Republic v Encelan

GR No 170022
January 9, 2013

Facts:
Respondent Cesar married Lolita and the union bore two children. To support his family,
Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia. While still in Saudi Arabia, Cesar learned that Lolita had
been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez (Alvin). Subsequently, Lolita allegedly left the
conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been
separated. Thereafter, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the
nullity of his marriage based on Lolitas psychological incapacity.

At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolitas infidelity and subsequent
abandonment of the family home. He testified that he continued to provide financial support for
Lolita and their children even after he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin.

RTC declared Cesars marriage to Lolita void. Upon reconsideration, CA affirmed the
RTCs decision. The Office of the Solicitor General then filed the present petition.

Issue:
Whether or not there exists sufficient basis to nullify the marriage.

Ruling:
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage. In interpreting this provision, the Court have repeatedly
stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not merely the refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. The plaintiff bears the burden of
proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage),
gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant spouse. In this case, Cesars testimony failed
to prove Lolitas alleged psychological incapacity.
 In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do
not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation.
To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and
abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring
spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations.

Republic vs Jose Sarenogon

G.R. No. 199194
February 10, 2016

Facts:
Sarenogon filed a petition before the RTC to declare the presumptive death of his wife
Netchie. He testified that they got married and lived together as husband and wife for a month
only because he left to work as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper.
For 3 months, he did not receive any communication from Netchie and had no idea about her
whereabouts. While still abroad, he tried to contact Netchies parents, but failed. He returned
homeafter his contract expired, then inquired from Netchies relatives and friends about her
whereabouts. They also did not know where she was. Because of these, he had to presume that
his wife Netchie was already dead. He filed the Petition before the RTC so he could contract
another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code. Joses testimony was corroborated
by his older brother, and by Netchies aunt. These two witnesses testified that Jose and Netchie
lived together as husband and wife only for one month prior to their leaving the Philippines for
separate destinations abroad and added that they had no information regarding Netchies
location. The RTC found that Netchie had disappeared for more than four years, reason enough
for Jose to conclude that his wife was indeed already dead.

The OSG questioned the RTC ruling via Rule 65 before the CA for the RTCs error in its
misappreciation of evidence. The CA saw no error in the RTC judgment and further held that
Rule 65 is the wrong recourse in elevating a declaration of presumptive death judgment from the
RTC.

Issue:
Whether or nor the well-founded belief requisite under Article 41 (FC) was complied
with.

Ruling:
No. To comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief
was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that
based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent
spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort. In this case, Sarenogon failed to
satisfy required well-founded belief standard.

Sarenogons pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing Netchie are notches below
the required degree of stringent diligence prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare
claims that he had inquired from alleged friends and relatives as to Netchies whereabouts, Jose
did not call to the witness stand specific individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw or met in
the course of his search or quest for the allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he
sought the assistance of the pertinent government agencies as well as the media. Nor did he
show that he undertook a thorough, determined and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at
least two years (and what those years were), and naming the particular places, provinces, cities,
barangays or municipalities that he visited, or went to, and identifying the specific persons he
interviewed or talked to in the course of his search.

Ong Eng Kiam v. Ong

G.R. No. 153206
October 23, 2006
Facts:
On June 13, 1975, William Ong and Lucita Ong got married; however, after than 20
years of being married together, Lucita filed a complaint for Legal separation under Article 55
par. (1) of the Family Code. She alleged that since their third year of marriage, her husband
William subjected her to physical violence like slapping, kicking and pulling her hair and bang
her head against the concrete wall and been violent towards their three children. He would scold
them using his belt buckle to beat them. One day after a violent quarrel wherein William hit
Lucita on several different parts of her body, pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the
house which she did. Lucitas statements about Williams abusive behavior were corroborated by
her sister Linda Lim. Dr. Vicente Elinzan whom Lucita consulted the day after she left her
conjugal home also testified about her injuries.

Issue:
Whether or not Lucita Ong should be granted a decree on legal separation.

Ruling:
The Court held that the claim that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case is for her
family to take control of the conjugal properties is absurd. Lucita left because of her husbands
repeated physical violence and grossly abusive conduct. The physical violence and grossly
abusive conduct were brought to bear upon Lucita have been duly established. He can derive no
personal gain from pushing for the financial interests of her family at the expense of her marriage
of 20 years and the companionship of her husband and children The assessment of the trial court
regarding the credibility of witnesses is given great respect. Relationship alone is not enough to
discredit and label a witness testimony as biased and unworthy of credence. Witnesses Linda
Lim and Dr. Elinzano gave detailed and straightforward testimonies the court finds that their
testimonies are not tainted with bias. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is
abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. Lucita left William due to his
abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated in the said provision.
 Go v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 114791
May 29, 1997

Facts:
In 1981, Hermogenes Ong and Jane Ong contracted with Nancy Go for the latter to film
their wedding. After the wedding, the newlywed inquired about their wedding video but Nancy
Go said its not yet ready. She advised them to return for the wedding video after their
honeymoon. The newlywed did so but only to find out that Nancy Go can no longer produce the
said wedding video because the copy has been erased. The Ongs then sued Nancy Go for
damages. Nancys husband, Alex Go, was impleaded. The trial court ruled in favor of the
spouses Ong and awarded in their favor, among others, P75,000.00 in moral damages. In her
defense on appeal, Nancy Go said: that they erased the video tape because as per the terms of
their agreement, the spouses are supposed to claim their wedding tape within 30 days after the
wedding, however, the spouses neglected to get said wedding tape because they only made their
claim after two months; that her husband should not be impleaded in this suit.

Issue:
Whether or not Nancy Go is liable for moral damages.

Ruling:
Her contention is bereft of merit. It is shown that the spouses Ong made their claim after
the wedding but were advised to return after their honeymoon. The spouses advised Go that their
honeymoon is to be done abroad and wont be able to return for two months. It is contrary to
human nature for any newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video coverage of their wedding;
the fact that the Ongs filed a case against Nancy Go belies such assertion. Considering the
sentimental value of the tapes and the fact that the event therein recorded a wedding which in
our culture is a significant milestone to be cherished and remembered could no longer be
reenacted and was lost forever, the trial court was correct in awarding the Ongs moral damages
in compensation for the mental anguish, tortured feelings, sleepless nights and humiliation that
the Ongs suffered and which under the circumstances could be awarded as allowed under
Articles 2217 and 2218 of the Civil Code.

Anent the issue that Nancy Gos husband should not be included in the suit, this
argument is valid. Under Article 73 of the Family Code, the wife may exercise any profession,
occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband. In this case, it was shown
that it was only Nancy Go who entered into a contract with the spouses Ong hence only she
(Nancy) is liable to pay the damages awarded in favor of the Ongs.

Dio vs. Dio

G.R. No. 178044
January 19, 2011

Facts:
Alain Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad Dio (respondent) were childhood friends and
sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996,
they decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor
Aguilar of Las Pias City.

In 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against

respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Issue:
Is the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties shall be complied
first before a decree of absolute nullity of marriage be issued?

Ruling:
 No. The Court has ruled in Valdes vs. RTC, Br. 102 QC that in a void marriage,
regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in
this case.

Petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, partition may be
made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. It is not necessary to liquidate
the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.

Ining v. Vega
G.R. No. 174727
August 12, 2013

Facts:
Leon Roldan, married to Rafaela Menez, is the owner of a 3,120-square meter parcel
ofland inKalibo, Aklan. Leon and Rafaela died without issue. Leon was survived by his siblings
RomanaRoldan and GregoriaRoldanIning, who are now both deceased. Romana was survived by
her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson, Leonardo R. Vega. Leonardo is survived by his
wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto and
Lenard Vega. Gregoria, was survived by her six children. The petitioners on the case except for
Ramon Tresvalles and Roberto Tajonera are Gregorias grandchildren or spouses.

In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as
Romanas surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan
for partition, recovery of ownership and possession, with damages, against Gregorias heirs. In
their Answer with counterclaim, Gregorias heirs claimed that Leonardo had no cause of action
against them; that they have become the sole owners of the subject property through Lucimo Sr.
who acquired the same in good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez, who in turn acquired the same
from Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this fact.

The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription, declared lot to
becommon property of the heirs of GregoriaRoldanIning, and concluded that Leon never sold the
property to Enriquez, and in turn, Enriquez never sold the property to Lucimo Sr.; hence, the
subject property remained part of Leons estate at the time of his death in 1962. The CA declared
1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the plaintiffs as successors-in-interest of Romana Roldan
and the other 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the defendants as successors-in-interest of
GregoriaRoldanIning.

Issue:

Whether or not Lucimo Sr. has the right to perform acts which characterized as a
repudiation of the co-ownership in the subject property.

Ruling:

No. He is not a co-owner of the property. He is not an heir of Gregoria; he is merely

Antipolos son-in-law, being married to Antipolos daughter Teodora. Under the Family Code,
Family Relations, which is the primary basis for succession, exclude relations by affinity. One
who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter and cannot
become a co-owner of the decedents property. Consequently, he cannot validly effect a
repudiation of the co-ownership, which he was never part of. For this reason, prescription did not
run adversely against Leonardo, and his right to seek a partition of the property has not been lost.

Fortaleza v. Lapitan

G.R. No. 178288

August 15, 2012

Facts:

Spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza obtained a loan from spouses Rolando and
AmparoLapitan in the amount of P1.2 million subject to 34% interest per annum. As security,
spouses Fortaleza executed on January 28, 1998 a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over their
residential house and lot situated in Barrio Anos, Municipality of Los Baos, Laguna. When
spouses Fortaleza failed to pay the indebtedness including the interests and penalties, the
creditors applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage before the Office of
the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Calamba City. The public auction sale was set on
May 9, 2001. Dr. Raul Lapitan and his wife Rona emerged as the highest bidders with the bid
amount of P2.5 million. The one-year redemption period expired without the spouses Fortaleza
redeeming the mortgage. On August 27, 2004, spouses Lapitan filed an ex parte petition for the
issuance of writ of possession with Branch 35 of the RTC of Calamba City. On September 16,
2005, the RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of possession explaining that it is a ministerial duty
of the court. Spouses Fortaleza elevated the case to the CA, however, the appellate court
dismissed the appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners were bared on their right of redemption over the foreclosed
property by demanding redemption price of a highly equitable and more than double the amount
of the foreclosed property, especially that the foreclosed mortgaged property is a family home.

Ruling:

As a rule, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment.
However, Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly allows the forced sale of a family home
"for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution." In this case,
there is no doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily executed on January 28, 1998 a deed of Real
Estate Mortgage over the subject property. Assuming that the property is exempt from forced
sale, spouses Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption from forced sale
before it was sold at the public auction. Failure to do so would stop the party from later claiming
the exemption.

Concepcion vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 123450

August 31, 2005

Ponente: Corona, J.

Facts:

Gerardo Concepcion and Ma. Theresa Almonte were married on December 29, 1989.
During their marriage, Jose Gerardo was conceived and born. Subsequently, Gerardo filed a
petition for annulment of their marriage on the ground of bigamy alleging that Theresa has been
previously married to Mario Gopiao. The second marriage was contracted without the first
marriage being annulled or declared void. While Theresa did not deny her first marriage, she
claims that her marriage with Gopiao was a fake one. The trial court nonetheless ruled that
Theresas marriage with Mario is a valid marriage. Thus, the marriage between Theresa and
Gerardo was annulled and Jose Gerardo was declared as an illegitimate child. His custody was
awarded to his mother while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Theresa raised the issue to the
Court of Appeals which rendered the decision finding Jose Gerardo not the son of Ma. Theresa
with Gerardo but with Mario as he was conceived and born during the subsistence of the valid
marriage of Theresa and Mario. Gerardo filed a motion to impugn the legitimacy of Jose
Gerardo.

Issue:
 Is the Court of Appeals correct in ruling that Jose Gerardo is the legitimate child of
Mario instead of Gerardo?

Ruling:

Yes. Provided under Article 164 of the Family Code, a child who is conceived or born
during the subsistence of a valid marriage is considered to be a legitimate child of the spouses of
such valid marriage. In the present case, the marriage between Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was
declared to be void ab initio since the marriage between Mario and Ma. Theresa was valid and
subsisting when they contracted such second marriage. Jose Gerardo was conceived during the
subsistence of the valid first marriage; thus, the law presumes that Jose Gerardo was a legitimate
child of Theresa and Mario. Gerardo cannot impugn the legitimacy of Jose Gerardo because such
right is strictly personal to Mario, being the legitimate husband of Theresa. Since the marriage of
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning; he never became her husband and
thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child. According to Article 167 of
the Family Code, it is the right of a child to be presumed legitimate even if his mother declared
against his legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. Therefore, the Court
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals declaring Jose Gerardo as the legitimate child of
Theresa and Mario.

BBB v AAA CASE DIGEST [G.R. No. 193225, February 9, 2015, REYES, J.]

FACTS: BBB and AAA allege that they started to date seriously only in 1996. AAA was then a medical
student and was raising her first child borne from a previous relationship, named CCC, a boy. During
their relationship, AAA bore two more children namely, DDD (born on December 11, 1997) and EEE
(born on October 19, 2000). BBB and AAA married in civil rights to legalize their relationship. The birth
certificates of the children, including CCCs, was amended to change their civil status to legitimated by
virtue of the said marriage. Later on, their relationship turn sour and they decided to live separately.
Citing economic and psychological abuse, AAA filed an application for the issuance of a Temporary
Protection Order with a request to make the same permanent after due hearing, before the RTC. Finding
good ground in AAAs application, the RTC issued a TPO. The TPO was thereafter, made permanent by
virtue of a Decision of the RTC dated August 14, 2007.

BBB appealed before the CA. CA affirmed RTCs decision but ordered the remand of the case for the
latter to determine in the proper proceedings to determine who shall be awarded custody of the
children. The CA found that under the provisions of RA9262, BBB had subjected AAA and their children
to psychological, emotional and economic abuses. BBB displayed acts of marital infidelity which exposed
AAA to public ridicule causing her emotional and psychological distress. While BBB alleged that FFF was
only a professional colleague, he continued to have public appearances with her which did not help to
dispel AAAs accusation that the two had an extra-marital relation. BBB filed a Manifestation and Motion
to Render Judgment Based on a MOA alleging that he and AAA had entered into a compromise
regarding the custody, exercise of parental authority over, and support of DDD and EEE: that BBB shall
have the custody over both children.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC should determine who shall be awarded custody over the children.

HELD: YES. All told, the Court finds no merit in BBBs petition, but there exists a necessity to remand the
case for the RTC to resolve matters relative to who shall be granted custody over the three children,
how the spouses shall exercise visitation rights, and the amount and manner of providing financial
support. The RTC and the CA found substantial evidence and did not commit reversible errors when they
issued the PPO against BBB. Events, which took place after the issuance of the PPO, do not erase the fact
that psychological, emotional and economic abuses were committed by BBB against AAA. Hence, BBBs
claim that he now has actual sole care of DDD and EEE does not necessarily call for this Courts
revocation of the PPO and the award to him of custody over the children.

This Court, thus, affirms the CAs order to remand the case for the RTC to resolve the question of
custody. Since the children are now all older than seven years of age, they can choose for themselves
whom they want to stay with. If all the three children would manifest to the RTC their choice to stay
with AAA, then the PPO issued by RTC shall continue to be executed in its entirety. However, if any of
the three children would choose to be under BBBs care, necessarily, the PPO issued against BBB relative
to them is to be modified. The PPO, in its entirety, would remain effective only as to AAA and any of the
children who opt to stay with her. Consequently, the RTC may accordingly alter the manner and amount
of financial support BBB should give depending on who shall finally be awarded custody over the
children.
Pursuant to Articles 201 and 202 of the Family Code, BBBs resources and means and the necessities of
AAA and the children are the essential factors in determining the amount of support, and the same can
be reduced or increased proportionately. The RTC is reminded to be circumspect in resolving the matter
of support, which is a mutual responsibility of the spouses. The parties do not dispute that AAA is now
employed as well, thus, the RTC should consider the same with the end in mind of promoting the best
interests of the children.

Abadilla v. Tabiliran

A.M. No. MTJ-92-716

October 25, 1995

Facts:

Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a complaint against Judge Tabiliran on the
grounds of gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge. With
respect to the charge on gross immorality, she contended that the judge scandalously and
publicly cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during subsistence of his marriage with Teresita
Banzuela. Tabiliran and Priscilla got married in May 1986. On the other hand, with respect to the
charge on deceitful conduct, petitioner claims that the judge caused his 3 illegitimate children
with Priscilla be registered as legitimate by falsely executing separate affidavits stating the
delayed registration was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight when in fact, he
knew these children cannot be legally registered as legitimate. The judge averred that 25 years
had already elapsed since the disappearance of her wife in 1966 when he married Priscilla hence
the cohabitation was neither bigamous nor immoral. However, as early as 1970, based on the
record, Priscilla had begotten her 3 children.

Issue:

Whether or not the 3 children can be considered legitimate.

Ruling:

The 3 children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since the
time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between Tabiliran and Teresita. Only
natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time
of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other,
are natural.

Under Article 177 of the Family Code, only children conceived and born outside of
wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other may be legitimated. Reasons for this limitation:

1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;

2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights;

3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change;

4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy
the sanctity of marriage;

5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the
child.

In re Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia

G.R. No. 148311

March 31, 2005

Facts:
 On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged that Stephanie was born on June
26, 1994 and her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia. Stephanie has been using her mothers
middle name and surname. Now that he is a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent, he
prayed that Stephanies middle name,Astorga, be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and
that her surname, Garcia, be changed to Catindig, his surname. On March 23, 2001, the trial
court rendered the assailed decision granting the adoption. The decision stated that the minor
child shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.

On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration
praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as
her middle name. On May 28, 2001, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his
biological mother as his middle name. Hence, this present petition.

Issue:

May an illegitimate child use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural father?

Ruling:

Yes. There is no law regulating the use of a middle name. However, as correctly pointed
out by the Office of the Solicitor General, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname
of the child's mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code
and Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of
the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father. Justice Caguioa suggested that
the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect that it shall be mandatory on the child to use
the surname of the father but he may use the surname of the mother by way of an initial or a
middle name. Therefore, this petition is granted allowing Stephanie is allowed to use her
mothers surname Garcia as her middle name.
 Lam v. Chua
G.R. No. 131286
March 18, 2004

Facts:
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage by Adriana Chua against Jose Lam in the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109). Adriana alleged in the petition that: she and
Jose were married on January 13, 1984; out of said marriage, they begot one son, John Paul Chua
Lam; Jose was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage but said incapacity was not then apparent; such psychological incapacity of Jose
became manifest only after the celebration of the marriage when he frequently failed to go home,
indulged in womanizing and irresponsible activities, such as, mismanaging the conjugal
partnership of gains; in order to save what was left of the conjugal properties, she was forced to
agree with Jose on the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains and the separation of
present and future properties; said agreement was approved by the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City (Branch 149) in a Decision dated February 28, 1994; they had long been separated
in bed and board; they have agreed that the custody of their child will be with her, subject to
visitation rights of Jose. Adriana prayed that the marriage between her and Jose be declared null
and void but she failed to claim and pray for the support of their child, John Paul.

Issue:
Should Jose give the corresponding support?

Ruling:
The Pasay RTC should have been aware that in determining the amount of support to be
awarded, such amount should be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the
necessities of the recipient, pursuant to Articles 194, 201 and 202 of the Family Code. It is
incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence presented before it.
The evidence must prove the capacity or resources of both parents who are jointly obliged to
support their children as provided for under Article 195 of the Family Code; and the monthly
expenses incurred for the sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation of the child.

Sagala-Eslao v. Court Of Appeals

G.R. No. 116773

January 16, 1997

Facts:
Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married. After their marriage, the
couple stayed with TeresitaEslao, mother of Reynaldo. The couple had two children namely
Leslie and Angelica. Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of Maria's mother while
Angelica was entrusted with her parents at Teresita's house. Reynaldo died 4 years later. Maria
intended to bring Angelica to her mother's place but Teresita prevailed and entrusted to the
custody of Angelica. Maria returned to her mother's house and stayed with Leslie. Years later,
Maria married James Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-American orthodontist, and she migrated to US
with him. A year after the marriage, Maria returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her
children and bring them to US. Teresita, however, resisted by way of explaining that the child
was entrusted to her when she was 10 days old and accused Maria of having abandoned
Angelica. The trial court rendered a decision where Teresita was directed to cause the immediate
transfer of custody of the child to Maria. CA affirmed with the lower court's decision.

Issue:
Whether or not Teresita has the right to the custody of the child.

Ruling:
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being
purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts
the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is
given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority.
Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same. The father and
mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to
keep them in their custody and company. In this case, when Maria entrusted the custody of her
minor child to Teresita, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not
constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. Thus, Teresita does not have the
right to the custody of the child.

In re Adoption of Stephanie Garcia

G.R. No. 148311
March 31, 2005

Facts:

On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged that Stephanie was born on June
26, 1994 and her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia. Stephanie has been using her mothers
middle name and surname. Now that he is a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent, he
prayed that Stephanies middle name,Astorga, be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and
that her surname, Garcia, be changed to Catindig, his surname. On March 23, 2001, the trial
court rendered the assailed decision granting the adoption. The decision stated that the minor
child shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.

On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying
that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her
middle name. On May 28, 2001, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his
biological mother as his middle name. Hence, this present petition.
Issue:

May an illegitimate child use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural father?

Ruling:

Yes. There is no law regulating the use of a middle name. However, as correctly pointed
out by the Office of the Solicitor General, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname
of the child's mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code
and Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of
the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father. Justice Caguioa suggested that
the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect that it shall be mandatory on the child to use
the surname of the father but he may use the surname of the mother by way of an initial or a
middle name. Therefore, this petition is granted allowing Stephanie is allowed to use her
mothers surname Garcia as her middle name.

Republic vs. Cagandahan

G.R. No. 166676
September 12, 2008

Facts:
Respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate before the Regional Trial Court of Siniloan, Laguna. In her petition, she alleged that
she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth
but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted
possess both male and female characteristics.

Issue:
Can the trial court order the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent?

Ruling:

Yes, the determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue
and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides
that No entry in civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. The Court
has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised
in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow.