Marbury v.

Madison

Brief Fact Summary. William Marbury (Marbury), an end-of-term appointee of President John Adams
(President Adams) to a justice of the peace position in the District of Columbia, brought suit against
President Thomas Jeffersons (President Jefferson) Secretary of State, James Madison, seeking delivery
of his commission.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) has constitutional
authority to review executive actions and legislative acts. The Supreme Court has limited jurisdiction,
the bounds of which are set by the United States Constitution (Constitution), which may not be enlarged
by the Congress.

Facts. Before the inauguration of President Jefferson, outgoing President Adams attempted to secure
Federalist control of the judiciary by creating new judgeships and filling them with Federalist
appointees. Included in these efforts was the nomination by President Adams, under the Organic Act of
the District of Columbia (the District), of 42 new justices of the peace for the District, which were
confirmed by the Senate the day before President Jeffersons inauguration. A few of the commissions,
including Marburys, were undelivered when President Jefferson took office. The new president
instructed Secretary of State James Madison to withhold delivery of the commissions. Marbury sought
mandamus in the Supreme Court, requiring James Madison to deliver his commission.

Issue. Is Marbury entitled to mandamus from the Supreme Court?

Held. No. Case dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

As the President signed Marburys commission after his confirmation, the appointment has been made,
and Marbury has a right to the commission

Given that the law imposed a duty on the office of the president to deliver Marburys commission, that
the Supreme Court has the power to review executive actions when the executive acts as an officer of
the law and the nature of the writ of mandamus to direct an officer of the government to do a
particular thing therein specified, mandamus is the appropriate remedy, if available to the Supreme
Court.

To issue mandamus to the Secretary of State really is to sustain an original action, which is (in this case)
outside the constitutional limits of jurisdiction imposed on the Supreme Court.

Discussion. The importance of Marbury v. Madison is both political and legal. Although the case
establishes the traditions of judicial review and a litigable constitution on which the remainder of
constitutional law rests, it also transformed the Supreme Court from an incongruous institution to an
equipotent head of a branch of the federal government.
Griswold v. Connecticut

Brief Fact Summary. Appellants were charged with violating a statute preventing the distribution of
advice to married couples regarding the prevention of conception. Appellants claimed that the statute
violated the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The right of a married couple to privacy is protected by the Constitution.

Facts. Appellant Griswold, Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and
Appellant Buxton, a licensed physician who served as Medical Director for the League at its Center in
New Haven, were arrested and charged with giving information, instruction, and medical advice to
married persons on means of preventing conception. Appellants were found guilty as accessories and
fined $100 each. Appellants appealed on the theory that the accessory statute as applied violated the
14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. Appellants claimed standing based on their
professional relationship with the married people they advised.

Issue. Does the Constitution provide for a privacy right for married couples?

Held. The First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion,
which although not expressly included in the Amendment, is necessary to make the express guarantees
meaningful. The association of marriage is a privacy right older than the Bill of Rights, and the States
effort to control marital activities in this case is unnecessarily broad and therefore impinges on
protected Constitutional freedoms.

Dissent. Justice Stewart and Justice Black. Although the law is silly, it is not unconstitutional. The citizens
of Connecticut should use their rights under the 9th and 10th Amendment to convince their elected
representatives to repeal it if the law does not conform to their community standards.

Concurrence. Justice Goldberg, the Chief Justice, and Justice Brennan. The right to privacy in marriage is
so basic and fundamental that to allow it to be infringed because it is not specifically addressed in the
first eight amendments is to give the 9th Amendment no effect.

Justice Harlan. The relevant statute violates the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment because if
violates the basic values implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.

Discussion. The right to privacy in marriage is not specifically protected in either the Bill of Rights or the
Constitution. Nonetheless, it is a right so firmly rooted in tradition that its protection is mandated by
various Constitutional Amendments, including the 1st, 9th and 14th Amendments.
GIRLIE M. QUISAY, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated October 10, 2014 and the
Resolution3 dated January 30, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 131968, which
affirmed the denial of petitioner Girlie M. Quisay's (petitioner) Motion to Quash before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 144 (RTC).chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Facts

On December 28, 2012, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City (OCP-Makati) issued a Pasiya4 or
Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner for violation of Section 10 of Republic Act No. (RA)
7610,5 otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act." Consequently, a Pabatid Sakdal6 or Information was filed before the RTC on January
11, 2013 charging petitioner of such crime.

On April 12, 2013, petitioner moved for the quashal of the Information against her on the ground of lack
of authority of the person who filed the same before the RTC. In support of her motion, petitioner
pointed out that the Pasiya issued by the OCP-Makati was penned by Assistant City Prosecutor Estefano
H. De La Cruz (ACP De La Cruz) and approved by Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo G. Hirang
(SACP Hirang), while the Pabatid Sakdal was penned by ACP De La Cruz, without any approval from any
higher authority, albeit with a Certification claiming that ACP De La Cruz has prior written authority or
approval from the City Prosecutor in filing the said Information. In this regard, petitioner claimed that
nothing in the aforesaid Pasiya and Pabatid Sakdal would show that ACP De La Cruz and/or SACP Hirang
had prior written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor to file or approve the filing of the
Information against her. As such, the Information must be quashed for being tainted with a jurisdictional
defect that cannot be cured.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In its Comment and Opposition,8 the OCP-Makati countered that the review prosecutor, SACP Hirang,
was authorized to approve the Pasiya pursuant to OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32.9 Further, it
maintained that the Pabatid Sakdal was filed with the prior approval of the City Prosecutor as shown in
the Certification in the Information itself.10chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The RTC Ruling

In an Order11 dated May 8, 2013, the RTC denied petitioner's motion to quash for lack of merit. It found
the Certification attached to the Pabatid Sakdal to have sufficiently complied with Section 4, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court which requires the prior written authority or approval by, among others, the City
Prosecutor, in the filing of Informations.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,13 which was, however, denied in an Order14 dated July 10, 2013.
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for
certiorari.15chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The CA Ruling

In a Decision16 dated October 10, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. It held that pursuant to Section
9 of RA 10071,17 otherwise known as the "Prosecution Service Act of 2010," as well as OCP-Makati
Office Order No. 32, the City Prosecutor of Makati authorized SACP Hirang to approve the issuance of,
inter alia, resolutions finding probable cause and the filing of Informations before the courts. As such,
SACP Hirang may, on behalf of the City Prosecutor, approve the Pasiya which found probable cause to
indict petitioner of violation of Section 10 of RA 7610.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Further, it held that the Certification made by ACP De La Cruz in the Pabatid Sakdal clearly indicated that
the same was filed after the requisite preliminary investigation and with the prior written authority or
approval of the City Prosecutor. In this regard, the CA opined that such Certification enjoys the
presumption of regularity accorded to a public officer's performance of official functions, in the absence
of convincing evidence to the contrary.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration,20 but was denied in a Resolution21 dated January
30, 2015; hence, this petition.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly held that the RTC did not
gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing petitioner's motion to quash.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the filing of a complaint
or information requires a prior written authority or approval of the named officers therein before a
complaint or information may be filed before the courts, viz.:

SECTION 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. - If the investigating prosecutor finds
cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify
under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally
examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the
complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit
controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.

Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within
ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action.

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior
written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the
Ombudsman or his deputy.

x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts without the prior written
authority or approval of the foregoing authorized officers renders the same defective and, therefore,
subject to quashal pursuant to Section 3 (d), Rule 117 of the same Rules, to wit:

SECTION 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the
following grounds:

xxxx

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In this relation, People v. Garfin22 firmly instructs that the filing of an Information by an officer without
the requisite authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by
silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent. Hence, such ground may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the case at bar, the CA affirmed the denial of petitioner's motion to quash on the grounds that: (a) the
City Prosecutor of Makati may delegate its authority to approve the filing of the Pabatid Sakdal pursuant
to Section 9 of RA 10071, as well as OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32; and (b) the Pabatid Sakdal
contained a Certification stating that its filing before the RTC was with the prior written authority or
approval from the City Prosecutor.
The CA correctly held that based on the wordings of Section 9 of RA 10071, which gave the City
Prosecutor the power to "[investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes,
misdemeanors and violations of penal laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions, and
have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made and filed against the persons
accused,"24 he may indeed delegate his power to his subordinates as he may deem necessary in the
interest of the prosecution service. The CA also correctly stressed that it is under the auspice of this
provision that the City Prosecutor of Makati issued OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32, which gave division
chiefs or review prosecutors "authority to approve or act on any resolution, order, issuance, other
action, and any information recommended by any prosecutor for approval,"25 without necessarily
diminishing the City Prosecutor's authority to act directly in appropriate cases.26 By virtue of the
foregoing issuances, the City Prosecutor validly designated SACP Hirang, Deputy City Prosecutor
Emmanuel D. Medina, and Senior Assistant City Prosecutor William Celestino T. Uy as review
prosecutors for the OCP-Makati.27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In this light, the Pasiya or Resolution finding probable cause to indict petitioner of the crime charged,
was validly made as it bore the approval of one of the designated review prosecutors for OCP-Makati,
SACP Hirang, as evidenced by his signature therein.

Unfortunately, the same could not be said of the Pabatid Sakdal or Information filed before the RTC, as
there was no showing that it was approved by either the City Prosecutor of Makati or any of the OCP-
Makati's division chiefs or review prosecutors. All it contained was a Certification from ACP De La Cruz
which stated, among others, that "DAGDAG KO PANG PINATUTUNAYAN na angpaghahain ng sakdal na
ito ay may nakasulat na naunang pahintulot o pagpapatibay ng Panlunsod na Taga-Usig"28 - which
translates to "and that the filing of the Information is with the prior authority and approval of the City
Prosecutor."

In the cases of People v. Garfin,29Turingan v. Garfin,30 and Tolentino v. Paqueo31 the Court had already
rejected similarly-worded certifications, uniformly holding that despite such certifications, the
Informations were defective as it was shown that the officers filing the same in court either lacked the
authority to do so or failed to show that they obtained prior written authority from any of those
authorized officers enumerated in Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Here, aside from the bare and self-serving Certification, there was no proof that ACP De La Cruz was
authorized to file the Pabatid Sakdal or Information before the RTC by himself. Records are bereft of any
showing that the City Prosecutor of Makati had authorized ACP De La Cruz to do so by giving him prior
written authority or by designating him as a division chief or review prosecutor of OCP-Makati. There is
likewise nothing that would indicate that ACP De La Cruz sought the approval of either the City
Prosecutor or any of those authorized pursuant to OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32 in filing the Pabatid
Sakdal. Quite frankly, it is simply baffling how ACP De La Cruz was able to have the Pasiya approved by
designated review prosecutor SACP Hirang but failed to have the Pabatid Sakdal approved by the same
person or any other authorized officer in the OCP-Makati.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, the CA erred in according the Pabatid Sakdal the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions solely on the basis of the Certification made by ACP De
La Cruz considering the absence of any evidence on record clearly showing that ACP De La Cruz: (a) had
any authority to file the same on his own; or (b) did seek the prior written approval from those
authorized to do so before filing the Information before the RTC.

In conclusion, the CA erred in affirming the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's motion to quash as the
Pabatid Sakdal or Information suffers from an incurable infirmity - that the officer who filed the same
before the RTC had no authority to do so. Hence, the Pabatid Sakdal must be quashed, resulting in the
dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner.

As a final note, it must be stressed that "[t]he Rules of Court governs the pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts of the Philippines. For the orderly administration of justice, the provisions
contained therein should be followed by all litigants, but especially by the prosecution arm of the
Government."32chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 10, 2014 and the Resolution dated
January 30, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 131968 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Information against petitioner Girlie M. Quisay is QUASHED and the criminal case
against her is DISMISSED.
Villa v. Ibanez

TUASON, J.:

Attorney Abelardo Subido, chief of the division of investigation in the office of the mayor of the City of
Manila, was appointed by the then Secretary of Justice, Honorable Ricardo Nepomuceno, as special
counsel to assist ,the City Fiscal of Manila in the cases of city government officials or employees he had
investigated; and in pursuance of that appointment, he subscribed, swore to and presented an
information against Pedro P. Villa, the present petitioner, for falsification of a payroll of the division of
veterinary service, Manila health department. Attorney Subido's authority to file the information was
thereafter challenged by the accused but was sustained by His Honor, Judge Fidel Ibanez. Hence this
petition for certiorari, which is in reality a petition for prohibition and will be so regarded.

Chief ground of attack, the resolution of which will dispose of the others and to which this opinion will
therefore be confined, has to do with Attorney Subido's legal qualifications for the appointment in
question under section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 144, which reads as follows:

"SEC. 1686. Additional counsel to assist fiscal. The Secretary of Justice may appoint any lawyer, being
either a subordinate from his office or a competent person not in the public service, temporarily to
assist a fiscal or prosecuting attorney in the discharge of his duties, and with the same authority therein
as might be exercised by the Attorney General or Solicitor General."

Appointments by the Secretary of Justice in virtue of the foregoing provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended, were upheld in Lo Cham vs. Ocampo et al.,[1] 44 Official Gazette, 458,
and Go Cam et al., vs. Gatmaitan et al., (47 Official Gazette, 5092)[2]. But in those cases, the appointees
were officials or employees in one or another of the bureaus or offices under the Department of Justice,
and were rightly considered subordinates in the office of the Secretary of Justice within the meaning of
section 1686, ante.

The case at bar does not come within the rationale of the above decisions. Attorney Subido is a regular
officer or employee in the Department of Interior, more particularly in the City Mayor's office. For this
reason he belongs to the class of persons disqualified for appointment to the post of special counsel.

That to be eligible as special counsel to aid a fiscal the appointee must be either an employee or officer
in the Department of Justice is so manifest from a bare reveling of section 1686 of the Revised
Administrative Code as to preclude construction. And the limitation of the range of choice in the
appointment or designation is not without reason.
The obvious reason is to have appointed only lawyers over whom the Secretary of Justice can exercise
exclusive and absolute power of supervision. An appointee from a branch of the government outside
the Department of Justice would owe obedience to and be subject to orders by, mutually independent
superiors having, possibly, antagonistic interests. Referring particularly to the case at hand for
illustration, Attorney Subido could be recalled or his time and attention be required elsewhere by the
Secretary of Interior or the City Mayor while he was discharging his duties as public prosecutor, and the
Secretary of Justice would be helpless to stop such recall or interference. An eventuality or state of
affairs so undesirable, not to say detrimental to the public service and specially the administration of
justice, the Legislature wisely intended to avoid.

The defendant had pleaded to the information before he filed a motion to quash, and it is contended
that by his plea he waived all objections to the information. The contention is correct as far as formal
objections to the pleading are concerned. But by clear implication if not by express provision of section
10 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, and by a long line of uniform decisions, questions of want of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. Now, the objection to the respondent's
actuations goes to the very foundations of jurisdiction. It is a valid information signed by a competent
officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused
and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity of the nature noted
in the information can not be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.

The petition will therefore be granted and the respondent judge ordered to desist from proceeding with
criminal case No. 11963 upon the information filed by Attorney Abelardo Subido, without costs.

Moran, C. J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
Mateo Cario vs The Insular Government (December 1906)

On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cario went to the Court of Land Registration (CLR) to petition his inscription
as the owner of a 146 hectare land hes been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only
presented possessory information and no other documentation. The State opposed the petition averring
that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed.
Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and
occupation as in the previous cases Cansino vs Valdez and Tiglao vs Government; and that the right of
the State over said land has prescribed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some
time.

HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the
absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateos possession of the land has not been of
such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It
was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since
the insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used by Cario for any purpose.

While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a
sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper
administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute
owner.