Legal Forms Cases 2

[G.R. No. 122806.
June 19, 1997]
TIMES BROADCASTING NETWORK, represented by ALEX SY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FILOMENO
AROCHA, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari was filed by Times Broadcasting Network, represented by its owner, Alex V. Sy, to
reverse and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 24, 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 35450[1] and its
Resolution dated November 15, 1995 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The records show that petitioner Times Broadcasting Network leased a portion of Hotel Arocha in Ozamis City owned by
private respondent Filomeno Arocha. The subject of the lease consisted of two rooms with a total area of 7 meters by 11
meters, a terrace with an area of 25 square meters, and the rooftop of the four-storey building. The premises were to be
used by petitioner to operate a radio station.[2]
In June 1993, petitioner began installing its equipment and apparatus in the leased premises. Petitioner, however,
installed its radio antenna on the third floor rooftop of the hotel, instead of the fourth floor rooftop as stipulated in the
contract.
On October 18, 1993, private respondent, through its counsel, Ferdinand S. Reyes, sent a letter to petitioner demanding
payment of P2,500.00 as monthly rental for the use of the third floor rooftop, since the third floor rooftop is not covered
by the lease.[3] Petitioner refused to pay. It claimed that the installation of its radio antenna on the third floor rooftop
was with the permission of private respondent. It also averred that it is impossible for it to mount its antenna on the
fourth floor rooftop because it is already occupied by the hotel's TV antenna.[4]
On January 10, 1994, private respondent Arocha filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Dipolog,
Branch 1 a verified complaint for ejectment with payment of back rentals and damages against petitioner. The
complaint prayed:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing consideration, it is most respectfully prayed to this Honorable Court that, after
hearing, judgment be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant as follows:
a. Ordering the defendant to vacate the 3rd storey rooftop and remove his FM and VHF antennas and other equipment,
wirings and other peripherals, without causing further damage, and transfer it to the premises or area covered by the
existing lease contract;
b. Ordering the defendant to pay a monthly rental of P 2,500 a month from the time he/it occupied the 3rd storey roof
top until such time that it shall be actually vacated.
c. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the amount of:
Moral damages P 5,000
Exemplary damages P 5,000
Docket, Sheriff Fees
1|Page LEGAL FORMS CASES 2

and other Litigation
expenses P 1,000
Actual expenses/ P 10,000
Damage and P 1,500
Attorney's Fee P 10,000
plus an appearance fee of P 500everytime this case will be called to (sic) a hearing.[5]
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint. It argued that the MTCC has no jurisdiction over the case because private
respondent's cause of action is actually not for ejectment but for specific performance. Petitioner contended that
private respondent's action was not simply for recovery of possession of the premises but was for compliance with the
terms of the lease contract. Hence, petitioner asserted that it was the Regional Trial Court (RTC), not the MTCC, which
had jurisdiction over the case.[6]
The MTCC denied the motion.[7] On May 23, 1994, it rendered a Decision[8] in favor of private respondent. It ordered
petitioner to vacate the third floor rooftop and to pay a monthly rental of P 1,500.00 from May 1993 up to the time it
vacates the third floor rooftop plus P 5,000.00 attorney's fees, thus:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered ordering Defendant (Times)
1 - To vacate the 3rd storey rooftop and remove its FM and VHF antennas and other equipment, wirings and other
peripherals, without causing further damage, and transfer it to the premises or area covered by the existing lease
contract;
2 - To pay Plaintiff (Arocha) a monthly rental of One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 1,500.00) from May, 1993 (Annex
4, supra-Times) when it installed its antennas aforesaid up to such time that it shall have vacated said 3rd storey of
Plaintiff's (Arocha's) Hotel; and
3 - To pay Plaintiff (Arocha) the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P 5,000.00) as attorney's fees.
Costs against Defendant. (Times.)
SO ORDERED.[9]
On appeal, the RTC reversed the Decision of the MTCC. It held that the issues raised in the parties' pleadings are not the
proper subject of a summary action of forcible entry.[10] The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
Wherefore and for all of the foregoing observations, the decision of the court a quo dated May 23, 1994, is reversed and
another judgment hereby rendered dismissing the plaintiff's complaint dated January 7, 1994, with costs against the
plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Private respondent elevated the case to respondent Court of Appeals on a Petition for Review. In its Decision dated
August 24, 1995, respondent court reversed the Decision of the RTC and reinstated the Decision of the

MTCC.[12] Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by respondent court in its Resolution dated
November 15, 1995.[13]
Petitioner filed the instant petition on the following grounds:
1. The court a quo gravely abused its discretion and seriously erred in not dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction by
the original court (MTCC) over the nature and subject of the case and has thus rendered a decision not in accord with
law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court.
2. The court a quo seriously erred and disregarded the law and prevailing jurisprudence when it found that there has
been sufficient compliance with the requirements for an action of forcible entry to prosper.[14]
The issue to be resolved is whether the complaint filed by private respondent is one for ejectment or specific
performance.
A reading of the allegations in the complaint shows that the action filed by private respondent was for ejectment and
not for specific performance as asserted by petitioner. The complaint states:
1. Plaintiff is of legal age, Filipino, married, owner/proprietor of Hotel Arocha and a resident of Magsaysay Street,
Miputak, Dipolog City where he may be served with court notices.
2. Defendant Alex Sy is likewise of legal age, Filipino, married and a (sic) the vice-president of the Times Broadcasting
Network who is operating the radio station DXAQ-FM whose office, studio and transmitter are located at the 3rd floor of
Hotel Arocha along Malvar corner Quezon Avenue, Dipolog City where it/he can be served with summons, notices and
court processes.
3. The Plaintiff is the absolute owner of Hotel Arocha, a four-storey hotel in Dipolog City made of concrete materials.
4. The defendant, by virtue of a lease contract it entered into with the plaintiff, leased two rooms of the fourth storey of
the plaintiff's hotel. The terms, conditions and stipulations of the lease contract dated April 22, 1993 are as follow:
xxx
5. That sometime in June or July 1993, the defendant began installing its equipment and apparatus in the leased
premises of Arocha Hotel.
6. That without the knowledge, information and consent of the plaintiff, thru stealth and strategy, defendant mounted,
installed, utilized, planted and positioned its FM antenna and a VHF antenna on the 3rd floor rooftop of Hotel Arocha;
not on the 4th storey rooftop as stipulated in the Contract of Lease.
7. That when the plaintiff came to know about the mounting and installation of the FM and VHF antenna in the 3rd
storey rooftop, the antennas were already erected and used by the defendant in their broadcast operation.
8. That the plaintiff did not ask permission from the defendant when it/he used, occupy (sic) and utilized the rooftop of
the hotel's 3rd storey.
9. That the rooftop of the 3rd storey of plaintiff's Hotel Arocha is not included among the leased premises to the
defendant as evidenced by the lease contract itself.

10. That the installation, mounting, planting and positioning of the defendant's FM antenna on the rooftop of the hotel's
3rd storey is without a valid permit from the city engineering.
11. That on October 18, 1993, the plaintiff, thru his counsel, wrote the defendant a letter which says:
xxx
Dear Mr. Sy,
Our client, Hotel Arocha, thru our law office, wish to inform you that for utilizing their third storey rooftop as the
mounting pad of your FM antenna and other radio equipment - they are charging you with a monthly rental
of P 2,500.00 beginning the time you installed and mounted these antennas.
May we formally inform you also that the rooftop of the third floor of Hotel Arocha is not leased to you as of this
moment. We would appreciate it very much if you can come to Dipolog City within this month so we can formulate the
lease contract covering your FM antennas.
Hotel Arocha is expecting to receive your full payment for the use of the third floor rooftop within ten days from receipt
of this notice and subsequently a contract of lease has to be entered into between Hotel Arocha and your company.
Failure on your part to pay the full rental for the use of the rooftop of the third floor of the hotel will compel us to resort
to actions which we deem fit, proper and necessary.
May you give this matter your preferential attention.
Truly yours,
(Sgd.) Ferdinand S. Reyes
xxx
12. That a copy of this letter quoted above was sent to Mr. Alex Sy by registered mail on October 18, 1993. Another
similar copy was sent to Ms. Melody Bernardo, station manager of the defendant in Dipolog City, thru the security
guard, on the same date.
13. Evidencing receipt of the plaintiff's 18 October 1993 letter, the defendant answered, thru counsel, by stating that:
xxx
Dear Compaero,
Your letter of October 18, 1993 addressed to Mr. Alex V. Sy, Vice-president of TIMES BROADCASTING NETWORK, was
referred to us for appropriate reply.
Pending verification of the facts obtaining in the instant case, as well as the pertinent documents on hand, may we
request that you defer whatever action you are contemplating to take in this what appears to be a mere misappreciation
of the provisions of the Contract of Lease between our clients. For this purpose, we will be needing at least ten (10) days
from your receipt hereof for us to be able to intelligently reply to you.
Thank you for your attention and kind consideration.

Very truly yours,
Jose Ramon R. Remollo
xxx
14. Granting the request of the defendant thru its/his counsel, plaintiff waited for ten days. After almost a month had
lapsed and even up to now, defendant did not submit its reply as promised; nor did the defendant came (sic) to Dipolog
City and met (sic) the plaintiff.
15. On December 6, 1993, plaintiff thru counsel, wrote the defendant another letter and delivered by personal service
on same date.
xxx
Dear Mr. Sy,
Your company has failed to pay the monthly rental for using and utilizing the 3rd storey rooftop of Hotel Arocha as
mounting pad of your FM and VHF antennas. This is despite the lapse of more than a month from the time you received
the written demand of Hotel Arocha dated 18 October 1993.
From June 1993 to November 1993, your unpaid rental for the use of the hotel's 3rd storey rooftop already amounted
to P 15,000 at P 2,500 a month.
Aside from your failure and refusal to pay the monthly rental, you also refused to heed our request that you come to
Dipolog to execute a lease contract for utilizing the hotel's 3rd storey rooftop. We have already advised you in your
previous letter that the 3rd storey rooftop of the hotel is not covered nor included in your present lease contract to
occupy the fourth floor.
Please take notice that ten days from this date, our client expects to receive your monthly rental of P15,000 in full and
within the same period of time, you are expected to come to Dipolog to execute the lease contact. Otherwise, the
management of Hotel Arocha will be forced to institute the necessary court action and remove your FM and VHF
antenna.
This time, we fervently hope that you will do your share to maintain a good business relationship with our client.
Very truly yours,
FERDINAND S. REYES
xxx
16. In answer to the 6 December 1993 letter of the plaintiff, defendant answered thru its legal counsel:
xxx
Dear Compaero,
The management of DX-AQ FM of the Times Broadcasting Network brought to the attention of the undersigned your
letter of demand addressed to Mr. Alex V. Sy, stating among others the request to be paid the amount of P2,500.00 as
monthly rental of the third floor rooftop occupied by the FM antenna of said lessee.
Much is the desire of my client to fulfill all his obligations arising from their contract, but it is sad to note that said term,
subject-matter of your demand, is without the ambit of the latter (sic) and intent of the instrument. None of the terms,
conditions, and stipulations thereof, express or implied, would warrant my client's acquiescence.
The installation of the antenna at bar at the 3rd floor roof top was with the consent and permission of your client
beforehand. While it is correctly observed that the said area is not within the contemplation of the contract, but the
same antenna cannot be relocated to the 4th floor roof top premises due to the existence of a TV antenna installed
thereat presumably with your client's consent.
In the interest of goodwill, my client is willing to meet Mr. Felomino Arocha at any time and place at his convenience
upon enough period of invitation to iron out gaps.
(sgd.) CRESENCIO PALPAGAN JR.
xxx
17. By way of reply, plaintiff answered the defendant's 6 December 1993 letter the following day:
xxx
Dear Mr. Sy and Atty. Palpagan,
In our letter dated December 6, 1993 addressed to Mr. Sy thru Ms. Melody Bernardo, we said: "that ten days from this
date, our client expects to receive your monthly rental of P15,000 in full and within the same period of time, you are
expected to come to Dipolog to execute the lease contract. Otherwise, the management of Hotel Arocha will be forced
to institute the necessary court action and remove your FM and VHF antenna."
If the Times Broadcasting network is not willing to pay the monthly rental of P2,500 for the use of the hotel's 3rd storey
rooftop and for Mr. Alex Sy to personally come to Dipolog within the period we have specified for the execution of the
lease contract, we advise you to immediately remove your antenna so you will not be obliged to continue paying for its
monthly rental which we are demanding.
Despite the long period of time we have given the management of Times Broadcasting to pay the rental and come to
Dipolog to meet the management of Hotel Arocha about this matter, our client is quite displeased that the former has
not exerted positive efforts to address their demand.
Please be informed also that the TV antenna was installed and mounted by your client in the absence of and without the
consent and permission of Mr. Filomeno Arocha.
(sgd.) FERDINAND S. REYES
xxx
18. Until now, the defendant has not met with the plaintiff despite the pronouncement of its/his legal counsel that he is
willing to me(e)t the latter "at any time and place at his convenience".
19. Nor has the defendant paid the back rentals demanded by the plaintiffs.
20. That the defendant - in promising to answer the plaintiff's letter and asking that he be given more time to prepare
his "intelligent" answer which promise he did not fulfill, in failing to meet the plaintiff despite his assurance that he is

willing to do so, and in doing the actionable wrong as alleged in the preceding paragraphs - did not act with justice nor
did he observe honesty and good faith.
21. That as a result of what the plaintiff did in illegally occupying and covertly utilizing the 3rd storey rooftop of Hotel
Arocha, the galvanized roofing was damaged causing water to drip and seep into the hotel rooms situated beneath.
22. That the dripping and seeping of water inside the hotel rooms in the third floor from the rooftop where the
defendant mounted and installed his FM antennas has caused embarrassment and humiliation to the plaintiff and his
business establishment. As a result, a lot of the plaintiff's guests who have occupied the rooms in the 3rd floor have
complained and criticized the hotel management.
23. That because of the disastrous and ugly water marks that dripped and seeped into the hotel rooms in the hotel's 3rd
floor, the plaintiff was forced to make the necessary and immediate repairs and renovations to the damaged rooms so
as not to destroy the prestige, goodwill and reputation of Hotel Arocha.
24. That aside from the damage done to the galvanized roofings caused by the defendant's illegal occupation and covert
utilization of the 3rd storey rooftop as the mounting pad of his/its FM antenna, high voltage wires were sprawled in the
galvanized roofing posing great danger that an electrocution or electrical grounding will occur.
25. That because of the failure and refusal of the defendant to pay the rentals as demanded by the plaintiff and to come
to Dipolog to discuss the terms and conditions relative to the subsequent execution of a lease contract, plaintiff is
compelled to file this case to protect his proprietary right, the safety of the hotel occupants and the goodwill and
reputation of Hotel Arocha.
26. For filing this action, plaintiff was compelled to engage the services of a lawyer for P10,000 not including yet the
appearance fee of P500 everytime this case will be called to hearing or trial.
27. As a result of the damage caused by the defendant's illegal occupation and covert utilization of the 3rd storey roof
top of the hotel, the plaintiff incurred damages amounting to more or less P10,000 which amount were used to repair
and renovate the damaged portion of the hotel rooms.
28. For the preparation of demand letters and notices to the defendant and previous consultation with the lawyer,
plaintiff has already spent P1,500.00 as actual expenses.
29. For the inconvenience, tarnished business image, mental anguish and anxiety the plaintiff suffered, he is claiming
moral damages in the reasonable amount of P5,000 and another P5,000 as exemplary damages to prevent other people
from doing what the defendant did.
30. That the plaintiff has not filed or instituted any similar action in any court, tribunal or agency other than this.[15]
The nature of the action and the jurisdiction of courts are determined by the allegations in the complaint.[16] The
aforequoted complaint shows that the plaintiff (herein private respondent) is the owner of the Hotel Arocha building in
Ozamis City and that the defendant (herein petitioner), through stealth and strategy, and without any authority from the
owner, used the third floor rooftop of the building as mounting pad of its radio antenna.
Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. -- Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a
person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a

landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully witheld
after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the
legal representatives or assigns of any such landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1)
year after such unlawful deprivation or witholding of possession, bring an action in the proper inferior court against the
person or persons unlawfully witholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for
the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. The complaint must be verified.
The rule provides two kinds of action: forcible entry and unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical
possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one
lawfully witholds possession of thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied.[17] The only issue in this case is physical possession, that is, who between the plaintiff and
the defendant has a better right to possess the property in question.[18]
In the case at bar, private respondent was unlawfully deprived of the possession of the third floor rooftop of Hotel
Arocha when petitioner used it as mounting pad for its antenna. Private respondent sought to recover physical
possession thereof through an action for ejectment filed before the MTCC. Hence, the case properly falls within the
jurisdiction of the MTCC.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 149576 August 8, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Land Registration Authority, Petitioner, vs. KENRICK
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The Republic of the Philippines assails the May 31, 2001 decision 1 and August 20, 2001 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
This case stemmed from the construction by respondent Kenrick Development Corporation of a concrete perimeter
fence around some parcels of land located behind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air Transportation Office
(ATO) in 1996. As a result, the ATO was dispossessed of some 30,228 square meters of prime land. Respondent justified
its action with a claim of ownership over the property. It presented Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 135604,
135605 and 135606 issued in its name and which allegedly originated from TCT No. 17508 registered in the name of one
Alfonso Concepcion.
ATO verified the authenticity of respondent’s titles with the Land Registration Authority (LRA). On May 17, 1996, Atty.
Jose Loriega, head of the Land Title Verification Task Force of the LRA, submitted his report. The Registrar of Deeds of
Pasay City had no record of TCT No. 17508 and its ascendant title, TCT No. 5450. The land allegedly covered by
respondent’s titles was also found to be within Villamor Air Base (headquarters of the Philippine Air Force) in Pasay City.

