G.R. No.

164733 September 21, 2007

MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Whereas, mankind owes to the child the best it has to give. (Final preambular clause of the
Declaration of the Rights of the Child)

This is a petition for review1 of the decision2 dated July 30, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 25925 affirming with modification the decision 3 of Branch 109 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 00-0691 which found petitioner Michael John Z. Malto
guilty for violation of paragraph 3, Section 5(a), Article III of RA 7610, 4 as amended.

Petitioner was originally charged in an information which read:

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO of VIOLATION OF
SECTION 5(b), ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT 7610, AS AMENDED, committed as follows:

That on or about and sometime during the month of November 1997 up to 1998, in Pasay City,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, Michael John. Z. Malto, a professor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
induce and/or seduce his student at Assumption College, complainant, AAA, a minor of 17 years old,
to indulge in sexual intercourse for several times with him as in fact said accused had carnal
knowledge.

Contrary to law.5

This was subsequently amended as follows:

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO of VIOLATION OF
SECTION 5(a), ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT 7610, AS AMENDED, committed as follows:

That on or about and sometime during the month of November 1997 up to 1998, in Pasay City,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, Michael John. Z. Malto, a professor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take advantage and exert influence, relationship and moral ascendancy and induce and/or seduce
his student at Assumption College, complainant, AAA, a minor of 17 years old, to indulge in sexual
intercourse and lascivious conduct for several times with him as in fact said accused has carnal
knowledge.

Contrary to law.6

Petitioner did not make a plea when arraigned; hence, the trial court entered for him a plea of "not
guilty." After the mandatory pre-trial, trial on the merits proceeded.
The prosecution established the following:

At the time of the incident, private complainant AAA was 17 years old.7 She was a college student at
the Assumption College in San Lorenzo Village, Makati City. Petitioner, then 28, was her professor in
her Philosophy II class in the first semester of the school year 1997 to 1998.

On July 18, 1997, AAA was having lunch with her friends when petitioner joined their group. He told
them to address him simply as "Mike." He handed them his organizer and asked them to list down
their names and contact numbers.

On October 3, 1997, while AAA and her friends were discussing the movie Kama Sutra, petitioner
butted in and bragged that it was nothing compared to his collection of xxx-rated films. To the shock
of AAAs group, he lectured on and demonstrated sexual acts he had already experienced. He then
invited the group to view his collection.

On October 10, 1997, petitioner reiterated his invitation to AAA and her friends to watch his collection
of pornographic films. Afraid of offending petitioner, AAA and two of her friends went with him. They
rode in his car and he brought them to the Anito Lodge on Harrison St. in Pasay City. They checked
in at a "calesa room." Petitioner was disappointed when he found out there was neither a video
cassette player (on which he could play his video tapes) nor an x-rated show on the closed-circuit
television. He suggested that they just cuddle up together. AAA and her friends ignored him but he
pulled each of them towards him to lie with him in bed. They resisted until he relented.

AAA and her friends regretted having accepted petitioners invitation. For fear of embarrassment in
case their classmates got wind of what happened, they agreed to keep things a secret. Meanwhile,
petitioner apologized for his actuations.

Thereafter, petitioner started to show AAA amorous attention. He called her on the phone and
paged8 her romantic messages at least thrice a day. When semestral break came, his calls and
messages became more frequent. Their conversation always started innocently but he had a way of
veering the subject to sex. Young, naive and coming from a broken family, AAA was soon
overwhelmed by petitioners persistence and slowly got attracted to him. He was the first person to
court her. Soon, they had a "mutual understanding" and became sweethearts.

When AAA secured her class card in Philosophy II at the start of the second semester, petitioner told
her that he gave her a final grade of "3." She protested, stating that her mid-term grade was "1.2."
He gave her a grade of "1.5" when she promised not to disclose his intimate messages to her to
anyone. He also cautioned her not to tell anyone about their affair as it could jeopardize his job.

On November 19, 1997, at around 11:00 a.m., AAA agreed to have lunch with petitioner outside the
premises of the college. Since she was not feeling well at that time, he asked her to lie down in the
backseat of his car. She was surprised when he brought her to Queensland Lodge 9 on Harrison St.
in Pasay City. Once inside the motel room, he kissed her at the back and neck, touched her breasts
and placed his hand inside her blouse. She resisted his advances but he was too strong for her. He
stopped only when she got angry at him.

On November 26, 1997, petitioner asked AAA to come with him so that they could talk in private. He
again brought her to Queensland Lodge. As soon as they were inside the room, he took off his shirt,
lay down in bed and told her, "halika na, dito na tayo mag-usap." She refused but he dragged her
towards the bed, kissed her lips, neck and breasts and unsnapped her brassiere. She struggled to
stop him but he overpowered her. He went on top of her, lowered her pants and touched her private
part. He tried to penetrate her but she pushed him away forcefully and she sat up in bed. He hugged
her tightly saying, "Sige na, AAA, pumayag ka na, I wont hurt you." She refused and said,
"Mike, ayoko." He angrily stood up saying, "Fine, hindi na tayo mag-uusap. Dont come to the faculty
room anymore. You know I need this and if you will not give in or give it to me, let us end this." She
replied, "Mike, hindi pa ako ready and it was you who said it will be after my debut" on December 3,
1997. He insisted that there was no difference between having sex then and after her debut. He told
her, "kung hindi ko makukuha ngayon, tapusin na natin ngayon." Pressured and afraid of his threat
to end their relationship, she hesitantly replied "Fine." On hearing this, he quickly undressed while
commenting "ibibigay mo rin pala, pinahirapan mo pa ako" and laughed. They had sexual
intercourse.

In July 1999, AAA ended her relationship with petitioner. She learned that he was either intimately
involved with or was sexually harassing his students in Assumption College and in other colleges
where he taught. In particular, he was dismissed from the De La Salle University-Aguinaldo for
having sexual relations with a student and sexually harassing three other students. His employment
was also terminated by Assumption College for sexually harassing two of his students. It was then
that AAA realized that she was actually abused by petitioner. Depressed and distressed, she
confided all that happened between her and petitioner to her mother, BBB.

On learning what her daughter underwent in the hands of petitioner, BBB filed an administrative
complaint in Assumption College against him. She also lodged a complaint in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasay City which led to the filing of Criminal Case No. 00-0691.

In his defense, petitioner proffered denial and alibi. He claimed that the alleged incidents on October
3, 1997 and October 10, 1997 did not happen. He spent October 3, 1997 with his colleagues Joseph
Hipolito and AJ Lagaso while he was busy checking papers and computing grades on October 10,
1997. The last time he saw AAA during the first semester was when she submitted her final paper on
October 18, 1997.

On November 19, 1997, between 10:30 a.m. and 1:00 p.m., he sorted out conflicts of class
schedules for the second semester at the Assumption College. On November 26, 1997, he was at
St. Scholasticas College (where he was also teaching) preparing a faculty concert slated on
December 12, 1997. At lunch time, he attended the birthday treat of a colleague, Evelyn Bancoro.

On November 29, 1997, he attended AAAs 18th birthday party. That was the last time he saw her.

According to petitioner, AAA became his sweetheart when she was already 19 years old and after he
was dismissed from Assumption College. On December 27 and 28, 1998, they spent time together,
shared their worries, problems and dreams and kissed each other. On January 3, 1999, he brought
her to Queensland Lodge where they had sexual intercourse for the first time. It was repeated for at
least 20 times from January 1999 until they broke up in July 1999, some of which were done at
either his or her house when no one was around.

The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution sufficient to sustain petitioners conviction. On
March 7, 2001, it rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty.10 The dispositive portion read:

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Michael John Malto y Zarsadias guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Article III, Section 5(a)[,] paragraph 3 of RA 7610[,] as amended
and hereby sentences him to reclusion temporal in its medium period or an imprisonment of
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and to pay civil indemnity
in the amount of Php 75,000.00 and moral and exemplary damages of Php 50,000.00 to minor
complainant with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 11
Petitioner questioned the trial courts decision in the CA. In a decision dated July 30, 2004, 12 the
appellate court affirmed his conviction even if it found that his acts were not covered by paragraph
(a) but by paragraph (b) of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. It further observed that the trial court
failed to fix the minimum term of indeterminate sentence imposed on him. It also ruled that the trial
court erred in awarding 75,000 civil indemnity in favor of AAA as it was proper only in a conviction
for rape committed under the circumstances under which the death penalty was authorized by
law.13 Hence, the CA modified the decision of the trial court as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of conviction is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that (1)
appellant MICHAEL JOHN MALTO y ZARSADIAS is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor as minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years, Four (4)
Months and One (1) Day of reclusion temporal as maximum; and (2) the sum of 75,000.00 as civil
indemnity is DELETED.14

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that the CA erred in sustaining his conviction although it found that he did not
rape AAA. For him, he should have been acquitted since there was no rape. He also claims that he
and AAA were sweethearts and their sexual intercourse was consensual.

Petitioner is wrong.

The Offense Stated in the Information Was Wrongly Designated

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.15 Pursuant thereto, the complaint or information against him should be
sufficient in form and substance. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of
the offense and the place where the offense was committed. 16

The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the
acts or omissions constituting the offense and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances.17 If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it.18 The acts or omissions constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.19

The designation of the offense in the information against petitioner was changed from "violation of
Section 5(b), Article III" of RA 7610 to "violation of Section 5(a), Article III" thereof. Paragraphs (a)
and (b) of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provide:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who, for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to
be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
the following:
 (a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include, but
are not limited to, the following:

1. Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;

2. Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral

advertisements or other similar means;

3. Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;

4. Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or

5. Giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with

intent to engage such child in prostitution.

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article
335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, that the penalty for
lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period; and

xxx xxx x x x(emphasis supplied)

The elements of paragraph (a) are:

1. the accused engages in, promotes, facilitates or induces child prostitution;

2. the act is done through, but not limited to, the following means:

a. acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;

b. inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral

advertisements or other similar means;

c. taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;

d. threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute or

e. giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with

intent to engage such child in prostitution;

3. the child is exploited or intended to be exploited in prostitution and

4. the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

On the other hand, the elements of paragraph (b) are:

1. the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;

 2. the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse and

3. the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

Paragraph (a) essentially punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution. It
contemplates sexual abuse of a child exploited in prostitution. In other words, under paragraph (a),
the child is abused primarily for profit.

On the other hand, paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a
child exploited in prostitution but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not only
a situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion,
intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. 20

The information against petitioner did not allege anything pertaining to or connected with child
prostitution. It did not aver that AAA was abused for profit. What it charged was that petitioner had
carnal knowledge or committed sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct with AAA; AAA was
induced and/or seduced by petitioner who was her professor to indulge in sexual intercourse and
lascivious conduct and AAA was a 17-year old minor. These allegations support a charge for
violation of paragraph (b), not paragraph (a), of Section 5, Article III, RA 7610.

The Real Nature of the Offense is Determined by Facts Alleged in the Information, Not By the
Designation

The designation in the information of the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise on
the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. However, the
failure to designate the offense by statute,21 or to mention the specific provision penalizing the
act,22 or an erroneous specification of the law violated23 does not vitiate the information if the facts
alleged clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged.24 What controls is not the title of the
information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the information. 25 In other
words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense,
that determines the crime being charged in the information.26

The facts stated in the amended information against petitioner correctly made out a charge for
violation of Section 5(b), Article III, RA 7610. Thus, even if the trial and appellate courts followed the
wrong designation of the offense, petitioner could be convicted of the offense on the basis of the
facts recited in the information and duly proven during trial.

