department of Economics,
without whose loyal and unremitting labours in the
preparation of the charts and the statistical appendix
publication at this stage would have been impossible.
LIONEL ROBBINS
T H E LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
June 1934
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
1914-1933
1. Introduction 1
2. Pre-war Capitalism . . . . . . 1
3. W a r 3
4. Post-war Chaos . . . . . . . 6
5. Boom 7
6. Collapse 10
7. The Great Depression 10
CHAPTER II
MISCONCEPTIONS
1. Introduction 12
2. The Fall of Prices 12
3. Over-production 13
4. Deflation 16
5. Shortage of Gold 19
6. Maldistribution of Gold 22
CHAPTER I I I
T H E GENESIS OF THE DEPRESSION
1. Introduction . . . . . . . 30
2. The Problem restated 30
3. The Structure of Production . . . . 31
4. The Theoretical Effects of a n Expansion of Credit . 34
5. Outline of a possible Trade Cycle . . . . 39
6. Real and Monetary Explanations of Cyclical Fluctua-
tion 42
ix
THE GREAT DEPRESSION
7. T h e A m e r i c a n B o o m . . . . . . 43
8. I n t e r n a t i o n a l Credit E x p a n s i o n . . . . 4 9
9 . T h e G e n e s i s of t h e B o o m . . . . . 51
CHAPTER IV
T O E CAUSES O F DEFLATION
1. Introduction . . . . . . . 55
2. Politics 57
3. W a r , Capital Consumption a n d Change . . . 5 8
•4. The Post-war Economic Structure . . . 59
5. T h e F i n a n c i a l P o l i c i e s of t h e B o o m . 61
6. P r o t e c t i v e Tariffs 65
7. T h e M a i n t e n a n c e of C o n s u m e r s ' P u r c h a s i n g P o w e r . 6 9
8. Bankruptcy-Phobia . . . . . . 7 1
CHAPTER V
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

1. Introduction 76
2. The Post-war Monetary Controversy . . . 76
3. T h e P e r i o d of S t a g n a t i o n 80
4. Great Britain a n d t h e World Slump . . . 87
5. Floating Balances 88
6. T h e Crisis . 9 1
7. R e t r o s p e c t of t h e G o l d S t a n d a r d . . . . 96
CHAPTER VI
INTERNATIONAL CHAOS
1. I n t r o d u c t i o n . . . . . . . 100
2. T h e Case of G e r m a n y . . . . . . 100
3. T h e F o r t u n e s of Sterling 104
4.% Gold Prices a n d Deflation 110
5. A m e r i c a leaves t h e Gold S t a n d a r d . . . 119
CONTENTS xi
CHAPTER VII
RESTRICTIONISM AND PLANNING VM}E
1. The American Recovery Programme . . . 1 2 5

2. Restriction ofHours ofLabour . . . . 1 2 6
3. Agricultural "Adjustment" . . . . . 1 2 9
4. Maintaining the Value ofInvested Capital . . 1 3 6
5. T h e C u m u l a t i v e T e n d e n c i e s of R e s t r i c t i o n i s m . 143
6. T h e M e a n i n g of P l a n n i n g . . . . . 145
7. T h e C e n t r a l Difficulty of a P l a n n e d S o c i e t y . . 148
8. Planning a n d Economic Nationalism . . . 156
CHAPTER VIII
CONDITIONS O F RECOVERY
1. Introduction . . . . . . . 1 6 0
2. S t a b i l i s a t i o n of E x c h a n g e s . . . . . 160
3. T h e B a s i s of a n I n t e r n a t i o n a l M o n e t a r y S y s t e m . 164
4. " A Gold S t a n d a r d with Movable P a r i t i e s " . . 172
5. R e m o v a l of T r a d e R e s t r i c t i o n s . . . . 1 8 2
6. T h e F r e e i n g of t h e M a r k e t 185
7. T h e R e s t r i c t i o n of R e s t r i c t i o n i s m . . . . 1 8 9
8. T h e R e s t o r a t i o n of C a p i t a l i s m . . . . 193
CHAPTER I X
PROSPECTS
1. T h e I n s e c u r i t y of t h e F u t u r e . . . . 195
2. War 196
3. Socialism 197
4. Democracy . . . . . . . 198
STATISTICAL A P P E N D I X . . . . . . . 203
TABLES IN THE
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
PAGE
1. United Kingdom—Security Prices . . . . 203

2. United States—Security Prices . . . . 204
3. Total Capital Issues 205
4. Capital Issues on Foreign Account . . . . 206
5. United Kingdom—Index of Wholesale Prices . . 207
6. United States—Index of Wholesale Prices . . .208
7. Indices of the Cost of Living 209
8. Indices of Industrial Production . . . . 210
9. Indices of Production of Producers' a n d Consumers'
Goods 211
10. Total Value of World Trade 212
11. National Unemployment Statistics . . . .213
12. United States—Index of Industrial Production . .214
13. Acceptances and Securities of Federal Reserve Banks . 215
14. Bank of England—Total Deposits . . . .216
15. United States—Velocity of Circulation of Bank Deposits 217
16. United States—Total Gold Reserves of t h e Federal
Reserve Banks . . . . . . . 218
17. United States—Total Loans, Discounts a n d Invest-
ments of Weekly Reporting Member Banks . .219
18. B a n k of France — Gold Reserves a n d Notes in
Circulation 220
19. B a n k of England—Gold Reserves . . . .221
20. London Clearing Banks—Total Deposits . . .222
21. New York—Average R a t e of Interest on Call Loans . 223
22. United States—Index of Composite Wages . . 224
23. Reichsbank—Gold Reserves plus Foreign Assets . 225
24. Germany—Total Credits of the Big Banks . . 226
25. Germany—Estimated Balance of P a y m e n t s . . 227
26. Germany—Indices of Security Prices . . . 228
xiii
xiv THE GREAT DEPRESSION
27. Germany—Index of Wages 229
28. Reichsbank—Discount Rate 230
29. New York Federal Reserve Bank—Discount Rate . 231
30. Bank of England—Bank Rate . . . . 232
31. Bank of France—Discount Rate . . . . 233
32. Sterling-Dollar Exchange—London Quotations . . 234
33. Sterling-Dollar Exchange—New York Quotations . 235
34. United Kingdom—Index of Average Weekly Wages . 236
35. United Kingdom—Balance of Payments on Income
Account 237
36. Foreign Exchange Rates—Percentage Discount in
Relation to Gold Parity 238
CHAPTER I
1914-1933
1. THE object of this Essay is to examine the nature
and the causes of the present depression of trade. Its
first task, therefore, is to trace the background of the
depression and the broad conditions amid which it was
generated.
To do this it is necessary to draw the picture on a
canvas wider than that which would at first sight seem
appropriate to an enterprise of this nature. The onset
of the present crisis may perhaps be dated from the
autumn of 1929. But its causes and the conditions
under which they have operated take their rise long
before this date. The body-economic, equally with the
body-politic, has been in a state of violent tension ever
since the war. We live, not in the fourth, but in the
nineteenth, year of the world crisis. If our discussion
of the events since 1929 is not to be wholly unrelated
to their most significant causes, it must take some
account, however brief, of events before that date.
1914 is the beginning of our epoch.
2. For the hundred years which preceded the out-
break of the Great War, the economic system had not
at any time shown itself to be in serious danger of grave
breakdown. It was a period of unprecedented change.
The external conditions of economic activity were
in process of continual alteration. In the old world
1 B
2 THE GREAT DEPRESSION OH.
the advent of steam and machinery was changing
the nature and the structure of manufacturing indus-
try. In the new, the coming of new modes of trans-
port was opening up vast areas, hitherto undeveloped,
both as sources of food supply and raw materials, and
as markets for the products of the manufacturing pro-
cesses. The population of the world, whose normal
state there is reason to suppose to have been more or
less stationary, was growing rapidly. The aggregation
of people into large cities, dependent for the most
elementary necessities of life upon supplies produced
at the other ends of the earth, proceeded at a rate un-
known in any earlier epoch. Yet the economic mechan-
ism was adjusted to this complex of change without
anything like the present dislocations, and, year in,
year out, turned out what, for a substantial proportion
of the increasing population, has been regarded as the
basis of an increasing standard of real income. Accord-
ing to the calculations of Sir Josiah Stamp, the level
of real incomes in Great Britain in the years before
the war was four times as great as in the Napoleonic
period.
To say all this is not in the least to contend that the
pre-war period was immune from economic difficulties,
or that what has come since is to be regarded as
spontaneous catastrophe, having no intimate connec-
tion with anything that went before. No student of
those times is likely to be unaware of the ups and
downs of trade, the recurrent waves of business de-
pression and unemployment, which ruffle the lines of
secular development. Nor will he be blind to the
increase towards the end of the period in political
tendencies which, viewed in the light of more recent
developments, can be seen to have been fraught with
i 1914-1933 3
danger to the stability of the whole system. The Great
War itself was the product, not of accident, but of some
of these tendencies. Nevertheless, compared with what
has come since, the difficulties of those times must be
admitted as being of a minor order. During the years
for which we have records, the number of unemployed
trade-unionists in Great Britain only once rose above
10 per cent. The crises were not such as to disrupt the
unity of monetary conditions in the important financial
centres. The interventionist and restrictive tendencies
of economic policy, although no doubt calculated to
retard the increase of productivity, were never such
as seriously to threaten to reverse it. There is no need
to present the world before the war as a Utopia to
point the contrast with what has come after.
3. Into this world there came the catastrophe of
war. There is no need at this point to dwell on the in-
tellectual and cultural changes which this catastrophe
involved, although for those who are not dominated
by a purely materialist conception of history it is argu-
able that, even in this context, these were the most
important changes of all. More germane, however,
to the purpose of this survey, are certain more tangible
influences.
As an influence on economic activity, the war, and
the political changes which followed the war, must be
regarded as a vast series of shifts in the fundamental
conditions of demand and supply, to which economic
activity must be adapted. The needs of war called a
huge apparatus of mechanical equipment into being.
The resumption of peace rendered it in large part
superfluous. The fact of war involved a disruption of
the world market. The settlement, which came after,
created conditions which aggravated this disruption.
4 THE GREAT DEPRESSION en.
The struggle which was to end nationalist friction
in fact gave nationalism new scope.
As an influence on subsequent developments, these
changes have a double significance. In the first place,
they were discontinuous. They therefore involved vast
destruction of capital. Secondly, they were restrictive
of free economic activity. They therefore involved a
reduction in the productivity of the factors of pro-
duction. For four years, the capital resources of the
belligerent countries of the world were devoted to
providing offerings to Mars, which either perished in
the moment of their production or remained as useless
as the pyramids of the Pharaohs, once the occasion
for the sacrifice had ceased. The disruption of the
world market, consequent on the war and on the peace
settlement, meant a restriction of the area within
which the division of labour had scope. It meant there-
fore a limitation of the increase of wealth to which
division of labour gives rise.
Concurrently with these structural dislocations, there
came a further series of changes no less important in
the causation of post-war difficulties. At the same time
as the using up of capital and the lowering of product-
ivity were producing conditions demanding readjust-
ment on a scale hitherto unknown in economic history,
the economic system was losing its capacity for adapta-
tion. The successful prosecution of war involved, as we
have seen, a large and discontinuous alteration of the
"set" of the apparatus of production. This alteration
was carried through. But the measures which were
necessary to bring it about—the centralisation of con-
trol of industrial operations—were such as permanently
tc impair its capacity for further change. The grouping
of industrial concerns into great combinations, the
i 1914-1933 5
authoritarian fixing of wages and prices, the imposition

of the habits of collective bargaining, were no doubt
measures which would be justified by appeal to the
necessities of war. But they carried with them a
weakening of the permanent flexibility of the system,
whose effects it is difficult to over-estimate. This was a
dish of eggs not easy to unscramble.
Here, as with other contrasts between pre-war
and post-war conditions, it is important not to exag-
gerate differences. It is not contended that the pre-war
system was entirely flexible, or that the post-war
system has shown itself to be incapable of some adapta-
tion. This would be untrue. All that is argued is that
the changes introduced by way of groupings which
made for cartellisation on the one hand and a greatly
increased rigidity of the labour market on the other,
were such as to produce an important and far-reaching
impairment of what degree of flexibility there was. In
the light of well-known facts regarding the rigidity of
wages and the prices of cartellised products in the post-
war period, this does not seem to be a contention which
is open to serious question.
Beyond all this came the break-up of international
monetary unity. For forty years before the war, the
financial systems of the leading countries of the world
had been linked together by the international Gold
Standard. For a century, the Gold Standard had been
virtually effective. Trade between different national
areas took place on the basis of rates of exchange which
fluctuated only between very narrow limits. Capital
moved from one part of the world to another, if not
with the same ease with which it moved within national
areas, at least with much the same effects as regards
the volume of credit available. The prices of inter-
6 THE GREAT DEPRESSION CH.
nationally traded commodities moved together in all

the important centres. The price and cost structures of
the different financial areas maintained a relationship
which was seldom seriously out of equilibrium.
The war put an end to all this. Within a few days of
the outbreak of hostilities, in each of the belligerent
financial centres, measures had been taken which
amounted to an actual, if not to a legally acknowledged,
abandonment of the Gold Standard. Of the chief finan-
cial centres, the United States was the only one to
remain on gold. The others not only suspended the
rights of effective convertibility; they each, in greater
or lesser degree, resorted to the device of inflation as a
means of financing the war. The results were as might
have been expected. The gold supplies of the world
tended more and more to be concentrated in the vaults
of the Federal Eeserve Banks. Prices rose in the in-
flating countries in various degrees, according to the
measure of the inflation. In the markets for foreign
exchange the conditions of supply and demand re-
flected the internal depreciation. It was the first phase
of a period of international disequilibrium from which
we have not yet emerged.
4. The conclusion of peace brought no end to this
disorder. The inordinate claims of the victors, the crass
financial incapacity of the vanquished, the utter bud-
getary disorder which everywhere in the belligerent
countries was the legacy of the policies pursued during
the war, led to a further period of monetary chaos. In
the United States a brief inflationary boom was fol-
lowed by collapse, and then a fairly rapid recovery. In
Great Britain the boom and the collapse had no such
fortunate sequel: a long period of relative stagnation
followed. In continental Europe, the confusion was
i 19H-1933 7
without precedent. It was the era of the great inflations.
The rouble, the crown and the mark all suffered what
was virtually an annihilation of value. The franc and
the lira underwent serious depreciation. The results
were what was to be expected—severe curtailment of
trade, further structural dislocations, capital con-
sumption and the wiping-out of middle-class resources,
a further disruption of the basis of the international
equilibrium of prices.
5. By the middle of the 'twenties, this intense dis-
order had come to an end. One by one, budgets were
balanced and disordered currencies were restored to
some kind of stability. In the spring of 1925, Great
Britain and the British dominions returned to the
Gold Standard. By the end of the year, of the import-
ant countries, only France was still on a fluctuating
standard.
There followed a period of good trade—a period,
indeed, which in the light of more complete knowledge
of the relevant statistics can be seen to have been,
for some parts of the world, one of the biggest booms
in economic history. Trade revived, incomes rose.
Production went ahead by leaps and bounds. Inter-
national investment was resumed on a scale surpassing
even pre-war dimensions. The stock exchanges of the
more prosperous centres displayed such strength that
speculation for a rise seemed a more certain path to a
secure income than all the devices of ancient prudence.
It was a period in which the finance ministers of the
world, looking forward to years of increasing revenue,
felt no hesitation in incurring fresh obligations on the
side of expenditure. Men of the type of the late
Ivar Kreuger moved rapidly from one capital city to
another, arranging without fuss or inconvenience to
anybody, w h a t were described as "good constructive
loans"—the acolytes of t h e " n e w economics". I t was
in these days that it was said that the trade cycle had
become extinct.
Nevertheless, there were certain features of this
phase which were such as to distinguish it, if not in
kind, at any rate in degree, from other periods of ex-
panding trade. It was pre-eminently an industrial
boom. The rise in profitability was essentially a feature
of manufacture and raw material producing industry.
Throughout the period, the profitability of certain
lines of food production was relatively low. In the
United States—then as now the centre of the world
fluctuation—side by side with extreme prosperity in
the manufacturing industries, there existed severe
difficulties, and in parts even distress, among the pro-
ducers of agricultural products. All over the world the
relative decline of agriculture was giving rise to severe
political strain and desperate attempts, in the shape
of pools and restriction schemes, to evade the con-
sequences of technical progress.
Moreover, even in manufacturing industry the boom
was not universal. Important areas of manufacturing
production experienced its influence only indirectly.
Throughout the boom years in the United States, in-
dustrial activity anywhere in Great Britain could
never have been described as more than moderately
good. There were large areas in the North where this
description would have been an exaggeration. In
Central Europe, particularly in Austria, partly as a
result of the peace settlement, partly as a result of
internal policy, there was definitely discernible a tend-
ency to capital consumption. In Germany, the appal-
ling shortage of capital created by the war and the
i 1914-1933 9
post-war inflation was partly compensated by large

imports of capital. But the business situation was
never normal, and at a much earlier date than else-
where it became quite obviously perilous.
At the same time, in the financial centres of the
world there existed conditions wholly without parallel
in any earlier period of prosperity. The stabilisation
of European currencies and the fixing of new parities,
after the colossal fluctuations of the post-war years,
had been carried through on the basis of what very
often could only be described as hit-or-miss methods;
and although in some cases the miss was not very
great, in others it was considerable. In the case of
Great Britain, the parity chosen was almost certainly
too high. In France there is reason to suppose that the
error was in the opposite direction. The result was a
most peculiar state of inter-local monetary disequi-
librium. The centres which had returned too high were
continually in danger of losing gold; the centres which
had returned too low were almost embarrassed by the
gold they attracted. Now it so happened that the
centre which suffered chiefly from over-valuation was
also the chief centre of organised capital export. While
the over-valued exchanges made long-term capital
export from London a highly difficult operation, the
relatively high rates, which were necessary to keep gold
from flowing out, were especially tempting to short-
term balances. Hence, throughout the whole of this
period there existed in one of the chief financial centres
of the world a lack of balance between long- and short-
term investment which was itself conducive to dis-
equilibrium and latent with dangers of extensive
catastrophe, should anything occur to disturb the
insecure prosperity elsewhere.
6. Thus, in spite of the appearance of considerable
prosperity and a very real measure of revival of trade
and industry, the period immediately preceding the
slump was not without conditions which might justifi-
ably have given rise to very grave anxiety. Clearly,
if the forces making for prosperity were to slacken,
the ensuing depression was likely to be a depression
of more than usual severity.
They did slacken. Looking back, it is possible to dis-
cern the beginning of the depression about the end of
1928, when the How of American lending to Germany
first began to lose its pace. By the middle of 1929, the
evidences of serious weakening in that part of the
world were unmistakeable. In certain raw material
producing centres, too, there were signs of weakness
quite early in the summer.
But the main tide of American speculation continued
to flow with undiminished strength until the autumn.
As early as February the authorities of the Federal
Reserve System had become persuaded that the boom
had reached such dimensions that a crash was inevit-
able. But, in spite of private warnings, rising discount
rates, and all kinds of unofficial indications, the rise of
stock exchange values continued. Then suddenly there
came a crack. The collapse of the Hatry swindles m
London caused a sudden tightening of markets there.
The rate of interest was advanced to 6j per cent. In
New York there was a sympathetic movement. On
October 23rd the Dow-Jones index of the price of in-
dustrial shares in New York dropped about 21 points ;
during the next six days it fell about 76 points more.
Prosperity was at an end. The bottom had dropped
out of the market.
7. The depression which followed has dwarfed all
i 1914-1933 11
preceding movements of a similar nature both in

magnitude and in intensity. In 1929 in the United
States the index of security prices stood in the neigh-
bourhood of 200-210. In 1932 it had fallen to 30-40.
Commodity prices in general fell in the same period
by 30 to 40 per cent; the fall in particular commodity
markets was even more catastrophic. Production in
the chief manufacturing countries of the world shrank
by anything from 30 to 50 per cent: and the value
of world trade in 1932 was only a third of what it
was three years before. It has been calculated by the
International Labour Office that in 1933, in the world
at large, something like 30 million persons were out
of work.1 There have been many depressions in modern
economic history but it is safe to say that there has
never been anything to compare with this. 1929 to
1933 are the years of the Great Depression.
1
For more extensive statistical information see Tables 1 to 12, Statistical
Appendix.
CHAPTER II
MISCONCEPTIONS
1. WHY did these things happen?

Before proceeding to a tentative explanation, there
are certain misconceptions which demand our atten-
tion both on account of their widespread acceptation
and their possible influence on policy. Incidentally
their examination will bring to light certain matters
which have an important bearing on the explanations
eventually to be offered.
2. Perhaps the most conspicuous feature of the
statistics which we have just cited is the fall of com-
modity prices. A fall of 40 per cent in gold prices in
four years is an event without precedent. In popular
discussion, people often speak as if this were, not only
a symptom, but actually the cause of the slump and
its various attendant difficulties. The fall of prices is
the cause of the depression, they urge.
Such a view is based upon misapprehension. There
can be no doubt that when prices fall as rapidly and
as severely as they have done in this depression all
sorts of difficulties, which would not otherwise have
existed, necessarily come into being. The increasing
budgetary deficits and the growing weight of fixed
indebtedness of which so much has been heard in the
past few years, are difficulties of this kind. These diffi-
culties may rightly be described as consequences of the
12
CH. ii MISCONCEPTIONS 13
fall of prices. But it does not in the least follow that

the fall of prices is, in any sense, a prime cause of the
depression. Indeed, if we reflect upon the role played
by prices in the markets in which prices arise, such a
conclusion must at once be seen to be fallacious. In the
market, prices are the resultant of the forces under-
lying, on the one hand, commodity supply, and on the
other, money demand. A fall of prices does not occur
spontaneously. It occurs only as a result of changes
in one or other of these factors. No doubt when it
occurs, it may bring with it the further complications
we have noticed. But its occurrence is not the cause—
it is the effect—of the fundamental fluctuation. In the
search for ultimate causes it constitutes the problem,
not the solution.
3. It follows, therefore, that any explanation of the
slump which is to escape the charge of complete super-
ficiality must go behind prices to the causes of which
prices are the resultant. That is to say, it must look
either to commodity supply or to demand expressed
in terms of money.
It is in this sense, if we are to do justice to them at
all, that we must interpret those theories which explain
the slump in terms of over-production. So long as there
remain anywhere wants which are unsatisfied, it is
quite clear that there cannot be over-production in
the sense of a real superfluity of commodities. No doubt,
as against those who wish to cure depression by all-
round restriction, it is important to reiterate this
homely truth. But the over-production which is in-
voked in popular explanations of the depression is not
over-production in this sense. It is merely over-pro-
duction in the sense that, in wide groups of important
markets, at the price prevailing, the supply cannot be
sold at a profit. Against appeal to this unquestion-
able fact it is absurd to brandish the platitude that
even in the best of times many wants are left un-
satisfied.
Now there can be no doubt that in the present de-
pression, and indeed in every depression of which we
have knowledge, over-production in this sense has been
present. The fall in profitability in many lines of in-
dustry due to changed relations, or anticipations of
changed relations, between supply and demand is one
of the most conspicuous features of the beginning of
all downward fluctuations of this nature. It is a move-
ment which often shows itself in the index of security
prices long before commodity prices have been affected.
The appeal to over-production of this sort therefore
has a solid basis of fact.
But here, as with the appeal to the fall in commodity
prices, the alleged explanation proves to be nothing
but another way of putting the fundamental problem.
Over-production in this sense exists. But why does it
exist? Why is it that supply exceeds demand in so
many different markets?
I t is useful to put the question thus, for in this way
the real nature of the problem—the simultaneity of
over-production in many lines of industry—is especially
emphasised. Over-production in one line of industry
only is not likely to lead to general depression. If the
industry is one from which producers cannot shift,
consumers get the larger supply at cheaper prices and
the producers have to put up with lower incomes. If
migration into other lines of industry is possible, then
supply is restricted by a redistribution of labour and
capital. In a competitive system, the fact that, in one
line of industry, costs are above prices, definitely im-
ii MISCONCEPTIONS 15
plies that the different factors, whose prices go to make
up cost here, would produce elsewhere a more valuable
product. In either case, the disturbances involved are
not of the sort which is necessarily conducive to
general disequilibrium.
It is sometimes thought that an increase of produc-
tion which leads to lower prices and lower incomes in
a particular branch of industry is detrimental to pro-
duction elsewhere, in that it involves a diminution in
the demand for the products of other industries. An
increase of agricultural production, it is held, leads to
a fall in agricultural prices, and this, in turn, implies
a diminution in demand for the products of manu-
facturing industry—a diminution of purchasing power.
Such a view undoubtedly underlies the agrarian
policy at present being pursued in the United States.
It is sometimes- said that the growing cheapness of
agricultural products is detrimental to the prosperity
of manufacturing production in Great Britain.
This belief is misleading. Let us suppose that, owing
to technical progress, the supply of wheat increases.
Let us suppose further that, owing to the relatively
inelastic nature of the demand for wheat, the price of
wheat falls more than proportionately, and the pro-
ducers of wheat have therefore lower incomes. Does
this mean that that much purchasing power will have
disappeared from the world? Not at all. It is true that
the wheat producers will have less to spend. But the
consumers, who now get more wheat for a smaller out-
lay, will have more money left over. It may very well
be that they will not spend this increase on exactly the
same things that the wheat producers would have pur-
chased. But they will be in a position to buy more of
something; and this will render any reshuffling of the
labour force which the changed direction of demand
makes necessary, a comparatively easy process.
But is it not possible that the money thus trans-
ferred may not be spent at all—that the consumers of
wheat, having obtained their wheat for less, hoard the
difference rather than spend it? In such a case, no
doubt, there would be a net diminution of spending
and the over-production in one industry would have
injurious effects, via the hoarding process, on others.
But is such a state of affairs likely, if the initial over-
production takes place in only one industry? Why
should consumers hoard? Why should they not spend
more on something else? The possibility of hoarding
of this sort must not be ruled out altogether. But so
long as the initial increase in production is confined to
one industry it seems, prima facie, improbable. Only
if there is a fall of prices due to a simultaneous over-
production in many lines of industry does such a
tendency seem at all probable.
But this brings us back to the real problem. Why do
such simultaneous changes take place? Why is there
over-production in many lines of industry?
4. Considerations of this sort have led many to the
belief that the ultimate cause of this, and indeed of all
other depressions, is to be looked for, not on the side of
commodity supply, but rather on the side of money.
Money is the one thing common to almost all eco-
nomic activity in the modern world. Is it not probable
that disturbances affecting many lines of industry at
once will be found to have monetary causes?
The suggestion is plausible and, as we shall eventu-
ally see, it is probable that it contains an important
core of truth. But the kinds of monetary explanation
are various and need separate examination.
IT MISCONCEPTIONS 17
Perhaps the most widely held view of this sort is
that which attributes the slump to deflation. A fall of
prices so great as the fall we have recently witnessed
cannot be wholly due to increased technical pro-
ductivity. Clearly there must bf* a strong element of
monetary causation involved. The slump, therefore, is
due to deflation. Such is the most popular monetary
explanation of our present difficulties. It is not difficult
to see what implications are held to follow as regards
the policy appropriate to recovery.
Unfortunately, there seems to be no reason to regard
this explanation as sufficient. If we take deflation to
mean a deliberate curtailment of the supply of money,
there seems to be no evidence of its existence on a
large scale either before or since the slump commenced.
Before the slump, if we take the world as a whole, all
the evidence shows that the supply of money in the
widest sense was expanding very rapidly. Since the
slump, Central Banks and Governments have vied
with each other in promoting policies calculated to
bring about easy money conditions. Save perhaps in
Germany, where the exigencies of the transfer prob-
lem compelled a certain stringency of credit, there is
no evidence of deflation, in the sense of a deliberate
restriction of credit. The following chart,1 which shows
the effects of the "open market" policy of the Federal
Reserve System and the Bank of England, should be
a sufficient refutation of the charge that the Central
Banks of the world have deliberately brought about
deflation.
If, however, we take deflation to mean, not merely a
deliberate curtailment by Central Banks of the supply
1
For the statistics upon which it is based, see Tables 13 and 14 of the
Appendix.
C
of money, but a slowing up of the frequency with

which money is used by different members of the com-
$mns.
_______ Qd nh of EnQland Deposits
2,300-
3
2.OOO-
Ace eptances and Securities of Federal Reserue Banl
AJ 21O
1,700- -180
i
/ '
1.4OO- i -150
i
i
1,100- -120
8OO-
V
V -00
5OO- -6O
\ /
200- ^—y 3O
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
"OPEN MARKET" POLICY
munity, then there can be no possible question of its

existence in the years since the slump. The figures of
bank debits divided by bank deposits give a rough
idea of the average rapidity with which money is
changing hands. The following chart shows the extra-
-3-2
2-8- -2-a
2-4- -2-4
2-0- -20
1-6- -I-a
1.2- •1-2
1929 1930 1931 1932 v 1933

-•8
UNITED STATES—VELOCITY OF CIRCULATION OF BANK DEPOSITS
ordinary diminution which has taken place in the

United States since the slump began.1
1
See Statistical Appendix, Table 15.
There can thus be no denying the existence of de-

flation in this sense in this period. But here, as in the
case of all the theories we have so far examined, the
diagnosis reveals, not a solution, but a problem. Why-
was there deflation in this sense? Why did people tend
to leave money on idle deposit, rather than invest it
in active business? Surely we cannot regard such a
phenomenon as a spontaneous evil. Under capitalism
there are permanent influences tending in the opposite
direction. Under capitalism he who hoards is punished
—punished by the loss of interest. If therefore people
incur this punishment we are entitled to assume that
something has gone wrong—that some other disturb-
ance is the prior cause of the depression. To appeal to
deflation as an ultimate explanation is only one degree
less superficial than to appeal to the mere fact of the
fall in prices. A monetary explanation which is to
command respect must show why deflation takes place
at all.
5. It is sometimes thought that the coming of de-
pression is due to a shortage of gold. In order that busi-
ness may remain stable it is said it is necessary that
prices should not fall. In order that prices should not
fall it is necessary that the gold supply should increase
so as to keep pace with advancing productivity. The
failure of prices to remain stable is therefore due to a
deficiency of gold.
It is clear that a theory of this sort cannot be dis-
missed as a mere restatement of the problem. If it were
true that it is necessary for prices to remain stable for
business to continue to be profitable; if it were true
that for prices to remain stable it is necessary for the
gold supply to increase by a certain percentage every
year; if it were true that during the period leading up to
the depression the gold supply had failed to conform
to these requirements, then clearly here would be a
genuinely causal explanation of our troubles. Un-
fortunately none of these things seem to be true. It is
not difficult to demonstrate this.
Let us take first the proposition that for business
conditions to be profitable it is necessary for the price-
level to be stationary. It is often thought that this
view is generally accepted by economists—that it is
only questioned by a tiny handful of "sadistic de-
flationists". In fact this is the reverse of the truth.
Whatever their differences on other aspects of mone-
tary theory, the majority of economists of repute in
recent times have held quite definitely the view that
there is nothing detrimental to business stability in a
price-level falling with increased productivity. Mar-
shall, Edgeworth, Taussig, Hawtrey, Robertson, Pigou,
to mention only the names of English-speaking econo-
mists, have all been of this opinion.
The reason is very simple. Technical progress—the
main cause of an increase in the volume of produc-
tion—is essentially a cost-reducing process. Now it
is clear that there is nothing inimical to the profit-
ability of particular undertakings if the prices of the
things they produce fall pari passu with their cost.
Why should the mere amalgamation of particular
prices into a statistical average in any way affect the
position?
I t is sometimes thought that this argument ignores
the existence of fixed interest charges and similar
obligations. But this is a misapprehension. The argu-
ment is that, if costs fall, prices can fall too, without
loss of profitability: it is beside the point to say that
some costs do not fall. So far as Government debt is
MISCONCEPTIONS 21
concerned, it is true that in such circumstances the
"real value" of each pound's worth of debt rises. But
it is not true that the "real burden" rises. By hypo-
thesis the fall in prices is due to increased productivity.
There is a larger product out of which to pay the larger
interest. All that happens is that rentiers share in the
increase of productivity. This may or may not be
thought to be ethically desirable. But it imposes no
mechanical friction on the smooth working of the
economic system. The real burden of debt increases in
the way suggested only when the price fall is due, not
to increased productivity, but to absolute deflation.
Hence there is no foundation for the view that the gold
supply must "keep pace" with increased productivity;
so long as it "keeps pace" with the increase of popula-
tion there is no serious ground for fearing a gold
shortage.
But let us put these refined considerations aside and
concentrate on the facts of the situation we are ex-
amining. Even if it were true that, for business to be
stable, the gold supply must keep pace with produc-
tivity, it would still be untrue that the gold supply
actually failed to conform to these requirements in the
period under discussion. The rate of increase which is
commonly held to be desirable is from 2\ to 3 per
cent per annum. There are grave reasons for suspect-
ing the whole basis of the statistical operation by
which these results are reached. But for the sake of
argument let us accept them. The following table *
shows the state of the world's monetary stocks of gold
for the years 1925-30:
1
See Annex to the Final Report of the Gold Delegation of the League of
Nations. The Table was originally published in the Statistical Yearbook of
the League of Nations, 1931-32 (Geneva, 1932).
WORLD'S MONETARY GOLD STOCKS
End of $ millions. End of $ millions

1925 . . 10,244 1928 . . 10,953
1926 . . 10,496 1929 . . 11,201
1927 . . 10,602 1930 . . 11,715
It will be seen that the monetary gold reserves of the

world as a whole increased at a rate of between 2\ and
3 per cent per annum. Even if the theory on which the
explanation of the slump in terms of absolute gold
shortage is based were correct, it would be inapplicable
because it fails to fit the facts. The assertion of a gold
shortage is unfounded.
6. Confronted with arguments of this sort, those who
are disposed to explain the present difficulties in terms
of the vagaries of gold supply usually fall back on
another kind of argument. They appeal, not to
shortage, but to maldistribution of the precious metal.
They admit that the gold supply as a whole has been
sufficient. But they urge that its distribution has been
such as to prevent its effective use. There has been too
much gold in France and America they say; too little
in the rest of the world. For this the banking authorities
in the two countries first named are to blame. They
have not worked the Gold Standard according to the
"rules of the game". They have sterilised their enor-
mous gold reserves. For a time the rest of the world
was able to progress in spite of this policy, but eventu-
ally the pressure became too great and depression set
in. A highly sensational mythology has been em-
broidered around this argument.
It is important to examine this carefully. It is an
argument which has received extraordinarily wide
acceptance in Great Britain. It has influenced our
views regarding the economic policy of the future. It
has caused much international misunderstanding. It
has led to much self-righteous denunciation of our
neighbours. Yet in fact it is almost completely
false.
Let us first be clear about the problem at issue. There
can be no doubt that, at the time of the break-up of
the International Gold Standard, the gold supplies of
the world were distributed in a highly abnormal man-
ner. At the end of June 1931 over 60 per cent of the
central gold reserves of the world (apart from the
U.S.S.R.) were in two countries: the United States of
America and France. There can be no doubt, moreover,
that from the time of the break in prosperity in the
autumn of 1929, the gold which flowed into these
countries did not produce a commensurate expansion of
credit. But this is no proof that the slump was the
consequence of this movement. On the contrary, there
is every reason to suppose that this movement was the
consequence of the slump. It is a well-known pheno-
menon of the trade cycle that, from the turn of trade
onwards, the creditor countries tend to receive interest
on the money they have lent in the boom in gold rather
than in goods. It is well known, too, that during times
of depression a reinforcement of the gold reserves of a
central bank does not necessarily immediately produce
a commensurate increase of borrowing. It is clear that
the authorities of the Federal Reserve Bank and the
Bank of France did nothing to prevent their increased
reserves becoming effective. It is not really sensible,
therefore, to attribute what happened after 1929 to
their policy; the causes of the gold flows after 1929 are
obvious, and though it may rightly be argued that they
were aggravated by tariff policies adopted after that
date,1 it is to lose all sense of proportion to regard them

as the causes rather than as the consequences of the
slump. The real problem relates to what happened be-
fore, not after, the depression became intense. Did the
French and American authorities transgress the rules of
the Gold Standard game in the period before that date?
What are "the rules of the Gold Standard game"?
Broadly speaking they are simply these: that centres
receiving gold should expand credit, and centres losing
gold should contract credit. In detail, they require that
the expansions and contractions should more or less
counterbalance each other so that payments between
national areas should be on the same footing as pay-
ments within national areas; i.e. should involve no net
expansion or contraction of the money supply in the
world as a whole. When the gold supply of the world
as a whole is increasing, the situation is more com-
plicated as regards the absolute magnitude of the
requirements of expansion and contraction; but the
broad principle remains the same as regards flows
from one country to another. Inter-local transfers, as
such, should involve no net expansion or contraction.
It follows, therefore, that we can judge the validity of
the theory we are discussing by examination of the bank-
ing statistics of the countries concerned. Were gold
imports sterilised or not? That is the question at issue.
Let us first take the United States of America. The
following chart shows the movements of gold reserves
and effective bank credit in the United States during
the period under discussion:2
1
It is important to remember that the notorious Hawley Smoot Tariff
only became operative in 1930. There were no important alterations in U.S.
tariff policy between 1922 and that date.
2
For the figures on which the chart is based see Statistical Appendix,
Tables 16 and 17.
MISCONCEPTIONS 25
Gold Reserves
Loans, Discounts and Investments
1926 1927 1928 1929 1930
FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS
Is this a picture of gold sterilisation? Surely not. It is a

picture rather (or part of a picture) of a considerable
expansion of credit. (How great this expansion was we
shall examine further in the next chapter.) Far from
indicating any infringement of the rules of the Gold
Standard game in the sense of inadequate expansion,
it indicates, if anything, an infringement in the oppo-
site direction. From the spring of 1927 until late in
1928—the period which is regarded by many as decisive
for the genesis of the collapse which followed—there
was taking place in the United States an expansion
of credit on a declining gold basis. The Americans are
surely not altogether to be blamed when they show
some impatience at our interpretation of their policy!
The French position is a little more complex. There
is some reason to suppose that the parity at which
the Gold Standard was restored in France was, if any-
thing, on the low side. To the extent that this is true
it is correct to argue that more gold must have flowed
in that direction than would otherwise have been the
case. But it does not seem correct to argue that, once
there, the gold was deliberately sterilised. The follow-
ing chart shows the movement of the gold reserves

plus foreign assets of the Bank of France and the
notes in circulation against it: 1
64.00O- 64.OOO
60,000- •6O.OOO
56,000 56,000
1928 1929 1930
BANK OF FRANCE—RESERVES AND NOTES
There is no obvious "sterilisation" here. As gold flows

in or as foreign assets are acquired, so the note issue
is enlarged. Nor is there evidence of sterilisation in the
accounts of the commercial banks. Owing to an exten-
sion of demand for cash the volume of deposits actually
sinks during this period, but it sinks proportionately-
less than the cash reserve. The reserve as a percentage
of deposits therefore actually diminishes. The table 2 on
the following page shows its movements.
Where this cash went to is a difficult question to de-
termine. There is reason to suppose that some was im-
mobilised in the savings banks. But that much went
into active circulation seems to be sufficiently shown
by the index of cost of living during that period, which
1
2
See Statistical Appendix, Table 18.
See Balogh, "The Import of Gold into France", Economic Journal, 1930,
p. 447. (Extracted from Jean Loriot, "Les Banques", Revue d? Economic
Politique, 1930, p. 542.) The whole article is a mine of illuminating information
on this difficult question.
MISCONCEPTIONS 27
RESERVES OF THE CREDIT BANKS AS A PERCENTAGE
OF DEPOSITS
1927. 1928. 1929.
January- 18 20 15
March 27 18 14
June 40 18 14
September 31 16 14
December . 23 18 14
rose from 498 in the last quarter of 1927 to 565 in the

last quarter of 1929.1
There seems no reason, therefore, to accuse either the
American or French authorities of deliberate sterilisa-
tion of gold during the period under discussion. In both
countries there was expansion as gold flowed in. But
it may well be asked: Was the expansion sufficient,
having regard to what was going on elsewhere? To
answer this it is necessary to look at the British
statistics.
If we were to believe what is commonly said about
British experience during this period we should expect
to find a substantial contraction. Moreover if we have
regard to the requirements of Gold Standard theory
we should entertain similar expectations. For there
can be no doubt that during this period Great Britain
was out of international equilibrium. Even when we
did not actually lose gold we only retained it by all
sorts of devices—including, so it is said, occasional
appeals ad misericordiam to French bankers not to
withdraw their balances. The sterling exchange tended
continuously to be in the neighbourhood of the gold
export point during the greater part of the period we
1
Paris Commission on Cost of Living.
are discussing. But the figures do not bear out these

expectations. The following chart 1 shows the move-
ments of the gold reserve of the Bank of England and
the deposits of the London Clearing Banks from 1925
to 1929:
Bank of England- Gold Reserves

London Clearing Banks-Deposits
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929
UNITED KINGDOM
Clearly there is no evidence here of deflation. Deposits

actually increased from a yearly average of £1623-2
millions in- 1925 to £1762-5 millions in 1929. There
may have been some offset to this in an increase in
the proportion of time deposits to current accounts.
But of deflation, in any sense of that much abused
word, there can be no question.
But this puts a new complexion on the French and
American figures. So long as Great Britain, the centre
tending to lose gold, was not contracting, the other
centres were under no obligation, according to "the
rules of the Gold Standard game", to expand. Indeed,
in so far as they did so, they were risking a net in-
flation. As we have seen, in America this risk was taken
—with what results we shall see later. In France, as
1
See Tables 19 and 20, Statistical Appendix, and the chart in Chapter
V. p. 84.
was only natural in a country which had just emerged
from the horrors of a big inflation, the policy was much
more cautious. But it is clear that if "the rules of the
Gold Standard game" were infringed during these
years it was not in France or America.
Moreover—and this is a point which even the
apologists of France and America have often over-
looked—while Great Britain remained out of equi-
librium, it is difficult to see how, in the absence of a
complete reversal of existing habits of foreign lending
in the case of France, and a drastic change in tariff
policy in the case of America, the monetary authorities
of these two countries could have avoided receiving
gold, save by carrying out a degree of inflation which
all the experience of post-war years suggested to be
fraught with disaster. A country which is out of in-
ternational equilibrium—as Great Britain was during
this period—acts, as it were, as a watershed of the
precious metal. The fact that it is out of equilibrium
is the cause of a gold flow to other centres. What
maldistribution there was in these years, therefore, is
to be ascribed, not to gold sterilisation on the part of
America and France—this thesis does not stand exam-
ination—but to the state of continued disequilibrium
with the rest of the world which was the fate of Great
Britain. The theory that the maldistribution of gold
in the period 1925 to 1929 caused deflation therefore
falls to the ground. In so far as there was maladjust-
ment it caused, not deflation, but inflation. This leads
to the thesis which is the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER III
THE GENESIS OF THE DEPRESSION
1. So far, the various explanations of the depression

which we have examined have all proved to be de-
fective; some because they were not explanations at
all but merely restatements of the problem; some be-
cause the assumptions on which they rested were in
obvious conflict with fact. Where then are we to turn?
2. Let us go back a little to a point which was raised
in the last chapter when we were discussing over-
production. We saw there that one way of describing
the slump was to depict it as a simultaneous break-
down of the profitability of many different lines of
industry. It is well known, in fact, that this breakdown
is most serious in the industries producing what are
known as producers' goods; that is to say, the so-called
constructional industries and the industries produc-
ing raw materials.1 In these industries the depression
shows itself as a condition of over-production, a condi-
tion in which costs are higher than prices, a condition
in which the supply coming forward is not taken up at
profitable prices, a condition in which the businesses
engaged in these lines of industry find that their
earlier expectations are not justified by the state of the
market, a condition in which earlier errors of anticipa-
tion are revealed.
1
See Tables 8 and 9, Statistical Appendix, for evidence on this point.
30
CH. m THE GENESIS OF THE DEPRESSION 31
One way of putting our problem, therefore, is to ask
why the errors thus revealed were originally com-
mitted, why they occurred in this peculiar form. It is
quite clear that the leaders of business are at no time
equipped with perfect foresight. We should always
expect some mistakes to be made somewhere. But in
the absence of special information we should expect
a random distribution. We should not expect this
peculiar cluster of errors. Why should the leaders of
business in the various industries producing producers'
goods make errors of judgement at the same time and
in the same direction?
Now it seems probable, as was hinted in the last
chapter, that a dislocation which is common to many
industries, if it does not actually originate on the side
of money, will at least be transmitted and enlarged
though the monetary medium. This provides a clue
of a kind to the solution of our problem. But it does
not, in itself, explain the peculiar distribution of error.
Money is spent on everything. Why do not fluctuations
in the supply of or the demand for money affect all
lines of production equally? Are there any reasons for
supposing that monetary changes will bring about the
kind of error we are contemplating?
3. Let us first see if such a thing is theoretically
conceivable. If this proves to be the case, we can then
proceed to discover whether the assumptions on which
our theory is based have a counterpart in the reality
of the fluctuation we are examining.
Our problem relates to demand expressed in terms
of money. It is necessary, therefore, to be quite clear
wherein money demand consists.
If we take a cross-section of the industrial system
at any moment of time, the activities of supply there
discernible fall quite naturally into two groups. On
the one hand we have the supply of goods and ser-
vices ready for immediate consumption—bread, fuel,
domestic service, etc. On the other hand we have the
supply of things which directly or indirectly contribute
chiefly to the consumption of the future. In this group
fall raw materials, semi-manufactures, machines, fac-
tories, and all those durable consumption-goods like
houses whose consumptive uses stretch out over long
periods ahead. This division corresponds more or less
to the familiar statistical division between consumers'
goods and producers' goods save that with the pro-
ducers' goods we must here include durable consump-
tion-goods such as houses. In conception, this distinction
between production for present and future consump-
tion is quite clear and definite. In practice we have to
be content with rough classification. A suit of clothes
is a durable consumption-good. But we usually class it
with consumption-goods. If we like, we may make a
distinction between the supply of income-goods and
the supply of capital-goods, remembering t h a t the
use of a house for which rent is paid will be an income-
good and the house itself considered as an object of
ownership will be a capital-good.
Corresponding to these activities of supply there
will be streams of money demand. On the one hand,
there will be streams of money being spent on goods
for immediate consumption. On the other hand, busi-
ness men and others will be spending money on goods
and services whose fruits will only be available in the
future. The housewife will be spending money on
bread, fuel, etc. The baker will be spending money on
the labour he employs to make bread, on replenishing
his stocks of flour, perhaps on repairing his oven, and
in THE GENESIS OF THE DEPRESSION 33
so on and so forth. The distinction here is roughly the
same as the distinction between expenditure out of
income and capital expenditure. The sums of money
spent by consumers, in normal times at any rate, will
be part or the whole of their money-incomes, moneys
which have accrued to them as a result of the labour
which they do as producers or the property which, in
one way or another, they lend out. The business men
will be using their capital—money released by the sale
of stock or new funds borrowed in one way or another
from the capital market. Corresponding to our dis-
tinction relating to supply we may distinguish between
the demand for income-goods and the demand for
capital-goods.
The minute circumstances determining expenditure
on income-goods need not concern us here. But the
direction of capital expenditure deserves a little
further attention. As we have seen, at any moment of
time business men must be conceived as spending
money on particular objects—re-investing capital
which has been freed by previous sales, or investing
new sums which they have saved themselves or bor-
rowed from the capital market. What determines the
direction of their expenditure? In the capitalist
system, within the limits prescribed by law, free capital
can be spent on anything. A business man who has
capital free may re-invest it in his business, doing the
same sort of thing he has done before. Or he may put it
elsewhere. What in fact are the considerations govern-
ing the direction of his expenditure?
Clearly in particular instances there may be all sorts
of non-pecuniary considerations. But, speaking broadly,
it is not misleading to say that the main considerations
are anticipations of profit. Money goes where, taking
everything into account, the profits are expected to be
highest. The business man considers costs on the one
side and prices on the other, and tries to put his money
where the margin of profit is greatest. If therefore the
return on capital in different lines of industry is not
equal (and it never actually becomes equal) there is a
tendency for capital to shift from those branches and
methods of production where it is relatively lower to
those where it is relatively higher. The rate of return
on capital is, as it were, the governor of the system.
One further point before we utilise these elementary
notions in examining the effects of monetary changes.
It should be clear that at any moment there must exist
possibilities of production which might be utilised if
the profitability of other lines of industry were not so
high. When the rate of interest drops from 4 to 3 per
cent, a whole range of enterprises, which were not
worth while when 4 per cent was the rule, now become
attractive. Factories can be built, machines con-
structed, transport facilities extended, housing pro-
vided, which, when the higher rate prevailed, were out
of the question. The owners of free capital would not
undertake these things themselves if a higher return
could be obtained elsewhere. They could not profitably
have been undertaken on borrowed money, since the
cost of borrowing was too high. The anticipated rate of
return on capital, therefore, performs the double func-
tion of guiding the direction of existing investment and
confining it to enterprise yielding a return above a
certain margin.
4. So far we have supposed that money spent at any
moment, either by business men or consumers, is
money which has been released either by sales of
stock, the rendering of services, or the hiring out of
m THE GENESIS OF THE DEPRESSION 35
property. We have assumed the total supply of cur-
rency and credit to be constant. We have tacitly ex-
cluded the possibility of an augmentation of money
demand either by way of an increase of currency, or
by an increase in the rate at which currency and credit
are used. We must now examine what happens if this
occurs. We must examine the effects on production of
monetary changes.
Let us suppose, for the sake of simplicity, an in-
crease in the supply of money.
Now it is very important, from our point of view,
to be clear how this increase actually comes about.
Suppose that by a governmental decree all money
holdings were to be doubled; that is to say, suppose
that all balances at the banks were multiplied by two
and all holders of cash were entitled to treat each note
and coin in their possession as double its previous face
value. In such circumstances, in a free economy with
fairly full employment, there is no reason to suppose
that great disturbances would follow. The competition
of buyers would lead to the fairly quick marking up
of all prices to something like double their original
level. Some distributive changes there would be as a
result of the existence of long-term contracts. Rentiers
would continue at the old level of income. Profit-
makers and possibly wage-earners would benefit corre-
spondingly. These distributive changes would possibly
lead to shifts in demand for particular commodities.
But there seems no reason to expect that a general
oscillation of any importance would be generated.
But, in the real world, new money is not made avail-
able in this way. In normal times, expansion and con-
traction of the money supply comes, not via the print-
ing press and government decree, but via an expansion
of credit through the banks. The rate of discount of
the Central Bank is the main regulator of money
supply. This involves a mode of diffusion of new money
radically different from the case we have just exam-
ined—a mode of diffusion which m a y have important
effects on t h e nature and direction of production. Let
us see how this happens.
L e t us suppose t h a t , for reasons which for the mo-
m e n t we will leave uninvestigated, t h e Central Banks
of the world make their rates of discount lower t h a n
would be justified by the volume of voluntary saving
coming into the system. (We shall return later on to
a discussion of the possible reasons for such a policy.)
W h a t are likely to be the effects on production?
Let us ignore, for the time being, the rather intricate
mechanism b y which the initial change will transmit
itself through the capital market. The fundamental
fact on which we m u s t concentrate our attention is
t h a t borrowing is cheaper. The structure of interest
rates has fallen. This means t h a t the profitability of
all forms of production which involve making things
which only yield services a t a later date, or over a long
period of time, is increased. Consider the position of
a speculative builder when the rate at which he
borrows falls b y one per cent, say from 6 per cent to 5.
Suppose he has been paying £1000 for a certain collec-
tion of materials. Interest on t h a t at 6 per cent is £60.
When the rate falls to 5 per cent and the price of exist-
ing house property rises accordingly, he will be making
an increased profit until the price rises to something
a little less t h a n £1200. Clearly it will pay to borrow
more.
We can perhaps see this even more clearly if we use
t h e language of the real-estate market. A fall in the rate
of interest implies an increase in the number of years'
income which it is worth while to pay for the possession
of land outright. When the rate of interest is 5 per cent
the corresponding number of years' purchase is 20.
When it is 4 per cent it is 25. Now this applies not
merely to land and houses but to all kinds of capital
instruments. The longer-lived the capital instrument,
or the greater its distance from consumption, the more
its value is affected by the change in the rate of inter-
est. The shorter-lived it is, or the less its distance from
consumption, the less is it affected. The value of flour
in the baker's shop is hardly affected at all by a cheap-
ening of the cost of borrowing. The value of mines,
forests, houses and heavy factory equipment is enor-
mously affected.
It follows, therefore, that the bulk of the new
borrowing will be undertaken by those who propose to
engage in enterprises of this nature. The new money
will flow to those parts of the economic system most
affected by the rate of interest. There will be an in-
creased demand for what we have called capital-goods.
There will be a boom in the constructional industries
and the industries producing raw materials. Pro-
ducers in these industries, on the strength of the new
demands, will be able to bid away from other in-
dustries factors of production common to both. The
new labour supply will go into these industries rather
than elsewhere. Raw materials, such as coal, pig iron
and timber, will tend to be used in greater proportions
in these parts of the economic system. The production
of "producers' goods" and durable consumption-
goods, such as houses, will increase.
So far, the phenomena we have described are almost
exactly similar to the phenomena we should expect to
accompany a fall in the rate of interest which was due

to an increase in voluntary saving. But there is this
very important difference. An increase in voluntary
saving which is made effective in the investment
market, means a spontaneous change in the proportion
of money spent on income-goods and capital-goods—
a change in favour of the latter. It is of the essence of
saving that it involves a proportionate slackening of
expenditure on present consumption, and a proportion-
ate increase of expenditure on making things which will
only be consumable in the future. But the change we
have been describing involves a change in the amount
spent on capital-goods without any diminution, on the
part of the recipients of income, of expenditure on
consumption-goods. The business men who have
borrowed the new money from the banks compete
with the demands which come from those whose
money has been secured by the sale of stocks, the per-
formance of work or the hiring out of their property.
But these sums of new money which come from the
banks do not remain at the stage of demand for raw
materials and the products of the constructional
industries. Gradually, as they filter through the
economic system, they become ultimate income. Now
there is nothing which justifies us in assuming that the
recipients of income will necessarily increase the pro-
portion of their incomes that they save. It follows,
therefore, that as the new money becomes income we
must expect a strengthening of the demand, not for
capital-goods, but for income-goods. The old propor-
tion between demand for income-goods and demand
for capital-goods tends to be re-established.
But what does this mean in terms of the relative
profitability of different lines of industry? Surely that
the producers making for immediate consumption will
now be in a stronger position to bid against the pro-
ducers of capital-goods for the factors of production
which they use in common and for new loans from the
banks. And what does this mean? A tendency to a rise
in costs and a hardening of market rates of interest.
Wages rise. Interest rates in the short-loan market
rise still more. But this means that the anticipations
on which the producers of capital-goods planned their
extensions of production are frustrated. What do they
do? Probably they try to obtain new credits at the
banks. For a time this may be possible. The initial
prospects of profitability will in all probability have
tempted both banks and individuals to reduce their
margin of liquidity. But eventually the rise in costs
and in the rate of interest becomes too great. The error
of the initial anticipations becomes revealed. Invest-
ment in the lines of industry most affected by the rate
of interest is seen to be unprofitable. The supply of
capital-goods coming forward encounters a slackening
demand. There ensues depression in the constructional
industries and the industries producing raw materials.
5. So much by way of bare essential outline of the
manner in which an inflationary extension of credit
may generate collective error on the part of the pro-
ducers of capital-goods. It is not difficult to fill in
sufficient detail as regards the actual movement of the
capital markets to give the picture a much more
familiar appearance.
Let us start, as before, from a state of affairs in which
the rate of discount of the Central Banks has moved
downwards. We may assume that the Central Banks
are in a position to make this rate effective either in
virtue of the actual market situation or of "manage-
m e n t " in the shape of purchases of securities in the
open market. What happens as a result of this move-
ment?
I t is probable that the effect will at first be confined
to the short-loan market. Bill rates and call-loan rates
will be low. There will be a condition of ease and
liquidity in the inner circle of financial institutions.
If such a state of affairs continues for long, however,
it will begin to spread to the long-term market. I t will
be profitable to borrow from the banks to hold long-
dated securities. There will be an upward movement in
the market for bonds and debentures. There is no need
to suppose that all this is financed by new credit. As
the upward movement proceeds, people who have had
money lying idle in the banks will be drawn into the
movement. The existing supply of money will com-
mence to circulate more rapidly.
It is not possible for a movement of this sort to pro-
ceed very far before it begins to affect other branches
of the market. The fall in the yield of bonds and
debentures, which is the obverse of the rise in their
value, will lead the more adventurous spirits in the
market to begin to look elsewhere for a higher return
on their investment. The market in common stocks will
rise. I t will not be long before a stock exchange boom
is in progress. If it is a country where development is
expected, there will be extensive speculation too in real
estate.
But a boom of this sort is not a thing which can be
confined in its effects to the money market. The idea
that a boom on the Stock Exchange keeps money from
industry is of course the exact reverse of the truth. The
rise in security prices makes it easier for existing under-
takings to secure overdrafts from the banks. At the
same time it is a direct incentive to the flotation of new-
issues. If the centre is financially important, part of this
will probably take the form of foreign lending.
All this will be reflected in the various commodity
markets. As the money raised in these different ways is
spent, it will tend to drive up (or to prevent from falling)
the prices of raw materials. The heavy industries will
begin to make larger profits. This in turn will react on
the market for securities. Prices will be marked up to
reflect the higher expectations of profit. More money
will be borrowed from the banks to finance speculative
operations. The rapidity with which deposits are used
will increase still further. The yield of gilt-edged
securities will begin to rise. The opportunity for
speculative gain will be such that short-loan rates will
be driven above long. By this time the banks will have
become alarmed and will be making various attempts
to put the brake on. For some time, however, the wave
of optimism may carry the boom along.
But it cannot go on. As it proceeds, the technical
strain on the credit structure becomes greater and
greater. At the same time, the rise in wage rates, re-
inforced probably by the expenditure of speculative
gains for consumptive purposes, diminishes the pros-
pects of profitability of the industries producing capital-
goods, both by raising their costs and by stimulating
the competition of the consumption-good industries,
thus raising the rate at which they can borrow. Usually
it is some accident which is actually responsible for a
reversal of the process—a conspicuous business failure,
the rumour of a bad crop, or something fortuitous of
that kind. But the end is certain. Once costs have begun
to rise it would require a continuous increase in the
rate of increase of credit to prevent the thing coming
to disaster. But that itself, as we have seen in the great

post-war inflations, would eventually generate panic.
Sooner or later the initial errors are discovered. And
then starts a reverse rush for liquidity. The Stock
Exchange collapses. There is a stoppage of new issues.
Production in the industries producing capital-goods
slows down. The boom is at an end.
6. Finally, one more word about the origin of such
movements. So far, for the sake of expository con-
venience, we have assumed that the expansion of
credit was directly initiated by the banks. This is not
unlikely. Indeed, as we shall see, there is strong reason
to suppose that such was the origin of at least one
important phase of the fluctuation we are discussing.
But it is not at all necessary. The downward movement
of the discount rate may be the result of the flow of
new gold from the mines. It is equally possible that the
expansion may originate on the "goods side". The con-
ditions for credit expansion of the sort we have been
discussing are present when, the structure of money
rates remaining constant, there occurs some change in
the sphere of production, some invention, some open-
ing up of new markets, some discovery of new natural
resources, which makes borrowing more profitable—to
use a technical term, some change which tends to raise
the "natural rate" of interest. If in such circumstances
money rates are not raised, then there are present the
conditions for an extension of borrowing, an introduc-
tion into circulation of new money, which brings it
about that investment is in excess of saving.
Kecognition of this point should do much to remove
the misgivings which are often entertained with regard
to "purely monetary" theories of the trade cycle. A
purely monetary theory of the trade cycle—a theory
which explained the ups and downs of trade solely in
terms of movements of the general level of prices
brought about by the arbitrary changes in monetary
conditions—is quite rightly regarded with suspicion
by most people who have had some experience of the
working of the economic machine. If it were all as easy
as that the trade cycle would have been eliminated
already. If a mistake were made in one direction, it
would be enough to reverse it by the converse mone-
tary measures. The world we live in is not of this
degree of simplicity.
But the theory we have been developing does not
make this assumption. It allows for the impulse to
expansion to come either from the condition of real
investment or from changes in monetary policy. It
exhibits at every point the changes in the world of
productive activity which follow these initial impulses,
and it shows them proceeding via changes in antici-
pation of the future of business men and investors.
It explains the real over-production in certain lines of
industry which arises as a result of these changes. It
shows how, when the boom has collapsed, there exist
dislocations and disproportionalities in the world of
industry, the wreckage of false expectations, which
monetary manipulation is not likely to remove. Only
in its emphasis on the importance of demand in terms
of money and the influence of money rates of interest
as transmitted through investment markets can it be
described as a monetary theory of the trade cycle. But
in this form surely emphasis on monetary factors is
only in accordance with common knowledge of the
facts of business.
7. So far we have simply discovered how a general
fluctuation of trade is logically possible. We have seen
how an inflation which operates through the mechan-
ism of the money market may breed errors of anticipa-
tion among the capital-producing industries which
lead first to the phenomena of a boom and then, when
these errors are revealed, to a consequential collapse.
How does this theory fit the facts of the present
depression?
At this point it is necessary to proceed with great
caution. Whatever be the ultimate truth with regard to
the origin of this depression, one thing is certain, t h a t
no one explanation is capable of explaining all its
different aspects. As we shall see in more detail in the
next chapter, the fundamental causes, whatever they
may be, have operated in a milieu more than usually
disturbed by external changes and secondary oscilla-
tions, and their manifestations are thus inevitably com-
plicated. It will take years of careful scrutiny of the
available material before we can hope to be in a posi-
tion to pronounce with complete confidence on these
matters, and it is not certain that we shall ever
reach this stage. Nevertheless, even now, there is
a considerable body of evidence which seems to
afford a presumption that causes, not dissimilar from
the causes outlined above, have actually been in
operation.
The big collapse came in America, and it is to
America, and the centres most intimately associated
with America, that we must turn if we are to discover
the antecedents of the depression.
If we look in this direction we do certainly find
movements remarkably similar to the movements we
should expect from our theory. We saw in the last
chapter what a very considerable expansion of credit
took place in the Federal Reserve System from 1925
onwards. The following chart, which exhibits bank
debits divided by bank deposits, gives a rough indi-
cation of the changes in the velocity of circulation
during the same period:1
C-8-
1-4.
1926 1927 1928 1929
UNITED STATES—VELOCITY OF CIRCULATION OF BANK DEPOSITS
No doubt some of this was restricted to a very narrow

field of speculative operations—though it should be
observed that the index for the banks outside New
York moves in the same direction as the New York
index itself. But even when this has been fully dis-
counted, it is evident, if we take both the increase in
credit and the increase in velocity into account, that
the increase in the effective volume of money was very
great indeed—that there was undoubtedly a most
considerable inflationary movement.
The effects of this are quite evident in the market
for common stocks. The following chart shows the
movement of the prices of such securities during the
period under consideration.2
It is not necessary to labour the point that this was
one of the most remarkable Stock Exchange booms in
modern economic history.
Expectations are not disappointed when we turn
1
For the figures on which it is based see Statistical Appendix, Table 15.
2
For the figures see Statistical Appendix, Table 2.
220' 220
200- 200
180- •18O
160" •160
140- -14O
130 12O
1926 Level
1OO- 1OO
80
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929
UNITED STATES—INDEX OF SECURITY PRICES
to the sphere of production. The following chart 1

shows the movement of the production of producers'
goods and consumers' goods at this time. The indices
from which it is constructed are not by any means
all that could be desired from the point of view of
statistical purity, but the general direction of move-
ment is unmistakeable.
12O 120
Producers' Goods
110- Consumers' Goods 110
Averagre 1925/9
s
1OO- 1OO
90 9O
80. 80
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929
. UNITED STATES—INDICES OF PRODUCTION
The construction of durable consumers' goods too

shows a similar movement. The index of the value of
residential building contracts awarded rises from 117
in 1927 to 126 in 1928. It then falls off as money rates
become higher. In general we find all the characteristic
evidences of a boom in the constructional and raw
material producing industries.
1
THE GENESIS OF THE DEPRESSION 47
Similarly, when we turn to interest rates and costs
we find movements which conform to the expectations
of theory. The following chart shows movements of
short-loan rates of interest in New York City:1
Per Cent
10-
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929
N E W YORK—CALL-LOAN RATE
Statistics of costs are hard to obtain. The wage index,

however, which stood at 212 in January 1925 and 221
in January 1927, had risen to 227 in September 1929.
Here we have just those directions of movement which
have been explained.
It is sometimes said that the movement of wage
rates is too small to have played the part here ascribed
to them. This objection is reinforced by appeal to the
comparatively small increase in the figures of national
income recorded during this period ($79 billions to
$85 billions). This seems to have little weight. This for
two reasons. In so far as the wage index is an index of
costs, it probably considerably under-estimates the
movement. All the evidence on trade fluctuation seems
to show that, during the later phases of a cycle, costs
rise faster than the movement of wage rates would
suggest. On the other hand, in so far as it is an index
1
of increased pressure at the consumption end, it must
be remembered that it again clearly errs on the side
of under-estimation. During the later stages of the
boom there seems reason to suppose that among many
classes of consumers speculative gains were treated
as income and spent accordingly. Moreover, statistics
of national income are misleading here, since they in-
clude agricultural incomes which were actually falling
during the period under consideration. So far as manu-
facturing industry is concerned there seems no reason
to doubt that, towards the end of the boom, there
occurred an increase in costs and a considerable increase
of spending for consumptive purposes.
The one element which at first sight appears to be
incompatible with the explanation we have offered is
the movement of prices. In June 1924 the level of
wholesale prices in the United States stood at 95.*
In June 1927 it stood at 94. In June 1929 it stood
at 95. The price-level was almost stationary—if any-
thing, tending to fall slightly. At first sight this appears
to be incompatible with the suggestion of an infla-
tionary boom, and there can be no doubt that it was
the more or less stable condition of the price-level
which blinded contemporary observers to the real
nature of what was going on at the time. So long as the
price-level remains stationary, they urged, there can
be no fear of inflation. A little reflection, however,
should show that this belief is fallacious. A stationary
price-level shows an absence of inflation only when
production is stationary. When productivity is in-
creasing, then, in the absence of inflation, we should
expect prices to fall. Now the period we are examining
was a# period of rapidly increasing productivity. The
1
comparative stability of prices, therefore, so far from
being a proof of the absence of inflation, is a proof of
its presence.
On this point the verdict of Mr. J. M. Keynes is
particularly interesting. Mr. Keynes, it will be remem-
bered, was not one of those who expressed alarm at
the abundance of cheap money during the days of the
expansion. On the contrary, he was one of the chief
influences in the world calling for more and more cheap
money. In the Treatise on Money, however, with cus-
tomary candour, he admits having misapprehended
the situation:
Anyone who looked only at the index of prices would see no
reason to suspect any material degree of inflation, whilst any-
one who looked only at the total volume of bank credit and the
prices of common stocks would have been convinced of the
presence of an inflation actual or impending. For my part I
took the view at the time that there was no inflation in the
sense in which I use this term. Looking back in the light of
fuller statistical information than was then available, I believe
that whilst there was probably no material inflation up to the
end of 1927, a genuine profit inflation developed some time
between that date and the summer of 1929.x
On the existence of inflation in America during these
years, therefore, there would appear to be substantial
agreement. Would that this had been so then.
8. The inflation was not confined to America,
although it was in that part of the world that some of
its most characteristic manifestations were witnessed.
An enormous volume of foreign loans spread out
to other centres and generated expansion there. The
following chart shows the movement of capital into
Germany and the resulting credit expansion:2
1
A Treatise on Money, vol. ii. p. 190.
8
For the figures see Statistical Appendix, Tables 23, 24 and 25.
E
Gold Reserve of Reichsbank
..—'
Net Capital Import
12
I6
* 4 =^ 4 5
•I., _^
£ 3 3 |
\
|
\
\
* 1
1925
V 1926 1927
GERMANY
1928 1929 1930
Security prices had reached a peak in the early part

of 1927 from which they were shaken by efforts on the
part of the Reichsbank to control the situation. But
the inflowing tide of credit from the United States
overbore this tendency to recession. In the later part
of the year they revived and remained active until
the end of 1928, when the inflow of foreign lending
began to slacken. The discount rate which was 5 per
cent in the early part of 1927 reached 1\ per cent in the
spring of 1929. Wages rose. The index of skilled wages,
for instance, which was 96 in the first quarter of 1927,
by October 1929 had reached a level of 104. Other series
show a similar movement. Here surely are characteristic
symptoms of the effects of credit expansion.1
But the expansion did not stop here. It was almost
world-wide in extent. It is difficult to compile an index
1
For further figures see Statistical Appendix, Tables 26, 27 and 28.
Ill THE GENESIS OF THE DEPRESSION 51
of world expansion. The following table, based on
statistics furnished by the League of Nations, gives
some idea of the extent to which even not predomin-
antly industrial countries were affected:
LOANS, DISCOUNTS AND ADVANCES OF COMMERCIAL BANKS
Country 192-4 1929
Canada . . . . 100 162

Argentine . . . . 100 134
Brazil . . . . . 100 151 (1928)
Australia . . . . 100 146
New Zealand 100 122
U n i o n of S o u t h Africa . 100 181
These figures probably a little exaggerate the ex-

pansion for they are "corrected" for changes in the
price-level, which fell slightly during the period. But
it is difficult to understand the frame of mind of those
who deny the existence of a very considerable degree
of inflation.
9. But why did inflation take place?
It is clear that the effects of the war and the post-
war inflation, which caused so large a proportion of
the world's gold supply to be concentrated in New
York, laid the foundations for the expansion. It has
sometimes been said that these gold imports were
sterilised. But, as we have seen, this is a complete mis-
apprehension. They were made the basis of a very
considerable expansion.
But clearly this is not the end of the story. If we
look back at the chart of credit movements in the
States which we were examining in the last chapter
we shall see, as indeed we noticed then, that the system
continued to expand in 1927-28, even when gold was
flowing out. It is clear, too, from the velocity chart that
it was during this period that the situation got really
out of hand. Why did this take place?
The answer seems to be that it was the direct out-
come of misdirected management on the part of the
Federal Reserve authorities—an error of management,
however, which Englishmen at any rate have no right
to speak of with reproach, for it seems almost certain
that it was carried out very largely with the intent to
ease our position.
The situation seems to have been roughly as follows.
By the spring of 1927 the upward movement of busi-
ness in the United States, which started in 1925,
showed signs of coming to a conclusion. A moderate
depression was in sight. There is no reason to suppose
that this depression would have been of very great
duration or of unusual severity. It was a normal
cyclical movement.
Meantime, however, events in England had produced
a position of unusual difficulty and uncertainty. In
1925 the British authorities had restored the Gold
Standard at a parity which, in the light of subsequent
events, is now generally admitted to have been too
high. The consequences were not long in appearing.
Exports fell off. Imports increased. The Gold Standard
was in peril. The effects of the over-valued exchange
made themselves felt with greatest severity in the coal
trade. Throughout 1926 there raged labour disputes,
which were the direct consequence of these troubles—
first the general strike, then a strike in the coal-fields
which dragged out for over six months, still further
endangering the trade balance. By 1927 the position
was one of great danger. International assistance was
sought. And in the summer of that year, partly in
order to help us, partly in order to ease the domestic
position, the authorities of the Federal Reserve System
took the momentous step of forcing a regime of cheap
money. A vigorous policy of purchasing securities was
initiated.
On this point the evidence of Mr. A. C. Miller, the
most experienced member of the Federal Reserve
Board, before the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, seems decisive:
In the year 1927 . . . you will note the pronounced increase
in these holdings [Federal Reserve holdings of United States
securities] in the second half of the year. Coupled with the
heavy purchases of acceptances it was the greatest and boldest
operation ever undertaken by the Federal Reserve System, and,
in my judgement, resulted in one of the most costly errors
committed by it or any other banking system in the last
75 years! . . -1
What was the object of Federal Reserve Policy in 1927? It
was to bring down money rates, the call rate among them,
because of the international importance the call rate had come
to acquire. The purpose was to start an outflow of gold—to
reverse the previous inflow of gold into this country.2
The policy succeeded. The impending recession was

averted. The London position was eased. The reflation
succeeded. Production and the Stock Exchange took
on a new lease of life. But from that date, according
to all the evidence, the situation got completely out
of control. By 1928 the authorities were thoroughly
frightened. But now the forces they had released were
too strong for them. In vain they issued secret warn-
ings. In vain they pushed up their own rates of dis-
1
Senate Hearings pursuant to S.R. 71, 1931, p. 134.
2
Ibid. p. 154.
54 THE GREAT DEPRESSION CH. m
count. Velocity of circulation, the frenzied anticipation
of speculators and company promoters, had now taken
control. With resignation the best men in the system
looked forward to the inevitable smash.
Thus, in the last analysis, it was deliberate co-opera-
tion between Central bankers, deliberate "reflation"
on the part of the Federal Reserve authorities, which
produced the worst phase of this stupendous fluctua-
tion. Far from showing the indifference to prevalent
trends of opinion, of which they have so often been
accused, it seems that they had learnt the lesson only
too well. It was not old-fashioned practice but new-
fashioned theory which was responsible for the excesses
of the American disaster.
CHAPTER IV
THE CAUSES OF DEFLATION
1. A FLUCTUATION of the kind described in the last

chapter is bound to be followed by a period of exten-
sive depression. The errors of anticipation which led to
the disaster have been discovered. Adjustment must
be made to the new situation. While this takes place
some factors of production will be unemployed, some
funds of liquid capital will be left idle at the banks.
Moreover, the general shock to confidence is likely to
accentuate this process. Investors will fight shy of
active investment. Bonds will be preferred to equities.
More money will tend to be left on deposit. The coming
of depression is almost certain to be accompanied by
some measure of deflation.
But, in a system undisturbed by other causes making
for depression, there seems no reason to suppose that
this process need go very far. The experience of similar
fluctuations in the pre-war period seems to suggest
that, after a certain interval of liquidation and cost
cutting, business prospects will once more brighten
and revival will gradually take place. In the present
depression things have been different. Whether or not
revival is now on the way, there can be no doubt that
the deflationary process which preceded it has been
one of quite unparalleled severity. The explanation
which we have examined already provides an account
55
of how the slump originated. But it certainly does not
explain why it has been so severe. Our next task,
therefore, is to examine this problem. What have been
the causes of the severity of the depression?
At the outset of the inquiry, one thing is clear. No
single explanation of this phenomenon will be sufficient.
The genesis of the slump may be traced to the collapse
of a general inflationary movement which might be
regarded as a single cause. But the subsequent course
of the slump has been so obviously affected by a
multiplicity of influences that any attempt to bring
them under one heading must necessarily involve over-
simplification. Political accidents, deliberate policies,
structural weaknesses, local psychology, have all played
a part which cannot be ignored. Nor is it possible
at this stage to assign exact quantitative importance
to these influences. Who can diagnose with certainty
the relative importance of the part played by political
power and the part played by bad banking policy, not
to mention personal dishonesty, in the causation of the
German Banking Crisis? What weight are we to assign
to the peculiar psychology of the American people,
what weight to the mechanical difficulties of their debt
structure, in explaining the collapse of last spring?
Clearly the time has not yet come, if it ever will, for
exact assessment of exact causal priority in this his-
tory. All that can be done is to ascertain the existence
of certain tendencies and to explain their mode of
operation.
It will be convenient to examine, first, certain
general characteristics of the political and economic
structure in which the dislocation took place, and then
subsequently to trace certain tendencies of policy
which have aggravated the disturbance.
iv THE CAUSES OF DEFLATION 57
2. If we look at the general circumstances of the
time in which the breakdown took place, it is not
difficult to see that the probabilities of a depression
more severe than most were very high.
It was a time of great political unrest. The Repara-
tion problem was still unsettled. The political fron-
tiers of Europe, then as always since the war, were
the subject of hot dispute. Internally the various
governments of the ex-enemy powers maintained an
equilibrium ever more perilously poised half-way be-
tween democracy and dictatorship. The German
position was especially acute. The tide of political
extremism, which has since overwhelmed that country,
was already rising strongly. The Nazi propaganda,
hitherto confined to the worst elements of the ex-
military and ex-criminal classes and to a handful of
the less responsible students, was beginning to make
itself felt in high politics. The German middle classes,
bereft of their property during the inflation, their
minds besodden with the turgid anti-rationalism which
in that part of the world has for many decades passed
as profundity, were apt soil for such teaching. Any
worsening of the economic situation was likely to lead
to political upheaval.
All this was itself conducive to a worsening of the
economic situation. In a world of such uncertain
political prospects, the prospects of enterprise were
necessarily uncertain. The distribution of resources
was distorted by the high political risk factor. As the
situation deteriorated a vicious circle set in. The busi-
ness depression reacted on politics and politics reacted
on the business depression. Fears of the future set in
motion forces which brought it about that these fears
were justified. The view which ascribes the course of
the depression to fluctuations of political confidence

alone, no doubt involves considerable exaggeration.
But a view which takes no account of politics omits
one of the most important factors operative. The con-
tinual intensification of political risk is one of the
dominant features of this period.
3. But politics apart, there were certain features
of the general economic situation which were con-
ducive to severity of depression. The profound dis-
locations brought about by the war, to which we have
already alluded, had not yet been eliminated. The
capital shortage in Germany and Central Europe in-
volved a dislocation of the channels of investment un-
precedented in modern economic history. Never have
there existed between civilised areas such wide differ-
ences of rates of return on capital. While the boom
lasted, foreign lending from American and from other
centres to some extent submerged these differences.
The industrial machine in Germany was attuned once
more to relatively low rates of interest. But the mo-
ment foreign loans ceased to flow in this direction the
capital shortage was once more revealed. The vast
system of over-rationalised plant and equipment was
paralysed for want of capital. In a normal fluctuation
the probability is that the degree of error in long-term
interest rates is not more than one or two per cent. In
Germany and Central Europe it was probably two or
three times this magnitude.
Beyond this, the technical changes of the post-war
period, especially in agricultural production, had pro-
duced a situation in which the incidence of industrial
depression was likely to be unusually severe. We have
seen already that it is a fallacy to regard technical
progress in any line of industry as being likely in itself
to lead to general depression. But we have recognised
also that if the result of technical progress in the shape
of a great fall in the prices of the products concerned
were to become manifest at a time at which other
lines of industry were depressed, there might well be
an enhancement of the general difficulties. This seems
to have been what has happened. The fall of prices
of agricultural products due to technical improvement
has coincided with industrial depression, and the diffi-
culties of transition have been heightened. This seems
to be the core of truth in the popular views on this
subject. It is important, however, not to press it too
far. As we shall see, there is strong reason to believe
that many of the difficulties created by the position
in the markets for agricultural products are in fact
by-products of State policy and the peculiar nature
of the boom.
4. The effects of these changes were bound in any
case to be extensive. But there can be little doubt
that the difficulties with which they have been ac-
companied are, in part at any rate, a by-product of
the weaknesses of the post-war economic structure.
The effects of an earthquake are, in part, a function of
the strength of the original shocks, in part a function
of the strength of the buildings affected. So in the
economic system the effects of fluctuations, whether
cyclical or otherwise, are in part a function of the
magnitude of the original change, in part a function of
the elasticity of the economic organisation affected.
Now there can be no doubt that, in the post-war
period, the capacity of the economic system to sustain
shocks and to adapt itself to a process of rapid change
has been seriously impaired. The essence of pre-war
capitalism was the free market, not necessarily free
60 THE GREAT DEPRESSION OR.
competition in the remote and rigid sense of the mathe-
matical economists; but the free market in the sense
that the buying and selling of goods and the factors of
production was not subject to arbitrary interference by
the State or strong monopolistic controls. No doubt
there was some interference and some monopoly. But
that the free market was the typical institution is not
open to serious question. Since the war it has tended
to be more and more restricted. The cartelisation of
industry, the growth of the strength of trade unions,
the multiplication of State controls, have created an
economic structure which, whatever its ethical or
aesthetic superiority, is certainly much less capable of
rapid adaptation to change than was the older more
competitive system. This puts it very mildly. There can
be little doubt, on a broad view, that the tendencies
under discussion, so far from facilitating change or
easing the process of transition, do indeed work in pre-
cisely the opposite direction. Certainly no one who
wishes to understand the persistence of the maladjust-
ments of the great slump can neglect the element of
inelasticity and uncertainty introduced by the exist-
ence of the various pools and restriction schemes,
the rigidities of the labour market and cartel prices,
which are the characteristic manifestation of these
developments.
These tendencies are the creation of policy. It is
sometimes thought that they are the inevitable out-
come of modern technical conditions. But this is not
the case. Whether modern technical developments
operating in a free system would give rise to such
phenomena is a question which we may leave un-
discussed. Historically, the fact is that the elements of
rigidity and instability, which we are discussing, are
the direct outcome of policy. So far in the history of
the world cartels and labour organisations exercising
strongly monopolistic influence have not shown them-
selves to be capable of survival, save as a result of
direct or indirect assistance from States. We have seen
already how the war-time controls fostered the growth
of such bodies. The cartel systems of continental
Europe are the direct creation of tariffs and State
intervention. The post-war rigidity of wages is a by-
product of Unemployment Insurance. So, too, with the
great restriction schemes which have exerted such in-
fluence on the various commodity markets—Eubber
Restriction, the Brazilian Coffee Institute, the Sugar
Control, the Federal Farm Relief Agency, and so on.
All are inconceivable without direct State intervention.
Whether or not from what is called a "social" point of
view these things have been justifiable, it is not open to
serious question that their existence has introduced a
new instability in the economic structure, and that this
has had an important influence in the intensification
of the slump.
5. To understand completely the peculiar dangers
of the economic structure in which the slump began, it
is necessary to turn once more to the circumstances of
the boom which preceded it.
We have seen already that the genesis of the slump
can be attributed to the effects of credit expansion.
But, so far, our diagnosis has been confined to the
quantitative aspects of this process—to its magnitude
relatively to the movement of productivity and to its
effects on industries with different investment periods.
As a first approximation to the truth this procedure
has justification. Any other mode of approach would
involve missing the wood for the trees—missing the
essential direction of change b y preoccupation w i t h

details of particular m o v e m e n t s . Nevertheless, we do
wrong t o stop a t this stage—to leave undiscussed t h e
qualitative aspects of t h e credit expansion—for there
can be no d o u b t t h a t t h e y are of high relevance t o t h e
explanation of t h e severity of t h e slump. The econo-
mist, listening t o t h e business m a n as he a t t r i b u t e s t h e
whole disaster t o this or t h a t particularly m o n s t r o u s
piece of financial ineptitude or business chicanery, m a y
well feel t h a t these details alone p u t m a t t e r s in a wrong
perspective. B u t he p a y s t h e p e n a l t y of superficiality
if he does n o t see t h a t somewhere, somehow, t h e y m u s t
form p a r t of t h e t o t a l picture.
Now it is clear t h a t an inflationary b o o m of t h e k i n d
which was described in t h e last chapter, besides h a v i n g
t h e q u a n t i t a t i v e effect of over-stimulating t h e capital-
goods industries, also h a s t h e qualitative effect of pro-
viding a favourable a t m o s p h e r e for t h e fraudulent
operations of sharks a n d swindlers. I t is n o t when
m o n e y is tight, when m e n look twice a t each shilling
before t h e y spend it, t h a t t h e Kreugers and H a t r y s get
a w a y with it. I t is when m o n e y is easy, when profits
seem t o be there for t h e t a k i n g and everyone is anxious
t o be in a little earlier t h a n his neighbour. This has
been t h e case in all t h e major booms of history. The
big frauds almost all h a v e been p e r p e t r a t e d on a rising
market.
Blest paper credit. Last and best supply
To lend corruption lighter wings to fly,
sang Pope two hundred years ago. There is no need
to multiply evidence of this influence of inflationary
credit in the boom from whose aftermath we are still
suffering.
But there is no doubt, too, that the latest frauds
were perpetrated upon a public which had become quite
abnormally gullible. The scale of business, the air of
expertise with which it was invested, the vast mechan-
ism of the operations of high finance, were conducive
to an attitude of mind in which the possibility of fraud
or serious error was disregarded. No doubt before banks
had big offices and expert advisers there was an
"individualist chaos". But we had changed all that.
As if the fact that a man had five telephones on his
desk and a menagerie of tame statisticians in the cellar
was a circumstance which justified the suspension of
all the maxims of Victorian prudence! But they were
suspended, and the mistakes which Victorian prudence
had painfully learnt to avoid were committed.
But the boom was remarkable, not only for the
proliferation of fashionable fraud; it was remarkable,
too, for a change in the methods of straightforward fin-
ancing. The history of post-war finance is marked by
a conspicuous increase in the proportion of public
investment which takes the form of fixed debt rather
than participating ownership. This tendency was
bound to accentuate the difficulties of any period of
depression.
In part, the change was due to changes of banking
policy. The increased participation by banks in the
financing of all kinds of enterprise created a market for
bonds where equities would have been unacceptable.
The big insurance companies, moreover, through whose
agency so large a proportion of the savings of the
poorer and middle classes are invested, had a preference
for this kind of investment.
But in part it was due to the increased economic
activity of States and governmental bodies. The most
intractable and disastrous masses of fixed debt which
have obstructed recovery in the slump have been
debts of this sort. The example of Australia will be
familiar to English investors. Even more conspicuous,
and much more important as an unsettling influence
in the depression, are the debts of the German and
Central European States and municipalities. Of the
total amount invested in Germany in the years 1924-
1928, it has been estimated that at least 40 per cent was
on account of governmental bodies. Much of this was
spent on the carrying out of works such as the con-
struction of swimming-baths, the financing of housing
schemes and so on, which had little prospect of being
financially remunerative. This was at a time when
German industry was still suffering from the greatest
capital shortage in modern economic history. Much of
this money is irretrievably lost. But, because it was
borrowed by government bodies, recognition of this
fact is slow to come and liquidation has thus been
delayed. Paradoxically enough, economists who have
urged that this sort of thing has not proved its worth
in practice, are often called by their opponents
"deflationists".
Finally, in this connection, it should be noted that
the easy money conditions created by the boom had
an important influence in facilitating the rise of the
various pools and restriction schemes for agricultural
products to which allusion has been made already. I t
is not to be thought that the Brazilian Coffee Institute,
for example, would have been able to raise the colossal
sums it did for so preposterous an adventure as the
"valorisation" of 1927-29 in a time in which men were
careful of the way they spent their money. Nor can it
be doubted that the general inflationary conditions
of that period served to support the prices of agricul-
tural products which in more normal circumstances
would have been falling. To that extent, therefore,
the process of readjustment was delayed, and the dis-
location which was eventually revealed was made
greater.
6. So far, we have done little but examine those
various features of the general political and economic
environment and the internal industrial structure of
the pre-slump period which made it likely that the
breakdown of the boom would be accompanied by
more dislocations and disturbances than have usually
accompanied the termination of prosperity in the
past. We have now to examine certain tendencies of
policy since that date which have greatly enhanced
these difficulties.
We may commence with the policy of restrictions
on international trade.
The use of protective tariffs as a "cure" for trade
depression is not new. The atmosphere of trade de-
pression is favourable to the adoption of panic
measures. The interests which, in times of prosperity,
find it hard to enlist support for their conspiracies to
rob the public of the advantages of cheapness and
division of labour, in times of bad trade, find a much
more sympathetic hearing. People are alarmed. The
dangers of a price-fall due to deflation blind them to
the dangers of a price-rise due to restriction. The
existence of unused capacity makes it easy for them
to believe that no diminution of the volume of exports
is likely to follow the imposition of restrictions on im-
ports. As a consequence, whenever a depression occurs
—that is, a general contraction of trade—there is to
be witnessed the odd spectacle of the nations of the
world zealously endeavouring to bring about a further
contraction by excluding each other's products. In

this way arose the protective systems of the latter part
of the nineteenth century. In this respect the post-
war world has not been slow to continue old practices.
But it has continued them on a scale which makes all
previous trade restrictions insignificant by comparison.
We have seen already the effects of this on the total
value of world trade—contraction to something like
a third of its former dimensions. An almost equally
vivid illustration of what has happened is provided by
the following table, which shows the domestic price
of wheat in different countries in 1929 and 1932:x
In United States
Cents per Bushel of CO lb.
Country
January 1929 January 1932
Argentina . . . . 113 44
Canada . . . . 120 51
Great Britain . . . 123 53
United States . . . . 121 58
India . . . . . 158 60
Hungary . . . . 158 60
Poland 140 81
Sweden . . . . . 137 91
Austria . . . . . 131 120
Czechoslovakia 147 121
Germany . . . . 135 147
Italy 192 151
France . . . . . 164 179
From a state of affairs in which the price differences

were at the most of the order of magnitude of 80
cents we have passed in three years to a state of affairs
1
Thefiguresare taken from the League of Nations World Economic Survey,
1931-32, p. 137.
in which they are 135 cents. In some centres the price
of wheat has actually risen. In others it has fallen by
almost 100 cents per bushel. To speak of a world price
for wheat has now become an absurdity.
The effects of such obstructions are highly inimical
to rapid recovery. That their long-run effects are to
raise prices by restriction, and to limit the division of
labour, need scarcely be argued. Only the feeble-
minded and the paid agents of vested interests will be
found to deny such propositions. But that their short-
run effects are damaging to business improvement is
not so immediately obvious. Yet in fact it is equally
certain.
The short-run effect of the erection of obstructions
to trade is a tendency to deflation. This is perhaps a
hard saying for those who have come to look at tariffs
as a means of safeguarding the trade balance and so
avoiding deflation. But if we look at things from the
international point of view, it is not so difficult to
realise. It is clear that the effect of such obstructions is
to destroy business capital. The effect of the curtail-
ment of markets is to lower the value of stocks and
of fixed capital devoted to making such stocks. This
clearly tends to bring about forced sales and to in-
crease the struggle for liquidity. At the same time,
taking the world as a whole, it limits the field for the
investment of new capital; that is to say, it lowers the
equilibrium rate of interest. I t follows, therefore, that
unless money rates of interest immediately respond to
this change in the conditions of real investment, the
tendency for saving to lag behind investment, always
present in the first stages of depression, will be en-
hanced.
There is a further effect also conducive tcr net
deflation. The erection of obstructions to trade has the

effect of enhancing the difficulties of transferring debt
payments from one centre to another. It should be
noticed that the phrase used in this connection is the
"erection of obstructions". It is not true, as is some-
times asserted, that the mere existence of tariffs makes
transfer impossible. Nothing in theory or experience
goes to suggest that this is correct. Given time, prices
and costs in the different countries concerned can be
adapted to carry through almost any degree of trans-
fer over almost any degree of tariff obstacle. But if, as
the price relationships which make this possible begin
to emerge, new tariffs are erected to protect the
creditor countries against the "devastating flood of
cheap imports" which are the interest on their debts,
then, of course, transfer is prevented and new adjust-
ments have to take place. If the new tariffs come into
operation as trade depression is developing, the
probability is that the contraction of credit which they
compel in the paying country will not be offset by any
expansion in the receiving country. There will be a
net deflation.
Now, of course, this is just what happened at the
commencement of the present depression. When the
flow of foreign lending from the United States began to
cease it became necessary that the various debts
owing to the United States and her citizens, which
hitherto had been re-lent, should be paid in the form
of goods. But just at the same time the Congress of
the United States saw fit to put into force that monu-
ment of obstruction to trade, the Hawley-Smoot
Tariff. There can be no doubt that the difficulties of the
debtor countries were enormously enhanced by this.
As has been shown in an earlier chapter, the accusa-
tion that the difficulties of the world had been en-
hanced by gold sterilisation on the part of the United
States in the period 1923-29, has no foundation in
fact. But that the introduction of the Hawley-Smoot
Tariff at a critical stage of the depression did much
damage is clear.
7. It would be a great mistake, however, to at-
tribute the intensification of the crisis, particularly in
its earlier stages, entirely to the influence of such
obstacles. There were other policies adopted, the effect
of which was no less serious.
The breakdown of an inflationary boom is a revela-
tion of a wastage of capital. Large blocks of invest-
ment which have been made in the expectation of
profit now prove to have no such prospect. It follows,
therefore, that if profitability is to be restored costs
must be cut and the capital resources rehabilitated.
In earlier depressions this has been the rule. And
since the process has started quickly, comparatively
little cutting has been necessary. But at the outset of
this depression other measures were adopted. In the
United States the word went forth that consumers'
purchasing power must at all costs be maintained.
President Hoover pledged the leaders of big industry
to make no reduction of wage rates. 1 Until the summer
of 1930 no serious reduction of wage rates took place.
At the same time special efforts were made to maintain
rates of dividends for shareholders. In Germany, too,
throughout 1930 wage rates were well maintained.
Now this policy was the reverse of what was needed.
As we have seen already, the depression is essentially
a depression in the constructional and raw material
1
See J. Viner, Balanced Deflation, Inflation or More Depression, Uni-
versity of Minnesota Press, 1933, pp. 12-13.
producing industries—a falling-off of demand for

capital goods. As will be readily seen from the theory
which has already been developed, one way of ex-
plaining the coming of depression is to say that
demand at the consumers' end has become relatively
too high. And, in fact, there was no deficiency of
consumption at this period. Global statistics of con-
sumption are almost impossible to obtain. But in-
vestigations made by the Harvard School of Business*
indicate a state of affairs which is far from suggesting
that consumers' buying was unduly slack. The follow-
ing table exhibits some of the more spectacular results
which the Harvard enquiry brings to light:
INDICES OF CONSUMPTION IN THE UNITED STATES
(1928 = 100)
Article 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932
Wheat flour. 100 100-2 101-0 94-5 90-0

Butter 100 101-5 101-8 104-4 105-6
Cheese 100 93-2 99-3 113-2 107-3
Gasolene 100 1134 120-2 122-8 113-2
Cigarettes . 100 112-4 112-9 107-1 97-8
Silks and velvets . 100 94-5 98-2 98-3 90-6

Hosiery 100 109-8 118-6 138-8 137-6
Infants' wear 100 107-5 106-8 105-4 91-4
Popular - priced
dresses 100 113-5 115-3 125-5 117-7
These are admittedly strong cases. But it is clear

that in many lines, consumption in 1930 was higher
1
See Arthur R. Tebbutt, The Behaviour of Consumption in Business
Depression, Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration,
August 1933. For the lower portion of the Table, which is based on physical
sales of department stores, see p. 15. The other indices have been calculated.
than in the boom year 1929. In 1931 it was still high.
Not until 1932 when the deflation which followed
the financial crisis of 1931 had the system in its grip
was there any important falling off. This is exactly
what we should expect from the theory outlined in
Chapter IV. But it is not a state of affairs which
seems to call for the action which was taken.
In fact, the result of this action was to intensify the
effects of the boom. The maintenance of wage rates
and dividends was at the expense of capital. There can
be little doubt that it was financed by encroachment
on secret reserves. But what does this mean? Simply
that the new saving of the community which takes up
the sale of securities that constitute hidden reserves,
instead of constituting new demand for the products
of the capital-goods producing industries, is appropri-
ated for the consumption of wage earners and dividend
receivers. Consumption is maintained at the expense
of capital. The powers of resistance of the capital-
producing industries are sapped, and the struggle for
liquidity is intensified. Thus, when cost cutting actually
began, the cuts which were necessary if profitability
was to be restored were very much greater and very
much more disturbing to general confidence than
would have been the case if the process had not been
so long delayed.
8. The policy of maintaining consumers' purchasing
power was of limited application and duration. Much
more damaging and productive of general deflation
have been the policies adopted in regard to debts and
bad business positions in general. For these have been
almost universally adopted.
In the course of a boom many bad business commit-
ments are undertaken. Debts are incurred which it is
impossible to repay. Stocks are produced and accumu-
lated which it is impossible to sell at a profit. Loans are
made which it is impossible to recover. Both in the
sphere of finance and in the sphere of production,
when the boom breaks, these bad commitments are
revealed.
Now in order that revival may commence again, it
is essential that these positions should be liquidated.
There is nothing which is more damaging to confidence,
nothing therefore which is more deflationary, than the
persistence on a large scale of bad business positions.
They affect the whole business atmosphere. The word
goes round that such and such a house is in difficulties.
People say, "It's only a matter of time before a crash
comes. When it comes it may hit us too." Hence, even
if their own position is perfectly sound, they begin to
draw in their horns to make their position more liquid.
So too in the commodity markets. If stocks are hang-
ing over the market, even if for the time being prices
have not fallen, people become nervous. They say,
"The thing cannot last. It would be foolish to buy
extensively." So hand-to-mouth buying sets in. The
fear of a break is often much worse than the break
itself.
Now in the pre-war business depression a very clear
policy had been developed to deal with this situation.
The maxim adopted by central banks for dealing with
financial crises was to discount freely on good security,
but to keep the rate of discount high. Similarly in
dealing with the wider dislocations of commodity prices
and production no attempt was made to bring about
artificially easy conditions. The results of this were
simple. Firms whose position was fundamentally sound
obtained what relief was necessary. Having confidence
in the future, they were prepared to foot the bill. But
the firms whose position was fundamentally unsound
realised that the game was up and went into liquida-
tion. After a short period of distress the stage was once
more set for business recovery.
In the present depression we have changed all that.
We eschew the sharp purge. We prefer the lingering
disease. Everywhere, in the money market, in the
commodity markets and in the broad field of company
finance and public indebtedness, the efforts of Central
Banks and Governments have been directed to
propping up bad business positions.
We can see this most vividly in the sphere of Central
Banking policy. The moment the boom broke in 1929,
the Central Banks of the world, acting obviously in
concert, set to work to create a condition of easy
money, quite out of relation to the general conditions
of the money market. 1 This policy was backed up by
vigorous purchases of securities in the open market in
the United States of America. From October 1929
to December 1930 no less than $410 millions was
pumped into the market in this way. The result was
as might have been expected. The process of liquida-
tion was arrested. New loans were floated. The follow-
ing table shows the issues on foreign account alone in
the principal investment centres for the years 1928 to
1932:2
1
See Statistical Appendix, Tables 28, 29, 30 and 31.
2
This table, which relates to foreign issues in the United States, United
Kingdom, Netherlands and Switzerland, is reproduced from Timoshenko,
World Agriculture and the Depression (University of Michigan, 1933), p. 625.
The original data are from the German Institut fur Konjunkturforschung,
with the exception of those for the fourth quarter of 1931, which have been
taken from the article by F. Sternberg, "Die Weltwirtschaftskrisis," Welt-
wirtschaftliches Archiv, vol. 36, Heft 1 (July 1932), p. 131.
FOREIGN ISSUES ON FOUR SECURITY MARKETS

(In Millions of Dollars)
Period 1928 1929 1930 1931
! First quarter . 636-3 584-8 491-7 277-0

I Second quarter 754-9 373-5 727-3 169-6
! Third quarter 324-7 132-0 184-4 68-1
j Fourth quarter 386-4 194-9 304-0 0-5
Annual Total 2102-3 1285-2 1707-4 515-2
It will be seen that the issues in the second quarter of

1930 were of an order of magnitude comparable with
the issues of the corresponding quarter of 1928. This
money was not soundly invested. For the most part it
went to prop up positions which were fundamentally
unsound. The easy conditions in the money market
then and later on made possible the carrying of stocks
which otherwise would have had to be sold off. The
fundamental causes of uncertainty and deflation were
not removed. It is clear from their magnitude that they
could not be removed in this way. The reflation merely
helped them to persist.
But this was not all. The policy of relief was not
confined to the money markets. Everywhere the
Governments of the world, fearing the effects of a
break, intervened in one way or another to support
weak positions. We have noted already the multiplica-
tion of tariffs. More direct forms of support were almost
equally prevalent. The expenditure of the Federal Farm
Board, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the
renewed support to restriction schemes of one kind or
another, are only the most conspicuous cases of a policy
which was universal. The effects we know: continuation
of uncertainty, intensification of the deflation, pro-
longation of the depression.
It is important to realise the nature of this diagnosis.
It is not difficult for its critics, who are often people
with something to save from the wreck themselves, to
misrepresent it as a plea for bankruptcy as such. But
this is not the case. Nobody wishes for bankruptcies.
Nobody likes liquidation as such. If bankruptcy and
liquidation can be avoided by sound financing nobody
would be against such measures. All that is contended
is that when the extent of mal-investment and over-
indebtedness has passed a certain limit, measures which
postpone liquidation only tend to make matters worse.
No doubt in the first years of depression, to those who
held short views of the disturbance, anything seemed
preferable to a smash. But is it really clear, in the
fourth year of depression, that a more astringent policy
in 1930 would have been likely to cause more dis-
turbance and dislocation than the dislocation and
disturbance which have actually been caused by its
postponement?
CHAPTER V
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
1. DEFLATION, when it springs from causes such as

those discussed in the last chapter, is likely to have a
cumulative influence. In the summer of 1931 the de-
pression deepened into a great financial crisis, a crisis
from whose disruptive effects the whole world is still
suffering and is likely long to suffer. To understand
this event and its consequences it is necessary to
devote some attention to the peculiar economic cir-
cumstances of Great Britain. Great Britain is the
storm-centre of this phase of the depression.
2. At the outbreak of the war, Great Britain, in
common with all the other belligerent countries, aban-
doned the Gold Standard. At the end of 1919 the
external value of the pound sterling in terms of gold
dollars showed a depreciation of 22 per cent. Internal
prices had more than doubled. Money-wages, if they
had not kept pace with prices, at any rate had not
lagged far behind.1 For a short time the inflation con-
tinued. But it was not long before it was arrested. By
1921 the post-war boom was at an end.
As soon as this had happened there emerged an
important issue of policy. What was to be the future
basis of the British Monetary System? Was it to con-
tinue to be inconvertible paper without a gold backing
1
See Tables 33 and 34, Statistical Appendix.
76
CH. v GREAT BRITAIN AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 77
as it had been during the war? Or was it once more to
be linked up to gold as it was before the war? And if so,
at what rate of exchange was the return to gold to take
place? These questions were the subject of long, and
often heated, discussion.
In fact, however, there was only one question which
had practical importance—the question of the correct
gold parity. From the point of view of the historian of
the recent crisis, nothing can be more important than
the propaganda for a managed currency. It encouraged
the belief that the stable price-level was the be-all and
end-all of monetary policy. It created an attitude of
mind on the part of the educated public which in sub-
sequent years made it more and more difficult to work
the Gold Standard successfully. It led to an extrava-
gant admiration of the policy of the Federal Reserve
System at a time when the policy of the Federal
Reserve System was sowing the seeds of the slump.
One of the main obstacles to the restoration of stable
monetary conditions at the present day is the public
opinion which this propaganda has engendered.
But from the point of view of immediate practice all
this was a side-issue. At that time the idea of a managed
currency never had a ghost of a chance of being adopted
as a basis of policy. This for very good reasons. The
state of the world at large was not such as to justify
high hopes in the ability of Governments to manage
inconvertible paper successfully. All the Great Powers,
save America, had gone ofl the Gold Standard during
the war. None of them had exhibited the capacity to
keep the operation of the printing press within limits.
At the time when the controversy in England was at its
height, the standards of continental Europe were in a
condition of the most violent fluctuation ever witnessed.
78 THE GKEAT DEPRESSION OH.
Trade h a d shrunk t o a fraction of its pre-war dimen-
sions. T h e one hope of stabilising business conditions
seemed t o be t h e elimination of these fluctuations.
Gold stood for stability. The eyes of t h e world looked
to Great Britain for leadership. Small wonder t h a t
responsible m e n charged with t h e conduct of policy,
although ignorant for t h e most p a r t of t h e profound
theoretical strictures which could have been passed
upon t h e plan for a managed currency, turned a deaf
ear t o all this talk a n d resolved upon a restoration of
the Gold Standard.
B u t a t w h a t rate was it t o be restored? Were we t o
go back to the old Gold Standard with the pound worth
123-27 grains of fine gold a n d t h e dollar-sterling ex-
change a t 4-86? Or were we t o devaluate t o restore t h e
Gold Standard a t some lower parity? Here was a ques-
tion of severely practical import. To go back t o t h e old
parity safely involved a rise of prices in America—
the leading gold centre—a fall of prices a t home, or
some combination of these circumstances, which would
bring prices a n d costs in Great Britain a n d t h e gold-
using centres into t h e appropriate relationship. To
devaluate a t t h e parity of t h e m o m e n t m e a n t none of
these difficulties—meant t h e elimination of t h e wait-
ing period, t h e avoidance of t h e stresses a n d strains
of deflation. Y e t curiously enough it was a policy
which was hardly discussed. I t was almost t a k e n for
granted that the Gold Standard should be restored at
the old parity.
Why did this happen?
A combination of causes conspired to bring it about.
Sentiment played a part. It was thought to be a fine
thing for the pound once more to "look the dollar in
the face". It was thought, too, that a return at the old
v GREAT BRITAIN AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 79
rate would redound to the prestige of the City and so
bring international business in greater volume to this
country. There was some regard for the real value of
sterling debts abroad, some regard for what was thought
to be justice to the bond-holder. Partly it was due to
a belief that American prices would rise and so obviate
the need for deflation, partly to an ignorance of the
difficulties which the degree of deflation otherwise
necessary would involve. Beyond this we must not
ignore the confusion created by the propaganda for a
managed currency. In their eagerness to combat the
views of the advocates of paper, the protagonists of
the Gold Standard tended to assume that there was
only one alternative to such a system—the Gold
Standard "at the old rate. In the clamour of this
discussion, the few voices which urged devaluation
tended to pass unheard.
It is not easy at this distance of time to do full
justice to the undoubted sincerity and public spirit
of those who held these opinions. There seems little
in the argument for prestige. There could have been
little loss of prestige in recognising changed conditions.
Nor is there much in the argument for justice to the
bond-holder. The object of policy was to restore the
dollar-sterling exchange to the old parity. This could
come about by a deflation of English prices, an in-
flation of American prices or an inflation of English
prices accompanied by a still greater inflation in
America, etc. etc.—"justice to the bond-holder",
therefore, was a highly ambiguous notion. No doubt
there was more in the argument for retaining the full
value of sterling debts from abroad. But it is doubtful
whether the sacrifices here would have outweighed
the advantages of stabilisation in 1921 without the
difficulties of deflation. As for the traditional wisdom of
the subject, had not Bicardo a hundred years before
made it perfectly clear that, whereas to redress a 5 per
cent depreciation it was worth making a special effort,
to redress a depreciation of 20 per cent was a game
not worth the candle?
But restoration at the old parity was chosen.
Throughout 1921 there was considerable deflation.
Prices fell from 325 in April 1920 to 164 in January
1922. The dollar-sterling exchange rose to 4-221.
From 1922 there ensued a period of uncertainty and
indecision. The British price-index remained relatively
stable; it was 160 in March 1922 and 165 in the same
month of 1924. American prices rose from 95 in the
second quarter of 1922 to 102 in the second quarter of
1923. They then relapsed to 96 in the second quarter
of 1924. The exchange moved accordingly—4-44 in the
second quarter of 1922, 4-63 in the second quarter of
1923, 4-34 in the second quarter of 1924. By the middle
of 1924, however, matters took a decisive turn.
American prices began to rise. By the first quarter of
1925 they had risen 8 per cent (from 96 to 104) while
British prices only rose from 164 to 169 (quarterly
averages)—roughly 4 per cent. In the foreign ex-
change markets a return to gold at the old parity was
anticipated. The sterling-dollar exchange appreciated
from 4-34 to 4-78.
In the spring of 1925, therefore, it was thought that
the adjustment between sterling and gold prices was
sufficiently close to warrant a resumption of gold pay-
ments at the old parity. Accordingly, on April 28th,
1925, gold payments were resumed. Great Britain had
returned to the Gold Standard.
3. From 1925 onwards British industry was in diffi-
culties. Unemployment persisted at a high figure. In
October 1924 it was 1,281,000. In the same month of
1929 it was 1,254,000. The export industries were
stagnant and in some instances declining. Large ex-
panses of the industrial North were more severely-
depressed than at any time since their rise. It is im-
portant not to exaggerate the dark side of the picture*.
Some industries in the South were going ahead fairly
rapidly. Others were at least holding their own. The
real wages of those in employment rose rapidly. But
in a world in which, in most parts, trade appeared to
be very prosperous, the mediocrity of our circumstances
was conspicuous.
Why was this? Was it the result of a return to the
Gold Standard at too high a parity? Or were other
causes operative?
Even to-day it is not easy to give a precise answer
to this question. Broadly speaking, the various ex-
planations which have been put forward do not seem
mutually exclusive. Controversial discussion of the
question of the parity has made it quite clear that too
much weight should not be attached to precise esti-
mates of the degree to which sterling was over-valued
when the return to gold took place. But that there
was some over-valuation seems unquestionable. Ad-
mission of this, however, does not preclude appeal to
other factors., the falling of! of markets in the East,
competition in the European markets for coal, the rise
of manufacturing industry in other countries and so
on, which tended further to aggravate the position.
Indeed, an eclectic view seems most reasonable. The
parity was too high. Our position in world markets
declined also for other reasons.
But, whatever the rights and wrongs of this most
intricate question, one thing is certain. We were out

of equilibrium. And the steps necessary to restore
equilibrium were not taken.
It is quite clear that there was disequilibrium in the
labour market. During the period under discussion
the total number of unemployed never fell seriously
below the level of a million. It was often considerably
higher. Now the labour market is like all other markets
in that the quantity sold—the amount of labour em-
ployed—is a function of price. If the price which pre-
vails is above a certain point, then the market is
not cleared—there is labour unemployed. Of course
in times of the briskest trade and the freest labour
market there will be some unemployment due to the
process of industrial change, just as, during the best
times in the real estate market, there will be houses
vacant due to the turnover of population. But the
unemployment of the period 1925-29 considerably
exceeded the most generous estimate of the necessary
minimum of this kind. The very fact, therefore, that
there was unemployment on this scale is a proof that,
in some parts of the labour market, the rates charged
were too high.
This is not to say, as might wrongly be inferred, that
the total amount paid as wages was too high. That
does not follow at all. There are strong reasons for
believing that the demand for labour of the less
specialised kind has a considerable degree of elasticity.
If that is so, then a reduction of wage rates would have
been accompanied by an actual increase in the amount
paid as wages. The main import of the diagnosis is
missed if this distinction is not observed.
Nor is it to argue that unemployment was due to a
policy of aggressive rate-raising. This may be the case
in certain instances. It is fairly clear that it was so
in Germany during this period. There are other cases
equally conspicuous. But in Great Britain this was not
so. Wage rates in Great Britain were more or less con-
stant from 1924 onwards. All that happened was that,
in the face of a tendency to a decline in the demand
for labour, wage rates were not lowered. The causes of
the change in the conditions of the market did not
originate with the trade unions. If the analysis given
above is correct, they originated partly in monetary
policy and partly in changes in world markets. But the
effects on the volume of unemployment were the same
as would have been the case if they had. If the equi-
librium price falls and the actual price remains un-
altered, the market is not cleared.
But why was such a disequilibrium possible? In the
pre-war period the persistence of unemployment at
such a level was unheard of. The trade union per-
centage of unemployed in Great Britain only exceeded
the lowest point of post-war unemployment twice
during the fifty years for which we have records. The
cause is evident. In the pre-war period the trade
unions were responsible for the maintenance of their
unemployed. If the volume of unemployment rose
above a certain point they knew that it was time to
reconsider their wage policy. (We owe our excellent
unemployment statistics to the care with which they
watched such movements.) In the post-war period
they have been relieved of this responsibility by the
system of unemployment insurance. The volume of
unemployment created by their wage policy is there-
fore no longer a first consideration with their leaders.
This is no indictment of the trade union leaders. Nor
is it, in itself, a criticism of the system of unemploy-
ment insurance. It is simply a statement of unescap-

able fact. It is one of the consequences of unemploy-
ment insurance in the form in which it existed during
that period that it increased the rigidity of wages. In
a period when the equilibrium wage tends to fall this
means disequilibrium in the labour market.
But this was not the only disequilibrium of that
period. It is no less clear that the money market was
in disequilibrium. We have examined the nature of
this disequilibrium in Chapter II., when discussing the
distribution of gold. All through the period from 1925
to 1929 the condition of the money market was ab-
normal. The dollar-sterling exchange tended continu-
ally towards the gold export point, as may be seen
from the following figure:*
Gold Import Point
Parity / r
V^y ^—
J 1925 1926
Gold Exj ort Point
1927 1928 1929 1930 1931

STERLING-DOLLAR EXCHANGE
The net increase in the reserve from April 1925

to April 1929 was about £3 millions. During
the same period the world's monetary resources in-
creased from about £10,244 millions to about £11,201
millions.
In such circumstances, as was only natural, there
was continual anxiety about foreign lending. The
market, which in pre-war days had cheerfully carried
1
an annual volume of anything up to £190 millions,
now felt alarmed at movements less than half this size
although in the meantime the value of money had
fallen by 40 per cent. On at least two occasions, an
embargo was placed on foreign issues by the Bank of
England; and rumour speaks of less public restraints
whose operation was almost continuous.
Such a state of affairs is clearly indicative of
acute disequilibrium—a condition for which, failing a
miracle elsewhere, the only remedy was a contraction
of credit—a contraction of credit which would bring
prices and costs into such a relation with the outside
world that the tendency to lose gold would be arrested
and the condition of stringency eased. But no such
contraction took place. Micawber-like, the authorities
sat waiting for something to turn up which would
avoid the necessity for this disagreeable operation,
meanwhile, on occasion, taking such steps as would
prevent the loss of gold from having any effect on the
market. "You will find, if you look at a succession
of Bank Returns," said Sir Ernest Harvey, Deputy
Governor of the Bank of England, in his evidence
before the Macmillan Committee, referring to an
occasion of this sort, "that the amount of gold we
have lost has been almost replaced by an increase in
the Bank's securities." Such a policy was bound to
perpetuate the trouble. If, as gold flows out, credit is
not contracted, then the occasion for the gold flow is
not removed. The monetary reformers who, during
these years, complained so bitterly that the Bank
was deaf to their teaching, complained too much.
Unostentatiously, without any public repudiation of
Gold Standard practice, the Bank was following their
policy.
It is clear that in such conditions the persistence

of disequilibrium was almost inevitable. The initial
occasion of disequilibrium, the precise weights to be
assigned to the over-valuation of 1925, and to the
adverse market conditions subsequently operative,
may still be the subject of dispute. But the persistence
of disequilibrium, however occasioned, is only to be
explained as a failure of the internal mechanism to
adapt itself to changed conditions—a failure which
was due to the factors we have examined, a wage-
level which was rigid and a credit mechanism which
did not contract. Great Britain was not the only
country to stabilise her exchange at the pre-war level.
But, as Mr. Loveday has shown in an essay whose
main findings are not open to serious question, she
was the only country to fail to recover from such
a policy. The following table, taken from this essay,
shows the percentage movement of the gold value of
exports of those European countries which re-estab-
lished the pre-war level of their currencies:1
GOLD VALUE OF EXPORTS—PERCENTAGE MOVEMENT
Country 1913 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929
United Kingdom . 100 1384 146 124 135 137 136-6

Denmark 100 194 221 216 226 241 251
Norway 100 142 184 174 173 176 194
Sweden 100 153 167 174 198 193 221
Switzerland . 100 146 148 133 146 154 151
Netherlands . 100 114 110 120 126 126
(The figure for the first year during the whole of

which the exchanges were at par is printed in italics.)
1
See Loveday, Britain and World Trade, London, 1931, p. 158.
It will be seen that of the countries concerned only
the United Kingdom failed to recover a level of ex-
ports at least as high as that prevailing before the
restoration of the old parity. As Mr. Loveday con-
cludes, the restoration of the old parity was more
detrimental in England than elsewhere, "because other
countries made the necessary adjustments to their
whole machinery of production and we did not".
4. There was no boom in Great Britain. There were
repercussions of the boom which was taking place
elsewhere but no direct inflationary disturbance.1 In
consequence, the direct impact of depression was
lighter. The slump, when it came, revealed no such
gross internal mal-investments as were generally re-
vealed elsewhere. The effects of the slump showed
themselves in the first instance far more in a falling-
off of demand from countries where the boom had
been rampant than in any grave internal maladjust-
ment. This showed itself in the statistics. The Board
of Trade Index of Production for the third quarter
of 1930, for instance, shows a decline of 10 per cent.
In Germany over the same period there was a decline
of 20 per cent; in the United States of America a
decline of 23 per cent. The increase of unemployment
between September 1929 and September 1930 shows
a similar tendency. In Great Britain it increased 82
per cent and in Germany 116 per cent. Although no
accurate information is available regarding unemploy-
ment in the United States, there is a consilience of
evidence that the position of Great Britain in the
1
It should be noted that this is not in the least in conflict with the view
expressed in the last section that the price structure was in an inflated
condition compared with the equilibrium level; nor with the view expressed
in an earlier chapter that British disequilibrium was indirectly responsible
for some of the inflation elsewhere.
slump, in respect of production, was perceptibly less
bad than t h a t of many other countries.
None the less, viewed as a whole, it was a position
of great danger. We have seen already how insecure
was the general position of London as a centre of
world finance during the preceding period of prosperity.
In the slump this insecurity was enhanced by the
operation of a new factor. Hitherto there had been
a certain reserve margin of safety in the magnitude of
the volume of interest on investments overseas. So
long as this continued to mount from year to year,
the diminution of overseas lending which could be
brought about by a rise in the discount rate could be
trusted to restore for the moment the conditions of
safety for the Gold Standard. This reserve was now
to be depleted. The coming of depression in the lands
in which British capital had been invested led to a
falling-off of dividends. As it deepened, there was a
decline in other more dependable receipts due to
the suspension of debenture interest and default on
governmental obligations. In 1929 the estimated net
income from overseas investment was £250,000,000;
in 1930 it was £220,000,000; in 1931, £165,000,000.
In the same period, exports fell from £729,000,000 to
£389,000,000 and shipping earnings from £65,000,000
to £30,000,000.* Clearly, unless steps were taken to
remedy the local disequilibrium, the maintenance of
the Gold Standard by Great Britain was likely to be
a matter of increasing difficulty.
5. The difficulty thus created would have been great
enough in the case of a subsidiary monetary system. I t
was increased beyond all comparison by the special
circumstances of London as a world financial centre—
1
See Table 35, Statistical Appendix.
by the presence of unusually large volumes of foreign
balances liable to be withdrawn at very short notice.
The presence of these balances is to be attributed
to a variety of causes. Monetary stabilisation in con-
tinental Europe had, in many cases, resulted in the
establishment, not of independent Gold Standards of
the British pre-war type, but of what were known as
Gold Exchange Standards—currency systems in which
the reserve of the Central Bank concerned consisted
not of gold itself but of titles to gold held in another
centre, such as London or New York, where gold was
freely obtainable. The saving in expense of such ar-
rangements was obvious, for the reserves so held were
remunerative. But they tended to the erection of a
credit structure larger than would otherwise have been
possible and they concentrated the risk of withdrawal
on the few main centres on which they depended.
London was the chief of these centres, and in the
period after 1925 a large volume of balances was
continually held in London on foreign Central Bank
account.
Such balances were a normal feature of the post-
war monetary system. Had that system persisted they
would necessarily have persisted with it. There were
other balances, however, whose presence was not so
normal. In the period from 1924 to 1926, when the
French franc was depreciating and its future was highly
uncertain, large volumes of French funds were placed
for safety in this country. When the franc was stabilised
these funds were not immediately repatriated. The
French banks, into whose hands these assets gradually
drifted, retained them in London to take advantage
of the higher rates of interest there prevailing. It is
said that, in times of difficulty, appeals were made
that they should not be withdrawn too quickly. These

appeals were not unsuccessful. In this way there re-
mained right up to the crisis of 1931 an unusually
large volume of French money on short loan in the
City.
Beyond this, there was a miscellaneous volume of
international money whose presence was to be ex-
plained partly in terms of straightforward commercial
and financial convenience, partly, however, in terms
of the peculiar circumstances of the post-war capital
market. There seems little doubt that, since the war,
there have existed very abnormal conditions in the
European capital market. The supply of short-term
funds relatively to the supply of money for long-term
investment has been much greater than in the pre-war
period—a condition which has been reflected in the
relation between short- and long-term rates of interest.
This has been due to many factors. Partly it is to be
explained in terms of political risks which have scared
the investor from certain forms of long-term invest-
ment; partly in terms of the provision by Governments,
especially by the British Government, of short-term
securities and bills which were thought to provide
immunity from the risks of other forms of investment.
Nor must we overlook, in this connection, the funda-
mental fact of the British international trade dis-
equilibrium, whereby the chief European centre for
long-term lending was chronically prevented from dis-
charging its function of providing for the world at large
an ample stream of foreign securities for long-term
investment. But whatever the cause, in particular
instances, the net effect was the same—an abnormally
large fund of international short money flitting from
one centre to another according to the variations in
local conditions of risk and opportunities of profit. In
the days before the crisis London was the habitation
of a large proportion of this fund.
Now the presence of all these balances was not in
itself a bad thing for the City. To judge from the
language which was sometimes used when the abandon-
ment of the Gold Standard had deprived such balances
as remained of 25 per cent of their value, one would
think that they had been accommodated here solely
for charitable reasons. That was certainly not the case.
They were a source of very considerable profit. But
at the same time they were a source of considerable
danger. If, at any time, confidence in London was
shaken, a sudden withdrawal would lead to a very
grave crisis.
6. The crisis came. Throughout the years since the
war, the inhabitants of the Kepublic of Austria had
been gradually consuming their capital. The trade
policies of the secession States had limited the Austrian
markets. The economic policy of successive Austrian
governments and the Viennese municipality accelerated
the process which the Paris Settlement had begun.
From 1913 to 1930 the value of the Austrian industrial
share capital situated in the present Austria shrank to
a fifth of its former dimensions.1 The expenditure of
the Viennese municipality on its housing programme
alone since the Armistice exceeded the total value of
the capital of all Austrian manufacturing joint-stock
companies.2 In the year 1931 it was calculated that
if all the undertakings in Austria were to be sold at
the value of their Stock Exchange quotation for the
1
Thefiguresare given in an article by Dr. Oskar Morgenstern in the Zeit-
schrift fur Nationalokonomie, Bd. iii. pp. 251-5.
2
See Hayek, "Wirkungen des Mietzinsbeschrankungen," Schriften des
Vereinsfiir Sozialpolitik, Bd. 182, p. 265.
autumn of that year, the proceeds would not cover
one-half of the public expenditure for a single year.
No financial system could stand such a strain as this
without collapse. One by one, the financial houses in
Vienna put up their shutters. The slump intensified the
capital consumption. Early in May 1931, the Kredit
Anstalt, which had taken over the bad debts of its
predecessors, announced that it could not meet its
liabilities. The actual smash is sometimes attributed
to the political tension aroused by the untimely pro-
posals for an economic Anschluss between Germany
and Austria. Whether this is so or not, there can be
no doubt that the ultimate cause of the difficulty was
the capital consumption of the years which had pre-
ceded it.1
The collapse was the beginning of a world-wide
financial crisis. The process of deflation analysed in an
earlier chapter, together with the growing political
tension which accompanied the rise of Hitler, had pro-
duced a situation of extreme peril in Germany in par-
ticular. The German banks, weakened by practices
which for years had been the admiration of foreign
financial experts—active participation in industrial
financing—and honeycombed with the jobbery and
graft characteristic of the Kreuger period, were in no
position to stand a run. A run developed. American
and French creditors hastened to withdraw their
balances from Berlin. Domestic withdrawals began on
1
On the whole Austrian episode, to which much too little attention has been
given in English-speaking countries, the important paper by Mr. Nicholas
Kaldor on "The Economic Situation of Austria", Harvard Business Review,
October 1932, should be consulted. Austria is the classical example of how
the various policies now being vigorously introduced into this and other
countries actually work out in practice. The contention that it is all the re-
sult of the Peace Treaties does not bear examination. The Peace Treaties
did much. But much, too, is the result of policy.
a large scale. Feverish attempts were made on all sides
to arrest the rot. The Hoover moratorium was the most
conspicuous. But in vain. On the morning of July 13th,
the Danat Bank closed its doors, never to be reopened.
The next day all banks in Berlin, save the Reichsbank,
were closed by decree.
The crisis in Berlin was bound to have serious reper-
cussions in London. The London bankers, drawing
upon the ample supplies of international short money
at their disposal, had made liberal advances to German
banks and industry. When the run developed they had
been slow to follow their American and French col-
leagues in withdrawing their advances. When the
smash came and the Berlin banks were closed, there-
fore, their German assets were frozen. Important
houses were believed to be heavily committed. The
foreign creditors of London became nervous for the
safety of their sterling assets. There began a run on
sterling.
How far these fears would have gone had confidence
in London otherwise been general it is impossible to
say. But there existed no such confidence. For years,
Continental opinion had been coming to the view that
the British system was dying of ossification. The in-
flexibility of the wage-level, the drain on the Govern-
ment finances of the colossal expenditure on un-
employment relief, the incessant propaganda for cheap
money, were widely noted. Englishmen travelling on
the Continent in those years speedily became aware
that, from the European point of view, these were the
conspicuous features of the economic position of Great
Britain. Rightly or wrongly, the Continent had come
to the conclusion that if serious strain were to occur
the adjustments necessary to remain on the Gold
Standard would not be made. The rejection by all three
parties of the recommendations of the interim report
of the Royal Commission on Unemployment Insurance
only confirmed this opinion. The publication of the
May report served to communicate something of this
alarm to Englishmen. The run on sterling was intensi-
fied. Apprehension became general.
In these circumstances the measures taken to meet
the crisis were not such as to restore confidence. Indeed,
so far as foreign opinion was concerned, they only
served to weaken it. Large sums were borrowed from
France and the United States in the attempt to stave
of! disaster. Now there was very good warrant in earlier
financial history for the adoption of such a measure.
It was not the first time that the Bank of England
had had resort to foreign borrowing when faced with
financial difficulties. The immense resources of the
Bank of France traditionally constituted a reserve line
of defence when London was in difficulty. But there
was this difference: in earlier crises the borrowing had
been accompanied by high rates of discount. On this
occasion the rate never rose above 4 j per cent. More-
over, there was made permissible an increase in the
fiduciary circulation.
If we are to understand the Continental point of view
the significance of these facts cannot be overstated.
Ever since the war, British financial experts had been
travelling round Europe saying to distressed Govern-
ments: "You must put up your bank rate and you must
limit your fiduciary issue. Anything else is bad finance."
And now when the British crisis arrived we were
observed to do neither of these things. The bank rate
was kept low and we raised the fiduciary limit. I t is
said that the circumstances were different, that the
functioning of English institutions is exempt from the
criteria which Englishmen frame for the judgment of
other people's policy. But it is scarcely to be wondered
at that other people do not understand this; and that
the foreigner, still smarting from the lessons of domestic
inflation, thought that what was sauce for the goose
was sauce for the gander, and continued to withdraw
his money.
It is sometimes urged that if the bank rate had been
raised it would only have made matters worse. People
would have said, "The crisis is really serious now",
and would have withdrawn their money all the more
quickly. It is not easy to see sufficient reason for this
view. There may have been some who were unaware
of the gravity of the crisis. If there were, it is con-
ceivable that a rise in the bank rate would have roused
their apprehensions. But it is difficult to believe that
such were in a majority either as regards numbers or
as regards possessions. The Continental holders of
balances knew that the situation was grave. That was
why they were withdrawing their money. And one of
the main reasons why they thought it to be grave was
the belief that steps would not be taken to raise the
rate and contract credit. It is hard to believe that,
if they had seen such measures actually taken, they
would have been made more apprehensive. No doubt
much would have depended upon the time at which
these things were done. It may well be that, by the
end, the situation had become uncontrollable. But if at
the time when foreign assistance was first sought there
had been a stiff rise in the rate, it is at least arguable
that it would have been effective. The foreign credits
would then have appeared as a mass de manoeuvre
available for meeting bear attacks in a manner with
which M. Poincare had made Continental operators

familiar. As it was, they must have appeared merely
as a means of avoiding credit contraction. Hence they
actually functioned merely as a means for the safe re-
patriation of foreign capital.
A new Government was formed. The Budget was
balanced. But there was no rise in the bank rate. The
run continued. The last straw was a rumour of a naval
mutiny, greatly exaggerated in the Continental news-
papers. On September 21st, the right to draw gold
from the Bank of England was suspended. Great
Britain had left the Gold Standard. To the end the
rate of discount was 4 | per cent.
7. Thus ended the post-war Gold Standard as an
international monetary system. From this moment
the world was broken up into a series of competing
local monetary areas, some still on gold, some pursuing
different policies of their own. Before dealing with
these it is worth while looking back for a moment at
the period which had thus ended, and trying to get its
main lessons in proper perspective.
The post-war monetary reconstruction was not a
success. Its stability was never great and it ended in
chaos. It is often said that this failure was inherent in
its nature—that the experience of these years shows
the Gold Standard as such to be a generator of in-
stability. It was on the Gold Standard that the Ameri-
can boom was generated, it is urged. It was adherence
to the Gold Standard which was responsible for the
economic difficulties of Great Britain. It was the Gold
Standard which engendered this great mass of floating
balances which eventually brought the whole structure
to disaster. Experience is conclusive against the Gold
Standard.
But, if the analysis of the present and earlier
chapters is correct, this conclusion is unwarranted.
For none of these difficulties can the Gold Standard
as such be held responsible. The American boom, as
we have seen, was generated on a declining gold
basis. The English disequilibrium was the result of
the choice of a wrong parity and of failure to con-
form to its requirements. The floating balances, in so
far as they were a special danger, were the product
partly of the instability which preceded the restoration
of the Gold Standard—the flight from the franc—
partly of the persistence of the British disequilibrium.
In so far as the disaster of this period is to be attri-
buted to monetary causes, it was not conformity to
the logic of the Gold Standard, but rather disregard
of this logic, which was at the root of the trouble. It
was not the Gold Standard as such but rather the way
it was mismanaged, and the peculiarly perilous nature
of the environment in which the mismanagement took
place, which was the cause of the difficulty; not the
Gold Standard, but the choice of a wrong parity
and the attempt to work the Gold Standard on
managed currency lines, which were responsible for
the debacle.
There are, however, certain positive lessons which
flow from this recent experience. Two in particular
are conspicuous.
In the first place, it is clear that monetary disturb-
ances are likely to be much more severe than would
otherwise be the case if they are accompanied by inter-
national disequilibrium. Booms and slumps are likely
to take place as a result of monetary causes—in the
sense defined above—under almost any system, but
they are likely to be much more severe if they are the
H
outcome of the failure of the leading monetary centres
of the world to keep properly in step with one another.
I t is almost certain that the extravagance of the
American boom was, in part at any rate, a by-product
of the British disequilibrium. If we had been in equi-
librium with the rest of the world it is still unlikely
that the boom would have been avoided; but it is also
improbable that the peculiar distortions which accom-
panied it would have been present, nor would the
position during the slump have been latent with such
explosive properties.
It follows therefore that, if relative stability is
desired, international equilibrium is a major objective
of policy. But—and here is the second lesson of this
experience—it is clear that this international equi-
librium cannot be secured under the Gold Standard
unless the authorities in the various monetary centres
are prepared to work the Gold Standard on Gold
Standard lines. That is to say, they must be prepared
to allow the gold movements to produce their full
effect through the whole system. You cannot work a
local Gold Standard on "managed currency" lines.1
This is made abundantly clear by British experience.
No one will wish lightly to pass adverse judgment on
the eminent and disinterested men who gave such
unremitting labour to the conduct of the monetary
policy of Great Britain during these troubled times.
Viewed even from the distance of two short years, the
whole episode assumes more and more the aspects of
a tragedy, a tragedy in which judgments of praise or
blame are equally inappropriate. But in respect of the
actual implications of the policy they pursued, the
1
This does not in the least preclude concerted measures throughout the
world to damp down general fluctuation. See below, pp. 169-172.
verdict of Sir Josiah Stamp, himself a director of the
Bank of England, must be taken as final:
The charge often made by continental writers that the
responsibility ior working the gold standard throughout the
industrial organism was not recognised, must be admitted to
be in part true. The gold standard certainly presupposes that
the flow of gold to balance international trade must work out
its effects in raising and lowering costs; otherwise that standard
is meaningless. The gold wasflowingfor political reasons and
other reasons that were artificial compared with the balance of
trade, and every effort was made to prevent wages and other
costs rising and falling. The natural reactions of the gold
standard were, therefore, denied—denied no doubt, or pre-
vented, in self-protection, but all the same having the effects
of prevention in destroying the self-balancing qualities of the
gold standard.1
This is a hard saying, and its implications are even

harder. Rigidity of costs is inimical to the successful
working of an international standard, and for this
reason many have been led to seek relief in the device
of independent national currencies. Before we can
pass judgement on plans of this sort, however, we must
examine their operation in practice. But this leads to
the subject of the next chapter.
1
Economic Essays in Honour of (Justav Casscl, p. GO I.
CHAPTER VI
INTERNATIONAL CHAOS
1. THE abandonment of the Gold Standard by Great

Britain meant the end, for the time being at any rate,
of the international monetary system. Henceforward
the course of the depression in different centres varied
with the fortunes of the local monetary system, the
disunity itself giving rise to new complications and
disturbances. It is the task of this chapter to outline
the most conspicuous features of this period of mone-
tary chaos.
2. It is convenient to start with Germany. For the
crisis first became acute in Germany. And there are
certain special features of the German situation which
are deserving of separate comment.
The Germans did not abandon the Gold Standard.
Officially at any rate, when the Berlin banks were
reopened, the mark was still on a gold basis. For this
there were obvious reasons. The memory of inflation
dies hard. At the first sign of an official abandonment
of the Gold Standard there can be little doubt that
the mark would have become almost worthless. The
population to a man would have sallied into the shops
and bought anything rather than keep money. There
would have been a flight into commodities.1 It is said
1
Whether this would happen now if Unser Fuhrer in his wisdom decided
to pnt Dr. Feder's plans into operation, is another question. Perhaps inflation
is only conceived to be possible when there are Jews about. When there are
good Aryans behind the counter prices do not rise!
100
CH. vi INTERNATIONAL CHAOS 101
that agreements existed between the big concerns and
the trade unions that the moment the mark ceased to
be on a gold basis all dealings should be calculated in
dollars. No doubt this sounds childish to Anglo-Saxons,
who do not know yet what a major inflation is. But
the burnt child dreads the fire.
Moreover, quite apart from this psychological ob-
stacle there were stubborn mechanical reasons why a
depreciation wras not thought to be advisable. The
overwhelming proportion of the German debts were
contracted in gold terms. A depreciation of the ex-
change would have had the effect of increasing the
burden of interest. In those days, at any rate, there
seems every reason to suppose that the German
authorities honestly intended to make every effort in
their power to continue paying their debts. They
looked forward to a time when new credits might be
desirable. They entertained no desire for retreat into a
complete state of self-sufficiency. In such circum-
stances, and with such objectives, an abandonment of
the Gold Standard would have only increased their
difficulties.
But the Gold Standard was not maintained in sub-
stance. The facade was there. But the machinery
ceased to function. To maintain this facade there was
erected the most formidable apparatus of exchange
control yet known to economic history. The accu-
mulated knowledge of the inflation period was mus-
tered in the Reichsbank to elaborate a mechanism
which should make unofficial dealing in foreign ex-
change, if not impossible, yet so hedged about with
penalties and inspection as to reduce it to what have
probably been smaller proportions than those pre-
vailing at any earlier period. It is not impossible to
get money out of Germany on a small scale. But large-

scale evasion of the control is said to be almost out of
the question.
Now it may be possible to control the exchange by
measures of this sort. But it is not possible to control
the number of bills coming forward. That is a matter
which depends upon the volume of transactions
effected. And it is the paradox of measures of this
sort that the more efficient they are from the technical
point of view, the more inimical they are to the
restoration of trade equilibrium. As an emergency
measure against a flight of capital caused by purely
political disturbances they may on occasion be effect-
ive, though it is arguable that there are almost always
alternative measures which would meet the situation
more efficiently. But as a cure for less transitory dis-
turbances, be it an adverse turn of the terms on which
the country in question can do trade or a change of
disposition on the part of domestic and foreign capi-
talists in regard to the location of their investments,
they tend to be self-frustrating. By keeping up the rate
of exchange and apparently obviating the necessity
for credit contraction, they prevent that expansion of
exports which is necessary to restore equilibrium. And
the longer such restrictions last, the more rapid is the
rate of accumulation of deferred payments. Sooner or
later the controlling authorities are forced to take other
measures—repudiation of foreign debts, surreptitious
subsidies to export and so on. The exchange control
in Germany has been more efficient than anything
of its kind before, and at the outset the case for
its imposition must have seemed almost overwhelm-
ing. But it is no accident that German exports have
lost ground and that the position of the foreign debtors
vi INTERNATIONAL CHAOS 103
of Germany to-day is less hopeful than at any time
before.1
The situation in Germany was moreover compli-
cated by the peculiar arrangements made with foreign
creditors. In return for exchange control and certain
guarantees about internal repayment, the foreign
creditors of Germany undertook not to attempt to
withdraw their advances. No doubt it was an ad-
vantage to the monetary authorities in Berlin to be
immune from attempts at withdrawal. But the strict
control of exchange which such agreements necessi-
tated, still more the working of the arrangements as
regards repayment, were a highly dubious benefit.
Funds which would otherwise have left the country
accumulated in the blocked accounts, producing a state
of false liquidity peculiarly damaging to money rates
as a guide to rational investment. The insistence of the
foreign creditors that they should share in all repay-
ments by home debtors produced a situation in which
home debtors were even compelled by the banks to
defer the repayment of credits in order that the volume
of foreign repayments might not be "unduly" aug-
mented. The result was naturally an almost complete
paralysis of investment of any kind —a paralysis which
was all the more damaging in that it hit sound con-
cerns even more severely than the unsound. Concerns
which could have repaid all that they owed were
prevented from doing so. Concerns which had no hope
of repaying were kept alive. The result was, as might
have been expected, deflation and an intensification of
the depression.
1
It is perhaps worth noting that this diagnosis is not a case of wisdom
after the event. The substance of this section is adapted, with very little
alteration, from a memorandum written in conjunction with a friend for
private circulation in the early summer of 1932.
The whole episode is peculiarly instructive. It

typifies in a particularly vivid way that new mode of
dealing with economic diseases to which allusion was
made in an earlier chapter. The fact is that much of
the money advanced to Germany was lost, and lost
irretrievably. The right way to have dealt with such
a situation was to have recognised this—to have ex-
amined each case on its merits, to have wound up the
bad concerns, written off the bad debts and started
anew on a fresh basis. But this was not done, and has
not been done even now. Instead, a system was
erected which treated good and bad debts indis-
criminately, and perpetuated a state of uncertainty
and maladjustment in the capital market which had
the effect of causing still further deterioration in the
general economic position.
In all this the foreign creditors were by no means
without responsibility. No doubt the breathing-space
thus afforded gave certain influential houses which
had over-lent, the opportunity of retrenching in other
directions and steadying their position. But the safe-
guarding of the credit of individual lenders, however
important, seems a high price to pay for a prolonga-
tion of the general paralysis which was probably the
immediate occasion for political changes which have
already destroyed all Liberal institutions in Germany,
and may yet be responsible for even graver political
complications.
3. The abandonment of the Gold Standard by
Great Britain was attended by no internal disaster.
Having kept the bank rate at 4 | per cent when they
were struggling to keep on the Gold Standard, the
authorities decided that it was worth while putting
it up to 6 per cent now we were off. This obviated any
immediate danger of inflation and tended to restore

confidence. By February it was thought safe to lower
it to 5 per cent and henceforward by stages to 2 per
cent at the end of June. The dollar-sterling exchange
rapidly fell to about 3'85, and later in the year it
moved down to a lower level in the neighbourhood of
3-40. But for reasons which we shall have occasion to
discuss later on, there was no great rise in prices.
In September 1931 the level of sterling prices was 99.
Three months later (December 1931) it was 106. From
September 1931 to September 1933 it only moved
between 99 and 103.1
But what of the external position? How did the
change affect Great Britain vis-a-vis the rest of the
world? This is a matter of some complexity which it is
necessary to examine carefully.
In foreign eyes the abandonment of the Gold Stan-
dard by Great Britain was the equivalent of default.
In less troubled times the loss of prestige would have
been enormous. The chief centre of international
finance was not paying twenty shillings in the pound.
It is important not to under-estimate the effects of all
this on the absolute level of confidence throughout the
world. We may be quite sure that in future banks and
financial institutions will be much less willing to hold
balances in foreign centres. The restoration of the
Gold Standard on Gold Exchange Standard lines will
be a matter of much greater difficulty than it was
before. For good or for bad, the tendency for each
Central Bank to accumulate its own reserves of gold
has been immensely strengthened.
But actually the relative position of Great Britain
has not suffered greatly. Once off the Gold Standard,
1
Board of Trade Index (1913= 100). See Statistical Appendix, Table 5.
the policy of the Treasury and the Bank has been one
of great prudence. The Budget has been balanced. The
expansion of credit has been kept within limits. It is
true that they have refrained from taking any steps
towards a return to gold when it has been arguable
that such steps would have contributed greatly to a
stabilisation of world conditions. They have left the
rest of the world in great uncertainty concerning the
future of sterling. But in the face of what at times has
been an almost overwhelming pressure to indulge in
inflationary experiments, they have pursued a policy
of solvency and restraint. Moreover external con-
ditions have altered. As the result of causes, whose
operation we shall examine later, the position of other
financial centres has weakened. A balance in London,
although exposed to the fluctuations of the sterling
exchange, has on occasion seemed relatively safer
than a balance in most other centres—a pis alter no
doubt, but, so far as the relative strength of sterling
has been concerned, effective for all that.
The fall of the exchange meant a diminution of
power to buy foreign products. It is true that, in the
event, the prices of some foreign products fell so that
the absolute volume of such products purchasable
with a pound sterling was not greatly diminished. But
it is clear that it is less than it would be if the rate of
exchange were higher. No one who has had occasion
for foreign travel in the last two years will deny a not
inconsiderable impoverishment.
In the same way it has involved a relative shrinkage
in the real value of all debts owing to Great Britain and
payable in sterling. This is a sacrifice inevitably bound
up with the abandonment of the Gold Standard, yet in
no way contributory to the solution of the problem
which the abandonment of the Gold Standard may be

regarded as an attempt to solve. To relieve the over-
valuation of the pound and to get into international
equilibrium it was necessary either to reduce costs or
lower the exchange. The fall of the exchange viewed in
this light is simply an automatic instrument for reduc-
ing the price of exports and the power to buy imports.
But whereas the direct reduction of costs would have
left the real value of our sterling assets unaffected, the
fall of the exchange has also the effect of surrendering
part of such assets. It may be argued that default on
such payments was inevitable with the exchange at its
former level, and that the fall in the exchange may
therefore be regarded as a rough-and-ready arrange-
ment with our debtors. It is certainly true that it has
eased the position of such people and, to that extent,
may even have been conducive to their recovery. But
it is open to the objection applicable to so many of the
policies of the slump that it sacrifices good debts along
with bad, and most certainly sets a precedent likely to
be damaging to the prospects of prudent international
lending.
But it is a relief from over-valuation. Here too it
may well be objected that it is a crude method of
dealing with a very complex question. As has already
been emphasised, the maladjustments which were re-
sponsible for the disequilibrium in Great Britain were
not of that simple order which would be typified by a
state of affairs in which all money incomes were a
certain percentage too high. They were much more
complex than that. The fundamental obstacle to the
smooth working of the equilibrating forces was not the
height of the various cost items but their rigidity. The
depreciation of the exchange removes none of this. It
applies a crude cut to the gold value of all sterling

incomes. It leaves their relations unaltered and their
rigidity unaffected. Indeed it sets a certain seal of
inviolability on such arrangements. If we were prepared
to abandon the Gold Standard with all the fateful
consequences which that involved, rather than change
nominal incomes, under what circumstances would such
changes be deemed obligatory? Yet it is improbable
that the necessity for adaptation to external change
ceased in 1931. We may yet pay dearly for our refusal
to adopt what from the internal and short-run point
of view may well seem to have been the harder alter-
native.
None the less, the fall of the exchange was a definite
relief. By itself it did not, and it could not, remedy the
internal disequilibrium—the maladjustment between
demand for and supply of the various kinds of labour,
and the many other circumstances making for lack of
profits and depression. But it did mean that no longer
were the export trades to struggle against the burden
of an exchange out of relation to a level of costs which
seemed unyielding. It did mean that, in so far as the
internal disequilibrium was conditioned by external
factors, its occasion would be removed. It meant
further that, in so far as the exchange fell below its
equilibrium point, for the time being it conferred on
British exporters a comparative, though of course
necessarily transitory and in part self - frustrating,
advantage.
How far this happened it is quite impossible to say
with any great degree of precision. We do not know the
degree of over-valuation which existed when the Gold
Standard was abandoned, and we cannot know how
the equilibrium relationship has changed since that
time. The purchasing-power parity of the foreign ex-
changes is essentially a doctrine which is only capable
of affording quantitative guidance when few elements
in the situation are changing. But this has not been
the case in the period under discussion. The whole
framework of international trade has undergone, as it
were, a continuous earthquake. The changes in the
channels of trade have been so multitudinous that we
can really form no precise idea of the probable volume
of trade in more settled conditions. Moreover, the price-
changes to which we refer in any attempt to ascertain
the changes in the purchasing-power parities are them-
selves of a kind which is highly unstable. There can be
no doubt, as we shall see in detail later on, that some
part, at any rate, of the fall in gold prices during this
period is to be attributed to the effects of the fluctua-
tions in the exchanges. What value, then, can be attri-
buted to it as a measure of the change in exchange
rates which might be expected if exchange rates were
relatively stable?
Nevertheless on the crudest tests a considerable
degree of under-valuation seems probable. If we assume
that the dollar-sterling exchange was 10 per cent over-
valued at the time of the departure from gold, the
equilibrium rate would have been in the neighbourhood
of 4-42. The actual rate in the next four weeks was in
the neighbourhood of 3-90. By October 1932 gold
prices had fallen from 70 to 64, while sterling prices
had only moved from 104 to 101. This means a lower-
ing of the purchasing-power parity calculated on this
basis from 4-42 to 4-16. But the actual exchange stood
at about 3-40. This probably greatly under-estimates
the true under-valuation. A tariff had been imposed
on the importation of goods into Great Britain. This
must have had the effect of a not inconsiderable

raising of the equilibrium exchange rate. Moreover
the level of gold prices was clearly abnormal. Given
greater stability of conditions it was bound to recover
considerably. This diagnosis is in conformity with
what appears to be the common experience of mer-
chants and travellers. The fall in the exchange made
sterling abnormally cheap.
But there was no immediate response in the figures
of external trade. In October 1931 British exports
were £32,832,000. By October 1932 they were only
£30,440,000. Despite the enormous exchange advan-
tage there had been no important improvement. To
understand why this was, we must turn our attention
once more to conditions overseas.
4. When Great Britain left the Gold Standard her
example was rapidly followed by a number of other
countries who, by a number of obscure devices, con-
trived to depreciate their exchanges to keep more or
less in step with the depreciation of sterling. Some,
such as Australia, Argentina and Brazil, had aban-
doned it before. The following chart shows the varying
relation to the old gold parity of a representative group
of national currencies during this period.1
To the extent to which this was not brought about
by measures involving a (relative) rise in costs, such
depreciation involved for these countries too, for the
time being, a relative advantage to trade of the kind
we have discussed already.2 Any pressure to internal
contraction was transferred to the exchange market.
1
2
Whether the advantage was permanent or not depended upon the extent
to which there had previously existed real over-valuation of the currency.
If this were not the case, then necessarily the measures taken to depress the
exchange must in the long-run wipe out the advantage of depreciation.
INTERNATIONAL CHAOS 111
Parity Japan
-8-
-16-
•
-24- /N t \ ' " V '••"
-32-
Argentina
-4O-
-48-
Spain
-56- Splir^-
-64-
1931 1932 1933
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES

Percentage Discount in relation to Gold Parity
The depreciation of the exchange gave a bonus to

exporters.
But in the Gold Standard countries there continued
a most catastrophic deflation. In September 1931 the
index of wholesale prices in the United States stood at
71; by February 1933 it had fallen to 60—a fall of 15
per cent. At no period during the slump had the fall
been more extensive or more damaging.
We have examined already the general causes which
were making for deflation during the earlier stages of
the depression. These causes did not cease to operate.
But from September 1931 they were reinforced by new
tendencies—the results of the crisis of 1931. A sub-
stantial part of the deflation of 1931-32 must be
directly attributed to the break-up of the Gold
Standard.
At first sight this verdict may appear highly para-
doxical. The abandonment of the Gold Standard in-
volved a diminution of the demand for gold as a backing
for the currencies concerned. Surely this should imply
tendencies the reverse of deflationary in the Gold
Standard countries? The argument is plausible—if we
112 THE GREAT DEPRESSION c«.
think only of the long-run. In the long-run, if this
country and others remain off the Gold Standard and
other things remain unchanged, there seems reason
to suppose that the value of gold will be less than
it would otherwise have been—that the general level
of gold prices will be higher than it would have
been if the area of monetary use of gold had been
greater. The precedent of silver seems to bear out this
conclusion. The same volume of metal concentrated
in a smaller area will surely give rise to a higher level
of prices.
The argument is plausible. If we could assume that
other things would remain unchanged for a sufficient
period, no doubt the results predicted would come
about. But the impact effects of a change of the kind
we are considering are not of this order; and if the
change is on a large scale, they may produce new
changes in the situation which postpone almost in-
definitely the working out of the long-run tendencies.
In the short run the effects of such a change are likely to
be highly deflationary. We can best see why this is so
if we examine what actually happened.
The suspension of gold payments in London and the
fall of the exchange which followed meant a substantial
shrinkage in the gold value of all foreign balances
which had not already been withdrawn. The immediate
effect of this was violently deflationary. Central Banks
which had kept part of their reserves in the form of
sterling assets suddenly found their reserves depleted
in circumstances when the probability of unexpected
withdrawals was greater than ever before. It is said
that the Bank of France lost a sum exceeding the whole
value of its paid-up capital. The Bank of the Netherlands
openly announced a loss of over 30 million guilders.
All those smaller Central Banks which had been recon-
structed, often with the advice of British experts, on the
assumption t h a t a sterling balance was as good as gold,
suffered losses of comparable proportions. Nor were
other financial institutions which had abstained from
participating in the general panic in any better position.
Their assets, too, had lost 20 per cent of their value
overnight. One and all commenced a desperate struggle
for liquidity—a struggle which, by its very nature, was
deflationary in its incidence. When the reserve falls
and attempts are made to re-establish liquidity, it is
active investment which suffers.
But this was only the beginning of the trouble. The
struggle for liquidity was not confined to financial
institutions. The fall of the exchange which conferred a
benefit upon British exporters imposed a corresponding
disadvantage on their competitors in foreign markets
whose exchange had not also fallen. The German textile
manufacturer, the Polish mine-owner, the American
car exporter, all found their capital committed to lines
of enterprise in which its value had fallen. Naturally
they, too, commenced to struggle for liquidity—to
shorten credit, to diminish reinvestment, to save what
they could from the wreck.
Nor was this all. The commodity markets were more
directly affected. The fall in the sterling exchange
meant a diminution in demand from buyers whose
capital was in sterling. Now the demand from such
sources in many cases constituted an important pro-
portion of the total demand in the market. A diminu-
tion of such demand therefore meant a substantial fall
in gold prices. This fall, in turn, while it permitted the
British consumer to escape any big rise in sterling
prices, meant a further destruction of capital and a
further intensification of t h e struggle for liquidity.
These are things which to-day he who runs m a y read.
Yet at the time they first began, in this country at
any rate, whoever ventured to predict them, how-
ever pianissimo, wrote himself down as perverse and
obscurantist—out of touch with the best tendencies of
modern thought, unsympathetic to the economics of
the new era, enthralled in the tangles of the gold
superstition, etc. etc. etc.
All this followed from the effects of the first fall of
the exchanges. But these effects were now to be re-
inforced by policy. The Governments and the Central
Banks in the countries remaining on the Gold Standard
were composed of men educated in a strong mercan-
tilist tradition. It was not to be expected that they
should be content to meet the shrinkage in their re-
spective trade balances due to the tendencies just
described, by straightforward contraction of credit.
Moreover, if they had, an electorate still more strongly
innoculated with similar views would have set other
men in their places. Accordingly the various mercan-
tilist expedients were once again adopted. Tariffs,
exchange restrictions, quotas, import prohibitions,
barter trade agreements, central trade-clearing arrange-
ments—all the fusty relics of mediaeval trade regulation,
discredited through five hundred years of theory and
hard experience, were dragged out of the lumber-rooms
and hailed as the products of the latest enlightenment.
Protest, in the few cases in which it was made, was
completely unavailing. "You cannot put the clock
back", it was said.
It is difficult to exaggerate the state of confusion in
international trade which has been produced by these
arrangements. We have examined already the effects
of tariffs. But if we are to retain a sense of proportion,
it must be realised that, in these recent developments,
tariffs have been a relatively minor obstacle. It is the
exchange restrictions, the quota regulations, the im-
port prohibitions, which have done the greater damage.
And it should be added, it is the persistence of such
measures which offers the greater obstacle to recovery.
Given stability of tariff conditions, however high the
rates, the currents of trade may be expected eventually
to become adapted to the new situation. The existence
of a tariff is not inimical to the achievement of trade
equilibrium—although no doubt the equilibrium which
may be achieved in this way may be judged by com-
monly accepted standards to be inferior to that which
could have been achieved in its absence. But with
these other measures it is different. We have examined
already how exchange restriction prevents the restora-
tion of equilibrium. The same thing is true, although
for different reasons, of the quotas. When the volume
of goods that is permitted to pass the customs' barriers
is rigidly fixed and cannot fluctuate with price or
exchange fluctuations, then the entire mechanism of
international equilibration, be it by way of gold flows
or of exchange movements, is thrown completely out
of gear. It is sometimes thought that it can be replaced
by a series of barter trade agreements. But this is a
pure delusion, based on the mistaken belief that equi-
librium in the balance of trade between one country
and the rest of the world implies equality of exports
and imports between it and any other single country.
As soon as it is realised that this is only the case by
pure accident, the hope of reconstructing trade equi-
librium by a series of bilateral agreements is seen to
be quite without foundation. The concept of barter
equilibrium is applicable only to exchange between
two groups.
To this chaos there was added yet a further source
of confusion: the fluctuations of exchange. As we have
seen already, when the Gold Standard broke up in
1931, the exchange rates of the centres which aban-
doned it did not fall to a certain point and then remain
fixed; they continued to fluctuate over a very wide range
(see chart p. I l l above). In December 1931 the pound
sterling had fallen to 3-37. By April it had risen to
3-75. In August it stood at 3-47. By December it had
fallen to 3-27. The fluctuations in other exchanges were
of a similar order of magnitude.
The uncertainty created by these fluctuations was
in itself highly deflationary. It was deflationary in its
effects on day-to-day trade. If there exists a free for-
ward market in foreign exchange it is possible to some
extent for the trader to insure himself against exchange
fluctuations. But it was one of the objects of the
measures already described to prevent free dealing
in the exchanges. Over the area where exchange re-
striction prevailed, therefore, this expedient was not
available. And in the centres which remained free, a
wide forward market was not always operative. The
volume of trade therefore tended further to contract.
But beyond this, the uncertainty of the exchange
meant an almost complete cessation of long-term inter-
national investment. If it is possible to effect an insur-
ance of day-to-day trade and finance, it is out of the
question to carry out any similar operation for long-
term investment. There is no forward market in bonds
and debentures. Either lender or borrower has to take
the risk. If the exchange is fluctuating, therefore, a
considerable curtailment of foreign investment is in-
evitable. If it fluctuates widely, foreign investment is
likely to cease. But cessation of foreign investment in
a world which has been organised on the expectation
of a large volume of capital movement is in itself a
deflationary influence. In circumstances of uncertainty,
such as we have just described, this influence was
likely to be greatly enhanced. An investor in a Gold
Standard country was on the horns of a dilemma. He
was reluctant to invest at home because he did not
know what new damage the exchange was likely to
do to domestic industry. The only way out was to re-
frain from investing. But this meant a continuance of
deflation.
In all these ways the break-up of international mone-
tary unity aggravated the difficulties of the countries
which still remained on gold. I t is not surprising,
therefore, t h a t for many months after it had happened
the position of the countries which had been eased by
the breakdown showed such scanty signs of improve-
ment. Whether or not it be welcomed as a solution
for certain very pressing domestic problems, no really
impartial observer of world events can do other than
regard the abandonment of the Gold Standard by
Great Britain as a catastrophe of the first order of
magnitude. Will European democracy in the form we
have known it survive the repercussions it has engen-
dered? I t is much too early to say. But the question is
not irrelevant.
I t is sometimes said t h a t the dislocation was inevit-
able, that, given the initial disequilibrium in which
Great Britain was placed at the beginning of the slump,
similar results must have followed any measures which
eliminated it. Whether we adopted the method of cost
reduction or the method of releasing the exchange, it
was the same thing so far as the rest of the world
was concerned, it is urged. From the domestic point
of view the adoption of the latter eliminated all the
horrors of disputes between capital and labour.
Such a view seems based upon complete misappre-
hension. It may be admitted that the elimination of
our disequilibrium by internal contraction would have
caused some disturbance. It would certainly have
meant a disadvantage to the foreign manufacturers
and miners who competed with our exports. It would
have involved some contraction of our demand for
imports. But to argue that the probable effects of such
measures can be compared with the effects of the
abandonment of the Gold Standard is surely to lose all
sense of proportion. They would have involved no
diminution of the value of foreign balances. They
would have involved not the slightest probability of
undervaluation of sterling. They would have involved
no persistent uncertainties of trade. Suppose that in
the spring of 1931 there had been cuts in wage rates
in Great Britain of the order of 10 per cent—to
take a figure which was often quoted at that time—
is it really to be supposed that this could have given
rise to the crop of exchange restrictions, tariffs, quotas,
and all the other obstacles to trade which frantic
Governments elsewhere erected against exchange de-
preciation? There would have been some gain of com-
petitive advantage by Great Britain. There might have
been some competitive wage reductions elsewhere.
But in general people would have known where they
were. They would have been sure that there was a
bottom to this kind of contraction—and with a good
deal of grumbling and some obstruction no doubt they
would have accepted the result. But with the exchange
there was no such certainty. With a depreciating

exchange nothing was certain—not even the number
of exchange rates which could remain relatively stable.
It is impossible that domestic contraction could have
led to the same results as competitive depreciation.
5. This brings us to a new phase of the post-crisis
chaos.
In the summer of 1932 there began a small revival
of business. The orgy of trade restrictionism which had
followed the crisis of the previous autumn had begun
to abate its intensity. In Great Britain the effects of
the fall in the exchange and the restoration of financial
solvency were beginning to make themselves felt. In
other parts of the world, liquidation and cost-cutting
had reached a stage at which the restoration of profit-
ability at some not too far distant date seemed a legi-
timate expectation. The conclusion of what seemed to
be a definitive settlement of the Reparation problem
at Lausanne gave a stimulus to confidence. There was
a stock exchange recovery. The indices of trade and
production turned slightly upwards. For Great Britain
and for many other parts of the world this was the
beginning of revival.
But in the Gold Standard countries the position was
still very precarious. The revival in other parts was
to some extent the result of undervaluation of the
exchange. The position of those who had maintained
continuity of standard was therefore bound to be less
favourable. And the continued uncertainty of the ex-
change was further cause of difficulty. In the autumn,
partly as a result of the usual seasonal pressure, partly
as a result of apprehensions regarding default on the
American debt, partly as a result of the credit expan-
sion which had accompanied the conversion operations,
sterling began to fall. In October it stood at 3-39.

By December it had fallen to 3-27. Even when appre-
hension of default had passed, it did not rise above 3-43
until after the American crisis*.
In no country was this felt more severely than in
the United States of America. The banking situation
in that country had long been profoundly unhealthy.
The strain of two years of deflation had produced
panic psychology on the part of depositors. Especially
in the middle west, the banks were loaded up with
mortgages, the value of which was probably never
fully recoverable. As the international uncertainty
continued, gold hoarding became more and more pre-
valent. Only a revival of confidence could avert a big
disaster.
In these circumstances a desperate bid was made from
Washington. An unofficial ballon d'essai was launched
across the Atlantic. If Great Britain would stabilise the
pound, it was hinted, then the United States would be
prepared to write off a substantial slice of the war debt.1
Could anything have been more attractive? Here
was the pound sterling almost certainly under-valued,
but deprived of the opportunity of conferring the
maximum stimulus to recovery by continued uncer-
tainty about its future. Here was the offer, or sug-
gestion of an offer, that in return for taking a step so
much to our advantage we should receive the further
considerable benefit of a revision of our obligations.
Was it ever given to a great nation before in such wise
to be bribed into sanity?
But in vain. The antagonists of the Gold Standard,
the reflationists, had done their work too well. Go
back to the Gold Standard under circumstances quite
1
See the Economist, vol. cxvi., Jan. 21, 1933, p. 113.
as favourable as those under which the French went
back in 1927—an under-valued exchange and a large
margin for a cautious credit expansion? Never. Not until
the price-level is at the 1929 (or the 1924) figure, until
tariffs have been swept away and all obstacles to trade
removed. Sentiments of this sort were voiced freely
by the highest authorities. I t did not seem to occur
to these gentlemen that obstacles to trade would not
be removed until the exchanges were stable, that an
alleviation of the paralysing instability of the ex-
changes would have been conducive to a considerable
recovery of prices—a recovery which, unlike a return to
the 1929 price-level, would not necessarily carry with
it the dangers of inflation and collapse—and that the
perpetuation of the uncertainty with regard to the
future of sterling was creating a position in which
resort to competitive depreciation was more and more
probable.
Thus the opportunity for a restoration of inter-
national stability under conditions of maximum ad-
vantage for the ossified cost structure of Great Britain
was rejected. I t is unlikely to recur.
Meanwhile the position of the American banks was
rapidly deteriorating. Uncertainty with regard to
future monetary policy, alarm at the revelations of
weakness in unsuspected quarters which followed the
publication of the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion's accounts, the paralysis of business almost in-,
evitable in a change of political regime, had produced
an atmosphere of distrust which only needed a very
slight jolt to degenerate into complete panic. The jolt
came in the shape of a run on the banks of Detroit. A
bank holiday was declared in Michigan. The panic
spread. Other states followed suit. On March 4th,
1933, when President Roosevelt took up office, the

crisis had become general. A general bank holiday
was declared and the right to withdraw gold for export
was suspended.
The internal crisis was handled with great expedi-
tion. An Act was passed giving the President ex-
tensive powers to reorganise bankrupt institutions and
to regulate the reopening of the sound. An emergency
currency was provided. On March 13th such banks as
were judged to be sound began to reopen. The Stock
Exchange moved upwards.
But the export of gold remained in abeyance and for
over a month the position was obscure. There were
ample reserves of gold. The trade balance was favour-
able. To the outside observer, the obvious policy for
the President was to proceed as rapidly as possible with
the liquidation of the bank crisis and to redouble at-
tempts to stabilise the international position. "There
can be little doubt," says the American Institute of
Banking, " t h a t at the time the United States departed
from the Gold Standard its international economic
position was so strong and its own gold holdings so
large that no external pressure could easily have
forced suspension." * But the party that was now in
power had other views of policy. Inflationist senti-
ment, always a strong force in American policy, now
became dominant. The advisers of the President were
determined to carry through a policy of deliberate re-
flation. In the pursuance of this policy they conceived
that the Gold Standard would prove an obstacle.
Accordingly, when the banks reopened, the right to
withdraw gold was not restored. By a series of ad-
ministrative orders culminating in the refusal, on May
1
Anti-Depression Legislation, p. 101.
1st, of licences for the export of gold to meet matur-

ities and interest on United States obligations held
abroad, the abandonment of the Gold Standard was
confirmed. The dollar-franc exchange at par is 1 dollar
= 25-52 francs. In May it was 21-70. Thenceforward
it continued to depreciate.
These measures produced a revulsion of opinion in
Great Britain. Before the dollar had cut loose from
gold, opinion was hostile to any sort of stabilisation.
But now things were different. The fear of competitive
depreciation was seen to have been no illusion. The
advantage of the under-valuation of sterling, which
might have been consolidated in a general settlement in
February, now seemed likely to be snatched away by
still further under-valuation of the dollar. The political
repercussions of still further damage to the Gold
Standard countries, moreover, were not lightly to be
contemplated. If some stabilisation agreement were
not reached all hopes of a successful outcome of the
World Economic Conference would prove illusory.
Something must be done even at this late hour to re-
store the conditions of stability.
Accordingly when the World Economic Conference
met in June, the representatives of the leading Central
Banks had established a provisional agreement for
stabilisation. So far as Great Britain was concerned
the terms were certainly not as good as could have
been obtained earlier. Still, such as they were, they
were better than nothing. If they could be carried
out there seemed good prospect of stabilisation of
tariffs and substantial modification of the greater
obstacles to international trading. The terms were
such as to commend themselves even to the more
radical members of the American delegation. To
124 THE GREAT DEPRESSION OH. VI
many observers the prospects of sound recovery

were present.
But they reckoned without the President. The
abandonment of the Gold Standard and the expecta-
tion of inflation had produced a minor boom in
America. The Dow Jones index of the price of common
stocks rose from 59 in April to 92 in July. The prices
of raw materials were rising. Any move which set
a limit to the prospects of inflation was likely to
moderate the pace of the improvement. This was not
a prospect which commended itself to the presidential
mind. Moreover, he was now set on even more grandi-
ose manoeuvres. The Agricultural Adjustment Act,
which was to restore prosperity to the farmers (and
incidentally to win the Middle West from itsEepublican
allegiance), had declared as an object of policy the
raising of prices to the 1926 level, and the restoration
of agricultural prices to a pre-war relation to the
prices of industrial products. Could this be done on
gold? It was doubtful. The President therefore re-
mained recalcitrant and sternly called the assembled
nations of the earth to a sense of economic realities.
Thus at one stroke the prospects of stabilisation
were shattered. In vain did the reflationists in the
President's own team send imploring telegrams to
their chief urging him to accept the eminently reason-
able settlements they had negotiated. In vain did the
redoubtable, Professor Moley, hitherto the leader of
the American isolationists, bend every nerve to effect
a last-minute ..settlement. It was too late. As on an
earlier occasion, it had been easier to bamboozle a
President than to debamboozle him. The period of
international chaos passed into a new phase.
CHAPTER VII
RESTRICTIONISM AND PLANNING
1. IT is yet too early to say whether the American

emergency legislation will prevent the coming of some
degree of recovery. The various measures which have
been introduced each work in such different directions.
The National Recovery Act raises costs and fosters
monopoly. The Agricultural Adjustment Act restricts
output and subsidises immobility. The Gold Policy
attempts to raise prices by a method which increases
the scarcity of gold and imposes the maximum incon-
venience on the world at large. The unbalancing of the
Budget and the vast expenditures on public works
have an inflationary tendency which may well over-
ride the various impediments to enterprise created in
other directions and engender an inflationary boom—
a boom which, if the analysis of earlier chapters is
correct, would be likely to be followed by a deflationary
collapse. It would be futile to attempt to assess in
detail the relative importance of these various and
rapidly changing influences. It is more fruitful at this
stage, if we are to understand the broad conditions of
recovery, to examine the underlying principles of cer-
tain proposals for reconstruction. It will be observed
that such a discussion has a bearing on certain aspects
of the American experiments.
125
2. We may commence with proposals for restricting

hours of labour.
In recent years it has often been suggested that the
appropriate cure for the slump is a reduction of hours
of labour. The enormous volume of unemployment in
manufacturing industry, it is held, is a proof that with
modern machine production the amount of work to be
done is less than the supply of labour available. In
such circumstances unemployment is inevitable unless
steps are taken to ration the amount of employment
that any one labourer may secure. If this could be
done by a general reduction of hours, a great curse
would be turned into a great blessing—what would
have been unemployment for the part would become
leisure for the whole. At one stroke the problem of the
depression would have been solved.
Now there can be no doubt that a demand for a
given number of man-hours is capable of being spread
over a greater or a smaller number of labourers accord-
ing to the number of man-hours that each labourer
supplies. If labour is bought on an hourly basis, therefore,
or if it is rewarded according to the volume of product it
produces, a reduction in the length of time it is per-
mitted to employ any one labourer will in all proba-
bility involve an increase in the number of labourers
hired. It is by no means certain that the increase will
be proportionate—that for instance a halving of the
working day will result in doubling of the volume of
employment. A change of this sort would in many
businesses involve an increase in costs other than direct
labour costs, an increase in expenditure on supervision,
etc., which would diminish the amount available for
the purchase of labour. But, broadly speaking, it is not
open to question that the volume of employment could
VII RESTRICTIONISM AND PLANNING 127
be increased by spending the amount devoted to hiring
labour on the purchase of smaller quantities of labour
from a larger number of men.
But what does this mean? So far as production is
concerned it involves no increase on the existing low
level. The "work to be done"—the product to be pro-
duced—has been done by a greater number of people.
Even if we assume that there is no increase in cost, and
therefore no diminution in production, can this be said
to be a cure for depression? Has anything been done
which involves a revival of industrial output? Clearly
not. At best—and to ignore all the disorganisation
within particular business units, which such a change
would involve, is to make a very generous assumption
—the effects of the contraction have been redistributed.
And a re-expansion of production has been prevented
from taking place.
We can perhaps better appreciate the implications
of this if we look at the other side of the picture—
the effects on working-class income. It should be
abundantly clear from what has been said already that
an increase of employment due to a reduction of hours
involves diminution in the weekly wages of those
already in employment. If a man is paid by piece rates
a reduction in the time he is allowed to work means a
reduction in his income—though not necessarily a
proportionate reduction if his rate of output is greater
with a shorter working day; if he is paid by the hour,
then a strictly proportionate reduction will occur. This
is a well-known feature of organised short time in par-
ticular industries. There is nothing to suggest that it
could be different if organised short time were general.
But is this what labourers want? In discussions of
such proposals appeal is often made to the well-known
phenomenon that in the past increasing wealth per
head has often been taken out partly in increased
leisure. The historical fact is unquestionable, as is,
indeed, the probable existence of such a disposition on
the part of labourers. If wealth per head were to
increase it is probable that hours of labour would be
shorter. But such considerations are surely irrelevant
to the matter under discussion. If the labourers already
in employment wished to "take out" part of their
existing earning power in leisure—that is, if they
wished to exchange part of their incomes for greater
leisure—it would be open to them to negotiate. The
fact that they do not do so, that it would be necessary
to prevent them by law from working as long as they
do now, suggests that the adjustment that would be
brought about in this way would not be, from their
point of view, a movement towards equilibrium.
In fact, of course, the popularity of the proposal we
are discussing depends essentially upon the tacit as-
sumption that, if hours were shortened in this way,
weekly wages would not be lowered—that is, that the
price of labour per hour and piece rates would be
adjusted upwards. But if this were the case there is
no reason to believe that unemployment would be
diminished. For a reduction of hours, weekly wages
remaining constant, means an increase in the cost of
labour per unit. To employ the same number of men as
before would cost the same total amount. But unless
the daily output per man remained constant—a most
improbable outcome of the big reductions usually pro-
posed—the cost per unit of output would increase.
There would therefore be an incentive to a contraction
of employment. The volume of unemployment would
be increased.
It is sometimes alleged that this effect would not
follow, since the employers would borrow more from
the banks to finance an increase of their wage bill.
There seems no reason to believe this to be at all
probable, at any rate as a general rule. As a general
rule, business men will be disposed to borrow more
from their banks when the prospects of profit are in-
creasing. In certain cases when there occurs an un-
expected increase in costs which is not expected to be
permanent, they may borrow more than usual. But such
cases are to be regarded as exceptional. The justifica-
tion of such borrowing is the transitory nature of the
increase. A legislative increase of costs such as is
involved by a compulsory reduction of hours, wages
remaining constant, does not fall within this category.
The net effect of such a measure would be a contraction
rather than an increase of borrowing. If in the United
States, where, under the National Recovery Act,
measures of this sort have been put into operation,
there is not an absolute increase of unemployment, this
will be because of the simultaneous operation of other
tendencies—lavish Government expenditure and the
like—which work in the other direction more power-
fully. If recovery comes, it will be in spite of these
measures, not because of them. In isolation they are
inimical both to employment and to production.
3. It is clear then that a general restriction of pro-
ductive activity offers no hope of escape from depres-
sion. We may turn, therefore, to proposals for restric-
tion in limited areas.
The course of the slump, as we have already seen,
has been marked by extreme depression in agricultural
and raw material production. The industries producing
food and raw materials have suffered falls in the prices
they receive for their products far greater in magnitude
than those taking place at other points of the industrial
system. In many quarters, therefore, it has been sug-
gested that concerted measures for the restriction of
this kind of output are an essential condition of revival.
Only in this way, it is said, can the prices of such pro-
ducts be raised to their old level. Only in this way can
a "proper balance" be restored to the world economy.
So strong a hold indeed have such views on the minds
of certain leaders of opinion that there can be little
doubt that the news of widespread earthquakes and
inundations, which reduced substantially the total
capacity of the world to produce such products, would
be hailed by them as a bull point for general recovery.
A beneficent interposition of Providence would have
performed at a stroke a restoration of the "balance"
which a score* of international conferences might
accomplish much less perfectly.
Such beliefs are founded upon delusion. There is no
"proper balance" between one industry and another in
the sense of a ratio of prices which must not be changed
whatever the changes in the general conditions of pro-
duction. 1 The fall in prices of food and raw materials is
the resultant of two tendencies. Partly it is due to the
contraction of demand which is the sign of the down-
ward phase of a general fluctuation. On general grounds
we should expect to find the fluctuations of raw material
prices much greater than any other. In so far as it is
due to this, and to the superimposed deflationary in-
fluences we have examined, it is reasonable to expect
1
The whole notion of a proper balance between industry and industry,
of which so much is heard in popular discussion of planning, etc., is relevant
only to the sphere of aesthetics or military strategy, if it is not strictly re-
lated to considerations of prices and costs. Outside these spheres it is an
almost perfect example of the pseudo-concept—a concept which on analysis
proves to have no content of meaning.
that to some extent it will be reversed in any recovery
of trade. But it is due partly to an intensification of
productivity in these branches of production, due, not
merely to the influences of the boom, but to the march
of technical progress—an intensification of product-
ivity which has encountered a relatively inelastic
demand. In so far as it is due to such causes, there is no
reason whatever to expect a restoration of the old
price ratios. If the products whose prices have fallen
relatively are produced in centres from which no migra-
tion is possible, then, in the absence of restriction, we
should expect a permanent change of the same order
as the original fall. The inhabitants of such areas would
have lower incomes. The inhabitants of other areas
would have more to spend on other things. If they are
produced in areas from which migration is possible,
then there would come about some shift over to better-
paid occupations, which would have the effect of miti-
gating the original fall.1 But there is no reason to expect
that the old price relationship would be restored.
Now it is conceivable that restriction schemes may
have the effect of restoring the old relationship. As we
shall see later on, there are very grave difficulties in
the way of their successful management. But if they
do succeed, they do so merely by depriving those mem-
bers of the world community who would have gained
by greater cheapness of the benefits which the tech-
nical changes which brought about the initial price-
change have made possible. They are exactly equiva-
lent, if they are successful, to natural disasters which
limit productivity; or to a deliberate suppression of
technical progress. If they benefit the producers of the
commodity restricted, they do so by damaging the
1
See Chapter II. pp. 15-16, above.
producers of other commodities. A n d if t h e y become
widespread they are apt to recoil with damaging effects
even on those who originally benefited. Restriction
in one line of production may benefit the restricted.
Restriction all round leads to general impoverishment.
A rise of prices brought about by restriction in many
industries would be an indication not of increased
wealth but of increased poverty.
It is sometimes said, however, that such schemes
have the effect of restoring purchasing power and in
that way promoting recovery. Such contentions are
the obverse of the fallacy we examined in an earlier
chapter. A change of relative prices of this sort has no
direct significance so far as the total volume of spend-
ing is concerned. The man who has to pay more for
bacon has less to spend on cloth. The pig farmer might
borrow more from the bank. But the cloth manu-
facturer will borrow less. And, as we shall see later,
general restriction is probably deflationary.
An apt illustration of all this is provided by American
experience. For many years American agriculture has
been in chronic difficulties. Ever since the war the
prices of agricultural products have been tending down-
wards. In June 1920 the price of No. 2 winter wheat
in Chicago was 295 cents per 60 lb. In June 1929 it was
113 cents. The prices of cotton, maize, hogs and other
staples have moved, if not with the same rapidity,
at least in the same direction. The farmers, many of
whom mortgaged their farms in the boom period of
1920, have found it increasingly difficult to meet their
obligations. Even when manufacturing industry was
booming there was some distress in the agricultural
districts. With the coming of industrial depression this
distress has become widespread. Many of the most con-
vn RESTRICTIONISM AND PLANNING 133
spicuous features of American political history in the
last fifteen years are only to be explained in terms of the
influence of the difficulties of the farmers of the South
and the Middle West.
In all this there is no particular mystery for the eco-
nomist. The agricultural experts who provide esoteric
explanations in terms of deficiencies of marketing
arrangements, shortage of agricultural credit, inade-
quate diffusion of crop reports and the like, have lost
their way in a mass of not very interesting details.
They see the fly on the barn door but they do not see
the barn door itself. The difficulties of agriculture here,
as elsewhere in modern economic history, are to be ex-
plained, in the large, in terms of an increase of pro-
ductivity due to technical progress which encounters a
relatively inelastic demand. Superimposed on this are
the further difficulties due to the industrial slump—
difficulties which, as has been said already, may be
expected to disappear if manufacturing industry re-
vives. But, in the main, the secular tendency is clear.
Technical progress in American agriculture has been
very rapid. The American farmer is feeling with especial
force the pressure of those influences which in the
course of history have tended continually to reduce the
proportion of effort devoted to the production of agri-
cultural staples. In the beginning it was 100 per cent.
Since then it has been diminishing. In the absence
of restriction, it would in all probability continue to
diminish.
In such circumstances there is only one solution
which does not involve a deliberate rejection of the
fruits of technical progress, or a permanent impover-
ishment of agricultural producers. A certain proportion
of the producers of the products whose prices have
fallen must change over to an occupation the demand

for whose product is more elastic. There must be a
reshuffling of the labour force—a contraction of the
proportion employed on the production of products in
relatively inelastic demand and an expansion of the
proportion employed elsewhere.
Now there can be no doubt that such a process bears
hard on particular producers. A change of this sort
necessarily involves the breaking of old associations,
the rupture of deep-rooted habits. When its incidence
is slow, the transfer can come about mainly by a shift
of the younger generation. When it is more rapid, or
when it has been delayed by State intervention, the
propping up of agricultural prices by subsidy and
Government buying, more drastic movements are
necessary. There can be no doubt that in America the
political pressure from the agrarian interests has been
tremendous.
But it so happens that in America in recent years
there has been ready to hand an expedient which, while
fostering no artificial restriction and giving rise to no
false hopes for agricultural producers, would have un-
questionably done much to ease the difficulties of the
transition and to mitigate the pressure on the farmers
—a lowering of the industrial tariff. The American
farmer has been subject to two pressures—the reduc-
tion of his money-income due to the forces we have
been discussing, and an increase of costs, a curtailment
of markets and a reduction of real income due to the
operation of American tariff. This second pressure is in
no wise dictated by the operation of consumers' de-
mand or the course of technical progress. It is the
direct result of restrictions on division of labour im-
posed in the interests of manufacturing industry. Its
net result, so far as agriculture is concerned, is to make

the degree of contraction necessary to bring real in-
comes into equilibrium greater than would otherwise
be the case. A lowering of the tariff would have the
effect of extending agricultural markets, lowering agri-
cultural costs, raising agricultural incomes, and to that
extent relieving the pressure to contraction.
It would have been reasonable to expect, therefore,
that the policy of successive Governments would have
been based upon this knowledge. While doing nothing
that would hinder the movement from the more de-
pressed branches of agriculture, or raise false hopes of a
fundamental change in the direction of secular pressure,
a Government determined to give a square deal to
agriculture might have been-expected to strain every
nerve to reduce industrial tariffs—already, as we have
seen, a cause of general disturbance and disequilibrium
in the world economy as a whole.
But it was not so. We have already examined the
effects of Mr. Hoover's policy. The grandiose buying
organisations by which he tried to maintain agricultural
prices had the effect of demoralising markets alto-
gether, by the accumulation of stocks and the creation
of uncertainty. At the same time, by raising false
hopes in the minds of the producers, they tended to
arrest the contraction of agricultural production.
President Roosevelt has been more thorough. The
Agricultural Adjustment Act declares it to be the
policy of Congress "To establish and maintain between
the production and consumption of agricultural com-
modities . . . such a ratio as will re-establish prices to
farmers at a level that will give agricultural com-
modities a purchasing power with respect to articles
that farmers buy, equivalent to the purchasing power
of commodities in the base period. The base period

. . . shall be the pre-war period, August 1909 to July
1914." To this end it proposes in various ways to re-
strict production by paying farmers to throw land out
of cultivation. No reduction of tariffs has been carried
through, and the provisions of the National Recovery
Act make it extremely unlikely that any substantial
reduction will take place. It is worth noting that at
the same time under the Tennessee Valley Authority
Act steps are being taken to provide for "the flood
control . . . and the agricultural development of the
said valley".
Thus the net effect of the State intervention in
American agriculture is this. The industrial workers
will pay more for their food (they pay, as it were,
twice—once in the rise of price which restriction brings
about and once in the processing tax by which it is
hoped to subsidise the restriction), and the farmers
continue to pay high prices for industrial products and
suffer the curtailment of markets which is the conse-
quence of industrial protection. At the same time, the
subsidy which they receive for the curtailment of
acreage is a definite incentive to marginal producers
to stay where they are. Presumably when the agricul-
tural development of the Tennessee Valley has been
provided for, there will be more subsidies to keep part
of it out of cultivation.
4. Not all restrictionism is as avowedly restric-
tionist as the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The
subtler apologist for the various producers' rings,
pools, marketing boards and the like which, with the
enthusiastic support of the Governments of the world,
are rapidly being brought into being, will defend them,
not on the ground that they restrict sales and produc-
vri KESTRICTIONISM AND PLANNING 137
tion, but on the ground that they promote "orderly

marketing" and eliminate "wasteful competition".
They bring order into the "chaos of unrestricted
capitalism". They permit "conscious control" of the
fortunes of the various industries. All of which sounds
very pleasant. But it is not irrelevant to ask what it
means.
"Orderly marketing" means the raising or the main-
tenance of prices. The various pools and marketing
boards which have justified their existence in these
terms have all had this object in view and, at the
outset of their operations at any rate, have not in-
frequently succeeded in bringing it about. The more
candid supporters of such schemes have been quite
frank about this. Let us hear, for instance, Mr. Aaron
Sapiro, the founder of the American Pool Movement:
"When we go into co-operative marketing activities,"
he said to the Indiana Wheat Marketing Conference,
"do we say we are simply going to try to get some little
economy in the handling of wheat? No, because you
and I know that we can't handle wheat as far as the
physical handling alone is concerned any more cheaply
than the big elevator companies. . . . We don't say
that the purpose of co-operative marketing is to intro-
duce any economy in the physical handling of grain,
because we think that particular point is absolutely
too trifling to bother about. What are we trying to do?
When we talk of co-operative marketing we say this:
We are interested in raising the basic level of the price
of wheat." 1
Such changes are only likely as a result of restric-
tion—restriction of sales and eventually restriction of
1
Quoted by Boyle, "The Farmers and the Grain Trade", Economic
Journal, vol. xxxv., 1925, p. 18.
138 THE GREAT DEPRESSION
production. I t is sometimes urged that the basic price
can be raised merely by evening out sales throughout
a given crop year. This plea is singularly lacking in
substance. In the case of the staple gradeable products,
at any rate, there is no reason whatever to suppose that
fluctuations within the crop year are not evened out
already, so far as this is desirable, by the machinery of
the market. Whenever this matter has been investi-
gated by impartial observers the same conclusion has
been reached. The supporters of the wheat pool pro-
jects, for instance, made much of the contention that
wheat "dumping", as they called it, upset the course
of prices. The investigations of Professor Boyle and the
Leland Stanford Food Institute showed beyond ques-
tion that this was entirely without foundation. 1 I t is
quite conceivable, and no doubt very often happens,
that an isolated producer, temporarily short of cash,
may sell to a local dealer at a price lower than the
price he would have obtained if he could have waited
a day or two. But quantitatively such cases are not im-
portant. In any case they do not demand the setting
up of nation-wide monopolies as remedies. In the main
there can be no doubt that "orderly marketing", when
that stands for marketing schemes making it com-
pulsory for producers to market their products through
one central authority, stands also for restriction of
production. If it were not so, then it would not be
thought necessary to give the organisers of such
schemes statutory powers to limit output.
But is not some restriction desirable? The more in-
telligent supporters of such schemes will admit that
1
Professor Boyle examined the average price of cash wheat in Chicago
for forty-three years and found that the total spread for the year was nine
cents—barely sufficient to cover carrying charges (op. cit. p. 23).
they involve restriction, but only such restriction, they
will contend, as is indicated by the demand for the
product. If the conditions of demand make it desirable,
they will urge, it will be possible to relax the limits of
restriction.
To such a contention two answers are possible. In
the first place it is surely not irrelevant to point out
that an association of producers with statutory powers
to exclude competition is not necessarily the best judge
of the interest of consumers. Monopolistic bodies with-
out statutory powers may well be restrained from
great exploitation of their position by fear of potential
competition. It is not so clear that restraint of this sort
will dictate the policy of monopolies backed up by
State authority. "The interests of dealers in any par-
ticular branch of trade or manufactures is always in
some respects different from, and even opposite to,
that of the public. To widen the market and to narrow
the competition is always the interest of the dealers.
To widen the market may frequently be agreeable
enough to the interest of the public, but to narrow the
competition must always be against it and can serve
only to enable the dealers by raising their profits above
what they naturally would be, to levy, for their own
benefit, an absurd tax upon the rest of their fellow
citizens. The proposal of any new law or regulation of
commerce which comes from this order ought always
to be listened to with great precaution, and ought
never to be adopted till after having been long and
carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous,
but with the most suspicious, attention. It comes from
an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the
same with that of the public, who have generally an
interest to deceive and even to oppress the public,
and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both

deceived and oppressed it." x Nothing that has hap-
pened in the hundred and fifty years since this was
written has made it less applicable now than it was
then. State-aided monopolies of producers, now as
then, are not the best judges of the interests of the
consumer.
But even if this were not the case, even if it could
be shown that the State-aided monopolist, new style,
was a totally different animal from the State-aided
monopolist of Adam Smith's day,2 from the point of
view of the consumer there would still be reason for
regarding the principles on which he acts with very
grave misgiving. The criterion of restricting supply to
demand, which is so loudly proclaimed as the object
of these schemes, is no criterion at all. There is no such
thing as demand for a commodity irrespective of its
price. And so long as a price exists at all there is un-
satisfied demand for the product. Whether from the
consumers' point of view it is more desirable that the
demand which is left unsatisfied—excluded that is to
say—at any given price, should be supplied before the
unsatisfied demands for other commodities are pro-
vided for, depends essentially upon the prices of the
other commodities and the ability and willingness of
labour and capital to migrate from one line to another.
From the consumers' point of view, the only justifiable
restriction on the supply of one commodity is that
which is exerted by the competing demand for others.
The only justifiable restriction on the supply of
potatoes is the limitation on indefinite transfer into
1
Wealth of Nations (Cannan's Edition), vol. i. p. 250.
2
It does not seem very clever to argue that such a transformation is
effected by putting a "representative of the consumer1' on the Board of
Management.
potato production which is provided after a certain
point by the prospects of wages and profits elsewhere.
Before this point is reached restriction is damaging to
the consumer. Afterwards it is unnecessary.
Now this is not the view of the supporters of State-
aided monopoly. For them the underlying principle
of restriction—the rationale of the mysterious adjust-
ment of supply to demand to which allusion has been
made already—is just this, that no expansion shall be
permitted which lowers the value of capital already
invested in the industry. No doubt most restriction
attempts to do more than this—to raise the value of
capital already invested in the industry. But this is not
an aim to which public appeal is made. The public
policy of restrictionism is the maintenance of the value
of invested capital.
But this policy is completely at variance with the
interests of the consumer. The interest of the con-
sumer, as we have seen, is to get as much of each com-
modity as is compatible with the service of demand for
others. The maintenance of the value of invested
capital may very well mean that producers who find
prospects in one industry more attractive than the
prospects in any others are prevented from entering
it, that cost-reducing improvements of technique which
would greatly cheapen the commodity to consumers
are held up, that the "wasteful competition" of people
who are content to serve the consumer for lower returns
than before is prevented from reducing prices. Every
schoolboy knows that the cheapness which comes
from importing corn is incompatible with the main-
tenance of the value of the corn lands which would
be cultivated if import were restricted. The plati-
tudes of the theory of international trade do not lose
any of their force when they are applied to domestic

competition. The argument, for instance, that road
transport diminishes the value of railway capital has
just as much and just as little force as the argument
that cheap food lowers the value of agricultural pro-
perty. "To be consistent," said Ricardo, "let us by the
same act arrest improvement, and prohibit importa-
tion." * Economic progress, in the sense of a cheapen-
ing of commodities, is not compatible with the pre-
servation of the value of all capital already invested
in particular industries. A policy which is directed to
this end, therefore, is a policy which conflicts with this
conception of economic progress.
But do we want economic progress in this sense?
This is clearly a question of ultimate valuation upon
which neither economics nor any other science is
capable of giving a decision. All that science can do is
to present the alternatives. The ultimate decision is
one of will, not of knowledge. But, if a digression into
this sphere be permitted, it does seem pertinent to
observe that the majority of the human race are still
very poor and that if, in the interests of a supposed
stability, a halt is to be called in the process of raising
real incomes, it is an issue which should be squarely
presented to those who are most affected by it. It is
all very well for the dilettante economists of wealthy
universities, their tables groaning beneath a suffi-
ciency of the good things of this world, their garages
furnished with private means of transport, to say,
"Food is cheap enough. Charabancs are vulgar. The
railways are admirable. We have enough of plenty.
Let us safeguard security." It is for the millions to
1
On the Influence of a Low Price of Corn on the Profits of Stock (Gonner's
Edition), p. 253.
vii RESTRICTIONISM AND PLANNING 143
whom a slice of bacon more or less, or a bus ride to the
sea, still matter, to make the decision. It is not so
certain that, if the issue were clearly and honestly ex-
plained to them, they would choose the maintenance
of existing capital values. For as yet the issue has not
been put either honestly or clearly.
5. There are certain further aspects of restriction-
ism which, from the point of view with which we are
especially concerned in this essay, it is particularly
desirable to bear in mind.
The effect of restrictionism, as we have just seen,
is to maintain (or to enhance) the value of capital
already invested in the industry in which production
is restricted. But it does this by lowering the prospect-
ive return on capital which is invested elsewhere. If,
before restriction was applied, there was a tendency
for more capital to be invested in the restricting in-
dustry—and it is such a tendency which is the raison
d'etre of restrictionism—it should be clear that when this
channel of investment is closed, other channels where
the prospective return is thought to be lower must be
resorted to. That is to say, the productivity of new
investment is lower. There will be more invested in
other lines of industry than would have been the case
had restriction not been applied. The volume of
workers seeking employment in other lines of industry,
too, will be greater.
Now if investors are not quickly responsive to this
change in the rate of return on investment, the effect
will be a tendency to deflation. And surely this is not
improbable. The man who is prevented from reaping
a gain of, let us say, 7 per cent on investment in road
haulage will not immediately be content with the 6
per cent which is perhaps the best he can hope for
elsewhere. He will say, "Things can't be as bad as all this;
I must wait a bit". So he keeps his money on deposit
or in some short-dated security. There is a tendency
for saving to lag behind active investment—a drag
on the velocity of circulation. The proliferation of re-
striction schemes may preserve existing capital values,
but it is detrimental to the revival of investment.
But beyond this, and far transcending it in long-
run importance, is the tendency of restrictionism to
spread. There is a sort of snowball tendency about this
kind of interventionism which has no limit but com-
plete control of all trade and industry. It is clear that,
within the restricting industries, the State will be
driven to adopt closer and closer control if the schemes
are not to break down from evasion of their rules. It
is one thing to forbid farmers and others not to pro-
duce more than a certain quota. It is another thing
to prevent them doing so. The Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act which pays farmers to throw land out of
cultivation contains the pathetic proviso that such
restriction must be unaccompanied by "increase of
commercial fertilisation". How, short of the socialisa-
tion of American farming, do the framers of this stipu-
lation propose to put it into force?
But the tendency to extension of control does not
operate only within the industries already partially
socialised. It works just as conspicuously outside this
sphere. As we have seen already, the fact that pro-
duction in one line is limited means that more capital
and labour will be available for other lines of produc-
tion. The fact that some farmers who wish to grow
potatoes are precluded from doing so, because they
are not in the original restriction scheme, means that
more of other kinds of produce will be forthcoming.
But this increase in supply will bring down prices.
The earnings of those already in these lines of pro-
duction will be reduced. They will go to the Govern-
ment and say: "You have helped the growers of
potatoes to make higher profits, but it is time you did
something for us. If you don't, we shall insist that it is
a scandal and a shame that we are not allowed to
grow more potatoes." There is no law of analytical
economics which obliges us to conclude that a
minister of agriculture, anxious to make his way in the
world, will not tell them to go away and be content
with lower earnings. But experience suggests that this
is not the line he will adopt. And so new controls are
instituted. It is the overwhelming verdict of theory
and war-time experience that once Governments start
to control important branches of industry, if they are
not willing at some point definitely to reverse their
whole line of policy, there is no stop to this process
short of complete socialism.
6. But is this a tendency we wish to avoid? It is not
clear that this is the attitude of the present leaders of
opinion. Socialism is a term which is not universally
popular. But "planning"— ah! magic word — who
would not jplani We may not all be socialists now, but
we are certainly (nearly) all planners. Yet, if planning
is not a polite name for giving sectional advantages
to particular industries, what does it denote but social-
ism—central control of the means of production? A
"planned" economy introduced by right-wing parties
might for a time (until the parties of the left got
control) acknowledge certain rights to the receipt of
income, in the past associated with the ownership of
property, which would be destroyed at the outset by a
purely socialist dictatorship. But, if it were to be true
to its name, it could not acknowledge the substance of
ownership, the right of individual disposal of the actual
instruments of production. For "planning" involves
central control. And central control excludes the right
of individual disposal. Nothing but intellectual con-
fusion can result from a failure to realise that Planning
and Socialism are fundamentally the same. Now the
leaders of opinion want planning.
But do they know what they mean? Have they really
faced what planning involves? This is by no means so
certain.
I t is often thought that the erection of State-aided
monopolies of the kind we have discussed already is an
integral part of the general policy of planning, and that
the problems which confront the framers of such
schemes are essentially the problems of a planned
society. No doubt this belief is helpful to the interests
which benefit from the existence of State-aided mono-
poly: it enlists for the support of sectional exploitation
a body of disinterested opinion which would otherwise
be hostile. But it rests on misapprehension. The prob-
lems which confront the organisers of a particular
industry differ, not only in degree, but also in kind
from the problems which confront the organisers of a
planned economy.
A simple example should make this quite clear. It is
to the interest of any particular branch of industry that
it should have plentiful supplies of capital at low rates
of interest. Only if the rate of return on new invest-
ment in that industry were zero and the rate at which
it borrowed were also zero would its interest in more
and cheaper capital be at an end. But for the organisers
of the system as a whole it presents itself in quite a
different manner. For them it is not desirable that any
particular industry should have an unlimited claim, at

the lowest possible rates, to the limited supply of free
capital. For them the problem is essentially a problem
of distributing the given supply between different
industries. The solution of this problem is different in
kind from the solution of the former problem. Long
before the organisers of a particular industry would
cease to benefit from a reduction of the rate at which
they could borrow, there would come a point at which
the economy as a whole would lose by not devoting
capital to some other object. From the point of view
of the economy as a whole, making certain assumptions
regarding the relative importance of different con-
sumers, the greatest gain would be reaped when all
industries borrowed at an equal rate. From the point
of view of any particular industry there would always
be a gain in borrowing more cheaply than the others.
It should be clear then that the problem of planning
is not to be solved by giving each industry the power
of self-government (i.e. restriction of entry and pro-
duction). This is not planning; it is syndicalism. It
merely extends to whole industries the right to make
plans for themselves similar to the right already en-
joyed by individual entrepreneurs. But by eliminating
competition, or potential competition, it creates a
state of affairs much less likely to be stable—much
more likely to be restrictive—than the so-called chaos
of competitive enterprise. President Roosevelt may
think that by suspending the Sherman Act, and by
giving each industry the right to restrict competition,
he is creating the framework of an ordered society. But
he is likely to receive a rude shock. A planned economy
must be planned from the centre. This is the only
intelligible meaning which can attach to the concept.
7. B u t on what basis is planning to take place? 1 The
rationale of a planned society must surely be t h a t it
serves some purpose outside t h e plan. I t must be
planned for something. There are few who would
regard t h e mere imposition of a pattern as an end in
itself. W h a t purpose is t h e plan to serve? Whose
preferences are to govern t h e organisation of pro-
duction?
If t h e question is p u t in this way t h e answer seems
obvious. A democratic community, a t a n y rate, will
attempt to organise production to meet the preferences
of consumers. I t will not value branches of production
as such. I t will value them for the various individual
satisfactions which they make possible. I t will not
decide t h a t the production of boots must be a certain
absolute volume before it has ascertained the relative
strength of t h e demand for boots and t h e demand for
the products whose production has to be sacrificed if
capital and labour are p u t to this job rather t h a n to
others. I t will seek to distribute t h e factors of produc-
tion between different lines of industry in such a way
t h a t it will be impossible to withdraw them from any
one line and p u t them to any other without the pro-
ducts sacrificed being of greater value t h a n t h e pro-
ducts gained. And if wants change, or if t h e means of
satisfying them alter, it will seek to rearrange produc-
tion so as once more to attain this end.
But how is this to be done? W h a t mechanism is
available for ascertaining t h e complex and changing
tastes of the millions of different individuals constitut-
ing t h e community? And what means are present for
1
The argument which follows owes much to the work of Professor Lud-
wig von Mises. See especially his Gemeinwirtschaft. A translation of this
important book is shortly to appear in English.
deciding the relative efficiency of the different factors

of production for satisfying these ends? How will the
organisers of the planned economy choose between the
production of boots and the production of potatoes?
And having chosen, how will they decide the most
expeditious methods of production?
Let us examine first the ascertainment of the pre-
ferences of consumers. It should be quite clear that
this is not a matter which can be satisfactorily settled
by the methods of political election. The problem of the
planning of production concerns a vast multiplicity of
alternatives. It is not a matter of "Vote for Jones and
more umbrellas" or "Vote for Smith and more water-
proof suiting". Thousands of commodities are involved
and the possibilities of alternative grouping run into
many millions. It is clear that to attempt to solve the
problem this way would result in complete chaos—a
chaos which would result, not in consumers getting
what they wanted, but in their being given simply
what the planning authority on quite arbitrary prin-
ciples decided that they ought to want—which would
be by no means the same thing.
At first sight there seems ready to hand a much more
efficient mechanism. If the various individuals con-
stituting the community were given sums of money and
were left free to bid for the various commodities avail-
able, there would result a series of prices which would
be the objective register of their various preferences.
The market in this respect may be compared to a con-
tinuous election with proportional representation.
Every shilling spent is a vote for a particular com-
modity. The system of prices as a whole is the register
of such an election.
It might be supposed then that a democratic com-
munity, determined to plan production, would attempt

to resort to the market as a means for ascertaining the
relative urgency of the demand for the various com-
modities available. A plan which was based upon the
preferences of consumers would seek so to distribute its
productive resources that the demand for all com-
modities was satisfied to the same level of urgency.
If in making clothes a given quantity of labour
produced less value in price terms than it would
produce in the making of, let us say, fireworks, it
would be withdrawn from the one and devoted to the
other. And so with all the multitudinous instruments
of production.
But it is one thing to sketch the requirements of the
plan. It is another thing to conceive of its execution.
It is in carrying out these requirements of productive
organisation that the project of planning to meet con-
sumers' demands seems likely to encounter obstacles
of a quite fundamental character—obstacles of whose
existence the majority of the advocates of planning do
not seem to have the slightest suspicion.
The requirement of a rational plan, as we have just
seen, is that the factors of production (the land, capital
and labour) should be so distributed between the
various alternatives of production that no commodity
which is produced has less value than the commodities
which might have been produced had the factors of
production been free for other purposes. But how is this
to be carried out? How is the planning authority to
decide what distribution of resources satisfies this re-
quirement? We have seen that it can do something to
ascertain the preferences of consumers by permitting
the pricing of the different commodities they consume.
But clearly this is not enough. It must know also the
relative efficiencies of the factors of production in pro-

ducing all the possible alternatives.
On paper we can conceive this problem to be solved
by a series of mathematical calculations. We can
imagine tables to be drawn up expressing the con-
sumers' demands for all the different commodities at
all conceivable prices. And we can conceive technical
information giving us the productivity, in terms of each
of the different commodities, which could be produced
by each of the various possible combinations of the
factors of production. On such a basis a system of
simultaneous equations could be constructed whose
solution would show the equilibrium distribution of
factors and the equilibrium production of commodities.
But in practice this solution is quite unworkable.
It would necessitate the drawing up of millions of
equations on the basis of millions of statistical tables
based on many more millions of individual computa-
tions. By the time the equations were solved, the
information on which they were based would have
become obsolete and they would need to be calculated
anew. The suggestion that a practical solution of the
problem of planning is possible on the basis of the
Paretian equations simply indicates that those who put
it forward have not begun to grasp what these equa-
tions mean. There is no hope in this direction of
discovering the relative sacrifices of alternative kinds
of investment. There is no hope here of a means
of adjusting production to meet the preferences of
consumers.
Under competitive conditions this problem is solved
by a comparison of costs and prices. In a free capital-
istic society, the business man, deciding in what line
to extend his enterprise, will take two things into
consideration: on the one hand, the prices at which

various commodities may be expected to sell; on the
other, the costs which their production by various
technical methods may be expected to incur. His
expectations of price are based upon his knowledge
of markets. His expectations of cost on • technical
information coupled with knowledge of the prices for
the various factors of production. But the prices of
the various factors of production, which are the re-
sultant of the competitive bidding of the different
entrepreneurs, tend to reflect the value of their con-
tribution to the production of different products. If,
therefore, costs are below prices in any line, that is an
indication that additions to production in that line are
more valuable in terms of consumers' preferences than
the things which are being produced elsewhere—that
transfer would result in a distribution of factors more
in accordance with the preferences of consumers. If,
under competitive conditions, the cost of producing
potatoes is above the price which potatoes will fetch,
that is an indication that some of the resources devoted
to producing potatoes would produce things of more
value elsewhere. Computations of costs and prices
under competitive conditions are, as it were, a short cut
to the solution of the millions of equations whose
multiplicity we found such an obstacle to planning.
The free market does the rest.
But, unfortunately, it is not easy to see how such
computations could be made by a planning authority.
For the possibility of computations of relative profit-
ability of this sort involves the existence, not merely
of a market for final products but also of markets
for all the multitudinous elements entering into costs:
raw materials, machines, semi-manufactures, different
kinds of land, labour, expert guidance and, last but not
least, free capital—with the entrepreneurs constituting
the sellers and buyers, each acting according to his
anticipation of the prices in the various markets in
which they operate. But, by definition, the central
planning authority has abolished all that. I t disposes
of all resources. There is no division between buyers
and sellers. A plan is the centralised disposal of factors
of production. And centralised disposal of the factors
of production precludes the existence of free markets.
The planning authority can order production to be
organised how it wishes. But it does not seem to be in a
position to keep accurate accounts. How, then, can it
plan in the spirit we have postulated?
It is sometimes thought that this difficulty can be
surmounted by the creation of fictitious markets. The
planned society is to be broken up again into semi-
independent productive units, and the management of
these units must, as it were, play at competition. They
will bid against each other for factors of production,
sell their products competitively, in short behave as if
they were competitive capitalists. In this way the
planned society will be realised.
There is a certain aesthetic attraction in the con-
templation of a project which, setting out to eliminate
the institutions of a "planless" society—the "chaos of
competitive enterprise"—arrives finally at an attempt
to reproduce them. Unfortunately there does not seem
reason to suppose that the reproduction would be suc-
cessful. The propounders of such schemes conceive of
the problem in altogether too static and simpliste a
manner. They conceive of competitive prices as spring-
ing from the demands of clearly demarcated admin-
istrative units whose continuity can be postulated
without destroying the hypothesis that competitive

prices are realised. But this is not the case. The conditions
of demand and supply are continually changing. Tastes
change. Technique changes. The availability of re-
sources and the supply of labour and capital is in pro-
cess of continual alteration. Competitive prices in the
factor markets are the resultant of all this multiplicity
of forces influencing the disposal of individual capital.
For competition to be free the entrepreneur must be at
liberty to withdraw his capital altogether from one line
of production, sell his plant and his stocks and go into
other lines. He must be at liberty to break up the ad-
ministrative unit. It is difficult to see how liberty of
this sort, which is necessary if the market is to be the
register of the varying pulls of all the changes in the
data, is compatible with the requirements of a society
whose raison d'etre is ownership and control at the
centre. No doubt capitalism as we know it, encum-
bered on all sides by interventionism and State-created
monopoly, and distorted by the vagaries of mis-
managed money, is very far short of the accuracy of
competitive adjustment. But with all its deficiencies in
this respect, it seems a much more flexible mechanism
than the collectivist alternatives. The path towards a
completely planned economy is not a path towards, it
is a path away from, the organisation of production
which would fulfil most completely the preferences of
consumers.
In fact, of course, there is very little reason to sup-
pose that the authorities of a planned society would
resort to pseudo-competition. It is much more probable
that they would fall back upon frankly authoritarian
planning. They would attempt to manage production
as a whole as the general staff manages an army at war.
They would probably retain the price mechanism as
an agency for distributing consumers' goods, supple-
menting it when anything went very wrong by the
device of rationing, as in Russia at present. But for the
rest they would dictate production from the centre,
choosing what kinds and qualities seemed to them
most desirable. Such decisions, as we have seen, could
not be based on an accounting system with any very
precise meaning. The planning authorities would have
no way of discovering with any accuracy whether the
ends they chose were being secured with an economical
use of means. In particular lines of production they
could no doubt erect an apparatus which, from the
technical point of view, would be very imposing. The
Pharaohs did not need a price system for the erection
of the pyramids. But at what sacrifice of other goods its
products would be secured, at what economic, as dis-
tinct from technical, efficiency,1 it functioned, could not
be ascertained. The system would require the complete
regimentation of individuals considered as producers.
As consumers they could choose between the com-
modities available. But on the choice of commodities
to be produced they would have relatively little in-
fluence. They would have to take what it was decided
to produce. And what it was decided to produce would
be the resultant, not of the conflicting pulls of prices
and costs, but of the conflicting advice of different
technical experts and politicians with no objective
measure to which to submit the multitudinous alter-
natives possible.
1
For a more extensive discussion of the difference between the economic
and the technical see my Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic
Science, chapter ii., also my article on "Production" in the Encyclopedia of
the Social Sciences, vol. 12. It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that failure
to distinguish between the technical and the economic lies at the root of
nearly all the major confusions of contemporary economic discussion.
Is it certain that such a system would be more
efficient than Capitalism? Is it certain that the friends
of liberty and progress who are also friends of planning
have sufficiently considered the compatibility of these
aims?
8. If the world were united under a single Govern-
ment, the tendencies of restrictionism which we have
already examined would find their logical conclusion
in complete world socialism. In the world as we know
it, they tend to a world of national socialist economies.
If we examine the prospects of a world of this sort, we
find further reasons for doubting both its efficiency
and its stability.
The authorities of a democratic State which was run
on planned lines would presumably postulate, as the
object of their plan, the ideal which we have sketched in
the previous section—the organisation of production to
meet the preferences of consumers. In carrying out the
plan, in so far as they were concerned with domestic
production, they would encounter the accounting diffi-
culties we have already examined. In so far as they
were concerned with production entering into inter-
national trade in one way or another, in certain circum-
stances their task would be facilitated. A socialist
State in a non-socialist world enjoys something of the
advantages of a municipal undertaking. It can base its
calculations on the outside market. It can judge the
efficiency of its own enterprise by comparison with
costs elsewhere. Because others buy and sell, it can
calculate. Of course this is all a matter of degree. A
large State doing a small international business with
the rest of the world would have small help here in
economic calculation. But a small State doing extensive
business with the rest of the world might well evade
most of the difficulties of economic calculation which
would arise under purely socialist conditions.
In such circumstances, the trade policy appropriate
to the aim of planning to meet the preferences of indi-
viduals would be one which approximated in all import-
ant particulars to the traditional free trade policy. The
productive resources of the State would be put to the
uses for which they were relatively most efficient in
price terms. If commodities could be procured more
cheaply from abroad, by way of producing something
else and sending it in exchange, this would be done. A
concern whose costs were higher than the costs of a
corresponding concern abroad would cease to receive
orders. It would have to go out of business. The capital
and labour there employed would have to be put to
other uses. The ideal trade policy of a State planned to
raise to a maximum the real incomes of its members in
all these formal respects would exactly resemble the
trade policy of economic liberalism.
But is there the slightest chance that a State of this
kind would in fact pursue such a policy? Can we imagine
a socialist State permitting free imports to undercut
the products of its own factories? Surely not. All the
probabilities point to a policy of restrictionism. Having
invested resources in a given set of undertakings, the
policy actually adopted would be to maintain their
value intact. If this necessitated the exclusion of com-
peting foreign imports, they would be excluded without
hesitation. It would be so much easier, it would cause
so much less friction with the producers, to do this than
to bring about the changes in the organisation of pro-
duction which the new conditions of international
supply and demand made desirable. If the conditions
of international trade were such as to call simply for
an expansion of established export industries a t a con-
stant or rising rate of money incomes, this tendency-
would not operate. B u t a planned economy which did
not occupy so fortunate a position—an economy whose
position in t h e world was such as to necessitate con-
tinual readjustments if t h e full advantages of inter-
national exchange were to be enjoyed—would almost
inevitably come to adopt a policy of greater and greater
isolation. The ideal socialist policy would be equivalent
to t h e free trade adjustment. The actual policy would
be equivalent to something worse t h a n high protec-
tionism.
But all this assumes a planned economy operating
within a world of otherwise free enterprise. 1 A world of
planned economies would present a totally different
picture. I t would be a world of geographical syndi-
calism. Any semblance of a competitive market would
have disappeared. Inside t h e various systems there
would be authoritarian disposal of t h e factors of pro-
duction; between them a chaos of bilateral bargains
between State monopolies. W e have seen already t h e
disorder and indeterminateness brought about in Cen-
tral Europe and elsewhere by the a t t e m p t to make barter
trade agreements t h e foundation of trade policy. I n a
world of planned economies this disorder a n d indeter-
minateness would be general.
I t is often said t h a t in such circumstances the world
of planned States would be merged in a scheme of
world planning. W e have seen already t h a t there are
grave reasons for doubting the efficacy of this particular
solution. But, quite apart from this, how improbable is
such an outcome. The process which has preceded t h e
1
This does not exclude the existence of a good deal of petty trade
obstruction, tariffs, and so on.
VII RESTRICTIONS! AND PLANNING 159
state of affairs we are contemplating is a process which
in every direction has strengthened the forces of eco-
nomic and political nationalism. Vested interests of
officialdom and associations of producers, not to men-
tion the emotional forces which tend to be projected
upon anything specifically national, would all present
barriers to international union much more formidable
than any yet existing. A world in which the movement
of goods, of money and of people, is restrained and
impeded by national organisation is a world in which
the achievement of the international ideal, whether on
Socialist or Liberal lines, is more distant even than it is
at present. I t is mere self-deception to believe, as so
many Socialists now believe, that such developments
are an "inevitable stage" in the "right line" of evolu-
tion, just as it is self-deception to urge that it is right
to arm further to facilitate disarmament, to erect
tariffs in order to promote free trade, and so on. These
are not cases of reculer pour mieux sauter; they are
cases of recoiling to jump in the opposite direction.
Nationalism and internationalism in the field of eco-
nomic organisation are inimical to each other. Whatever
leads to the one must inevitably lead from the other.
It is difficult to believe that in such a world inter-
national peace would be safer, or national productivity
higher, than in a world of free enterprise. International
division of labour would be less; international invest-
ments almost negligible. To the existing causes of
political friction between States would be added a host
of economic frictions which do not arise when inter-
national trading is in private hands. A world of national
planning is not a world which offers high hopes of
political stability or economic progress.
CHAPTER VIII
CONDITIONS OF RECOVERY
1. UNDER what conditions might we hope for stable

recovery? It is not the function of the economist to
frame a day-to-day programme of action. But if his
diagnosis is correct, it should enable him to describe
the general conditions which must be satisfied if the
disorders he has indicated are to disappear. Whether
it is ultimately desirable that they should disappear
it is not within his capacity as economist to judge. On
the basis of what has been said in earlier chapters,
therefore, an attempt will now be made to outline the
conditions under which business might be expected
to revive and the tendencies to extreme instability, so
characteristic of the post-war period, might in some
degree be eliminated. Complete stability is probably
unattainable. But experience suggests that there are
causes of instability which could be eliminated if it
were so desired.
2. The first essential of any recovery from the posi-
tion in which the world now finds itself is a return of
business confidence. Much as has been done in various
ways to eliminate the causes of the initial dislocations,
men will not recommence business operations, they
will not undertake new commitments of any but the
most transitory nature, unless they have confidence
in the future. The revival of industry in the lines where
160
CH. VIII CONDITIONS OF RECOVERY 161
it is most depressed—in the capital-producing in-

dustries—depends upon a revival of willingness to take
long-term risks, to plan for a future beyond the day
after to-morrow. Enterprise is the assumption of risk.
But when risk is too great enterprise will not be under-
taken.
But how is confidence to be restored?
It should be quite clear from what has been said
already, that, political complications apart, the main
danger to confidence at the present time is the fear of
monetary disturbance. A world in which the exchanges
fluctuate on the scale on which they have fluctuated
during the last three years is not a place in which
any general revival of business can be expected. Local
revivals there may be, in the areas benefited by relative
under-valuation. But world-wide revival cannot come
from such causes. While this very paragraph was being
written, there came news of the depreciation of yet
another currency. Before it is printed, there may be
many more. There can be no healthy recovery on such
a basis. So long as there is danger either of loss of
markets through exchange fluctuations, or loss of
capital through internal inflation, investment will hang
fire and revival be retarded. The first essential of
world-wide recovery is some degree of stabilisation of
the foreign exchanges.
It is often said that stabilisation of this sort should
not be attempted until prices have risen. Until prices
have risen to the level at which they stood before the
slump started, it is urged, it is wrong to think about
exchange stabilisation. When we are back at the 1926
price-level, and not before, it will be time to discuss
such refinements as exchange stability. Such has been
the view of the English reflationists. Such was the
M
ground on which President Roosevelt destroyed the
prospects of the World Economic Conference.
Now it may be freely admitted that the level of
prices, which exists at the bottom of a great depression,
is not a level which it is desirable to perpetuate. No
one who has followed the analysis of the earlier chapters
of this book will be disposed to question the exist-
ence of deflationary tendencies which have reduced the
general level of prices considerably below the level
which the purely technical tendencies operative before
the slump h( gan would have led one to expect. No one
will deny th- x the presence of unusual risks in the shape
of exchange fluctuations, apprehensions of political
disturbances and the like, has held up spending to a
degree which has been highly deflationary. It is quite
clear that if confidence were restored there would be
such an increase of spending as would raise certain
prices considerably.
But it is one thing for prices to rise as a result of the
restoration of confidence. It is quite another to attempt
to push them up by deliberate monetary manipulation.
A rise in prices which comes from a return of confidence
is a movement which may be viewed without appre-
hension, provided that it is not too quick and that it
does not go too far. (The sudden uprush which comes
from relief from undue panic, as in the United States
in the May and June of 1933, is not of this order.) But
the rise of prices which comes from the anticipation
of inflation, the upward spurt which comes from a
momentary gain in the race of competitive deprecia-
tion, these are movements which, so far from creating
the basis of lasting confidence, are likely to destroy
the basis in which lasting confidence can be built. Two
years ago, when the present writer and others drew
VIII CONDITIONS OF RECOVERY 163
attention to the real danger of competitive deprecia-

tion to which the policy of isolated reflation was lead-
ing, fears of this sort were treated as academic and
illusory. At the present day, if they are to be dis-
credited, they must be described by other adjectives.1
Failure to stabilise at an earlier date on the part of
Great Britain was one of the main causes of the aban-
donment of the Gold Standard by the United States
of America. Failure to stabilise generally at the World
Economic Conference was one of the main causes of
the present grave economic and political difficulties
of the different members of the Gold Block, among
which are to be counted the most conspicuous of the
remaining parliamentary democracies of continental
Europe. If democracy goes by the board altogether,
among the chief States of continental Europe, the
chaos of international exchanges since 1931, although
by no means the only cause, will have played a not
unimportant role in bringing about the disaster.
As for the view that what is necessary is to raise
prices to the 1929 or to the 1926 level, it is perhaps un-
necessary to waste much time in argument. Whatever
may have been its influence two years ago—and as we
have seen it was the main cause for the British refusal
to co-operate in repairing the ravages of the disaster
of 1931—at the present day it is coming to be realised
that as an objective it is not merely illusory, but
positively harmful. If the analysis which has been de-
veloped in these pages is correct, one of the main
causes of the present difficulties was the inflationary
boom of 1927-29. To raise prices from their present
level to the level of the pre-slump period would be to
run the risk of a repetition of this disaster. Already it is
1
See a correspondence in the pages of the Economist, May 1932.
164 THE GREAT DEPRESSION cm.
abundantly clear that if recovery gets going at all—
and of course it is not certain that it will not be frus-
trated by war or b y Government policy—one of the
main tasks of the monetary authorities will be to
prevent it flaring up into a wild boom whose collapse
might well be associated with consequences even more
disastrous than anything which has happened in
the present depression. The policies which have been
pursued b y the Central Banks in the attempt to
counter deflation have resulted in the creation of a
basis for credit expansion much more considerable than
t h a t existing at the commencement of the slump. 1 If
business prospects were to brighten and confidence
were to be restored, it would probably be incumbent
on the authorities actually to contract this basis if
things were not to get out of hand. To carry through
such a policy of business stabilisation and at the same
time to attempt to get back to the price-level of 1926
are not compatible undertakings.
3. I t is clear, then, that some kind of provisional
stabilisation of exchanges is the first condition of per-
manent recovery. Having regard to the incredible con-
fusion into which the world has been thrown by the
exchange policy of the United States, it is improbable
that anything more than provisional stabilisation can
be hoped for until sufficient time has elapsed for it to
be seen whether the new parities are appropriate to
the permanent elements in the situation. I t would
certainly be most unwise to attempt to restore the
Gold Standard under conditions which would make its
operation impossible. The countries which are now off
the Gold Standard will do well to follow the example
1
See Chart above, Chapter II. p. 18, and Tables 13 and 14, Statistical
Appendix.
set by the French in 1927 rather than that set by the

British in 1925, in bringing about a final stabilisation
of the exchanges.
But while provisional stabilisation must come first,
final stabilisation must come later, if full recovery on a
world-wide scale is to be possible. There can be no re-
vival of international lending, no extensive reduction
of obstacles to international trade, until uncertainty
with regard to the exchanges is finally at an end. Until
international investment revives, until international
trade is relieved of some, at least, of the impediments
which now hinder its operation, it is futile to hope for
recovery to reach a very high level. This consideration
is important for all countries dependent to any great
extent upon relations with the outside world, but it
is especially germane to the circumstances of Great
Britain. Important as are the new industries catering
for the home market, there can be no full restoration
of prosperity for this country, without a considerable
restoration of international trade and international
investment.
On what basis should such stabilisation take place?
It is clear that two things are desirable. Firstly, that
monetary conditions in different parts of the world
should be kept in a relationship conducive to inter-
national equilibrium—that the local movements of
money and credit should be such as to bring about
those movements of relative prices necessary to avoid
a breakdown of the regime of stabilised exchanges.
Secondly, that monetary conditions in the world as a
whole should be such as to avoid the creation of large
fluctuations of trade and industry by the generation of
inflationary booms. Let us examine these requirements
separately.
So far as the preservation of interlocal equilibrium

is concerned, it is clear that the main requirement is a
mechanism which allows payments between individuals
and groups of individuals living in different countries
to exercise the same effect on prices as would be
exercised by similar payments between individuals and
groups of individuals living in the same country—a
mechanism which puts payments between countries
on the same footing as payments between counties.
If, on balance, the payments made from Edinburgh
to London in a certain period exceed the payments
made from London to Edinburgh, it is necessary, if
equilibrium is to be preserved, that there should be a
contraction of balances in Edinburgh and an expan-
sion in London. If this does not happen—if balances
in London are increased and balances in Edinburgh
are not diminished—then there is a net inflation, and
the disequilibrium in the trade balance will continue.
Precisely the same thing is true of international pay-
ments. The requirement of equilibrium is that the
movements of active balances should exactly balance
each other. If this does not take place, if in one
centre there is "offsetting" in the sense of creating
new credit to take the place of the credit which has
been transferred, then the conditions of equilibrium
are not satisfied. As we have already seen, under
conditions of this sort, most disastrous inflations may
be generated.
It is clear that such requirements would be fulfilled
by a banking system which was completely unified
and international. The balances in the various branches
in different parts of the world would expand and con-
tract automatically with the payments in and out of
the various customers. It would be within the power of
the controlling authority to maintain effective inter-
national and interlocal equilibrium.
Such a system is not practicable. In a world of
separate States, it is highly improbable that complete
surrender of the right to regulate the conditions of
supply of money would be made by the various
nations. It is an open question, on quite other grounds,
whether such a complete elimination of separate banks
is desirable. In any case we may be quite sure that such
an arrangement is not immediately probable. Inter-
national equilibrium will not be secured on these lines.
But the advantages of such an arrangement can be
secured in a much more practical manner. If the vari-
ous Central Banks agree to buy and sell one of the
precious metals at a fixed price and if they regulate
the volume of credit in their respective areas by refer-
ence to the fluctuations in their holdings of these
metals, expanding as they increase, contracting as they
contract, and rigorously avoiding "offsetting" credit
creation, the same effects will be secured as regards
interlocal adjustment as if the money of all these
countries were exclusively composed of the precious
metal or if the credit arrangements of the world were
in the hands of one bank. If prices and costs in a par-
ticular area are too high in relation to the world con-
ditions of supply and demand, payments out will
exceed payments in. Elsewhere the reverse state of
affairs will prevail. Payments out will tend to be made
by shipments of the precious metal which forms the
common basis of the different countries. If no "off-
setting" takes place, there will be a tendency for
prices and costs in the different areas to be brought
into equilibrium.
But what is this but that most maligned and mis-
understood institution, the Gold Standard, run, not

on the inflationist lines which caused its breakdown in
the years after the war, but on the strict lines which
the theory of the Gold Standard rightly understood
has always postulated? It was the rationale of the
Gold Standard in the sense in which it was always
understood by its intelligent supporters—it is not really
very clever to pretend that the bulk of expert opinion
in the past has always been actuated by ignorant pre-
judice—that it imposed on a world of separate national
States and national currencies the same conditions as
would obtain if the currency system were truly inter-
national. To be on the Gold Standard in this sense
meant that although the various national monies
might have different units of account yet the value of
these units was kept in a fixed relationship. Inter-
national payments had the same significance as inter-
county payments. Arbitrary increases in the local
supply of money could take place only at the risk of
being forced off the Gold Standard.
It is quite clear that such a system is not fool-proof.
It is not "automatic" in the sense that it is independent
of human volition. As we have seen since the war, if it
is attempted to work it without regard for the rules
which constitute its raison d'etre, it breaks down. But
so far as international adjustments are concerned it
sets a clear objective of policy. It possesses powerful
psychological sanctions. It provides a basis on which
men can trade and invest internationally with some
degree of confidence. The pre-war world in which such
a system prevailed was not immune from general
cyclical fluctuations but, save in outlying parts, it
was reasonably immune from the evils of fluctuating
exchanges and the paralysis of capital movements.
vm CONDITIONS OF RECOVERY 169
This it owed to the Gold Standard. The achievement of
even such a limited degree of stability would seem to
be a worthy object of policy in our own time.
But what about our second requirement, a monetary
system which avoids the generation of general fluctua-
tions'?
I t is quite clear that there is nothing in the Gold
Standard as such which precludes the generation of
such fluctuations. I t is possible to conceive them aris-
ing under a monetary system consisting solely of gold
coins and token money with no bank credit. Once bank
credit is taken into account, the probability of their
occurrence, in the absence of policy directed to secure
their elimination, becomes much greater. I t is clear
that the accidental variations of geological discovery
and mining technique do not necessarily guarantee
fluctuations of money supply conducive to the elimina-
tion of cyclical fluctuations. Discovery of this truism
has often afforded great satisfaction to first-year
students and platform speakers in search of cheap
effects.
But this is by no means decisive against the Gold
Standard. I t is clear that it is a safeguard against gross
inflation. Uncontrolled, it permits a certain degree of
inflation which no doubt may be very damaging. But
it sets a limit to such movements which does not exist
under a free standard. I t is unfortunately true that in
the past there is no example of a paper standard which
has not sooner or later suffered a degree of depreciation
inconceivable under any probable condition of the
Gold Standard. Moreover, if run according to the rules
inherent in the logic of its conception it is a safeguard
against local depreciation. There can be little doubt
that the extreme severity of the present depression is
due in part to the fact that it was the result of an
inflation conditioned by local disequilibrium. As we
have seen, the American inflation would never have
gone so far had it not been for the disequilibrium of
Great Britain. The American inflation is a product of
the absence of a banking policy on Gold Standard lines.
Beyond this—and for those who have hopes that in
time the growth of knowledge will permit the smooth-
ing out of the worst excesses of cyclical fluctuation,
this is the important consideration—there is nothing
in the Gold Standard as such which precludes con-
certed action for the stabilisation of business on the
part of the Central Banks concerned. Examination of
the probable trend of the gold supply during the next
two decades does not suggest any mechanical obstacle
to a policy of this kind. A "shortage" of gold in the
sense of an absolute diminution or a failure of supply
to increase as rapidly as the gold-using population is
improbable. A rapid increase—itself conducive to large
inflation on a world scale—is also unlikely. With prices
at anything near their present level the present supply
should be ample to permit of adequate reserves for such
Central Banks as want them. For the rest, the possi-
bility of concerted variation of reserve requirements by
Central Banks should be quite sufficient to ensure that
the fact that their respective systems were linked to
gold should not be an obstacle to the carrying out of
prudent action designed to mitigate the instability of
business.
But what form should that action take? It would be
lacking in candour to suggest that at the present time we
are in a position to draw up any very precise set of rules
for such action. Our knowledge of the more intricate
mechanism of fluctuations is far from complete, and it
is with the more intricate mechanism that a Central

Bank policy which is not to be intolerably wooden and
clumsy must be concerned. There is not complete
agreement among economists upon these matters. It is
agreed that to prevent the depression the only effective
method is to prevent the boom. But how this is to be
done is not a matter on which there exists unanimity.
Certain economists, impressed by the analysis whereby
it is established that the policy of the stable price-level
is not necessarily conducive to general stability, now
urge that the object of policy should be the stabil-
isation of incomes—that is, a price-level falling with
increased productivity. With the general theoretical
background of this proposal it is possible to feel con-
siderable sympathy. Many of the propositions in this
essay are based upon similar analysis. But at the same
time it is still possible to feel considerable scepticism
concerning the adequacy of such a prescription. The
price-level is a crude index for the carrying out of so
intricate a policy as the smoothing out of the trade
cycle. It is insensitive and slow to respond to what may
well be important changes of tendency. A policy which
waits on movements of the price-level before taking the
action necessary to arrest the development of a boom
may well miss the main opportunity of carrying out its
intentions. Much more promising, and at the same time
much more practical—at least in the opinion of the
present writer—is the suggestion that the banks should
pay chief attention to the movements of the security
markets and that group of prices which is especially
sensitive to movements of interest rates. If, as soon as
there appeared signs of a general boom on security
markets, the Central Banks were to take action to
bring it to an end, it seems probable that extremes of
business fluctuations might be avoided. Certainly this
is a policy which would have averted much of the dis-
tresses from which the world has been suffering recently.
B u t whatever m a y be t h e t r u t h in this very difficult
matter, one thing seems tolerably certain. The policy
of stabilising t h e general level of prices and ignoring all
other movements is a snare and a delusion. I t was this
policy, conjoined with t h a t other policy of frustrating
t h e effects of gold movements, to which we have already
alluded, which was largely responsible for t h e catas-
trophe of 1929. Again and again during t h e boom years
we were assured by men who should have known better
t h a t t h e trade cycle h a d been eliminated, t h a t so long
as prices did not rise there was no fear of over-
expansion, t h a t the boom in land and common stocks
was merely a reflection of t h e increased value of
property, and t h a t if there were any sign of a fall
of prices due to a transfer of expenditure to Stock
Exchange and real-estate speculation, t h e n t h e Central
Banks should create more credit to support t h e specula-
tion. This policy was pursued. Y e t such is t h e inflexi-
bility of t h e h u m a n mind t h a t , in spite of all t h a t it led
to, there are yet to be heard voices urging t h a t a similar
policy should be adopted in t h e next period of pro-
sperity. I t is no accident t h a t t h e y are t h e voices of men
who failed utterly to see w h a t was happening before
t h e depression, and who t h r o u g h o u t t h e slump, no
d o u b t with t h e best will in the world, have consistently
supported those policies which have arrested liquida-
tion, prolonged uncertainty and delayed t h e coming of
recovery.
4. I t is t h e a r g u m e n t of the preceding section t h a t
a condition of final recovery is t h e restoration of a n
international Gold S t a n d a r d managed with a view t o
preserving interlocal equilibrium and avoiding the
development of booms. There can be little doubt that
at the present time a policy of this sort commands the
approval of a growing body of expert opinion. But it is
by no means generally accepted. In this country, at
any rate, there are those who favour a more separ-
atist policy. They are willing to undertake a pro-
visional stabilisation. They are willing to preserve a
certain relation between the national currency and
gold. But they are unwilling to fix a permanent parity.
A Gold Standard with movable parities, not merely
during the period of provisional stabilisation but also
as a permanent arrangement, is the object of their
policy. Such influences must not be under-estimated.
It is necessary, therefore, to give full consideration to
their case. Incidentally this will cast further light on
the position here adopted. 1
The case for a Gold Standard with movable parities
is essentially the case for an independent national
standard. The arguments by which it is supported are
essentially the arguments by which the case for inde-
pendent paper standards has been supported in the
past. It should be clear that a system under which
interlocal adjustments are carried out, not by the gold-
flow mechanism with its local expansions and con-
tractions of credit, but by alterations of the par of ex-
change, is no Gold Standard at all in the strict sense of
the word. In its working it resembles the paper system
of pure theory. But because paper does not inspire con-
fidence, because the constant fluctuations of paper are
obviously damaging, it works behind a gold fac,ade.
The arguments for such a system are twofold. On
1
The argument of this section is necessarily somewhat technical; the next
section takes up the thread of the general argument of the chapter.
the one hand it is hoped that in this way it will be
possible to insulate, as it were, the area in which it
prevails from the general fluctuations of business which
occur in the outside world. On the other hand it is
claimed that it provides a more effective method of
adaptation to changes in world conditions. Under the
Gold Standard proper, a change in the conditions of
world supply and demand may involve a contraction
of credit and a lowering of prices and incomes. Under
the Gold Standard with movable parities, a change in
the par of exchange will be sufficient.
The two arguments are not equally persuasive. The
claim that a national system will be enabled to insulate
the area in which it prevails from general fluctuations
of business is not at all convincing. We can leave un-
discussed the desirability of a mechanism which per-
mits experiments in local inflation. (The possibility of
varying the exchange removes the check of the gold
flow). History affords no ground for confidence that
such experiments will not be attempted, and, as we
have seen, there is not yet sufficient agreement on the
policy of monetary management to justify any very
great confidence in supposing that one area will do
better in this respect than the combined efforts of the
banks of the world as a whole. But, even if we ignore
these grave practical difficulties, there still remains the
important general question, Can a system, which is in
communication with the rest of the world, insulate
itself from world fluctuations by a device of this
nature? General reasoning affords no presumption that
it can. Indeed if the analysis of earlier chapters be
correct, there is a certain presumption that it cannot.
For if it be true that a business cycle is generated by
movements of interest rates which affect relative prices
in such a way as to cause false expectation, there is no

reason to suppose that a policy of local management
directed to keeping the local price-level constant or
gently falling would prevent the transmission of such
changes arising in other parts of the world. If prices
in general in one part of the world moved differently
from prices in the managed area, there would pre-
sumably be a shift in exchange rates. But this shift
in exchange rates would not itself affect the relative
profitability of different stages of production. If prices
in the capital-producing industries in the rest of the
world were affording a greater profit margin, then the
fact that the British exchange rate moved against the
rest of the world would not prevent the British capital-
producing industries receiving also a relative stimulus.
It is not at all clear that the fluctuating exchange by
itself is an effective insulator against this kind of
fluctuation. The principles of monetary management
which, in such circumstances, would eliminate dis-
turbance have yet to be enunciated.
The argument for independence and insulation,
therefore, is much less persuasive than might at first
be imagined. The argument for automatic adjustment
to changes in the terms of trade, however, is on a much
less fragile footing. It is quite clear that the rigidity of
costs in certain areas has been one of the great obstacles
to the successful functioning of an international stan-
dard. It is clear that in the future it may give rise
to difficulties. A system which eliminated such diffi-
culties without countervailing disadvantages would
have much to recommend it. The question is, does it?
Are there no countervailing disadvantages? It is this
question which is fundamental to the correct judge-
ment of this proposal.
It is important to realise the exact object of the

system if we are not to attach undue weight to the
result which it promises. If the fundamental conditions
of international trade bring about a lowering of the
equilibrium real terms of trade, then no power in the
world can prevent real incomes from being lowered or
unemployment from being created. If the demand for
Australian wool falls off, nothing can prevent the real
receipts derived from the sale of wool from being
lowered. The sole purpose of the device of the fluctuat-
ing exchange, therefore, is to put the receivers of fixed
money-incomes (contract wages, etc.) into the same
position as those who sell directly in the world market.
It is as though the people in the area concerned were
to say: "We know that the goods we sell in the world
market fetch a smaller weight of gold, but we don't
like admitting that the weight is smaller. We will
therefore change the unit of weight and pretend our
incomes are the same." Only of course they don't know
it. The essence of the device is to carry through the
adjustment without causing trouble. How long it would
be before wage-earners and others began to think in
terms of real instead of money wages, and whether it
would not be simpler in the end to instruct them in the
elementary theory of markets, we may leave undis-
cussed for the moment. Our question is rather, are there
accompanying disadvantages?
There can be no doubt that such a system would
impose considerable limitations on international in-
vestment. Long-term contracts between the inhabitants
of the different national areas would be subject to the
risk of an alteration in the relative gold content of the
respective currencies. A world of Gold Standards with
movable parities would be a world in which the volume
vni CONDITIONS OF RECOVERY 177
of international investment would be considerably
reduced.
Is this effect undesirable? A few years ago there
would have been almost unanimous agreement that it
was. The benefits of putting free resources to the point
of maximum return were so obvious; the part played
by the movement of international capital in the de-
velopment of the modern world was so conspicuous.
Who could have argued that the time had come to call
a halt to such a process—that what had made possible
the enormous increase in wealth of the last hundred
years had now ceased to have any function? And at
the present day, if we survey the wreckage left behind
by the slump, the crushing shortage of capital in those
parts of the world least able to provide it, can it
seriously be argued that a revival of international lend-
ing would be anything but beneficial? Nevertheless,
there can be no doubt that there has been* a certain
change of opinion. The slump has brought disillusion-
ment. So many of the international investments made
in the pre-slump period have proved to have been
misplaced, so much money that was sent abroad in
those days has been irretrievably lost, that to say that
a certain measure will diminish the volume of inter-
national lending does not nowadays arouse the appre-
hension that it would have done in the days before the
slump.
This attitude is surely unreasonable. Unquestion-
ably in the past there have been grave mistakes in the
business of international lending. Unquestionably in
the future there will exist political risks which will
militate against a revival of international investment.
It is certainly desirable that greater prudence should
be exercised in the flotation of foreign loans. But the
N
fact that risks which were previously ignored are now
recognised and that risks which did not before exist
have now come into being is no argument for an
arrangement which introduces yet another limitation
on business. The fluctuating exchange discriminates
equally against all foreign loans of the same class,
whether good or bad. It does not really seem a sensible
plan to deal with one set of risks by calling another into
existence.
Beyond this—and this is a consideration which has
especial importance for Great Britain—it is important
not to underestimate the structural and monetary
implications of a great diminution of the volume of
international lending. The structure of industry all
over the world has been based on the expectation of
large volumes of international capital transfer. The
export industries of countries like Great Britain de-
pend even in their present shape upon a substantial
volume of capital export. If this is to cease, these in-
dustries will have to be abandoned or totally trans-
formed. Moreover, the monetary effects of such a
curtailment are not such as to warrant the expectation
of a smooth transition. If the custom of exporting
capital from the centres in which the rate of return
on investment is relatively low to centres where it is
relatively high is to cease, the long-term equilibrium
rate in the erstwhile capital-exporting centres must be
very much lower than accords with present expecta-
tions. This means a danger that long-term investment
will hang fire, that balances will accumulate and, in
short, that that persistence of deflationary tendencies
in the system, which we all deplore, may be indefinitely
prolonged.
But this is not all. Quite apart from its effect on
long-term investment, the existence of a Gold Stan-
dard with movable parities is likely to create a highly-
dangerous and deflationary situation in the short-term
market. We have seen already, in an earlier chapter,
how the existence of abnormally large funds of liquid
resources, ready to migrate at short notice from one
centre to another, has caused dislocation and difficulty
in the chief money markets of the world. The setting
up as a final arrangement of a Gold Standard with mov-
able parities is likely to cause such a state of affairs to
be permanent. The prospect of alterations of parity
creates opportunities of investment which definitely
provoke extraordinary transfers of capital. There have
been abundant examples in the last few years. So soon
as it is thought that the parity may be altered there
develops an abnormal situation in the forward market.
Short-term funds begin to distribute themselves in
a wholly abnormal manner—flying from the centre
where downward valuation is expected, piling up in
the centres where consequential appreciation is likely.
It is difficult to see how this can be avoided. What
dealer operating in short money, who has reason to
anticipate a downward valuation of the money of the
centre in which he is operating, will not regard this as
a suitable occasion for an in-and-out operation? It is
pretty clear that a regime of this sort must necessitate
the most extensive measures of exchange control and
probably the nationalisation of the entire apparatus
of the capital market. Some may find this unobjection-
able; if so, they should say so explicitly.
Such difficulties would accompany a regime in which
the parities were moved only in accordance with the
"ideal" theoretical requirements. In practice it is
improbable that the movements would be of this order.
The advocates of this scheme often speak as if the
ascertainment of the appropriate movements of the
parities would be a simple matter. In fact it would be
a matter of the utmost difficulty. In works on theory,
in which the movements of exchanges are discussed,
it is assumed that the movements of the real terms of
trade, etc., which occasion such movements, are given.
In practice they would have to be discovered, and this
is no easy matter. To gauge the equilibrium exchange
rate it is not enough to know how technical productivity
in different areas is developing, though this is suffi-
ciently difficult. It is necessary to know the movements
in relative demand for different kinds of goods, to
gauge the effects of the import and export of capital.
It is impossible to believe that the authorities would
hit the nail on the head nearly so often as they would
if they were simply trying to maintain the Gold Stand-
ard. And if they did not hit the nail on the head there
would arise all those tendencies to international dis-
equilibrium which, since the over-valuation of the
pound and the under-valuation of the franc, we have
learned to know so well.
All this, moreover, assumes that the question of the
parity could be kept out of politics. But is it not almost
certain that it could not? No doubt there is no guarantee
that the working of the Gold Standard itself may not
be the subject of political debate and influence. This
sometimes happens. But can there be any doubt that
if the alteration of gold parities were to come to be
regarded—to use the terms of one of its supporters—
as "the most natural and easy means of adjusting
the international position of countries vis-a-vis one
another", it would become one of the most natural
and easy ways of appealing to the electorate? Can the
CONDITIONS OF RECOVERY 181
supporters of this policy contemplate with equanimity
the disturbance in the sphere of industry and finance
in a world in which mob voting on the parity was one
of the staple items of democratic elections? Would it
not be one of the most certain methods of discrediting
democracy?
But even if such a matter could be kept out of
domestic politics, is it probable that it would not create
injurious repercussions in international relationships?
This of course is a matter of practical judgement, not
of analytical economics. But it seems fairly clear that
competitive depreciation, the erection of anti-exchange-
dumping duties, systems of discriminating licensing and
the like, would be the almost inevitable accompaniment
of any manipulation of exchange rates. It would be all
very well for the supporters of such manipulations to
go round to the politicians of the nations undertaking
such reprisals, and to say: "My dear friends, your ap-
prehensions are groundless; we are only altering the
exchange to correspond with the alteration of the real
terms of trade. You must realise that this is in the
interests of international equilibrium." This is not the
sort of story which will go down with the manufac-
turers of competing exports. No doubt Gold Standard
adjustments, too, may have the effect of intensifying
international competition, and may occasionally pro-
voke tariff reprisals. It is improbable that they would
lead to the kind of competition in depreciation and
trade restriction which seems the most likely outcome
of alterations of parity. There will be no substantial
reduction of tariffs in a world of movable parities.
What, then, are we to say of the device of movable
parities? It follows from what has been said already
that the disturbance and limitations upon the smooth
working of the economic machinery which it brings
into being are in all probability even greater than the
disturbances and difficulties which we know may ac-
company the working of the Gold Standard. It follows,
too, that these disturbances and difficulties are almost
inseparable from the device as such, whereas the dis-
turbances and difficulties which have accompanied the
working of the Gold Standard are not bound up with
the Gold Standard itself but spring from causes which
with greater knowledge and goodwill we might hope to
see dissipated. But in matters of this sort we must not
abstract too much. It is improbable that in the next
few years all the outlying raw material producing
centres will restore the Gold Standard. And so far as
the smaller areas, which in the past have probably
already borrowed too much, are concerned, it is con-
ceivable that the disadvantages of such an arrange-
ment may not be too great, nor the repercussions on
world stability very considerable. But so far as the
great financial centres of the world—London, Paris,
New York, Amsterdam—are concerned, the weight of
argument is all the other way. If these centres do not
establish a common monetary system which permits
confidence in the future and eliminates uncertainty
with regard to the exchanges, the continuance of the
process of recovery to a very high level is improbable,
and the danger of a relapse into severe financial crisis
is very grave.
5. A stabilisation of exchanges and an eventual
restoration of an international monetary system, run
on the lines indicated above, would probably afford the
basis for a considerable recovery of business if political
conditions were favourable—if there were no war and
if domestic policy in the various countries was not such
as seriously to disturb confidence. Over a wide spread

of business activity, in one way or another, there has
probably been sufficient liquidation and cost reduction
to restore the prospects of profit if monetary instability
is eliminated. But recovery cannot be general, nor can
it be expected to reach a very high level, so long as
the various barriers and impediments to international
trade which have grown up in the post-war period,
especially since the slump, remain at their present high
level. Full recovery, let alone future progress, depends
upon the removal of, at any rate, the worst of these
obstacles.
It is important that in considering this matter we
should preserve a sense of proportion. As has been
argued in an earlier section, the existence of protective
tariffs on a considerable scale is not in itself an obstacle
to extensive business activity nor to a fairly rapid rate
of progress. During the period before the war there
existed extensive systems of protective tariffs, and
although there can be little doubt that they were inimi-
cal to the full exploitation of the advantages of the
division of labour, they did not prevent that consider-
able advance of wealth per head which was character-
istic of that period. No one in his senses would argue
that the establishment of universal free trade is a sine
qua non of business recovery at the present. But the
obstacles which limit international business at the pre-
sent time are on so much more extensive a scale than
in the pre-war period, and are of a kind so much more
disturbing to trade, that the situation created by their
existence differs not only in degree but in kind from the
situation of those days. In central Europe at the present
time, to be called a Free Trader it is not necessary to
cease to support a regime of high protection; it is
necessary only to oppose the existing systems of import
licences, exchange controls and quota restrictions. Be-
fore the world can hope for general recovery, these
obstacles at least must be swept away. In the present
situation a moderate tariff is a relatively minor evil. A
return even to the pre-slump level of tariffs would be a
most powerful stimulus to recovery.
This is not to say that there is anything to be said
for tariffs as a positive means to prosperity. Nothing
that has been said in recent years has served to alter
in any substantial respect the strength of the case for
the maximum international division of labour, that is
the case against protective tariffs; and the technical
developments of modern industry have done much to
make that case even more pertinent than in the past.
The economies of mass production, which modern
technical developments make possible, are economies
which can only be reaped to the full if the market is
sufficiently extensive. Since tariffs necessarily con-
tract markets, it follows that the existence of tariffs
must prevent resort to the economies of mass pro-
duction being as widespread as might otherwise be the
case. A world of national States each striving for
economic autarchy is a world in which the economies
of large-scale production can never be fully exploited.
A removal of the grosser obstacles to trade would be
a powerful stimulus to recovery. But the world would
continue to be poorer than it need be if it were con-
tent with tariffs at the pre-slump level. The creation
of an economic machinery more immune from fluctua-
tions, and capable of making available for mankind
the full fruits of technical progress, must involve a
definite reversal of the trade policies which have im-
posed increasing limitation on world trade since the
seventies, and a return to the policy of a progressive
freeing of trade.
6. A removal of the grosser obstacles to trade and
the prospect of a lowering of tariff barriers would do
much to enhance a recovery made possible by a stabil-
isation 6f monetary conditions. Neither monetary
policy nor he freeing of trade can guarantee a lasting
stability < business conditions, if the underlying
structure < business costs and organisation does not
regain its apacity for adaptation to change. As has
been emphasised in an earlier chapter, we misread
he lesson of the present depression if we
s violence solely to monetary disturbances.
seen, the nature of the structure within
monetary disturbances took place, the
Great Britain to get into international
, the delay in liquidation and cost reduc-
r the world in 1930, not to mention the
of State-aided monopolies and pools, also
rge part. It is quite certain that if, in the
price system becomes more rigid and busi-
oscillations which otherwise might be of quite a minor

order may develop into fluctuations of the same or
even great r order of magnitude will be very greatly
>
enhanced, rice rigidity and an ossified business struc-
ture woulc only be supportable in a period in which
the tempo •f change was very slow. But the tempo of
change in ur times is very rapid.
In recent years, the consequences of inflexibility
have been particularly apparent in the labour market.
As we have seen already, it would be a mistake to say
that the existence of a large body of unemployment
is necessarily due in the first instance to wage rates
which have been pushed above the point at which
employment would be normal. The initial change may
come as a result of some monetary maladjustment—
the restoration of the exchange at too high a level for
instance; or it may originate in some movement of
the conditions of real demand for the products of the
industry or industries in question. Nor is it true to
argue that if wage rates were perfectly plastic all un-
employment would disappear. Some unemployment
exists at the height of prosperity, and in times of
severe slump a complete absorption of all the un-
employed within a very short period is not to be
hoped for. But in general it is true to say that a greater
flexibility of wage rates would considerably reduce un-
employment; in particular, that a greater flexibility
of wage rates in the industries first affected by fluctua-
tions would almost certainly diminish the spread and
the violence of the repercussions of these movements.
If it had not been for the prevalence of the view that
wage rates must at all costs be maintained in order
to maintain the purchasing power of the consumer,
the violence of the present depression and the magni-
tude of the unemployment which has accompanied it
would have been considerably less. If the obstacles to
cost adjustment in Great Britain had been less for-
midable the whole history of the last ten years would
have been different.
This is a hard saying, and there can be little wonder
that men of humanity, especially those who are not
themselves of the wage-earning classes and who there-
fore feel a natural reluctance to say anything which
may seem to imply a desire that the position of others
should be even temporarily worsened, should be loath
to accept it. But it can be rejected only as a result
of failure to perceive the significance of the wage

contract in the organisation of modern industry. If
industry were run by groups of independent pro-
ducers and if the demand for their products were to fall
off, it would be inevitable either that prices would have
to be lowered or that some of the products would re-
main unsold. If the buyers in the market place a lower
valuation on the product but the sellers maintain their
prices, then they are left with supplies on their hands.
But substantially the same is true when industry is
organised by capitalist employers. The employers sell
the products of industry and pay the wage-earners out
of the capital thus maintained. If there is a diminu-
tion of demand, the first impact of the shock falls
upon profits. It is right that this should be so, for it is
the function of the entrepreneur to assume the main
risks of enterprise. But profits are not indefinitely
squeezable, nor are the other non-wage elements in
costs. So that if the fluctuation is at all severe, either
there must be some downward modification of wage
rates or some of the labour offered at the old price
must remain unemployed. This conclusion is abund-
antly borne out by experience. Unemployment is pre-
dominantly a phenomenon of those industries where
the market for labour and the market for the product
are separated, as it were, by the wage contract. The
areas of unemployment to-day are the areas of contract
wages. Peasant producers are not unemployed in trade
fluctuations. They suffer an automatic reduction of
money-income.
Once this is clear, the attitude of the true humani-
tarian must surely assume a new complexion. He will
naturally be anxious that the wage-earner should re-
ceive the full value of his part in the production of the
product. But he will realise too that a policy which
holds wage rates rigid when the equilibrium rate has
altered, is a policy which creates unemployment. He
will regard it as hypocritical to blame the policy of the
trade unions more than, or even as much as, he would
blame other attempts at monopolistic restriction. But
he will remember too the victim of monopolistic restric-
tion, the unemployed man who is prevented by the
policy of maintaining wage rates from disposing of his
labour at a price at which it is possible for the con-
sumer to be induced to purchase the product. And he
will regard with some contempt the attitude of those
who, unwilling to face the facts of poverty, content
themselves with approving the enforcement of a wage
higher than industry can bear and avert their gaze from
the unemployment which they have thus created, or
deceive themselves that it springs from other causes.
It is sometimes said that this proposition that un-
employment could be diminished and fluctuations
avoided by a greater plasticity of wage rates involves
the view that wages should be reduced indefinitely
and trade unions prohibited by law. Such assertions
rest either upon crass ignorance or deliberate misrepre-
sentation. With a free demand for labour there is
no probability of an indefinite reduction of wage rates.
Nor is the disappearance of trade unions a necessary
feature of the restoration of flexibility of wage rates.
As selling and negotiating agents, trade unions per-
form a function which, if guided by a right conception
of policy, may well be conducive to the smooth func-
tioning of the market for labour. They prevent petty
exploitation and they eliminate a multiplicity of indi-
vidual bargains. What is necessary is that their policy
shall be guided by considerations of employment, and
that they shall not be allowed to prevent from working

those who, in order to avoid unemployment, are pre-
pared to accept a rate lower than the rate which has
previously prevailed. In order that the market should
be reasonably free it is not at all necessary that trade
unions should be prohibited. It is necessary only that
they, equally with other would-be monopolists, should
receive no support from the Government, either direct
or indirect.
7. But this brings us back to our main contention,
the necessity for the elimination of all kinds of inflexi-
bility. In order that recovery maybe assured and future
dislocations minimised, it is necessary not only that
flexibility should be restored to the prices of different
kinds of labour but that flexibility should also be
restored in other markets. There is strong reason for
attributing much of the severity of the depression to
the inflexibility of cartel prices and to the insecurity
caused by the existence of giant buying agencies in the
various commodity markets. If future fluctuations are
to be avoided it is necessary that these things should
disappear.
But how is this to be done? The answer is not very
difficult. As we have seen already, the worst cases of
market rigidity, or of insecurity of industrial structure,
are the creation of Government policy. Cartel prices
have never shown themselves unduly inflexible when
the cartels could not depend upon a tariff or other
forms of State support. Industrial monopoly, where it
does not depend upon natural monopoly, is usually the
by-product of Protection or a system of trade marks
and patent legislation definitely inimical to competi-
tion. Pools and restriction schemes flourish chiefly
when they receive Government support. It would be
foolish to pretend that the structure of capitalistic in-

dustry is such as continually to achieve the ideal com-
petitive adjustment. But it is fairly clear that the most
conspicuous failures to tend in this direction depend in
one way or another on authoritarian measures which
tend to foster monopoly.
If, therefore, it is desired to eliminate these sources
of instability, the policies of States in relation to in-
dustry must undergo complete revision. It must be a
maxim of State policy to do nothing to bolster up
monopoly. The habit of intervening to prop up un-
sound positions and to support particular interests
must cease. Nothing must be done which will encourage
business men to believe that they will not be allowed
to go under if they make mistakes or if the conditions
of the market make necessary a contraction of their
industry. Instead of being more and more an official
of the State, hampered on all sides by administrative
rules and regulations, the business man should be freed
as far as possible to perform that function which is his
main justification in a society organised, not for the
benefit of the part but of the whole, namely, the as-
sumption of risk and the planning of initiative. The
same principle must underlie the treatment of private
property. Property must be left to stand on its own
legs. Intervention to maintain the value of existing
property—i.e. to frustrate the effects of change in the
conditions of demand and supply—must cease. The
property owner must learn that only by continually
satisfying the demands of the consumer can he hope to
maintain intact its value. Only in such conditions can
we hope for the emergence of a structure of industry
which is stable in the sense that it can change without
recurrent catastrophe.
vin CONDITIONS OF RECOVERY 191
It is often said that this plea for the liberation of
trade and investment to the domination of the market
—that is, in the last resort, to the demand of the ulti-
mate consumer—involves a denial of State functions,
a demand for an anarchistic chaos. At the present day
if it is desired to discredit any proposal, however
modest, for the freeing of trade and industry, there is
no more certain appeal to the gallery, no more certain
title to the approval of the sciolist, than to say that
it smacks of laissez-faire. If this essay should be re-
viewed by any of the more popular writers on these
subjects, there is a 99 per cent probability that it will
be said to be based upon a laissez-faire philosophy long
since discredited among reasonable men, that it harks
back to a system which is past, that it ignores the
changed temper of the modern mind, and so on.
What laissez-faire was; whether there ever was a laissez-
faire philosophy in the sense usually implied; who
discredited it—these are, of course, questions to which
every intelligent man may be assumed to know the
answer. They are questions therefore to which answers
are never provided. Perhaps this is just as well. It is
the emotional effect which is important.
In fact, of course, the propositions under discussion
have no such implication. The plea that the market
should be freed, and that private property should be
left to assume the risks of investment and enterprise,
in no way involves the denial of the economic functions
of the State. Private property is itself a creation of
the State. The delimitation of its scope and the main-
tenance of the appropriate mechanism of contract is a
task of the utmost complexity, which can only be per-
formed by the State. No one who has any idea of the
nature of the problems relating, for instance, to the
192 THE GREAT DEPRESSION ™.
status of the so-called public utility undertakings
under changing technical conditions can believe, for a
moment, that in a world in which States abandoned
all the specific measures of intervention which have
here been the subject of discussion, their economic
functions would cease to be of grave importance to the
well-being of their citizens. In the context of this dis-
cussion the accusation of anarchism, of laissez-faire, of
a denial of the economic functions of the State, is a
pure red herring. All that is contended is that if the
ends of stability and progress are deemed desirable,
then States must abstain from certain forms of inter-
vention which analysis most clearly shows to be defin-
itely inimical to the achievement of these ends. To
meet this indictment of a whole trend of policy with
a smoke-screen of exceptional cases and metaphysical
discussions of State functions is not argument: it is just
obscurantism.
As a matter of fact, so far from such changes imply-
ing any abdication of the proper functions of the State,
it is becoming increasingly clear that it is only in this
way that their proper functions can be safeguarded.
One of the most conspicuous and disquieting features
of our time is the inefficiency of governmental institu-
tions—not the inability of parliaments or dictatorships
to "cure the depression"—they have already done so
much curing as almost to kill the patient—but their
inability to turn out laws which do not need to be
revised within twelve months of their being placed
on the statute book, their incapacity to pay sufficient
attention to the great issues which States, and only
States, can handle. The House of Commons, which, for
good or for bad, is ultimately responsible for the
government of India, can barely afford forty-eight
vni CONDITIONS OF RECOVERY 193
hours in a normal year for the discussion of Indian
business. The literature of political science abounds in
discussions of this problem. The pundits are never
tired of propounding new solutions in the shape of
adjustments in the committee system, devolution on
non-elected bodies, reform of local government, and
so on. But it is essentially a problem which cannot be
solved without a more radical limitation of State
activity. The congestion of governmental business all
over the world is due, in the last analysis, not to the
trifling imperfections of this or that system or parlia-
mentary procedure or to the absence of electric buttons
for recording the votes of members, but to the fact
that parliaments are assuming responsibility for more
than they can properly supervise. The maxim "to
govern well, govern little" is not to be interpreted in
the sense that government is a necessary evil to be
reduced to an absolute minimum, but in the sense that
when governments bite off more than they can chew,
they don't do their own business properly. The
tendency to dictatorship in the modern world is an
inevitable result of the fact that if democratic bodies
attempt to go outside a certain sphere, either they
do the business inefficiently or they abdicate their
functions.
8. I t has been the object of the last sections to show
that if recovery is to be maintained and future progress
assured, there must be a more or less complete reversal
of contemporary tendencies of governmental regulation
of enterprise. The aim of governmental policy in regard
to industry must be to create a field in which the forces
of enterprise and the disposal of resources are once
more allowed to be governed by the market.
But what is this b u t the restoration of capitalism?
194 THE GREAT DEPRESSION CH.VIH
And is not the restoration of capitalism the restoration

of the causes of depression?
If the analysis of this essay is correct, the answer is
unequivocal. The conditions of recovery which have
been stated do indeed involve the restoration of what
has been called capitalism. But the slump was not due
to these conditions. On the contrary, it was due to their
negation. It was due to monetary mismanagement and
State intervention operating in a milieu in which the
essential strength of capitalism had already been
sapped by war and by policy. Ever since the outbreak
of war in 1914, the whole tendency of policy has been
away from that system, which in spite of the persistence
of feudal obstacles and the unprecedented multiplica-
tion of the people, produced that enormous increase of
wealth per head which was characteristic of the period
in which it was dominant. Whether that increase will
be resumed, or whether, after perhaps some recovery,
we shall be plunged anew into depression and the chaos
of planning and restrictionism—that is the issue which
depends on our willingness to reverse this tendency.
CHAPTER IX
PROSPECTS
1. WHAT, then, are the prospects of enduring recovery?

It is clear that they are not bright. It is quite prob-
able, if there is no immediate outbreak of war on a
large scale, that the next few months may see a sub-
stantial revival of business. If the exchanges are stabil-
ised and the competition in depreciation ceases, there
is a strong probability that the upward movement,
which began in the summer of 1932, will continue.
If the stabilisation were made permanent and some
progress were made with the removal of the grosser
obstacles to trade, it is not out of the question that a
boom would develop. There are many things which
might upset this development. The basis of recovery
in the United States is gravely jeopardised by the
policy of the Government. The conditions under which
the dollar has been stabilised may lead to an inflation
there, or most severe difficulties, financial and political,
in continental Europe. There is the danger of war and
civil disturbance.
These dangers may not mature. It may be that the
next two or three years (or even longer) may be years
of comparative revival. But it is impossible to feel any
confidence in a continuance of stability. In the fifty
years before the war, in England, a man planning his
life on the threshold of his career might look forward
195
to a time of reasonable peace and security, conditioned

no doubt in part by the luck which governs so much
even in the most settled society, but determined also
by the vigour and the foresight with which he pursued
his aims. To-day not even the most fortunate can have
any such assurance. The probability of peace and pro-
gress in the next half-century is not very great. We may
not feel this at every moment any more than we feel
at every moment that we shall not live for ever. But
the rational grounds for believing the contrary are not
strong.
2. Why is this? There are two main reasons.
In the first place comes the danger of war. In the
years immediately following the conclusion of the last
war, the memory of what it meant and the relief at
being delivered from its horrors, were so intense that
most of us were loath to believe that such things could
be allowed to occur again. There was never very much
ground for this assurance, and recent events have made
it clear that what ground there was has largely ceased
to exist. So long as we could believe that the great body
of people in civilised countries hated war and would be
prepared to do anything to avoid it, it was possible to
view the growing diplomatic tensions in Europe and
elsewhere with the belief that these were minor diffi-
culties which patience and goodwill could eliminate.
The Nazi revolution has dispelled this illusion. We
know now that, for a time at any rate, we have to live
out our lives side by side with men whose conceptions
of the true ends of life are fundamentally different from
our own—men to whom the kindly virtues of peace are
contemptible and for whom the destruction of life is a
better thing than its preservation. We do damage to
the prospects of peace if we fail to recognise this fact.
PROSPECTS 197
3. These paroxysms may pass. But the economic
instability of the modern world does not seem likely to
diminish. The tendencies making for instability, which
we have examined in earlier chapters, have not been
weakened during this depression. On the contrary, they
have been strengthened. I t is true that there are some
signs of recognition of the mistakes which have been
made in the sphere of monetary policy. But as yet
there seems little will to repair them, still less to face
the wider economic consequences which such repair
would involve. For the rest, so far from there being
any recognition of the instability and confusion which
has been caused by the policy of interventionism, the
majority of the leaders of public opinion seem to have
drawn from the events of the last few years the con-
clusion that more intervention is necessary. All over
the world, Governments to-day are actively engaged,
on a scale unprecedented in history, in restricting trade
_and enterprise and undermining the basis of capitalism.
Such a policy is not confined to the Socialists. Indeed
the political power of the socialist parties in many
parts of the world may be said to be waning. But their
opponents, the dictators and the reactionaries, are
inspired by the same ideas. I t is a complete misappre-
hension to suppose that the victory of the Nazis and
the Fascists is a defeat for the forces making for the
destruction of capitalism. They have the same fanatical
hatred of economic liberalism, the same hopes of a
planned society. The differences are hierarchical. In
Germany it is a crime deserving of torture or exile to
be a Jew; in Russia to possess two cows. In our own
more tranquil community the differences are equally
non-economic. No doubt to their respective friends and
colleagues it seems to make a world of difference
whether agriculture is planned by Major Elliot or Dr.

Addison. From the economic point of view there is
continuity of policy.
Such policies, as we have seen, have a cumulative
tendency. They lead to an order of society which is
likely to be less stable, less free, less productive, than
our own. They lead, too, to an intensification of
nationalism and to an enhancement of the causes which
lead to civil strife. Men will not stand indefinitely a
regime of catastrophic fluctuations. Neither will they
acquiesce without blind protest in protracted im-
poverishment. We fail to realise the connection of
things if we attribute the civil disorder and the
nationalistic chaos of continental Europe entirely to
the malevolence of violent men or the lack of fore-
sight of the makers of treaties. The forces making for
nationalism and domestic violence have no doubt
been influenced by such factors. But they have been
enormously strengthened by the results of economic
policy. The unfortunate men who were shot down in
the streets of Vienna the other day were the victims,
not only of anti-democratic politics, they were the
victims also of an economic policy which had eaten
up the capital of industry, and by producing desperate
impoverishment had provoked a violent reaction. It
may be that in our more fortunate parts we have been
given a period of respite. We have not yet travelled
far down the Austrian road. But we deceive ourselves
if we think we can stand indefinitely fluctuations of
the present order of intensity.
4. It is often said that these developments are in-
evitable. The changes in policy which would be neces-
sary to avert.them are impossible, it is said, because
men will not stand them. Whether we like it or not
ix PROSPECTS 199
the modern world is set upon the creation of the in-

stitutions and the habits which cause instability. Pro-
test is unavailing. We can only go with the stream.
Such an attitude is surely unreasonable. If it can be
shown, as has been argued in this essay, that the pur-
suance of these policies leads to instability and poverty,
and if it can be shown too that these disasters are only
to be avoided by the adoption of policies not favoured
at the moment, then surely it is folly not to say so. It
is not really to be believed that the majority of men
in democratic communities are so in love with poverty
and instability that if they were convinced that certain
policies led in that direction they would continue to
support them. On the contrary, it is clear that they
at present support these policies because they believe
—wrongly it has here been argued—that they lead to
greater stability and progress. If they were convinced
otherwise, can it be doubted that they would abandon
them?
But can such things be in democratic communities?
Can men be led by reason? Are not the majority of men
so limited in outlook and so bound by prejudice that
it is hopeless to endeavour to argue with them?
It is conceivable. But the history of the modern
world does not bear out the contention. The policies
which at present prevail have been adopted, not be-
cause they have been forced on politicians by the
masses, but because the masses have been taught to
believe them. The masses, as such, do not think for
themselves; they think what they are taught to think
by their leaders. And the ideas which, for good or for
bad, have come to dominate policy are the ideas which
have been put forward in the first instance by detached
and isolated thinkers. If the direction of policy in
200 THE GREAT DEPRESSION CH. IX
Great Britain, and the modern world generally, to-day

is overwhelmingly socialist, this is not because it is
dictated by the objective facts of the situation, or
because the masses v/ith one accord have willed a
socialistic reorganisation of industry. It is because men
of intellect, with powers of reason and persuasion,
have conceived the socialistic idea and gradually per-
suaded their fellows. It is the same with monetary
policy. The measures of the last decade have been the
result, not of spontaneous pressure by the electorate,
but of the influence of a number of men whose names
could be counted on the fingers of two hands. We do
not appreciate fully the tragedy of this aspect of the
present situation unless we realise that it is essentially
the work of men of intellect and goodwill. In the short
run, it is true, ideas are unimportant and ineffective,
but in the long run they can rule the world.
There is, therefore, no reason to despair on the
ground that reason is necessarily powerless. It may
be that the forces, which have been released by the
ideas of forty years ago, have become so powerful—
so surcharged with mere mechanical impetus—that
it is now too late to arrest them. It would be unwise to
ignore the very strong probability that this is so. But
until the case, which experience and more recent
developments of knowledge have shown can be made
against them, has been argued with as much patience
and disinterested intelligence as went to the establish-
ment of their ascendancy, we are not justified in con-
cluding that reason and persuasion have reached the
limit of their effectiveness. At all events it is worth
trying.
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
STATISTICAL APPENDIX 203
TABLE I
UNITED KINGDOM
INDEX OF SECURITY PRICES
(1926 = 100)
Year and Year and Year and
Month Index Month Index Month Index
1925 1928 1931

January 96 January 120 January 84
February . 94 February . 119 February . 82
March 94 March 123 March 84
April . 94 April . 125 April . 82
May . 93 May . 129 May . 70
June . 93 June . 125 June . 72
July . 90 July . 121 July . 75
August 94 August 122 August 72
September . 95 September . 125 September . 68
October 98 October 128 October 76
November . 101 November . 125 November . 80
December , 99 December . 121 December . 71
1926 1929 1932
May . 99 May . 126 May . 67
June . 100 June . 123 June . 64
August 100 August 124" August 75
December . 101 December . 106 December . 80
1927 1930 1933
May . 107 May . 104 May . 84
The above index relates to the price of 92 ordinary industrial shares, the
prices being taken on the 15th of each month. The index is based upon that of
the London and Cambridge Economic Service, but the series has been recalcu-
lated from the original 1924 base for purposes of comparison with the
American index.
TABLE 2
UNITED STATES
INDEX OF SECURITY PRICES
(1926 = 100)

1925 1928 1931

February 84 February . 135 February . 110
May . 83 May . 155 May . 89
1926 1929 1932
May . 93 May . 193 May . 38
July . 100 July . 203 July . 36
1927 1930 1933
May . 113 May . 160 May . 65
June . 114 June . 143 June . 77
July . 117 July . 140 July . 84
Augiist 122 August 139 August 79
This index, compiled by the Standard Statistics Company, is based on 335-

351 ordinary industrial shares, the average of the closing prices on each
Thursday of the month being used.
TABLE 3
TOTAL CAPITAL ISSUES
United United vpnr United United

X cell Kingdom States x ear Kingdom States
and and
Month Amount Index Amount Index Month Amount Index Amount Index
£ 1929 % 1929 £ 1929 $ 1929
1929 millions = 100 millions = 100 1932 millions = 100 millions = 100
Jan. 47-4 225 915 121 Jan. 2-9 14 180 24
Feb. 330 156 894 118 Feb. 120 57 74 10
Mar. 33-8 160 984 130 Mar. 121 57 162 21
April 34-8 165 677 89 April 180 85 71 9
May 211 100 1127 149 May 12-3 58 91 12
June 25-4 120 773 102 June 17-5 83 84 11
July 22-2 105 880 116 July 3-3 16 105 14
Aug. 3-6 17 843 111 Aug. 01 62 8
Sept. 2-7 13 307 40 Sept. ,, 93 12
Oct. 11-5 54 843 111 Oct. 19-7 93 98 13
Nov. 12-9 61 281 37 Nov. 10-8 51 44 6
Dec. 5-3 25 574 76 Dec. 4-3 20 123 16
1930 1933
Jan. 16-9 80 747 99 Jan. 8-3 39 65 9
Feb. 26-2 124 598 79 Feb. 7-2 34 20 3
Mar. 26-4 125 799 105 Mar. 13-4 63 16 2
April 21-3 101 903 119 April 8-2 39 25 3
May 37-9 179 1109 146 May 14-6 69 44 6
June 13-2 62 704 93 June 17-5 83 110 15
July 16-4 78 553 73 July 60 28 117 15
Aug. 6-6 31 204 27 Aug. 21-2 100 46 6
Sept. 50 24 379 50 Sept. 7-2 34 64 8
Oct. 30-5 144 394 52 Oct. 100 47 59 8
Nov. 19-9 94 258 34 Nov. 12-8 61 88 12
Dec. 15-9 75 385 51 Dec. 6-4 30 57 8
1931
Jan. 12-3 58 466 61
Feb. 19-6 93 206 27
Mar. 13-4 63 560 74
April 1-7 8 368 49
May 110 52 341 45
June 12-8 61 250 33
July 5-2 25 226 30
Aug. 1-7 8 120 16
Sept. 1-3 6 268 35
Oct. 2-5 12 44 6
Nov. 4-4 21 109 14
Dec. 2-7 13 119 16
The series for the United States is published by the Commercial and Financial
Chronicle. The monthly average for 1929, upon which the index is based, is $758
millions.
The United Kingdom series was compiled by the Midland Bank, and the figures
are for "subscriptions invited on the home market, excluding Government loans for
national purposes, local government loans with no specific limit to total subscriptions
and bonds of less than 12 months currency". The monthly average for 1929 ia
£21-1 millions.
TABLE 4
CAPITAL ISSUES ON FOREIGN ACCOUNT
VPHT
United United vpar United United
x Gcir JL ear
Kingdom States Kingdom States
and and
Month Amount Index Amount Index Month Amount Index Amount Index
£ 1929 $ 1929 £ 1929 % 1929

1929 millions = 100 millions = 100 1932 millions = 100 millions = 100
Jan. 29-4 374 40 63 Jan. 2-6 33
Feb. 6-9 88 66 104 Feb. 2-9 37
Mar. 90 114 225 354 Mar. 1-0 13
April 60 76 16 25 April 8-4 107
May 8-8 112 47 74 May 3-4 43
June 11-4 145 172 270 June 21 27
July 8-3 105 35 55 July 01 1 .,
Aug. 1-4 18 21 33 Aug. 2 "3
Sept. 1-2 15 8 13 Sept. 20 31
Oct. 41 52 53 83 Oct. 7-9 100 4 6
Nov. 6-7 85 35 55 Nov. 0-5 6 1 2
Dec. 1-2 15 45 71 Dec. 0-3 4
1930 1933
Jan. 5-6 71 31 49 Jan. 0-4 5
Feb. 18-2 231 126 198 Feb. 2-3 29
Mar. 9-4 119 141 222 Mar. 1-2 15
April 9-4 119 175 275 April 1-0 13
May 20-1 255 120 189 May 5-3 67
June 5-5 70 176 277 June 1-5 19
July 3-3 42 80 126 July 0-8 10 1 2
Aug. 31 39 39 61 Aug. 19-9 253
Sept. 2-6 33 3 5 Sept. 0-4 5 #
Oct. 17-7 225 100 157 Oct. 3-2 41
Nov. 8-4 107 10 16 Nov. 0-6 7
Dec. 5-4 69 21 33 Dec. 1-3 17
1931
Jan. 4-5 57 132 208
Feb. 13-7 174 4 6
Mar. 6-0 76 10 16
April 0-3 4 ,.
May 10-1 128 '*8 13
June 8-5 108 26 41
July 2-9 37
Aug.
Sept. 51 '80
Oct.
Nov.
Dec. ••
The data for the United States are published by the Commercial and Financial
Chronicle, and the monthly average for 1929 upon which the index is based is $63-6
millions.
The United Kingdom series was compiled by the Midland Bank, and the monthly
rage for 1929 is £7-87 millions.
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TABLE 7
INDICES OF THE COST OF LIVING

(July 1914 = 100)
Year and United United Year and United United

Month Kingdom States Mvjnth Kingdom States
1929 1932
January 165 161 January 147 130
February 166 161 February . 146 128
March. 162 160 March 144 127
April . 161 159 April . 143 126
May . 160 159 May . 142 124
June . 161 160 June . 143 123
July . 163 162 July . 141 123
August 164 163 August 141 123
September . 165 163 September . 143 122
October 167 163 October 143 121
November . 167 163 November . 143 121
December . 166 162 December . 142 120
1930 1933
January 164 160 January 141 118
February 161 159 February . 139 115
March. 157 157 March 137 115
April 155 158 April . 136 114
May 154 156 May . 136 116
June 155 155 June . 138 116
July 157 152 July . 139 120
August 157 152 August 141 123
September . 156 153 September . 141 124
October 157 152 October 143 125
November . 155 150 November . 143 124
December . 153 148 December . 142 123
1931
January 152 145
February 150 143
March. 147 142
April 147 141
May 145 139
June 147 137
July 145 137
August 145 137
September . 145 137
October 146 135
November . 148 134
December . 147 133
The figures for the United States are for the middle of the month; for the
United Kingdom, end of the month. In both cases, the base is July 1914.
1
After this point the figures given are those of the National Industrial
Conference Board converted from the 1923 base. Strict comparability is not
possible between the two sections of the series and there is reason to suppose
that they would diverge appreciably.
P
TABLE 8
INDICES OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION

(1928 = 100)
Year and Ger- Year and Ger-
Month many U.K. U.S.A. Month many U.K. U.S.A.
1929 1932
January . 95 105 January . 62 65
February . 91 106 105 February . 63 89 62
March 99 106 March 61 60
April 108 110 April 61 57
May 109 108 111 May 62 si 54
June 110 114 June 61 53
July 105 112 July 60 52
August 104 106 111 August 59 76 54
September 102 110 September 60 60
October . 101 105 October . 61 60
November 101 112 96 November. 62 85 59
December 96 89 December . 62 60
1930 1933
January . 95 94 January . 63 59
February 93 107 97 February . 65 86 57
March 93 94 March 65 54
April 95 96 April 66 60
May 90 98 94 May 68 87 70
June 84 90 June 70 83 ,
July 81 85 July 71 90
August 80 89 83 August 71 86 82
September 78 82 September 71 76
October . 77 79 October . 72 69
November 76 90 76 November. 73 95 65
December 72 .. 74 December. 75 68
1931
January . 68 74
February . 69 83 78
March 74 78
April 76 80
May 74 79 80
June 74 76
July 72 75
August 68 79 71
September 67 ., 69
October . 64 66
November 64 88 65
December 60 •• 67
The above statistics have been compiled from the bulletins of the German
Institut fiir Konjunkturforschung.
The original sources are:
GERMANY—Institut fiir Konjunkturforschung.
U.K.—London and Cambridge Economic Service (original base, 1924).
U.S.A.—Federal Reserve Board (original base, 1923-1925).
TABLE 9
INDICES OF PRODUCTION OF PRODUCERS' AND

CONSUMERS' GOODS
(1925-1929 = 100)
Year PRODUCERS' GOODS CONSUMERS' GOODS

or
Quarter
i Germany U.K. U.S.A. Germany U.K. U.S.A.
1925 88 93 87 97
1926 85 99 89 97
1927 108 102 92 111 ioi 102
1928 107 100 104 109 100 100
1929 112 107 113 104 100 104
1930 95 96 83 101 90 88
1931 70 78 54 94 88 89
1932 54 75 29 85 90 82
1930: (1) 108 108 97 103 95 95
(2) 98 102 92 103 90 88
(3) 90 93 78 99 87 85
(4) 85 84 63 99 90 87
1931: (1) 77 83 66 92 85 88
(2) 76 80 60 98 87 91
(3) 71 73 47 94 89 92
(4) 58 77 42 91 96 87
1932: (1) 54 78 36 86 92 84
(2) 55 77 27 84 93 70
(3) 52 72 24 83 85 84
(4) 54 75 28 86 90 87
1933: (1) 58 77 25 85 89 82
Compiled from the League of Nations' World Production and Prices,

1925-32, Table V. p. 56.
GERMANY—Producers' industries include: iron and steel, non-ferrous ores
and metals, building, machinery, motor vehicles, shipbuilding, coal, petro-
leum, gas, electricity, paper, hemp, yarn and potash. Consumers* industries
include: textiles, footwear, glassware, porcelain, musical instruments, meat,
dairy produce, sugar, tobacco products, beer, brandy, sea fishes.
UNITED STATES.—Investment industries represented by iron and steel, tin
and cement. Consumers' industries represented by textiles, leather and food
industries.
UNITED KINGDOM.—Investment industries represented by iron and steel,
non-ferrous metals, chemicals, engineering and shipbuilding. Consumers' in-
dustries as in the case of U.S.A.
TABLE 10
TOTAL VALUE OF WORLD TRADE

(1929-1932)
Millions of Dollars
Year Imports Exports Total

1929 35,606 33,035 68,641
1930 29,083 26,492 55,575
1931 20,847 18,922 39,769
1932 13,885 12,726 26,611
From the League of Nations' World Economic Survey, 1932-33, p. 211.

TABLE 11
NATIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT STATISTICS

E N D OF MARCH X
(In thousands)
Country 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
Australia. 39 63 114 120 109

Austria . 225 239 304 417 456
Belgium 2 28 42 207 350 383
Canada . 12 23 32 77 80
Czechoslovakia 50 88 340 634 878
Danzig . 18 20 27 36 38
Denmark 66 49 70 145 166
Esthonia 4 4 3 8 15
Finland . 3 10 11 18 19
France 9 14 72 347 356
Germany. 2,484 3,041 4,744 6,034 5,599
Hungary 14 43 55 71 69
Irish Free State 4 19 23 25 31 83
Italy 2 . 309 413 735 1,085 1,111
Japan 352 397 474
Latvia 9 6 9 23 13
Netherlands 253 342
New Zealand . "3 **3 *38 45 51
Norway . 24 23 29 38 42
Poland . 177 289 373 360 280
Roumania . ,. 10 13 48 55
Saar 9 9 18 45 42
Sweden . 44 42 73 99 121
Switzerland 2 . 9 21 61 103 113
United Kingdom 2 . 1,204 1,694 2,666 2,660 2,821
United States 3 2,964 6,403 10,477 13,359
Yugoslavia 12 10 12 23 23
Reproduced from the League of Nations' World Economic Survey 1932-33,

p. 109.
1
Original Source—League of Nations' Monthly Bulletin of Statistics.
2
Partial and intermittent unemployment included.
3
Figures for United States, 1930-1932 ; American Federation of Labour,
see Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, April 1933.
4
New Series from June 1932.
TABLE 12
UNITED STATES
INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
(1923-1925 = 100)

Index Index Month Index
Month Month
1925 1928 1931

May . 103 May . 110 May . 89
June . 100 June . 108 June . 83
1926 1929 1932
May . 107 May . 126 May . 61
June . 106 June . 125 June . 59
July . 103 July . 120 July . 56
1927 1930 1933
May . 112 May . 105 May . 79
The above index has been compiled by the Federal Reserve Board, Division
of Research and Statistics, from 57 individual series of data representing
the production of about 34 industries and estimated to represent directly, or
indirectly, about 80 per cent of total industrial production in the United
States. The base is the monthly average for the years 1923 to 1925.
TABLE 13
UNITED STATES
ACCEPTANCES AND SECURITIES OF FEDERAL RESERVE
BANKS
Millions of Dollars
Year Accept- Year Accept- Year Accept-

and ances and and ances and and ances and
Month Securities Month Securities Month Securities
1929 1931 1933

January . 702 January . 853 January . 1838
February 569 February. 705 February. 1906
April 321 April 773 April 2067
May 298 May 743 May 1932
June 278 June 731 June 1945
July 222 July 753 July 2032
August 279 August . 847 August 2072
September 394 September 995 September 2209
October . 491 October . 1425 October . 2362
November 611 November 1287 November 2452
December 766 December 1117 December 2533
1930 1932
January . 799 January . 980
February 765 February 894
March 786 March 914
April 796 April 1066
May 711 May 1454
June 712 June 1747
July 737 July 1878
August 752 August 1887
September 794 September 1882
October . 787 October . 1885
November 783 November 1885
December 901 December 1888
These are monthly averages of daily figures, and represent the total
acceptances and securities of the Federal Reserve Banks. The series has
been compiled from the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
TABLE 14
BANK OP ENGLAND
TOTAL DEPOSITS
Millions Sterling
Year and Deposits Year and Deposits Year and Deposits

Month Month Month
1925 1928 1931

January . 129-8 January . 115-2 January . 107-9
February . 121-7 February . 108-6 February . 108-6
March 121-4 March 111-9 March 100-9
April 122-5 April 112-8 April 103-7
May 122-5 May 111-8 May 106-0
June 131-8 June 129-5 June 120-4
July 1240 July 118-4 July 104-7
August 126-0 August 114-5 August 128-6
September 129-5 September 113-4 September 145-3
October 113-7 October 117-7 October . 133-4
November 125-7 November. 1210 November. 1250
December. 169-0 December . 1200 December . 174-4
1926 1929 1932
March 129-0 March 114-3 March 1161
April 114-6 April 112-4 April 1170
May 123-3 May 115-6 May 1341
June 1651 June 128-3 June 139-3
July 115-2 July 109-1 July 133-9
October 122-6 October 110-6 October . 136-3
November 124-6 November. 113-8 November. 137-7
December. 1430 December . 115-6 December . 1451
1927 1930 1933
January 116-5 January . 1181 January . 147-5
May 1181 May 108-1 May 150-2
June 126-9 June 121-4 June 161-4
July 113-4 July 107-5 July 170-3
August 1153 August 114-6 August 164-4
October . 111-8 October 111-7 October . 165-8
December. 138-5 December . 175-2 December . 159-9
The above figures relate to the end of the month and comprise:
(a) "Public Deposits" (including Exchequer, Savings Banks, Com-
missioners of National Debt, and Dividend Accounts).
(b) "Private Deposits" ("Bankers' Deposits" and "Other Accounts").
TABLE 15
UNITED STATES
VELOCITY OF CIRCULATION OF BANK DEPOSITS
Year and Deposits 2 Debits 8 D J '

Year and Deposits 2 Debits 3
Month $ millions $ millions Ratio Month $ millions $ millions Ratio
1926 1930
January . 29,169 54,145 1-86 January . 31,982 60,423 1-89
February 29,149 44,915 1-54 February 31,531 52,625 1-67
March 28,984 56,464 1-95 March 31,791 65,723 2-07
April 29,112 51,837 1-78 April 32,159 62,946 1-96
May 29,240 48,020 1-64 May 32,229 61,811 1-92
June 29,287 50,662 1-73 June 32,504 62,312 1-92
July 29,393 50,959 1-73 July 32,663 52,744 1-61
August . 29,385 47,011 1-60 August 32,581 45,993 141
September 29,586 46,954 1-59 September 32,643 48,636 1-49
October . 29,682 52,535 1-77 October . 32,726 54,460 1-66
November 29,654 47,384 1-60 November 33,014 42,176 1-28
December 29,825 57,070 1-91 December 32,314 52,107 1-61
1927 1931
January . 29,729 54,714 1-84 January . 32,048 46,253 1-44
March 30,257 58,518 1-93 March 32,069 47,011 1-47
April 30,348 55,583 1-83 April 32,179 46,440 144
May 30,595 54,143 1-77 May 32,168 43,930 1-37
June 30,693 56,820 1-85 June 31,602 45,299 1-43
July 30,816 53,682 1-74 July 31,526 39,451 1-25
August . 30,827 53,702 174 August . 31,041 34,027 1-10
October . 31,487 59,201 1-88 October . 29,138 38,802 1-33
1928 1932
January . 32,263 62,885 1-95 January . 26,592 33,569 1-26
March 32,153 70,633 2-20 March . 25,431 29,889 1-18
April 32,165 67,003 2-08 April 25,386 29,923 1-18
May 32,650 71,616 2-19 May 25,466 25,411 1-00
June 32,735 72,485 2-21 June 25,075 27,103 1-08
July 32,613 58,981 1-81 July 24,712 25,239 1-02
August . 32,211 58,504 1-82 August . 24,744 25,215 1-02
October . 32,059 72,894 2-27 October . 25,292 25,298 1-00
1929 1933
January . 32,566 82,814 2-54 January . 25,641 24,466 095
4 4
March 32,068 83,524 2-60 March
April 31,794 74,750 2-35 April 21/710 22^628 1-04
May 31,733 76,535 2-41 May 22,509 25,486 1-13
June 31,761 69,666 2-19 June 22,974 29,711 1-29
1 July 31,921 77,631 243 July 23,160 31,232 1-35
August . 31,896 77,344 2-42 August . 23,039 25,451 1-10
October . 32,441 95,572 2-95 October . 23,369 26,307 1-13
! December 32,182 66,752 2-07 December 23,646 26,301 1-11
1
Ratio of Bank Debits each month to the average of Bank Deposits for the same
month. What is significant is not the absolute magnitude of this figure but its fluctua-
tions through time.
2
Net Demand Deposits plus Time Deposits of all member banks: Monthly aver-
TABLE 16
UNITED STATES
TOTAL GOLD RESERVES OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS
Millions of Dollars
Year and Gold Year and Gold Year and Gold

Month Reserves Month Reserves Month Reserves
1926 1929 1932

May 2816 May 2813 May 2790
October . 2823 October 3004 October 3003
November 2830 November. 2948 November. 3049
December. 2815 December . 2857 December . 3151
1927 1930 1933
May 3002 May 3038 May 3520
1928 1931
January . 2819 January . 3062
February . 2808 February . 3070
March 2760 March 3115
April 2723 April 3161
May 2607 May 3250
June 2583 June 3409
July 2604 July 3431
August 2619 August 3456
September 2633 September 3138
October . 2641 October 2746
November 2600 November. 2918
December. 2584 December . 2989
These figures, which do not include gold earmarked for foreign account,
have been compiled from the Federal Reserve Bulletin and relate to the last
Wednesday of each month. It would appear that strictly comparable data
will not be available in future.
TABLE 17
UNITED STATES
TOTAL LOANS, DISCOUNTS AND INVESTMENTS OF WEEKLY
REPORTING MEMBER BANKS
Millions of Dollars
Loans, Loans, Loans,
Year and Discounts Discounts Discounts
Year and Year and
6H1Q
Month Month Invest- Month Invest-
Invest-
ments ments ments
1926 1929 1932
January . 19,426 January . 22,320 January 20,178
February . 19,422 February . 22,263 February . 19,775
March 19,546 March 22,472 March 19,434
April 19,525 April 22,388 April 19,096
May 19,579 May 22,114 May 19,112
June 19,816 June 22,231 June 18,877
July 19,627 July 22,479 July 18,419
August 19,684 August 22,465 August 18,587
September 20,029 September 22,646 September 18,739
October 19,892 October . 23,124 October . 19,026
November 19,849 November. 23,663 November. 18,987
December. 20,110 December . 23,012 December . 18,840
1927 1930 1933
January . 19,686 January . 22,368 January . 18,665
March 19,989 March 22,352
April 20,068 April 22,657
May 20,273 May 22,662
June 20,506 June 23,024
July 20,404 July 23,101
August 20,357 August 23,128
September 20,653 September 23,220
October 20,918 October . 23,409
November 21,112 November. 23,455
December. 21,328 December . 23,117
1928 1931
January . 21,493 January . 22,660
February . 21,315 February . 22,659
March 21,502 March 22,839
April 21,944 April 22,942
May 22,148 May 22,713
June 22,063 June 22,439
July 22,006 July 22,393
August 21,809 August 22,093
September 21,871 September 22,078
October . 21,938 October 21,425
November 21,983 November. 21,023
December. 22,189 December. 20,749
The above figures are monthly averages, except for the year 1926, when
they related to the last return of the month. Strictly comparable figures are
not available after February 1933. The series has been compiled from the
220 THE GREAT'DEPRESSION
TABLE 18
BANK OF FRANCE
GOLD RESERVES AND NOTES IN CIRCULATION
Millions of Francs
Gold Re- Gold Re- Notes in

Year and serves plus Notes in Year and serves plus
Month Foreign Circula- Foreign Circula-
tion Month tion
Assets Assets
1928
June 56,235 60,628 October 65,954 68,246
July 59,353 60,434 November 66,633 68,159
August 62,301 62,184 December . 67,439 67,149
September 61,765 62,654
October . 63,263 61,327 1930
November 62,275 62,660 January . 68,611 70,339
December 64,618 63,916 February . 68,525 71,116
March 68,192 70,826
1929 April 67,946 72,373
January . 64,451 62,153 May 69,336 73,079
February 63,860 62,506 June 69,654 72,594
March 63,078 64,575 July 72,046 74,008
April 62,813 62,848 August 72,818 73,677
May 62,788 64,316 September 74,001 73,053
June 62,357 64,921 October 76,399 74,787
July 63,103 64,135 November 77,834 75,951
August 64,732 66,467 December. 79,725 76,436
September 65,225 66,639
The above figures, compiled from the Annuaire Statistique de la France,

relate to the end of each month. Comparable statistics are not available
before June 1928, the gold reserves of the Bank of France having been
revalued at that date.
TABLE 19
BANK OF ENGLAND
GOLD RESERVES
Millions Sterling
Year and Gold Year and Gold Year and Gold
1925 1928 1931

January . 155-6 January . 155-9 January . 1401
March 155-7 March 1581 March 144-5
May 156-5 May 162-9 May 1521
June 157-6 June 172-3 June 164-0
July 164-3 July 173-7 July 133-3
September 160-5 September 173-2 September 1361
October 150-3 October . 164-9 October 136-9
November 145-7 November 159-8 November 121-7
1926 1929 1932
January . 144-5 January . 1530 January . 121-4
May 148-8 May 163-3 May 125-8
June 150-3 June 155-7 June 1370
July 1521 July 142-6 July 138-6
October . 152-8 October . 1321 October 140-4
December. 1511 December . 1461 December . 120-6
1927 1930 1933
January . 1510 January . 150-4 January . 124-4
February . 150-1 February . 152-0 February . 1430
May 152-6 May 1581 May 187-4
June 1521 June 157-2 June 190-6
July 151-8 July 153-3 July 191-4
September 1511 September 156-8 September 191-8
October . 151-3 October . 160-7 October . 191-8
December. 152-4 December... 148-3 December . 191-7
The above figures relate to the end of the month and, for the year 1925,
include gold in the Treasury. Since September 1931 an additional quantity of
gold (of unknown amount) has been held by the Exchange Equalisation
Account.
TABLE 20
LONDON CLEARING BANKS
TOTAL DEPOSITS
Millions Sterling
Year and Deposits Year and Deposits Year and Deposits
Month Month Month
1925 1928 1931

May 1598 May 1688 May 1700
October . 1627 October . 1753 October 1688
1926 1929 1932
May 1590 May 1732 May 1661
1927 1930 1933
May 1650 May 1742 May 1904
October 1710 October 1791 October . 1912
The above statistics are monthly averages, relating to the nine London
Clearing Banks, and have been compiled from the Bulletins of the London
and Cambridge Economic Service.
TABLE 21
N E W YORK CITY
AVERAGE RATE OF INTEREST ON CALL LOANS
Year and Call Year and Call Year and Call

Month Rate Month Rate Month Rate
1925 1928 1931

January . 3-32 January . 4-24 January 1-50
May 3-82 May 5-70 May 1-45
June 3-97 June 6-32 June 1-50
July 409 July 605 July 1-50
October . 4-87 October 6-98 October 210
1926 1929 1932
April 406 April 9-46 April 2-50
May 3-81 May 8-79 May 2-50
June 415 June 7-83 June 2-50
July 4-27 July 9-41 July 2-08
August 4-52 August 815 August 2 00
October . 4-75 October . 610 October 1-35
1927 1930 1933
January . 4-32 January . 4-31 January . 100
March 413 March 3-56 March 3-27
May 4-26 May 305 May 1-00
June 4-33 June 2-60 June 100
July 405 July 218 July 1-00
November 3-60 November. 200 November. 0-75
These figures represent the monthly average rate of interest paid on new
Stock Exchange call loans in New York City and have been compiled from
various issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
TABLE 22
UNITED STATES
INDEX OF COMPOSITE WAGES
(1913 = 100)

1925 1928 1931

1 March 212 March 220 March 213
May 211 May 221 May 209
August 213 Aiigust 222 August 206
1926 1929 1932
January . 217 January . 224 January 194
April • 218 April 225 April 187
May 217 May 225 May 184
October 220 October . 226 October . 178
1927 1930 1933
May 220 May 222 May 172
i August 221 August 220 August 177
; October . 220 October 216 October . 177
1 November 219 November. 216
December. 221 December . 213
The above series is a weighted index based on indices of either wages or

earnings in 12 different industries, with seasonal fluctuations eliminated.
The index was compiled by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
TABLE 23
KEICHSBANK
GOLD KESERVES PLUS FOREIGN ASSETS

Millions of Reichsmarks

1925 1928 1931

January . 1112 January . 2161 January 2443
May 1355 May 2315 May 2576
1926 1929 1932
May 1880 May 2064 May 992
October . 2129 October 2588 October . 940
1927 1930 1933
May 1895 May 2942 May 449
December. 2147 December. 2685 December . 395
The above data represent holdings at the end of the month of gold re-
serves plus those foreign assets which may legally replace gold as primary
cover for notes.
TABLE 24
GERMANY
TOTAL CREDITS OF THE BIG BANKS 1
Month Credits Month Credits Month Credits
1925 1928 1931

January . January . January .
March March 9,125 March 10,688
May May 9,545 May 10,293
June 4,677 June 9,532 June 9,264
July July 9,565 July 8,156
September September 9,979 September 7,856
October . 5,003 October . 10,309 October . 7,451
November November 10,593 November 7,333
December . 5,227 December . 11,132 December.
1926 1929 1932
January . January . .. January .
May May 10,513 May 7,201
June 5,674 June 10,818 June 7,207
October . 6,387 October . 11,670 October 7,067
December . 6,890 December . 12,001 December .
1927 1930 1933
January . January . January .,
May May 12,167 May 6,537
June 7,451 June 12,249 June 6,502
October 8,121 October . 11,043 October 6,224
December. 8,800 December . 11,070 December .
1
Grossbanken: Kreditoren Insgesamt.—The above statistics, which relate
to the end of the month, include figures for ten banks until February 1929;
then, as a result of fusions, nine banks until October 1929; subsequently,
seven banks. The series is, however, quite continuous. The data have been
compiled from various issues of the Vierteljahrshefte zur Konjunkturfor-
schung, published by the German Institut fiir Konjunkturforschung.
TABLE 25
1
GERMANY—ESTIMATED BALANCE OP PAYMENTS
Total
1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1924-30
Exports 2 . 7-9 9-5 10-7 111 12-6 13-6 121 77-5

Imports 2 . 9-7 120 9-9 141 13-9 13-6 10-6 83-8
Balance of Commodity
Trade 2 . _ 1 .0
- 2-5 + 0-8 -30 - 1-3 + 1-5 -6-3
Gold and Devisen Move-
ments at Banks of
Issue - 1-3 -01 -0-5 + 0-5 -0-9 + 01 + 01 -21
Reparations -0-3 - 10 - 1-2 - 1-6 -2-0 -2-5 - 1-7 -10-3
Services3 (Shipping,
Tourist, Insurance,
etc.) + 0-3 + 0-5 + 0-5 + 0-5 + 0-5 + 0-5 + 0-2 + 30
Interest + 0-2 •• -0-2 -0-3 -0-6 -0-8 -0-8 -2-5
- 2-9 -31 -0-6 - 3-9 -4-3 -2-7 -0-7 - 18-2
Capital Movements—
Long term * . + 1-0 + 11 + 1-4 + 1-7 + 1-7 + 0-6 + 1-6 + 91
Short term * . + 1-5 + 0-3 + 01 + 1-8 + 1-4 + 11 + 6-2
Other capital move-
ments, etc. . + 0-4 + 1-7 -0-9 + 0-4 + 1-2 + 1-0 -0-9 + 2-9
+ 2-9 + 31 + 0-6 + 3-9 + 4-3 + 2-7 + 0-7 + 18-2
1
Reproduced from the Economist, August 22, 1931, Special Supplement, Annex I.
2
Includes movement of precious metals (other than those at the Banks of Issue)
and the bulk of Deliveries in Kind. The latter amount to 4 milliard Reichsmarks for the
seven years.
3
Includes Reparation deliveries outside Germany, and Deliveries in Kind, so far
as these are not included in the figures of Merchandise Trade.
* So far as known.
TABLE 26
GERMANY
INDICES OF SECURITY PRICES
Index Index Index Index

Year and Base Base Year and Base Base
Month 1924-26 1928 Month 1924-26 1928
1927
January 158 111 March 111 78
February . 169 119 April 114 81
March 163 115 May 114 80
April 175 123 June 109 76
May 168 118 July 102 72
June 152 107 August 95 67
July 158 111 September 93 66
August 155 109 October . 87 61
September. 148 104 November. 83 58
October . 143 101 December . 78 55
November . 128 90
December . 136 95 January . 72 51
1928 February . 77 54
January 138 97 March 83 58
February . 136 96 April 84 59
March 143 100 May. 74 52
April 147 103 June 67 47
May 148 104
June 144 101 1932
July 143 101 April 45 32
August 143 101 May 46 33
September. 141 99 June 46 32
October . 140 99 July 46 33
November . 142 100 August 49 34
December . 140 99 September 56 39
1929 October . 54 38
January 139 98 November. 55 39
February . 134 94 December . 59 41
March 133 93 1933
April 133 94 January . 61 43
May 128 90 February . 61 43
June 131 92 March 67 47
July 129 90 April 71 50
August 127 89 May 72
September. 125 88 June 70 49
October . 116 82 July 67 47
November . 112 78 August 65 46
December . 107 76 September 61 43
1930 October . 60 42
January . 113 79 November. 62 44
February . 113 79 December . 65 46
The above indices are based on the monthly average prices of 212 ordinary
industrial shares, the source of the original data being the Statistisches
Eeichsamt. The series based on the years 1924 to 1926 has been compiled
from the Monthly Bulletin of Statistics of the League of Nations. That based
on 1928 has been calculated from this, for purposes of comparison with the
German wage index. The Stock Exchange was closed from July 1931 to
Anril 1932.
TABLE 27
GERMANY
INDEX OF WAGES
(1928 = 100)

1925 1928 1931

May 92 May 101 May 111
1926 1929 1932
October 97 October 104 October . 106
1927 1930 1933
The above indices are monthly weighted averages for skilled workers in
12 occupations and are based on weekly wages until 1931, and upon hourly
wages thereafter. The series has been recalculated from the index published
by Wirtschaft und Statistique, which is based on 1913.
TABLE 28
GERMANY
DISCOUNT RATE OF THE REICHSBANK

1925 1928 1931
May 9 May 7 May 5
August 9 August 7 August 10 l
1926 1929 1932
March 7 March 6, March 6
April 7 April 1; April 5
May 7 May 1\ May 5
June 6A June 7i June 5
July 6 July 1\ July 5
August 6 August 7- August 5
September 6 September 7| September 4
1927 1930 1933
January . 5 January . 6"£ January . 4
May 5 May May 4
October 7 October . 5 October . 4
December. 7 December. 5 December . 4
The above data relate to the end of each month.

1
The rate rose to 15 per cent during this month.
TABLE 29
NEW YORK FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
DISCOUNT RATE *

1925 1928 1931

January . 3 January . 3-5 January 2
February . 3-5 February . 4 February . 2
March 3-5 March 4 March 2
i
April 3-5 April 4 April I
May 3-5 May 4-5 May ' L-5
June 3-5 June 4-5 June L-5
July 3-5 July 5 July L-5
August 3-5 August 5 August L-5
September 3-5 September 5 September L-5 2
October 3-5 October . 5 October . 3-5
November 3-5 November 5 November 3-5
December. 3-5 December . 5 December . 3-5
1926 1929 1932
January . 4 January . 5 January . 3-5
April 3-5 April 5 April 3
May 3-5 May 5 May 3
June 3-5 June 5 June 2-5
July 3-5 July 5 July 2-5
August 4 August 5 August 2-5
September 4 September 5 September 2-5
October 4 October . 5 October 2-5
November 4 November 4-5 November 2-5
December . 4 December. 4-5 December. 2-5
1927 1930 1933
February . 4 February . 4 February . 2-5
April 4 April 3-5 April 3
May 4 May 3 May 2-5
July 4 July 2-5 July 2-5
October 3-5 October . 2-5 October . 2
November 3-5 November 2-5 November 2
December. 3-5 December. 2 December. 2
1
Discount R a t e for 60- t o 90-day commercial paper. F o r t h e first t h r e e
years t h e rates given are m o n t h l y averages. Thereafter, t h e y relate t o t h e e n d
of t h e m o n t h .
2
F r o m 8 t h t o 14th October, 2-5 per cent.
TABLE 30
BANK OF ENGLAND—BANK RATE
Year and j
Year and Year and
1925 1928 1931
January . 4 January 4-5 January . 3
February . 4 February . 4-5 February . 3
March 5 March 4-5 March 3
May 5 May 4-5 May 2-5
June 5 June 4-5 June 2-5 2
September 4-5 September 4-5 September 6
October 4 October . 4-5 October 6
November 4 November. 4-5 November. 6
1926 1929 1932
June 5 June 5-5 June 2
July 5 July 5-5 July 2
August 5 August 5-5 August 2
September 5 September 6-5 September 2
November 5 November. 5-5 November. 2
1927 1930 1933
April 4-5 April 3-5 April 2
May 4-5 May 3 May 2
June 4-5 June .. 3 June 2
July 4-5 July 3 July 2
August 4-5 August 3 August 2
September 4-5 September 3 September 2
October . 4-5 October 3 October . 2
November 4-5 November. 3 November. 2
December. 4-5 December . 3 December . 2
Monthly averages for the first three years, then end-of-the-month data—
1
From 6th to 19th March, 4 per cent.
2
From 23rd to 29th July, 3-5 per cent.
3
From 9th to 15th March, 4 per cent.
TABLE 31
BANK OF FRANCE—DISCOUNT RATE

1925 1928 1931

May 7 May 3-5 May 2
June 7 June 3-5 June 2
July 6 July 3-5 July 2
August 6 August 3-5 August 2
September 6 September 3-5 September 2
October . 6 October . 3-5 October . 2-5
November 6 November. 3-5 November. 2-5
December . 6 December . 3-5 December . 2-5
1926 1929 1932
February . 6 February . 3-5 February . 2-5
July 7-5 July 3-5 July 2-5
1927 1930 1933
January . 6-5 January 3 January . 2-5
February . 5-5 February . 3 February . 2-5
September 5 September 2-5 September 2-5
October . 5 October . 2-5 October . 2-5
November 5 November. 2-5 November. 2-5
December. 4 December . 2-5 December . 2-5
For the first three years, the rates given are monthly averages. Thereafter,
they relate to the end of the month.
TABLE 32
STERLING-DOLLAR EXCHANGE
LONDON QUOTATIONS

! 1925 1928 1931
May 4-855 May 4-882 May 4-864
June 4-861 June 4-881 June 4-865
July 4-860 July 4-864 July 4-857
October . 4-843 October 4-850 October . 3-886
1926 1929 1932
January . 4-858 January . 4-850 January 3-430
May 4-862 May 4-851 May 3-676
June 4-866 June 4-849 June 3-649
July 4-864 July 4-851 July 3-552
October . 4-850 October . 4-870 October 3-399
1927 1930 1933
January 4-853 January . 4-870 January 3-372
May 4-857 May 4-860 May 3-938
June 4-856 June 4-859 June 4-141
July 4-855 July 4-865 July 4-643
October . 4-870 October . 4-859 October 4-667
December. 4-883 December. 4-857 December . 5-124
The above are monthly averages of daily rates, and have been compiled
from the Bulletins of the London and Cambridge Economic Service.
8
pq
X
02
P
O
o
6
1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
OOSl 585-!
1-8537 1-7585 1-7658 3-6779 3-7419 1-2247 1-6546 •2591 1-7816 1-8578 t-8526 •8753 1-8498 I-8688 1-8546 3-4312 {•3613
00
585-!
CD
1-8495 r662 1-7580 3-3810 3-8758 1-3620 1-6908 •3077 1-7724 1-8633 1-8502 •8748 t-8521 1-8617 1-8583 3-4563 J-4220
8689-8
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099-!
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999-! t-8526
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1-8125 ?535 1-71^ 3-7258 3-9111 1-6956 •2906 1-7762 t-8608 1-8540 •8799 t-8631 1-8583 S-4328
• > *
86Z5-S
9
CO
CO
099J 989J
1-8000 J550 3-9310 3-9292 1-6554 •3512 1-7953 1-8622 1-8565 •8820 1-8532 t-8631 1-8598 3-7^
m
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cb
CO
CO
CO
099J
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1-80.00 '625 r556 3-8477 3-9753 1-6256 •3608 1-8547 1-8615 1-8570 •8816 1-8507 1-8596 1-8640 J-9323
• ^
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1-8910 '587 r555 3-9497 3-7815 1-6146 •3198 1-8604 1-8661 1-8561 •8802 1-8482 1-8586 1-8648 11356
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0009 f 999i
1-8634 1-8550 •8636 1-8510 1-8656 1-8560 t-6499
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cb
999; 009 J
5-5600 '625 587 1-2720 3-6219 3-6536 t-4646 1-5603 •4994 t-8569 t-8586 1-8602 •8535 1-8485 1-8707 1-8577 ("57 1-5026
o
cb
999J
50625
008.
'675 f550 11790 3-5102 3-7240 1-4307 1-5422 •4605 1-8464 1-8541 1-8635 •8505 1-8482 1-8611 1-5312 1-6647
1968-8
00
05
CO
CO
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00
oo
O5
699; 089J
1-8699 1-8589
I
4-9800 '250 ^550 11840 3-4751 3-8728 1-4384 1-5237 •4870 1-8428 1-8503 •8495
in
4-9087 fl37 ^520 f575 10982 3-4372 3-9702 1-4799 1-3821 •6096 1-8458 1-8487 1-8740 1-8492 1-8774 1-8564 S-7199 3-2752 )1497
695i
in
f512 r525 1-7585 J-8123 3-4923 41561 1-6098 1-3601 •6958 1-8498 1-8512 t-8825 1-8524 1-8816 1-8566 J-3737 3-2786
1-4258 36642 3-8490 1-4292 15748 44171 4-8289 t-8582 18610 4-8662 4-8568 18621 1-5349 3-5060 1-2368
!
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TABLE 36
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES
PERCENTAGE DISCOUNT IN RELATION TO GOLD PARITY
Argen- Aus-
Year tina tralia Canada Japan Spain Sweden U.K.
1931
January . 27-75 •21 •81 •13 •24
February 25-43 •02 •88 •11 •17
March 1911 •02 •96 •08 •17
April 20-74 •05 •98 •09 •14
May 26-71 •06 •93 -03 x •05
June 27-18 •28 •95 •02 1
•03
July 27-56 •34 •99 •16 •22
August . 3307 23-37 •31 •99 54-41 •19 •18
September 38-12 28-51 3-75 103 53-44 2-66 6-89
October . 46-10 38-64 10-90 1-19 53-55 13-75 20-08
November 39-01 41-31 1101 1-10 55-36 22-62 23-56
December 39-34 44-83 17-29 2-80 56-47 3018 30-68
1932
January . 39-60 43-71 14-87 27-80 56-50 28-40 29-49
February 39-65 43-30 12-71 3114 59-75 28-01 28-98
March 39-58 40-29 10-55 35-49 60-62 25-92 25-22
April 39-66 38-48 1012 34-18 6012 28-76 22-94
May 39-55 39-71 11-56 35-86 57-93 3013 24-48
June 39-34 40-17 13-26 39-24 57-27 30-20 25-07
July 39-30 41-77 12-93 44-94 58-27 32-02 27-06
August . 39-29 42-98 12-45 50-86 58-22 33-40 28-58
September 39-27 4305 9-74 52-59 58-00 33-56 28-68
October . 39-28 44-28 8-77 53-73 57-57 34-57 30-21
November 39-28 46-27 12-70 58-63 57-64 34-96 32-70
December 39-28 46-21 13-40 58-41 57-76 3317 32-63
1933
January . 39-28 44-85 12-54 58-39 57-62 31-72 30-67
February 39-28 43-86 16-49 58-28 57-27 31-84 29-72
March 39-57 43-96 16-48 57-34 56-24 3213 29-58
April 39-65 44-10 19-08 57-68 56-04 32-96 29-73
May 39-96 4512 25-27 58-93 55-84 35-57 3116
June 39-93 44-83 26-69 57-85 56-19 35-23 30-68
July 39-95 45-52 32-20 58-57 56-65 35-78 31-41
August . 39-98 46-36 . 31-28 60-66 56-72 36-83 32-48
September 39-86 48-58 34-97 63-15 56-65 39-50 35-31
October . 39-87 48-59 34-26 62-48 56-59 39-51 35-47
November 40-36 47-37 36-75 61-39 57-52 3807 33-86
December 49-71 46-41 35-65 60-53 57-57 36-97 32-70
The above Table has been compiled from various issues of the League of
Nations' Monthly Bulletin of Statistics.
1
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THE GREAT DEPRESSION

BOOKS FOR LIBRARIES PRESS

INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER*.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER:

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

1. The American Recovery Programme . . . 1 2 5

1. United Kingdom—Security Prices . . . . 203

authoritarian fixing of wages and prices, the imposition

nationally traded commodities moved together in all

post-war inflation was partly compensated by large

preceding movements of a similar nature both in

1. WHY did these things happen?

fall of prices. But it does not in the least follow that

of money, but a slowing up of the frequency with

"OPEN MARKET" POLICY

munity, then there can be no possible question of its

1929 1930 1931 1932 v 1933

UNITED STATES—VELOCITY OF CIRCULATION OF BANK DEPOSITS

ordinary diminution which has taken place in the

There can thus be no denying the existence of de-

WORLD'S MONETARY GOLD STOCKS

End of $ millions. End of $ millions

It will be seen that the monetary gold reserves of the

date,1 it is to lose all sense of proportion to regard them

1926 1927 1928 1929 1930

FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS

Is this a picture of gold sterilisation? Surely not. It is a

ing chart shows the movement of the gold reserves

BANK OF FRANCE—RESERVES AND NOTES

There is no obvious "sterilisation" here. As gold flows

1927. 1928. 1929.

rose from 498 in the last quarter of 1927 to 565 in the

are discussing. But the figures do not bear out these

Bank of England- Gold Reserves

1925 1926 1927 1928 1929

Clearly there is no evidence here of deflation. Deposits

1. So far, the various explanations of the depression

accompany a fall in the rate of interest which was due

to disaster. But that itself, as we have seen in the great

UNITED STATES—VELOCITY OF CIRCULATION OF BANK DEPOSITS

No doubt some of this was restricted to a very narrow

UNITED STATES—INDEX OF SECURITY PRICES

to the sphere of production. The following chart 1

. UNITED STATES—INDICES OF PRODUCTION

The construction of durable consumers' goods too

1925 1926 1927 1928 1929

Statistics of costs are hard to obtain. The wage index,

Gold Reserve of Reichsbank

Security prices had reached a peak in the early part

LOANS, DISCOUNTS AND ADVANCES OF COMMERCIAL BANKS

Country 192-4 1929

Canada . . . . 100 162

These figures probably a little exaggerate the ex-

The policy succeeded. The impending recession was

1. A FLUCTUATION of the kind described in the last

the depression to fluctuations of political confidence

essential direction of change b y preoccupation w i t h

contraction by excluding each other's products. In

From a state of affairs in which the price differences