By virtue of the report, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on September 3, 1996, filed a complaint for revocation,
annulment and cancellation of certificates of title in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines (as represented by the LRA)
against respondent and Alfonso Concepcion. It was raffled to Branch 114 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where
it was docketed as Civil Case No. 96-1144.
On December 5, 1996, respondent filed its answer which was purportedly signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. as counsel
for respondent.
Since Alfonso Concepcion could not be located and served with summons, the trial court ordered the issuance of an alias
summons by publication against him on February 19, 1997.
The case was thereafter punctuated by various incidents relative to modes of discovery, pre-trial, postponements or
continuances, motions to dismiss, motions to declare defendants in default and other procedural matters.
During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and Committee on Justice and Human Rights
conducted a hearing in aid of legislation on the matter of land registration and titling. In particular, the legislative
investigation looked into the issuance of fake titles and focused on how respondent was able to acquire TCT Nos.
135604, 135605 and 135606.
During the congressional hearing held on November 26, 1998, one of those summoned was Atty. Garlitos, respondent’s
former counsel. He testified that he prepared respondent’s answer and transmitted an unsigned draft to respondent’s
president, Mr. Victor Ong. The signature appearing above his name was not his. He authorized no one to sign in his
behalf either. And he did not know who finally signed it.
With Atty. Garlitos’ revelation, the Republic promptly filed an urgent motion on December 3, 1998 to declare
respondent in default, 2 predicated on its failure to file a valid answer. The Republic argued that, since the person who
signed the answer was neither authorized by Atty. Garlitos nor even known to him, the answer was effectively an
unsigned pleading. Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, 3 it was a mere scrap of paper and produced no
legal effect.
On February 19, 1999, the trial court issued a resolution granting the Republic’s motion. 4 It found respondent’s answer
to be sham and false and intended to defeat the purpose of the rules. The trial court ordered the answer stricken from
the records, declared respondent in default and allowed the Republic to present its evidence ex parte.
The Republic presented its evidence ex parte, after which it rested its case and formally offered its evidence.
Meanwhile, respondent sought reconsideration of the February 19, 1999 resolution but the trial court denied it.
Aggrieved, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari 5 seeking to set aside the
February 19, 1999 resolution of the trial court. Respondent contended that the trial court erred in declaring it in default
for failure to file a valid and timely answer.
On May 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision. It found Atty. Garlitos’ statements in the
legislative hearing to be unreliable since they were not subjected to cross-examination. The appellate court also
scrutinized Atty. Garlitos’ acts after the filing of the answer 6 and concluded that he assented to the signing of the
answer by somebody in his stead. This supposedly cured whatever defect the answer may have had. Hence, the
appellate court granted respondent’s petition for certiorari. It directed the lifting of the order of default against

respondent and ordered the trial court to proceed to trial with dispatch. The Republic moved for reconsideration but it
was denied. Thus, this petition.
Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial court’s order which declared respondent in default for its failure to file
a valid answer? Yes, it did.
A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify another’s statement. 7 Where it appears that a party
clearly and unambiguously assented to or adopted the statements of another, evidence of those statements is
admissible against him. 8 This is the essence of the principle of adoptive admission.
An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the
party’s reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person. 9 By adoptive admission, a third
person’s statement becomes the admission of the party embracing or espousing it. Adoptive admission may occur when
a party:
(a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by another; 10
(b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it; 11
(c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of another; 12
(d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another but ignores further points which he or she has
heard the other make 13 or
(e) reads and signs a written statement made by another. 14
Here, respondent accepted the pronouncements of Atty. Garlitos and built its case on them. At no instance did it ever
deny or contradict its former counsel’s statements. It went to great lengths to explain Atty. Garlitos’ testimony as well as
its implications, as follows:
1. While Atty. Garlitos denied signing the answer, the fact was that the answer was signed. Hence, the pleading could
not be considered invalid for being an unsigned pleading. The fact that the person who signed it was neither known to
Atty. Garlitos nor specifically authorized by him was immaterial. The important thing was that the answer bore a
signature.
2. While the Rules of Court requires that a pleading must be signed by the party or his counsel, it does not prohibit a
counsel from giving a general authority for any person to sign the answer for him which was what Atty. Garlitos did. The
person who actually signed the pleading was of no moment as long as counsel knew that it would be signed by another.
This was similar to addressing an authorization letter "to whom it may concern" such that any person could act on it
even if he or she was not known beforehand.
3. Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the answer; he never disowned its contents and he resumed acting as counsel
for respondent subsequent to its filing. These circumstances show that Atty. Garlitos conformed to or ratified the signing
of the answer by another.
Respondent repeated these statements of Atty. Garlitos in its motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s February 19,
1999 resolution. And again in the petition it filed in the Court of Appeals as well as in the comment 15 and memorandum
it submitted to this Court.
10 | P a g e LEGAL FORMS CASES 2

Evidently, respondent completely adopted Atty. Garlitos’ statements as its own. Respondent’s adoptive admission
constituted a judicial admission which was conclusive on it.
Contrary to respondent’s position, a signed pleading is one that is signed either by the party himself or his counsel.
Section 3, Rule 7 is clear on this matter. It requires that a pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing
him.
Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself or his counsel operates to validly convert a pleading from one
that is unsigned to one that is signed.
Counsel’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. He may not delegate it to just any person.
The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the pleading; that, to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief, there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. 16Under
the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to these matters.
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice of law which is reserved exclusively for
the members of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer 17 but cannot do
so
in favor of one who is not. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 9.01 ― A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only
be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unqualified persons, 18 something the law strongly
proscribes.
Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitos entrusted to just anyone was void. Any act taken
pursuant to that authority was likewise void. There was no way it could have been cured or ratified by Atty. Garlitos’
subsequent acts.
Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate hearing shows that Atty. Garlitos consented to the signing of
the answer by another "as long as it conformed to his draft." We give no value whatsoever to such self-serving
statement.
No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket authority for just anyone to sign the answer. The trial court
correctly ruled that respondent’s answer was invalid and of no legal effect as it was an unsigned pleading. Respondent
was properly declared in default and the Republic was rightly allowed to present evidence ex parte.
Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It maintains that even if it were true that its answer was
supposedly an unsigned pleading, the defect was a mere technicality that could be set aside.
Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly labeled as mere technicalities have their own valid raison
d’ etre in the orderly administration of justice. To summarily brush them aside may result in arbitrariness and injustice. 19
The Court’s pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of Appeals 20 is relevant:
Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus [enjoined]
to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules,
this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality
in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and
circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be
relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying
with the prescribed procedure. 21 In this case, respondent failed to show any persuasive reason why it should be
exempted from strictly abiding by the rules.
As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by Atty. Garlitos in violation of the ethics of the
legal profession. Thus, he should be made to account for his possible misconduct.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The May 31, 2001 decision and August 20, 2001 resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the February 19, 1999 resolution of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 114 declaring respondent in default is hereby REINSTATED.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the
commencement of disbarment proceedings against Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. for his possible unprofessional conduct not
befitting his position as an officer of the court.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-24864. May 30, 1996]
FORTUNATO HALILI, doing business under the name and style Halili Transit [substituted by Emilia De Vera Vda. de
Halili], petitioner, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, and HALILI BUS DRIVERS and CONDUCTORS UNION
(PTGWO), respondents.
[G.R. No. L-27773. May 30, 1996]
EMILIA DE VERA VDA. DE HALILI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, and HALILI BUS DRIVERS and
CONDUCTORS UNION (PTGWO), respondents.
[G.R. No. L-30110. May 30, 1996]
EMILIA DE VERA VDA. DE HALILI, petitioner, vs. HALILI BUS DRIVERS AND CONDUCTORS UNION-PTGWO, and COURT
OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
[G.R. No. L-38655. May 30, 1996]
FELICIDAD M. TOLENTINO, as Administratrix of the ESTATE of FORTUNATO F. HALILI,petitioner, vs. COURT OF

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and HALILI BUS DRIVERS & CONDUCTORS UNION (PTGWO), respondents.
RESOLUTION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
The herein petition was filed by the Halili Bus Drivers and Conductors Union (PTGWO), under the caption of the original
case/cases,1 as it may in fact be considered an incident thereto.

The above-captioned cases were claims for unpaid overtime pay of 897 union members against Fortunato Halili, then
doing business under the name and style, Halili Transit which were initially commenced as a complaint2 with the defunct
Court of Industrial Relations on August 20, 1958.
After Fortunato Halilis demise, said cases were settled amicably. The Union and the Administratrix of Fortunato F. Halilis
estate reached an Agreement on December 23, 1974, the pertinent portions of which read:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, in the face of this strong urging on the part of the Supreme Court Justices upon the parties to put an
immediate end to this case by amicable settlement, the parties repeatedly came to conference, conscientiously explored
all avenues of settlement, and finally arrived at the tentative agreement (tentative because of the condition that the
same be sanctioned by the court in the estate case) whereby the Administratrix would transfer to the employees title to
that tract of land, covered by TCT No. 36389, containing an area of approximately 33,952 square meters, situated in the
Barrio of San Bartolome, Municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal, and pay in addition the cash amount of P25,000.00
in full and final satisfaction of all the claims and causes of action of all of the employees against the estate of Fortunato
F. Halili, subject of CIR Case No. 1099-V.
xxx xxx xxx
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing and of the covenants, stipulations and undertakings
hereinafter contained, the parties have agreed as follows:
1. The UNION, its officers and members-claimants relative to CIR Case No. 1099-V. shall withdraw and dismiss with
prejudice Case No. 1099-V filed by the UNION in behalf of its members-claimants before the Court of Industrial Relations
and all its incidents thereto.
2. The ESTATE shall deliver or cause to be delivered, to the UNION the following:
(a) Deed of Transfer of a parcel of land situated in Barrio San Bartolome, Caloocan City, containing an area of THIRTY-
THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO (33,952) Square Meters, more or less, and covered by Transfer Certificate
of title No. 35389 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, to be made, upon authority and approval granted by the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, at Quezon City, in Proc. No. Q-10852 in the name of the Halili Bus Drivers & Conductors
Union (PTGWO), free from any and all liens, encumbrances, and any and all claims whatsoever.
(b) Negotiable Check for TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P25,000.00) PESOS in the name of Domingo D. Cabading, President
of the UNION.
3. The transfer of the above-described parcel of land and receipt of the amount of P25,000.00 constitute the full and
final satisfaction of the claims and award in said CIR Case No. 1099-V, as well as any and all attorneys liens in said case,
for and in consideration of which the UNION members- claimants in CIR Case No. 1099-V by these presents now and
forever release and quitclaim Halili Enterprises, Halili Transit, Fortunato F. Halili, his estate, heirs and successors by
reason of CIR Case No. 1099-V, it being their intention that they be absolutely, completely and finally absolved and
released from any and all liability in said case, including attorneys liens, the transfer of the property and payment of the
amount hereinabove stated constituting for all intents and purposes a full, final and complete settlement and
satisfaction of the award in CIR Case No. 1099-V and all incidents thereto.

4. The UNION and its undersigned officers hereby warrant that the UNION is a duly registered labor organization and
that in a special meeting called for the purpose they were duly authorized on December 22, 1974, by all the members-
claimants in CIR Case No. 1099-V to sign this Memorandum of Agreement with Release and Quitclaim which was
unanimously approved and ratified by said members-claimants as evidenced by a Resolution dated December 22, 1974,
a copy of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof as Annex B, and hereby jointly and severally hold the estate
and heirs of Fortunato F. Halili free and harmless from, and undertake to indemnify them for any and all liability for any
claims by members of the UNION, their heirs, assigns and agents relating to CIR Case No. 1099-V or attorneys liens in
connection therewith (69 SCRA 509- 510).3
On January 6, 1975, pursuant to the abovementioned Agreement, the Administratrix of the Estate of Fortunato F. Halili
executed a Deed of Conveyance of Real Property, transferring the aforementioned parcel of land to the Halili Bus and
Conductors Union (PTGWO) in trust for the individual members of the Union claimants.
The parcel of land covered by the said Deed of Conveyance was registered without encumbrance in the name of the
said Union on February 14, 1975 under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 205755.4
On August 9, 1982, the said Union, through its legal counsel, Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda, filed an urgent motion with the
then Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) requesting that authority be granted to sell and dispose of the property.
On September 23, 1982, the MOLE acting through Labor Arbiter Raymundo R. Valenzuela, granted the Unions motion to
sell the subject property.
Thereafter, Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda filed a motion with the Supreme Court on December 1, 1982, requesting authority
to sell the property. This Court, however, merely noted the motion in a Resolution dated December 8, 1982.
Relying on the earlier authority given him by the Ministry of Labor, Atty. Pineda subsequently filed another urgent
motion with the MOLE, this time praying that the Union be authorized to sell the lot to the respondent herein Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. (MMPCI, for brevity).
In an Order, dated February 9, 1983, Labor Arbiter Valenzuela, for the MOLE, likewise granted the motion to sell the
subject property to MMPCI.
The sale of the property held in trust by the seller-Union to the buyer-MMPCI was finally consummated on June 7, 1983.
On the basis of the Order of Arbiter Valenzuela and the Deed of Sale between the Union and MMPCI, Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 205755 in the name of the Union was canceled and said property was registered in the name of respondent
MMPCI, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 301151 by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on June 14, 1983.
Significantly, however, the Orders, dated September 23, 1982 and February 9, 1983, issued by Labor Arbiter Valenzuela
which granted the two motions of the Unions former counsel, Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda, for an authority to sell the real
property awarded to the Union, were set aside by this Court in a Resolution, dated October 18, 1983, to wit:
[A]nd considering that, as affirmed by the Solicitor General, the challenged orders of Arbiter Raymundo R. Valenzuela
dated September 23, 1982 and February 9, 1983, were issued without due process of law, the COURT RESOLVED (1) to
set aside as null and void said orders of September 23, 1982 and February 9, 1983 of Arbiter Raymundo R. Valenzuela x x
x.5
On the basis of this Resolution nullifying the above orders of the Labor Arbiter, the Union filed a complaint with the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) seeking to compel the buyer, private respondent Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc., to reconvey the Unions property bought by MMPCI from Atty. Pineda upon the ground that the latter
sold it without proper authority from the Supreme Court.
The Chief of the Legal and Enforcement Division of the NLRC, tasked to act on the complaint, refused to take cognizance
of the case for lack of jurisdiction, viz:
The instant complaint does not fall under the jurisdictional ambit of this Commission (NLRC) or any labor forum. It is our
considered view that the cause of action raised herein is a proper subject of the regular courts. 6
Hence, the Union filed this Petition/Motion with Prayer for Clarification, through which it seeks, among others, the
recovery of subject real property comprising of 33,952 square meters sold to respondent MMPCI, to wit:
3. That the Petition/Motion with Prayer for Clarification in this subject complaint claim for recovery of the Union Real
Property in trust as provided in the provisions in the Union General Resolution dated January 21, 1986, was a valid and
verified cause of action of the union-members/co-owners of the said union real property in trust to be recovered and
take possession due to the ground that the sale of said union real property was sold by persons without authority to sell
from the owners of said property or acquired authority to sell from the Supreme Court or Court of jurisdiction being that
this union real property in trust was sold in a means of purely illegal sale. 7
The petition has no merit.
Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 9 of Republic Act 6715 delineates the scope ofjurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Commission and the Labor Arbiters, to wit:
ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor
Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the
submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the
following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours
of work and other terms and conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and
lockouts; and
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising
from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount
exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.

(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising from
the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the
same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements.
The subject matter of the instant petition, which is the reconveyance of the disputed real property to the Union by the
respondent MMPCI does not fall under any of the issues cognizable by the NLRC as enumerated in Article 217 of the
Labor Code. Hence, the public respondent NLRC committed no error in dismissing the complaint brought before them by
the petitioner Union for the simple reason that said Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the same.
II
The fact that the subject real property was registered under the Torrens System of registration in the name of
respondent MMPCI under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 301151 by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on June 14,
1983, makes the instant petition all the more dismissible, considering that the best proof of ownership of a piece of land
is the Certificate of Title.8
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. -A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot
be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
A certificate of title accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by
its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its
owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed,
modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, all security in
registered titles would be lost.9
In the present petition, the Union seeks from respondent MMPCI the recovery of the subject property. It is evident that
the objective of such claim is to nullify the title of private respondent to the property in question, which thereby
challenges the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. This is apparently a collateral attack which is not
permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title. It is well settled that a Torrens Title cannot be
collaterally attacked. The issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised
in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Hence, whether or not petitioners have the right to claim ownership of
the land in question is beyond the province of the instant proceeding.10
III
Furthermore, all portions of said land, now known as Holy Cross Memorial Park, have already been sold out to individual
lot buyers, who are innocent purchasers for value, and contain the interred remains of the lot owners and/or their
relatives. Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the Certificate of Title thus issued, acquire rights
over the property, the Court cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate. The effect of
such an outright cancellation would be to impair public confidence in the Certificate of Title, for everyone dealing with
property registered under the Torrens System would have to inquire in every instance as to whether the title has been
regularly or irregularly issued by the Court. And this is contrary to the evident purpose of the law. Every person dealing
with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the Certificate of Title issued there for and the law will in no
way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property.11
IV

As adverted to earlier, ownership of the lot in question had already been vested in the Union upon sale to it by the Heirs
of Halili. Considering this, the Union had every right to dispose of the property. After the termination of the above-
entitled cases, judgment therefor having become final and executory, even as of 1982, neither the NLRC nor this Court
will have any authority to look into the validity of the disposal by the Union of the property so acquired by the Union in
the proceedings. Under the circumstances, therefore, it is to be assumed that the sale by the Union, as virtual owner of
the property, to the respondent MMPCI would not need any authority to sell from the NLRC or from this Court and we
hereby write finis to these cases in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and considering that these cases were instituted as
early as 1958.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5921 JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Cabanatuan City, Branch 29
and Pairing Judge, Branch 30, - versus - ATTY. ELLIS F. JACOBA and ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA, March 10, 2006
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This administrative case arose from a complaint filed on 22 October 2001 by

Judge Ubaldino A. Lacurom (Judge Lacurom), Pairing Judge, Regional Trial Court of CabanatuanCity, Branch 30, against
respondent-spouses Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba and Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba (respondents). Complainant charged
respondents with violation of Rules 11.03,[1] 11.04,[2] and 19.01[3] of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Facts
The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion (Veneracion) in a civil case for
unlawful detainer against defendant
Federico Barrientos (Barrientos).[4] The Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City rendered judgment in favor
of Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The case was raffled to Branch 30 where
Judge Lacurom was sitting as pairing judge.
On 29 June 2001, Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution (Resolution) reversing the earlier judgments rendered in favor
of Veneracion.[5] The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby REVERSES its Decision dated December 22, 2000, as well as REVERSES the Decision of the
court a quo dated July 22, 1997.
Furthermore, the plaintiff-appellee Alejandro Veneracion is ordered to CEASE and DESIST from ejecting the defendant-
appellant Federico Barrientos from the 1,000 square meter homelot covered by TCT No. T-75274, and the smaller area
of one hundred forty-seven square meters, within the 1,000 sq.m. covered by TCT No. T-78613, and the house thereon
standing covered by Tax Declaration No. 02006-01137, issued by the City Assessor of Cabanatuan City; and Barrientos is
ordered to pay Veneracion P10,000.00 for the house covered by Tax Declaration No. 02006-01137.
SO ORDERED.[6]

Veneracions counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Request for Inhibition)[7] dated 30 July 2001 (30 July
2001 motion), pertinent portions of which read:
II. PREFATORY STATEMENT
This RESOLUTION of REVERSAL is an ABHORRENT NULLITY as it is entirely DEVOID of factual and legal basis. It is a Legal
MONSTROSITY in the sense that the Honorable REGIONAL TRIAL COURT acted as if it were the DARAB (Dept. of Agrarian
Reform ADJUDICATION BOARD)! x x x HOW HORRIBLE and TERRIBLE! The mistakes are very patent and glaring! x x x
xxxx
III. GROUNDS FOR RECONSIDERATION
1. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Peremptorily and Suddenly Reversing the Findings of the Lower
Court Judge and the Regular RTC Presiding Judge:
x x x The defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and after a very questionable SHORT period of time, came this
STUNNING and SUDDEN REVERSAL. Without any legal or factual basis, the Hon. Pairing Judge simply and peremptorily
REVERSED two (2) decisions in favor of the plaintiff. This is highly questionable, if not suspicious, hence, this Motion for
Reconsideration.
xxxx
[The Resolution] assumes FACTS that have not been established and presumes FACTS not part of the records of the case,
all loaded in favor of the alleged TENANT. Clearly, the RESOLUTION is an INSULT to the Judiciary and an ANACHRONISM
in the Judicial Process. Need we say more?
xxxx
4. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Holding That the Defendant is Entitled to a Homelot, and That
the Residential LOT in Question is That Homelot:
THIS ERROR IS STUPENDOUS and a real BONER. Where did the Honorable PAIRING JUDGE base this conclusion?
x x x This HORRENDOUS MISTAKE must be corrected here and now!
xxxx
6. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED Grievously in Holding and Declaring that The [court] A QUO
Erroneously Took Cognizance of the Case and That It Had No Jurisdiction over the Subject-Matter:
Another HORRIBLE ERROR! Even an average Law Student knows that JURISDICTION is determined by the averments of
the COMPLAINT and not by the averments in the answer! This is backed up by a Litany of Cases!
xxxx
7. FINALLY, the Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge Ridiculously ERRED in Ordering the Defendant To
Pay P10,000.00 to the Plaintiff As Payment for Plaintiffs HOUSE:
THIS IS the Last STRAW, but it is also the Best ILLUSTRATION of the Manifold GLARING ERRORS committed by the Hon.
Pairing Court Judge.

xxxx
This Order of the Court for the plaintiff to sell his RESIDENTIAL HOUSE to the defendant for the ridiculously LOW price
of P10,000.00 best illustrates the Long Line of Faulty reasonings and ERRONEOUS conclusions of the Hon. Pairing Court
Presiding Judge. Like the proverbial MONSTER, the Monstrous Resolution should be slain on sight![8]
The 30 July 2001 motion prayed that (1) Judge Lacurom inhibit himself in order to give plaintiff a fighting chance and (2)
the Resolution be reconsidered and set aside.[9]Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba (Velasco-Jacoba) signed the motion on behalf
of the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm.
On 6 August 2001, Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and explain why she should not be
held in contempt of court for the very disrespectful, insulting and humiliating contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.[10] In
her Explanation, Comments and Answer,[11] Velasco-Jacoba claimed that His Honor knows beforehand who actually
prepared the subject Motion; records will show that the undersigned counsel did not actually or actively participate in
this case.[12] Velasco-Jacoba disavowed any conscious or deliberate intent to degrade the honor and integrity of the
Honorable Court or to detract in any form from the respect that is rightfully due all courts of justice.[13]She rationalized
as follows:
x x x at first blush, [the motion] really appears to contain some sardonic, strident and hard-striking adjectives. And, if we
are to pick such stringent words at random and bunch them together, side-by-side x x x then collectively and certainly
they present a cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect. x x x
xxxx
We most respectfully submit that plaintiff & counsel did not just fire a staccato of incisive and hard-hitting remarks,
machine-gun style as to be called contumacious and contemptuous. They were just articulating their feelings of shock,
bewilderment and disbelief at the sudden reversal of their good fortune, not driven by any desire to just cast aspersions
at the Honorable Pairing judge. They must believe that big monumental errors deserve equally big adjectives, no more
no less. x x x The matters involved were [neither] peripheral nor marginalized, and they had to call a spade a spade.
x x x [14]
Nevertheless, Velasco-Jacoba expressed willingness to apologize for whatever mistake [they] may have committed in a
moment of unguarded discretion when [they] may have stepped on the line and gone out of bounds. She also agreed to
have the allegedly contemptuous phrases stricken off the record.[15]
On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt and penalized her with imprisonment
for five days and a fine of P1,000.[16]
Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration of the 13 September 2001 order. She recounted that on her way out of the
house for an afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis Jacoba (Jacoba) stopped her and said O, pirmahan mo na ito kasi last day
na, baka mahuli. (Sign this as it is due today, or it might not be filed on time.) She signed the pleading handed to her
without reading it, in trusting blind faith on her husband of 35 years with whom she entrusted her whole life and
future.[17] This pleading turned out to be the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba drafted but could not sign because of his
then suspension from the practice of law.[18]
Velasco-Jacoba lamented that Judge Lacurom had found her guilty of contempt without conducting any hearing. She
accused Judge Lacurom of harboring a personal vendetta, ordering her imprisonment despite her status as senior lady
lawyer of the IBP Nueva Ecija Chapter, already a senior citizen, and a grandmother many times over.[19] At any rate, she

argued, Judge Lacurom should have inhibited himself from the case out of delicadeza because [Veneracion] had already
filed against him criminal cases before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City and before the
Ombudsman.[20]
The records show that with the assistance of counsel Jacoba and the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm, Veneracion had
executed an affidavit on 23 August 2001 accusing Judge Lacurom of knowingly rendering unjust
judgment through inexcusable negligence and ignorance[21] and violating
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019).[22] The first charge became the subject of a preliminary
investigation[23] by the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City. On the second charge, Veneracion set forth his allegations in
a Complaint-Affidavit[24] filed on 28 August 2001 with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
Judge Lacurom issued another order on 21 September 2001, this time directing Jacoba to explain why he should not be
held in contempt.[25] Jacoba complied by filing an Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition, wherein he denied that he
typed or prepared the 30 July 2001 motion. Against Velasco-Jacobas statements implicating him, Jacobainvoked the
marital privilege rule in evidence.[26] Judge Lacurom later rendered a decision[27] finding Jacoba guilty of contempt of
court and sentencing him to pay a fine of P500.
On 22 October 2001, Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint against respondents before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP).
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
Respondents did not file an answer and neither did they appear at the hearing set by IBP Commissioner Atty. Lydia A.
Navarro (IBP Commissioner Navarro) despite sufficient notice.[28]
IBP Commissioner Navarro, in her Report and Recommendation of 10 October 2002, recommended the suspension of
respondents from the practice of law for six months.[29]IBP Commissioner Navarro found that respondents were prone
to us[ing] offensive and derogatory remarks and phrases which amounted to discourtesy and disrespect for
authority.[30] Although the remarks were not directed at Judge Lacurom personally, they were aimed at his position as a
judge, which is a smack on the judiciary system as a whole.[31]
The IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) adopted IBP Commissioner Navarros Report and Recommendation, except for
the length of suspension which the IBP Board reduced to three months.[32] On 10 December 2002, the IBP Board
transmitted its recommendation to this Court, together with the documents pertaining to the case.
Several days later, Velasco-Jacoba sought reconsideration of the IBP Board decision, thus:[33]
xxxx
3. For the information of the Honorable Commission, the present complaint of Judge Lacurom is sub judice; the same
issues involved in this case are raised before the Honorable Court of Appeals presently pending in CA-G.R. SP No.
66973 for Certiorari and Mandatory Inhibition with TRO and Preliminary Injunction x x x;
4. We filed an Administrative Case against Judge Lacurom before the Supreme Court involving the same issues we raised
in the aforementioned Certiorari case, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court for being premature, in view of the
pending Certiorari case before the Court of Appeals;

5. In like manner, out of respect and deference to the Court of Appeals, the present complaint should likewise be
dismissed and/or suspended pending resolution of the certiorari case by the Court of Appeals.[34] (Emphasis supplied)
The Courts Ruling
On a preliminary note, we reject Velasco-Jacobas contention that the present complaint should be considered sub
judice in view of the petition for certiorari and mandatory inhibition with preliminary injunction (petition for
certiorari)[35] filed before the Court of Appeals.
The petition for certiorari, instituted by Veneracion and Velasco-Jacoba on 4 October 2001, seeks to nullify the following
orders issued by Judge Lacurom in Civil Case No. 2836: (1) the Orders dated 26 September 2001 and 9 November 2001
denying respondents respective motions for inhibition; and (2) the 13 September 2001 Order which found Velasco-
Jacoba guilty of contempt. The petitioners allege that Judge Lacurom acted with grave abuse of discretion [amounting]
to lack of jurisdiction, in violation of express provisions of the law and applicable decisions of the Supreme Court.[36]
Plainly, the issue before us is respondents liability under the Code of Professional Responsibility. The outcome of this
case has no bearing on the resolution of the petition for certiorari, as there is neither identity of issues nor causes of
action.
Neither should the Courts dismissal of the administrative complaint against Judge Lacurom for being premature impel us
to dismiss this complaint. Judge Lacuroms orders in Civil Case No. 2836 could not be the subject of an administrative
complaint against him while a petition for certiorari assailing the same orders is pending with an
appellate court. Administrative remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is
available to the aggrieved parties and the same has not been resolved with finality. Until there is a final declaration that
the challenged order or judgment is manifestly erroneous, there will be no basis to conclude whether the judge is
administratively liable.[37]
The respondents are situated differently within the factual setting of this case. The corresponding implications of their
actions also give rise to different liabilities. We first examine the charge against Velasco-Jacoba.
There is no dispute that the genuine signature of Velasco-Jacoba appears on the 30 July 2001 motion. Velasco-
Jacobas responsibility as counsel is governed by Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Signature and address.Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him x x x.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay.
x x x Counsel who x x x signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter
therein x x x shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. (Emphasis supplied)
By signing the 30 July 2001 motion, Velasco-Jacoba in effect certified that she had read it, she knew it to be meritorious,
and it was not for the purpose of delaying the case. Her signature supplied the motion with legal effect and elevated its
status from a mere scrap of paper to that of a court document.
Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed the 30 July 2001 motion only because of her husbands request but she
did not know its contents beforehand. Apparently, this practice of signing each others pleadings is a long-standing
arrangement between the spouses. According to Velasco-Jacoba, [s]o implicit is [their] trust for each other that this
happens all the time. Through the years, [she] already lost count of the number of pleadings prepared by one that is
signed by the other.[38] By Velasco-Jacobas own admission, therefore, she violated Section 3 of Rule 7. This violation is an
act of falsehood before the courts, which in itself is a ground for subjecting her to disciplinary action, independent of any
other ground arising from the contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.[39]
We now consider the evidence as regards Jacoba. His name does not appear in the 30 July 2001 motion. He asserts the
inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacobas statement pointing to him as the author of the motion.
The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain a
denial of his wifes account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion by stating that he trained his
guns and fired at the errors which he perceived and believed to be gigantic and monumental.[40]
Secondly, we find Velasco-Jacobas version of the facts more plausible, for two reasons: (1) her reaction to the events
was immediate and spontaneous, unlike Jacobasdefense which was raised only after a considerable time had elapsed
from the eruption of the controversy; and (2) Jacoba had been counsel of record for Veneracion in Civil Case No. 2836,
supporting Velasco-Jacobas assertion that she had not actually participate[d] in the prosecution of the case.
Moreover, Jacoba filed a Manifestation in Civil Case No. 2836, praying that Judge Lacurom await the outcome of the
petition for certiorari before deciding the contempt charge against him.[41] This petition for certiorari anchors some of its
arguments on the premise that the motion was, in fact, Jacobas handiwork.[42]
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to object timely to its
presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent.[43] This waiver applies to Jacoba who
impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 11.03.A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04.A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the
case.
No doubt, the language contained in the 30 July 2001 motion greatly exceeded the vigor required of Jacoba to defend
ably his clients cause. We recall his use of the following words and phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal
monstrosity, horrendous mistake, horrible error, boner, and an insult to the judiciary and an anachronism in the judicial
process. Even Velasco-Jacoba acknowledged that the words created a cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect.[44]
Respondents nonetheless try to exculpate themselves by saying that every remark in the 30 July 2001 motion was
warranted. We disagree.
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful
terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.[45] However, even the most hardened judge would
be scarred by the scurrilous attack made by the 30 July 2001 motion on Judge Lacuroms Resolution. On its face, the
Resolution presented the facts correctly and decided the case according to supporting law and jurisprudence. Though a
lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the
legal profession.[46] The use of unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the courts and
trust in judicial administration.[47]
In maintaining the respect due to the courts, a lawyer is not merely enjoined to use dignified language but also to pursue
the clients cause through fair and honest means, thus:
Rule 19.01.A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not
present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in
any case or proceeding.
Shortly after the filing of the 30 July 2001 motion but before its resolution, Jacoba assisted his client in instituting two
administrative cases against Judge Lacurom. As we have earlier noted, Civil Case No. 2836 was then pending before
Judge Lacuroms sala. The Courts attention is drawn to the fact that the timing of the filing of these administrative cases
could very well raise the suspicion that the cases were intended as leverage against Judge Lacurom.
Respondent spouses have both been the subject of administrative cases before this Court. In Administrative Case No.
2594, we suspended Jacoba from the practice of law for a period of six months because of his failure to file an action for
the recovery of possession of property despite the lapse of two and a half years from receipt by him of P550 which his
client gave him as filing and sheriffs fees.[48] In Administrative Case No. 5505, Jacoba was once again found remiss in his
duties when he failed to file the appellants brief, resulting in the dismissal of his clients appeal. We imposed the penalty
of one year suspension.[49]
As for Velasco-Jacoba, only recently this Court fined her P5,000 for appearing in barangay conciliation proceedings on
behalf of a party, knowing fully well the prohibition contained in Section 415 of the Local Government Code.[50]
In these cases, the Court sternly warned respondents that a repetition of similar acts would merit a stiffer penalty. Yet,
here again we are faced with the question of whether respondents have conducted themselves with the courtesy and
candor required of them as members of the bar and officers of the court. We find respondents to have fallen short of
the mark.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) years effective upon finality of this
Decision. We also SUSPEND Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) months effective upon
finality of this Decision. We STERNLY WARN respondents that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall merit a
more severe sanction.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal records
as attorneys; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
NELSON P. COLLANTES, Petitioner, G.R. No. 169604
- versus -
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE

COMMISSION and DEPARTMENT OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondents. March 6, 2007
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. A final judgment may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law; and whether it be made
by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land.[1]
What would happen, however, if two separate decisions, irreconcilably conflicting with each other, both attained
finality? Quite clearly, to hold that both decisions are immutable and unalterable would cause not only confusion and
uncertainty, but utter bewilderment upon the persons tasked to execute these judgments.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the
Decision[2] dated 10 March 2005 and the Resolution[3] dated 31 August 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
78092.
The undisputed facts of this case are summarized by the Court of Appeals:
Petitioner Nelson Collantes (hereafter, Collantes) was conferred Career Executive Service Eligibility on 29 February
1996. Then President Fidel V. Ramos accorded him the rank of Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) II on 10 February
1997. More than a year later, he was appointed as Undersecretary for Peace and Order of the Department of Interior
and Local Government (DILG).
With the change of administration, Collantes allegedly received word from persons close to then President Ejercito
Estrada to give up his position so that the President could unreservedly appoint his key officials. As such, Collantes
relinquished his post at the DILG.
Thereafter, on 1 July 1998, President Estrada appointed Collantes to the controversial post Undersecretary for Civilian
Relations of the Department of National Defense (DND). As it happened, his stint in the DND was short lived. Collantes
was supposedly ordered by then Secretary Orlando Mercado to renounce his post in favor of another presidential
appointee, General Orlando Soriano. In deference to the Presidents prerogative, he resigned from office believing that
he will soon be given a new assignment.
Unfortunately, Collantes was not given any other post in the government, as in fact, he received a letter from President
Estrada terminating his services effective 8 February 1999.Consequently, on 24 March 1999, Collantes requested the
assistance of the Career Executive Service Board relative to the termination of his services as Undersecretary for Civilian
Relations of the DND invoking his right to security of tenure as a CESO.
The termination of Collantes services, notwithstanding, President Estrada accorded Collantes the highest rank in the CES
ranking structure, CESO Rank I, on 17 July 1999. But then, despite this promotion in rank, Collantes did not receive new
appointment, and worse, the President appointed Mr. Edgardo Batenga to the much coveted position of Undersecretary
for Civilian Relations of the DND.
Taking definite action on the matter, Collantes instituted a Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus before Us on 29
January 2001, docketed as C.A. G.R. SP NO. 62874. Collantes maintained that he was constructively dismissed from
work, without any cause and due process of law, and thus, his position in the DND was never vacated at all. Accordingly,
he prayed that the appointment of Mr. Edgardo Batenga be nullified, and that he be reinstated to his former position
with full back salaries. Notably, Collantes also sought for appointment to a position of equivalent rank commensurate to
his CESO Rank I if reinstatement to his former position is no longer legally feasible.

Meanwhile, on 13 August 2001, the CSC favorably acted on Collantes letter-request issuing Resolution No. 011364, and
thereby holding that Collantes relief as Undersecretary of DND amounted to illegal dismissal as he was not given another
post concomitant to his eligibility.
Then, on 30 August 2001, We rendered Our Decision in C.A. G.R. SP No. 62874 dismissing the Petition for Quo Warranto
and Mandamus filed by Collantes. Significantly, We pronounced:
By such actuations of the petitioner, the Court finds that he has (sic) effectively resigned from his position as
Undersecretary of the DND, and the public respondents are under no compulsion to reinstate him to his old position.
xxxx
In this case, petitioner has undoubtedly shown his intention to relinquish his public office, and has in fact surrendered
such post to the Chief Executive, who, on the other hand, has shown his acceptance of the same by appointing a new
person to the position relinquished by the petitioner.
xxxx
Quo warranto, it must be pointed out, is unavailing in the instatnt case, as the public office in question has not been
usurped, intruded into or unlawfully held by the present occupant. Nor does the incumbent undersecretary appear to
have done or suffered an act which forfeits his assumption. (Section 1, Rule 66, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure). Furthermore, it appears that the action for quo warranto, assuming it is available, has already lapsed by
prescription, pursuant to Section 11 of the pertinent Rule ...
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus is hereby DISMISSED.
The controversy reached the Supreme Court as G.R. No. 149883. Nevertheless, the case was considered closed and
terminated when Collantes manifested his desire not to pursue his appeal and withdraw his Petition for Review on
Certiorari. Thereafter, Collantes moved for the execution of CSC Resolution No. 011364, which was accordingly granted
through CSC Resolution No. 020084 dated 15 January 2002 directing the DND to give Collantes a position where his
eligibility is appropriate and to pay his backwages and other benefits from the time of his termination up to his actual
reinstatement.
In a Letter dated 7 February 2002, the Legal Affairs Division of the DND, through Atty. Leticia A. Gloria, urged the CSC to
revisit its Resolutions which were entirely in conflict with Our 30 August 2001 Decision in C.A. G.R. SP NO. 62874, which
has attained finality pursuant to the Supreme Courts Resolution in G.R. No. 149883.
Consequently, in complete turnabout from its previous stance, the CSC issued Resolution No. 021482 dated 12
November 2002 declaring that had it been properly informed that a Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus was then
pending before Us, it would have refrained from ruling on Collantes quandary, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs Leticia A. Gloria of the department
of National Defense (DND) is hereby GRANTED and CSC Resolutions Nos. 01-1364 dated August 13, 2001 and 02-0084
dated January 15, 2002 are reversed. Accordingly, pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals, Nelson P. Collantes
is deemed effectively resigned from his position as Undersecretary of the DND.

Forthwith, Collantes moved for a reconsideration of this Resolution, but was denied by the CSC in the second assailed
Resolution No. 030542 dated 5 May 2003.[4]
On 18 July 2003, herein petitioner Collantes then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals praying for the
reversal of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolutions No. 021482 and No. 030542. Before the Court of Appeals can
decide this case, however, petitioner was appointed as General Manager of the Philippine Retirement Authority on 5
August 2004. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari in the assailed 10 March 2005 Decision:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. No grave abuse of discretion may be imputed against the
Civil Service Commission for rendering Resolution Nos. 021482 and 030542, dated 12 November 2002 and 5 May 2003,
respectively. No pronouncement as to costs.[5]
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied in the assailed 31 August 2005 Resolution.[6]
Petitioner filed the present Petition for Review, seeking the reversal of the foregoing Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals. In view of his 5 August 2004appointment, however, petitioners prayer is now limited to seeking the
payment of backwages and other benefits that may have been due him from the time of his alleged dismissal on 8
February 1999 to his appointment on 5 August 2004. Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
A. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT HELD THAT THE
DECISION IN CA-G.R. NO. 62874 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS IS A BAR TO IMPLEMENT THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY
JUDGMENT OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION DATED AUGUST 14, 2001.
B. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DID NOT FIND THAT THE
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT REVERSED ITS VERY OWN DECISION WHICH HAS LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND IN
FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
C. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE
RESOLUTION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION WHICH HELD THAT PETITIONER MAY BE REMOVED FROM HIS
POSITION AS UNDERSECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE WITHOUT THE CONCOMITANT TRANSFER
TO A POSITION EQUIVALENT IN RANK OR BE REMOVED THEN, BE FLOATED PERPETUALLY, WHICH IS TANTAMOUNT TO A
CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL, IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE AS A CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE
ELIGIBLE.[7]
Both petitioner and herein respondents CSC and Department of National Defense (DND) invoke the doctrine of
immutability of final judgments.
Petitioner claims that the 13 August 2001 Resolution of the CSC, which held that petitioner was illegally removed as
Undersecretary of the Department of National Defense and therefore x x x should be given a position where his
eligibility is appropriate or sufficient, has attained finality. Petitioner adds that, not only has there been no appeal or
motion for reconsideration filed within the allowable periods, the CSC even granted the Motion for Execution filed by
petitioner in its Order dated 15 January 2002. Petitioner thereby invokes our ruling that, before a writ of execution may
issue, there must necessarily be a final judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding.[8] Petitioner also
faults the CSC for ruling on a mere letter filed by Atty. Leticia Gloria of the DND, which petitioner claims is fatally
defective for failure to comply with the procedural due process clause of the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and the
Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service which require notice to adverse parties.[9]

Respondents, on the other hand, invoke the same doctrine of immutability of final judgments, this time with respect to
the 30 August 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus filed by
petitioner. This Court of Appeals Decision became final and executory when petitioner withdrew the Motion for
Extension to File a Petition for Review on Certiorari he filed with this Court.[10]
Forum Shopping, Res Judicata, and Litis Pendentia
Our rules on forum shopping are meant to prevent such eventualities as conflicting final decisions as in the case at
bar. We have ruled that what is important in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused
the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same
or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of
conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues.[11]
More particularly, the elements of forum shopping are: (a) identity of parties or at least such parties as represent the
same interests in both actions; (b) identity of the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.[12]
Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with
the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2)
filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally
resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action
but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res
judicata).[13] If the forum shopping is not considered willful and deliberate, the subsequent cases shall be
dismissed without prejudice on one of the two grounds mentioned above. However, if the forum shopping is willful and
deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions shall be dismissed with prejudice.[14]
Petitioner disputes respondents claim, and the CSCs ruling,[15] that he had lodged two separate actions. Petitioner
explains that he never filed a case before the CSC. He merely sought the assistance of the Career Executive Service Board
(CESB) in a letter-request dated 24 March 1999. Said letter-request, petitioner claims, did not ask for any ruling.
Petitioner claims that, considering that two years had already lapsed without any response from the CESB, he filed on 23
January 2001 his Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus with the Court of Appeals. Petitioner was surprised when he
learned through the 8 February 2001 letter of the CESB that, on 29 November 2000, it referred petitioners request to
the CSC for appropriate action.[16] Petitioner was not required to submit any pleading in support of his
request. Apparently, the CSC treated the letter-request as a complaint or petition over which it could exercise its
adjudicative powers, as it issued its 13 August 2001 Resolution declaring petitioner to have been illegally removed as
Undersecretary of the DND, and should therefore be given a position appropriate or sufficient for his eligibility.[17] As
stated above, the Court of Appeals Decision dismissing the Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus was rendered 17
days later, on 30 August 2001. Petitioner filed with this Court a motion for an extension of time within which to file a
Petition for Review on Certiorari, but he later submitted a Manifestation for the withdrawal of this motion as he decided
not to pursue his appeal.[18] Instead, petitioner filed with the CSC on 25 October 2001 a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ
of Execution,[19] which the CSC granted on 15 January 2002.[20]
In repeatedly asserting that he did not file two separate actions, petitioner is arguing, without stating it categorically,
that he cannot be held liable for forum shopping. However, what one cannot do directly cannot be done
indirectly. Petitioner had been aware, through the 8 February 2001 letter of the CESB, that his request for assistance was
referred to the CSC on 29 November 2000 for appropriate action. From that point on, he knew that two government
agencies the CSC and the Court of Appeals were simultaneously in the process of reaching their respective decisions on
whether petitioner was entitled to reinstatement or to a position appropriate to his eligibility. Therefore, it cannot be
denied that petitioner knew, from the moment of receipt of the 8 February 2001 letter of the CESB, that he had
effectively instituted two separate cases, and whatever original intention he had for his letter-request is, by then,
forgotten. Petitioner subsequently proceeded to act like a true forum shopper he abandoned the forum where he could
not get a favorable judgment, and moved to execute the Resolution of the forum where he succeeded.
Petitioners above actuation is, in fact, a violation of his certification against forum shopping with the Court of Appeals, a
ground for dismissal of actions distinct from forum shopping itself. As petitioner knew from the receipt of the CESB
letter that another claim was pending in a quasi-judicial agency concerning these issues, he was bound by his
certification with the Court of Appeals to report such fact within five days from his knowledge thereof. This circumstance
of being surprised by the discovery of another pending claim with another court or quasi-judicial agency is the very
situation contemplated by letter (c) in the first paragraph of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court:
Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint
or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously
filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if
he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact
within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
(Emphases supplied.)
Petitioner, however, further asserts that the issues brought in the Petition for Certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals
on 18 July 2003 and the Petition for Quo Warrantoand Mandamus filed on 29 January 2001 are distinct, and that the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in the latter cannot constitute res judicata with respect to the former.[21]Petitioner
claims that the issues, remedies and reliefs in the two cases are different, citing as basis the textbook definitions of quo
warranto, certiorari and mandamus. Petitioner further claims that:
There is a clear distinction between the right of petitioner to the position of Undersecretary for Civilian Relations and his
right to be re-appointed to another position of equivalent rank, in view of his CESO I status. The former issue may have
been resolved by the Court of Appeals when it ruled that petitioner Collantes had effectively resigned from his position
as Undersecretary of the DND, and the public respondents are under no compulsion to reinstate him to his old
position. The latter issue, or the right of petitioner Collantes to be given a new assignment fitting to his CESO I rank,
arises from his right to security of tenure as a Career Executive Service Eligible, and not from his appointment to the
DND.[22]
This allegedly clear distinction springs from petitioners claim that he resigned from his position, but not from his rank as
a Career Executive Service Officer (CESO).Petitioner claims that, as a CESO, there is a great difference between (1)
resigning from ones position and (2) resigning or relinquishing ones rank, as position is different from ones
rank. POSITION refers to the particular or specific office from which one may be appointed. RANK, on the other hand,
refers not to a particular position but to the class to which one belongs in the hierarchy of authority in an organization or
bureaucracy.[23] Petitioner cites Cuevas v. Bacal[24]:

[S]ecurity of tenure to members of the CES does not extend to the particular positions to which they may be appointed -
-- a concept which is applicable only to the first and second-level employees in the civil service --- but to the rank to
which they are appointed by the President.
xxxx
Mobility and flexibility in the assignment of personnel, the better to cope with the exigencies of public service, is thus
the distinguishing feature of the Career Executive Service. x x x.
and General v. Roco[25]:
In addition, it must be stressed that the security of tenure of employees in the career executive service (except first and
second-level employees in the civil service), pertains only to rank and not to the office or to the position to which they
may be appointed. Thus, a career executive service officer may be transferred or reassigned from one position to
another without losing his rank which follows him wherever he is transferred or reassigned. In fact, a CESO suffers no
diminution of salary even if assigned to a CES position with lower salary grade, as he is compensated according to his
CES rank and not on the basis of the position or office he occupies.
While there is indeed a distinction between position and rank, such that a CESO may be transferred or reassigned from
one position to another without losing his rank, there can be no distinction between resigning from a position and
resigning from a rank. The rank of a CESO is deactivated upon separation from the government service, which includes
the resignation of a CESO from his position. The CESB has clarified this concept of being in the inactive status in its
Resolution No. 554, series of 2002:
Rule II
xxxx
7. CESO in Inactive Status - is a CESO who no longer occupies a position in the CES as a result of any of the modes of
separation from the government service, provided that such separation is not due to dismissal from the service for
cause.
xxxx
Rule IV
Section 1. Modes of Deactivating a CES Rank. There are three (3) modes by which the CES Rank of a CESO may be
deactivated from the CES:
1. Acceptance of a position by virtue of an appointment outside the coverage of the CES;
2. Dropping from the rolls of government officials and employees; and
3. Other modes of separation from the CES, provided that separation from the CES resulting from dismissal
from the service for cause and after due process shall result in the loss of CES rank and shall not be considered as a
mode of deactivation.
xxxx

Sec. 2. Effect of Deactivation of CES Rank. A CESO whose CES rank has been deactivated by the Board loses all the rights
and privileges accorded to him/her by law on account of his/her CES rank.
Likewise, it would be absurd for us to rule that a civil servant who resigns from his position can compel the President to
appoint him to another position. Such a ruling would effectively derogate the discretion of the appointing
authority,[26] as it will give the CESO the option to choose which position he or she wants, by the simple expediency of
resigning from the position he or she does not want.
In sum, there is an identity of issues in the two cases which resulted in the two conflicting final and executory
decisions. But while, as stated above, the second petition can be dismissed on the ground of either res judicata or non-
compliance with the undertakings in petitioners certification against forum shopping, these grounds can only be invoked
when the case is still pending. As petitioner points out, the Resolution of the CSC had already become final and
executory.
The 30 August 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals, however, has also attained finality. Hence, we go back to the main
issue in this petition: which of the two final and executory decisions should be given effect, the 30 August 2001 Court of
Appeals Decision dismissing the petitioners Petition for Quo Warranto, or the 13 August 2001 CSC Resolution declaring
petitioner Collantes to be illegally removed as Undersecretary of the DND?
Two Conflicting Final and Executory Decisions
Jurisprudence in the United States offers different solutions to this problem:
Where there have been two former actions in which the claim or demand, fact or matter sought to be religated has
been decided contrarily, the rule that, where there is an estoppel against an estoppel, it setteth the matter at large has
been applied by some authorities, and in such case both parties may assert their claims anew. Other authorities have
held that, of two conflicting judgments on the same rights of the same parties, the one which is later in time will prevail,
although it has also been held that the judgment prior in time will prevail. It has been held that a decision of a court of
last resort is binding on the parties, although afterward, in another cause, a different principle was declared.[27]
There are thus three solutions which we can adopt in resolving the case at bar: the first is for the parties to assert their
claims anew, the second is to determine which judgment came first, and the third is to determine which of the
judgments had been rendered by a court of last resort.
As there are conflicting jurisprudence on the second solution, it is appropriate for this Court to adopt either the first or
the third solution. The first solution involves disregarding the finality of the two previous judgments and allowing the
parties to argue on the basis of the merits of the case anew. The third solution merely involves the determination of
which judgment has been rendered by this Court, the court of last resort in this jurisdiction.
Adopting the third solution will result in the denial of this Petition for Certiorari. Whereas the finality of the 13 August
2001 CSC Resolution came about by the failure to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal within the proper
reglementary periods, the finality of the 30 August 2001 Court of Appeals Decision was by virtue of the 12 November
2001 Resolution[28] of this Court which declared the case closed and terminated upon the manifestation of petitioner

that he decided not to pursue his appeal and was thus withdrawing the motion for extension of time to file a petition for
review on certiorari.
The better solution, however, is to let the parties argue the merits of the case anew, and decide the case on the basis
thereof. We can do this either by remanding the case to a lower court, or by resolving the issues in this disposition. The
latter recourse is more appropriate, for three reasons: (1) all the facts, arguments, and pleadings in support of the
parties contentions are now before us, with the parties advancing the very same contentions as those in this Petition; (2)
a remand to the Court of Appeals would entail asking the latter to resolve the very same issues it had passed upon
twice; and (3) a remand to the Court of Appeals would only entail another unnecessary delay in the termination of the
case when the case is now ripe for adjudication before us.
The merits of the case are the focus of petitioners third assignment of error in the present petition. Petitioner claims
that the Court of Appeals committed a grave and reversible error when it upheld the resolution of the CSC which
allegedly effectively held that petitioner may be removed from his position as Undersecretary of the Department of
National Defense without the concomitant transfer to a position equivalent in rank or be removed then, be floated
perpetually, which is tantamount to a constructive dismissal, in violation of his right to security of tenure as a career
executive service eligible.[29]
Petitioners arguments presuppose that he had been removed from his position as Undersecretary of the DND. He,
however, did not present any evidence to that effect, whether in this Petition or in his earlier Petition for Quo
Warranto and Mandamus with the Court of Appeals. If he is implying that he was removed from office by virtue of his
account that he was approached by persons close to President Joseph Estrada who asked him to relinquish his post,
which he did, then this Petition must fail, for, by his own deliberate deed, he resigned from his position.
There are no special legal effects when a resignation is one of a courtesy resignation. The mere fact that the President,
by himself or through another, requested for someones resignation does not give the President the obligation to
appoint such person to another position. A courtesy resignation is just as effectual as any other resignation.There can be
no implied promises of another position just because the resignation was made out of courtesy. Any express promise of
another position, on the other hand, would be void, because there can be no derogation of the discretion of the
appointing power,[30] and because its object is outside the commerce of man.[31] As held by the Court of Appeals in its 30
August 2001 Decision:
In the first place, petitioner has not established by any quantum of certainty the veracity of his claim that he was
promised an equivalent position in the government. Assuming, however, that such promise was true, petitioner, as a
ranking member of the bureaucracy, ought to have known that such promise offers no assurance in law that the same
would be complied with. The time-honored rule is that public office is a public trust, and as such, the same is governed
by law, and cannot be made the subject of personal promises or negotiations by private persons.[32]
WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. No costs.
GAUDENCIA NAVARRO VDA. DE TAROMA, G.R. No. 160214

BENEDICTO N. TAROMA, ANGELINA T.
GUARDION, CONSOLACION T. CABUTE,
OFELIA N. TAROMA and NOEL N. TAROMA, Promulgated:
P e t i t i o n e r s, December 16, 2005

- versus -
SPS. FELINO N. TAROMA and LYDIA

MARTINEZ, SPS. JOSE N. TAROMA and
IMELDA NOVERO and THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF THE PROVINCE OF TARLAC,
R e s p o n d e n t s.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Court has said quite often enough that although a party may avail himself of the remedies prescribed by the Rules
of Court, he is not free to resort to these remedies simultaneously lest he be guilty of forum shopping. Neither is he free
to wage a battle already long lost as this is proscribed by the rule on finality of judgments.
Before us is a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the nullification of a Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated 03 0ctober 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 70017 which noted without action petitioners Brief Motion for
Reconsideration on the ground that it had already lost jurisdiction over the case upon the filing by petitioners of a
Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court.
As culled from the records of the case, the facts are as follows:
On 25 August 1997, herein petitioners Gaudencia Navarro Vda. De Taroma, Benedicto N. Taroma, Angelina T. Guardion,
Consolacion T. Cabute, Ofelia N. Taroma and Noel N. Taroma instituted a complaint for annulment of title and damages
against herein private respondents before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Moncada, Tarlac. After trial on the
merits, the MCTC dismissed the complaint. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let this case be DISMISSED. With costs against plaintiffs.[1]
Petitioners appealed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paniqui, Tarlac. On 26 March 2002, the RTC affirmed the
decision of the MCTC, Presiding Judge Cesar M. Sotero disposing that:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.[2]
A copy of the RTC decision was received by petitioners, thru counsel, on 27 March 2002. A motion for extension of time
to file petition for review was thereafter filed. On 24 April 2002, within the period of extension, petitioners, through
their counsel Atty. Leonel L. Yasay, filed a Petition for Review.[3] In a Resolution dated 30 May 2002, the Court of Appeals
directed private respondents to file their comment to the petition without necessarily giving due course thereto.[4] On
13 June 2002, petitioners, through collaborating counsel, Atty. Esmeraldo U. Guloy, filed an Urgent Motion Ex-Parte to
amend the petition attaching therewith the said Amended Petition.[5] On 12 July 2002, private respondents filed their
Comment to the original petition.[6]
In a Resolution dated 06 August 2002, the Court of Appeals, among other things, required counsel for private
respondents to comment on the Amended Petition.[7]Private respondents filed their comment to the amended petition
on 06 September 2002.[8]
On 27 February 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision,[9] the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed 26 March
2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 556 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.[10]
A copy of the decision was received by petitioners, through their counsels, on 06 March 2003. On 19 March 2003, they
filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision before the Court of Appeals essentially arguing that the decision was
invalid as it was based on the original petition for review and not on the amended petition filed soon thereafter.[11]
The next day, or on 20 March 2003, petitioners filed before the Supreme Court a Petition (Ex-Abundante Cautela) under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the very same decision under reconsideration in the Court of
Appeals.[12] This case was docketed as G.R. No. 157393 and was raffled to the First Division of this Court.
On 28 April 2003, the First Division resolved to deny the petition for failure to submit proof of authority to sign the
verification and certification on non-forum shopping.[13]Petitioners moved for reconsideration on 03 June 2003.[14] On 25
June 2003, the petition was denied with finality.[15]
Refusing to accept the Courts ruling, petitioners filed on 29 July 2003 a Motion for Referral of the Case to the Supreme
Court En Banc in the Interest of Justice and for the Maintenance of the Rule of Law.[16] Among the reasons cited by
petitioners for their request was the pendency of the motion for reconsideration of the 27 February 2003 Decision
before the Court of Appeals. In a Resolution dated 13 August 2003, the First Division noted without action the motion
for referral, the petition for review on certiorari having been denied in the resolution of April 28, 2003 and the motion
for reconsideration thereof denied with finality in the resolution of June 25, 2003.[17]
In the meantime, on 20 August 2003, the Court of Appeals resolved the motion for reconsideration filed therein by
declaring the same as abandoned in accordance with Section 15, Rule VI of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals.[18]
Still undeterred by the resolutions of both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, petitioners subsequently did the
following:
1. Before the Court of Appeals: On 04 September 2003, petitioners filed a Brief Motion for Reconsideration of
the 20 August 2003 Resolution essentially arguing that in filing a petition for review in the Supreme Court, they cannot
be deemed to have abandoned their motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals as different subject matters
were involved;[19] and
2. Before the Supreme Court en banc: On 17 September 2003, petitioners transmitted a copy of the 13 August
2003 Resolution of the First Division in the hope that the Court en banc will accept their motion for referral.[20]
In response to this latest barrage by petitioners, the First Division of this Court held in a Resolution dated 01 October
2003 that:
The transmittal of counsel for petitioners of the resolution of August 13, 2003 to the Court En Banc for referral thereto
is NOTED WITHOUT ACTION.
Let an ENTRY of judgment in this case be made in due course.
NO FURTHER pleadings shall be entertained herein.[21]

In the meantime, on 22 July 2003, the Decision in G.R. No. 157393 became final and executory and was thereafter
recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.[22]
For its part, the Court of Appeals resolved petitioners Brief Motion for Reconsideration in this wise:
Petitioners filed an Amendment Petition for Review and respondents were made to comment thereon, but the Court
has taken no action on said prayer for admission of the Amended Petition for Review.
Moreover, Sec. 15 of Rule VI of the IRCA clearly provides that if a petition is filed with the Supreme Court subsequent to
the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration with this Court, the latter should be deemed ABANDONED. Clearly, when
petitioner filed the Supreme Court Petition, on the justification that it has to be filed within 15 days otherwise the
decision will become final, the pending Motion for Reconsideration is deemed ABANDONED.
The Motion for Reconsideration seeks for the nullification of the 27 February 2003 Decision rendered by the Former
Sixth Division. The Petition for Review on Certiorari filed with the Supreme Court likewise prays for the nullification of
the same decision. Thus, the Brief Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners is NOTED without action
considering that this Court already lost jurisdiction over the case upon filing of the petition with the Supreme Court by
herein petitioners.[23]
The aforecited Court of Appeals Resolution, dated 03 October 2003, is the subject matter of the instant petition
whereby petitioners replicate their argument that contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, their filing of a petition
for review on certiorari in the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 157393 did not result in the abandonment of their motion for
reconsideration filed before the Court of Appeals. Petitioners contend that
With all due respect to the Honorable Court of Appeals, the herein petitioners sincerely believe that they have never
abandoned their AMENDED PETITION FOR REVIEW dated May 30, 2002, which was filed on June 13, 2002, neither has
the Court lost jurisdiction over it. They also contend that the Court rendered a wrong decision on February 27, 2003,
because it was a decision of the Petition for Review dated April 24, 2002, which has been earlier amended.[24]
In support of their arguments, petitioners argue that under Section 2, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, they can amend
their petition as a matter of right before a responsive pleading is served upon them or, in case of a reply, at any time
within ten (10) days after it is served. Thus, they alleged that the Court of Appeals failure to admit their amended
petition was probably due to the clerk of courts inadvertence and that abandonment as a ground for dismissing their
motion for reconsideration was merely an afterthought.
We are not convinced.
The Brief Motion for Reconsideration partakes of a second motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision
dated 27 February 2003 as the first motion for reconsideration of said decision was already denied by the Court of
Appeals in its resolution dated 20 August 2003. The Court of Appeals thus correctly noted without action the Brief
Motion for Reconsideration considering that under Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, such motions shall not be
entertained by the Court.[25]
Be that as it may, and if only to disabuse the minds of petitioners, we shall state, once and for all, that from a perusal of
the records, it is starkly clear that the Court of Appeals never admitted the Amended Petition, which explains why its
Decision of 27 February 2003 was based on the original Petition. That private respondents were asked to comment to
the Amended Petition does not mean that the same was given due course. If at all, the records are deafeningly silent as
to the action taken by the Court which legally means that the Amended Petition was denied. Thus, petitioners reliance

on Section 2, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court[26] is misplaced as this refers to an amendment made before the trial court.
The applicable provision is Section 6, Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction which states:
Section 6. Due Course. If upon the filing of the comment or such other pleadings as the court may allow or require, or
after the expiration of the period for the filing thereof without such comment or pleading having been submitted, the
Court of Appeals finds prima facie that the lower court has committed an error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal
or modification of the appealed decision, it may accordingly give due course to the petition. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court of Appeals, therefore, is vested with discretion to admit or deny the Amended Petition filed before it. In
herein case, when it passed upon the matter sub-silentio, such can only be construed as a denial of the said Amended
Petition.
Our discussion does not end here, however. We need to stress that notwithstanding the foregoing discussion on the
issue presented for resolution by petitioners, which is but a mere concession to petitioners in the interest of substantial
justice, the present case must be denied on a more fundamental level.
Under the undisputed facts of the case, the existence of forum shopping is self-evident and seals the fate of the petition
as a lost cause. It must be remembered that from the Decision dated 27 February 2003, petitioners sought
reconsideration with the Court of Appeals. Twenty-four hours later, the same petitioners sought the reversal of the
same decision, this time before this Court on petition for review. As the records would reveal, petitioners actively
pursued both actions before the two courts so much so that they were filing pleadings in both courts with the same end-
view in mind, i.e., to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 February 2003. When the First Division of this
Court declared that no further pleadings by petitioners would be entertained in G.R. No. 157393, petitioners went
around the proscription by filing instead the instant case.
There is forum shopping when a party repetitively avails himself of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely by, some
court.[27] A party should not be allowed to present simultaneous remedies in two different forums for it degrades and
wreaks havoc to the rule on orderly procedure.[28] Thus:
. . . A party may avail of the remedies prescribed by the Rules of Court for the myriad reliefs from the court. However,
such party is not free to resort to them simultaneously or at his pleasure or caprice. Such party must follow the
sequence and hierarchical order in availing such remedies and not resort to shortcuts in procedure or playing fast and
loose with the said rules. Forum shopping, an act of malpractice, is considered as trifling with the courts and abusing
their processes. It is improper conduct and degrades the administration of justice. It the act of the party or its counsel
clearly constitutes willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall constitute direct contempt, and a cause for
administrative sanctions, as well as a ground for the summary dismissal of the case with prejudice.[29]
Finally, it is also to be pointed out that at the heart of the instant petition is an attempt to resurrect the issue of the
validity of the 27 February 2003 Court of Appeals Decision which was already sought to be annulled in petitioners
dismissed Petition (Ex-Abundante Cautela), a dismissal by this Court which had already attained finality; hence
unassailable. We thus remind petitioners that by choosing their forum, and by unfortunately losing their claim thereat,
they are nevertheless bound by such adverse judgment on account of finality of judgment, otherwise, there will be no
end to litigation.[30] Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective
administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause therein should be laid to rest.[31]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
[G.R. No. 123332. February 3, 1997]
AUGUSTO GATMAYTAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, respondents.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
Involved in this contempt proceeding are no less than nine (9) separate judicial remedies availed of by the same party,
all directed principally at impugnation of the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court over an ejectment suit, in order
to cause its indefinite delay if not indeed to bring about its dismissal. The resort to these remedies has prevented the
progress of the ejectment suit. More than ten (10) years after its commencement, it has yet to be tried and resolved in
the court of origin.
The Mother Action:
Civil Case No. 32033
On November 3, 1986, Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank) filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 61,[1] an ejectment suit against the law firm identified as CIAGLO (Caparas Ilagan Alcantara & Gatmaytan
Law Office). The suit was docketed as Civil Case No. 32033.[2] It was instituted by Metrobank as successor-in-interest of
the owner of the building in question - Fortune Motors, Inc. The defendant, CIAGLO, was occupying space in the
building as sub-lessee of a lessee, Canlubang Automotive Resources Corporation (CARCO); and it was sued for its failure
to pay rentals and electric bills amounting to P76,224.99. In its Answer with Counterclaim, CIAGLO set up the defenses,
among others, that (a) ownership of the leased premises was subject of a pending case between METROBANK and
Fortune Motors, Inc.; (b) implementation of METROBANKs writ of possession had been enjoined by the Court of
Appeals; (c) it (CIAGLO) had a valid and effective arrangement with CARCO regarding the leased area; (d) the rent and
electricity charges were unreasonable and unconscionable.[3]
Thereafter, the cases and proceedings hereunder outlined were instituted by Augusto Gatmaytan, a partner of CIAGLO,
singly or jointly with his law firm.
1. Civil Case No. 17873
On September 21, 1987 during the pendency of Civil Case No. 32033 Gatmaytan filed an action in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 145.[4] It was described as one for declaratory relief, prohibition and damages,[5] and
docketed as Civil Case No. 17873. CIAGLO later joined as plaintiffs. The complaint alleged that in Case No. 32033, the
question of possession ** (was) intertwined with that of ownership; METROBANKs alleged ownership ** is pending
determination ** by the Regional Trial Court; there is no privity of contract between METROBANK and CIAGLO, and the
latters sub-lessor has not been impleaded; METROBANK is bound to respect the lease between Fortune and CARCO. The
prayer was chiefly to declare (a) the MTC without jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case and without power to
conduct further proceedings therein; and (b) Metrobank, as bound to respect CIAGLOs sublease.[6] Named respondents
were Metrobank and the presiding Judge of Branch 61, Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Makati.
This action was however given short shrift by the Makati RTC, Br. 145, which dismissed it in an Order dated January 28,
1988[7] for the reason that: (a) Gatmaytan could not ask that METROBANK be declared bound to respect CIAGLOs sub-
lease because there is already an action pending in another court involving the same issue; (b) prohibition was improper
because Gatmaytan had an adequate remedy in the unlawful detainer case filed against his firm from which, in case of
an adverse judgment, appeal could be taken; (c) the MTC had exclusive original jurisdiction over the ejectment case filed
by METROBANK against CIAGLO the pendency whereof abates Case No. 17873 filed by CIAGLO against METROBANK;
and (d) damages may not be claimed in an action of prohibition or certiorari.
Gatmaytan filed a motion for reconsideration, and an amended complaint (by substitution before responsive
pleading)[8] in connection with which he subsequently twice moved that respondents be declared in default, allegedly for
failure to answer.
2. CA-GR SP No. 14116
Before the RTC could act on the motion for reconsideration, the amended complaint, and the motions for default,
CIAGLO filed a petition with the Court of Appeals against the Makati RTC, Branch 145; the Makati MTC, Branch 61; and
METROBANK. In that petition, docketed as CA-GR SP No. 14116,[9] CIAGLO prayed for judgment commanding (a) the
Makati RTC (Br. 145) to give due course to its amended complaint in Civil Case 17873; (b) the MTC (Br. 61), to dismiss or
suspend proceedings in Civil Case No. 32033; and (c) METROBANK to pay it damages of at least P200,000.00. Named
respondents were (i) the RTC of Makati (Br. 145), (ii) the MTC of Makati (Br. 61), and (iii) Metrobank.[10]
3. CA-GR CV No. 18292
Meanwhile, by Order dated April 18, 1988, the Makati RTC (Br. 145) denied CIAGLOs motion for reconsideration of its
order dismissing Civil Case 17873. CIAGLO thereupon appealed the order to the Court of Appeals, its appeal being
docketed as CA-GR CV No. 18292.[11] CIAGLO contended that (a) as sub-lessee, it was a possessor in good faith entitled to
the peaceful enjoyment of the leased premises; (b) its rights under its sub-lease from CARCO were violated by
METROBANK when it attempted to impose and collect a much higher and exorbitant rental, etc.; (c) since METROBANK
failed to pursue any action against CARCO, it (CIAGLO) is not bound to pay any rental to the bank; (d) there is a pending
action between Fortune and METROBANK involving ownership of the building; and (e) the result of the action brought
by CIAGLO in the RTC would be conclusive adjudication of the ejectment suit in the MTC.
By Resolution dated July 16, 1990, the appeal was dismissed and the challenged dispositions affirmed.[12] The Appellate
Tribunal pointed out that (a) under the law, the rights of a possessor in good faith do(*) not apply to a lessee or sub-
lessee; (b) the issues raised by CIAGLO are matters and defenses that it may set up in the ejectment suit earlier filed
against it * *, in fact, * * (it) set up these defenses in its answer; (c) CIAGLOs linking the issue of ownership with the issue
of possession * * (did) not divest the MTC of its exclusive jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer;
(d) in not claiming ownership of the building, CIAGLO cannot in an ejectment raise such issue and deny title to
Metrobank; (e) in any case, Metrobanks title over said building is already beyond debate at this time. The Court also
rejected CIAGLOs contention that its amended complaint in C.C. No. 17873 should have been admitted as fallacious and
untenable, the original complaint having already been dismissed for want of jurisdiction and the amendment being
precisedly aimed at conferring jurisdiction by eliminating the objectionable portion thereof.
4. G.R. No. 87891
CA-GR SP No. 14116 was also dismissed by the Court of Appeals (First Division) by judgment promulgated on December
16, 1988,[13] The Court adjudged CIAGLOs petition to be without any grain of merit. It ruled that linking the issue of
ownership with the issue of possession cannot divest MTC with their exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of unlawful
detainer, a proposition that CIAGLO could not circumvent by later filing Civil Case No. 17873 in the respondent RTC. The

Court observed that CIAGLOs remedy against the MTC interlocutory Order denying its motion to dismiss or suspend
proceedings was a challenge via certiorari, not the filing of Civil Case No. 17873 which is a combination of an action for
declaratory relief, prohibition and damages, and rightly ordered dismissed for being inapropos."[14] Reconsideration was
denied by Resolution dated April 10, 1989.
In an attempt to reverse that dismissal, CIAGLO or Augusto Gatmaytan came to this Court. The dismissal was however
upheld by this Court in a Resolution dated July 13, 1989 in G.R. No. 87891. In throwing out CIAGLOs petition, this Court
said:
* * It appears that, basically, petitioner * * (CIAGLO) questions the jurisdiction of the * * (MTC) over the ejectment suit
filed by * * (Metrobank) against it for non-payment of rentals and electric bills on grounds, foremost of which are, that
(1) the ownership of the leased premises is the subject of a pending case between Metrobank and Fortune Motors
(Phils.), Inc.; and (2) the implementation of the writ of possession of Metrobank over the leased premises has been
enjoined by the Court of Appeals. Both the * * (RTC) and respondent Court of Appeals rejected * * (CIAGLOS)
arguments. In the instant case which reiterates the same arguments, We find that the appellate court correctly ruled
that linking the issue of ownership with the issue of possession will not divest the MTC of its exclusive jurisdiction over
cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer under B.P. 129, Section 33(2). Besides, * * (CIAGLO) in not claiming
ownership of the building cannot in an ejectment case raise such issue and deny title to Metrobank (see Tui v. Court of
Appeals, L-32626, January 28, 1971, 37 SCRA 100). Further, We take judicial notice of the fact that Metrobanks writ of
possession over the Fortune Building has been upheld by this Court in G.R. No. 76430 (not 76480) (Fortune Motors
[Phils.] Inc. v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., et al., in the resolution of February 23, 1988.
CIAGLOs motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution dated September 4, 1989.[15]
5. G.R. No. 95992
CIAGLO challenged the judgment of the Court of Appeals of July 16, 1990 in CA-GR CV No. 18292, supra. It filed with this
Court a petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 95992, raising the following issues:
(a) Did the Court of Appeals commit an error of law, abuse its discretion, act arbitrarily, and deny petitioner full hearing,
due process, and justice, in failing to find and hold that petitioner (plaintiff) sub-lessee has a cause of action for damages
and injunctive relief arising from private respondent (defendant)s interference with petitioners sublease and
disturbance of its possession of the sub-leased premises, as well as from private respondents manifest acts of coercion,
harassment, intimidation, tort, abuse of right, and oppression, in violation of the law and of sub-lessees rights as alleged
purchaser at auction sale of the sub-leased premises.
(b) Did the Court of Appeals commit an error of law, abuse its discretion, act arbitrarily, and deny petitioner full hearing,
due process, and justice, in finding and holding that petitioner (plaintiff)s causes of action are abated or barred by an
ejectment suit which cannot be sustained and ought to be dismissed on various grounds, particularly, lack of cause of
action and/or intertwined with issues which are beyond the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court.
(c) Did the Metropolitan Trial Court commit an error of law, abuse its discretion, act arbitrarily, and deny petitioner full
hearing, due process, and justice, in refusing to dismiss an ejectment suit against a designated or named defendant law
office by an alleged purchaser of leased and subleased premises, without suing the lessee-sublessor that had apparently
surrendered its lease, for alleged failure to sign a contract of lease and pay a much higher rental in disregard of the
special arrangement of sublease between the lessee-sublessor and petitioner.

(d) Did the Metropolitan Trial Court commit an error of law, abuse its discretion, act arbitrarily, and deny petitioner full
hearing, due process, and justice, in setting and hearing, without adequate notice to petitioner, the ejectment suit in the
absence of petitioners counsel who had to appear at a previously scheduled hearing before the Regional Trial Court (in
Antipolo, Rizal), and setting another hearing pending final resolution of CA-G.R. No. 18292, without conducting pre-trial
proceedings and pending omnibus motion (to reconsider the order denying petitioners motion to dismiss that failed to
resolve the issues raised, to strike out private respondents evidence received in the absence of petitioners counsel),
request (to admit) and written interrogatory.
However, this Court dismissed the petition by Resolution dated February 25, 1991 for failure to sufficiently show that
the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment.[16]
6. Motion to Dismiss Case No. 32033
Earlier, or on October 10, 1989 - after the MTC (Branch 61) had scheduled Civil Case No. 32033 for trial on October 23,
1989 - CIAGLO filed a motion for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 32033, a motion it reiterated on June 5, 1990. The
motions, founded upon substantially the same grounds previously alleged, were denied by an Order dated September
25, 1990, which also set the case for trial on November 9, 1990. On this date, CIAGLO filed a motion for postponement,
a request for admission, written interrogatories, and an omnibus motion. These were all denied by the Court in an Order
dated June 4, 1991.
7. Civil Case No. 91-1908
CIAGLO and/or Gatmaytan then filed with the Makati RTC (Br. 61) on July 9, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, particularly praying (a) that the Orders of the Makati MTC, Branch 61 of September 25, 1990 and June
4, 1991 be nullified; (b) that the MTC be prohibited to conduct further proceedings in Civil Case No. 32003; and (c) that
Case No. 32003 be dismissed. This action was docketed as Civil Case No. 91-1908.[17]
8. CA-GR SP No. 33314
Civil Case No. 91-1908 was dismissed by the Makati Regional Trial Court (Br. 61) by Order promulgated on September
30, 1992.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, CIAGLO filed a petition to set aside the Order of September 30, 1992
with the Court of Appeals.[18] There, the case was docketed as CA-GR SP No. 33314,[19] and the following questions were
raised:
(a) Is the ejectment complaint where ownership is raised one for recovery of possession within the jurisdiction of the
RTC?
(b) does the complaint state a cause of action against a law office that has no juridical personality?
(c) is a purchaser at public auction of leased property (METROBANK) bound to respect the lease and sub-lease existing
thereon at the time of the mortgage and sale?
(d) does METROBANK have a cause of action to eject a sub-lessee which has a contract of sub-lease from the lessee, and
which is lawfully in possession?
(e) does METROBANK have a cause of action to eject a sub-lessee of its building, absent privity of contract?

(f) what is the liability for rental of the sub-lessee, and is he subject to ejectment on surrender of the premises by the
lessee-sublessor, and is the latter an indispensable party?
(g) does a sub-lessee have the right to insist on the terms of the sub-lease and refuse to pay rentals and resist ejectment
on the ground of disturbance of peaceful possession and failure of reimbursement for or removal of improvements
introduced in the leased premises?
(h) may METROBANK maintain an action for ejectment of a sub-lessee upon claim of ownership after it is declared not
the owner of the building?
(i) did the MTC commit grave error and deny CIAGLO due process, correctible by certiorari, in failing to grant
appropriate remedy, including dismissal of the complaint, in regard to METROBANKs refusal to make discovery?
(j) did the MTC commit grave error and deny CIAGLO due process in refusing to postpone the testimony of
METROBANKs witnesses?
CA-G.R. SP No. 33314 was dismissed by the Court of Appeals, in a Decision promulgated on July 18, 1995.[20] It
pronounced the issues raised to be barred by res judicata, and CIAGLO, guilty of forum shopping by the institution of
multiple petitions, cases or proceedings focused on the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61,
over the ejectment case instituted by METROBANK. The Court said:
As narrated above, petitioner-appellant (CIAGLO) instituted several actions or proceedings focused on the jurisdiction of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati over the ejectment case (Civil Case No. 32033) filed against it by the herein
private respondent-appellee which ultimately resulted in judgments adverse to petitioner-appellant.
Filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of courts processes and improper conduct that tend to impede, obstruct
and degrade the administration of justice. (see Gabriel vs. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 273). Forum shopping is
contumacious, as well as an act of malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and abusive
of their processes. A violation of the rule against forum-shopping warrants prosecution for contempt of court and
constitutes ground for summary dismissal of the actions involved, without prejudice to appropriate administrative
action against the counsel (Buan vs. Lopez, 145 SCRA 34, 38-39; Collado vs. Fernando, 161 SCRA 639; People vs. Court of
Appeals, 101 SCRA 450, 463-464).
CIAGLOs motion for reconsideration was later denied by Resolution of December 4, 1995 because time-barred.[21] Its
petition for relief was also denied by Resolution of January 4, 1996, for lack of merit.
9. G.R. No. 123332
To reverse these adverse dispositions of the Appellate Tribunal, Gatmaytan initiated the proceeding at bar, G.R. No.
123332, through a petition for the review on certiorari.[22] In his petition, he set up the following issues:
a) whether or not the complaint for ejectment states a cause of action;
b) whether or not a purchaser at public auction has a cause of action against a sub-lessee without joining the lessee-
sublessor, an indispensable or necessary party;
(c) whether or not the action (allegedly for ejectment), where ownership is alleged by an alleged purchaser, is a plenary
action for recovery of possession or one for ejectment; and whether its filing before the RTC (Civil Case No. 15243) puts
the plaintiff in estoppel on the issue of jurisdiction;

(d) whether or not a decision in a previous case confers a cause of action on the complaint and jurisdiction on the MTC;
or whether the complaint for ejectment is barred by res judicata;
(e) whether or not such lack of cause of action and jurisdiction may be acted upon and resolved motu proprio and may
be questioned at any time by direct or collateral attack;
(f) whether or not remand of the case to the MTC for further proceedings will serve a useful purpose;
(g) whether or not CIAGLOs motion for reconsideration and petition for relief ought to have been granted, the date of
actual receipt ought to have prevailed over the presumption of date of receipt, and not otherwise, delay in earlier
receipt being excusable.
This petition was dismissed by this Court in a Resolution dated February 12, 1996.[23] The Court ruled that Gatmaytans
motion for extension of time to file his petition for review on certiorari, * * (and his) petition, as well as the requisite
docketing fees, were all delivered out of time, prescinding from the fact that the decision of the Court of Appeals sought
to be reviewed has become final and executory. In any event, petitioners cause is barred twice over by res judicata,
raises questions too unsubstantial to merit consideration, and is prosecuted manifestly for delay.
In the same Resolution dated February 12, 1996, this Court resolved to ORDER petitioner Augusto Gatmaytan to show
cause, within ten (10) days from notice of this Resolution, why he should not be held liable and correspondingly
punished for forum shopping. The order was reiterated in the Resolution dated March 27, 1996.[24]
Atty. Gatmaytan filed his Compliance (with motion for leave) on May 2, 1996.[25] Essentially, his justification for his resort
to the various remedies above mentioned, was:
1) That said remedies were forced or duty moves compelled by the circumstances and (in adherence) to the rules; they
did not constitute forum shopping as the term is defined in the case of Ortigas & Company Ltd. Partnership v. Velasco,
234 SCRA 501; and he had a good ground to seek the declaration of the complaint in Civil Case No. 32033 as void for
failure to state a cause of action;
2) that [h]e should not be made to wait for the final judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court on the patently deficient
complaint; and that he only acted in good faith and in accordance with the law in seeking and applying for appropriate
remedy and relief in various courts.[26]
The justification is not acceptable.
The facts plainly demonstrate Atty. Gatmaytans guilt of forum shopping, i.e., the institution of two (2) or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition (or the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking
another (and possibly favorable) opinion in another forum other than by appeal or the special civil action
of certiorari).[27] In the case at bar, Atty. Gatmaytan repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely by, some
other court. He did this obviously to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in
another. A party is not permitted to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different (fora).[28] This is a practice which
derogates and ridicules the judicial process,[29] plays havoc with the rules of orderly procedure, and is vexatious and
unfair to the other parties to the case. Hence it is that, as observed in Ortigas, supra,[30] forum-shopping is both
contumacious and an act of malpractice; it is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and abusive of their

processes * * (warranting) prosecution for contempt of court and * * (constituting) ground for summary dismissal of the
actions involved, without prejudice to appropriate administrative action against the counsel.
The Rules of Court, the code governing judicial procedure, prescribes the remedies (actions and special proceedings)
that may be availed of for the myriad reliefs that persons may conceivably have need of and seek in this jurisdiction. But
that the adjective law makes available several remedies does not imply that a party may resort to them simultaneously
or at his pleasure or whim. There is a sequence and a hierarchical order which must be observed in availing of
them. Impatience at what may be felt to be the slowness of the judicial process, or even a deeply held persuasion in the
rightness of ones cause, does not justify short-cuts in procedure, or playing fast and loose with the rules thereof.
In the case at bar, as in the other proceedings instituted by him, Atty. Gatmaytan had one obvious and obsessive
objective: put at issue the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court at Makati over the ejectment case filed against him
and his law partners and, by thereby preventing said case from continuing in due course in said court, defer and put off
adjudication on the basic issue for as long as possible. It is an enterprise upon which he embarked for the ninth time in
the case at bar, after he had already been rebuffed on the same fundamental issue a number of times by the Court of
Appeals and this Court in various cases brought by him or his law firm, CIAGLO. He has frustrated and thwarted final and
executory dispositions against him and his partners, and unwarrantedly imposed on the time and patience of this Court
and others, in relation to what should have been a simple, summary ejectment action. He should no longer be
permitted to do so; and he should be punished for having done so for years, with evident premeditation.
This opinion may fittingly be ended with a reiteration of the observations pointedly made by the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 33314, supra:[31]
One final word. The factual milieu of this case demonstrates eloquently that petitioner-appellant misused all known
technicalities and remedies to prolong the proceedings in a simple ejectment case. The equitable remedy provided by
the summary nature of ejectment proceedings has been successfully frustrated by petitioner-appellant to the great
prejudice of the herein private respondent-appellee and the time of this Court.
A lawyer should never take advantage of the seemingly endless channels left dangling by our legal system in order to
wangle the attention of the court. The petitioner-appellant may have thought that he could get away with his
indiscriminate filing of suits that were clearly intended to delay the proceedings in the ejectment case. When court
dockets get clogged and the administration of justice is delayed, our judicial system may not be entirely blameless, yet
the greater fault lies in the lawyers who had taken their privilege so lightly, and in such mindless fashion (see
Dimagiba vs. Montalvo, Jr., 202 SCRA 647).
WHEREFORE, Atty. Augusto Gatmaytan is found and declared guilty of contempt of court; and in accordance with the
provisions of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as amended,[32] he is (a) ORDERED to pay a fine of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00) within ten (10) days from finality of this judgment, in default of which he shall suffer IMPRISONMENT of
fifteen (15) days, and (b) SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective also from finality
of this judgment. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

CONRADO QUE,Complainant, A.C. No. 7054
- versus - Promulgated:
ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR., Respondent. December 4, 2009
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In a complaint for disbarment,[1] Conrado Que (complainant) accused Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. (respondent) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP Committee on Bar Discipline or CBD) of committing
the following violations of the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
(1) The respondents abuse of court remedies and processes by filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
(CA), two petitions for annulment of title before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for annulment of judgment
before the RTC and lastly, a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC (collectively, subject cases) to assail and
overturn the final judgments of the Metropolitan Trial Court[2] (MeTC) and RTC[3] in the unlawful detainer case rendered
against the respondents clients. The respondent in this regard, repeatedly raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction by the
MeTC and RTC knowing fully-well that these courts have jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. The respondent
also repeatedly attacked the complainants and his siblings titles over the property subject of the unlawful detainer case;
(2) The respondents commission of forum-shopping by filing the subject cases in order to impede, obstruct, and
frustrate the efficient administration of justice for his own personal gain and to defeat the right of the complainant and
his siblings to execute the MeTC and RTC judgments in the unlawful detainer case;
(3) The respondents lack of candor and respect towards his adversary and the courts by resorting to falsehood and
deception to misguide, obstruct and impede the due administration of justice. The respondent asserted falsehood in the
motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment by fabricating an imaginary order
issued by the presiding judge in open court which allegedly denied the motion to dismiss filed by the respondents in the
said case. The complainant alleged that the respondent did this to cover up his lack of preparation; the respondent also
deceived his clients (who were all squatters) in supporting the above falsehood.[4]
(4) The respondents willful and revolting falsehood that unjustly maligned and defamed the good name and reputation
of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico (Atty. Catolico), the previous counsel of the respondents clients.
(5) The respondents deliberate, fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court in the petition for annulment of
judgment for 15 litigants, three of whom are already deceased;
(6) The respondents willful and fraudulent appearance in the second petition for annulment of title as counsel for the
Republic of the Philippines without being authorized to do so.
Additionally, the complaint accused the respondent of representing fifty-two (52) litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762
when no such authority was ever given to him.

The CBD required the respondent to answer the complaint.
In his Answer,[5] the respondent declared that he is a member of the Kalayaan Development Cooperative (KDC) that
handles pro bono cases for the underprivileged, the less fortunate, the homeless and those in the marginalized sector in
Metro Manila. He agreed to take over the cases formerly handled by other KDC members. One of these cases was the
unlawful detainer case handled by the late Atty. Catolico where the complainant and his siblings were the plaintiffs
and the respondents present clients were the defendants.
With respect to paragraph 1 of the disbarment complaint, the respondent professed his sincerity, honesty and good
faith in filing the petitions complained of; he filed these petitions to protect the interests of his clients in their property.
The respondent asserted that these petitions were all based on valid grounds the lack of jurisdiction of the MeTC and
the RTC over the underlying unlawful detainer case, the extrinsic fraud committed by the late Atty. Catolico, and
the extrinsic fraud committed by the complainant and his family against his clients; he discovered that the allegedly
detained property did not really belong to the complainant and his family but is a forest land. The respondent also
asserted that his resort to a petition for annulment of judgment and a petition for declaratory relief to contest the final
judgments of the MeTC and RTC were all parts of his legal strategy to protect the interests of his clients.
On the allegations of falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the petition for annulment
of judgment (covered by paragraph 3 of the disbarment complaint), the respondent maintained that his allegations were
based on his observations and the notes he had taken during the proceedings on what the presiding judge dictated in
open court.
The respondent denied that he had made any unauthorized appearance in court (with respect to paragraphs 5 and 6 of
the disbarment complaint). He claimed that the 52 litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 were impleaded by
inadvertence; he immediately rectified his error by dropping them from the case. On the petition for annulment of
judgment, the respondent claimed that a majority (31 out of 49) of the litigants who signed the certification constituted
sufficient compliance with the rules on forum-shopping. The respondent likewise denied having represented the
Republic of the Philippines in the second petition for annulment of title. The respondent pointed out that there was no
allegation whatsoever that he was the sole representative of both the complainants (his clients) and the Republic of
the Philippines. The respondent pointed out that the petition embodied a request to the Office of the Solicitor General
to represent his clients in the case.[6]
The respondent submitted that he did not commit any illegal, unlawful, unjust, wrongful or immoral acts towards the
complainant and his siblings. He stressed that he acted in good faith in his dealings with them and his conduct was
consistent with his sworn duty as a lawyer to uphold justice and the law and to defend the interests of his clients. The
respondent additionally claimed that the disbarment case was filed because the complainants counsel, Atty. Cesar P. Uy
(Atty. Uy), had an axe to grind against him.
Lastly, the respondent posited in his pleadings[7] before the IBP that the present complaint violated the rule on forum
shopping considering that the subject cases were also the ones on which a complaint was filed against him in CBD Case
No. 03-1099 filed by Atty. Uy before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline. The respondent also posited that the present
complaint was filed to harass, ridicule and defame his good name and reputation and, indirectly, to harass his clients
who are marginalized members of the KDC.
The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner

Except for the last charge of unauthorized appearance on behalf of 52 litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762,
Investigating Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan[8](Investigating Commissioner Cunanan) found all the charges against the
respondent meritorious. In his Report and Recommendation, he stated:
While an attorney admittedly has the solemn duty to defend and protect the cause and rights of his client with all the
fervor and energy within his command, yet, it is equally true that it is the primary duty of the lawyer to defend the
dignity, authority and majesty of the law and the courts which enforce it. A lawyer is not at liberty to maintain and
defend the cause of his clients thru means, inconsistent with truth and honor. He may not and must not encourage
multiplicity of suits or brazenly engage in forum-shopping.[9]
On the first charge on abuse of court processes, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan noted the unnecessary use by the
respondent of legal remedies to forestall the execution of the final decisions of the MTC and the RTC in the unlawful
detainer case against his clients.[10]
On the second charge, the Investigating Commissioner ruled that the act of the respondent in filing two petitions for
annulment of title, a petition for annulment of judgment and later on a petition for declaratory relief were all done to
prevent the execution of the final judgment in the unlawful detainer case and constituted prohibited forum-shopping.[11]
On the third and fourth charges, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found ample evidence showing that the
respondent was dishonest in dealing with the court as shown in his petition for annulment of judgment; he resorted to
falsities and attributed acts to Atty. Catolico and to the presiding judge, all of which were untrue. [12]
On the fifth and sixth charges, the Investigating Commissioner disregarded the respondents explanation that he had no
intention to represent without authority 15 of the litigants (three of whom were already deceased) in the petition for
annulment of judgment (Civil Case No. Q-01-45556). To the Investigating Commissioner, the respondent merely glossed
over the representation issue by claiming that the authority given by a majority of the litigants complied with the
certification of non-forum shopping requirement. The Investigating Commissioner likewise brushed aside the
respondents argument regarding his misrepresentation in the second complaint for annulment of title since he knew
very well that only the Solicitor General can institute an action for reversion on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
Despite this knowledge, the respondent solely signed the amended complaint for and on behalf of his clients and of the
Republic.
The Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, through its Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 on CBD Case
No. 03-1100, adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Cunanan and
recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.[13] On reconsideration, the
Board of Governors reduced the respondents suspension from the practice of law to one (1) year.[14]
The Issue
The case poses to us the core issues of whether the respondent can be held liable for the imputed unethical infractions
and professional misconduct, and the penalty these transgressions should carry.
The Courts Ruling
Except for the penalty, we agree with the Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Cunanan and
the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline.

We take judicial notice that this disbarment complaint is not the only one so far filed involving the respondent; another
complaint invoking similar grounds has previously been filed. In Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia v. Atty.
Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.,[15] we suspended the respondent from the practice of law for his willful and intentional
falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for
collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We initially imposed a suspension of two (2) years, but in an
act of leniency subsequently reduced the suspension to six (6) months.[16]
Abuse of court procedures and processes
The following undisputed facts fully support the conclusion that the respondent is guilty of serious misconduct for
abusing court procedures and processes to shield his clients from the execution of the final judgments of the MeTC and
RTC in the unlawful detainer case against these clients:
First, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53892) with prayer for the issuance of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to question the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC for lack of
jurisdiction. In dismissing the respondents petition, the CA held:
Even for the sake of argument considering that the petition case be the proper remedy, still it must be rejected for
failure of petitioners to satisfactorily demonstrate lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City over the ejectment case.[17]
Second, notwithstanding the CAs dismissal of the petition for certiorari, the respondent again questioned the MeTCs and
the RTCs lack of jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case in a petition for annulment of judgment (docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-01-45556) before the RTC with an ancillary prayer for the grant of a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction. The RTC dismissed this petition on the basis of the motion to dismiss filed.[18]
Third, the respondent successively filed two petitions (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-38780 and Civil Case No. Q-02-
46885) for annulment of the complainants title to the property involved in the unlawful detainer case. The records show
that these petitions were both dismissed for lack of legal personality on the part of the plaintiffs to file the petition.[19]
Fourth, after the dismissals of the petition for annulment of judgment and the petitions for annulment of title, the
respondent this time filed a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
complainant and his siblings from exercising their rights over the same property subject of the unlawful detainer case.
The respondent based the petition on the alleged nullity of the complainants title because the property is a part of
forest land.
Fifth, the persistent applications by the respondent for injunctive relief in the four petitions he had filed in several courts
the petition for certiorari, the petition for annulment of judgment, the second petition for annulment of complainants
title and the petition for declaratory relief reveal the respondents persistence in preventing and avoiding the execution
of the final decisions of the MeTC and RTC against his clients in the unlawful detainer case.
Under the circumstances, the respondents repeated attempts go beyond the legitimate means allowed by professional
ethical rules in defending the interests of his client.These are already uncalled for measures to avoid the enforcement of
final judgments of the MeTC and RTC. In these attempts, the respondent violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which makes it obligatory for a lawyer to observe the rules of procedure and. . . not [to]

misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. By his actions, the respondent used procedural rules to thwart and
obstruct the speedy and efficient administration of justice, resulting in prejudice to the winning parties in that case.[20]
Filing of multiple actions and forum shopping
The respondent likewise violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,[21] as
well as the rule against forum shopping, both of which are directed against the filing of multiple actions to attain the
same objective. Both violations constitute abuse of court processes; they tend to degrade the administration of justice;
wreak havoc on orderly judicial procedure;[22] and add to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the
courts.[23]
While the filing of a petition for certiorari to question the lower courts jurisdiction may be a procedurally legitimate (but
substantively erroneous) move, the respondents subsequent petitions involving the same property and the same parties
not only demonstrate his attempts to secure favorable ruling using different fora, but his obvious objective as well of
preventing the execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case against his clients. This intent is
most obvious with respect to the petitions for annulment of judgment and declaratory relief, both geared towards
preventing the execution of the unlawful detainer decision, long after this decision had become final.
Willful, intentional and deliberate falsehood before the courts
The records also reveal that the respondent committed willful,

intentional and deliberate falsehood in the pleadings he filed with the lower courts.
First, in the petition for annulment of judgment filed before the RTC, Branch 101, Quezon City, the respondent cited
extrinsic fraud as one of the grounds for the annulment sought. The extrinsic fraud was alleged in the last paragraph of
the petition, as follows:
In here, counsel for the petitioners (defendants therein), deliberately neglected to file the proper remedy then available
after receipt of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration thus corruptly sold out the interest of the
petitioners (defendants therein) by keeping them away to the Court and in complete ignorance of the suit by a false
pretense of compromise and fraudulent acts of alleging representing them when in truth and in fact, have connived
with the attorney of the prevailing party at his defeat to the prejudice of the petitioner (defendants therein) [24]
Yet, in paragraph 35 of the same petition, the respondent alleged that no second motion for reconsideration or for new
trial, or no other petition with the CA had been filed, as he believed that the decisions rendered both by the MeTC and
the RTC are null and void.[25] These conflicting claims, no doubt, involve a fabrication made for the purpose of supporting
the petition for annulment. Worse, it involved a direct and unsubstantiated attack on the reputation of a law office
colleague, another violation we shall separately discuss below.
Second, the respondent employed another obvious subterfuge when he filed his second petition for annulment of title,
which was an unsuccessful attempt to circumvent the rule that only the Solicitor General may commence reversion
proceedings of public lands[26] on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. This second petition, filed by a private party
and not by the Republic, showed that: (a) the respondent and his clients requested that they be represented by the
Solicitor General in the proceedings; (b) the Republic of the Philippines was simply impleaded in the amended petition
without its consent as a plaintiff; and (c) the respondent signed the amended petition where he alone stood as counsel
for the plaintiffs. In this underhanded manner, the respondent sought to compel the Republic to litigate and waste its
resources on an unauthorized and unwanted suit.

Third, the respondent also committed falsehood in his motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing his petition for
annulment of judgment where he misrepresented to the court and his clients what actually transpired in the hearing
of June 28, 2002 in this wise:
Likewise, the proceedings on said date of hearing (June 28, 2002) show, that after both counsel have argued on the
aforesaid pending incident, the Honorable Presiding Judge, in open court, and in the presence and within the hearing
distance of all the plaintiffs and their counsel as well as the counsel of the defendants resolved: TO DENY THE MOTION
TO DISMISS FILED AND DIRECTED DEFENDANTS COUNSEL TO FILE AN ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN THE
REMAINING PERIOD.[27][Underscoring and emphasis theirs]
The records, however, disclose that the scheduled hearing for June 28, 2002 was actually for the respondents
application for temporary restraining order and was not a hearing on the adverse partys motion to dismiss.[28] The
records also show that RTC-Branch 101 held in abeyance the respondents application for injunctive relief pending the
resolution of the motion to dismiss filed by the adverse party.[29] As stated in the order of the Presiding Judge of RTC-
Branch 101:
Browsing over the records of this case specifically the transcripts of stenographic notes as transcribed by the
Stenographer, the same will indicate that the allegations in the Motion for Reconsideration are not true.
how can this Court make a ruling on the matter even without stating the factual and legal bases as required/mandated
by the Rules. Moreover, there are no indications or iota of irregularity in the preparation by Stenographer of the
transcripts, and by the Court interpreter of the Minutes of the open Court session.[Underscoring theirs]
The records further disclose that despite knowledge of the falsity of his allegations, the respondent took advantage of
his position and the trust reposed in him by his clients (who are all squatters) to convince them to support, through their
affidavits, his false claims on what allegedly transpired in the June 28, 2002 hearing. [30]
For these acts, we find the respondent liable under Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 the Code of Professional Responsibility for
violating the lawyers duty to observe candor and fairness in his dealings with the court. This provision states:
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow
the Court to be mislead by an artifice.
Likewise, the respondent violated his duty as an attorney and his oath as a lawyer never to mislead the judge or any
judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.[31] The respondent failed to remember that his duty as an
officer of the court makes him an indispensable participant in the administration of justice,[32] and that he is expected to
act candidly, fairly and truthfully in his work.[33] His duty as a lawyer obligates him not to conceal the truth from the
court, or to mislead the court in any manner, no matter how demanding his duties to his clients may be.[34] In case of
conflict, his duties to his client yield to his duty to deal candidly with the court.[35]
In defending his clients interest, the respondent also failed to observe Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which reads:
CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF LAW
Rule 19.01 A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his clients x x x

This Canon obligates a lawyer, in defending his client, to employ only such means as are consistent with truth and
honor.[36] He should not prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless actions.[37] The
recital of what the respondent did to prevent the execution of the judgment against his clients shows that he actually
committed what the above rule expressly prohibits.
Maligning the name of his fellow lawyers
To support the charge of extrinsic fraud in his petition for annulment of judgment, the respondent attacked (as quoted
above) the name and reputation of the late Atty. Catolico and accused him of deliberate neglect, corrupt motives and
connivance with the counsel for the adverse party.
We find it significant that the respondent failed to demonstrate how he came upon his accusation against Atty. Catolico.
The respondent, by his own admission, only participated in the cases previously assigned to Atty. Catolico after the latter
died. At the same time, the respondents petition for annulment of judgment also represented that no second motion for
reconsideration or appeal was filed to contest the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case for the reason
that the respondent believed the said decisions were null and void ab initio.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the respondent has been less than fair in his professional relationship with
Atty. Catolico and is thus liable for violating Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which obligates a lawyer
to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues. He was unfair because he
imputed wrongdoing to Atty. Catolico without showing any factual basis therefor; he effectively maligned Atty. Catolico,
who is now dead and unable to defend himself.
Unauthorized appearances
We support Investigating Commissioner Cunanans finding that the respondent twice represented parties without proper
authorization: first, in the petition for annulment of judgment; and second, in the second petition for annulment of
title.[38]
In the first instance, the records show that the respondent filed the petition for annulment of judgment on behalf of 49
individuals, 31 of whom gave their consent while the other 15 individuals did not. We cannot agree with the
respondents off-hand explanation that he truly believed that a majority of the litigants who signed the certification of
non-forum shopping in the petition already gave him the necessary authority to sign for the others. We find it highly
improbable that this kind of lapse could have been committed by a seasoned lawyer like the respondent, who has been
engaged in the practice of law for more than 30 years and who received rigid and strict training as he so proudly
declares, from the University of the Philippines College of Law and in the two law firms with which he was previously
associated.[39] As Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found, the respondents explanation of compliance with the rule
on the certification of non-forum shopping glossed over the real charge of appearing in court without the proper
authorization of the parties he allegedly represented.
In the second instance, which occurred in the second complaint for annulment of title, the respondent knew that only
the Solicitor General can legally represent the Republic of the Philippines in actions for reversion of land. Nevertheless,
he filed an amended petition where he impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as plaintiff without its authority and
consent, as a surreptitious way of forcing the Republic to litigate. Notably, he signed the amended complaint on behalf
of all the plaintiffs his clients and the Republic.
In both instances, the respondent violated Sections 21 and 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court when he undertook the
unauthorized appearances. The settled rule is that a lawyer may not represent a litigant without authority from the
latter or from the latters representative or, in the absence thereof, without leave of court.[40] The willful unauthorized
appearance by a lawyer for a party in a given case constitutes contumacious conduct and also warrants disciplinary
measures against the erring lawyer for professional misconduct.[41]
The Respondents Defenses
We find no merit in the respondents defenses.
Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking unconscientious advantage of another. Accordingly,
in University of the East v. Jader we said that "[g]ood faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue
advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of law, together with the absence of all information or
belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious."[42] Bad faith, on the other hand, is a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest, ill will or for an ulterior purpose.[43] As
both concepts are states of mind, they may be deduced from the attendant circumstances and, more particularly, from
the acts and statements of the person whose state of mind is the subject of inquiry.
In this case, we find that the respondent acted in bad faith in defending the interests of his clients. We draw this
conclusion from the misrepresentations and the dubious recourses he made, all obviously geared towards forestalling
the execution of the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC. That he took advantage of his legal knowledge and
experience and misread the Rules immeasurably strengthen the presence of bad faith.
We find neither sincerity nor honest belief on the part of the respondent in pleading the soundness and merit of the
cases that he filed in court to prevent the execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions, considering his own conduct of
presenting conflicting theories in his petitions. The succession of cases he filed shows a desperation that negates the
sincere and honest belief he claims; these are simply scattershot means to achieve his objective of avoiding the
execution of the unlawful detainer judgment against his clients.
On the respondents allegations regarding his discretion to determine legal strategy, it is not amiss to note that this was
the same defense he raised in the first disbarment case.[44] As we explained in Plus Builders, the exercise of a lawyers
discretion in acting for his client can never be at the expense of truth and justice. In the words of this cited case:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in
the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only
within the bounds of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his clients
case with the end in view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain such actions or
proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the
law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon admission to the Bar that he will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; and that he will conduct
[himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as
to [his] clients. Needless to state, the lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense. A lawyers responsibility
to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and
malicious intentions against the other party.[45]
We cannot give credence to the respondents claim that the disbarment case was filed because the counsel of the
complainant, Atty. Uy, had an axe to grind against him. We reject this argument, considering that it was not Atty. Uy

who filed the present disbarment case against him; Atty. Uy is only the counsel in this case. In fact, Atty. Uy has filed his
own separate disbarment case against the respondent.
The sui generis nature of a disbarment case renders the underlying motives of the complainants unimportant and with
very little relevance. The purpose of a disbarment proceeding is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue
acting as an officer of the court and a participant in the dispensation of justice an issue where the complainants personal
motives have little relevance. For this reason, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by the Court motu proprio upon
information of an alleged wrongdoing. As we also explained in the case In re: Almacen:
. . .disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not
- and does not involve - a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of
its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
xxx
It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of-the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.[46]
Hence, we give little or no weight to the alleged personal motivation that drove the complainant Que and his counsel to
file the present disbarment case.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of professional misconduct and
thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards imposed on members of the Bar. We cannot agree, however,
that only a penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of law should be imposed. Neither should we limit
ourselves to the originally recommended penalty of suspension for two (2) years.
Given the respondents multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and the nature of these violations
which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over concerns for the orderly administration of justice,
we believe and so hold that the appropriate action of this Court is to disbar the respondent to keep him away from the
law profession and from any significant role in the administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a continuing
risk, too, to the public that the legal profession serves. Not even his ardor and overzealousness in defending the
interests of his client can save him. Such traits at the expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of the
profession and the orderly administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.
Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondents first ethical infraction of the same nature. We
penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and intentional
falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for
collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to
suspension for six (6) months. We cannot similarly treat the respondent this time; it is clear that he did not learn any
lesson from his past experience and since then has exhibited traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the
respondents professional legal career for the sake of the public, the profession and the interest of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 dated December 17, 2005 and
Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable for professional misconduct for violations of the
Lawyers Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify
the penalty the IBP imposed, and hold that the respondent should be DISBARRED from the practice of law. SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. 147989 February 20, 2006
ROLANDO CLAVECILLA, Petitioner, vs. TERESITO QUITAIN and RICO QUITAIN, et al., Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
October 5, 2000 which dismissed Rolando Clavecilla’s petition on the ground that the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping was signed by counsel without the proper authority from petitioner, as well as the Resolution
dated March 28, 20012 which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Teresito and Rico Quitain (Quitains) filed on March 7, 1997, a complaint against Rolando Clavecilla (Clavecilla) before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Davao City (MTCC) for the enforcement of the amicable settlement entered into
by them on August 19, 1996 before the Lupon Tagapamayapa, Barangay Talomo, Davao. Pertinent portions of said
settlement reads:
1. That the respondent (Clavecilla) agreed to purchase the property on October 15, 1996.
2. Failure to pay the property on the said date the respondent will voluntarily vacate the place with the assistance of five
thousand (₱5,000.00) pesos only.
3. The complainant (Rico Quitain) agreed to the demand of the respondent.3
The Quitains alleged that Clavecilla failed to pay the amount agreed upon and six months had already passed since the
agreement was entered into and yet Clavecilla has still not left the premises.4
Clavecilla answered that the August 19, 1996 agreement was no longer enforceable since it was novated by an
agreement dated October 29, 1996.5 Said agreement reads:
xxx
1. That both parties agreed to meet again on Nov. 5, 1996 at the Barangay for another round of talk (sic).
2. That on Nov. 5, 1996 the respondent will pay the 50% total amount of the selling price of the said lot, 111 sq.m. more
or less located at Lot 1989-A being a portion of Lot 1989 (T.C.T. # T-6615) at Talomo proper.
3. Price per sq.m. ₱1,000.00 only.

4. Failure to accomplished (sic) this Nov. 5, 1996 requirement, the respondent will voluntarily vacate the said lot with a
₱5,000.00 assistance for their effort.
5. All agreement is final upon signing.6
xxx
Clavecilla claims that on November 5, 1996, he appeared at the barangay and was supposed to pay Quitains the 50%
price of the lot in question but they were not present.7 Rico Quitain asserts however that he was present that day as
shown by a certification made by the office of the lupon of said barangay.8
On March 8, 2000, the MTCC rendered its Decision in favor of the Quitains finding that there was no novation, as the
October 29, 1996 was not incompatible with the August 19, 1996 agreement but was only a reiteration of the earlier
agreement.9
Clavecilla filed a notice of appeal.10
On June 20, 2000, the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 33 (RTC) dismissed the appeal for Clavecilla’s failure to
file the memorandum on appeal within the period prescribed by the Rules.11
Clavecilla filed a Motion for Reconsideration and For Leave of Court to Admit Appeal Memorandum claiming that his
counsel was not able to file the memorandum on appeal on time since said counsel was diagnosed with pneumonia and
had to rest for more than ten days.12 Clavecilla then filed an Appeal Memorandum claiming that the MTCC erred in
rendering judgment against him since he did not sign the agreement but it was his wife Erlinda who signed the same
without authority from him.13
On July 5, 2000, the RTC denied Clavecilla’s motion stating that the reason advanced by Clavecilla’s counsel for his failure
to file the appeal memorandum on time is not a compelling reason, and even if such memorandum was given due
course, the arguments raised by Clavecilla therein are not sufficient to justify a reversal of the Decision of the lower
court.14
Petitioner filed another motion for reconsideration dated July 21, 2000 which was denied by the RTC on the same day.15
On September 13, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court with the CA which
rendered the herein assailed Resolution on October 5, 2000 thus:
The Verification and Certification of non-forum shopping, which accompanied the petition at bench, was executed and
signed by petitioner’s counsel Atty. Oswaldo A. Macadangdang, without the proper authority from petitioner, in
violation of Sec. 5, Rule 7 and Sec. 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The duty to certify under oath is
strictly addressed to petitioner, Rolando Clavecilla. To allow delegation of said duty to anyone would render Revised
Circular No. 28-91 inutile.16
xxx
xxxx
Accordingly, the Court Resolves to DENY DUE COURSE and to DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.17

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied on March 28, 2001 as follows:
Petitioner moves for the reconsideration of our Resolution dated 05 October 2000 dismissing the petition for the reason
that the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed by petitioner’s counsel and not by the petitioner.1avvphil.net
Admitting that the duty to sign under oath the certificate is addressed to the petitioner, petitioner attached to his
motion a Special Power of Attorney dated 09 August 2000 authorizing his counsel to sign the certificate. The court
believes that this authorization was made after the petition had been filed, in a vain attempt to cure the fatal defect, for
if Atty. Maca[d]angdang had such authority, he would have indicated that in the Verification and Certification he signed
on 25 August 2000 attached to the petition.
In any event, it is a settled rule that the certificate against forum shopping must be executed by the petitioner and not
by counsel. xxx To merit the Court’s Consideration, petitioner must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign
the certification. x x x This petitioner failed to show. (citations omitted)
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.18
Hence, the present petition alleging that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED JURISPRUDENCE OF ALLOWING
LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RULES OF COURT PROVIDED PETITIONER SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH CIRCULAR
NO. 28-91 AS SHOWN IN THE SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY WHICH HE ATTACHED TO HIS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION.19
Petitioner avers that: his lawyer had the authority to sign the certification against forum shopping; the CA was hasty in
concluding that the authorization of petitioner’s lawyer was made after the petition had been filed; the CA should have
granted petitioner the benefit of the doubt that he gave such authorization to his lawyer at the time that his lawyer
signed the verification and certification against forum shopping; petitioner’s failure to have a properly executed
certification against forum shopping attached to his petition for review is not fatal; the rules of procedure are used only
to help secure and not override substantial justice, and the CA departed from the established liberal interpretation of
the rules despite petitioner’s substantial compliance with the rule on non-forum shopping.20
Rico Quitain in his Comment countered that: the petition is not sufficient in form and substance and is utterly deficient
in factual and procedural bases; petitioner named "Teresito Quitain, Rico Quitain, et al." as respondents without
specifying who "et al." referred to; Teresito Quitain is already deceased and the MTCC as early as June 5, 1998 already
ordered Teresito’s substitution; the spouse and children of Teresito, to wit, Lolita, Rene, Ruel, Radi and Romy, all
surnamed Quitain, have the right to be informed of the filing of the petition and the fact that they were not so
specifically named as respondents but were referred to as "et al." makes the petition a sham pleading; petitioner failed
to attach certified true copies of the MTCC Decision dated March 8, 2000 and the RTC Order dated July 5, 2000 which
should have been included as annexes in the present petition as they are material to the case, and the petition does not
allege a good and valid defense which, if appreciated, could probably cause the reversal of the July 5, 2000 and March 8,
2000 issuances.21
The parties filed their respective Memoranda reiterating their respective contentions.22

After evaluating the records of the case and the issues raised by the parties, the Court finds that the CA did not err in
denying the petition and motion for reconsideration filed by Clavecilla before it. The Court however finds different
grounds for denying Clavecilla’s petition.
First, it must be determined whether there existed a special power of attorney in favor of petitioner’s counsel when the
petition before the CA was filed.
The CA in its Resolution dated March 28, 2001, stated that it believes that the special power of attorney in favor of the
lawyer attached to petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was only made after the petition had been filed reasoning
that if the counsel had such authority from the beginning, he would have attached the same when the petition was first
filed.
The Court disagrees.
The rule is that any suspicion on the authenticity and due execution of the special power of attorney which is a notarized
document, thus a public document, cannot stand against the presumption of regularity in their favor absent evidence
that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.23
In this case, the petition before the CA was filed on September 13, 2000.24 The special power of attorney meanwhile was
dated August 9, 2000.25 Absent any proof that the special power of attorney was not actually in existence before the
petition was filed, this Court has no recourse but to believe that it was indeed in existence at such time.
The next matter to be determined is whether the CA was correct in dismissing Clavecilla’s petition and motion for
reconsideration, notwithstanding the authority given by Clavecilla in favor of his lawyer to sign the verification and
certification in his behalf.
The Court answers in the affirmative.
Obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if we are to expect fair results therefrom, and utter
disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.26 Time and again, this
Court has strictly enforced the requirement of verification and certification of non-forum shopping under the Rules of
Court.27 This case is no exception.
Verification is required to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition have been made in good faith, or are
true and correct and not merely speculative.28
In this case, petitioner’s counsel signed the verification alleging that he had read the petition and the contents thereof
are true and correct of his own "knowledge and belief."29
On this ground alone, the petition should already be dismissed for as provided for in Section 4 Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC dated May 1, 2000:
Sec. 4. Verification. ---xxx
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and
correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.1avvphil.net
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge,
information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

While the Court has exercised leniency in cases where the lapse in observing the rules was committed when the rules
have just recently taken effect,30 the attendant circumstances in this case however do not warrant such
leniency.1avvphil.net
The certification against forum shopping in this case was signed by petitioner’s counsel despite the clear requirement of
the law that petitioners themselves must sign the certification. The certification must be made by petitioner himself and
not by counsel, since it is petitioner who is in the best position to know whether he has previously commenced any
similar action involving the same issues in any other tribunal or agency.31 And the lack of a certification against forum
shopping, unlike that of verification, is generally not cured by its submission after the filing of the petition.32
As explained by this Court in Gutierrez v. Sec. of Dept. of Labor and Employment:33
x x x [T]he certification (against forum shopping) must be signed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by
the attorney. For such certification is a peculiar personal representation on the part of the principal party, an assurance
given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and
causes of action.
x x x Obviously it is the petitioner, and not always the counsel whose professional services have been retained for a
particular case, who is in the best position to know whether he or it actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in that
case. Hence, a certification against forum shopping by counsel is a defective certification.34
In Mariveles Shipyard Corp. v. Court of Appeals,35 this Court further elucidated that:
x x x In the case of natural persons, the Rule requires the parties themselves to sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping. x x x [I]n the case of the corporations, the physical act of signing may be performed, on behalf of the
corporate entity, only by specifically authorized individuals for the simple reason that corporations, as artificial persons,
cannot personally do the task themselves.36 (emphasis supplied)
In the case of Santos v. Court of Appeals,37 the Court further clarified, that even with a special power of attorney
executed by the petitioners in favor of their counsel to sign the certification on their behalf, still the rule stands. Thus:
We are aware of our ruling in BA Savings Bank v. Sia that a certification against forum shopping may be signed by an
authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in such document. However, BA
Savings Bank must be distinguished from the case at bar because in the former, the complainant was a corporation, and
hence, a juridical person. Therefore, that case made an exception to the general rule that the certification must be made
by the petitioner himself since a corporation can only act through natural persons. In fact, physical actions, e.g., signing
and delivery of documents, may be performed on behalf of the corporate entity only by specifically authorized
individuals. In the instant case, petitioners are all natural persons and there is no showing of any reasonable cause to
justify their failure to personally sign the certification. It is noteworthy that PEPSI in its Comment stated that it was
petitioners themselves who executed the verification and certification requirements in all their previous pleadings.
Counsel for petitioners argues that as a matter of policy, a Special Power of Attorney is executed to promptly and
effectively meet any contingency relative to the handling of a case. This argument only weakens their position since it is
clear that at the outset no justifiable reason yet existed for counsel to substitute petitioners in signing the
certification. In fact, in the case of natural persons, this policy serves no legal purpose. Convenience cannot be made
the basis for a circumvention of the Rules.38(emphasis supplied)

While there are cases when the Court has relaxed the rule requiring that in case of a natural person, he shall personally
sign the non-forum shopping certification, in such cases the Court found compelling and justifiable reasons to relax
observance of the rules.
In Donato v. Court of Appeals39 and Wee v. Galvez40 the Court noted that the petitioners were already in the United
States, thus the signing of the certification by their authorized representatives was deemed sufficient compliance with
the rules. In Orbeta v. Sendiong41 the Court found that the annulment of judgment filed by the parties was meritorious
thus the certification signed by the daughter of petitioner who had a general power of attorney in her favor was deemed
sufficient. In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals42 the Court also upheld substantial justice and ruled that the failure of the
parties to sign the certification may be overlooked as the parties’ case was meritorious.
No such justifiable or compelling reasons exist in the case at bar.
In this case, petitioner did not present any cause for his failure to personally sign the certification against forum
shopping at the time that the petition was filed at the CA. He merely acknowledged in his motion for reconsideration of
the October 5, 2000 Resolution of the CA that he "has the duty to certify under oath."43 He then asked for a
reconsideration of the said Resolution and attached a Special Power of Attorney executed by him in favor of his lawyer.44
There is also no showing that there is substantial merit in petitioner’s claims. In his petition before the CA and in his
Appeal Memorandum filed with the RTC, petitioner argues that he is not a party to the amicable settlement as it was his
wife who signed the same without authority from him.45 Petitioner in his Answer however admitted having entered into
an agreement with the Quitains, before the lupon of their barangay on August 19, 1996.46
Petitioner also claims that the August 19, 1996 agreement was novated by the one dated October 29, 1996. The claim
has no merit.
Novation cannot be presumed but must be clearly shown either by the express assent of the parties or by the complete
incompatibility between the old and the new agreements.47 In this case, the October 29, 1996 agreement merely held
that the parties shall meet again on November 5, 1996 at which time petitioner shall pay 50% of the purchase price or
he will vacate the property. His obligation to pay the purchase price or to vacate the property in case of his failure to do
so, still exists and was not extinguished by the October 29, 1996 agreement.
Records also show that Rico Quitain was ready to comply with his part of the agreement as he was present at
the barangay on November 5, 1996 to receive the payment from Clavecilla.48 Quitain also consigned the amount of
₱5,000.00 to the court, which is the amount he agreed to give Clavecilla to assist him and his family when they leave the
property.49
As correctly pointed out by the RTC, even if petitioner’s appeal was allowed to proceed, still the arguments raised are
not sufficient to overturn the ruling of the MTCC.
It is also worth mentioning that the petitioner erred in including the name of Teresito in the caption of the petition and
using only the phrase "et al." to refer to the heirs who substituted him after his death. As pointed out by respondent
Rico Quitain, Teresito is already deceased and was already substituted by his heirs, namely: Lolita, widow of Teresito,
Rene, Ruel, Radi, and Romy, sons of Teresito, in the Order of the MTCC dated June 5, 1998.50Consequently, the above-
named heirs are deemed co-respondents in the present petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 131214. July 27, 2000]
BA SAVINGS BANK, petitioner, vs. ROGER T. SIA, TACIANA U. SIA and JOHN DOE, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The certificate of non-forum shopping required by Supreme Court Circular 28-91 may be signed, for and on behalf of a
corporation, by a specifically authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in
such document. Unlike natural persons, corporations may perform physical actions only through properly delegated
individuals; namely, its officers and/or agents.
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the August 6, 1997
Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 43209.[2]
Also challenged by petitioner is the October 24, 1997 CA Resolution[3] denying its Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
On August 6, 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying due course to a Petition for Certiorari filed by BA
Savings Bank, on the ground that the Certification on anti-forum shopping incorporated in the petition was signed not by
the duly authorized representative of the petitioner, as required under Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91, but by its
counsel, in contravention of said circular x x x.
A Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently filed by the petitioner, attached to which was a BA Savings Bank
Corporate Secretarys Certificate,[4] dated August 14, 1997. The Certificate showed that the petitioners Board of Directors
approved a Resolution on May 21, 1996, authorizing the petitioners lawyers to represent it in any action or proceeding
before any court, tribunal or agency; and to sign, execute and deliver the Certificate of Non-forum Shopping, among
others.
On October 24, 1997, the Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that Supreme
Court Revised Circular No. 28-91 requires that it is the petitioner, not the counsel, who must certify under oath to all of
the facts and undertakings required therein.
Hence, this appeal.[5]
Issue
In its Memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues for the consideration of the Court:
I Whether or not petitioner-corporations lawyers are authorized to execute and sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping. x x x
II Whether or not the certification of petitioners authorized lawyers will bind the corporation.
III Whether or not the certification by petitioner corporations lawyers is in compliance with the requirements on non-
forum shopping.[6]

Simply stated, the main issue is whether Supreme Court Revised Circular No. 28-91 allows a corporation to authorize its
counsel to execute a certificate of non-forum shopping for and on its behalf.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Authority of Counsel
A corporation, such as the petitioner, has no powers except those expressly conferred on it by the Corporation Code and
those that are implied by or are incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said powers through its board
of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents. Physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be
performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate bylaws or by a specific act of the board
of directors. All acts within the powers of a corporation may be performed by agents of its selection; and, except so far
as limitations or restrictions which may be imposed by special charter, by-law, or statutory provisions, the same general
principles of law which govern the relation of agency for a natural person govern the officer or agent of a corporation, of
whatever status or rank, in respect to his power to act for the corporation; and agents once appointed, or members
acting in their stead, are subject to the same rules, liabilities and incapacities as are agents of individuals and private
persons.[7]
In the present case, the corporations board of directors issued a Resolution specifically authorizing its lawyers to act as
their agents in any action or proceeding before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agency[;] and to sign, execute and deliver in connection therewith the necessary pleadings, motions, verification,
affidavit of merit, certificate of non-forum shopping and other instruments necessary for such action and
proceeding. The Resolution was sufficient to vest such persons with the authority to bind the corporation and was
specific enough as to the acts they were empowered to do.
In the case of natural persons, Circular 28-91 requires the parties themselves to sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping. However, such requirement cannot be imposed on artificial persons, like corporations, for the simple reason
that they cannot personally do the task themselves. As already stated, corporations act only through their officers and
duly authorized agents. In fact, physical actions, like the signing and the delivery of documents, may be performed, on
behalf of the corporate entity, only by specifically authorized individuals.
It is noteworthy that the Circular does not require corporate officers to sign the certificate. More important, there is no
prohibition against authorizing agents to do so.
In fact, not only was BA Savings Bank authorized to name an agent to sign the certificate; it also exercised its appointing
authority reasonably well. For who else knows of the circumstances required in the Certificate but its own retained
counsel. Its regular officers, like its board chairman and president, may not even know the details required therein.
Consistent with this rationale, the Court en banc in Robern Development Corporation v. Judge Jesus Quitain[8] has
allowed even an acting regional counsel of the National Power Corporation to sign, among others, the certificate of non-
forum shopping required by Circular 28-91. The Court held that the counsel was in the best position to verify the
truthfulness and the correctness of the allegations in the Complaint and to know and to certify if an action x x x had
already been filed and pending with the courts.[9]

Circular 28-91 was prescribed by the Supreme Court to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum shopping. We see no
circumvention of this rationale if the certificate was signed by the corporations specifically authorized counsel, who had
personal knowledge of the matters required in the Circular. In Bernardo v. NLRC,[10] we explained that a literal
interpretation of the Circular should be avoided if doing so would subvert its very rationale. Said the Court:
x x x. Indeed, while the requirement as to certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the
requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice
of forum-shopping.
Finally, we stress that technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate, justice.[11] While the swift
unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the appealed Resolution is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case
is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, which is directed to continue the proceedings in CA-GR SP No. 43209 with all
deliberate speed. No costs.SO ORDERED.

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[G.R. No. 122806.

June 19, 1997]

c. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the amount of:

Moral damages P 5,000

Exemplary damages P 5,000

Docket, Sheriff Fees

1|Page LEGAL FORMS CASES 2

Actual expenses/ P 10,000

Damage and P 1,500

Attorney's Fee P 10,000

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered ordering Defendant (Times)

Costs against Defendant. (Times.)

2|Page LEGAL FORMS CASES 2

Petitioner filed the instant petition on the following grounds:

3|Page LEGAL FORMS CASES 2

Dear Mr. Sy,

May you give this matter your preferential attention.

(Sgd.) Ferdinand S. Reyes

Thank you for your attention and kind consideration.

4|Page LEGAL FORMS CASES 2

Jose Ramon R. Remollo

Dear Mr. Sy,

Very truly yours,

(sgd.) CRESENCIO PALPAGAN JR.

Dear Mr. Sy and Atty. Palpagan,

(sgd.) FERDINAND S. REYES

6|Page LEGAL FORMS CASES 2

Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

7|Page LEGAL FORMS CASES 2

Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 149576 August 8, 2006

8|Page LEGAL FORMS CASES 2

9|Page LEGAL FORMS CASES 2

(a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by another; 10

(b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it; 11

(c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of another; 12

(e) reads and signs a written statement made by another. 14

10 | P a g e LEGAL FORMS CASES 2

in favor of one who is not. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

The Court’s pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of Appeals 20 is relevant:

[G.R. No. L-24864. May 30, 1996]

[G.R. No. L-27773. May 30, 1996]

[G.R. No. L-30110. May 30, 1996]

[G.R. No. L-38655. May 30, 1996]

FELICIDAD M. TOLENTINO, as Administratrix of the ESTATE of FORTUNATO F. HALILI,petitioner, vs. COURT OF

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

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xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

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The petition has no merit.

1. Unfair labor practice cases;

15 | P a g e LEGAL FORMS CASES 2

16 | P a g e LEGAL FORMS CASES 2

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

This administrative case arose from a complaint filed on 22 October 2001 by

17 | P a g e LEGAL FORMS CASES 2

II. PREFATORY STATEMENT

III. GROUNDS FOR RECONSIDERATION