A Critique of Markedness-Based Theories in Phonology
A Critique of Markedness-Based Theories in Phonology
A Critique of Markedness-Based Theories in Phonology
The Keep
Faculty Research and Creative Activity Communication Disorders & Sciences
October 2001
Recommended Citation
Gurevich, Naomi, "A critique of markedness-based theories in Phonology" (2001). Faculty Research and Creative Activity. 8.
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Studies in the Linguistic Sciences
Volume 31, Number 2, Fall 2001
Naomi Gurevich
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
[email protected]
1. Literature Survey
1.1. Introduction
We find that, without any doubt, UR’s are a valuable, and perhaps even
essential tool for linguistic field work, whose adoption often allows for
simple and concise statements of phonological patterns. However, our
concern in this paper is not with the task of the linguist in identifying and
describing sound patterns, but with the psychological status of UR’s as an
encoding [of] the sound representation of a word in the mental lexicon. (p.3)
2
Similarly, I question the psychological status of markedness as an encoding of
some universal ‘naturalness’ in the phonology, although I readily admit that the
notion of markedness may very well be a useful tool for linguists in a number of
ways.
For the reasons detailed above, and others that will be expanded on within this
paper, exploring the notion of markedness is both important and difficult.
In this part of the paper I consider and critique some of the major definitions
of markedness that have been explored in the literature. I examine the entrance of
the term markedness into mainstream linguistics jargon, how this notion gained
ground, and how it became so closely tied to linguistic universals, and hence to
3
some psychological reality. I also attempt to isolate the often controversial theory-
specific (more often than not, generative theory-specific) assumptions that are
presupposed in various uses of markedness theory. The present discussion calls
attention to the complications and misconceptions involved in the use of the notion
of markedness in contemporary theories and helps build a case against the view
that markedness is in some way significant to speakers.
It is commonly agreed that the term ‘mark’ originates with Trubetzkoy, one
of the founders of the Prague school of phonology. The notion of markedness in
his work is associated, to varying degrees, with articulatory complexity,
combinatory possibilities of sounds, phonological statistics, functional load, and
neutralization. Most prevalent, and most often cited, is Trubetzkoy’s observation
that the outcome of neutralization is normally the unmarked member of an
opposition. Having borrowed the term from Trubetzkoy, generativists suggest that
in contrast to their own approach he considered markedness assignments to be
language-specific rather than universal; however, it is his work that sparked the
use of markedness in the context of universal tendencies of language.
Trubetzkoy wrote that if two phonemes share the same set of features, except
for one feature found in only one of the phonemes, this feature is the ‘mark’ and
involves an extra articulatory gesture. Guitart (1976) points out that within the
generative framework it is not always the case that the marked member involves
an extra gesture. For example, a [+nasal] element is considered marked, but it is
the unmarked oral sounds that require the extra gesture of closing the velum.
4
While the generativist argument that the marked element does not always require
an extra gesture is well taken, the example shows how complex this situation
really is. The resting position of the velum is neither completely open nor closed.
Furthermore, in running speech the position of the velum depends on the
surrounding sounds.
In (a) the labial obstruent is voiced when it is word final (srb) but voiceless
when it is followed by voiceless obstruents (srpski and srpkinja).
Similarly, in (b) voicing of the palatal obstruent is determined by the voicing
properties of the following obstruents: voiceless in naruc&iti but voiced
when followed by b in narudz&ba. Another example comes from French,
where the opposition between nasalized and nonnasalized vowels is neutralized
before all (+/- nasal) vowels.
b) In the vicinity of the marked member, but retained in the vicinity of unmarked
member: For example, in Slovak the opposition between long and short vowels
5
is neutralized after a syllable with a long nucleus. Another example comes
from Sanskrit, where the opposition between dental and retroflex n is
neutralized after retroflex s` (which occurs even with intervening vowels,
labials, or gutturals), but is retained after nonretroflex consonants.
Types (a) and (c) cannot serve as diagnostics for markedness because the features
in question could be either marked or unmarked; types (b) and (d) can, because
there is a difference in results depending on whether the marked or unmarked
feature is in the vicinity.
Such use of markedness as a substitute for some abstract notion, in this case
the difficult to measure degree of complexity, suggests that markedness values are
concrete, and even absolute. This tendency is echoed in the generative framework,
where markedness values are linked to +/- feature values. And yet, when
phonologists started work on determining markedness values they found
themselves relying on many of the notions deemed abstract and in need of
translation into markedness values, such as articulatory effort, for their decisions
(e.g., Guitart 1976, Postal 1968, and Greenberg 1966 to name a few). This type of
circular thinking can be observed throughout the literature on markedness.
On the subject of frequency, Trubetzkoy adds that one must take into
account the possible presence and the extent of neutralization. That is, the
differences between unmarked and marked opposition members, and the
differences between oppositions that can be neutralized and those that cannot,
affect phoneme frequency. Put simply, the presence and extent of neutralization
affects the frequency of a sound: if neutralization can occur, the unmarked
elements, which are the usual results of neutralization, will be more frequent. It
becomes obvious that, in this diagnostic for frequency, it is not the markedness
values that matter but whether or not the elements in question can be results of
neutralization.
Trubetzkoy adds that this diagnostic does not always work because in some
languages the markedness relationship cannot be objectively established. Since all
other references to markedness in his work can be translated into ‘presence of
neutralization’, this statement can be understood as the following: in some
languages there may be cases of neutralization where no one member of an
opposition is more likely to be the target of the process than the other member. In
such cases, then, the presence and extent of neutralization does not affect the
frequency of the elements in question. As discussed in §1.4, Guitart (1976)
attempts to resolve the problem of neutralization where the outcome, contrary to
expectations, appears to be marked. This becomes an important issue once, based
on Trubetzkoy’s work, the outcome of neutralization is formally declared a
diagnostic for markedness values.
Here Trubetzkoy discusses one of the key issues in phonology: the relation
between sound substitutions and meaning. Neutralization will have different
functional consequences for economical and wasteful languages. For economical
languages the functional load of an opposition is expected to be higher, and
phonological neutralization is more likely to yield functional neutralization.3 It is
vital to note that markedness has no functional purpose whatsoever. Its only
connection to the subject is its use to distinguish between two of the types of
contextually conditioned dissimilative neutralization. In Trubetzkoy’s discussion
of functional load, no one type of neutralization is singled out; in this particular
discussion, markedness brings nothing to the party: it has no theoretical value.
In summary, Trubetzkoy not only brings the term markedness into the
phonological arena; he also draws associations between this notion and many of
the characteristics that markedness takes on in later literature (e.g., neutralization,
functional load, and frequency), as well as its use as a translation mechanism from
abstract notions such as articulatory complexity. However, as I suggest in the
discussion of his work, in most cases Trubetzkoy intended to draw connections
between the occurrence and result of neutralization processes, rather than
markedness values per se.
In the final chapter of The Sound Pattern of English (SPE) Chomsky and
Halle discuss unresolved problems from previous chapters. In particular, they
acknowledge that their previous discussion suffers from the fundamental
theoretical inadequacy of being overly formal and ignoring the fact that features
have intrinsic content.
For example, their theory suggests that the “naturalness” of a class can be
measured in terms of the number of features needed to define it. This diagnostic of
naturalness often fails, as in the case of voiced obstruents: they have the more
complex definition, as they are measured with a larger number of features than all
voiced segments, but are intuitively more natural as a class than the class of all
voiced segments (vowels as well as consonants). The authors point out that the
content of the features, rather than the form of the definition, is responsible for
naturalness. Hence, ignoring the content is precisely the reason for the failure
detailed above.
A third example of where the framework is lacking centers on the fact that a
vowel system as in (2) is more natural than those in (3) and (4), but the measures
of evaluation previously suggested by the authors cannot make such a distinction.
Similarly, no distinction can be made between a more natural situation where all
the vowels in a language are voiced, and an unattested situation where all vowels
in a language are voiceless.
Note that these observations, used to motivate the need for a notion of
markedness, are indeed valuable to the linguist; but the question of what value a
language learner could derive from such knowledge, e.g., that some element in
their language is more natural than another element, or that their vowel inventory
is not as natural as their neighbors’, is not addressed. This is due to the underlying
generative belief (at least at that stage of the theory) that the job of the linguist is
the same as the job of the learner, and that the theory’s formalisms are equivalent
to the manner in which learners code language. That is, that which is common
across languages is presumed to be part of the UG and hence the knowledge
learners are born with, and that which is unique about each language is what
learners must acquire about their individual languages. The linguistic
formalization of a language’s grammar is, therefore, primarily a matter of
identifying the exceptions and additional rules to the UG, which according to this
theory mimics the job of a learner.4 But while it makes sense for speakers of
English to know that nasals assimilate in place of articulation to following stops in
their language, what benefit is there to also being aware that this process is much
more natural than, say, iI after non palatalized consonants (as occurs in
Russian)? While arguing against this particular generative approach is beyond the
scope of the present paper, I do try to emphasize that most knowledge
encompassed by markedness issues is knowledge a learner either does not require
(such as knowing a process in their language is more natural than a process in
9
some other language) or can easily determine with no prior knowledge (e.g., that
intervocalically voiced stops are easier to articulate than voiceless ones).
Finally, the authors suggest that with the use of markedness they now have
the machinery for making distinctions between more and less plausible rules in
purely formal terms.
That is, what appears natural in human languages, once translated into markedness
terminology, can be used to argue what is natural in languages. This type of
circular reasoning is a recurring theme in markedness based theories.
10
1.4. Markedness and a Cuban Dialect of Spanish (Guitart 1976)
In §1.3 I discuss the SPE notion that markedness helps formalize intuitions
that linguists have based on the content of features. On a similar note, Guitart
reiterates the idea that certain phenomena are somehow more natural in the
languages of the world. For example,
1. Vowels can be voiceless, but are usually voiced; languages exist that have only
voiced vowels, but there are no known languages that have only voiceless
vowels.
2. When stops are neutralized in word-final position—a fairly common
phenomenon—the result is usually the voiceless stop.
3. Commonly, languages have only two nasal consonants as systematic
phonemes. When this is indeed the case, these two phonemes are most often m
and n.
4. Children learning languages that have liquids usually master these sounds quite
late, and before they do they tend to use glides instead.
These phenomena suggest that certain feature values are more common, more
likely to appear in a given context, are acquired earlier than others, and are hence
more natural. The already familiar strategy detailed in SPE is to characterize this
naturalness, that is based on the intrinsic content of features, with markedness
values. And, Guitart clarifies, since the set of features is universal, the intrinsic
content of features is also universal. Hence if it is decided that it is more natural
for back vowels to be rounded, that decision has been made for all languages.
Guitart is concerned with the heavy burden of making the universal marking
decisions. He relies quite heavily on Postal (1968) for a discussion of marking
criteria:
Relative occurrence of sounds: Certain sounds are very common in the languages
of the world while others are rare. This leads to generalizations such as that
nasality is marked for vowels because vowels are normally oral and there are no
languages with only nasal vowels. Similarly, voicelessness is marked for vowels
because no languages exist with only voiceless vowels.
11
Language acquisition and language loss: Guitart refers to Jakobson’s (1968, 1971)
hypothesis that sounds are acquired by the child—and lost by the aphasic—in a
certain fixed, universal order. Those phonological elements that are acquired later
and lost earlier are marked.
1. Not all sounds and sequences of sounds are either perceived or produced with
equal ease.
2. The constraints imposed on the organization of phonological systems and on
the utilization of phonological elements are due to the limitations of the human
structures having to do with the production and perception of speech, and are,
as such, universal.
3. Even though there are phonological elements that are both easy to produce and
easy to perceive, there are elements that are physiologically simple but
perceptually complex and elements that are physiologically complex but
perceptually simple.
4. Neither maximal contrast nor least effort is the main guiding principle in
human communication, i.e., neither the speaker nor the hearer is
overwhelmingly preferred. Phonological elements which are neither too simple
nor too complex—if judged by either the perceptual or the physiological
criterion—will be used more frequently than elements which are least complex
according to one criterion but most complex according to the other.
5. Human communication does not utilize sounds that are both harder to produce
and harder to perceive.
The author points out that the assignment of marked and unmarked values
represents only a class of observations, but that statistical frequencies, diachronic
mergers, synchronic neutralizations, etc. point to the fundamental correctness of
this concept. However, “the theory remains one of observation, one of
probabilities” (p.24). Herbert also concedes that the significance of the theory is
weakened due to a total lack of explanation. He offers to provide some of this
explanation in his classification of prenasalized consonants by pin-pointing and
adding more phonetic information to some level of the symbolic system that links
phonetic reality to feature values.
Houlihan and Iverson state that rules which convert marked segments into
unmarked ones must be neutralization rules, and all rules which are not
neutralizing are allophonic. Given this definition, Kaye points out that it is hardly
surprising that neutralization results in less-marked segments. Furthermore, since
the presence of marked segments in a language typically implies the presence of
their unmarked counterparts (we know this as implicational hierarchy), it is to be
expected that rules that result in unmarked segments will do so in the context of a
phonological inventory that already contains these segments. In the same line of
reasoning, the claim that rules resulting in relatively marked segments are
allophonic rules follows from the fact that marked segments are found less
frequently and are thus less likely to be found among the underlying phonemes of
16
a language or as the output of a phonological rule applying before the rule in
question.
Kaye concludes, therefore, that the fact that these definitions are generally
true is in no way an argument in their favor, but merely a consequence of their
formalizations. Put simply, defining these two types of rules using markedness
relations, when markedness relations are basically defined using the rules they
participate in, is circular and provides no insight into either situation.
This list, surely, represents the intuitions most linguists have about elements that
are characterized using markedness terminology. These are the general
observations that can be made about such elements; the general tendencies that are
often repeated in elements belonging to the same category (of marked or
unmarked), and hence considered universal.
Rice’s own approach to markedness, which stems from the study of language
acquisition, is to treat it as related to structure: markedness is mostly a
consequence of the amount of structure, where the less structure, the less marked
and vice-versa. Her goal is no different from similar works that stem from other
disciplines within linguistics. It is to provide “an account of what universal
grammar allows to be unmarked and what the universal and language particular
aspects to markedness are” (p.34).
Rice and Avery (1995, cited in Rice) argue that two aspects of language must
be accounted for: that there is cross-linguistic uniformity in the features that
pattern phonologically as unmarked (“global uniformity”), but these features are
not always the same (“local variability”).7 The variability aspect is, of course,
what makes the pattern only a tendency rather than a law. For Rice, it seems, the
key to explaining markedness resides in the criteria that separate elements that
succumb to the general tendency to pattern with others of the same markedness
category, from those that do not.
1.9. Discussion
The one constant that is retained, and reiterated, in the sections above relates
to the origin of the notion of markedness as a universal. This is the observation
that unmarked elements tend to pattern similarly cross linguistically, as well as to
some extent within languages. Encoding markedness categories in the grammar is
deeply rooted in the recognition that such universal tendencies exist. This is
18
emphasized in generative theories, where universal tendencies are especially
significant because these are the aspects of languages that are attributed to the UG.
Finally, this section shows that, while few agree on exactly what markedness
means, nobody questions its encoding in the grammar. The generativist-internal
motivation for the existence of such a component in the grammar is clear: the UG
contains (but is not limited to) that which is common across languages;
markedness captures these commonalities, and must therefore be part of the UG.
External motivation for allowing markedness to represent some psychological
reality is nonexistent, and yet such an essential part of scientific reasoning does
not seem lamented in the literature.
In bringing the term into the generative framework, and thereby into
contemporary phonology theories, Chomsky and Halle (1968) attempt to formalize
some degree of naturalness based on the intrinsic content of features. While
20
naturalness could be considered the one leading dimension of markedness, it is
clear that it is a dimension that is inherently abstract and cannot be determined
based on any one diagnostic. The most notable reasons for this are that naturalness
is based on articulatory as well as perceptual grounds, which don’t always agree,
and that it is context dependent rather than absolute. Furthermore, not only is
naturalness in itself a multidimensional measure but its use in the generative
framework is applied to a variety of phenomena which are common among the
languages of the world (listed in §1.4).
Accepting such a theory involves the responsibility for discovering the right
class of universal rules interpreting M and U representations as + and –. This
is a vast undertaking. At the moment, from the point of view of a completed
system, our knowledge along these lines is limited. But there is already a
great deal of knowledge, and many M-U decisions can be made with some
confidence. (p.168)
The diagnostics he suggests may be used with confidence are the following (these
are cited in §1.4, where they are discussed in detail):
There is an inherent problem with assigning only one of two values (marked
or unmarked) based on what, as explained above, must necessarily be a variety of,
sometimes unrelated, criteria. A choice of one of only two values is far too
limiting and cannot be expected to resolve cases where the various dimensions
involved in assigning markedness values are in conflict. Thus, when the
diagnostics for markedness contradict each other the predictive and explanatory
value of markedness is weakened.
(7) Korean place of articulation assimilation (Cho 1988, Iverson & Kim
1987, cited in Rice 1999:8)
a. coronal-labial ko/tp/alo ko[pp]alo ‘straight’
b. coronal-dorsal pa/tk/o pa[kk]o ‘to receive and’
c. labial-coronal pa/pt/o pa[pt]o ‘rice also’
d. dorsal-coronal ka/Nt/o ka[Nd]o ‘rubber’
These three ways in which unmarked elements tend to pattern similarly cover a
wide range of phenomena, some exact opposites of each other. What theoretical
significance is there to a diagnostic of markedness that is based on participation in
processes such as loss as well as epenthesis, and assimilation as well as
transparency to it? As with ‘relative markedness’, although to a lesser extent,
almost any element can be characterized as unmarked based on its participation in
one of so many processes.
Marked elements are harder to learn and are less natural and hence are often
subject to weakening or loss. This view of the marked element as being less stable
diachronically has already been presented in §1.4 where the example of glottalized
consonants disappearing from an inventory is offered. Another example of
diachronic change of marked elements towards their unmarked counterparts is the
intervocalic weakening of stops:
In this weakening of intervocalic stops from Latin to a dialect of Spanish, first the
intervocalic stops are voiced in the intermediate, reconstructed, stage. Then they
are spirantized in Spanish, and the dental element is finally lost in the dialect of
Spanish. Since each stage of the change in (8) involves a more “relaxed”
pronunciation than the previous stage and hence a less marked element, the
weakening process is a change of marked elements to unmarked ones.
Thus certain irregular verbs in English are more stable, less susceptible to change,
diachronically. Of course, one could claim that their frequency—the most
common explanation for their stability—renders them unmarked, and hence their
stability is expected. The question becomes one of determining the markedness
values of these elements in a situation where more than one value is predicted by
the diagnostics, and hence one of conflicting predictions.
Since marked elements can be both more and less stable diachronically, it is
doubtful that the markedness status of such elements is behind their behavior. In
fact, it becomes obvious that a variety of phenomena, and the interaction between
them, must be responsible for the variation in diachronic stability between these
elements (e.g., functional load, frequency, contrast maintenance, and social
factors, among others). These are the same phenomena used as diagnostics for the
determination of markedness value assignments. Subsuming them under one cover
term, and representing them with only one of two values, ignores not only the
specifics of these phenomena and their influence on diachronic stability, but also
the interaction between them, and hence reduces the explanatory power of the
theory.
3. Conclusion
But there is a way out: I suggest that the phenomena subsumed under the
cover term markedness are individually far more valuable than the cover term
itself. It is these phenomena that often drive phonological behavior. The fact that
these phenomena often conflict with each other, and therefore lead to conflicting
or vacuous predictions, is only a problem if they are thought of as dimensions of
one aspect of language, that is markedness. Individually, the fact that these
phenomena don’t always act in unison, as if towards some predetermined goal, is
part of the nature of language. Furthermore, funneling the generalizations that can
be made based on the individual phenomena into one of only two values (marked
or unmarked) emerges as a generalization that is too wide in scope to be truly
insightful. The predictive and descriptive powers of the dimensions of
markedness, when taken individually, are therefore far superior to those of
markedness used as a cover term.
26
NOTES
1 Again I turn to Cole and Hualde’s (1998) questioning the existence of abstract
underlying representations. They believe that “the burden of the proof should be
on the defenders of non-observable entities” (p.8). I agree, but do not believe that
the defenders of markedness as some psychological entity can be persuaded to
take on this burden.
7 It is not clear to me what aspect of this notion is local. Possibly, she means
within a language as opposed to the global cross-linguistic tendencies. Or, more
likely, she means locally within the group of elements that pattern as unmarked
cross-linguistically. I can only guess, but it does not really matter for our purposes.
REFERENCES