Petitioner violated Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, as amended

The first element of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertains to the act or acts committed by the
accused. The second element refers to the state or condition of the offended party. The third element
corresponds to the minority or age of the offended party.

The first element was present in this case. Petitioner committed lascivious conduct against and had
sexual intercourse with AAA in the following instances: (1) on November 19, 1997, when he kissed
her at the back and neck, touched her breasts and placed his hand inside her blouse to gratify his
lust; (2) on November 26, 1997, when, with lewd designs, he dragged her towards the bed of the
motel room and forcibly kissed her on the lips, neck and breasts and (3) when he exerted moral
influence on her and pressured her until she surrendered herself to him on November 26, 1997. His
acts were covered by the definitions of sexual abuse and lascivious conduct under Section 2(g) and
(h) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases
promulgated to implement the provisions of RA 7610, particularly on child abuse:

(g) "Sexual abuse" includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement,

enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage
in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with
children;

(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching, either directly or through
clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of
any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or
opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the
sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
public area of a person. (emphasis supplied)

The second element was likewise present here. The following pronouncement in People v. Larin27 is
significant:

A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child
indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other
consideration; or (b) under thecoercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group. (emphasis
supplied)

On November 19, 1997, due to the influence of petitioner, AAA indulged in lascivious acts with or
allowed him to commit lascivious acts on her. This was repeated on November 26, 1997 on which
date AAA also indulged in sexual intercourse with petitioner as a result of the latters influence and
moral ascendancy. Thus, she was deemed to be a "child subjected to other sexual abuse" as the
concept is defined in the opening paragraph of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 and in Larin.

The third element of the offense was also satisfied. Section 3 (a), Article I of RA 7610 provides:

SECTION 3. Definition of Terms.

(a) "Children" refers [to] persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable
to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition; (emphasis supplied)

On November 19, 2007 and November 26, 2007, AAA was a child as she was below 18 years of
age. She was therefore within the protective mantle of the law.

Since all three elements of the crime were present, the conviction of petitioner was proper.

Violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 and Rape are Separate and Distinct Crimes

Petitioner was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, not rape.
The offense for which he was convicted is punished by a special law while rape is a felony under the
Revised Penal Code.28 They have different elements.29 The two are separate and distinct crimes.
Thus, petitioner can be held liable for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 despite a finding
that he did not commit rape.
Consent of the Child is Immaterial in Criminal Cases Involving Violation of Section 5, Article
III of RA 7610

Petitioner claims that AAA welcomed his kisses and touches and consented to have sexual
intercourse with him. They engaged in these acts out of mutual love and affection. But may the
"sweetheart theory" be invoked in cases of child prostitution and other sexual abuse prosecuted
under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610? No.

The sweetheart theory applies in acts of lasciviousness and rape, felonies committed against or
without the consent of the victim. It operates on the theory that the sexual act was consensual. It
requires proof that the accused and the victim were lovers and that she consented to the sexual
relations.30

For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the
sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with another person.

The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish

[t]hose who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.

Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA
7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is
exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum
prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed.

A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws.31 This is on the rationale that she can
easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or
import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of
harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves
fully.32 Those of tender years deserve its protection.33

The harm which results from a childs bad decision in a sexual encounter may be infinitely more
damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful
consequences34 of her attempts at adult sexual behavior.35 For this reason, a child should not be
deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act of
ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her special protection against abuse,
exploitation and discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual predators like petitioner will be justified, or even
unwittingly tempted by the law, to view her as fair game and vulnerable prey.) In other words, a child
is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual
intercourse.361wphi1

This must be so if we are to be true to the constitutionally enshrined State policy to promote the
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being of the youth. 37 This is consistent with the
declared policy of the State

[T]o provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development; provide sanctions for their commissionand carry out a program for prevention and
deterrence of and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation, and
discrimination.38 (emphasis supplied)

as well as to

intervene on behalf of the child when the parents, guardian, teacher or person having care or
custody of the child fails or is unable to protect the child against abuse, exploitation, and
discrimination or when such acts against the child are committed by the said parent,
guardian, teacher or person having care and custody of the same.39(emphasis supplied)

This is also in harmony with the foremost consideration of the childs best interests in all actions
concerning him or her.

The best interest of children shall be the paramount consideration in all actions concerning
them, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities, and legislative bodies, consistent with the principles of First Call for
Children as enunciated in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Every effort
shall be exerted to promote the welfare of children and enhance their opportunities for a
useful and happy life.40 (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner May Enjoy the Benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law

The penalty prescribed for violation of the provisions of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 is reclusion
temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. In the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum period, the
medium of the penalty prescribed by the law.41Notwithstanding that RA 7610 is a special law,
petitioner may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. 42 Since the penalty provided in
RA 7610 is taken from the range of penalties in the Revised Penal Code, it is covered by the first
clause of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.43 Thus, he is entitled to a maximum term
which should be within the range of the proper imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period (ranging from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years) and a minimum term to be
taken within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the law: prision mayor in its
medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period (ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 14
years and 8 months).

The Award of Damages Should Be Modified

The trial court awarded AAA 75,000 as civil indemnity, 50,000 as moral and exemplary damages.
The CA deleted the award for civil indemnity. It correctly reasoned that the award was proper only in
a conviction for rape committed under the circumstances under which the death penalty is
authorized by law. Consistent, however, with the objective of RA 7610 to afford children special
protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination and with the principle that every person
who contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for
the same,44 civil indemnity to the child is proper in a case involving violation of Section 5(b), Article III
of RA 7610. Every person criminally liable is civilly liable. 45 The rule is that, in crimes and quasi-
delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of.46Thus, 50,000 civil indemnity ex delicto shall
be awarded in cases of violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610. 47

Moreover, the CA erred in affirming the grant of 50,000 as "moral and exemplary damages." The
rule is that, in every case, trial courts must specify the award of each item of damages and make a
finding thereon in the body of the decision.48 Thus, moral damages and exemplary damages should
be separate items of award.

AAA testified that she was "emotionally devastated" and "lost touch of her inner self" as a result of
what petitioner did to her. Because of the mental anxiety and wounded feelings caused by petitioner
to her, she had several sessions with the dean for student affairs 49 and the guidance counselor of
Assumption College as well as with a psychiatrist. This was corroborated by her mother and the
dean of student affairs of Assumption College. Thus, she is entitled to moral damages of 50,000.
However, in the absence of an aggravating circumstance, the grant of exemplary damages is
unwarranted.50

Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. Petitioner Michael John Z. Malto is hereby found guilty
of violating Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, as amended, for which he is sentenced to 14 years
and 8 months of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. He
is further ordered to pay AAA 50,000 as civil indemnity and 50,000 for moral damages.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE G.R. No. 186469
PHILIPPINES, Present:
Plaintiff-appellee,
PERALTA, J., Acting Chairperson,*
-versus- ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,**
MENDOZA, and
JOVER MATIAS y DELA PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
FUENTE,
Accused-appellant.
Promulgated:

June 13, 2012

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This resolves the appeal from the August 19, 2008 Decision [1]of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02781 filed by appellant Jover
Matias y Dela Fuente which affirmed his conviction for the crime of rape under
Sec. 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act (RA) No. 7610.[2]

The Factual Antecedents

Appellant Jover Matias y Dela Fuente and private complainant AAA[3]were

neighbors at Sto. Nio St., Barangay San Antonio, Quezon City. In the evening of
June 6, 2004, AAA, a minor, having been born on April 23, 1991, was on her way
to the vegetable stall (gulayan) of a certain Manuela to buy something when, all of
a sudden, appellant pulled her towards a house that was under construction. There,
he forced her to lie on a bamboo bed (papag), removed her shorts and underwear,
and inserted first, his finger, and then his penis into her vagina. Appellant
threatened to kill her if she should report the incident to anyone.

When AAA arrived home, she narrated to her mother and aunt what appellant did
to her. Together, they proceeded to the barangay to report the incident and,
thereafter, to the Baler District Police Station to file a complaint. A physical
examination was conducted by Police Chief Inspector Pierre Paul Figeroa Carpio
upon AAA, who was found to have [d]eep-healed lacerations at 3 and 7 oclock
positions and was in a non-virgin state physically at the time of
examination. Subsequently, appellant was charged with rape under Article 266-A
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in an Amended Information [4]dated July 16,
2004.

In defense, appellant claimed that in the evening of the incident, he and his uncle,
Romeo Matias, were doing construction work at the house of his aunt, also located
at Sto. Nino St., Barangay San Antonio, Quezon City. He was therefore surprised
when two policemen arrested him at around 6:30 in the evening of even date and
detained him at the Baler Police Station.

The RTC Ruling

In its April 19, 2007 Decision, [5]the RTC convicted appellant for rape under Sec. 5
(b), Article III of RA 7610 and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
RTC likewise directed him to pay AAA the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity
and P30,000 as moral damages.

In convicting appellant, the RTC gave full credence to AAA's testimony, which
was straightforward and positive. On the other hand, it found appellants defenses
of denial and alibi as weak, taking into consideration that his aunt's house where he
was allegedly doing construction work was just a few meters away from the
vegetable stall, clearly making it possible for him to be at the locus criminis at the
time of the incident.

The CA Ruling

In its assailed Decision,[6]the CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto, finding no

compelling reason to depart from its findings and conclusions. The appellate court
held that if the RTC found AAA's testimony to be credible, logical and consistent,
then it should be given great respect, as the RTC had the ability to observe
firsthand the demeanor and deportment of the witnesses on stand.

Moreover, for appellant's alibi to prosper, he should be able to show that he was a
great distance away from the place of the incident and that it was impossible for
him to be there or within its immediate vicinity at the time of the commission of
the crime. The CA ruled that it is highly unlikely for a young girl to fabricate a
story that would destroy her reputation and her familys life and endure the
discomforts of trial.

Issue Before The Court

The sole issue to be resolved in this appeal is whether the CA committed reversible
error in affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC, which convicted appellant of
rape under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610.

The Court's Ruling

Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 provides:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children,

whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate
or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed
to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:

(a) x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse;
xxx [7]

In the case of People v. Pangilinan,[8]which affirmed the doctrines enunciated in

the cases of People v. Dahilig[9]and People v. Abay,[10]the Court explained:

Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the

victim of sexual abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should not
be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape under Article 266-
A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and penalized with reclusion
perpetua. On the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the
offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b)
of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the
Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused of both
crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be
prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a
single criminal act. Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a violation
of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code
(on complex crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as
rape) cannot be complexed with an offense penalized by a special law.
In this case, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, convicted appellant for rape under
Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, upon a
finding that AAA was a minor below 12 years old at the time of the commission of
the offense on June 6, 2004. However, a punctilious scrutiny of the records shows
that AAA was born on April 23, 1991, which would make her 13 years old at the
time of the commission of the offense on June 6, 2004. Thus, appellant can be
prosecuted and convicted either under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 for sexual
abuse, or under Article 266-A of the RPC, except for rape under paragraph 1(d).
[11]
It bears pointing out that the penalties under these two laws differ: the penalty
for sexual abuse under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 is reclusion
temporal medium to reclusion perpetua, while rape under Article 266-A of the
RPC is penalized with reclusion perpetua.

On this score, it is worth noting that in its April 19, 2007 Decision, [12]the RTC
concluded that AAA was the victim of sexual abuse labeled 'rape', [13]considering
the established fact that there was sexual intercourse between him and AAA. Thus,
appellant's conviction was clearly under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610
or sexual abuse and not for rape under Article 266-A of the RPC.

