GIOVANNI ARRIGHI

Over time, however, patronage from above and below began to constrain
rather than support the capacity ofJapanese business to lead the process of
regional economic integration and expansion. As long as the "magnani­
mous" postwar US trade and aid regime was in place, Japan's dependence 3
on US military protection was not a problem. But, by the 1980s, that regime
The rise and fall of Eurocommunism
had given way to US extortions, such as the massive revaluation of the
yen imposed on Japan by the Plaza conference of 1985 and the so-called SILVIO PONS
Voluntary Export Restraints imposed on Japanese imports into the United
States, which considerably undermined Japan's capacity to profit from US
patronage. 47 To make things worse for Japan, US corporations began restruc­
turing themselves to compete more effectively with Japanese businesses in the After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the leading West
exploitation of East Asia's rich endowment of labor and entrepreneurial European Communist Parties - the Italian and the French - expressed their
resources, not just through direct investment, but also through all kinds of disapproval of the repression of the Prague Spring and of its ideological
subcontracting arrangements. The more intense this competition became, the justification, known as the Brezhnev Doctrine. Such dissent marked a historic
more the overseas Chinese emerged as one of the most powerful capitalist tum of events, given that both parties had unconditionally approved the Soviet
networks in the region, in many ways overshadowing the networks of US and invasion of Hungary in 1956. For a brief moment, the creation of a Western
Japanese multinationals. 48 Communist pole was conceived of as a possibility in Italy and France, and
This development encouraged Deng Xiaoping to seek the assistance of the perceived as a danger in Moscow. However, in a few months, the scenario of a
overseas Chinese in upgrading the Chinese economy and in pursuing national coup de theatre - a new heresy in the Communist world - came undone. Under
unification in accordance with the "One Nation, Two Systems" model. The pressure from the USSR, Western Communism's united front fell apart. The
result was the close political alliance between the Chinese Communist Party French Communists (Parti communiste fran«;:ais, or PCF) backtracked, happily
and overseas Chinese business. Together, they gready facilitated the reincor­ accepting the authoritarian "normalization" in Czechoslovakia. The Italian
poration ofmainland China into regional and global markets and resurrected a , Communists (Partito comunista italiano, or PCI), on the other hand, maintained
state whose demographic size, abundance of entrepreneurial and labor . their dissent, but were careful not to break with the Soviets, retaining the idea
resources, and growth potential surpassed by a good margin those of all of "unity in diversity" inherited from Palmiro Togliatti, the leader of the PCI
other states operating in the region, the United States included. The progres­ from 1927 to 1964. I
sive realization of that potential in the 1990S and 2000S would create for US Nevertheless, such a prospect was kept alive by the Italian Communists, the
hegemony a new challenge in key respects more complex and difficult to most important Communist force in the West. They obstinately refused to
contain than the Soviet challenge of the Cold War era. brush the Prague Spring aside as a negligible episode and gradually increased
their electoral strength in the country. During the early 1970s, the PCI under
Enrico Berlinguer's leadership developed into a party that promoted an Italian
47 Gilpin, The Challenge of Global Capitalism, II8-19, 132, 230-32; Giovanni Arrighi, Adam road to socialism within the framework of a parliamentary democracy.
Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century (London: Verso, 2007), ch. 6.

48 Arrighi, Hui, Hung, and Selden, "Historical Capitalism," 315-16.

Although they constandy appealed to their own national tradition - especially
to Antonio Gramsci's ideas about the complexity of revolution in the West
and to the tradition of a mass party, the so-called partito nuovo, established by
Togliatti after World War II - the Italian Communists tried to increase their

I See Maud Bracke, Which Socialism, Whose Detente? West European Communism and the
Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968 (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2007).

44 45
 SILVIO PONS The rise and fall ofEurocommunism

legitimacy by forging an international alliance with their French and Spanish

partners, based on independence from the USSR, detachment from the Soviet The Italian origins of Eurocommunism
model, and the idea of Western socialism founded upon democratic At the time of the Soviet repression in Czechoslovakia, Berlinguer had stood
pIes. The partnership of the three Western Communist parties gave rise to out as one of the PCl leaders who was staunchest in defending the right of
what was called Eurocommunism. other parties to disagree with the USSR. Since leading the Italian delegation
The birth of Eurocommunism in the second half of the decade garnered at the Moscow conference of the Communist Parties in 1969, he had appeared
attention in international public opinion for two reasons: first, because of its to the Soviets to be an independent personality, barely reliable from their
goal of modernizing European Communism; and, second, because it appeared 2
point of view. When Berlinguer became general secretary of the PCl in 1972,
to modifY the Cold War landscape. By declaring orthodox Communist polit­ he again proposed the idea of aggregating the Western Communists, a project
ical culture obsolete, the Eurocommunists proposed a "third way" between now made more feasible by the progress of the international detente. The
social democracy and Soviet socialism. By viewing detente as a new interna­ Italian Communists, not unlike the Soviet ones, supported detente and viewed
tional environment, they asserted themselves as one of the movements that West Germany's Ostpolitik favorably. But they developed their own particular
advocated the gradual end of the Cold War divide in Europe. Therefore, point ofview. Their propensity for a "dynamic," not static, detente overturned
Eurocommunism raised curiosity and concern, hope and hostility. In Western one of the Soviets' fundamental assumptions: while in Moscow bipolar
Europe, it was viewed with interest by some social democrats, mainly in detente and the authoritarian "normalization" of Eastern Europe were axio­
Germany and Sweden, but opposed by others, as in France, and discarded by matically linked, the PCI made a connection between European detente and
"new left" movements. In Eastern Europe, it was perceived with moderate the promotion of change under the banner of "socialism with a human face."
empathy in Belgrade and in Budapest, and elsewhere in infurmal circles, while At the same time, the Italian Communists had reexamined the negative opinion
being rejected as a destabilizing factor by most representatives of the of the European Economic Community (EEC) that held sway in Moscow. The
Communist establishments. Dissidents in socialist countries were inspired by concept of Europe adopted by the PCl increasingly overlapped with that of the
the Eurocommunists' declarations ofintellectual and political freedom, but also main social democratic parties, while remaining distinct from that of the other
frustrated by their diplomatic prudence and political unpredictability. Both .in Communist Parties.3
Moscow and in Washington, Eurocommunism triggered apprehension and Berlinguer set himself the goal of exporting the PCl's vision of detente
anxiety. and Europe to other Western Communist Parties. This appeared possible
Thus Eurocommunism was a factor for change and a source of conflict in especially after the PCF softened its own anti-Europeanism and decided to
European politicS. Eventually it collected more enemies than friends. The emulate the PCI, sending a delegation to the European Parliament in 1973. 4
Soviet reaction prevented East European Communists from joining and The Italians wanted to call a conference of the Western Communist Parties
thereby weakening bloc cohesion. The US opposition to any participation of
Communist Parties in Western European coalition governments was main­
tained, and damaged the PCl. Most of the Western Communist Parties 2. A. Cherniaev, Moia zhizn' i moe vremia [My Life and My Times] (Moscow:
remained small sectarian entities under Moscow's influence. Furthermore, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1995), 2.7T. At the time, Cherniaev worked under Boris
Ponomarev, chief ofthe International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet
contradictions and divisions between Eurocommunists carne to the surface,
union. After 1985, he was to become one of Mikhail Gorbachev's closest collaborators on
weakening their capacity to challenge Moscow and influence East European international issues.
Communism. Crucial disagreements between the two main partners, the Italian Donald Sassoon, "La sinistra, l"Eumpa, il PCI," in Roberto Gualtieri (cd.), II PCl nell'ltalia
repubblicana 1943-1991 (Rome: Cameci, 2.001), 223-49. See also the documents collected in
and the French Communists, were never overcome. The Italian Communists' Maggiorani and Paolo Ferrari (eds.), L'Europa. da Togliatti a Berlinguer: testimo­
ambition to generate a new political culture failed and became simply a national numze e documenti 1945-1984 (Bologna: II Mulino, 2005).
4 Gerard Streiff, Jean Kanapa 1921-t978: tine singuliere histoire till PC'F, 2 vols. (Paris:
peculiarity. As detente declined, Eurocommunism did not become an authentic L'Harmattan, 2001), vol. I, 553. Kanapa was head of the Foreign Department of the
political movement on the European scene and failed in its aim of representing a Central Committee of the PCF from 1973 to 1978. Among Europe's Communist
Parties, the PCI was the first to send its own delegation to the Strasbourg parliament
new model of reform Communism. in 1969.

46
47
 SILVIO PONS The rise and fall of Eurocommunism

aimed at identifying the nature of the problems they were grappling held orthodox positions. Only the Spanish Communist Party (l:'aru(1o cornu­
with. Georges Marchais, the general secretary of the PCF from 1972,5 agreed nista de Espana, or PCE) supported change. s
to assist Berlinguer with the conference, which took place in Brussels in After the meeting in Brussels, Berlinguer aimed gradually to define a set of
January 1974. Berlinguer's intervention in Brussels centered on Europe's distinctive principles and policies for Western Communism. His key idea was
autonomous role in world politics. For the PCI, the initiative of aggregating to put an end to the sectarian minority traditions and behavior of the Western
the Western Communist Parties made sense only ifit were linked to the idea Communists that had resulted from the Cold War, thus contributing to the
of Europe as "neither anti-Soviet nor anti-American.,,6 The French seemed prospect of Communism being able to compete with social democracy for
in tune with the Italians. But the majority of the Western Communist hegemony on the Left. Berlinguer's West European Communist strategy also
Parties clearly influenced by Moscow and the East European regimes had a national aspect. It was conceived in parallel with the launching of the
did not change even slightly their extremely negative view ofthe EEC and of "historic compromise" between Communists and Catholics in Italian politics,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Consequently, the confer­ proposed by Berlinguer in September! October 1973. 9 He intended to avoid a
ence showed more conflict than consensus? repetition in Italy of what had happened in Chile - a cruel conflict between
Nevertheless, convergence between the Italian and the French parties ­ the Left and the moderate forces, and a military coup d'etat made possible by a
respectively gathering more than one-fourth and more than one-fifth of the hostile international environment. In his view, as a consequence of European
national electorate looked encouraging. After all, the other Western detente, American hegemony could be contained, liqUidating the anti­
Communist Parties represented almost negligible political forces. In Northern Communist veto imposed over Italian politics from the outside. A suffiCiently
Europe, the traditional weakness of the Communists showed no sign of "dynamic" view of detente would bring a Communist party to power in a
change. The British, the Belgian, and the Norwegian Communist Parties ­ Western country, if the party were able to build national and international
the three minor parties that had expressed dissent the Soviet inva­ coalitions and to modernize its own political culture.
sion of Czechoslovakia - saw their support from the working class decline Despite the failure of the Brussels conference, the Soviets were unhappy.
and performed poorly in elections. All of the other northern parties were After having tolerated the initiative, they let the PCI know that were
invariably pro-Soviet. Only the Communist Party of Finland was successful not keen on the formula of Europe as "neither anti-Soviet nor anti-American,"
in terms of electoral percentages, but its interest in European issues was and that they were concerned about the possible creation of a Western
small. The Communist Party of West Germany - a fierce opponent of the Communist center. IO As Cherniaev noted in his journal, it was clear in
PCI in Brussels had no representation in the Bundestag and was strongly Moscow that some Western Communists avoided "identifying in any way
influenced by the ruling East German Communist Party. In Southern Europe, with Soviet and Eastern European Communism," especially after the latest
the prospects for change were more promising. But the Greek Communists repressive measures against world-famous dissident intellectuals such as Andrei
were deeply split between pro-Soviet and reform factions, while the Portuguese Sakharov and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. But the Soviets' discontent should not
II

be intetpreted solely in the light oftheir hardened ideological control. A political

paradox was taking shape: more than in Western Communism, the pcrs policy
5 Por a biographical profllc of Marchais, scc Thomas Hofuung, Georges Marchais; l'inconnu encountered a certain degree of positive attention in the East where it was
du Patti communiste franrais (Paris: L'Archipcl, 2001).
6 Pondazione Istituto Gramsci, Roma, Archivio del Partito Comunista Italiano (hereafter: essentially perceived as supporting European detente and national autonomy in
FIG APC), Pondo Berlinguer, serie Movimento Operaio Internazionale (MOl), fase. I14;
FIG APC, Scritti e discorsi di Berlinguer, 26 January 1974, mf 073,389-99. The archives of
the Italian Communist including Berlinguer's personal papers, are extremely rich 8 See Aldo Bandiere rosse; lin profilo storico dei comuni,mi europei (Rome: Editori
on international issues whole of the 1970S. This chapter is based on those archives. Riuniti, 264-87.
At the time of writing, the archives of the PCP and the Spanish Communist Party were 9 See Enrico Berlinguer, La "questione comunista," 196<}-1975, ed. by Antonio Tato (Rome:
not readily available for the second half of the 1970S, at least as far as international issues Editori Riuniti, 1975l, 609--39·
are concerned. 10 Information note, Foreign Policy Department, February 18,1974, FIG APC, Estero, 1974.
7 See the memoirs of Antonio Rubbi, 11 mondo di Berlinguer (Rome: Napoleone, 1994),34. mf074.414.
Ouring the 1970S, Rubbi was a leading official of the Foreign Department of the Central II A. Cherniacv, cNa Staroi ploshchadi: iz dnevnikovykh zapisei. 1973 god', Novaya i
Committee of the PCI. He became hear! of the department in 1979, noveishaya istania, 6 (2004l, 115.

48 49
 SILVIO PONS The rise ofEurocommunism

the Soviet bloc. The PCI's points of view came to influence the Communist Portugal's "carnation revolution" in April 1974. Views on the Portuguese
Parties in Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia, although for differing revolution soon became a testing ground for the principles embraced by the
reasons and with different emphases. 12 West European Communists. The Italian and Spanish Communists publicly
The Italian Communists' policy sounded a discordant note, just at the criticized the conduct of the Portuguese Communists, headed by Alvaro
moment when the Soviets wanted to take advantage of the Western world's Cunhal. In Berlinguer's two subsequent meetings with Manuel Azcarate,
weakness caused by the oil crisis after the 1973 Yom Kippur War in the Middle the head of the PCE's foreign department, and with Santiago Carrillo, the
East. Given the internal political and social crisis in Italy and the rise of general secretary of the PCE, held in June and July 1975, there was agreement
terrorism, that country appeared to be the weak link in the Atlantic alliance. on the concern that the model followed by Cunhal in his struggle with the
Moscow would have preferred the PCI to exert influence in Italy by main­ socialists resembled that of the "popular democracies" in Eastern Europe and
taining a traditional model of class politics. But the Italian Communists that he sought to achieve a monopoly of power for the Communists. '4 The
wanted to modify the bipolar architecture and develop an innovative example French Communists, in contrast, supported their Portuguese comrades. '5 In
of reform Communism in Western Europe. the meeting between Berlinguer and Marchais held in Paris on September 29,
In this context, Berlinguer's personality assumed international significance. the two sides agreed that their respective evaluations of the Portuguese
His strategy was by no means simply geared to obtaining nationallegitima­ question were different. The Italians understood that the French supported
tion, even ifhis political discourse constantly evoked the particular intellectual Eurocommunism essentially for domestic political reasons, but for those same
and national heritage ofItalian Communism. In Berlinguer's thinking, there reasons they could change their tactics at any time. I6 Berlinguer told his Italian
was a link between the idea of a new paradigm of Western socialism colleagues that working out an understanding with the French was even more
to be built by embracing pluralist democracy and by rejecting a consumerist difficult than with the Soviets.I7 Consequently, while the public meeting held
society and the idea of Europe as a "third actor" in world politics, emerging between Berlinguer and Carrillo in Rome in July 1975 was intended to convey
through the process of detente and the birth of a political architecture of a sense of harmony between Italian and Spanish Communists, nothing came
European integration. This vision had universal appeal as well as theoretical out of the November I975 meeting between Berlinguer and Marchais in Rome
limitations: his analysis of international relations was still essentially based on except symbolic declarations of good intentions. '8 The alliance between the
the old Communist axiom of the "general crisis of capitalism." Nevertheless. three had no clear political content.
Berlinguer put new issues on the agenda, belieVing in the possibility of The PCF's positions on Portugal largely reflected those of the Communist
pragmatic change in Communist political culture. His ideal of humanistic Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In private, the Soviets criticized Berlinguer
socialism was not intended to embrace social democracy: it was aimed at and accused the United States of preparing a coup in Portugal similar to what
preserving and modernizing the revolutionary tradition inherited from the had happened in Chile. 19 The Soviets' own objectives during the Portuguese
of Communism. '3 crisis were probably more restrained than revolutionary. A confidential note
,. written Vadim Zagladin, one of the main officials of the CPSU's Inter­
national Department headed by Boris Ponomarev, after a trip to Portugal in
Eurocommunism: birth and contradictions
However, cultural change and alliance-building between Western Communists 14 FIG APC, Fondo Berlinguer, serie MOl, fase. 122 and fase. 125.
proved to be difficult, as evidenced by disagreements in the aftermath of IS FIG APC, Estero, 1975, mf 204, 216--19.
16 FIG APC, Fondo Berlinguer, serie MOl, fase. 129. The notes taken by Kanapa at the time
also confinn the divergence between the PCI and the PCF on the Portuguese question:
12 inf{)rmation by Sergio Segre on his trip to Bucharest and Belgrade, FIG APC, Estero, see Streiff, Jean Kanapa, vo!' II, p. 30.
1974, mf 074.250. '7 FIG APC, Direzione, Verbali, September 26, 1975, mf 0208, 176-78.
13 See. in particular, Enrico La proposta comunista: relazione al Comitato centrale e 18 FIG APC, Fondo Berlinguer. serie MOl, fase. 129.
£lila Commissione centrale di del Partito comunista italiano in prcparazione del XIV 19 Record of the meeting between A. Kirilenko, v. Zagladin, E. Berlinguer, A. Cossutta,
Congresso (Turin: Einaudi, 1975). On Eurocommunism as a project of the Italian G. Napolitano, G. Pajetta, and S. March 24, 1975, FIG APC, Estero, 1975, mf 204,
Communists. see Silvio Pons, Berlinguer e La .fine del comunismo (Turin: Einaudi, 2006). 59394·

50 51
 SILVIO PONS The rise

early September 1975, shows that the Soviets sought contacts with a number Eastern Europe. 24 Even more than the Italian Communists' reversal of their
of political forces, starting with the Socialists, and that they wanted to anti-NATO positions, what worried Moscow was their idea that Europe
convince Cunhal to contain the extremist tendencies working in his party should play a new role in world affairs.25 Rather than seeking to capitalize
and in the army. The Soviets worried that a Portuguese Communist Party on the possibility of the PCI's entrance into an Italian governing coalition,
grab for power could result both in the party getting crushed and in Moscow Moscow feared that its example might undermine both Soviet leadership
losing its influence on politics in a strategically important country .20 However, of European Communism and the European detente, which was based on
Moscow believed Cunhal's conduct served as an example for other Western bipolar stability,
Communist Parties - in terms of both loyalty to the USSR and aversion to US Despite W ashint,-rton's alarm and Moscow's suspicion, Western Communism's
- and constituted an alternative to Berlinguer's policy. role on the European scene did not generate an authentic political movement.
On Western Communism, paradoxically, Soviet and American interests There were unbreachable divergences between the Italian and the French
converged. For different reasons, both Moscow and Washington feared the Communists, and not only over the Portuguese revolution. The PCI and
PCI's reform Communism. In T974-75, Kissinger, the US secretary of the PCF held different positions on Europe, since the latter was against any
state, outlined a position on the "Communist question" that matched his weakening of national sovereignty in favor of political integration. Moreover,
geopolitical thinking and his bipolar vision of the European theatre. The the individual parties' prospects differed conSiderably: while the PCI had
Portuguese revolution led him to fear a "domino effect" that would threaten achieved remarkably increased support at the administrative elections of
the system of American alliances in Southern Europe, notwithstanding the 1975 and was in the running to govern Italy as the dominant force on
political and ideological differences between the various Communist Parties. the PCF was from a stagnant voter base and competition
He worried that the United States would have a weakened capacity to control and the PCE was reemerging from illegality in the
Western Europe. 21 Even when the Italian Communists abandoned their anti­ transition after Francisco Franco's long dictatorship. Nevertheless, although
22
NATO position in December 1974, Kissinger's views did not change. At a its actual position remained fragile and uncertain, Eurocommunism was
meeting with his staff' in January 1975, he rejected the argument that the perceived by the public to be one of the portents of change triggered
United States could find a Communist Party"acceptable" if it were independ­ detente.
ent of Moscow, observing that 'Uosip Broz] Tito is not under Moscow's By the end of 1975, the term Eurocommunism had entered the pUlIllLa.t
control, yet his influence is felt allover the world." Should the Communists lexicon. The Western Communists now distinguished themselves by criticiz­
come to power in any West country, the map of the post-World ing Moscow on human rights in light of the Helsinki agreements. The
War II world would be "totally redefined."23 Congress of the CPSU recorded unprecedented events: Marchais did not
The Soviets avoided formulating so clear a position. But they probably attend, and Berlinguer made a speech focusing on the issue of "pluralism"
approved Kissinger's veto of the PCI. Thev were afraid that the model of and political democracy.26 The symbolic effect of this distancing from the
an maepenaent Communist help create an independent West Soviet model was quite considerable. 27 At his confidential meeting with
European center for which in tum could influence the parties of Leonid Brezhnev, the general secretary of the CPSU, on March I, Berlinguer
emphasized the "new possibilities" arising for the "democratic and socialist
20 Fond Gorbacheva, Archives, Moscow, fond 3, opis' I, kartochka 13678. forces" in a situation marked, in his opinion, by the decline of the United States
21 See Mario Del Pero, Kissinger e !'asceSil dei neoconservatori: aile origini della after its defeat in Vietnam and by the crisis of capitalism in Western Europe.
e.ltera americaIW Laterza, 2006), 8894. See also Jussi Hanhimaki,
Architect: Henry KisSinger and American Foreign Policy (Oxford and New York: Oxford
University Press, 2004), 400.
22 On December ro, 1974, in his report to the Central Committee of the PCI, tlertmguer 24 On the between Moscow and Washington against EurocommlllIism, see
declared that the party was no longer requesting Italy to break with NATO; see Berlinguer, Raymond L. A journey through the Cold War: A Memoir ~f Containment and
La proposta comunista, 60-64. Coexistence DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001),388.
23 Kissinger's stafl:' meeting, January 12, 1975, United States National Archives, Washington 25 FIG APC, Note alia 1975, mf 201, 779-83.
DC (NARA), RG 59, 780443, 6. See Henry Kissinger, Years ofRenewal (New York: Simon & 26 FIG APC, Fondo serie MOl, fase. 1}6.
Schuster, 1999), 627, 631. 27 Rllbbi, II mondo di Berlinguer, 102.

52 53
 SILVIO PONS The rise and fall of Eurocommunism

the Italians to attend the conference, which otherwise would have lost much
3I
of its meaning. On the other side, the Italians decided to participate because
they hoped to focus on detente and establish it as a principle shared by all
European Communist Parties.
The Italian Communists were at a crucial point in their own national policy.
Although it did not become the major political party at the national elections
ofJune I976, the PCI gained more than 34 percent of the vote. No Western
Communist Party had ever received the vote of one-third of the whole
electorate, a level that was comparable to that of Europe's major social
democratic parties. On the eve of the elections, Berlinguer had made another
move to legitimize the PCI as a governing force. In an interview with Carriere
della sera onJune 9, 1976, that was to become famous, he stated that the Italian
Communists' "road toward socialism" was more likely to be found within
the Western alliance than within the Soviet bloc. He also defined the North
Adantic Treaty as a "shield useful for constructing socialism in freedom."3 2

The Soviets were not happy, but Brezhnev wanted to avoid a rift \vith
Berlinguer,3> Nor did Berlinguer seek a confrontation with Moscow. 34 He
I. Leader of the Italian Communist Party Enrico Berlinguer (left) and French Communist
Party leader Georges Marchais during a meeting in 1976. Berlinguer took his party in a
was probably hoping that once the Helsinki Accords had been secured,
radical anti-Stalinist direction that Marchais found difficult to follow. Moscow might be open to a more advanced and flexible notion of detente,
one that would allow for change in the European order of the Cold War.
When Berlinguer had introduced the term Eurocommunism in Berlin,
Brezhnev adhered to Berlinguer's thesis, but denied that the USSR's actions
Marchais and the PCF had refused to follow him, preferring to adopt the tradi­
were conditioned by a "siege mentality," as the Italian leader had main­
tional concept of the autonomy of the parties.35 Tito and Nicolae Ceau§escu also
tained. 28 Subsequently, in a joint meeting with Marchais in Paris on June 3,
emphasized their autonomy. Thus, the PCI appeared to be the main feature
1976, Berlinguer used the term Eurocommunism in public for the first time. 29
in a new landscape of European Communism, marked by the end of Soviet
The main test came in late June, when a European conference ofCommunist
predorninance?6 Brezhnev and Mikhail Suslov, the head of ideology in the
parties convened in Berlin. Even just a few days before proceedings began,
Soviet Politburo, were not inclined to initiate divisive ideological and
despite pressure from the Soviets and their allies, the attendance of the Italian
political debates with the Westem Communists:,7 They were clearly satisfied
and French Communists was not taken for granted. There was no a!,rreement
with binding the PCI to a pattern of formal unity within the Communist
on a common document. For more than a year, preparatory talks had been
movement. Moscow would recognize Eurocommunism in order to contain it.
in a stalemate, generating tension. 30 The real point of the conference con·
cerned the relationship of the Communist movement to detente. The Soviets
31 Chemiaev, Moia zhizn' i moe vremia, 339.
and their closer allies aimed at containing the most dangerous messages of 32 See Enrico Berlinguer. La politica internazionale dM comunisti italiani (Rome: Editori
Helsinki - the protection of human rights and the abandonment of a concept Riuniti. 1976), 159 60.
33 Chemiaev, Moia zhizn' i moe vremia, 343. Brezhnev sent a letter of invitation to
of international relations based on class struggle by stressing the ideological Berlinguer on June I7, 1976, asking for his participation at the Berlin conference: FIG
ties that bound European Communists together. Therefore, Moscow wanted APC, Estero, 1976, mf 0240,382-87.
34 OnJune 19, 1976, BerHnguer, remarked that "[a J PCI-CPSU agreement [is] important for
the Communist movement in and out of Europe": ibid., 388.
28 FIG APC, Fondo Berlinguer. serie Mal, fase. 136.
35 FIG APC, Fonda Berlingucr, sene Mal, fasc. 140.
29 FIG APC, Estero, 1976, mf0228, 565-67: FIG APC, Fondo Beriinguer, selie Mal, fase. 139.
36 Rubbi, II mOMo di Berlinguer, 93ff
30 Chemiaev, Moia zhizn' i moe vremia, 339ff. See also Rubbi, n mondo di Berlinguer, 91ff.
37 Chemiaev, Moia zhizn' i moe vremia, 345: FIG APC, Fonda Berlinguer, serie Mal, fasc. 140.

54 55
 SILVIO PONS The rise ofEurocommunism

strategy Imkmg the democratic evolution of Westem Communism to devel­

Eurocommunism as a source of conflict
opments in the Soviet bloc. This approach contrasted with Kissinger's because
Between late T976 and early 1977, the development of Eurocommunism was it envisioned Eurocommunism as a phenomenon that might enhance US
identified largely with the role and initiative of the PCI, the leading Westem interests, given its potential consequences for Eastern Europe and the chal­
Communist Party and the only one that could boast growing electoral success. lenge it posed to the USSR's leadership of the Communist movement.
Furthermore, the PCI influenced the "national solidarity" government formed The launching of Eurocommunism in the Berlin conference, the start of a
by the Christian Democrat leader Giulio Andreotti in August T976, which new political arrangement in Italy, and the development of an alliance of the
included no Communist ministers, but rested upon the Communists' absten­ Left in France were significant political events in the West and had repercus­
tion in the parliament. The Italian Communists asked for full membership in sions throughout the continent. Soviet and East European leaders would have
the government and the abandonment of the US veto against them. preferred to ignore these developments, but they could not. The Hungarians
The administration ofjimmy Carter did not immediately indicate whether confessed to the Italians that Eurocommunism was creating "big problems" in
it looked favorably on the Italian Communists' participation in a governing the countries ofCentral and Eastern Europe, constituting a "point ofreference
coalition. Carter and his advisers oscillated between an open-minded con­ for a variety of forces sustaining the need for deep-seated changes."41 The
sideration of this unprecedented scenario and a traditional vision of Poles held positions similar to the Hungarians. 42 Western Communists _
Eurocommunism as a threat to NATO?8 In his memoirs, Richard Gardner­ and the Italians in particular were aware of the impact Eurocommunism
the US ambassador to Rome from 1977 to 1981 and a personal friend of Carter's was having. According to the PCI's foreign-policy chief Sergio Segre, it was
national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski acknowledges this ambiva· "feeding forces of renewal" and undercutting prevailing forms of political and
lence in American policy. Gardner observes that there was a predisposition to cultural life in Eastern Europe. 43
express "a position different from those ofFord and Kissinger, who had barred The ideas associated with Eurocommunism ignited conflict with Moscow.
the door to any contact" with the PCI. However, Carter and his advisers also The Soviets were now ready to confront Eurocommunism. Their intolerance
believed that the PCI's political evolution was still "far from iustifvinl2: the grew considerably in the aftermath of the Berlin conference. In the Politburo,
abandonment of American objections to its governing role."39 Suslov and Iurii Andropov, head of the KGB, the Soviet security and intelli­
The problem was not limited to Italy. A memorandum on forei b'11-policy gence agency, wanted to fight Eurocommunism as a dangerous form of
priorities written for President Carter immediately after his election, on revisionism. 44 At a Warsaw Pact meeting held in late 1976, Brezhnev
November 3, 1976, by Brzezinski, Gardner, and Henry Owen, stated that denounced an attempt by Western "reactionary circles" to separate Western
there was "a very subtle but important link" between the question of left­ Europe's Communist Parties from the socialist countries. 15 Moscow was
wing oppositions in \Vestern Europe and "United States' policy towards especially worried that the PCI would soon participate in the ruling coalition
Eastern Europe." They believed that the "moderate promotion of greater and its role was not being formally rejected by the administration in
diversity in Eastern Europe [could] be strengthened by efforts to foster gradual Washington; the PCI, in fact, was no longer the tool of USSR's influence in
'liberalization' and 'assilIl1ilation' of the Western European Communist parties Italy. The PCF seemed more eager to maintain an alliance with the Socialists,
into the democratic process."4 0 By the end of 1976, American policy toward who were in a position to lead the French Left to victory in the upcoming
Eurocommunism was not confined to "non-interference, but was part of a
41 FIG APC, Note alia Segrcteria, 1976. mf 0280,382-85.
42 Information from Poland, 1~4, 1977, FIG APC, Note aHa Segreteria, 1977,
38 Irvin Wall, "L'amministrazione Carter e \'curocomunismo," Ricerche di Stona politica, 2 mf 0288, 317.
(2006), 18r-y6. 43 See Sergio Segre, "Lineamenti per una storia deH'eurocomunismo," in Segre, A chi fa
39 Richard N. Gardner, Mission: Italy. Gli anni di piombo raccontati dall'ambasciatore amer­ paura l'eurocomunismoi' (Rimini·Florencc: Guaraldi, 1977), 36. Segre was head of the
icano a Roma 197}-1981 (Milan: Mondadori, 2004), 31. Foreign Department of the Central Committee of the PCI from 1970 to 1979.
40 Memorandum on Foreign Policy Priorities for the First Six Months, November 3, 1976, 44 Chemiaev, Moia zhi.zn' i moe vremia, 349.
Cyrus Vance and Grace Sloan Vance Papers, box 9, ( 19, Manuscripts and Archives, 45 Record of the meeting between Ceau~escu and Berlinguer, January 19, 1977, FIG APC,
Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, New Haven, CT. Notc alia Segreteria, 1977, mf 0288, I97.

56 57
 SILVIO PONS The rise ofEurocommunism

elections, and the PCE was on the eve of its first test in national elections. The possessing the potential to influence East European parties and even the
Kremlin, in short, had failed to thwart the birth of a Western Communist Soviets. The ideas professed by the Eurocommunists revealed a differentiated
which seemed to be solidifYing. scenario, combining common statements of principle on the values of democ­
As Eurocommunism loomed over the continent, the Soviets grew more racy with irreconcilable positions on major political issues.
and more worried that Kissinger's "guarantee" against upsetting the political However, Kremlin leaders feared the centrifugal, pluralistic, and critical
chessboard in Europe was no longer operative. Worse yet, in their eyes the message conveyed by Eurocommunists. After the Madrid meeting, the ten­
human rights campaign ofthe Carter presidency was not distinguishable from sion between Moscow and the three Western parties, including the
the public declarations of Eurocommunists in favor of freedom of thought in peaked. 50 The KGB tried to discredit Berlinguer.51 The casus beUi was supplied
the East. 46 The Soviet leaders, therefore, decided to cast aside their former by the publication of a pamphlet by Carrillo on Eurocommunism. 52 The
strategy of accepting and dec1awing Eurocommunism. In February 1977, they Soviets reacted against the criticisms of "real socialism" leveled by the Spanish
objected to a forthcoming meeting of the three Eurocommunist parties that leader.53 Berlinguer publicly declared that Eurocommunism was not an
was being planned for Madrid. In a letter to Berlinguer, they criticized the "so­ ephemeral phenomenon, and that all states and political parties had to come
called Eurocommunist platform" and warned of the "start of a new and to terms with it. 54 When a PCI delegation visited Moscow in July, it faced
extremely dangerous split in the Communist movement." They sent a similar harsh criticism from Suslov and Ponomarev. 55 And, some months later, in
letter to Marchais. 47 November 1977, when Berlinguer went to Moscow for the sixtieth anniversary
Thus, the meeting held in Madrid on March 3,1977, between Berlinguer, of the Russian Revolution and gave a speech saying democracy was a "histor­
Marchais, and Carrillo, seemed like a challenge to Moscow, even if it pre­ ically universal value upon which to base an original socialist society," he was
sented nothing new politically. The final document prepared by Segre, chided by Brezhnev. The Soviet leader attacked the PCI, ridiculed it for not
Azcarate, and Jean Kanapa, the head of the PCF's foreign department, was "unmasking" NATO' s "aggressive" nature, and implied that the Italian masses
diluted by the latter's refusal to emphasize the role of Europe and support did not support the PCl's policy.56 For the first time, the Soviets forced
closer ties with European sOcialists. 48 Berlinguer still believed as he main­ Berlinguer to choose between the pcrs new national and i.nternational
tained to the pcrs leadership shortly thereafter - that the meeting had been a positions on the one hand, and its membership in the Communist movement
"political success" because Marchais and Carrillo had for the first time "appro­ on the other.
priated the word Eurocommunism in public and in private."49 But the leaders Upon his return from Moscow, Berlinguer met with Carrillo to examine the
at Madrid articulated different conceptions of Eurocommunism: for the possibility of relaunching Eurocommunism, thus demonstrating his determi­
French Communists, it was a tool to be used for the purposes of internal nation not to back down in the face of Soviet intimidation. 57 In a joint inter­
politics and was subject to redefinition depending on their competition with view with the Spanish leader, Berlinguer stated that Eurocommunism was
the Socialists, while no real change was implied in the domain of political "not just a large movement of ideas, but a movement that advances based on
culture; for the Spanish, Eurocommunism constituted a genuine alternative certain fundamental political choices."5 8 However, he was well aware that
center of the international Communist movement confronting Moscow and
its East European allies; for the Italians, it was a movement aimed at gradual
50 Streiff, Jean Kanapa, vol. ll, 87-.88.
reform, indicating a new model of socialism and a positive idea of Europe, 51 Christopher Andrew with Vasilii Mitrokhin, J/archivio Mitrokhin: Ie atlivita segrete del
KGB in occidente (Milan: Rizzoli, 2000), 372.
52 See Santiago Carrillo, L'eurocomunismo e 10 Stato (Rome: Editori Riuniti, T977).
46 The Italian Communist press emphasized both the censure of Charter 77 in 53 Chemiaev, MoW. zhizn' i moe vremia, 350. 54 TUnita,' June 20, 1977.
Czechoslovakia and the arrest of the dissidents lurii Orlov and Aleksandr Ginzburg in 55 Notes by E. Macaluso on M. Suslov's and B. Ponomarev's interventions the
the USSR: see for example l'Unita. February 6, 1977. meeting with the PCl's delegation, no date, FIG APC, Note alla Segreteria, 1977,
47 l<lG APC, Estero, 1977. mf 0~97, 1494-95; Streiff,Jean Kanapa. vol. II. 78. mt' 0299, 235'48.
48 Rubbi. n mondo di BtTlinguer, 69. 56 FIG APC, Fondo Berlinguer, serie MOl, fusc. 151.
49 FIG APC, Direzione, Verbali, March 5. 1977, mf 0296, 798, 204: FIG APC, Fondo 57 Record of the meeting between E. Berlinguer and S. Carrillo. November 10,1977, FIG
Berlinguer, serie MOl, fasc. 146. See also Luciano Barca, Cronaehe daU'imemo del vernee APC, Note alia Segreteria, T977, mf 0309, 264-70.
del PCJ, 3 vols. (Soveria Manmelli: Rubbettino, :2005), vol. II, 677. 58 l'Unita, November 11, 1977.

58 59
 SILVlO PONS
The rise

political harmony with the PCF was weak and doubtfuL Eurocommunism provoked by the PCl's request in December 1977 to form a new coalition
could scarcely be defined as having a shared message, let alone as a political government that included the Communists.60 In fact, the State Depanment
movement. To make such an argument was, at best, a case of wishful thinking. merely repeated what was already known regarding the United States' official
Moreover, Berlinguer and Carrillo seemed to assume that Eurocommunism position; there was no radical revision of the Carter administration's pOlicy.61
and detente would continue to develop simultaneously, while instead the Nonetheless, the declaration meant that the intent to put Eurocommunism to
international political climate was deteriorating. The Soviet reaction the test, initially formulated by Brzezinski and his collaborators, was never
Eurocommunism was not ephemeral. It was a clear sign that the stalemate of in practice. The Caner administration had come to view the PCI and its
detente in the Cold War system would leave only a narrow political space for policies as a part of its European problems. Officials in Washington made no
unonhodox movements, especially in the Communist camp. serious attempt to detach the leading Western Communist Party from Moscow,
although they might have capitalized on growing tensions between
and Brezhnev. Instead, the Carter administration's strategy in Italv was to work
The demise of Eurocommunism with the Christian Democrats to weaken the PCl. 62
The Madrid meeting of March 1977 marked the apex of Eurocommunism, but A few months later, in the spring of 1978, the crisis of the Italian republic
also the start of its decline. The French Communists sundered the alliance of reached its climax when the Red Brigades kidnapped and murdered Aldo
the Left and embarked on a regression into orthodoxy. The Spanish Communists Moro, the moderate president of the Christian Democrats, the party most
garnered very modest results in their first electoral test than 10% open to collaboration with the Communists. 63 The Communists promised
compared to almost 30% for the Socialists), and they to succumb to support to the govemment, but received no real concessions in
internal division. The Italian Communists suffered from sharing in governing return. By that time, the French Left, beset by divisions between Communists
responsibility without actually taking pan in government. Within the respec­ and Socialists, had lost the national elections. For different reasons, the national
tive countries, the Communist Parties' relations with social democrats were chances of both the major Western Communist parties suddenly worsened.
not harmonious. Only the PCI could boast strong relations with many of Furthermore, the crisis of detente that became apparent in US-Soviet
the large non-Communist parties of the European Left and especially with relations by mid-I978, especially on the issue ofSoviet intervention in Africa,
German Social Democrats. However, deep bonds had not yet been developed, increasingly menaced all ideas and hopes of changing the bipolar architec­
although Berlinguer was aware that relations with European social democratic ture of Europe. 64 West European Communists responded in very different
parties were crucial to Eurocommunism in its search for Western legitimacy. ways to the hardening of the Cold War. While the French took sides with
The ~crs main counterpans were still in the East, particularly Tito and Janos the Soviet bloc, the Italians tried to maintain their independence. With the
Kadar; both empathized with Eurocommunist political discourse, but remained two major Western Communist Parties faCing domestic crisis and following
cool about pluralist democracy and open only to limited forms of cornpro­ opposing perspectives internationally, the collapse of Eurocommunism had
mise:9 Berlinguer's policy, therefore, still faced serious difficulties in coalition­ begun.
building, in spite of its international ambitions.
At the same time, the PCI was vulnerable domestically, !,riven the gravity 60 Memorandum for the President from Zbigniew Brzezinski, December 2, 1977,
of the Italian crisis. On January 12, I978, the US State Department issued Brzezinski donated material, box 41, Jimmy Carter Library; Gardner, Mission: Italy,
190fT.; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser,
a statement that the United States opposed Communist Parties' 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, '983),3'2.
participation in West European governments. This declaration had been 61 Wall, "L'amministrazione Carter e l'eurocomunismo," 194.
62 See Olav Nj0lstad, "Come tenere i comunisti fuori dal govemo senza ingercnze:
encouraged by Ambassador Gardner, and the decision to adoot it was l'amministrazione Carter e I'ltalia ('977'~78)," Passato e Presente, 16 ('998), 57-84·
63 See Agostino Giovagnoli, II raso Moro: U!Ul tragedia repubblicana (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2005).
59 FIG APC, Fondo Berlinguer, serie MOl, fase. 149, record of the meetings between 64 On the Soviet view of the crisis of detente in 1978, see Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed
E. Berlinguer and J. Kadar (October 1-3 1977); FIG APe, Notc alla Segreteria, 1977, Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill, NC:
mf 0304, 480-'95, record of the meetings between E. Berlinguer and J. Tito (October 4· I inivpr.<irv of North Carolina Press, 2007). See also the chapters by Zubok and Olav
'977); FIG APC, Note alia Segreteria, '977, mf 0304,5 0 2-20.
this volume.

60 61
 SILVlO PONS The rLle and fall of EUTOcommunism

In October 1978, a PCI delegation led by Berlinguer visited Paris, Moscow, that both Moscow and Washington would attempt to undermine the PCI's
and Belgrade. The trip was a political pilgrimage aimed at exploring what policy of working within the parliamentary system?'
could be done to halt the crisis of detente, preserving Europe from super­ In early 1979, the Italian Communists, for domestic political reasons, decided
power tensions. The meeting between Berlinguer and Marchais demonstrated to put an end to their participation in the "national solidarity" majority.
that basic differences between the two parties, regarding Europe's political Their retreat into opposition, and their subsequent electoral defeat in June
65
integration and the degree of collaboration with the socialists, persisted. The 1979, marked the end of their rise in the domestic arena. Although the
PCF had actually given up its previous hopes of building an alliance with the PCI continued to receive almost 30 percent of the vote, it would never
PCI, showing that its embrace of Eurocommunism had just been a matter of again take part in a government majority. Soon thereafter, the Euromissile
expediency.66 Consequently, Berlinguer acted in his mission to the East as the crisis and the invasion of Afghanistan provoked the final collapse of the
leader of the PCI, not as a partner in a Western Communist movement. international relaxation of tensions that had been conducive to nurturing
During Berlinguer's October 1978 mission to Moscow relations between political change in Europe during the 1970S. The Eurocommunist strategy
the Italian Communists and the Soviets worsened dramaticaIly.67 In his first ended without any lasting political achievement. The French Communists
meeting with Suslov and Ponomarev, Berlinguer established a clear connection returned to orthodoxy and realigned with Moscow, even to the point of
between the "hard blow" that Communist ideals had suffered because of the justifying the invasion of Afghanistan. The Spanish Communists frag­
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the difficulties Communists faced as a mented, with a considerable component swearing allegiance to the
result of "the limits to freedom" in the USSR. He requested respect for a Kremlin. In large measure, the Soviet campaign against Eurocommunism
of opinions," and remarked that dissidents "are said to be violating was successful. As international relations worsened, centripetal trends
the law, but it is the very nature of these laws that raises serious doubts prevailed in European Communism, both among the parties in the Soviet
with us." Suslov responded angrily, saying that respecting pluralism would bloc and among the Western parties. The Italian Communists, meanwhile,
mean restoring "a society divided into classes" and permitting "spying continued their criticism of Soviet foreign poHcy. They condemned the
activities." He aggressively invited the Italian Communists to abandon invasion of Afghanistan and then denounced General Wojciech Jaruzelski's
"the terms fpluralism and Eurocommunism] that have been created by our coup d'etat in Poland. The PCI evolved as a force increasingly separated from
adversaries." Ponomarev then said that Eurocommunism "serves only to set the Communist world, but without any major success in linking up with the
the Communist Parties of the West against those in the socialist countries. broader Western European Left?2
Our adversaries are not without praise for this." Berlinguer replied that "we do
not receive praise from our adversaries," to which Suslov retorted, "So we
hope.,,68In a subsequent meeting, Brezhnev revealed that he was entirely under Eurocommunism and the Cold War
the influence of Suslov.69 He rebuffed Berlinguer's attempt to defend the
Eurocommunism challenged the persistence of the Cold War system during
principles ofthe pcrs poHcy, and stated that the "national solidarity" experience
the 1970S. It tried to erode the clear demarcation of Europe's geopolitical
had bound Italy closely "to the American military machine and to NATo."70
boundaries and subverted the unity of the Communist movement. The
Berlinguer realized that he would get nowhere with Brezhnev. He concluded
Eurocommunists adopted a vision of detente as a source of political change

65 PIG APC, Direzione, Allegati, October 19, 1978, mf7812, 58~66.

66 See Stephane Counois and Marc Lazar, Hi.ltoire du Parti commul1istefran faLl (Paris: PUF, 71 Rubbi, II mondo di l:Ierltnguer, 142.
1995),368. 72 Strong emphasis on the PCI' s difference from social democracy was one leitmotiv of the
67 FIG APC, Estero, J978, mf 7812, 57-150~ See also Silvio Pons, "Meetings between the political memoranda sent to Berlinguer his assistant, Antonio Tato: see Caro
Italian Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Moscow and Rerlinguer: note e appunti ri.servati di Antonio a Enrico Berlil1guer 1969-1984 (Turin:
Rome. 1978-1980," Cold War HLltory, 3 (2002), 157-<l6. Einaudi, 2003). For retrospective criticism. see the memoirs of Giorgio Napolitano, at
68 FIG APC, Estero, 1978, mf 7812. 69 Rubbi, II mondo di Berlinguer, 141-57. the time one of leading personalities of the moderate wing of the PCI: Giorgio
70 Note by A. Rubbi on the meeting wlth L. Brezhnev of October 9, 1978, FIG APC, Napolitano, Da! PCI al socialismo europco: Ul1 'autobiografia politica (Rome-Bari: Laterza,
Direzione. mf 7812, 78-82. 2005).

62 63
 SILVIO PONS The rise ofEurocommunism

that clashed with the conservative notions prevailing in Washington and in and Soviet socialism remained a dream of the Itahan Communists alone.
Moscow. They underlined the role of Europe as a global player, thus contest­ Eurocommunist ideas would later become a significant asset for the reformers
ing bipolarity as an outdated international order and calling attention to who gathered around Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union. 73 But, in the
multipolarity as an emerging reality in world affairs. By emphasizing the early 1980s, the promise of Eurocommunism was apparently extinguished. In
virtues of pluralism and reform, they helped destroy diSCipline in the filct, at the time of Berlinguer's death in 1984, the term Eurocommunism itself
Communist camp and presented the Soviets with a political message that had fallen into disuse.
threatened to destabilize their dominion over Central and Eastern Europe.
The leading Eurocommunist party, the PCI, increased its national strength to
the point of becoming a plausible party of government in Italy. All of this 73 See the chapter by Archie Brown in this volume.
made Eurocommunism a significant international phenomenon in the second
half of the decade.
However, the Eurocommunists overestimated the potential for change in
the Cold War system and for reform in the Communist world. They main­
tained that reform and detente would go hand in hand. This assumption was
central to the rise ofEurocommunism, but it eventually proved deceptive. For
some time after the crisis of detente had begun, Eurocommunist ideas
resonated because of their critique ofbloc thinking and the Cold War system.
But, as a political phenomenon, Eurocommunism was never consistent and
successful. It was not based on a political platform genuinely shared by the
two major parties, the Italian and the French. It could not depend on a
substantial following among European Communist Parties or within overall
European public opinion. The Eurocommunists' relationship with the main
social democratic forces of the European Left remained limited and confuc­
tual. Their relations with Moscow were at the same time tense and hesitant,
and were maintained in spite of Soviet hostility. Even their rejection of Soviet
myths was inconsistent; in particular, the image of the basically peaceful
character of the USSR, as a counterbalance to US power politics, was never
completely abandoned. When detente began to collapse, the rifts in the alliance
between the three main West European Communist Parties became appa­
rent, and their cooperation broke down.
Before the decade was out, Eurocommunism had ceased to be a significant
international force. Although its appearance had weakened bloc cohesion, it
could not overcome the established policies of the two blocs. Its demise was
a clear sign of the limits of feasible change in international politics and in
European Com.munism. Outside Italy, Eurocommunism rapidly faded from
the European scene. Berlinguer's desire to remove the Soviet leadership of
the world Communist movement, to precipitate reform of Communism in
Eastern Europe, and to forge a new socialist model in the West proved to
be unachievable. The search for a "third way" between social democracy

64 65