In the light of all the foregoing, there is a need to modify the penalty imposed upon
appellant. Following the pronouncement in the case of Malto v. People[14]for sexual
abuse, and in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the
Court finds it appropriate to impose the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period, which has the range of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,[15]therefore, the maximum term of the

indeterminate penalty shall be that which could be properly imposed under the law,
which is 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal, while the
minimum term shall be within the range next lower in degree, which is prision
mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, or a
period ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. Similarly, the
award of moral damages is increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, pursuant to
the Malto case.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The August 19, 2008 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02781 finding appellant Jover
Matias y Dela Fuente guilty beyond reasonable doubt of sexual abuse under
Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as to penalty and the amount of
damages awarded. Appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of 12 years
of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as maximum, and ordered to pay the private complainant the amount
of P50,000.00 as moral damages. The rest of the assailed Decision stands.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 THIRD DIVISION

SALVADOR FLORDELIZ y ABENOJAR, G.R. No. 186441

Petitioner,
Present:

CORONA, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
DEL CASTILLO,* and
MENDOZA, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent.
March 3, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

For review are the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision [1] and Resolution[2] dated
July 29, 2008 and February 16, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CR No. 30949. The
assailed decision affirmed the Regional Trial Courts[3] (RTCs) Joint
Judgment[4] dated March 9, 2007, convicting petitioner Salvador
Flordeliz y Abenojar of nine (9) counts of Rape and one (1) count of Acts of
Lasciviousness, with a modification of the award of damages, while the assailed
resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The case stemmed from the following facts:

Sometime in March 1995, ABC, the wife of petitioner and the mother of
private complainants AAA and BBB, left for Malaysia as an overseas worker. AAA
and BBB were left under the care and custody of petitioner. They resided in a small
house in Quezon Hill, Baguio City.[5]
 In April 1995, while sleeping with BBB and AAA, who was then eleven (11)
years old, petitioner woke up AAA, touched her vagina, then played with it. AAA
cried and told petitioner that it was painful. The latter stopped, but warned AAA
not to tell anyone about it; otherwise, she would be harmed. [6] Petitioner allegedly
committed the same acts against AAA repeatedly.

Petitioner and his daughters later transferred residence and lived with the
formers siblings. Not long after, petitioner was convicted of homicide and
imprisoned in Muntinlupa City. Consequently, AAA and BBB lived with their
grandparents in La Trinidad, Benguet.[7] While petitioner was incarcerated, AAA
and BBB visited him and sent him two greeting cards containing the following
texts, among others: happy valentine; ur the best dad in the world; I love you papa,
love BBB, Love BJ; till we meet again; portrait of Jesus Christ with a heart, this is
for you dad; flordeliz, AAA P., love AAA and Iyos.[8]

In 2001, petitioner was released on parole. He would frequently fetch AAA

and BBB from their grandparents house during weekends and holidays and they
would stay with him in Gabriela Silang, Baguio City.[9]

Unsatisfied with the abuses committed against AAA, petitioner allegedly

started molesting BBB in May 2002.[10] In 2003, BBB spent New Years Day with
her father. On January 3, 2003, while they were sleeping, petitioner inserted his
two (2) fingers into BBBs vagina.[11] BBB did not attempt to stop petitioner
because of fear. Thereafter, they slept beside each other.[12] BBB suffered the same
ordeal the following night.[13]

On February 8, 2003, BBB visited petitioner. Again, petitioner held her

vagina, played with it and inserted his fingers, which caused her pain.[14]

The same incident allegedly took place on August 3, 2003.[15] On October

26, 2003, a day before AAAs birthday, while BBB was with petitioner, the latter
committed the same dastardly act. This time, it was for a longer period.[16]
 During All Saints Day of 2003, BBB spent two nights with her father and,
during those nights (November 1 and 2), she experienced the same sexual abuse.
[17]
The same thing happened on December 28, 2003.[18]

Notwithstanding the repeated incidents of sexual abuse committed against

her, BBB did not reveal her ordeal to anybody because of fear for her life and that
of her mother.[19]

AAA and BBB had the chance to reveal their horrifying experiences when
their mother ABC arrived for a vacation. AAA immediately told ABC what
petitioner did to her.When confronted by ABC, BBB likewise admitted the
repeated abuses committed by petitioner. ABC forthwith reported the incidents to
the National Bureau of Investigation.[20]

After conducting medical examinations on AAA and BBB, the attending

physician remarked that there was a disclosure of sexual abuse and she noted the
presence of hymenal notch in posterior portion of hymenal rim that may be due to
previous blunt force or penetrating trauma suggestive of abuse.[21]

With these findings, petitioner was charged with the crimes of Acts of
Lasciviousness,[22] committed against AAA, and nine (9) counts of Qualified Rape
through Sexual Assault,[23] committed against BBB, before the RTC. The crime of
acts of lasciviousness was allegedly committed as follows:

That sometime in the month of April 1995 up to 1996 in the City

of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design and deliberate intent
to cause malice and satisfy his lascivious desire, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously touched and play the private part of
the offended party AAA, a minor 14 years of age against her will and
consent which act debeased (sic), demeaned and degraded the intrinsic
worth and dignity of the minor as a human being.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[24]
On the other hand, except for the dates of the commission of the crime, each
Information for Rape reads:
 That on or about the 8th day of February 2003, in the City of
Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation and taking
advantage of his moral ascendancy over the private offended party he
being the biological father of said offended party, did then and there
remove the pants and underwear of said offended party and thereupon
fondles her private part and forcibly inserted his finger into the vagina of
the offended party BBB, a minor, 11 years of age against her will and
consent, which acts constitute Rape as defined under Republic Act 8353
and which acts demeaned, debased and degraded the intrinsic worth and
dignity of the minor as a human being.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[25]

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded Not guilty to all the charges. During
trial, he interposed the defense of denial and insisted that the charges against him
were fabricated by his wife to cover up the infidelity she committed while working
abroad.[26] Petitioner also relied on the testimonies of Florabel Flordeliz, Levy
Hope Flordeliz and Roderick Flordeliz, whose testimonies consisted mainly of the
alleged infidelity of ABC; and petitioner, being a good father, was often visited by
his daughters at his residence, where the rooms they occupied were only separated
by see-through curtains.[27]

On March 9, 2007, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment[28] finding petitioner

guilty as charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises all duly considered[,] the court finds

that the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt and hereby imposes upon him the following penalties:

1. In Criminal Case No. 23145-R for Acts of Lasciviousness, the

Indeterminate Penalty of 6 months of Arresto Mayor as the minimum
penalty to 6 years of Prision Correccional as the maximum penalty and
to indemnify the victim AAA the amount of P20,000.00 as moral
damages and to pay the costs.

The penalty shall also carry the accessory penalty of perpetual

special disqualification from the right of suffrage (Art. 43, Revised Penal
Code)[.]
 2. In Criminal Cases Nos. 23072-R to 23080-R, the Indeterminate
Penalty of twelve (12) years of Prision Mayor as the minimum penalty to
twenty (20) years of Reclusion Temporal as the maximum penalty for
each case or nine (9) counts of sexual assault considering the
aggravating/qualifying circumstance of relationship against the accused
and to indemnify BBB the amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages and
to pay the costs.

The penalties shall carry with them the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction for life and perpetual absolute disqualification (Art. 41,
Revised Penal Code).

The accused shall be credited with 4/5 of his preventive imprisonment in

the service of his sentences.

In the service of his sentences, the same shall be served successively

subject to the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code or the
Three-Fold Rule.

SO ORDERED.[29]

On appeal, the CA affirmed petitioners conviction with a modification of the

amount of his civil liabilities.

Petitioner now comes before us, raising the following errors:

ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS

The Honorable Court A Quo gravely erred in affirming the

judgment of conviction of the Honorable Regional Trial Court for the
crime charged despite the fact that the guilt of the petitioner has not
been proven beyond reasonable doubt with moral certainty.

RAPES THROUGH SEXUAL ASSAULT

1. The Honorable Court A Quo gravely erred in affirming the

judgments of conviction of the Honorable Regional Trial Court in
 Criminal Cases Nos. 23075-R (alleged rape through sexual assault
sometime in May, 2002) and 23078-R (alleged rape through sexual
assault on August 3, 2003) respectively, despite the complete absence of
evidence to show how the alleged incidents of rape through sexual
assault were committed by petitioner on said particular dates.

2. The Honorable Court A Quo gravely erred in affirming the

judgments of conviction of the Honorable Regional Trial Court in the
other alleged counts of rape through sexual assault despite the fact that
the guilt of the petitioner has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt with moral certainty.[30]

Simply put, petitioner assails the factual and legal bases of his conviction,
allegedly because of lack of the essential details or circumstances of the
commission of the crimes. Petitioner, in effect, questions the credibility of the
witnesses for the prosecution and insists that the charges against him were
designed to conceal ABCs infidelity.

We have repeatedly held that when the offended parties are young and
immature girls, as in this case, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version
of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability, but also the
shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the matter about
which they testified were not true.[31]

It is not uncommon in incestuous rape for the accused to claim that the case
is a mere fabrication, and that the victim was moved by familial discord and
influence, hostility, or revenge. There is nothing novel about such defense, and this
Court had the occasion to address it in the past. In People v. Ortoa,[32] we held that:

Verily, no child would knowingly expose herself and the rest of her
family to the humiliation and strain that a public trial surely entails
unless she is so moved by her desire to see to it that the person who
forcibly robbed her of her cherished innocence is penalized for his
dastardly act. The imputation of ill motives to the victim of an
incestuous rape [or lascivious conduct] becomes even more
unconvincing as the victim and the accused are not strangers to each
other. By electing to proceed with the filing of the complaint, the victim
risks not only losing a parent, one whom, before his moral descent, she
 previously adored and looked up to, but also the likelihood of losing the
affection of her relatives who may not believe her claim. Indeed, it is not
uncommon for families to be torn apart by an accusation of incestuous
rape. Given the serious nature of the crime and its adverse consequences
not only to her, it is highly improbable for a daughter to manufacture a
rape charge for the sole purpose of getting even with her father. Thus, the
alleged ill motives have never swayed the Court against giving credence
to the testimonies of victims who remained firm and steadfast in their
account of how they were ravished by their sex offenders. [33]
Neither can we sustain petitioners claim that the charges against him were
products of ABCs fabrication to cover up the infidelity she committed while
working abroad. No matter how enraged a mother may be, it would take nothing
less than psychological depravity for her to concoct a story too damaging to the
welfare and well-being of her own daughter. Courts are seldom, if at all, convinced
that a mother would stoop so low as to expose her own daughter to physical,
mental and emotional hardship concomitant to a rape prosecution.[34]

We now proceed to discuss the specific crimes with which petitioner was
charged.

Criminal Case Nos. 23072-R, 23073-R, 23074-R, 23076-R, 23077-R, 23079-R, and
23080-R for Rape Through Sexual Assault

The RTC, affirmed by the CA, correctly convicted petitioner of Rape in Criminal
Case Nos. 23072-R, 23073-R, 23074-R, 23076-R, 23077-R, 23079-R, and 23080-
R.

In her direct testimony, BBB clearly narrated that, on seven (7) separate occasions,
petitioner woke her up, held her vagina, played with it, and inserted his
fingers. During trial, the prosecutor presented a small doll where BBB
demonstrated how petitioner inserted his forefinger and middle finger, making an
up and down motion between the dolls legs.[35]
 The insertion of petitioners fingers into the victims vagina constituted the
crime of Rape through sexual assault [36] under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353, or
The Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which in part provides:

Art. 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is

committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under

any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave
abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12)
years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances

mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual
assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of
another person.[37]

Aside from proving the fact that Rape was committed, the prosecution also
established that petitioner is the biological father of BBB and that the latter was
less than twelve (12) years old at the time of the commission of the crimes. Under
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), rape by sexual assault, if attended
by any of the aggravating circumstances under paragraph 1[38] of Article 266-B,
would carry the penalty of reclusion temporal, ranging from twelve (12) years and
one (1) day to twenty (20) years.
 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the
indeterminate penalty shall be that which could be properly imposed under the
RPC. Other than the aggravating/qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship (which are already taken into account to raise the penalty from prision
mayor to reclusion temporal),[39] no other aggravating circumstance was alleged
and proven. Hence, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period, or fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months.
On the other hand, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should
be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by the
Code which is prision mayor or six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.

For each count of sexual assault, petitioner should be meted the

indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the victim of Rape through sexual assault is
entitled to recover civil indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00 for each
count. This is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of Rape. [40] Moreover, the
award of moral damages is automatically granted without need of further proof, it
being assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral damages entitling her
to such award. She is, thus, entitled to recover moral damages of P30,000.00 for
each count.[41] In addition, the presence of the aggravating circumstances of
minority and relationship entitles her to an award of exemplary damages. The
amount of P30,000.00 for each count is appropriate under the circumstances.

Criminal Case Nos. 23075-R and 23078-R

In Criminal Case No. 23075-R, it was alleged that petitioner sexually abused BBB
on August 3, 2003. Indeed, the RTC and the CA stated in their narration of facts
that on that particular date, while BBB was visiting her father, the incident
happened. A perusal of the transcript of the prosecution witnesses testimonies,
however, reveals that no such incident took place. No details were related by BBB
herself as to the circumstances surrounding the alleged incident.
In Criminal Case No. 23078-R, it was also stated in the Information that, from May
2002 to December 2003, petitioner committed the crime of Rape through sexual
assault against BBB. The Court notes, however, that the RTC decision is silent as
to the sexual abuse allegedly committed in May 2002. The RTCs narration of facts
started only with the incident that occurred in January 2003. While the CA stated
that, in May 2002, petitioner started sexually abusing BBB, the statement was
merely a conclusion unsupported by proof of how the crime was committed.
Assuming that acts of Rape were indeed committed in 2003 (which is within the
period from May 2002 to December 2003 as stated in the Information), those
instances could very well be the same incidents covered by the other Informations
discussed earlier.

Absent specific details of how and when the sexual abuses were committed,
petitioner should be acquitted in Criminal Case Nos. 23075-R and 23078-R.

Criminal Case No. 23145-R for Acts of Lasciviousness

In Criminal Case No. 23145-R, petitioner was charged with and convicted of Acts
of Lasciviousness and sentenced to suffer the penalty prescribed by Article 336 of
the RPC.While we sustain petitioners conviction of acts of lasciviousness, we
modify the assailed Decision in order to give the proper designation to the crime
committed and the law violated, and eventually to impose the proper penalty.
It is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the sexual abuse, AAA was
eleven (11) years old.[42] This calls for the application of R.A. No. 7610 or The
Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act, which defines sexual abuse of children and prescribes the
penalty therefor in its Article III, Section 5, to wit:

SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether

male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due
to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge
in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period

to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:

xxxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious

conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age,
 the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for
rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided,
That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium
period.[43]
Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only
with a child exploited in prostitution, but also with a child subjected to other sexual
abuses. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit, but also
where one -- through coercion, intimidation or influence -- engages in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child.[44]
However, pursuant to the foregoing provision, before an accused can be
convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct committed against a minor
below 12 years of age, the requisites for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of
the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5
of R.A. No. 7610.[45]

The crime of Acts of Lasciviousness, as defined in Article 336 of the RPC, has the
following elements:

(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;

(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:

a. By using force or intimidation; or

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and

(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex. [46]

In addition, the following elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article

III of R.A. No. 7610 must be proven:
(1) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct;
(2) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution
or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
(3) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. [47]
Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No.
7610 defines lascivious conduct as follows:

[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of

the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth of any
person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
pubic area of a person.[48]

Based on the foregoing definition, petitioners act of touching AAAs vagina and
playing with it obviously amounted to lascivious conduct. Considering that the act
was committed on a child less than twelve years old and through intimidation, it is
beyond cavil that petitioner is guilty under the aforesaid laws.
We are aware that the Information specifically charged petitioner with Acts
of Lasciviousness under the RPC, without stating therein that it was in relation to
R.A. No. 7610. However, the failure to designate the offense by statute or to
mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of
the law violated, does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged therein clearly
recite the facts constituting the crime charged. The character of the crime is not
determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor by the specification
of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by the recital of the
ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information.[49]

In the instant case, the body of the Information contains an averment of the acts
alleged to have been committed by petitioner and unmistakably describes acts
punishable under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.

It is also undisputed that petitioner is the father of AAA. The RTC did not
appreciate the alternative circumstance of relationship, because it was not alleged
in the Information.We do not agree.
The resolution[50] of the investigating prosecutor, which formed the basis of the
Information, a copy of which is attached thereto, stated that petitioner is the
victims biological father. There was, therefore, substantial compliance with the
mandate that an accused be informed of the nature of the charge against him.[51]
In crimes against chastity, like acts of lasciviousness, relationship is considered
aggravating.[52] Considering that AAA was less than twelve (12) years old at the
time the crime was committed, petitioner should be meted the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium period, or fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, petitioner should be meted the indeterminate penalty of thirteen (13)
years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal as minimum, to
sixteen (16) years, five (5) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal as
maximum.

With respect to the lascivious conduct amounting to child abuse under

Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 committed by petitioner, we impose a fine
of P15,000.00.[53]
Civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P20,000.00 shall be awarded.
[54]
Additionally, upon a finding of guilt of the accused for acts of lasciviousness,
the amount of P15,000.00 as moral damages may be awarded to the victim in the
same way that moral damages are awarded to victims of rape even without need of
proof because it is assumed that they suffered moral injury.[55] In view of the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of relationship, the amount
of P15,000.00 as exemplary damages should likewise be awarded.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals July 29,

2008 Decision and February 16, 2009 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 30949
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The Court finds petitioner Salvador
Flordeliz y Abenojar:

1. GUILTY of seven (7) counts of RAPE Through Sexual Assault

in Criminal Case Nos. 23072-R, 23073-R, 23074-R, 23076-R, 23077-R, 23079-R,
and 23080-R. He is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each count. Petitioner is ordered to
indemnify BBB P30,000.00 as civil indemnity; P30,000.00 as moral damages;
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count;
 2. GUILTY of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS in Criminal Case No.
23145-R. He is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of thirteen (13) years,
nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to
sixteen (16) years, five (5) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. He is likewise ordered to pay a fine of P15,000.00 and to indemnify
AAA P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P15,000.00 as moral damages,
and P15,000.00 as exemplary damages;

3. NOT GUILTY in Criminal Case Nos. 23075-R and 23078-R.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 187083

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
- versus - PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

EDUARDO DAHILIG y AGARAN, Promulgated:

Accused-Appellant. June 13, 2011
X--------------------------------------------------X

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the October 29, 2008 Decision [1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01488, which modified the July 19, 2005
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 159, Pasig City (RTC), in Criminal
Case No. 121472-H, by finding the accused guilty of child abuse, defined and
penalized in Sec. 5(b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, instead of the crime of
rape.
The Information, dated August 6, 2001, indicting the accused for rape reads:

Criminal Case No. 121472-H

The undersigned 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses EDUARDO
DAHILIG Y AGARAN, of the crime of Rape (Violation of Article 266-A
par. 1 in relation to Article 266-B, 1st par. of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by RA 8353 and in further relation to Section 5(a) of RA 8369),
committed as follows:
 That on or about the 17th day of December 2000, in the
municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused, by means of force and intimidation, and
taking advantage of night time and in the dwelling of
complainant, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with one AAA,[3] sixteen
(16) year old minor at the time of the commission of the
offense, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
[Underscoring supplied]

During the trial, the prosecution presented AAA, the private complainant;
and Police Senior Inspector Bonnie Y. Chua, the medico-legal officer, as its
witnesses. The defense, on the other hand, presented the accused himself, Eduardo
Dahilig (accused), as its sole witness.

Accused and AAA were both employed as house helpers by a certain Karen
Gomez. AAA was only sixteen (16) years old at the time of the commission of the
act, having been born on August 17, 1984. Their respective versions of the
incident, as expected, were diametrically opposed.

Version of the Prosecution

On December 17, 2000, at around 4:00 oclock in the morning, AAA was lying in
bed with her fellow helper, Roxanne. As it was hot and humid that morning, AAA
moved to the floor. While on the floor, she felt someone touching her. At that
instant, she found out it was the accused. She tried to resist his advances, but he
succeeded in pinning her down with his weight and he told her not to move. She
shouted for help from Roxanne but to no avail because the latter was sound asleep.
Eventually, the accused was able to remove her shirt, shorts and undergarments and
afterwards was able to get on top of her. Then, he forced his penis into her vagina
which caused her pain. After he was done with her, he returned to his quarters on
the third floor.
 The following day, AAA angrily confronted the accused and asked him why
he did such an act against her. He reacted by getting all his belongings and
immediately left their employers house. AAA then informed her employer what the
accused did to her. Their employer immediately assisted her in filing a case against
him. This caused the arrest of the accused and, at this point, he offered to marry
her. His offer, however, was rejected because AAA was determined to seek justice
for the ordeal she suffered in his hands.

A few days after the incident, AAA was medically examined. The medico-
legal examination disclosed that there was a healing laceration in her hymen
although no spermatozoa was found. It was also stated in the medico-legal report
that AAA could have lost her virginity on or about December 17, 2000.

Version of the Accused

Accused denied having raped AAA. According to him, the sexual congress that
transpired between them was consensual as she was then his girlfriend. He related
that he came to know AAA sometime in July 2000 and after a month of courtship,
they became sweethearts. In fact, on November 10, 2000, at around 9:00 oclock in
the evening, she went up to the floor where he was sleeping and had sex with him.
Afterwards, she returned to her room which was located on the second floor. It was
also in the same month that his former girlfriend, Roxanne, arrived and demanded
that he choose between her and AAA.

On the day of the incident, he was very tired and decided to lie down on the
floor where AAA and Roxanne were sleeping. AAA noticed him and moved beside
him. At around 4:00 oclock in the morning, they made love. He noticed during that
time Roxanne was awake because her eyes were open. When their employer
arrived at around 5:00 oclock in the morning, she asked him to go upstairs to his
room.

At around 8:00 oclock of that same morning, the accused was fetched by her
sister to attend a birthday party. When he returned at around 5:00 oclock in the
afternoon, AAA and Roxanne were quarrelling about their love making. The latter
threatened to report the incident to their employer. He tried to ease the tension
between the two but both refused to be pacified. In fact, Roxanne threatened to
stab both of them. This prompted him to flee by taking his personal belongings and
leaving their employers premises. AAA wanted to join him but he told her that he
would just return for her.

Accused went to Bulacan and stayed there for two (2) months. He then
proceeded to Ilocos where he requested his grandfather and mother to fetch AAA
because he wanted to marry her. She, however, refused to go with the two insisting
that he personally fetch her.

Three weeks later, the accused returned to Manila together with his mother
and grandfather to fetch AAA but again they failed. Instead, their employer sought
the help of the police who invited him to the station to discuss the intended
marriage. He was given two weeks to settle this matter. AAA said that she needed
to call her parents first. In the meantime, he was allowed to go home to Ilocos.
Subsequently, he received a call from their employer, telling him that her parents
had already arrived in Manila. He could not, however, go to Manila because he had
no money for transportation.
 Sometime thereafter, he received a subpoena from the Office of the
Prosecutor informing him that he had been charged with the crime of rape against
AAA. For lack of funds, he was also not able to attend the hearings at the
prosecutors office either. Finally, after several months, he was arrested by virtue of
a warrant of arrest issued against him.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In convicting the accused, the RTC reasoned out that, in its observation,
AAA never wavered in her assertion that the accused sexually molested her against
her will. According to the trial court, her narration bore the earmarks of truth and
was consistent throughout. As to his sweetheart defense, the accused failed to
prove it by clear and convincing evidence. What he laid before the court for its
consideration was a mere self-serving claim of their relationship. It fell short of the
rule that a sweetheart defense cannot be given credence in the absence of
corroborative proof like love notes, mementos, and pictures, to name a few.
Bolstering AAAs story was the medico-legal finding that there was a deep-healing
laceration which was consistent with the charge that she had been raped. Thus, the
dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the

accused EDUARDO DAHILIG Y AGARAN GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of Rape (Violation of Article 266-A par. 1 in rel. to
Article 266-B, 1st par. of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 8353
and in further relation to Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 8369) and the accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua.
Accused EDUARDO DAHILIG Y AGARAN is hereby adjudged to
pay AAA the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), as
moral damages and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), as civil
indemnity.
SO ORDERED.[5] [Underscoring supplied]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of fact of the RTC but clarified that the
crime charged should have been Child Abuse as defined and penalized in Sec. 5 (b)
of R.A. No. 7610, otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children Against
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act. Its conclusion was based on the
fact that the complainant was a minor, being 16 years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense and, as such, was a child subject of sexual abuse. R.A.
No. 7610 defines children as persons below eighteen years of age or those unable
to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation, or discrimination because of her age. Considering that AAA was 16
years old at the time of the commission of the crime, having been born on August
17, 1984 and the accused had admitted having sexual intercourse with her, all the
elements of child abuse were present. Thus, the decretal portion of the CA decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, the DECISION DATED JULY 19,

2005 is MODIFIED, finding EDUARDO DAHILIG Y AGARAN guilty
of child abuse as defined and penalized by Sec. 5, (b), Republic Act No.
7610, and, accordingly, sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of 11 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay to AAA P50,000.00 as
moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
The total period of the preventive detention of the accused shall be
credited to him provided he has satisfied the conditions imposed in Art.
29, Revised Penal Code, as amended.
SO ORDERED. [6] [Underscoring supplied]

In this forum, both the prosecution and the accused opted not to file any
supplemental briefs and manifested that they were adopting their arguments in
their respective briefs filed before the CA. In his Appellants Brief, the accused
presented the following:
 ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO

THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTIONS
WITNESSES.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT OF RAPE WHEN THE LATTERS GUILT WAS NOT
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[7]

In advocacy of his position, the accused argues that the testimony of AAA
was beclouded with inconsistencies and implausibility. He goes on to say that it
was highly improbable for their co-worker, Roxanne, not to have been awakened
despite AAAs shouts. He further argues that if the sex was not consensual, he
would not have bothered removing her clothes considering that during the alleged
time of commission, as recounted by AAA, she was shouting and struggling. With
respect to the medico-legals finding on forcible intercourse, it was not conclusive
because he precisely admitted having consensual sex with her.

The accused insists that he and AAA were sweethearts and the sexual
congress that took place between them on the evening of December 17, 2000 was
but the result of their love for one another. Roxannes threat to stab him with a knife
and to report the love making that transpired the previous night, was actually the
result of jealousy since she was his ex-girlfriend. This forced him to leave his
employers house. He further averred that the filing of the case was but an
afterthought by AAA on her mistaken belief that he had abandoned her.

The Court finds no merit in the appeal.

 Well-settled the rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies is best undertaken by a trial court, whose findings are binding and
conclusive on appellate courts.[8] Matters affecting credibility are best left to the
trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the elusive and
incommunicable evidence of that witness deportment on the stand while testifying,
an opportunity denied to the appellate courts which usually rely on the cold pages
of the silent records of the case.[9]

In this case, the trial court observed that AAA never wavered in her assertion
that she was molested by the accused. It even further wrote that her narrations
palpably bear the earmarks of truth and are in accord with the material points
involved.[10]

There is no dispute that the accused had sexual intercourse with AAA, a fact
which he clearly acknowledged. Contrary to his claim, however, the act was not
consensual as proven by the convincing testimony of AAA who replied as follows:

Q: Lets start from the beginning Miss witness. You said that you went
down to the floor from the bed?
A: Yes, maam.

Q: Was there anybody in the floor when you went down?

A: None.

Q: When you went down and there was no person there in the floor, what
did you do?
A: I continued sleeping on the floor.

Q: Were you awakened by anything while you were sleeping on the floor?
A: Yes maam.

Q: What awakened you?

A: I felt that somebody was lying beside me on the floor.
 Q: What was this person doing, if any?
A: Pinaghihipuan po ako.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: What did you do when you were awakened when you felt that
somebody was touching your breast, your face, and your legs?
A: I struggled.[11]

xxx xxx xxx

Q: When you were undressed, what did the accused do?

A: He kissed me on the face and on my lips.

Q: And while he was doing that, what were you doing?

A: I was resisting him maam.

Q: What happened after that?

A: He inserted his penis in my vagina.

Q: While he was inserting his organ in your vagina, what were you doing?
A: I was pleading to him and begging him not continue.

Q: What was the position of your hands at that time

A: When he was inserting his organ to my vagina, he was holding my both
hands very tightly.[12]

Moreover, the accused argues that AAA should not be believed because her
narration of facts was inconsistent and highly improbable. The points he has raised,
however, have no controlling significance and do not seriously affect the findings
of the courts below.

The fact that Roxanne was not awakened by the cries for help of AAA does not
negate her categorical and consistent assertion that the accused forcibly defiled
her. It is not unnatural that some persons are simply deep sleepers who cannot
easily be awakened even by loud noises.
 The sweetheart defense proffered by the accused likewise deserves scant
consideration. For the said theory to prosper, the existence of the supposed
relationship must be proven by convincing substantial evidence. Failure to adduce
such evidence renders his claim to be self-serving and of no probative value. For
the satisfaction of the Court, there should be a corroboration by their common
friends or, if none, a substantiation by tokens of such a relationship such as love
letters, gifts, pictures and the like.[13]

Clearly, the accused sexually abused AAA.

The question now is what crime has been committed? Is it Rape (Violation
of Article 266-A par. 1 in relation to Article 266-B, 1 st par. of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353), or is it Child Abuse, defined and penalized
by Sec. 5, (b), R.A. No. 7610?

As elucidated by the RTC and the CA in their respective decisions, all the
elements of both crimes are present in this case. The case of People v. Abay,
[14]
however, is enlightening and instructional on this issue. It was stated in that case
that if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either
sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 or rape under Article 266-A
(except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot
be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double
jeopardy will be prejudiced.[15] A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal
liability for a single criminal act.[16] Specifically, Abay reads:

Under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if

the victim of sexual abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should not
be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape under Article 266-
 A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and penalized with reclusion
perpetua. On the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender
should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610
or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal
Code. However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the
same act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A
person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal
act. Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of
RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex
crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be
complexed with an offense penalized by a special law.

In this case, the victim was more than 12 years old when the crime
was committed against her. The Information against appellant stated that
AAA was 13 years old at the time of the incident. Therefore, appellant may
be prosecuted either for violation of Section 5(b) of RA
7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised
Penal Code. While the Information may have alleged the elements of both
crimes, the prosecutions evidence only established that appellant sexually
violated the person of AAA through force and intimidation by threatening
her with a bladed instrument and forcing her to submit to his bestial
designs. Thus, rape was established.

Accordingly, the accused can indeed be charged with either Rape or Child
Abuse and be convicted therefor. Considering, however, that the information
correctly charged the accused with rape in violation of Article 266-A par. 1 in
relation to Article 266-B, 1st par. of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 8353, and that he was convicted therefor, the CA should have merely affirmed
the conviction.

For said reason, the Court sets aside the October 29, 2008 CA decision and
reinstates the July 19, 2005 RTC Decision. In line with prevailing jurisprudence,
however, the accused should also be made to pay the victim exemplary damages in
the amount of 30,000.00.[17]
 WHEREFORE, the October 29, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals
is SET ASIDE and the July 19, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION in that the accused is also ordered to
pay AAA the amount of 30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.
JOJIT GARINGARAO, G.R. No. 192760

Petitioner,

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*

BRION,

PERALTA,** and

PEREZ, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. July 20, 2011

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review 1 assailing the 26 November 2009
Decision2 and 22 June 2010 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 31354. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Branch 56 (trial court),
finding Jojit Garingarao (Garingarao) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
acts of lasciviousness in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 (RA 7610). 4

The Antecedent Facts

The facts of the case, as can be gleaned from the decision of the Court of Appeals, are
as follows:

On 28 October 2003, AAA5 was brought to the Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center by
her father BBB and mother CCC due to fever and abdominal pain. Dr.
George Morante (Dr. Morante), the attending physician, recommended that AAA be
confined at the hospital for further observation. AAA was admitted at the hospital and
confined at a private room where she and her parents stayed for the night.

On 29 October 2003, BBB left the hospital to go to Lingayen, Pangasinan to process

his daughters Medicare papers. He arrived at Lingayen at around 8:00 a.m. and left
the place an hour later. CCC also left the hospital that same morning to attend to their
store at Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, leaving AAA alone in her room.

When BBB returned to the hospital, AAA told him that she wanted to go home.
Dr. Morante advised against it but due to AAAs insistence, he allowed AAA to be
discharged from the hospital with instructions that she should continue her
medications. When AAA and her parents arrived at their house around 11:30 a.m.,
AAA cried and told her parents that Garingaraosexually abused her. They all went
back to the hospital and reported the incident to Dr. Morante. They inquired from the
nurses station and learned that Garingarao was the nurse on duty on that day.
On 20 January 2004, the City Prosecutor filed an Information against Garingarao for
acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610, as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of October 2003, at Virgen Milagrosa University
Hospital, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously touched the breast of AAA, 16 years
of age, touched her genitalia, and inserted his finger into her vagina, to the
damage and prejudice of said AAA who suffered psychological and emotional
disturbance, anxiety, sleeplessness and humiliation.

Contrary to Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to RA 7610. 6

During the trial, AAA testified that on 29 October 2003, between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00
a.m., Garingarao, who was wearing a white uniform, entered her room and asked if
she already took her medicines and if she was still experiencing pains. AAA replied
that her stomach was no longer painful. Garingarao then lifted AAAs bra and touched
her left breast. Embarrassed, AAA asked Garingarao what he was
doing. Garingarao replied that he was just examining her. Garingarao then left the
room and returned 15 to 30 minutes later with a stethoscope. Garingarao told AAA
that he would examine her again. Garingarao lifted AAAs shirt, pressed the
stethoscope to her stomach and touched her two nipples. Garingarao then lifted AAAs
pajama and underwear and pressed the lower part of her abdomen. Garingarao then
slid his finger inside AAAs private part. AAA instinctively crossed her legs and again
asked Garingarao what he was doing. She asked him to stop and informed him she
had her monthly period. Garingarao ignored AAA and continued to insert his finger
inside her private part. Garingarao only stopped when he saw that AAA really had her
monthly period. He went inside the bathroom of the private room, washed his hands,
applied alcohol and left. When BBB arrived at the hospital, AAA insisted on going
home. She only narrated the incident to her parents when they got home and they went
back to the hospital to report the incident to Dr. Morante.

Dr. Morante testified on AAAs confinement to and discharge from the hospital.
The prosecution presented the following documents before the trial court:

(a) AAAs birth certificate to establish that she was 16 years old at the time of
the incident;

(b) AAAs medical records establishing her confinement to and discharge

from Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center;

(c) the schedule of duties of the nurses at the hospital showing

that Garingarao was on duty from 12:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. on 29 October 2003;

(d) a certificate from the Department of Education Division Office showing that
BBB was present at the office from 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. on 29 October 2003;

(e) AAAs Medical Payment Notice;

(f) the incident report filed by AAAs parents with the police; and

(g) a letter from the hospital administrator requiring Garingarao to explain why
no administrative action should be filed against him in view of the incident.

For the defense, Garingarao gave a different version of the

incident. Garingarao alleged that on 29 October 2003, he and his nursing
aide Edmundo Tamayo (Tamayo) went inside AAAs room to administer her medicines
and check her vital signs. BBB then accused them of not administering the medicines
properly and on time. Garingarao told BBB that they should not be told how to
administer the medicines because they knew what they were doing and that they
would be accountable should anything happen to AAA. A heated argument ensued
between BBB and Garingarao. BBB told Garingarao he was an arrogant
nurse. Garingarao replied that if BBB had any complaint, he could report the matter to
the hospital. Garingaraodenied that he inserted his finger into AAAs private part and
that he fondled her breasts. Garingarao alleged that the filing of the case was
motivated by the argument he had with BBB.

Tamayo testified that he was with Garingarao when they went to AAAs room between
7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. of 29 October 2003. He alleged that BBB was present and he
accused Garingarao of not administering the medications properly. Tamayo alleged
that Garingarao and BBB had an argument. Tamayo stated that he would always
accompany Garingaraowhenever the latter would visit the rooms of the patients.

The Decision of the Trial Court

In its Decision7 dated 5 November 2007, the trial court found Garingarao guilty as
charged. The trial court gave credence to the testimony of AAA
over Garingaraos denial. The trial court ruled that Garingarao was positively
identified by AAA as the person who entered her room, touched her breasts and
inserted his finger into her private part. The trial court also found that the prosecution
was able to establish that BBB and CCC were not in the room when Garingarao went
inside.

The trial court found as baseless Garingaraos defense that the case was only motivated
by the argument he had with BBB. The trial court ruled that it was illogical for BBB
to convince his daughter to fabricate a story of sexual abuse just to get even
at Garingarao over a heated argument.

The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the

accused Jojit Garingarao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
 acts of lasciviousness in relation to Republic Act 7610, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 12 years to 1 day of Reclusion
Temporal as minimum to 14 years and 8 months of Reclusion Temporal as
maximum.

The accused is ordered to pay to the minor victim [AAA] P20,000.00 as moral
damages and P10,000.00 as fine.

SO ORDERED.8

Garingarao appealed from the trial courts Decision.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 26 November 2009 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts
decision with modifications.

The Court of Appeals ruled that while Garingarao was charged for acts of
lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610, he should be convicted under RA 7610 because
AAA was 16 years old when the crime was committed. The Court of Appeals ruled
that under Section 5(b) of RA 7610, the offender shall be charged with rape or
lascivious conduct under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) only if the victim is below 12
years old; otherwise, the provisions of RA 7610 shall prevail.

The Court of Appeals ruled that based on the evidence on record and the testimony of
AAA, the decision of the trial court has to be affirmed. The Court of Appeals ruled
that under Section 2(h) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and
Investigation of Child Abuse Cases, the introduction of any object into the genitalia of
the offended party as well as the intentional touching of her breasts when done with
the intent to sexually gratify the offender qualify as a lascivious act. AAAs testimony
established that Garingarao committed the lascivious acts.

The Court of Appeals found no reason for AAA or her family to fabricate the charges
against Garingarao. The Court of Appeals ruled that Garingaraos claim that the case
was filed so that BBB could get even with him because of the argument they had was
too shallow to be given consideration. The Court of Appeals likewise
rejected Garingaraos defense of denial which could not prevail over the positive
testimony of AAA.

The Court of Appeals modified the penalty imposed by the trial court. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the duration of reclusion temporal in its maximum period should
be 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years and not 14 years and 8 months as
imposed by the trial court. The Court of Appeals also raised the award of moral
damages and fine, which was deemed as civil indemnity, to conform with recent
jurisprudence.

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated November 5, 2007

of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Pangasinan in Criminal Case
No. SCC-4167 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

1. The penalty imposed on the accused-appellant is 14 years and 8

months of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion
temporal as maximum[;]

2. The award of moral damages is raised from P20,000.00

to P50,000.00; and
 3. The award of indemnity is raised from P10,000.00 to P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.9

Garingarao filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 June 2010 Resolution, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issue

The only issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error in affirming with modifications the trial courts decision.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Garingarao alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts
decision finding him guilty of acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA
7610. Garingarao insists that it was physically impossible for him to commit the acts
charged against him because there were many patients and hospital employees around.
He alleges that AAAs room was well lighted and that he had an assistant when the
incident allegedly occurred. Garingarao further alleges that, assuming the charges
were correct, there was only one incident when he allegedly touched AAA and as
such, he should have been convicted only of acts of lasciviousness and not of
violation of RA 7610.

We do not agree.

Credibility of Witnesses

The Court has ruled that in case of acts of lasciviousness, the lone testimony of the
offended party, if credible, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused. 10 In this
case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found the testimony of AAA
credible over Garingaraos defense of denial and alibi. It is a settled rule that denial is a
weak defense as against the positive identification by the victim. 11 Both denial and
alibi are inherently weak defenses and constitute self-serving negative evidence which
cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration by a
credible witness.12 Garingaraos defense of denial and alibi must fail over the positive
and straightforward testimony of AAA on the incident. Further, like the trial court and
the Court of Appeals, we find incredible Garingaraos defense that the case was an
offshoot of a heated argument he had with AAAs father over the
manner Garingarao was giving AAAs medications. It is hard to believe that AAAs
parents would expose her to a public trial if the charges were not true. 13 In addition,
the prosecution was able to establish that, contrary to Garingaraos allegation, both
BBB and CCC were not in AAAs room at the time of the incident.

Violation of RA 7610

Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides:

 Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male
or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period

to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:

(a) x x x

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with
a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That
when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for rape and Article 336 of Act No.
3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as
the case may be; Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the
victim is under twelve (12) yeas of age shall be reclusion temporal in its
medium period, x x x

(c) x x x

The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are the
following:
 1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;

2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to

other sexual abuse; and

3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. 14

Under Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA
7610, lascivious conduct is defined as follows:

[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia,

anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object
into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or
opposite sex, with the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or
gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person. 15

In this case, the prosecution established that Garingarao touched AAAs breasts and
inserted his finger into her private part for his sexual gratification. Garingarao used his
influence as a nurse by pretending that his actions were part of the physical
examination he was doing. Garingarao persisted on what he was doing despite AAAs
objections. AAA twice asked Garingarao what he was doing and he answered that he
was just examining her.

The Court has ruled that a child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse when the
child is the victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any
adult.16 In lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult, there must
be some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free
exercise of the offended partys free will. 17 In this case, Garingarao coerced AAA into
submitting to his lascivious acts by pretending that he was examining her.
Garingarao insists that, assuming that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
were true, he should not be convicted of violation of RA 7610 because the incident
happened only once. Garingarao alleges that the single incident would not suffice to
hold him liable under RA 7610.

Garingaraos argument has no legal basis.

The Court has already ruled that it is inconsequential that sexual abuse under RA 7610
occurred only once.18 Section 3(b) of RA 7610 provides that the abuse may be habitual
or not.19Hence, the fact that the offense occurred only once is enough to
hold Garingarao liable for acts of lasciviousness under RA 7610.

Indemnity and Moral Damages

In view of recent jurisprudence, we deem it proper to reduce the amount of indemnity

to P20,00020 and moral damages awarded by the Court of Appeals to P15,000.21 We
also impose on Garingarao a fine of P15,000.22

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 26 November 2009

Decision and 22 June 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
31354 with MODIFICATIONS. The Court finds Jojit Garingarao GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Republic Act No. 7610. He is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as
minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum and ordered to pay
AAA P20,000 as civil indemnity, P15,000 as moral damages and a fine of P15,000.

SECOND DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 171863
Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS (Second Division) and Promulgated:
GASPAR OLAYON, August 20, 2008
Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The then 22-year old herein respondent Gaspar Olayon was charged with
violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 (THE SPECIAL
PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AGAINST ABUSE, EXPLOITATION, AND
DISCRIMINATION ACT) in two separate Informations filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, of which the then 14-year old AAA was alleged to
be the victim.

Criminal Case No. 112571 alleged that

On or about 10:00 a.m. of January 27, 1997 in Taguig, Metro

Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused,
with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with and commit lewd and lascivious
acts upon the person of [AAA], a minor, fourteen (14) years of age.
[1]
(Underscoring supplied)

Criminal Case No. 112572 alleged that

 On or about 2:00 p.m. of January 27, 1997 in Taguig, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused,
with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with and commit lewd and lascivious
acts upon the person of [AAA], a minor, fourteen (14) years of age.
[2]
(Underscoring supplied)

Respondent was also charged for acts of lasciviousness before the RTC of
Taguig, docketed as Criminal Case No. 116350, of which the same then 14-year
old AAA was alleged to be the victim. The case was transferred to the Pasig City
RTC and consolidated with Criminal Case Nos. 112571-72. [3] The three cases were
jointly tried.[4]

After trial, Branch 158 of the Pasig City RTC, by Decision of January 15,
2002, acquitted respondent in Criminal Case No. 116350 (for acts of
lasciviousness).[5] It, however, convicted respondent of violation of Section 10 (a)
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 in Criminal Case Nos. 112571-72 in this wise:

x x x The accused, Olayon admitted his sexual liaisons with

[AAA]. His defenses are: 1) [AAA] is his sweetheart and 2) whatever
happened to them in terms of these sexual liaisons, occurred with the
consent of [AAA]. Although the testimony of [AAA] denies she
consented to the sexual liaisons, the evidence did not support it.

The events that occurred on January 27, 1997 at the house of one
Duke Espiritu show that [AAA] went with Olayon to that place
voluntarily. First, she was fetched from a tricycle stand and it took them
another ride to go to the house of Espiritu. If indeed she was forced to
board the tricycle, she could have resisted and shouted for help
considering that there were normally people around in a tricycle stand,
waiting for rides. If she indeed resisted and showed any manifestation in
this regard, people could have easily helped her in resisting whatever it
was Olayon wanted. Second, at the house of Espiritu she could have
easily shouted for help since it was located near a road and a pathway. x
xx

xxxx
 Although the sexual liaisons that occurred on January 27,
1997 were with the consent of [AAA] who at that time was only 14 years
of age, Olayon cannot escape responsibility because he took advantage
of [AAAs] minority to have these sexual liaisons , even if they
were with her consent. Consent is not an accepted defense in this
special law. He violated then Republic Act No. 7610, Section
10(a) which provides:

Section 10(a) Any person who shall commit any

other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the childs
development including those covered by Article 59 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, shall suffer the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.

x x x x[6] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus the trial court disposed:

WHEREFORE, Gaspar Olayon y Matubis a.k.a Eric Ramirez is

found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for having violated Republic Act
No. 7610, Section 10 (a) in Criminal Case Nos. 112571-72 and is
sentenced to suffer in prison the penalty of six (6) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day to seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision
mayor for each count. He is acquitted in Criminal Case No. 116350.

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.[7]

On appeal by respondent,[8] the Court of Appeals, answering in the negative

the issue of whether consensual sexual intercourse with a minor is classified as
child abuse under Section 10 of RA No. 7610, reversed the trial courts decision
and acquitted respondent, by Decision[9] of January 13, 2006, reasoning as
follows:
Acts of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of R.A. 7610 refers to
those acts listed under Sec. 3(b) of R.A. 7610, which reads as follows:
 Sec. 3. Definition of Terms

(a) x x x

(b) Child Abuse refers to maltreatment, whether habitual

or not, of the child which includes any of the following:

1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect,

cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;

2) Any act or deeds [sic] or words [sic] which

debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being;

3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for

survival, such as food and shelter; or

4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to

an injured child resulting in serious impairment
of his growth and development or in his
permanent incapacity or death.

Consensual sexual intercourse between OLAY[O]N and [AAA]

does not fall under the sexual abuse definition [in Section 5 of R.A. No.
7610] which is a completely distinct and separate offense from child
abuse, [under Section 10] because sexual abuse pertains to and is
associated with child prostitution [as defined in Section 5]. Sexual abuse
is defined separately under Section 5 of R.A. 7610, which reads as
follows:

Sec. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual

Abuse Children, whether male or female, who for money,
profit or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

Moreover, for the act of intercourse between OLAY[O]N and

[AAA] to be considered sexual abuse [under Section 5], such
 intercourse should have occurred due to coercion or intimidation. In
the case at bench, neither coercion nor intimidation were found to have
been present, consent having been freely given.[10] (Emphasis,
italics and underscoring supplied)

Hence, the present petition for certiorari [11] of the People under Rule 65,
alleging that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction

x x x IN ACQUITTING RESPONDENT OLAYON OF THE TWO (2)

COUNTS OF CHILD ABUSE UNDER SECTION 10(A) OF R.A.
7610 DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SEXUAL
ACTS COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT OLAYON ON THE MINOR
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT ARE CLEARLY WITHIN THE
TERM OTHER ACTS OF NEGLECT, ABUSE, CRUELTY OR
EXPLOITATION AND OTHER CONDITIONS PREJUDICIAL TO
THE CHILDS DEVELOPMENT DECLARED PUNISHABLE
UNDER SECTION 10(A) OF R.A. 7610.[12] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The record shows that the Pasig City Prosecutors Office found that the acts
of respondent did not amount to rape as they were done with the consent of the 14-
year old AAA.[13] Nevertheless, it found the acts constitutive of violations of
[Republic] Act No. 7610, hence, its filing of the above-quoted Informations for
violation of Section 10(a).[14]

The Informations alleged that respondent, with lewd designs did willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual intercourse with and commit lewd and
lascivious acts upon the person of [AAA], a minor, fourteen (14) years of age.[15]

Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 under which respondent was charged in each
of the two cases provides:

SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and

Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development.

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty
or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's
 development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No.
603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall
suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. (Underscoring
supplied),

Section 5(b), upon the other hand, provides:

SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether

male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to
the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion

perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:

xxxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious

conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual
abuse; Provided, That when the victims is under twelve (12) years of
age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3,
for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That
the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; (Italics in
the original, emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As Section 10 refers to acts of child abuse prejudicial to the childs

development other than child prostitution and other sexual abuse[16] under Section
5, attempt to commit child prostitution,[17] child trafficking,[18] attempt to commit
child trafficking,[19] and obscene publications and indecent shows,[20] the Court of
Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that x x x sexual
abuse [as defined under Section 5] x x x is a completely distinct and separate
offense from child abuse [as defined under Section 10].

Consensual sexual intercourse or even acts of lasciviousness with a minor

who is 12 years old or older could constitute a violation of Section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610. For Section 5(b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not
only with a child exploited in prostitution but also with a child subjected to other
sexual abuse.[21]

Section 2(g) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and

Investigation of Child Abuse Cases, promulgated to implement R.A. No. 7610,
defines sexual abuse as including the employment, use, persuasion, inducement,
enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage
in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or
incest with children. (Underscoring supplied)

For consensual sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a minor, who is

not exploited in prostitution, to thus fall within the purview of Section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of the child must be
present.

In People v. Larin,[22] the information alleged that the therein accused took
advantage of his authority, influence, and moral ascendancy as trainor/swimming
instructor of the minor victim[23] which the Court found constituted psychological
coercion.[24] In convicting the therein accused for lascivious acts, the Court held:

It must be noted that [Republic Act No. 7610] covers not only a
situation in which a child is abused for profit, but also one in which a
child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in any lascivious
conduct.[25] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And even in Malto v. People[26] wherein the accused was convicted for
violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the information alleged, and the
prosecution proved, that the therein accused who was the minors professor
obtained the minors consent by taking advantage of his relationship and moral
ascendancy to exert influence on her.

In the case at bar, even if respondent were charged under Section 5(b),
instead of Section 10(a), respondent would just the same have been acquitted as
there was no allegation that an element of the offense coercion or influence or
intimidation attended its commission.

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING disquisition, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198732 June 10, 2013

CHRISTIAN CABALLO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the January 28, 2011 Decision2 and
September 26, 2011 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27399-MIN which
affirmed with modification the April 1, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City,
Branch 30 (RTC), finding petitioner Christian Caballo (Caballo) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 76104(RA 7610), otherwise known as the
"Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," in relation
to Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases
(Rules on Child Abuse Cases).

The Facts

On March 16, 1999, an Information5 was filed charging Caballo of violation of Section 10(a), Article
VI of RA 7610 which was later amended on May 28, 1999, to include statements pertaining to the
delivery of private complainant AAAs6 baby. The Amended Information7 reads:

That undersigned Second Assistant City Prosecutor hereby accuses Christian Caballo of the crime
of Violation of Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610, committed as follows:

That in or about the last week of March 1998, and on different dates subsequent thereto, until June
1998, in the City of Surigao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, a 23 year old man, in utter disregard of the prohibition of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 7610 and taking advantage of the innocence and lack of worldly experience of AAA
who was only 17 years old at that time, having been born on November 3, 1980, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual abuse upon said AAA, by persuading and inducing
the latter to have sexual intercourse with him, which ultimately resulted to her untimely pregnancy
and delivery of a baby on March 8, 1999, a condition prejudicial to her development, to the damage
and prejudice of AAA in such amount as may be allowed by law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Surigao City, Philippines, May 28, 1999.

Upon arraignment, Caballo pleaded not guilty to the aforesaid charges. 8

Based on the records, the undisputed facts are as follows:

AAA, then 17 years old, met Caballo, then 23 years old, in her uncles place in Surigao City. Her
uncle was a choreographer and Caballo was one of his dancers. During that time, AAA was a
sophomore college student at the University of San Carlos and resided at a boarding house in Cebu
City. On January 17, 1998, Caballo went to Cebu City to attend the Sinulog Festival and there,
visited AAA. After spending time together, they eventually became sweethearts. 9 Sometime during
the third week of March 1998, AAA went home to Surigao City and stayed with her uncle. In the last
week of March of the same year, Caballo persuaded AAA to have sexual intercourse with him. This
was followed by several more of the same in April 1998, in the first and second weeks of May 1998,
on August 31, 1998 and in November 1998, all of which happened in Surigao City, except the one in
August which occurred in Cebu.10 In June 1998, AAA becamepregnant and later gave birth on March
8, 1999.11

During the trial, the prosecution asserted that Caballo was only able to induce AAA to lose her
virginity due to promises of marriage and his assurance that he would not get her pregnant due to
the use of the "withdrawal method." Moreover, it claimed that Caballo was shocked upon hearing the
news of AAAs pregnancy and consequently, advised her to have an abortion. She heeded Caballos
advice; however, her efforts were unsuccessful. Further, the prosecution averred that when AAAs
mother confronted Caballo to find out what his plans were for AAA, he assured her that he would
marry her daughter.12

Opposed to the foregoing, Caballo claimed that during their first sexual intercourse, AAA was no
longer a virgin as he found it easy to penetrate her and that there was no bleeding. He also
maintained that AAA had (3) three boyfriends prior to him. Further, he posited that he and AAA were
sweethearts who lived-in together, for one (1) week in a certain Litang Hotel and another week in the
residence of AAAs uncle. Eventually, they broke up due to the intervention of AAAs parents. At a
certain time, AAAs mother even told Caballo that he was not deserving of AAA because he was
poor. Lastly, he alleged that he repeatedly proposed marriage to AAA but was always rejected
because she was still studying.13

The RTCs Ruling

In a Decision dated April 1, 2003, the RTC found Caballo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation
of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610, in relation to Section 2 of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases.
Accordingly, it sentenced Caballo to suffer imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from
prision correccional, in its maximum period of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, as
minimum, to prision mayor in its minimum period of six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day,
as maximum. It also ordered Caballo to pay AAA moral damages in the amount of 50,000.00. 14

Aggrieved, Caballo elevated the case to the CA.

The CAs Ruling

In a Decision dated January 28, 2011,15 the CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed with modification
the RTCs ruling, finding Caballo guilty of violating Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.

It ruled that while the Amended Information denominated the crime charged as violation of Section
10(a), Article VI of RA 7610, the statements in its body actually support a charge of violation of
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.16

On the merits of the case, it found that the evidence adduced by the prosecution clearly showed that
Caballo persuaded, induced and enticed AAA, then a minor, to have carnal knowledge with him.
Towards this end, Caballo repeatedly assured AAA of his love and even went on to promise marriage
to her. He also assured AAA that she would not get pregnant because he would be using the
"withdrawal method." Thus, it was upon these repeated coaxing and assuring words that AAA
succumbed to Caballos evil desires which deflowered and got her pregnant. On this score, it
observed that consent is immaterial in child abuse cases involving sexual intercourse and lascivious
conduct and therefore, the sweetheart defense remains unacceptable. 17 It also found basis to sustain
the award of moral damages.18

Caballo filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied on September 26, 2011. 19

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issue

The core of the present controversy revolves around the interpretation of the phrase "due to the
coercion or influence of any adult" which would thereby classify the victim as a "child exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse" as found in Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. Consequently, the
interpretation which the Court accords herein would determine whether or not the CA erred in finding
Caballo guilty of violating paragraph (b) of the same proviso.

In his petition, Caballo essentially argues that his promise to marry or his use of the "withdrawal
method" should not be considered as "persuasion" or "inducement" sufficient to convict him for the
aforementioned offense, asserting that these should be coupled with some form of coercion or
intimidation to constitute child abuse. He further alleges that he and AAA were sweethearts which
thus, made the sexual intercourse consensual.

In its Comment,20 respondent advances the argument that there was "sexual abuse" within the
purview of RA 7610 as well as the Rules on Child Abuse Cases since it was only upon Caballos
repeated assurances and persuasion that AAA gave in to his worldly desires. Likewise, it points out
that the sweetheart theory, as relied on by Caballo, deserves scant consideration in view of the
Courts ruling in Malto v. People (Malto).21

The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertinently reads:

SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate
or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
the following: x x x x

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for rape and Article
336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the
case may be; Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

As determined in the case of Olivarez v. CA (Olivarez),22 the elements of the foregoing offense are
the following:
 (a) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;

(b) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse; and

(c) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

In this case, the existence of the first and third elements remains undisputed. Records disclose that
Caballo had succeeded in repeatedly having sexual intercourse with AAA who, during all those
instances, was still a minor. Thus, the only bone of contention lies in the presence of the second
element. On this note, the defense submits that AAA could not be considered as a "child exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse" since the incidents to do not point to any form of "coercion" or
"influence" on Caballos part.

The argument is untenable.

To put things in proper perspective, it must be pointed out that RA 7610 was meant to advance the
state policy of affording "special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation and discrimination and other conditions prejudicial to their development" and in such
regard, "provide sanctions for their commission."23 It also furthers the "best interests of children" and
as such, its provisions are guided by this standard. 24

Driven by the foregoing considerations, Congress crafted Article III of the same law in order to
penalize child prostitution and other forms of sexual abuse. Section 5 thereof provides a definition of
who is considered a "child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse." As illumined in
Olivarez,25 citing People v. Larin26 and Amployo v. People,27 the final version of the aforesaid provision
was a product of various deliberations to expand its original coverage to cases where the minor may
have been coerced or intimidated into sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, not necessarily for
money or profit, viz:

The second element, i.e., that the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected
to other sexual abuse, is likewise present. As succinctly explained in People v. Larin:

A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child
indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration;
or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group...

It must be noted that the law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit, but also
one in which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in lascivious conduct.

We reiterated this ruling in Amployo v. People:

... As we observed in People v. Larin, Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7610 does not merely cover a
situation of a child being abused for profit, but also one in which a child engages in any lascivious
conduct through coercion or intimidation...

Thus, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in lascivious
conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. In this case, Cristina was sexually abused
because she was coerced or intimidated by petitioner to indulge in a lascivious conduct.
Furthermore, it is inconsequential that the sexual abuse occurred only once. As expressly provided
in Section 3(b) of R.A. 7610, the abuse may be habitual or not. It must be observed that Article III of
R.A. 7610 is captioned as "Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse" because Congress really
intended to cover a situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into lascivious
conduct, not necessarily for money or profit. The law covers not only child prostitution but also other
forms of sexual abuse. This is clear from the deliberations of the Senate:

Senator Angara. I refer to line 9, who for money or profit. I would like to amend this, Mr. President,
to cover a situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into this lascivious
conduct, not necessarily for money or profit, so that we can cover those situations and not leave
loophole in this section.

The proposal I have is something like this: WHO FOR MONEY, PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER
CONSIDERATION OR DUE TO THE COERCION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE
OR GROUP INDULGE, et cetera.

The President Pro Tempore. I see. That would mean also changing the subtitle of Section 4. Will it
no longer be child prostitution?

Senator Angara. No, no. Not necessarily, Mr. President, because we are still talking of the child who
is being misused for sexual purposes either for money or for consideration. What I am trying to cover
is the other consideration. Because, here, it is limited only to the child being abused or misused for
sexual purposes, only for money or profit.

I am contending, Mr. President, that there may be situations where the child may not have been
used for profit or ...

The President Pro Tempore. So, it is no longer prostitution. Because the essence of prostitution is
profit.

Senator Angara. Well, the Gentleman is right. Maybe the heading ought to be expanded. But, still,
the President will agree that that is a form or manner of child abuse.

The President Pro Tempore. What does the Sponsor say? Will the Gentleman kindly restate the
amendment?

ANGARA AMENDMENT

Senator Angara. The new section will read something like this, Mr. President: MINORS, WHETHER
MALE OR FEMALE, WHO FOR MONEY, PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION OR
INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE OR GROUP INDULGE IN SEXUAL INTERCOURSE, et
cetera.

Senator Lina. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the amendment is
approved.

How about the title, Child Prostitution, shall we change that too?

Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, to cover the expanded scope.

The President Pro Tempore. Is that not what we would call probable child abuse?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Subject to rewording. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none,
the amendment is approved. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As it is presently worded, Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides that when a child indulges in
sexual intercourse or any lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of any adult, the child is
deemed to be a "child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse." In this manner, the law is
able to act as an effective deterrent to quell all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination against children, prejudicial as they are to their development.

In this relation, case law further clarifies that sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct under the
coercion or influence of any adult exists when there is some form of compulsion equivalent to
intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended partys free will. 28 Corollary thereto,
Section 2(g) of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases conveys that sexual abuse involves the element of
influence which manifests in a variety of forms. It is defined as:

The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in or

assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation,
prostitution, or incest with children.

To note, the term "influence" means the "improper use of power or trust in any way that deprives a
person of free will and substitutes anothers objective."29 Meanwhile, "coercion" is the "improper use
of x x x power to compel another to submit to the wishes of one who wields it." 30

In view of the foregoing, the Court observes that Caballos actuations may be classified as "coercion"
and "influence" within the purview of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610:

First, the most crucial element is AAAs minority. It is undisputed that AAA was only 17 years old at
the time of the commission of the crime and is hence, considered a child under the law. 31 In this
respect, AAA was not capable of fully understanding or knowing the import of her actions and in
consequence, remained vulnerable to the cajolery and deception of adults, as in this case.

Based on this premise, jurisprudence settles that consent is immaterial in cases involving a violation
of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610; as such, the argument that AAA and Caballo were sweethearts
remains irrelevant. The Malto ruling is largely instructive on this point:

For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the
sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with another person.

The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish "those who commit the act of sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse."

Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA
7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is
exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum
prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed.

A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can
easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or
import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of
harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully.
Those of tender years deserve its protection.

The harm which results from a childs bad decision in a sexual encounter may be infinitely more
damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful
consequences of her attempts at adult sexual behavior. For this reason, a child should not be
deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act of
ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her special protection against abuse,
exploitation and discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual predators like petitioner will be justified, or even
unwittingly tempted by the law, to view her as fair game and vulnerable prey.) In other words, a child
is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual
intercourse. x x x x32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Second, coupled with AAAs minority is Caballos seniority. Records indicate that Caballo was 23
years old at the time of the commission of the offense and therefore, 6 years older than AAA, more
or less. The age disparity between an adult and a minor placed Caballo in a stronger position over
AAA so as to enable him to force his will upon the latter.

Third, Caballo's actions effectively constitute overt acts of coercion and influence. Records reveal
1wphi1

that Caballo repeatedly assured AAA of his love for her, and even, promised to marry her. In
addition, he also guaranteed that she would not get pregnant since he would be using the
"withdrawal method" for safety. Irrefragably, these were meant to influence AAA to set aside her
reservations and eventually give into having sex with him, with which he succeeded.

Fourth, at least, with respect to the parties' first sexual encounter, it is observed that the brash and
unexpected manner in which Caballo pursued AAA to her room and pressed on her to have sex with
him, effectively placed her in, to a certain extent, a position of duress .. An important factor is that
AAA refused Caballo's incipient advances and in fact, asked him to leave. However, AAA eventually
yielded. Thus, it stands to reason that she was put in a situation deprived of the benefit of clear
thought and choice. In any case, the Court observes that any other choice would, nonetheless,
remain tarnished due to AAA's minority as above-discussed.

Hence, considering that Caballo's acts constitute "coercion" and "influence" within the context of the
law, and that AAA indulged in sexual intercourse and/or lascivious conduct with Caballo due to the
same, she is deemed as a "child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse"; as such, the
second element of the subject offense exists.

In fine, finding all elements to be present, the Court hereby sustains Caballo's conviction for violation
of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The January 28, 2011 Decision and September 26, 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 27399-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED .
 THIRD DIVISION

SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN G.R. No. 168852

Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN
and JUANITA L. TAN, Promulgated:
Respondents.* September 30, 2008
x----------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Resolution[1] dated March 7, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
94, QuezonCity in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 and the RTC Resolution[2] dated July 11,
2005 which denied petitioner's Verified Motion for Reconsideration.

The factual background of the case:

On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were
married.[3] Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle[4] and Kristen
Denise.[5] On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a
Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO)[6] against
Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents)
before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing
verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs
(e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)[7] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,[8] otherwise known as the
Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.

On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice [9] granting petitioner's prayer for a
TPO.

On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the

Issuance of Permanent Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition,
[10]
contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law
of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.

On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition[11] to respondents'

Motion to Dismiss arguing that respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a
liberal interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the protection and safety of victims of
violence.
On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution[12] dismissing the case as to respondents
on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not
included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule of
law expressio unius est exclusio alterius.[13]

On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for Reconsideration[14] contending
that the doctrine of necessary implication should be applied in the broader interests of
substantial justice and due process.

On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the Verified Motion for
Reconsideration[15] arguing that petitioner's liberal construction unduly broadened the
provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship between the offender and the alleged
victim was an essential condition for the application of R.A. No. 9262.

On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution[16] denying petitioner's

Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that to include respondents under
the coverage of R.A. No. 9262 would be a strained interpretation of the provisions of the
law.

Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to wit:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-

IN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE
OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR
CHILDREN ACT OF 2004.[17]

Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the provisions
of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory application of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on conspiracy under Article 8
of the RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had
community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial
support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in
repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically; that respondents
should be included as indispensable or necessary parties for complete resolution of the
case.
On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since
Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the victim only
by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that allegations on the
conspiracy of respondents require a factual determination which cannot be done by this
Court in a petition for review; that respondents cannot be characterized as indispensable
or necessary parties, since their presence in the case is not only unnecessary but
altogether illegal, considering the non-inclusion of in-laws as offenders under Section 3 of
R.A. No. 9262.

The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.

Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as any
act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former
wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to
result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty.

While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim
by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the
application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.

Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of
the RPC, thus:
 SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal
Code and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)

Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses
which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject
to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such
laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary. (Emphasis
supplied)

Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a
supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in
which the special law is silent on a particular matter.

Thus, in People v. Moreno,[18] the Court applied suppletorily the provision on subsidiary
penalty under Article 39 of the RPC to cases of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise
known as the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, noting that the special law did not contain any
provision that the defendant could be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
In People v. Li Wai Cheung,[19] the Court applied suppletorily the rules on the service of
sentences provided in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the accused who was found guilty
of multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, considering the lack of similar rules under the special law.

In People v. Chowdury,[20] the Court applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the RPC
to define the words principal, accomplices and accessories under R.A. No. 8042,
otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, because
said words were not defined therein, although the special law referred to the same terms
in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.
In Yu v. People,[21] the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise
known as the Bouncing Checks Law, noting the absence of an express provision on
subsidiary imprisonment in said special law.

Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,[22] the Court applied suppletorily the principle of
conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary provision
therein.

With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may
be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47
that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC,
which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.

Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or
action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.[23]

It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts
of violence against women and their children may be committed by an offender through
another, thus:

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxx

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another,

that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her
child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:

(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
 (2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or
her child;

(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or

her child against her/his will;

(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to

animals or pets of the woman or her child; and

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of
preventing further acts of violence against the woman or her child may include
individuals other than the offending husband, thus:
SEC. 8. Protection Orders. x x x The protection orders that may be issued
under this Act shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:

(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing,

personally or through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this
Act;

(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning,

contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly
or indirectly; x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus:

SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the

protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children.
(Emphasis supplied)
It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law [24] and that this intent must be
effectuated by the courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262
reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the
attainment of the object of the law according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the
protection and safety of victims of violence against women and children.

Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the

maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius finds no application here. It must be
remembered that this maxim is only an ancillary rule of statutory construction. It is not of
universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of
discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted
to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.[25]

The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on the attendance of
circumstances evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of Steven and respondents to
cause verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her. However, conspiracy is
an evidentiary matter which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits and
cannot be determined in the present petition since this Court is not a trier of facts.[26] It is
thus premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary matters since this controversy is
centered only on the determination of whether respondents may be included in a petition
under R.A. No. 9262. The presence or absence of conspiracy can be best passed upon
after a trial on the merits.

Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be

applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262, the Court will no longer delve on whether
respondents may be considered indispensable or necessary parties. To do so would be an
exercise in superfluity.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated March 7,
2005 and July 11, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case
No. Q-05-54536 are hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the
dismissal of the petition against respondents is concerned.
SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR: