Fred Halliday (Auth.) - Rethinking International Relations-Macmillan Education UK (1994)

Rethinking International Relations
By the same author
Arabia without Sultans

Iran: Dictatorship and Development
Threat from the East? Soviet Policy in the Age of Crisis
The Ethiopian Revolution (co-author)
The Making of the Second Cold War
State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan (co-editor)
Cold War, Third World
Revolution and Foreign Policy: The Case of South Yemen,
1967-1987
Arabs in Exile: Yemeni Migrants in Urban Britain
Rethinking International
Relations
Fred Halliday
M
MACMILLAN
Fred Halliday 1994
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DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-23658-9
A catalogue record for this book is available
from the British Library.
Contents
Acknowledgements viii
Preface IX
1 Introduction: The Pertinence of the 'International' 1

The 'International' in Perspective 1
Formative Influences 4
The Emergence of Theory 5
Realism and Behaviouralism 10
International Relations since the 1970s 16
The Parameters of 'Rethinking' 19
2 Theories in Contention 23
Traditional Empiricism: History and the English School 24
'Scientific Empiricism': the Siren of Behaviouralism 27
Neo-Realism: 'System' without Content 31
The Tallest Story: Post-modernism and the International 37
Conclusion: Another Path 46
3 A Necessary Encounter: Historical Materialism and

International Relations 47
A Challenge Evaded 47
Marxism and IR's Three 'Great Debates' 50
The Potential of Historical Materialism 55
The Historical Materialist Paradigm 59
The Inhibitions of Theory 68
Marxism beyond Cold War 71
4 State and Society in International Relations 74

Impasse on the State 74
Definitions Contrasted 78
The State as Domestic and International Actor 84
State Interests and Social Forces 86
Societies and State Systems 87
v
vi Contents
5 International Society as Homogeneity 94

The Meanings of 'International Society' 94
Transnationalism and its Limits 103
The 'Constitutive' Paradigm and its Protagonists: Burke,
Marx, Fukuyama 107
Implications for International Relations 119
6 'The Sixth Great Power': Revolutions and the

International System 124
A Case of Mutual Neglect 124
Revolutions and their Effects 128
The Formation of the International System 132
Historical Patterns 134
International and Domestic Links 139
Revolutions and War 143
7 Hidden from International Relations: Women and

the International Arena 147
The Silences oflnternational Relations 147
An Emerging Concern: Four Dimensions 152
State and Women: Nationalism and Human Rights 160
Implications and Problems 166
8 Inter-Systemic Conflict: The Case of Cold War 170

A Distinct Form of Conflict 170
Theories of Cold War 171
Sources of Theoretical Resistance 177
The Salience of Heterogeneity 180
9 A Singular Collapse: The Soviet Union anrl Inter-State

Competition 191
New Light on Old Questions 191
Transformation from Above 192
The Transition from Socialism to Capitalism 195
International Factors and Cold War 198
A Comparative Failure 205
Three Levels oflnternational Competition 211
Contents vii
10 International Relations and the 'End of History' 216

Aftermaths of Cold War 216
Varieties of Historical Evaluation 222
The 'End of History' 228
Prospects for Liberal Democracy and Peace 232
11 Conclusion: The Future of International Relations 236

The Challenge of the Normative 236
Alternatives in Research 241
Notes 245
Name Index 278
Subject Index 281

Acknowledgements
The author and publishers are grateful to the following for

permission to reproduce copyright material: Routledge Journals
and the editors of Economy and Society; the editors of Millennium,
The Journal of International Studies; Cambridge University Press;
the editors of New Left Review; Blackwell Publishers and the
editors of Political Studies; and the editors of the Review of
International Studies.
viii
Preface
The chapters in this book are elements of a double response - to

developments in political and social theory and in the academic
study of International Relations, and to changes in the inter-
national system itself over the past years, most particularly the
collapse of the Soviet bloc. In this sense, and in what may be a
reversal of conventional practice, the general, and in part
theoretical, reflections follow from a number of more concrete
studies of the international system and of the central conflicts
within it which I have already published, most specifically The
Making of the Second Cold War (1983) and Cold War, Third
World (1989) and a number of third world case studies. In so
doing, I hope not merely to extend these reflections on Inter-
national Relations, but also to draw out assumptions and questions
which were, to a greater or lesser extent, present within them.
International Relations, like all branches of knowledge, faces two
dangers- that of factual accounts devoid of theoretical reflection,
explanatory or ethical, and that of theorising unanchored in, or
tested by, the analysis of history itself. My hope is that these
essays, as responses to ideas and to events, will find a passage
between these two dangers. While making some general observa-
tions on the nature of the international system and of where
analysis of it may proceed, I have also examined some more
particular issues. My intention is to follow this overview of the
subject with two further theoretical and historical volumes, one on
the role of revolutions in the international system, the other on the
ethical tension between nationalism and internationalism.
In preparing these essays I have benefited from the stimulation
and criticism of many friends and colleagues over the past decade.
In particular I would like to thank my colleagues and students in
the International Relations (IR) Department at the London
School of Economics (LSE) who have, through individual contacts
and through the General Seminar in IR, provided many a
challenge and stimulus. Martina Langer of the International
Relations Department was ever helpful and speedy in helping with
IX
x Preface
preparation of the text. I would also like to thank the members of

the '1990s' International Relations discussion group, and of the
Transnational Institute, for providing congenial intellectual
contexts for the working through of many of these ideas. My
greatest thanks are to my partner, Maxine Molyneux, whose
support and ideas have been as enriching as they have been
indispensable.
While the chapters of this book have been updated and
considerably developed, many of the ideas and arguments
contained in this book draw on a set of articles and essays
published over the last few years: in particular parts of Chapters 1
and 2 have appeared in Political Studies (vol. 38, no. 3, September
1990), Economy and Society (vol. 18, no. 3 August 1989) and
Millennium (vol. 22, no. 2, summer 1993); an earlier version of
Chapter 4 was published in Millennium (vol. 16, no. 2, 1987); of
Chapter 5 in Millennium (vol. 21, no. 3, winter 1992); of Chapter 6
in Review of International Studies (vol. 16, no. 3, summer 1990); of
Chapter 7 in Millennium (vol. 17, no. 3, winter 1988); of Chapter 8
in Mike Bowker and Robin Brown (eds.) From Cold War to
Collapse: Theory and World Politics in the 1980s (Cambridge
University Press, 1993); of Chapter 9 in Contention (no. 2, winter
1992). Chapters 10 and 11 include material from New Left Review
(no. 193, May-June 1992) and from the Barclay Enterprise
Lecture, given at LSE, 17 May 1993, 'Sleep-Walking Through
History: The New World and its Discontents', later published by
the London School of Economics Centre for the Study of Global
Governance.
London FRED HALLIDAy

1
Introduction: The
Pertinence of the
'International'
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold: to examine what is meant

by the term 'international' and the confusion it occasions, and
secondly to provide a brief account of the growth in the discipline,
and the factors underlying this development. International
Relations (IR) has occupied an uneasy, often marginal, place in
the study and teaching of the social sciences. Yet its subject matter
is, in the simplest terms, clear enough, comprising three forms of
interaction -relations between states, non-state or 'transnational'
relations across frontiers, and the operations of the system as a
whole, within which states and societies are the main components.
While they may vary in the stress they lay on each of these, all
theories of the 'international' propose some explanation of each:
indeed the major debates within IR revolve, to a greater or lesser
extent, around these three dimensions and the primacy of one or
the other.
The 'international' in Perspective
Theoretical diversity is a strength, not a weakness of International

Relations. 1 The difficulties it has experienced lie not in any
theoretical uniformity or stasis, but above all in its methodological
and historical bases. Unduly defensive about its own methodo-
logical and disciplinary strengths, IR has, in the main, been
treated as an appendix to other, more established, subjects.
National politics, economics and sociology have been the main
1
2 Rethinking International Relations
focus of these disciplines: the 'international' has for long been a

supernumerary element, an option for students, a penultimate
chapter for the scholar.
The dramatic change in the status of the 'international' in the
past decade or two has only compounded this. Now that it has
become fashionable to stress the pervasiveness of the 'inter-
national', and the displacement of national specificity by
'globalisation', this once neglected dimension has become the
property of all: banishment has given way to promiscuity. Yet in
the process, the degree of internationalisation has been distorted-
overstated for the current world, and located far too simplistically
in changes since 1945 or the 1960s. This historical foreshortening
takes several forms, such as an unqualified assertion of the
outdatedness of the nation-state or of the role of force, in the case
of the literature on transnationalism, or the invocation of a new
age of 'post-modernity'. The continued adaptation of the global
and the particular - in politics, culture, economics - is under-
stated, and the much longer histories of international processes,
many of them going back to the workings of the international
system in the sixteenth century, are obscured.
These two approaches - denial and exaggeration - are but two
sides of the same coin, in that the the proponents of the latter
make their point by contrasting the contemporary world with a
period when, supposedly, states, nations, societies were separate
and insulated from each other. 'lnternationalisation' did not,
however, begin with a world financial market or Cable News
Network and its world-wide broadcasts. Nationalism itself, despite
its apparently individual and discrete evolution and character, and
its celebration of the specific, is an international process, a product
of intellectual, social and economic change shared by societies and
stimulated by their interaction over the past two centuries. 2 One
can indeed argue that far from the 'international' arising from the
national, and from a gradual expansion of links between discrete
entities, the real process has been the other way around: the
history of the modern system is one both of internationalisation
and of the breakdown of pre-existing flows of peoples, religion,
trade into separate entities; the precondition for the formation of
the modern nation-state was the development of an international
economy and culture within which these distinct states then
coalesced.
Introduction 3
Writers in Britain and the USA make much of the ways in

which, over the past twenty or thirty years, forms of political
control and sovereignty have been eroded by transnational
processes: but this is a gigantic historical conceit, born of the
particular, and very exceptional, national histories of these states.
Of the 190 or so sovereign states in the world today, only half a
dozen have escaped foreign occupation in the past two centuries.
Even in the case of Britain, for example, a country where insular
consciousness is greater than in most, and one of that half-dozen
countries to escape foreign occupation, there is no purely national
history: from Julius Caesar, St Augustine, the Anglo-Saxon
invasions, through 1066, the Reformation, the emergence of the
modern state in conflict with European neighbours, to the time of
empire and world war, the national and the international have
always interacted. The United States of America (USA) has
escaped foreign occupation since independence in 1783: but its
whole development has been one of interaction with the inter-
national - the acquisition by force and purchase of most of its
territory from other states and peoples, the mass influx of
populations from other countries, the expansion from around 1890
of US financial and industrial power across the world, the shaping
of its economy and political system by international conflict.
In both countries the myth of national insulation compounds the
other constitutive myth of their political development, that of non-
violent evolution: while they have subsequently been able to
acquire legitimacy through the gradual spread of democracy, both
the United Kingdom and the United States were states created,
and, on more than one occasion, maintained by force. What is
more, even the briefest of comparative surveys will show, if only
by implication, that the spread of democratic forms, and the
arrival of universal suffrage was itself an international process, a
result both of changing international norms, and of the impact on
different societies of international processes: industrialisation and
the arrival of mass society on the one hand, the political pressures
born of the two world wars on the other. The same applies to the
history of national economies: trade, and state intervention,
shaped by the needs of inter-state competition, have determined
this process, from the planting of oaks and the building of roads, to
the promotion of industry, technology and education. Equally, a
process such as the demise of slavery, preserved in particularist
and ethical terms, reflects broad changes in international trade and

production. 3
What is lived, and usually studied, as something that happened
'within' countries, turns out to be part of a much broader
international process of political and economic change. Through-
out 'national' histories, international competition, influence and
example all play central formative roles. Taxation for military
purposes, and the levying of taxes on trade, lie at the heart of the
modern state: the British Customs and Excise department enjoys
wide-ranging autonomy from government ministries because it has
existed longer than any ministry. There can, therefore, be no
purely national history of any state; equally there can be no theory
of the economy, the state, or social relations, that denies the
formative, not just residual or recent, impact of the international.
Thus neither of the conventional approaches - denial and over-
statement- do justice to a question that is common to all social
scientists but which is, within its particular disciplinary optic, the
constitutive concern of IR, namely the interaction of the national
and international, the internal and the external.
Formative Influences
The subject of International Relations is, like all academic

disciplines, located in more than one dimension. All the social
sciences owe their origins, and development, to an interaction with
the outside world: economics arose as a response to trade and
industrialisation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
sociology to the evolution of urban society, anthropology to the
colonial encounter and so forth. Yet each also has its own agenda
as a subject taught at university: a need to resist the fashions of the
moment and the pressures of power in order to look with
detachment at its subject-matter; a mission to use its substance and
methods as a means of sharpening and training the minds of its
students; and its own set of enduring disciplinary concerns.
These enduring concerns of International Relations, as evid-
enced by the usual range of courses offered, have two distinct
aspects: one is broadly analytic - the role of the state in
international relations, the problem of order in the absence of a
supreme authority, the relationship between power and security,
Introduction 5
the interaction of economic with military strength, the causes of

conflict and the bases of cooperation. The other is normative -the
question of when and to what degree it is legitimate to use force,
the obligations we owe the state and those not from our state, the
place of morality in international relations, the rights and wrongs
of intervention.
International Relations is, however, equally located in another
dimension, that of the 'real', or perhaps accurately 'non-reflective',
world. Nowhere in the broad spectrum of human activity does the
mythical and the imagined play such a role in everyday discourse
as in the field of the international. One has only got to think of the
strengths of national identification and antipathy, the almost
universal incidence of conspiracy theory and suspicion about
'foreigners', the extraordinary ignorance, even among the better
educated, about other countries, and the ease with which those
whose business it is to arouse public passions can do so by resort to
misrepresentation of the foreign, the alien, the 'other'.
Of all the disciplines of the social science taught in universities,
those concerned with IR probably encounter the greatest degree
of misunderstanding and ignorance, and engage in more ground-
clearing, conceptual, ethical and factual, than any other. This
alone, of course, gives the subject a definite relevance, even if it
lends to the clarification of international issues a certain Sisyphean
character. When apparently highly educated and experienced
people can include in their discussions of the future international
orientation of other countries such primitive stereotypes as 'the
German mind', 'the Japanese psyche', then we are all reminded
just how far we still have to go. The best that International
Relations can do may be - in the sphere of its activity, to apply
Freud's famous dictum on the purpose of psychoanalysis - to
reduce neurosis to everyday common misery.
The relationship of the academic study of international relations
to the outside world is of course shaped, and stimulatingly so, by
other concerns. Some are evident, and some are not. The most
obvious is that people feel that the international is important: it is
a source of threat, most obviously military, it is an arena where
great economic benefits and losses may be incurred, it is
apparently more and more intrusive into everyday lives. The
academic study of international relations began as an attempt to
study the causes of the greatest international intrusion of all,
namely war, and to develop means of reducing its incidence in the

future. It has since gone on to encompass a broader agenda - of
international economic activity in particular. As the world
changes, so do the questions posed for the academic study of the
international. The difficulty is that the very pressure of inter-
national issues, and the demand for analysis and commentary on
them, can act not only as a stimulant and a corrective of academic
thinking, but also as a warp; the result is that not only the curiosity
of the outside world, but the very work undertaken in universities
is shaped by what funders and policy-makers read in the morning
papers. To determine the academic agenda of International
Relations by such concerns is, however, dangerous, not only for
the loss of independence but also for the loss of perspective,
historical and conceptual. Economists are happy to comment on,
and be consulted about, the future of the stock exchange or the
rate of inflation, just as political scientists can proffer a view on the
outcome of the next election: this is not, any more than it should
be in the case of International Relations, the basis of what they
teach in a university.
The pressure on International Relations is, however, all the
greater because of another, less evident, factor, and that is what
may be termed its theoretical invisibility. Except for those who
make it their business to teach and study it at a university, the
subject does not have a clear definition at all, beyond sage
commentary on yesterday's news, or the odd flash of comparative
and contemporary international history. Part of this arises from an
everyday confusion about the word 'international'. The term itself,
invented by Jeremy Bentham in 1780 to denote legal links between
states, is a misnomer in terms of the subsequent meaning of the
term 'nation', since the least of its concerns has been relations
between nations in the sense that we use the term today. Nations
and states may or may not coincide, but even when they do those
relations that are conventionally called 'international' refer to
what passes between the governments of those countries, not that
which occurs between the respective national populations. More-
over, for most users of the term, the word 'international affairs'
covers two quite different things, namely what in newspapers is
included in the foreign pages: i.e. internal affairs, the domestic
politics of other countries, and international affairs in the strict
sense, namely relations between states and societies themselves.
Introduction 7
The former is, in academic terms, the purview of regional and

comparative politics: the latter alone is what forms the basis of the
academic study, International Relations.
To this is added, however, a final and curious twist. Most people
interested in a general way in the social sciences are aware of
theoretical work in a range of fields, even if they cannot spell out
what these theories actually say. Thus the average reader of the
more serious newspapers or of the New York Review of Books will
have heard of theorists of economics, Keynes or Friedman, and
may well be aware of debates in philosophy, between Rawls and
Nosick and their followers, or of the general ideas of Foucault and
'post-modernism'. In the case of International Relations this is
certainly not the case: very few outside the subject are aware of
any of those engaged in theoretical work in International
Relations, let alone the issues involved. It is assumed that a brisk
combina-tion of current affairs and common sense, with the odd
historical reference thrown in, can do the trick. The preservation
of an adequate and creative balance between the two dimensions
of International Relations, the academic and the policy-related, is
therefore all the more difficult. Yet precisely because of the pull of
the present, this is the more important to get right, or as right as
possible.
The Emergence of Theory
In the remainder of this chapter, I shall try to provide a brief

sketch of how theorjsation of the international has proceeded. The
development of IR, like that of all social sciences, is in fact a
product not just of two, but of three concentric circles of influence:
change and debate within the subject itself, the impact of
developments in the world, but also the influence of new ideas
within other areas of social science. While straightforward
academic genealogies are common, these latter two influences
receive less attention. IR has a very limited 'self-knowledge', let
alone an adequate account of the extra-disciplinary factors acting
on it. Yet in both forms these are evident enough: the major
events of twentieth-century history (the First and Second World
Wars, the Cold War and its aftermath) have shaped its focuses at
least as much as inter-paradigm disputes. Like other social
sciences IR has, however, tended to obscure some of these

connections, for fear of loss of intellectual prestige. Thtts the
enlisting of 'realism' by the Cold War, or the role of the Vietnam
War in promoting awareness of 'interdependence', are neglected.
Equally, national differences, of history and society, have shaped
analysis and research: what in the USA is a study of decision-
making may become in Germany the analysis of the relation
between democracy and foreign policy; 4 third world countries are
concerned with foreign domination, developed ones with integra-
tion. More generally, the very 'historicity' of its concepts, their
generation in particular contexts and, in analytic terms, their
relevance to specific periods, is denied.
The linkage of intellectual history to history in general remains
intermittent and obscure, as does, in a more restricted vein, the
relation between IR and other trends in the social sciences. Issues
of international theory and analysis have been present throughout
much of classical political thought. 5 Thucydides on the causes of
war, Machiavelli and Hobbes on the nature of power, Grotius on
international law, Kant and Marx on preconditions for cosmo-
politanism are but some of the most obvious antecedents. These
considerations were, however, part of a broader theoretical
endeavour - of history, law, philosophy, political theory - and
only rarely emerged as reflections upon a distinctive analytic
subject-matter, the 'international'.
As a separate academic discipline, International Relations is less
than a century old. The study of international relations began in
the aftermath of the First World War, focusing on the factors
precipitating war and the means to prevent its recurrence. It was in
that period that the first British university chairs and departments
were established- at Aberystwyth, LSE and Oxford- while in the
non-academic realm the Royal Institute of International Affairs
was set up to guide public policy. Contemporaneously and for
similar reasons, academic departments and the Council on Foreign
Relations were established in the US.
The three constituent elements of IR - the inter-state, the
transnational and the systemic - allow of many specialisations and
varying theoretical approaches. IR today comprises as sub-fields,
in addition to international theory as such (that is, the theorisation
of these three elements), strategic studies, conflict and peace
studies, foreign policy analysis, international political economy,
Introduction 9
international organisation, and a group of normative issues

pertaining to war: obligation, sovereignty, rights. To these
analytically distinct sub-fields must be added the range of regional
specialisms where theoretical approaches are applied to, and
refract, the study of individual states and groups of states. These
may not involve different theoretical approaches but vary
considerably in the relative emphasis they give to issues of, say,
ideology or law, economics or military power. In the 1980s alone a
range of new international issues were incorporated into the
analytic compass of the subject and taught as distinct courses: sea-
use and ocean politics, women and the international arena, the
international relations of the third world, ecological questions,
international dimensions of communication, to name but some.
The growth and variation in subject-matter within IR, already
alluded to, parallel an evolution in theoretical approaches. 6 In its
initial phase, IR sought to distinguish itself from those disciplines
out of which it had emerged: thus it was distinct from international,
that is, diplomatic, history in its comparative and theoretical
approach; over time it separated itself from international law in
adopting a positivist rather than normative approach and in
analysing dimensions of international interaction beyond the legal.
It was distinguished from political science as such in seeking to
combine the political with the economic and military and in taking
as its object of analysis not the internal political system of any one
country, but the international system itself, one distinguished
above all by the lack of sovereign authority and the greater
salience of violence within it. Its theoretical evolution has none the
less involved continued interaction with, and bo:rrowing from,
these disciplines as well as a growing interaction with other social
sciences, notably economics. Two disciplines with which it might
have been thought cognate, but with which it had very little
relationship, were sociology and geography: while, as we shall see
in Chapters 4 and 5, it utilised certain ideas from sociology,
notably 'society', and while in its early period it intersected with
the concerns of geopolitics, neither discipline had a major impact
on IR. The result has been, amongst other things, that subsequent
theoretical developments in these subjects have often not been
recognised within IR. It is only recently, as it has overcome its
early 'protectionist' phase, that IR has again begun openly to learn
from and contril:Jute to other areas of social science. The recent
interest of historical sociology in the dominance of strategic and

'war-making' concerns within state formation, and of the degree to
which international rather than endogenous factors have shaped
state development, is one pertinent example of this latter process.
If IR had a parental discipline it was not so much history or
political science as international law. In continental Europe, this
pattern prevails in many departments. In its initial phase, after the
First World War, IR adopted a predominantly legal approach,
today erroneously presented as 'utopianism' or 'idealism'. This
school, of 'peace through law', arose in part out of the liberalism
of Woodrow Wilson and sought to limit or prevent war by
international treaty, negotiation procedures and the growth of
international organisations, notably the League of Nations.
Academic critics of this approach often refer to it as 'utopianism',
but this is, in three ways, a misleading categorisation: first, it
confuses an attempt to regulate or improve international relations,
a perfectly down-to-earth project, with the pursuit of an ideal, a
'utopia'; secondly, it ignores what was for Wilson a central
precondition for the effectiveness of peace through law, namely
the general spread of liberal democracy, something he was wrong
in anticipating after the First World War, but which does have, as
we shall see in Chapter 10, considerable implications for the
international; 7 and, thirdly, in disparaging the 'utopians', these
critics derogate from the concept and analysis of utopia itself, a
valid and long-standing part of social and political theory.
Realism and Behaviouralism
With the crises of the 1930s, 'idealism' gave way to 'realism',

initially in the work of E. H. Carr and later in the work of a range
of US-based writers, including Hans Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger
and Kenneth Waltz. 8 They took as their starting point states'
pursuit of power, the centrality of military strength within that
power, and the enduring inevitability of conflict in a world of
multiple sovereignty. While not denying entirely a role for
morality, law and diplomacy, realists laid greatest stress on armed
might as an instrument of maintaining peace. They believed that
the central mechanism for regulating conflict was the balance of
power, through which undue strength of one state would be
Introduction 11
compensated for by increased strength or expanded alliances on

the part of others: this was something inherent in the system but
also capable of conscious promotion.
In a parallel development, a group of realists on the European
side of the Atlantic developed what came to be known as the
'English School': Charles Manning, Martin Wight, Hedley Bull
and Fred Northedge emphasised the degree to which the inter-
national system was 'anarchical', that is, without a central rulerY
They saw it not as straightforward chaos but as in a certain sense a
'society': that is, a group of states that interacted according to
certain conventions. These included diplomacy, international law,
the balance of power, the role of the great powers and, most
controversially, war itself. This school has continued to produce
work of consistent orientation and quality, evident in the writings
of Alan James, Michael Donelan, James Mayall, Adam Watson
and others. 10
Realism became the dominant, if not sole, approach to the
subject with the growth in academic study of international
relations after the Second World War. It possessed a powerful and
comprehensive explanation of international relations and conflict.
It accorded with common sense the terms in which international
affairs were discussed in much public debate. It had received a
powerful, apparently incontrovertible, affirmation from the events
of the 1930s and their consequences. Normally presumed as an
evolution within the English-speaking world, realism came to
articulate criticisms of the League of Nations that had, from the
1920s, been voiced by the German right. 11 Indeed, many of the
central themes of realism appear as (domesticated) descendents of
the militaristic and racist Social Darwinism of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. At the same time, it would seem
probable that the increased concern of political science in the
1930s with 'power' and the processes by which it is allocated, as
distinct from formal constitutional procedures compounded this
'power politics' trend within the academic field of International
Relations. 12
The dominance of realism began to be challenged in the 1960s
and has remained under pressure ever since. 13 From the early
1960s onwards, behaviouralism constituted an alternative to
orthodox IR as it did to other branches of the social sciences at
both the methodological and conceptual levels. Thus the new
'scientific' school of IR, almost wholly based in the US, sought to

get away from the traditionalists' use of history and orthodox
political terms such as 'state' to a new, quantifiable, study of what
could be observed, i.e. 'behaviour', in this case international
processes and interactions. Karl Deutsch studied the growth of
international communications; James Rosenau focused on in-
formal interactions, 'transnational linkages' between societies that
bypassed orthodox state-to-state relations; Morton Kaplan
developed more 'scientific' theorisations of the international
systems. 14 A wide-ranging and often acerbic debate between
'traditionalists' and 'behaviouralists' in IR took place, mirroring in
substance and tone many of the themes raised in the parallel
discussions within political science. The strictures of Bernard
Crick- the analyst of politics- on US political science found their
parallel 'in IR. In this exchange, in which both sides rather
overreached their philosophical and methodological competencies,
the 'English' school stood firm, positing history and 'judgement'
against what was seen as the vulgar and mistakenly 'scientific'
approach of American political science. 15 To this we shall return in
Chapter 2.
The overall attempt by the behaviouralists to supplant 'tradi-
tional' IR failed in three key respects. First, realism, and its later
variant 'neo-realism', remained the dominant approach within the
academic and policy-related study of international relations. 16
Secondly, the very theoretical challenge posed by behaviouralism,
to supplant the pre-scientific study of the 'state' and other
conventional, historical concepts with a new scientific theorisation
was not taken far enough, above all because it failed to provide an
alternative theorisation of the state itself. Thirdly, its theoretical-
and fund-raising - promise, to come up with major new conclu-
sions on the strength of data collection, was never fulfilled. In the
end behaviouralism became an adjunct, rather than an alternative
to, the orthodox state-centred approach. None the less, out of the
behaviouralist challenge and later theorisations of 'transnational'
and systemic factors, a number of major new sub-fields developed
within the discipline, three of which merit special attention:
foreign policy analysis, interdependence and international political
economy. Thus, if realism and neo-realism remained predominant,
they no longer had an intellectual or institutional monopoly within
the subject. Offshoots of the behavioural approach, foreign policy
Introduction 13
analysis, interdependence and international political economy,

were to achieve a permanent place in the overall discussion.
Foreign policy analysis, the study of the factors determining
foreign policy outcomes and decisions in particular, was an
ambitious and in many respects successful attempt to challenge the
core tenets of realism. 17 In seeking to analyse how foreign policy is
made, it rejects some of the central premises of realism: that the
state can be treated as a unitary actor; that it can be deemed to act
rationally, to maximise power or defend a national interest; that
the internal character and influences of a country can be treated as
not . relevant to the study of its foreign policy - this latter a
favourite claim of Waltz's in particular. Instead, foreign policy
analysis examined the composition of the foreign-policy-making
process - first in terms of bureaucratic and individual fragmenta-
tion and rivalry within the state itself, then in terms of the input of
broader elements within the polity, including legislatures, the
press, public opinion and ideology.
This approach opened up the possibility of something that had
been precluded by realism's denial of the relevance of internal
factors, and which brought it into fruitful interaction with work in
political science, namely the comparative study of foreign policy
making and of the ways in which different constitutional, historical
and social endowments affect the formulation and implementation
of foreign policy. The conclusion reached on this route, in
international as much as in more domestic investigations, was that
the premise of 'rationality' had to yield, in the face of bureaucratic
infighting, unintended consequences, individual and group delu-
sions, 'group think' and so forth. The presupposition that states
could be treated as rational power-maximisers and calculators of a
national interest was shown to be an inadequate, and often
diversionary, basis for analysing foreign policies.
The most important challenge of foreign policy analysis was,
however, to realism's claim that states could be treated uniquely as
units in an environment, without reference to their internal
structures and changes therein. What foreign policy analysis
sought to show was not only that its approach, incorporating
domestic factors, could provide a more persuasive account of the
making of foreign policy, and of its irrationalities, but also that it
was necessary to identify the ways in which the domestic
environments and processes of countries were affected by external
factors, whether or not the state was involved in this interaction.

This was evidently the case with economic processes - changes in
the world price of oil had effects on countries, whatever
governments chose to do- and also with a range of ideological and
political ones. Societies were interacting in ways that were
'transnational' rather than inter-state and these 'linkages' were in
turn having an impact on foreign policy. Faced with such external
challenges and influences, states acted to accommodate or pre-
empt, depending on circumstances.
Foreign policy analysis, born out of the behaviouralist rejection
of 'institutional' concepts, did not develop the theory of the state
itself. It had other limitations too: a narrow, fetished, concern with
decisions and a sociologically naive concept of the internal
'environment'. It therefore failed to take the opportunity which
later, historical sociological, literature was to benefit from, of a
comprehensive, combined, analysis of the internal and external
roles of state. Yet it was foreign policy analysis's achievement to
have opened this question up and made it possible to examine the
internal-external relationship in a new light.
It was in this context that there emerged the distinct approach
based on 'interdependence', a concept used to focus on how
societies and states were becoming increasingly interlinked and
what the consequences of this process were. The development of
the literature on interdependence illustrates well the opportunities,
and pitfalls, of recognising the domestic-international connection:
while it provides a context for examining this link, it has often led
to a simplification of the relationship and a facile assertion that all
is now 'interdependent'.
'Interdependence' is a term that has been intermittently in
vogue for over a century. In contemporary usage it originated as a
concept in economics, where it had a comparatively clear
meaning, according to which two economies were interdependent
when there was a rough equality of power between them and when
their mutual interaction was such as to make each significantly
vulnerable to actions by the other. Interconnection produced
vulnerability and hence acted to restrain what others might do. In
its classical form, this was indeed the idea that increasing trade
between nations would strengthen peace, an idea common prior to
the First World War but often heard since. Its re-emergence in the
1970s was a response both to economic events - the decline of the
Introduction 15
dollar, the OPEC (Oil Producing and Exporting Countries) price

rises - and to the political impact within the USA of the Vietnam
War. In its 1970s formulation, and especially in the work of Robert
Keohane and Joseph Nye, it rested on three propositions: that the
state was losing its dominant position in international relations to
'non-state' actors and forces, such as multinational corporations;
that there was no longer a hierarchy of international issues, with
military and strategic affairs, 'high politics', at the top and
economic and welfare issues, 'low politics', further down; and that
military power was losing its salience in international relations. 18
Even if the realist view of a state-centric strategy-orientated world
had been true of an earlier epoch, this was no longer the case, as
old barriers broke down and economic and political forces paid
less and less attention to the state.
Interdependence theory was criticised from a number of
perspectives. Waltz argued that it was historically misconceived,
since interdependence had in many respects been greater in earlier
periods than in the present. 19 Waltz and others saw increased
interaction as a stimulant of conflict: 'good fences make good
neighbours' they intoned. Northedge and Bull contested the view
that it was either true or desirable for states to lose control over
populations, or to cede responsibility for managing international
affairs: for all the talk of 'global issues' and the universal
'commons', it was states who, for better or worse, remained
responsible for resolving these questions, of peace, famine,
ecology. Individuals identified as much as ever with the state and
looked to it to perform security, representation and welfare
functions. Marxists pointed out that interdependence applied, at
best, to a small group of developed Western countries and that its
application to North-South relations concealed asymmetries of
power and wealth that the imperialist system was compounding.
The idea of interdependence was also dented by the deteriora-
tion in international relations in the latter part of the 1970s and
early 1980s. It appeared less evident, in both East-West and third
world contexts, that military power had lost its salience; inter-
national relations seemed to be concentrated once again and in a
rather traditional manner on states in general, and great powers in
particular; the supersession or circumvention of the state appeared
in many cases to take a malign form, rather than the benign one
that liberal exponents of interdependence theory had implied -
whether in situations of civil war (Lebanon, Sri Lanka), or in the

growth of transnational processes that were unwelcome -
terrorism, pollution and capital flight amongst them. 'Non-state
actors', like new social movements, were not all benign: just as the
former included fanatical religious sects and racist youth move-
ments, in addition to Oxfam, Bandaid and Amnesty International,
the latter category included the Mafia and the Medellin Cartel.
International Relations since the 1970s
The challenges to realism of behaviouralism, interdependence and

international political economy eroded the former's monopoly on
the subject and produced a more diverse and competitive
discipline. This in its turn encouraged a variety of other approaches
to emerge, both in vindication of realism and in further rejection
of it.
The reaffirmation of realism, 'neo-realism', to which I shall
return in Chapter 2, has engaged with the concerns of inter-
national political economy but sought to re-establish the primacy
of states, and politico-military concerns, within the overall
analysis. Thus Stephen Krasner ascribed the failure of third world
states to gain acceptance for their New International Economic
Order not to their economic weakness as such, but rather to their
weakness as states and their espousal of principles that clashed
with those of the dominant states in the international system. 20
Robert Tucker stressed the continued role of Great Powers and
military force in maintaining the international system and ascribed
the poverty of third world states to endogenous political and
economic factors. 21 The central tenets of neo-realism were,
however, most clearly laid out in two major works of the late 1970s
- Hedley Bull's The Anarchical Society and Kenneth Waltz's
Theory of International Relations: their arguments are reviewed
critically in, respectively, Chapters 5 and 2. 22 Both recognised, and
sought to refute, the criticisms of the past two decades. Thus they
stressed the primacy of states in the international system, and the
subordinate power and role of 'non-state' actors. At the same
time, they argued that economic processes, like other trans-
national activities, required states to provide the security and
regulation needed for their continuation. They were sceptical of
Introduction 17
claims that interdependence was on the increase and they stressed

the continued importance of the great powers in managing
international relations, for better or worse.
If 'neo-realism' responded to criticism of realism by reasserting
traditional tenets, others took the analysis of IR even further away
from established orthodoxy. In a radical extension of behaviour-
ism, John Burton in his World Society and other works developed
a theory of international relations based upon individual needs and
the system of issue-related linkages established by such needs. 23
The international system was, therefore, in Burton's view, a
cobweb of issue-defined interactions, within which the specific
structures of military and state power played a distinct but not
exclusive or predominant role. With a special emphasis upon the
resolution of conflict through small-group and individual media-
tion, Burton's work broke flamboyantly with the state-centric view
of international relations by introducing not only an alternative
analysis but also an alternative approach to policy. In a parallel
development, the World Order Modelling Project, Richard Falk
developed a theory of alternatives and oppositions to state power
at the international level based again on human needs and
transnational, non-state, interactions.
The growing relationship of Marxism to IR constituted another,
unorthodox, development in the 1970s and 1980s, which will be
discussed at greater length in Chapter 3. As already indicated,
Marxism's point of entry into IR was on the issue of underdevelop-
ment, and in many ways remained confined to this area. Not only
was the alternative, more classical, Marxist view on development
downplayed, according to which it was in capitalism's interest to
develop the third world, but Marxist concepts with more relevance
to the central concerns of IR- on the causes of war, role of classes,
character of ideology - were not applied to international analysis
in the same way. In arguing for the primacy of an alternative
agenda - North-South relations and international structures of
exploitation - Marxism left the main terrain of International
Relations relatively unscathed. This insulation of IR from Marxist
influence, to a degree perhaps greater than in any other area of the
social sciences, was of course compounded by the predominance
of American writing on the subject, reflecting an intellectual
climate from which Marxism was largely absent.
Only in the 1980s did this situation began to change. Within the
writing on international political economy, there was an applica-

tion of Marxist concepts to analyse the causes and consequences of
an increasingly internationalised market and the new forms it was
taking. Within the writing on foreign policy analysis, it became
possible to examine not only how bureaucratic and constitutional
factors affect policy outcomes but also how these are themselves
shaped by broader historical social and economic factors, including
class factors, within the country concerned. 24 The role of military
production sectors in promoting international confrontation and
alarm is one obvious, and not negligible, example of this.
The growth of a historical sociological literature around issues of
international competition and state formation, itself engaging
critically with Marxism, provides a particularly fruitful opportunity
for new work on exogenous-endogenous relations and on the ways
in which states interact with the world system.Z5 This literature has
made it possible, more than ever before, to discuss perhaps the
most deeply embedded and neglected element in realism, namely
the legal-territorial conception of the state which it uses, a subject
to which I shall return in Chapter 4. Much of the debate between
realism and Marxism has revolved around the question of the
state, yet it has too rarely been recognised that this involves two
quite distinct conceptions of 'state': the legal-territorial concept,
borrowed by IR from law and traditional political science, enables
one set of questions to be addressed and theorised; the alternative
concept, however, borrowed from Marxism and Weberian
sociology, in which the state is seen as an administrative-coercive
entity, an apparatus within a country or society rather than that
country as a whole, allows a very different set of questions to be
analysed. These include the vexed issues of how the international
and the domestic interact, and how changing relations of states to
peoples are affected by international factors, be these the role of
states in warfare, or shifting international standards of what does
and does not constitute legitimate government.
An even more recent critical current to emerge within IR has
been that influenced by feminism, the subject of Chapter 7 of this
book. Until the mid-1980s, IR appeared to be more indifferent to
issues of gender than any other area of the social sciences, a
situation compounded by widespread acceptance of the distinction
between a conventionally 'male' area of high politics, international
security and statecraft, and a 'female' one of domesticity,
Introduction 19
interpersonal relations and locality. This mutual indifference has,

however, given way in the face of two converging processes. One
comes from the realm of policy: in a range of international policy
areas, issues of gender have come to prominence in recent years.
These include questions of women in development processes,
issues in international law and EC policy pertaining to women, and
the varying impacts on men and women of international socio-
economic processes, among them migration and 'structural adjust-
ment' policies. The widespread involvement of women in move-
ments against war and nuclear weapons has made this another
point of gender-specific intersection. In a quite different area,
feminist writing has begun to engage with some of the core
concepts of IR theory and to question how far a gender-neutral
view of them is justified. These include the concepts of 'national
interest', security, power and human rights. All are presented in
the mainstream literature as gender-neutral concepts; yet, as
feminist re-examination has shown, each has implicit gender
significance. Above all, feminism, in common with other theories
emphasising individual and social rights, questions the very core of
conventional international relations practice, namely the supreme
value of sovereignty. For example, the establishment of independ-
ent states has in many countries led to a deterioration in women's
position vis-a-vis men, while assertions of sovereignty and
nationalist identity have been used to deny the legitimacy of
raising these issues: there is, therefore, room for considerable
engagement by feminism, in practice and theory, with the claims
of nationalism and with its correlate, the presumed authority of
the sovereign state.
The Parameters of 'Rethinking'
This chapter has argued that the 'international' is not an

additional, or recent, component of social and political reality but
an enduring, constitutive, element in it. Equally it has argued for
the location of IR in its broader intellectual and historical context.
The relationship of IR to other social sciences can above all be
defined by the joint approach which it, and other disciplines, could
make to issues that are both domestic and international: in regard
to specific issues or events it is possible to analyse how far the
international does and does not play a determinant role. 26 Three

groups of interrelated topics suggest themselves. The first are
issues of political theory in the older, normative, sense of the term:
of obligation, whether to family, state, or cosmopolitan com-
munity; of justice, its implementation at the national and
international levels, and its conflict with rival values, notably
security; of the legitimacy of force and coercion, within and
between states; of the right to resist sovereign states. 27 There are,
secondly, a set of theoretical issues in the more contemporary,
analytic sense: the analysis of power; the relation between
political, economic and ideological structures; the relevance of
rational choice models to social and political action, by states,
institutions and individuals within them. 28
Finally, there is the focus of this book, the explanation of social
and political systems in the light of both domestic and international
determinants. Each level, the national and the international, has
its own partial autonomy, yet, as indicated above, the insulation of
the two levels of study, as with political science and IR, has done
violence to explanation and analysis. As already argued, it is not
possible to explain the politics of individual states without
reference to a range of international factors, historical and
current. The 'international' is not something 'out there', an area of
policy that occasionally intrudes, in the form of bombs or higher
oil prices but which can conventionally be ignored. The inter-
national predates, plays a formative role in shaping, the emerg-
ence of the state and the political system. States operate
simultaneously at the domestic and international level and seek to
maximise benefits in one domain to enhance their positions in the
other. The requirements of inter-state competition explain much
of the development of the modern state, while the mobilisation of
domestic resources and the internal constraints account for much
of states' successes in this competition. Disciplines such as political
science and sociology, on the one hand, and International
Relations, on the other, are looking at two dimensions of the same
process: without undue intrusion or denial of the specificity of the
other, this might suggest a stable and fruitful interrelationship.
This relationship can, however, only be realised if the discipline

itself becomes more aware of each of the three circles of influence
Introdudction 21
upon it, and in particular of the external factors affecting it- if, in
effect, it evolves an acceptance of its own sociology of knowledge.
A body of thought can relate to the 'real' world in an effective and
critical way not by suppressing these connections, but by establish-
ing a distance from them, in both the priorities set and the
consciousness of how external factors have affected it. The history
of IR provides many examples of how this external constraint was
not adequately recognised, as does the history of social science in
general, and indeed of natural science. The priorities of the
subject have, in the main, been the priorities of elites and of states,
when not directly framed by the demands of state-related funding
agencies. This is true, however, not just for the explicit content of
work itself, but also for two other dimensions of this work: the
issues avoided and not discussed, and the underlying, apparently
neutral, methodologies used. The power of determining outcomes
depends as much on determining what questions are not raised,
and on excluding 'unacceptable' methods, as on imposing a
particular analysis. The extraordinary misrepresentation by IR of
the dominant conflict of the latter half of the twentieth century,
the Cold War, a subject discussed in Chapters 8 to 10, is a
remarkable case of ideological occlusion, the erection of a body of
knowledge serving not to illumine but to obscure a historical
process.
Equally, the dominance of inflatedly 'scientistic' methodologies,
or of their conventional opposite, ahistorical concepts of the
international 'system', have served to preclude other forms of
discussions within the discipline, notably on the role of values, and
on the linkage between domestic and international politics. As
Chapter 4 indicates, the flight from what is, in both domestic and
international politics, the central actor and concept, the state,
serves analogous ideological functions. If the recovery of IR's
history involves recuperation on all three levels- discipline, social
science, history itself- a reconstitution or rethinking of the subject
will simultaneously have to be aware of its significance in all three
of these dimensions.
The chapters that follow are one attempt to 'rethink' Inter-
national Relations along these lines. The next chapter is an
attempt to provide a critique of four major trends in the literature
from within the first circle, that of the discipline itself; the five
chapters that follow seek to broaden the discussion to relate
International Relations to a broader conception of social science,

while the final four locate the subject in the context of history
itself, and the responses of International Relations specialists to it.
The test of any such 'rethinking' will, however, consist as much in
the research and analyses of histories, states and societies that it
proposes and encourages, as in any strictly 'disciplinary' or
methodological engagement.
2
Theories in Contention
Chapter 1 aimed to provide a summary account of the challenges

facing International Relations and of the difficulties it faces. In the
face of these challenges the discipline of International Relations
has, in recent years, been riven by a series of methodological
debates the declared aim of which has been to resolve its
underlying uncertainties and establish a more rigorous relationship
with the real world beyond. Yet what resulted was, in too many
cases, not a clarification of method nor a more measured
interaction with history, but - in the case of established
approaches - a restatement of verities or - in the case of new
theories- a flight into confusion, a meandering compounded by
academic introversion, and a denial of both the significance and
the challenges of history. On one side, invocation of history as a
cult of facts served to deny historicity, i.e. political and intellectual
change or context; on the other 'Meta-theory', solemnly
announced, i.e. debates on how to write theory, became detached
from substantive analysis.
The point is not to argue against academic specialisation or
theoretical development: both are, as already made clear,
essential. But there is good specialisation and futile self-isolation;
there is theoretical work that is rigorous, as clear as possible, and
which has explanatory potential, and there is theory that is none of
these, 'theoreticist' in the sense of theory for the sake of it, often
covering old philosophic ground while pretending to say some-
thing new, pretentious where substance is lacking, and confused,
even lazy, where alternative formulation is possible.
Two methodological guidelines above all are important in this
respect. One is that while writing in IR needs to be methodologic-
ally aware and explicit, IR itself is not methodologically specific in
the sense of raising issues of theory or method distinct from other
23
social sciences. The problems it has - of fact and value, of

rationality and interpretation - are those of other social sciences:
the international has no epistemological or other privilege. 1 This
was, above all, the abiding error of the 'third debate' that arose in
IR in the latter part of the 1980s. 2 The attempt to resolve these
issues through discussion of the international alone, or to write of
IR in isolation from discussions in other social sciences, is a
conceit.
Secondly, given that IRis applied to a subject-matter, be this
the 'real', the 'concrete in history' or whatever, the test of its
theory is its explanatory power, not its methodological remote-
ness. Abstraction may be necessary, but as a route to explanation.
The alternative to bad theory is not empiricism, but good theory,
in both its conceptual and explanatory dimensions: the discipline
of IR has seen too much of the former, and, in recent years most of
all, too much theorising unanchored in historical explanation.
Taking these guidelines as its starting point, this chapter looks at
four of the more substantial approaches that have, at various
points in the past decades, been propounded as solutions to the
challenges facing International Relations. These are: traditional
empiricism, 'scientific' empiricism, neo-realism, post-modernism.
Traditional Empiricism: History and the English School
All social sciences face, from within and without their particular
disciplines, the argument that the 'facts' are enough, and that
theories, concepts, specialist language are unnecessary, examples
of 'jargon' and of academic pretension. This is particularly true of
International Relations: as a result of its 'invisibility' most of those
concerned with international issues, or having an opinion on them,
seem unaware that any specialist, conceptually specific, literature
on the subject exists. From within the discipline too, there are
pressures in this direction: the diplomatic historians for one have
long been wary of concepts and models and are quick to point to
what they regard as aberrations in this regard; robust and practical
dismissal of the need for such work recurs again and again in the
literature. 3 For students, coming to the subject for the first time,
the idea that there needs to be theoretical work often comes as a
surprise: Surely the facts are sufficient? And knowledge of the
Theories in Contention 25
international consists in knowing as many facts as possible? 4 Yet

facts are not, in IR or anywhere else, enough.
The arguments against empiricism have been cogently and
frequently stated elsewhere, especially in debates on sociology:
these criticisms apply to the study of the international as much as
to other social sciences. 5 First, there needs to be some preconcep-
tion of which facts are significant and which not. The facts are
myriad and do not speak for themselves. For anyone, academic or
not, there need to be criteria of significance. Secondly, any one set
of facts, even if accepted as true and as significant, can yield
different interpretations: the debate on the 'lessons of the 1930s' is
not about what happened in the 1930s, but about how these events
are to be interpreted. The same applies to the end of the Cold War
in the 1980s. Thirdly, no human agent, again whether academic or
not, can rest content with facts alone: all social activity involves
moral questions, of right and wrong, and these can, by definition,
not be decided by facts. In the international domain such ethical
issues are pervasive: the question of legitimacy and loyalty -
should one obey the nation, a broader community (even the
world, the cosmopolis), or some smaller sub-national group; the
issue of intervention - whether sovereignty is a supreme value or
whether other states or agents can intervene in the internal affairs
of states; the question of human rights and their definition and
universality.
In the field of IR, the initial facts/theory dividing line was drawn
between the historical approach to the international, based on
diplomatic history, and the first attempts to engage in 'Inter-
national Relations' itself, comparative and theoretical work on the
international. In several respects this division has been overcome,
in a range of work which uses conceptual developments in IR to
elucidate particular phases or episodes of international history. 6
Elsewhere a silly and futile argument continues as to where the
historical dividing line between IR and international history exists:
this misses the point that the issue is not 'history without archives',
or 'international analysis without concepts', but a differing
approach, the one factual and specific, the other comparative and
theoretical.
One concerted attempt to move beyond traditional history and
into a new theoretical domain, while still retaining a conventional
empiricist perspective and method, was that represented by the
'English School', a body of writers who began to produce work in

the 1950s and 1960s and who retain an influential following in
British universities today. The strengths of the 'English School' are
evident: a strong resistance to the fashions of 'presentism', a
resolute insistence on the endurance of constraint and necessity in
the international realm, an emphasis on the recurrence of concepts
and values in the study of international relations, and, by no
means least, a solid grounding in history itself. There is far more of
explanatory substance, and of theoretical challenge, in their works
than in most of the supposedly more 'scientific' or theoretically
contemporary literature that has sought to displace them.
Two of the central concepts of the 'English School'- 'State' and
'Society' -are the focus of subsequent chapters. Beyond the diffi-
culties raised by these terms, the 'English School', as reflected in the
work of Martin Wight remained, in some respects, constrained by
its origins, arrested by its concern to demonstrate equality with the
diplomatic historians, and equally by the conceptual under-
pinnings that IR brought with it from international history. 7
In the first place, the concept of 'history' with which Wight
operated was a curiously limited one: kings and queens, congresses
and battles, treaties and laws. In remaining engaged with the
historians, it failed to keep pace with changes in the concept of
history itself: the economic and the social remained alien to it.
What is most striking about reading Martin Wight, is that the use
of history in his work, brilliant and erudite as it is, is one that
historians themselves had in large measure ceased to practice.
Equally, while Wight and his associates insisted on the importance
of philosophic issues, and had their own conceptual schema
(notably 'international society'), their concept of political philo-
sophy was equally dated, consisting in the examination and re-
examination of a set of recurring themes, favourably grouped by
Wight into three transhistorical categories of rationalism, realism
and revolutionism. As an antidote to 'presentism' and as a means
of eliciting the conceptual issues, analytic and ethical, underlying
discussion of international relations, this was fruitful: but it failed
to recognise how far political philosophy itself had evolved and
how it offered the possibility of very different, and in some
ways more cogent, forms of political, including 'international',
theory.
It was in some respects the misfortune of the English School that
their 'philosophic' investigations, i.e. their eliciting of theoretical

underpinnings within the international, should have been consti-
tuted just prior to the great revival of political theory of the 1970s
and 1980s. 8 Wight's famous essay- 'Why is There no International
Theory?' - presupposes a particular concept of theory, i.e.
substantive classical philosophy - that was to be overtaken by
other writing almost as soon as it was published. 9
To these general limitations must be added the use of concepts
themselves: as will be explored at greater length in subsequent
chapters, the core terms used by Wight and Bull- 'society', 'state'
-are not given adequate, or even explicit, conceptual elaboration.
Definitions are introduced, or implied, in a way that suits the
overall argument, but, in so doing, they preclude other possibilities
of explanation and conceptual elaboration. The most obvious issue
of all, derived from the still unchallenged assumptions of diplomatic
history, is about what constitutes the international system itself. A
definition in terms of the growth of relations between states is one,
valid, definition: but, in addition to presupposing that somehow
the 'international' is made up of the links between the national, or
individual state, it also locates international history at the level of
the diplomatic and the inter-state. Alternative histories and
concepts of the international can be written by taking the starting
point as being the economic and the social, within which the
political, and the military, play an important role. The works of
Hobsbawm, Wallerstein, Krippendorf, Wolf and more recently
Rosenberg are all examples of such an alternative: the least that
can be said is that these provide a very different history of the
international system, and imply a variant set of ethical responses
to the orthodox version of its growth, 'the expansion of inter-
national society'. 10
'Scientific Empiricism': the Siren of Behaviouralism
One self-proclaimed alternative to the empiricist, factually based,

approach came in the 1950s and 1960s from the 'scientific
revolution' within the social sciences, and the rise of behavioural-
ism as an alternative to historical and empiricist accounts. This
school announced the possibility of a new quantitative, ahistorical,
and rigorous social science, in the field of the international as in
other areas; at the same time, it involved a critique of the pre-

existing schools as unfounded and outmoded. Yet the debate that
ensued, between Hedley Bull and Fred Northedge on the
traditional side, and James Rosenau and Morton Kaplan on the
behaviouralist side, was, in both cases, misguidedY
In the first place, this debate, formally about methodology,
acquired the character of a clash between two 'national' traditions,
an 'English' and an 'American' approach. This misrepresentation,
beyond obscuring the philosophic issues involved, served to
present international relations as somehow grouped into two,
implicitly monolithic, national camps, and in so doing obscured
the diversity in both camps, such as the rise of international
political economy in the British case, and the great range of
theoretical and political approaches in the American one. In other
words it served to reinforce both orthodoxy and polemic. The
latter was particularly evident in the way in which non-American
writers in critical traditions treated 'American' international
relations as a single, at times 'imperialist', whole, something that
was far from being the case: politically misguided, and analytically
imprecise, this practice has continued, with enduringly negative
results. Historical and regional differences do shape IR writing,
but not necessarily in a homogeneous way. The conceits of North
American behaviouralism have, rather too easily, found their
counterpart in the complacencies of their opponents - whether
English historiography or 'anti-imperialist' defiance. 12
Secondly, while the critique of empiricism has much to
recommend it, the alternative offered by such writers as James
Rosenau or J. D. Singer13 was itself spurious. The goal of a
scientific, quantitative-based international relations or social
science in general, is a chimera, one that, as already noted, ignores
the necessary unpredictability of human behaviour, the imposs-
ibility of analysis without criteria of significance, the role of ethical
issues in human affairs. Moreover, despite its claims to scientism,
behaviouralism operates with a spurious concept of science: if it has
been said that politicians operate with the conceptions of long-
dead economists, many social scientists, and not a few in IR,
operate with the prejudices of very long-dead philosophers of
science (such as John Stuart Mill, 1806-73). In many areas of
natural science, prediction is not a criterion of validity. Equally,
the natural sciences also operate with many concepts that cannot
be quantified or rendered very precise. Ironically for the positivists,

natural science often operates with a concept of analysis rather
akin to the 'judgement' that they so excoriated the traditionalists
for employing. Indeed, it was ironic that at the very moment when
behaviouralism, with its naive claim to 'science' was at its peak,
Kuhn should have published his Structure of Scientific Revolutions
showing how extraneous, 'institutional', factors shape specific
agendas. 14 Why the USA, in other respects a modern society,
should have made such a fuss about outdated methodologies is a
curiosity in itself, rather like the lack of a national banking
system.
To these methodological failings must be added the meagre
record of such positivism itself: as in other social sciences, grand
structures of quantification and algebra too often produced
banality or obscurity, or both; in the rush to avoid supposedly
outdated institutional categories such as the 'state' or 'war'
scholars resorted to confused interactions or taxonomic excess; in
the rejection of history, the behaviouralists produced conclusions
that were often ignorant of historical analogy, and which exagger-
ated the contemporary specificity of phenomena (e.g. globalisa-
tion).
The results of behaviouralism in IR were, therefore, poor; the
'behavioural revolution' served as a massive intellectual and
disciplinary detour, through feckless accumulation of data and
meaningless transhistorical comparisons. However, beyond a
welcome shaking up of the debate on methodology, some fruitful
consequences followed. As already discussed in Chapter 1, there
emerged, on the one hand, a wide-ranging exploration of the
process of foreign policy making, known as 'foreign policy
analysis'. The second positive consequence was the exploration of
the new forms of international interaction, subsumed under the
term 'interdependence'.
If these were significant achievements of the 'scientific' turn in
IR, they were achieved as much in spite of as because of the
theoretical reorientation of the discipline. For elsewhere many of
the worst features of this inflated 'revolution' were to be seen:
crazed pursuit of an elusive precision and prediction; increasing
absorption of the discipline in a language both trivial and private,
laboured and inflamed statements of the obvious. One example of
this approach was the attempt to provide an empirically precise
basis to theories of the causes of war. 15 Another was the assertion,

without conceptual or historical depth, of the supersession of the
state by 'transnational' development. Even those who did not fall
into the methodological spirals of the more committed
behaviouralists tended to counterpose their own, novel, approach
to a supposedly outmoded concern with the state: this, despite his
insights, was the enduring flaw in the work of James Rosenau. The
result was in ihe end the failure to break from the theoretical
premises of the dominant realist school, and its concept of the state.
Many of those who, in the 1960s, had begun to announce the
supersession of the state by new transnational phenomena, ended
up by accepting the continuing relevance, theoretical and actual,
of the state, and offering ameliorative modifications of the realist
approach.
An important example of this was Robert Keohane, one of the
originators of the transnationalism approach, and one of the most
innovative, and widely read, of those working in the field of
international relations theory. His 1970s work on transnationalism
was amongst the best, and least dogmatically 'scientific' of the
writing influenced by behaviouralism. His After Hegemony,
published in 1984, marked an important turning point in the
debate with transnationalism, since it addressed one of the central
claims of the realists, namely that there could be no order without
great powers, and without an element of direction and authority,
termed 'hegemony', in the system. 16
Important as it was in challenging this premise of realism,
Keohane's work nevertheless contained a number of debatable
assumptions. On the one hand, perhaps in order to establish a
congenial historical context, it both overstated the degree of
decline of US influence in the world, and, on the other, inflated
the role of the supposedly successor transnational institutions, in
this case the International Energy Agency. On the other, it
proceeded by including some questionable theoretical assump-
tions: its historical account of US 'decline' established too abrupt a
division between military and economic power, and failed to
recognise the ways in which US military predominance and
leadership, something that has continued after the Cold War, had
economic and other 'seigniorial' benefits. Its account of power
relations in the contemporary world was specific to those between
developed countries, and did not include those between less and
more developed states: hence as a general account, it understated

hierarchies and oligarchic benefits, which are more openly
recognised in theories of imperialism, on the one hand, and of
realism on the other.
Keohane also used only the realist definition of the state, against
which he sought to define his own transnationalist theory and so to
distance himself from both realism and Marxism, seen in this light
as sharing a common position. The result was that while not hostile
to Marxism, and willing to take its arguments seriously (at one
point he terms himself a Kautskyite), 17 Keohane declined to see
that within Marxism the 'state' could mean something very
different from what it meant in realist theory, and that this concept
is incorporated into a theory of power that embraces many of the
economic, social and ideological factors he subsumed within the
theory of interdependence.
Neo-Realism: 'Systems' without Content
In the face of these challenges, and of the rising importance of

economic issues on the international agenda, the school of realists
previously confined to historical and philosophic reflection gener-
ated a new body of work, 'neo-realism'. The work of Krasner and
Tucker, already mentioned in Chapter 1, was important here. If
the 'neo-' served in some measure to conceal the reassertion of
traditional themes- on state, power, conflict- it also reflected two
important revisions of the earlier agenda: on the one hand, a much
greater attention to the role of the economic in inter-state
relations, not in terms of transnational or interdependent
approaches, but as an instrument, mercantilist and competitive, of
state power; on the other hand, a theoretical revision, in an
attempt to make the theory more rigorous and to exempt it from
the methodological assaults to which the previous generation had
been subjected. Perhaps the most influential of these statements of
neo-realism was Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International
Politics. 18
Waltz's reputation in the field of international relations was
established with the publication of Man, the State and War in 1959,
a work in which he compared three 'images' of the origins of war-
the nature of man, the domestic constitution of states, and the
international system: he concluded that it was the third image

which provided the basis for a theory of the causes of war. One of
the central themes to emerge from this study, and repeated in his
later work, is the idea that the internal character of states is to be
excluded from the study of international relations.
Yet Man, the State and War, a lucid statement of the realist
position, achieved its apparently inexorable conclusions at the
expense of two issues. First, its distribution of interpretations of
conflict between three, apparently separate, compartments did
violence to the way in which many provided explanations that
straddled Waltz's divide: thus most theories based on image one,
human nature, provided a 'nurture', i.e. socialisation, account of
human personality and behaviour; more importantly, Waltz's
theories based on image two, liberalism and Marxism, both
contained an international dimension as an essential part of their
explanation. Liberalism asserted a close relation of democracy and
peace, not just as the first determining the second, but as an
interactive process. Lenin's theory of imperialism could only be
forced into the mould of the 'second image' by doing violence to its
detailed examination of how imperialism, far from being the
creation of an internal process, was the result of inter-state
economic and military competition. Secondly, as in his 1979 work,
Waltz contrasts what he terms 'reductionist' with 'systemic'
theories, i.e. those which explain international relations in terms
of the internal as opposed to those who look only at the
international system. The argument he adduces to support this is
that there is a regularity of outcomes in international relations that
persists despite changes in the character of actors. 19 The con-
sequence Waltz draws is, therefore, that it is no more necessary to
study the character of states in international relations that it is
necessary, when analysing markets, to study the internal workings
of firms. As will be discussed below, this is a questionable
conclusion.
Theory of International Politics begins with an assertion of the
need for, and possibility of, theory in the study of international
relations, and of the importance of analysing the structures of
inter-state relations. By structure he means 'a set of constraining
conditions' 20 and he exemplifies this in the international realm by
reference to two processes: socialisation (i.e. the acceptance by
states of certain behaviour) and competition.
The structure of the international political system is in Waltz's

view characterised by three features above all: by the fact that it is
anarchic, in the sense of their being no higher authority; that there
is no differentiation of function between different units, i.e. all
states perform roughly the same functions; and by an unequal
distribution of capacities, i.e. the distinction between great and
small powers. From these general propositions he derives a
number of other conclusions: that the central mechanism of the
international political system is the balance of power, and that the
nature of an inter-state system at any one time is given by the
character and number of its great powers. The world since 1945
had been constituted by relations between two great powers and is
therefore one of bipolarity, in contrast to the multipolarity of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Waltz takes the opportunity of his restatement of realism
to apply his theory to a number of contemporary issues in
international relations. Thus he criticises the enthusiasts of inter-
dependence theory for a lack of historical perspective - inter-
dependence was, he claims, in some ways greater before 1914 than
it is today- and for neglecting the dangers which excess interaction
between states can produce. In contrast to those who argue, as
part of the interdependence position, that military power is less
useful than in earlier epochs, he claims that it retains its purposes
in the bipolar world. For Waltz, the post-1945 bipolar system was
desirable, since it reduced the risks of conflict. In the international
system, he claims, small is better. Turning to the question of
managing international relations, Waltz argues, against those
stressing international institutions or diffusion of power, that the
key lies in constructive management of international relations by
the great powers.
There are two major problems with Waltz's analysis that
become immediately evident on reading his exposition and that of
most of his critics. The first is that it is ahistorical, in the sense that
it takes as transhistorical, or permanent, features of the system
that are the product of, and hence specific to, distinct phases of
international relations. The words of Goran Therborn have as
much relevance to IR theory as to other branches of social science:
'Even the most abstract theoretical discourses and scientific
endeavours are the product of particular societies in a particular
historical period. ' 21 In invoking Thucydides and examples from a
range of historical cases, Waltz argues that the structures of the

international system have remained the same for thousands of
years. 22 We are therefore dealing with a theory that abstracts from
the contemporary states system and its formation, and from other
historical processes that have intervened between the Greece of
the fourth century BC and the post-1945 epoch. The assumption
that he, and many other writers on international relations, make is
that there was an 'international system' before modern states, or
nations, or the international market emerged. This is, however, a
questionable claim, much as if one was to study pricing policy in
ancient Rome and contemporary America, or voting behaviour in
the Greek agora and modern elections. Some very general
statements can be made that apply to both systems, but these may
be of such banality as to render them of marginal import-
ance.
Indeed, elsewhere in the text, Waltz himself makes statements
that would only hold for a much more limited historical scale. Thus
in discussing the durability of states in the contemporary world he
observes: 'The death rate among states is remarkably low'. 23 If by
'states' is meant independent states in the modern era, then Waltz
is certainly right. If, however, his 'states' is set against the
historical record of the last two thousand years, or even the last
one hundred and fifty, then it becomes a nonsense: the number of
plausibly distinct political entities in Europe and the third world
that have been overwhelmed and wiped out by various form of
conquest, not least the assaults of imperialism, must run into
thousands. If Waltz's statement about the low death of states is
taken as characteristic of the structure he is discussing, then that
structure is a very recent creation indeed, post-dating not only the
emergence of an international system in Europe in the seventeenth
century, but also the end of colonialism.
This ahistorical perspective is reinforced by the absence of any
history of the system itself, and in particular of the origins of the
contemporary state system in the post-mediaeval period, and its
relation to the rise of capitalism. Since Waltz aspires to a strictly
'political' analysis of international relations, and has a correspond-
ing 'national-territorial' concept of the state, there is no room in
his view for the concept of capitalism and for a study of the
relationship of the rise of distinct states to the international spread
of capitalism.
Indeed, for all its concern with international process, and, more
recently with international economic processes, the literature on
international relations seems remarkably shy of using the term
'capitalism' at all. One of the consequences of this neglect is that
realist theory, and the history it implies, has a distinctive account
of how states and the international system interrelate. According
to this myth, states emerged as individual entities and then began,
gradually, to have relations with each other. Thus Waltz:
'Structures emerge from the coexistence of states' .24 This ignores
one of the central lessons of historical sociology and its account of
the development of states, which is that states, in the sense of
administrative-coercive entities, develop as a result of inter-
national processes, and not the other way around. Military
competition and the expansion of a market, together with the
existence of a shared culture, were not the results of, but the
preconditions for, the emergence of the state system. The
orthodox view that states arose first and then began to interrelate
to constitute an international system bears about as much relation
to reality as the myth of the social contract, or the stork.
The confusion about the history and definition of states is
evident in the second major difficulty with Waltz's analysis,
namely the claim that international relations can and should be
studied at a purely systemic level. The arguments Waltz advances
for this are rudimentary: that there is sufficient regularity in inter-
state relations to enable us to dispense with examinations of the
internal workings of states, and the, more general, claim that
'elegance' of theory is desirable. Waltz's formulations on this are,
again, revealing. His argument that systemic factors must be taken
into account in analysing international relations, i.e. that states are
not simply free to do what they want and are constrained by the
system as a whole, is unexceptionable. Thus he plausibly states: 'It
is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking
inside of states' (my italics). 25 This is, however, quite different
from arguing that the internal processes of states can be excluded
altogether from a theorisation of international relations: the move
from saying international relations cannot be studied 'simply' by
looking at the internal workings of states to saying that the internal
workings can be ignored is an important, and invalid, one.
Perhaps under the influence of other uses of the term 'structure',
su:;h as those in anthropology or linguistics, Waltz is drawn to a
usage that is deterministic and denies the relevance of differences

between individual units: but, in so doing, he conflates objects of
analysis where internal workings may well be irrelevant to the
workings of structure, such as linguistics can be, with ones in which
the external and internal do interrelate to a greater degree. States
are not analogous to morphemes, planets or kinship structures.
Waltz is, of course, helped in this denial of the relevance of 'internal
workings' by the standard International Relations confusion about
what the word 'state' means: in the first, legal-political, sense of
state it is strictly speaking impossible to ask about their internal
workings, given the fact that all that is internal is comprised by
definition in the concept of state. Instead, however, of taking this
as a good reason for abandoning this conventional and confusing
concept of the state, Waltz takes the national-territorial concept to
its logical conclusion and produces an unbalanced theory of
international relations.
In his reply to critics, at the end of Neo-Realism, Waltz seems
willing to give some ground on this point, but not to the extent of
abandoning his preference for a strictly 'systemic', as opposed to
'reductionist', theory.Z6 In so doing, however, he provides an
example which is at least as open to interpretation by 'reductionist'
as by 'systemic' theory: France and Germany, he says, are no
longer at all likely to go to war, because of their changed situation
in the international system, i.e. they are no longer great powers. 27
But there are plenty of medium and small powers in the world that
can and do go to war: Iran and Iraq, or India and Pakistan, are
hardly greater powers than France or Germany. What determines
their option is not structural position as such, but the combination
of this with internal factors - the kind of historic experience they
have had in the twentieth century (not least two world wars), the
kind of political and socio-economic regimes they maintain, and
the consequent alliances they have developed. On the basis of this
example, one could well argue the opposite of Waltz's case: that
international relations cannot be understood simply by looking at
relations between states.
The alternative Waltz poses- either a reductionist or a systemic
theory - is not necessary: what is needed, as several contributors
to Neo-Realism and its Critics suggest, is a theory that combines
the internal and external levels. As Ruggie points out, the
emergence of the modern state system rested upon quite distinct
kinds of state-society relation that had considerable impact on the

workings of international relations. 28
It is similarly evident that a study of the international dimensions
of revolution can show both how international factors affect the
internal workings of states and how these internal changes then, as
a result of revolutions, have effects on the international system.
Waltz, in common with most realists, seeks to underplay the
international effects of revolutions and takes pleasure in telling the
story of how the Bolshevik Revolution had, by 1922, come to
accept the norms of international behaviour: had, in other words,
been 'socialised' by the structure. As will be argued in Chapter 6,
the fact that Chicherin wore a top hat and tails, and signed a secret
treaty with Germany at Rapallo, did not, by any means, signify
that the underlying ideological conflict between the Russian
revolution and the capitalist West had been ended. Socialisation,
in the sense of accepting the prevailing norms of the system and
the legitimacy of other major actors within it, had certainly not
occurred, any more than it had when Chou En-lai arrived in
Geneva in 1954 and had tea with Anthony Eden. After the
Bolshevik Revolution, a long-run conflict, one that acquired new
life during and after the Second World War, had begun: it could
not be explained merely by resort to balance-of-power theory and
the abstractions of realism, but involved an incompatibility of
social and political systems. To explain how and why that conflict
developed requires examination of the internal workings of,
respectively, the USSR and its Western adversaries, something
that realist theory precludes us from doing.
The Tallest Story: Post-modernism and the International

The entry of post-modernism into the field of IR can be dated
from the latter part of the 1980s, following upon its development
in other areas of the academic domain, first aesthetics and the
humanities, and later sociology, history and politics. 29 It thus
formed part of what has been termed the 'third debate' in IR,
actually the 'fourth' if the introduction of structuralism and
Marxism is taken as the third. This 'third' debate covered very
different challenges, two of which, feminism and historical
materialism, will be considered later. In simplest term, the claims
of post-modernism are two: first, that there is no single rationality,
or historical narrative, in terms of which one can make sense of

history or any particular branch of the social sciences; secondly,
that the apparently discrete and unitary categories of social science
and other forms of interpretation conceal a diversity of meanings
and identities that make the subjects of political life much more
complex and indeterminate than the more rational approaches
would suggest. Strongly influenced, in concept and style, by
French post-structuralist writing, but influenced by the earlier
conceptual and moral indeterminacy of Nietzsche, post-
modernism came in the 1980s to be the major new challenge within
much of the social sciences.
Post-modernism's emphasis upon the role of 'discourse' in the
widest sense - words, meanings, symbols, identities, forms of
communication - in the constitution of society and of power has
significant implications for international relations, not least in the
very way in which states have sought to appropriate and project
their legitimacy. In a world where communication and media
images have an important role there is much to examine here: the
work of Robertson and Featherstone, for example, examining the
spread of various 'scapes' in the world, demonstrates the potential
of such analysis. 30 At the same time, the assertion of a multiplicity
of identities open to every human subject, and the denial of
necessary contradictions (e.g. between 'national' and 'inter-
national'), has both explanatory and ethical import.
The advent of post-modernism in IR has, however, been
accompanied by a number of more debatable contributions that
have, far from advancing the subject, done much to confuse and
divert. In the first place, the introduction and debate of post-
modernism in IR has been conducted in almost complete
separation from the broader debate on this trend within the social
sciences: those advocating it in the late 1980s have given scant
regard, or reply, to the many criticisms of the approach developed
over the previous decade or more. 31 In summary form these
criticisms highlight: the underlying amoralism of post-modernism,
with its denial of any generally applicable moral principles; its
inability to provide substantive explanation of historical events or
periods; its overstatement of the role of 'discursive' or ideological
factors in society; and neglect of the relation of these to other
more material processes of production, social relations and indeed
everyday life. 32
To these general cnttctsms can be added two further ones,

evident in the writing within IR. The first is the reliance of the
whole approach on something termed 'post-modernity', a claim of
questionable validity that in some sense the world has entered a
new historical phase. Often of loose historical application, and
based on some contingent observations about space, time, risk,
perception, this invocation of a 'post-modern' world serves as a
fetish rather than as an explanation. It suffers, moreover, from
many other claims about the new and its methodological implica-
tions: for if the philosophical or epistemological claims of 'post-
modernism' are valid, about the failings of enlightenment thought,
identity, the fact-value distinction, categories and so forth, then
they were always true, as much in the fifteenth, or fifth, centuries,
as in the modern epoch. The strength of Foucault's work on
madness or incarceration is that it applies across the historical
span, of several centuries, that he examines; the conceit of his
epigones is that they can conflate a historical turn with a revolution
in ideas.
Beyond these substantive problems there is one further aspect
of the post-modernist literature that merits criticism, and indeed
invites it: namely its t9ne and style. Post-modernists make much of
their concern for the dominated, the marginal, the subaltern: yet
this is accompanied by prescriptive vacuity and a conceit that they
are the first or only people to exhibit such a commitment. Time
and again the writers of this tendency resort to stylistic devices, of
mannered tentativeness and the hanging apodictic, when sub-
stantive analysis, of history or concepts, seems to fail. As in the
writings of Islamic clergy, repetition, rambling and conceptual
menace are too easily used, not to reinforce argument, but to
compensate for the lack of it. Words such as 'meditation' are
indicative of a contrived piety, that is part of this style, as is the use
of fragments of literary and historical writing on the history of
science, deployed for ornamental purposes, much as realists like to
flavour their narrative with episodes from Thucydides or quotes
from Cicero. Der Derian's On Diplomacy is a choice example of
this genre. The temptations of surenchere parisienne, evident in
earlier Anglo-Saxon schools derivative of French writing (notably
that of Sartre and Althusser) is here reproduced in not always
felicitous forms. The word 'continental' is used to give spurious
cachet to these ideas and style, rather as the term 'imported beer'
was pioneered in the 1970s: that an idea is 'continental', or

'insular', Parisian or Los Angelino, tells one nothing about its
validity or explanatory scope.
Within this tone, the treatment of questions of 'epistemology'
or, more mundanely, the philosophy of social science, plays an
important part, yet it is handled in a precious, and often banal and
incompetent, manner. Whatever else this strand of theory has
represented, it is not an informal awareness of developments in
the philosophy of science or of social science. These authors take
great delight in announcing new forms of epistemology, hermen-
eutics, dialectics, closure and so forth: but in so doing they neither
resolve questions of philosophy of science in general, nor
contribute to the theorisation of IR. Their work is, in this field,
pretentious, derivative and vacuous, an Anglo-Saxon mimesis of
what was already, in its Parisian form, a confused and second-rate
debate. The following from a pioneering collection of such texts,
captures the tone:
By no means a single school or unitary approach, the several

practices known under the 'postmodern' or 'poststructuralist'
rubric- deconstruction, semiotics, genealogy, feminist psycho-
analytic theory, intertextualism, and their variants - despite
their differences share several common themes. Above all, they
address the questions of how knowledge, truth, and meaning
are constituted. In the broadest sense, their works offer an
explanation for their dissatisfaction with what the constitution
Enlightenment project has brought about. Philosophical in its
origin and practice, poststructuralism challenges the intellectual
suppositions upon which Western rationalism and positivism
are based. These turn out to be suppositions that found modern
science and its adoring foster child, the social sciences.
Poststructural critiques of rationalism by French philosophers
turned out to be immensely attractive to other fields. For
reasons that no one has adequately explained, the first
enthusiastic interpreters were American literary theorists.
Poststructuralist analyses pose a radical challenge to both the
fact/value distinction and our concept of facticity generally, a
concept that poststructuralists claim is conventional and
culturally constructed rather than founded in nature. It is their
specific focus on the workings of language that lets them reveal,
often quite persuasively, those conventions that found a 'fact's'

convincing appearance. Discourses harnessed to powerful
social forces have, in the name of scientific objectivity, come to
constitute 'regimes of truth'. Poststructuralist methods of
analysis purport to offer new means to critique such condominia
of power and knowledge, methods potentially helpful for
assessing social scientific theories as well.
One possible reason why poststructuralism found such a
welcoming home among literary theorists is that these groups'
necessary tolerance for plurality in interpretation had taught
them something important about how meanings get constituted
as well. Unsurprisingly enough, in the hands of literary
theorists, such methods as deconstruction or genealogy tend to
be adapted as finely honed tools for doing some intricate textual
analysis. 33
Here it all is: the mannered invocation of the Parisian; the

confused salad of theoretical approaches; the ingenuously declared
naivety about the difference between the domains of literary
criticism and social science.
A representative example of this approach, in both its strengths
and weaknesses, is the work of Robert Walker, Inside/Outside:
International Relations and Political Theory. 34 One of the strongest
aspects of Walker's critique is that he locates the main areas of
disagreement not in the field of the international at all, but in
political theory in general. The conceit of disciplinary autarchy has
long compounded that of the international as a separate domain of
the real, and of the ethical: his re-evaluation of the tradition sets
IR theory firmly back into its broader intellectual and academic
context. He has little time for the major alternatives propounded
in recent years: if classical realism represents 'the careless embrace
of acute ontological antagonisms', 'scientific' approaches are but
'kitsch Kantianism', neo-realism is just reheated reification,
rational choice theories are 'utilitarian stories', political economy
remains trapped in spatio-temporal eternalisation.
For Walker, broadly influenced by post-modernist and post-
structuralist thinking, IR theory has three major weaknesses, all
derived from political theory as such: it treats as eternal and given
categories and contrasts which are historically produced, and
hence liable to change; it fails to register the degree to which the
political world, national and international, is changing, with the

transformations of the 'post-modern world'; it therefore excludes
and proscribes, by silence, the evolution of alternative theories
and practices, that might enable an improvement in the human
condition at national, international or local levels. If Martin Wight
had to label Walker he would be a revolutionist, but a revolutionist
sceptical of the categories of either Kant or Marx; they would, in
Walker's view, be themselves the bearers of their own reifica-
tions.
Walker uses post-modernism to provide a critique of eternal
categories, and in particular of a set of opposites which he sees as
underpinning IR theory, in its utopian/idealist as much as in its
realist forms: identity and difference, inside and outside, space
and time, community and anarchy. He identifies the constitutive
role of categories of time and space, concretised in the concept of
state sovereignty, within international relations.
In his critique of these reifications, Walker cites the French
philosopher of science, Gaston Bachelard, to the effect that the
words 'here' and 'there' 'have been promoted to the rank of an
absolutism according to which these unfortunate adverbs of place
are endowed with unsupervised powers of ontological determina-
tion' .35 The categories of 'inside' and 'outside' proclaimed in the
title refer in the first instance to the argument of some radical
difference between the characters of domestic and international
politics, and of a chasm between the practices appropriate to, or
possible in, each. They are also seen as providing a geometric and
therefore apparently immutable foundation for two contrasting
conceptions of sovereignty, one potentially democratic and
responsive, operating within, the other necessarily competitive
and antagonistic, operating without. In one of his most suggestive
leitmotifs, he traces the evolution of this binary conception of
sovereignty through Hobbes to a figure often ignored in the
history of IR theory, but central to modern conceptions of the
state and the grim inevitability of inter-state conflict, Max
Weber. 36
Even for those unconvinced by the theoretical underpinnings of
Walker's argument there is much here that is cogent: the location
of IR theory in a broader context of political theory and socially
embodied power is a great improvement on the official genealogies
of 'X read Y', or, even worse, 'B was the student of A'; the
assertion of the historically constituted, and contingent, character

of theories of sovereignty is equally welcome.
For those of other critical traditions, there is therefore plenty to
welcome, with the caveat that much of this has been said before,
and it has in recent years been taken further within the categories
of these critical traditions, and with fewer claims to theoretical
rebirth: historical sociology (as in Charles Tilly, Michael Mann,
John Hall, Theda Skocpol), and Marxist historiography of the
state (as in Perry Anderson, Ellen Wood, more recently Justin
Rosenberg) have all explored the historicity of our conceptions of
state and sovereignty. In these writings critical reassessment of
IR's central political categories, of at least equal range, is matched
by an engagement with historical processes and facts that post-
modernists, rushing to the next acceleration, textual density or
spillage, seem incapable of matching.
The question of novelty aside, the difficulties with Walker's
theory arise precisely where he, in his own critique of IR theory,
has located the problem: first, in the broader assumptions about
historical change invoked to sustain his argument; secondly, in the
positing of an alternative, of political or ethical pertinence, to
existing eternalities. The first, as in so much 'alternative' thinking
and modelling, remains elusive, indeed vapid - a benign invoca-
tion of the local, the cosmopolitan, the deconstructed, without
anchorage in either social reality or ethical and historical necessity:
indeed at one point Walker admits as much, summarising the
argument to date as 'a web of barely theorised possibilities and
tentative struggles'. One pertinent reading, central to his argu-
ment, is that of Kant as a statist: Perpetual Peace, not Universal
History, is discussed. This, one can only suspect, is a symptomatic
theoretical move, serving to repress the argument that, in terms of
positing a transcendent theoretical and historical process, the
Professor of Konigsberg had arrived two centuries ago and with
greater intellectual vigour where his post-modernist counterparts
have now beached.
Walker reproduces the general problem with the argument
about 'post-modernity': it involves an argument about how the
world is actually changing, and reads very like a variant on the
enthusiasms of transnationalism - Rosenau crossed witlr'Giddens
and Derrida. The argument on 'post-modernity' as a global
phenomenon rests upon the concept of a new phase in history,
marked by a greater acceleration of change, and a disappearance

of categories that we have inherited from another age. Walker,
like Giddens and others, repeats the view that identities are no
longer clear and that, in general, indeterminacy predominates
where once clarity prevailed. Like many another post-modernist
he is too quick to accept the claims of transnationalism, and
ignores the many criticisms thereof. He is also happy to recruit
Marx's phrase to the effect that 'All that is solid melts into air'. Yet
all that is solid does not melt into air, and certainly not just
because sociologists and alternative thinkers would have us believe
it so: indeed they omit the second half of Marx's sentence which
conveys a very different, rational, and teleological message:
' ... and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses, his real
conditions of life, and his relations with his kind'. 37 For post-
modernists, there can be no concept of the real, or indeed of the
sober.
The social sciences are rather too full of people telling us about
'post-modernity' but it may, on closer examination, be just
another apocalyptic fad, along with the end of ideology, the death
of the novel, the new world order, the supersession of the state
and so on. 38 Most of the claims about a new spatial and temporal
world are at best metaphorical, at worst waffle, and often highly
class- and place-bound - ethnocentric indeed! The argument on
uncertainty of identity can be countered, if this is what post-
modernists want, with evidence on how identity has, if anything
become more important than ever before, as has indeed the oft-
vaporised state: in the war in former Yugoslavia, what was striking
was not the onrush of new forms of identity and political ideology
but the vitality of old ones.
Beyond the assertion of some large-scale, but pretty obvious,
changes in the world, it is dubious what empirical or ethical force
can be attached to the concept 'post-modernity' at all: as already
suggested, most of those who have used it have precious little
qualifications, or inclination, to talk about the real. Witty
incantations about alterity, dissolution and freeze-frames, and
exaggerated claims about what has indeed changed in the world,
are no substitute for a substantive engagement with history or a
plausible conceptualisation of the alternatives for political and
theoretical change. Rather too inebriated with its own phrases,
post-modernism runs the risk of becoming the new banality, a set
of assertions as unlocated and useless as the vacuous generalities,

be they of balance of power or progressivist teleology, that they
seek to displace, and equally lacking in any conception, of analytic
or normative import, of how anything can be changed, of the
question of agency. No wonder, as in Walker's case, there is a
marked affinity with Machiavelli whose ethical scepticism, and
historical randomness, presaged the Parisian fashions of our time.
He, of course, was also very much a 'post-' man as well.
Yet it is precisely here, in the discussion of agency, that
Walker's book is suggestive of an important new set of considera-
tions, focused not on the abandonment of the nation-state but on
providing it with a new, more democratic and polyvalent, content.
And it is here too that one of the more substantive insights of post-
modernism, namely that all individuals and political institutions
have not one exclusive, but several overlapping identities, may be
most helpful. Chapter 7 of Walker's book, on democracy,
broaches these topics in a way that is not ethically indeterminate
and which, in its suggestive vein, is compatible with earlier
traditions of thought, at the domestic and international levels, of
how democracy can advance: it is, in this way, eminently Kantian.
This may suggest a conclusion that behind post-modernist excess
there lurks a more substantive, rigorous and rational, modernist
argument. Political thought has, in the past, moved forward by
removing the rational kernel from the mystical and mystifying
shell: this may be another case where such a transformation, or
incursion, is appropriate.
To realise this potential would involve, however, going beyond
the very .general invocations of 'new' social movements that post-
modernists and many others indulge in. The literature on the 'new'
movements evolved in the 1970s in response, on the one hand, to
the crisis of the old form of (mainly communist) political parties,
and on the other to the evident growth of a range of movements
that were not tied to particular parties or based on class identities:
movements of gender, race, ecology, disarmament were the
evident categories. 39 Yet, as often occurs with academic debate,
the academic literature remained stuck in this regard, or clung to
comforting assertions, such as that the peace movement had ended
the Cold War. 40 Here a left-critical discourse ran alongside the
more orthodox claims of transnationalism about non-state actors.
What this literature overlooked were several less welcome
considerations: first, that the role of these movements was far less
than often claimed, and that they were, as often or not, riven by
their own dissensions and factionalisms as much as any party of the
old sort; secondly, that while some movements were of a benign
and emancipatory kind, many others were not - mass movements
of a racist kind, in Germany and France, for example, Hindu and
Islamic fundamentalism, or the multiple expressions of the US
right, were just as much 'social movements' as the left and green
trends invoked by post-modernists. Their ability to meet two of
the main challenges they claimed to confront - explanation and
identification of an emancipatory subject - was, therefore, rather
limited: like the behaviouralists before them, they issued many a
promissory note.
Conclusion: Another Path
What kind of method is, therefore, appropriate for the study of

International Relations? The chapters that follow are one attempt
to contribute to such an endeavour, and to meet some broad
criteria for theoretical work in this field. First they develop an
approach that is anti-empiricist, conceptual, and where relevant,
critical, in relation to existing 'facts' and 'reality'. Secondly, they
seek to meet the criterion that is central to the social sciences,
namely explanation, and through explanation, the generation of
research agendas, i.e. programmes of work that remain to be
explained. The discussions of the Cold War, in particular, are
attempts to combine a set of theoretical concerns with historical
explanation. Too many of the theoretical approaches of the
'second' and 'third' debates, lack such a capability. Thirdly, they
are historical, not in the sense of seeking answers from history or
narrative alone, but in examining historically, i.e. locating issues
and concepts in their historical context. If realism seeks to make
concepts ahistorical in applying them to all of history, behavioural-
ism denies the relevance of history at all, and post-modernism
asserts a historical rupture between 'modern' and 'post-modern'.
By contrast the chapters that follow seek both to recognise the
continuities in history and to identify, where relevant, the
specificities and contingencies of idea and event.
3
A Necessary Encounter:
Historical Materialism and
International Relations
A Challenge Evaded
The fate of Marxism within the social sciences has, throughout the
past century, been profoundly uncertain, an ambivalence that has
in some respects been accentuated by the collapse of the
communist movements, and of communist regimes, since the late
1980s. On the one hand, the challenge of Marxism to established
patterns of thought, and to the existing state system, has led to its
exclusion from the academic domain, an exclusion compounded
by the dogmatisms, polemics and simplifications of Marxists
seeking or holding political power. On the other hand, Marxism,
itself part of the radical liberal tradition inherited from the
Enlightenment, and a response, along with the recognisable
academic disciplines of sociology and economics, to the rise of
industrial society, has shared many areas of common ground with
more strictly academic concerns and has in a variety of ways
influenced their evolution. If in some areas this has led to the
emergence of an identifiable 'Marxist' current within the social
sciences, it has a broader influence, one of diffusion,. so that
approaches originally associated with Marxism have become more
generally accepted. In this sense, in Gramsci's phrase, Marxism
has become 'the common sense of our epoch'.
If the ambivalence was accentuated by the communist challenge
and the Cold War, it was certainly made all the greater by the end
of that conflict and of the official challenge that communism
posed. It is now easy to say that Marxism has been discredited and,
47
in some respects to be examined in greater detail later in this

chapter and in this book, this is so: any theory based on an implicit
historical teleology, and an associated consequentialist ethic, or on
the supposition that some radically different society can be created
on this earth, has been discredited. Yet to recognise this is not to
conclude that in its broader sense the approach crystallised in
historical materialism has no relevance: it may indeed constitute
an important contribution to interpreting, and, where both
possible and desirable, prescribing for the contemporary world.
If realism can detach itself from its cousins- social Darwinism,
racism and Machtpolitik - so can an interpretive Marxism be
distinguished from its instrumental companion. Such a distinction
involves above all an examination of what Marx and Engels
themselves wrote, and of the work of independent Marxists who,
throughout the Leninist and orthodox communist domination of
the subject, sought to provide an alternative interpretation to that
of the dogmatists. 1 Just as in sociology, history and other social
sciences this independent, broadly 'Western', Marxist current has
been able to establish a recognised and analytically fruitful body of
work, so there exists the potential for it to do so in the realm of IR.
It is this claim which the following chapter seeks to explore, with
regard to a potential interaction of International Relations and the
Marxist tradition.
Despite many decades of potential interaction, the establish-
ment of a relationship between historical materialism and the
discipline of international relations is still at an initial stage. At
various stages in the history of the discipline, there have been
surveys of the implications of Marxism for International Relations
in which already constituted points of contact have been
identified. 2 Since the 1970s a number of writers have advocated
further theoretical work, be it the elaboration of a general Marxist
approach to International Relations, or the development of
domains in which the International Relations discipline, as
presently constituted, can strengthen its analytic endeavours by
drawing on specific elements within historical materialism. 3 In an
innovative and judicious study, Andrew Linklater has examined
the implications for IR of 'critical' Marxism, while stressing the
constraints which the international system imposes on any
emancipatory project. 4
However, in contrast to such other areas of the social sciences as
Historical Materialism and International Relations 49
sociology, economics or history, historical materialism has never

occupied a secure place within International Relations; there are
many who seek to limit its application, be this explicitly, as was the
case with those who denied its relevance, such as Martin Wight
and Hans Morgenthau, or implicitly, by relegating it to a minor
place, or by presenting it in a selective interpretation, such that its
pertinence is constricted. 5 This is achieved above all by blocking
out the main theoretical questions of Marxism. The fact that IRis
almost wholly silent on what for Marxism is the central category of
modern social analysis, namely capitalism, is itself indicative.
Equally, as discussed in Chapter 8, the degree to which the Cold
War embodied not just competing strategic interests, but different
socio-economic ones, has been ignored in most IR literature.
The sources of this failure lie on both sides of the relationship.
International Relations as a discipline has arisen primarily within
British and American universities, and as a theoretical derivative
of other disciplines in the social sciences. Neither institutional
context, nor theoretical influence, have been ones in which
Marxism has had a prominent or generally recognised place.
On the other hand, historical materialism has not itself
developed the theoretical focus needed for a comprehensive and
generally intelligible contribution to International Relations.
Much of what was produced in the name of Marxism, by
communist regimes or those following them, was vulgar polemic, a
repetition of certain standard, formulaic, readings of Marxism
itself and concentrated around a justification of political interests.
The confining of Marxist discussion of the international to the
question of 'imperialism', and a one-sided and banal interpretation
of the phenomenon at that, was as much the responsibility of those
espousing Marxism as of those opposed to it. 6 Those who, within
the independent currents of historical materialism, have sought to
elaborate a Marxist approach to International Relations have
laboured under the theoretical difficulties that confront those who
seek to analyse politics, and ideological factors, within the
confines of specific states themselves.
At the same time, Marxism's stress upon economic factors at the
international level has weakened any attempt to explain the
political, ideological and security issues that international relations
sees as quintessentially its domain. The very concept of the
'international' itself poses problems for Marxists, in that the
implicit contrast with the 'national' is not one that they readily
accept: from the cosmopolitan assertion of the Communist
Manifesto onwards, as fine a statement of liberal transnationalism
as one would want to find with its invocations of 'interdependence'
Marxism has seen world affairs confidently in terms of a single
world process: the result was that the very need for a study of
inter-state and international relations might appear to be ir-
relevant, a diversion from analysis of the real, universal, forces
shaping world politics. Marx's view of nationalism, while less
hostile than later critics have suggested, was also one that denied
any necessary contrast or contradiction between the formation of
nations and the growing interlocking of states and societies, the
former being but a precursor to the latter, and part of a broader,
teleological, historical process. 7
Marxism and IR's Three 'Great Debates'
This general lack of contact between the two intellectual bodies is

compounded by a number of specific difficulties involved in such a
theoretical exploration. As outlined in Chapter 1, in the seventy-
odd years of its existence as an academic discipline, International
Relations has gone through three major theoretical debates. These
have tended to define the literature and the terms of further study.
Yet Marxism fits uneasily into each of these three.
The first was that between the 'utopian' and 'realist' approaches.
These were themselves factitious terms but served to constitute an
ideological polarity. In this framework, Marxism shares elements
of both: if it is 'utopian' in its postulation of another, alternative,
way of ordering politics, and in the introduction of a set of ethical
concerns into political analysis, it is 'realist' in its emphasis upon
the material interests underlying human action, and its emphasis
upon the hypocrisy, mendacity and cynicism of much political life.
While there are striking parallels in the idealist projects each
initiated after the First World War- the Communist International
and the League of Nations- Leninism was resolutely distinct in the
utopia it proposes as a counter to Wilsonian idealism.
A similar problem arises with the second general debate, that
between traditionalists and behaviouralists. Marxism, enthusiastic
about the scientific methodologies of the nineteenth century and
imbued with the influence of classical British economics, certainly

emphasises the scientific potential of social analysis: quantifica-
tion, and the establishment of 'laws', lie at the heart of Marx's
approach in Capital. As with much nineteenth-century radical
thought, an earlier progressivism was given spurious scientific
validity by Darwinian theories of evolution. 8 Yet Marxism also
retains much of another approach: it is not just materialism- that
was the domain of the philosopher Feuerbach - but historical
materialism: history in the sense of events is as important in
Marxist analysis as to any traditionalist student of International
Relations, but is even more so in a different sense, that of
identifying the historicity~ or conditions of origin and reproduc-
tion, of a society or idea. Marxism is also intensely ethical, both in
the language of its judgements and in the emphasis upon
prescription, upon the injunction to act. That indeed was the
fundamental difference between Feuerbach and Marx, the latter
emphasising the need to change the world. 9
The third fundamental debate within international relations,
that between state-centred and world system approaches, can
bracket Marxism with little more success. For sure, Marxism
emphasises that capitalism creates a world market, and with it
class forces that operate on a world scale. In The German Ideology
Marx argued that the proletariat could only exist 'world-
historically' i.e. both as the result of a world-historical economic
process, the spread of capitalism, and as an agent acting on the
world scale. 10 Weltklasse, Weltpartei, Weltrevolution - the very
programme of the Comintern- sums up this view, as the earlier
Manifesto had done.
Yet Marxism has devoted much of its theoretical energy, in the
last century as in this, to theoretical and practical work upon the
state: analysing its strength and tenacity, and the class interests
embodied in it. 11 As discussed in Chapter 4, the conceptualisation
of what the state is, and how it relates to to other forces in society,
has been the subject of debate within and without the Marxist
tradition. Yet the premiss of this whole literature is that the state,
far from disappearing or being transcended, remains a central
factor in politics, subject to both internal and international
pressures. Marxism recognises the importance both of the state as
an object of political control, and of the nation-state as a
fundamental organising principle, whether in the struggle of
nationalist movements for power, or in the consolidation of

revolutionary regimes in an otherwise hostile world. Most
Marxists would be highly sceptical about contemporary liberal and
transnationalist claims that the state, as the locus of class power,
was being eroded as an element in international politics, or about
the claim that force and coercion had been displaced as central, or
at the very least reserve, instruments of class rule.
From the 1970s this apparent lack of communication began to
erode: the academic IR literature did concede a certain place to
Marxism. But with the exception of Linklater and a few others, the
very manner of this concession posed difficult problems. In
essence, it was argued that a theoretical approach, a 'paradigm'
derived from Marxism could be used to explain International
Relations, and that this paradigm, generally called 'structuralism',
could yield significant results. 12 It seemed, at least, that historical
materialism had found a place within International Relations.
But this equation of historical materialism, as a theoretical
approach, with 'structuralism', as a paradigm constituted within
the discipline, was uncertain. First, the very concept of structural-
ism, derived from linguistics and anthropology, differs in major
respects from historical materialism. It is a form of determinism, in
the sense of denying freedom of action, or agency, to the elements
in the structure. Yet Marxism, for all its stress upon the 'iron laws'
of history, and the determinations of the socio-economic context,
contains an element of freedom, of will, of the possibility- indeed
the necessity - of voluntarism: Marx, in the midst of the lengthy
elaboration of the laws of the mode of production in Capital,
asserts that, at a certain point in the conflict between owner and
exploiter, the workers will rise up. 13 The Manifesto is an injunction
to action.
The subsequent history of political Marxism, in the hands of
such revolutionary leaders as Lenin and Mao, hardly confirms the
image of man as a Prometheus chained to the ground by the
structures of his social being. Equally, within the independent
'Western' Marxist tradition there has been no unanimity on this:
while some theorists, notably Louis Althusser, did stress <~
determinism, others identified an ability of individuals and
political forces to pursue emancipation defiant of objective
constraints, and to challenge, through conscious action, the
constraints that have been identified in society.
This has, indeed, occasioned the other major introduction of

Marxism into IR, through the 'critical theory' associated with the
Frankfurt School: in this perspective, exemplified by the work of
Robert Cox, the emphasis is precisely on the emancipatory
potential of groups and individuals and on the possibility of an
appropriate theoretical response. One of the great contributions of
Habermas's work has been his distinction between the three forms
of knowledge -positivist, hermeneutic and critical, the last being
the basis for an emancipatory project. 14
Structuralism is misleading too since, in its conventional usage,
it suggests a multiplicity of relations affecting any one element in
the system: historical materialism, on the other hand, while
recognising a multiplicity of influences, and the diverse determina-
tions of class, nation, gender, place, culture and historical context,
also stresses the primacy of one of the levels of determination. It
postulates what Althusser has termed a 'structure in dominance'.
This dominance is given by the material, socio-economic, level: in
contrast to the contingency of conventional structuralism,
Marxism is a theory of socio-economic determination.
Examples of contingent determination within the IR literature
are Susan Strange's theory of the four 'structures' of international
relations, and Galtung's 'structural' theory of imperialism. 15
Michael Mann's conceptualisation of four forms of power has a
similar indeterminacy. All recognise the importance of forms of
determination focused on by histotial materialism, production and
economic exploitation respectively, but these are equal candidates
along with other forms of constraint. Structure in dominance is
displaced by a randomness of determination.
The conventional IR image of 'structuralism' also entails
another difficulty, that of limitation of scope. For, as a survey of
textbooks will show, the association of the 'structuralist' paradigm
is one with specific topics within International Relations, namely
North-South relations. If it provides one general theory of these
relations, it also asserts that they are central to international
relations in a manner not previously recognised. There are,
however, two significant limitations to this approach.
In the first place, the very theory subsumed under the name
'structuralism' provides a partial account even of what has been
written on the subject within historial materialism: while much of
the literature has indeed stressed the exploiting, dominating
character of imperialism, another strand, and arguably one more

true to Marx's initial perceptions, has argued a more complex
case: this is that imperialism, a product of the global spread of
capitalism, has a two-sided impact, both destroying and creating,
both disrupting established forms of economic and social activity
and forging new ones. This perspective is present in Marx's work
itself where, while condemning the suffering visited on humanity
by the spread of capitalism, including what was to become the
colonial world, and the moralising hypocrisy associated with it, he
also saw that it had positive economic and social effects. Neither
Marx nor Lenin, in his earlier work on Russia, in any way
sentimentalised the pre-capitalist societies of the world. It was
only later, and particularly with the rise of the anti-colonial
reading of Marx and of the theory of dependency, that Marxism
came to be dominated by the view that imperialism had an
unambiguously negative impact. Yet from the late 1970s onwards,
and under the impact of evident successes in industrialisation and
political change in a range of third world states, this older
tendency within Marxism came to be more evident. 16
Beyond this, selective, interpretation of the historical material-
ism position, there was a further problem with this identification of
Marxism with 'structuralism', namely its limitation of issues
deemed relevant: while any paradigm seeks to make part of its
impact by redefining the hierarchy of issues - the agenda - of the
discipline, it is inescapable th~t this very focus on 'structuralism'
weakened the scope of the paradigm. However important
economic relations between North and South become, they cannot
be seen as providing the key, as constituting (in the Kantian sense)
world politics. The emphasis upon this dimension therefore
restricts, indeed inhibits, as it also purports to legitimate, the
scope of historical materialism. Relations between the countries of
the North themselves, i.e. developed capitalist states, those
between countries of the South themselves, war and related
matters, as well as the role of specific national histories and
cultures and class configurations within individual states, cannot be
treated in a proportionate matter. Much of the history of the
international system would thereby be excluded.
Ironically, this delimiting relied upon a misreading of the
supposedly 'structuralist' Imperialism by Lenin: far from being a
book about North-South relations, this was a study of why the
great imperialist powers had gone to war in 1914, and how

socialists should react to it. 17 To examine the relevance of
Marxism there is, therefore, a need, not to abandon the emphasis
and the theoretical approach of 'structuralism', but rather to
broaden the theoretical scope of the paradigm: it could thereby
encompass what, in the conventional interpretation, is the high
ground of the discipline, and what must remain, for all the
'structuralist' adjustment of the agenda, some of the central
themes of the discipline. If the potential of historical materialism is
to be applied to the field of International Relations it needs to do
so by a double process- redefining the agenda on the one side,
and expanding its theoretical scope to embrace the subject-matter
of the discipline as a whole on the other.
The Potential of Historical Materialism
It is not possible to claim that the intellectual instruments for such

an encounter are simply at hand, waiting to be utilised. Marxism,
as a theoretical approach, remains in evolution: while there is
much that it has encompassed in the one hundred and fifty years of
its existence, there is also much that remains unanalysed, as there
is that is contradictory, outdated, confused within its corpus.
In this it is no different from other approaches, be these liberalism
or conventional economics. The work of analysing international
relations is to a considerable extent in the future, its components
not present in the works of historical materialists who have written
to date. Yet that such an endeavour is possible and can yield a
new, comprehensive, paradigm can be asserted, for two general
reasons.
First, as is evident from its impact in other social sciences,
historical materialism is a comprehensive general theory of
political, social and economic action, one that claims to be able to
encompass all major fields of social action within its scope. It is
indeed the most sustained attempt to provide a comprehensive
theory of society elaborated in the past century. Its impact has
already been evident in some areas of social science: in economics,
history, sociology, to name the three most evident. The fact that it
has not yet been accorded a comparable place in International
Relations, and has not yet responded proportionately to the
challenges of the discipline, is a result of the specific obstacles,

theoretical and historical, already outlined.
Many conceptual aspects of historical materialism contain
potential for International Relations, and can be applied to the
international as other theories have been. As we have seen in
Chapter 1, International Relations has derived an immense
amount, indeed the majority, of its theoretical tools from other
disciplines in the few decades of its existence: from the Chicago
school theory of power, through behaviouralism, rational action
theory, the first influences of law and philosophy, and conflict
theories, functionalism and now 'critical' theory, the influence
upon it of other branches of the social science are evident. The
scope for such a theoretical enrichment from historical material-
ism, even where as with history or sociology this enrichment is
based on work not directly related to International Relations, is
considerable.
Secondly, within its corpus even as presently constituted,
historical materialism has produced a body of literature pertaining
to the conventional agenda of International Relations, and way
beyond the specific interpretation of 'structuralism' that was
recognised in the late 1970s: on war, violence, the state,
international conflict, transnational economic issues, the develop"
ment of the international system itself. The attempt by Marxists in
the period 1900--20 to theorise the international system around the
concept of 'imperialism', by which they meant inter-state strategic
rivalry, is one of the most ambitious and creative ever made.
Since the 1970s another considerable body of literature on
international issues has been produced under the influence of
Marxism: apart from copious studies of imperialism, there have
been the world system theories of Wallerstein, the debates on
Cold War, and analyses of inter-capitalist relations. Wallerstein's
work posits a very different history of the international system to
that of orthodox IR: while covering roughly the same historical
period, from 1500 to the present. The Wallersteinian approach
emphasises the role of economic relations in constituting the
system, as distinct from the political and diplomatic analysis of
realism; it stresses the creation of hierarchy where the other
focuses on the formation of an international 'society', equal at
least in juridical claims, and it seeks to link the process of
international conflict to internal social and political change, in
contrast to realism's denial of the relevance of the internal. 18 At

the same time, Wallerstein's work has, from within historial
materialism, generated substantial criticism: as a theory that lays
too much stress on circulation rather than on production, as a
somewhat naive espousal of 'anti-systemic' forces even when these
are themselves oppressive, as resting on too one-sided and
'dependency'-theory-oriented explanation of imperialism. 19
The debate on the Cold War encompassed a wide range of
approaches, but was in marked contrast to the reluctance of
realism, and of other approaches in IR, to analyse this pheno-
menon in theoretical terms: for realism, it was but the continua-
tion of inter-state competition, for independence and structural
theories it was an embarrassing side-line, a distraction from their
main agenda, of inter-developed and North-South relations. The
implications of this for IR theory are discussed at greater length in
Chapters 8 and 9: suffice it to record here that virtually the only
theoretical debate on the nature of this, the dominant inter-
national conflict of the second half of the twentieth century, took
place within the historical materialist paradigm. 20
This was by no means the case for the literature on inter-
capitalist relations, which had been the stock in trade of
interdependence literature from the early 1970s onwards, reflected
in the work of, among others, Keohane, Gilpin and Strange,
writers who also participated in the debate on US 'decline' in the
1980s. But this was, as these authors themselves recognised, an
area on which prior to the First World War Marxists had produced
a major body of literature, and to which in the new intellectual
context they returned: the work of van der Pijl, Kolko, Gill and
others represented this contribution. 21
This work within IR was paralleled by the emergence of another
body of work, cognate to, but not formally within, the field of
International Relations, namely work in international history. Here
conventional disciplinary division combined with the long-standing
rivalry between the two academic approaches to prevent IR from
taking adequate account of the emergence of a substantial body of
literature within the historical field.
Marxism had already made a substantial contribution to other,
more specific, fields of history - national, political, social,
economic. But from the 1960s onwards there emerged a body of
international history influenced by historical materialism and
markedly different in approach to the international history of

the conventional diplomatic historians. Here, among others, one
could note the work of Eric Wolf, Perry Anderson, Eric
Hobsbawm. Wolf's study is a comprehensive, and cogent, analysis
of the subjugation of the non-European world to the European
socio-economic system.Z2 Anderson's work traces the evolution of
the state up to the epoch of democracy, in relation to both internal
social and political development and external competition. 23
Hobsbawm's work, perhaps the most wide-ranging and with the
most direct implications for the study of international relations, is
to be found in a set of three comparative studies on the evolution
of the modern international system: The Age of Revolutions 1789-
1848, The Age of Capital 1848-1875, The Age of Empire 1875-
1914.24
Hobsbawm's opus presented work of direct pertinence to
international relations and to the issues it addresses: the emerg-
ence of states, nations, markets, the role of economic, political
and strategic factors in international affairs, the sources of conflict,
within and between societies. No comparable body of work
emerged either within conventional international history, or
within the IR work on 'international society'. While empirically
based, and judicious in its judgements and connections,
Hobsbawm's work nonetheless located itself within a historical
materialist approach and the broad categories of enquiry and
explanation that this approach provided. In, for example, his The
Age of Imperialism, the four decades to the outbreak of the First
World War are surveyed, in the context of the development of
industrial society and its expansion: whether in the chapters on the
spread of democracy, nationalism, imperialism or the events
leading to war in 1914 this overall historical and materialist context
is maintained, without falling into any simplistic reductions. What
Hobsbawm portrays is not, however, the development of some
abstracted international society, or yet another exemplar of the
workings out of the balance of power, but the civilisation, and
crisis, of a very particular historical period.
These two factors - the theoretical potential of this approach as
a comprehensive social theory, the specific contributions, sub-
stantive and conceptual, it can make to International Relations-
combine to suggest that historical materialism can claim to offer a
comprehensive explanation of International Relations, without
piety about the adequacy of this approach to resolving the

questions it faces, or suppression of the weaknesses within it.
In what follows, I shall draw together the implications of the
discussions so far and to sketch out some lines along which such an
elaboration can go: this will be done first by outlining the general
parameters of the historical materialist paradigm, then by discuss-
ing certain specific thematic contributions of historical materialism
to International Relations. It will then be possible to identify some
of the problems involved in such theoretical work.
The Historical Materialist Paradigm
Marx and Engels wrote extensively on 'international' issues, both

with regard to theoretical questions underlying the international-
isation of capitalism, and on international political events of their
day. 25 There is much in these writings, of substance, concept and
tone, that is pertinent to the constitution of a historical materialist
engagement with IR. But this classical Marxist oeuvre on IRis, on
its own, an insufficient basis on which to base such a theoretical
endeavour: first, because the two types of writing- theoretical and
conjunctural - are markedly different, in that they fail to integrate
the theoretical with the analytic; secondly, because focusing on
what was written about the 'international' as such reduces the
scope of what Marxist theory as a whole can contribute to the
study of the international. With Marx, as with other theorists,
what is most pertinent to the theory of the international may lie
not so much in what is explicitly said about IR but in the
implications of his broader theory. In looking for their most
creative ideas on international questions we do not turn first to
what Machiavelli wrote about colonies, or mercenaries, or at
Rousseau's musings on the virtues of the Corsican independence
movement, or at Kant's views on race, but at their broader
theoretical approach and insights.
Amidst the multifarious writings of Marx and Engels, there are
four general themes which can be seen as defining, as constituting,
the intellectual position they advanced. The first is that of
'material' determination, or, more precisely, determination by
socio-economic factors, the word 'material' being used in this
particular sense. In simplified terms, Marx saw society as a
totality, a composite within which each element was in a broad

sense governed by the character and tendency of the whole. The
central activity in any society is economic production, and the
main analytic questions are considered in this framework: What is
the 'level' of production, or, in his terms, how developed are the
'forces of production'? Secondly, what are the systems of property
and effective control that define ownership of these forces, i.e.
what are the 'relations' of production?
Combined these forces and relations form a 'mode of produc-
tion' -feudalism, capitalism, socialism - and through this deter-
mination a broader entry, a particular society or 'social formula-
tion' is constituted. Ideas, institutions, events within a social
formation, do not take place in abstract or in isolation from this
context of the underlying mode of production, but must rather be
seen in relation to the totality and to this material determination
within it, defined by the forces and relations of production. This is
not to claim, as 'vulgar' Marxists or many critics of Marxism
allege, that everything has to be reduced to economic activity: this
is not what Marx claimed, and his analyses of political events and
conflicts, be these France in the 1840s and 1870, or the
international events of his time, bear this out. Moreover, his
concept of capitalism embodied not just the specific forces and
ownership of the economy, but the broader set of institutions -
political, legal, cultural - that interrelated with it. 26
What these broad concepts of the 'mode of production' and the
'social formation' did entail was that analysis of any area of human
acitivity had to be seen in this socio-economic context, and not in
abstraction from it. There is therefore no state, no belief, no
conflict, no power in general, or independent of this context. By
extension, there is no 'international system', or any component
activity, be this war or diplomacy, abstracted from the mode of
production. Indeed, International Relations is the study of the
relations not between states but between social formations. When
this insight is applied to the issues of international relations, a
definite shift of focus becomes visible. Thus the state is no longer
seen as an embodiment of national interest or judicial neutrality,
but rather of the interests of a specific society or social formation,
defined by its socio-economic structure. How far classes control
the state, or are separated from it, has been one of the main issues
of dispute within the field. Sovereignty equally becomes not a
generic legal concept but the sovereignty of specific social forces.

Its history is that of forms of social power and attendant
legitimisation within a formation. Security is removed from the
distinct theoretical sphere in which it has been placed and becomes
the security of specific social groups and for specific socio-
economic reasons.
The history of the system is also seen in another light: the
modern inter-state system emerged in a context of the spread of
capitalism across the globe, and the subjugation of pre-capitalist
societies. This socio-economic system has underpinned both the
character of individual states and of their relations with each
other: no analysis of international relations is possible without
reference to capitalism, the social formations it generated and the
world system they compriseY
The second central theme, embodied in the very term for the
paradigm itself, is that of history, and historical determination. In
the first instance, Marx argued that history influenced present
behaviour. In the phrase he used on one occasion: 'the tradition of
the dead generations weighs like a nightmare upon the minds of the
living'. But it meant something more than this: Marx argued that
the events or character of any society could only be seen in their
historical context - one had to ask how the object of study came
about, what the influences, of past events were, and what the
impact of the past in shaping the current situation might be. 28 Just
as he argued that society had to be seen in its socio-economic
context, so he believed that the conditions of generation and a
recognition of their contingent location, were central to any
analysis. To understand contemporary capitalist society, one had
to see how it originated and what the problems and tendencies
conditioned by the past were, how it limited what people thought
of as being their options, and led them to be influenced, or wholly
determined, by passions, illusions, identifications derived usually
unwittingly from the past.
Anyone familiar with the workings of the international system
will, in one sense, be aware of this- the ideological suppression of
the origins of the system, a propensity to deny the violence
involved in its creation, and the force within international affairs,
not least through nationalism, of irrational factors. Thus what
Marx said of the role of history in general could be said of any
particular country: its domestic and foreign policies, the instincts
of its leaders and the responses of its public, the institutions

through which policy was conducted, the grievances and fears that
drive its population -all reflected the past to a degree larger than
was often admitted.
More importantly, as with socio-economic, so with historical
determination, Marx also saw these conditioning factors as
undermining the appearance which all social events had of being in
some way 'natural' or 'eternal': one of the major functions of
political socialisation in any society is to make what exists in that
society appear as inevitable, and unchangeable. The same is true
of the international domain itself, and the attendant forms -
nation, state, sovereignty, etc. - associated with it. Location of
these features of a society in the historical context of their origin
serves to contradict this appearance of being natural and eternal,
as well as to suggest that alternatives are also the more possible.
The place of history in the study of international relations is, as
already recognised, an uneasy one. This is both for theoretical
reasons, in that International Relations seeks to identify a distinct
conceptual terrain for study, and for practical and professional
reasons, in that it wishes to distinguish and justify itself by contrast
with what is regarded as the ideologised approach of diplomatic
history, too often a fetishism of archives and dates. The question
of historical origin receives less attention. Where history is
present, it is usually either as illustration, or, rather too often, as a
means of intimidating the reader with a barrage of examples,
evident as much in James Der Derian (On Diplomacy) as in
Martin Wight.
The result, however, is that many of the questions considered
within International Relations are to a perilous degree abstracted
from their historical context. This applies, first, to the lack of
historical culture of most of those writing about and studying the
subject, so that the proportion and range of reference to history is
often absent. Behaviouralism, of course, made a rejection of
history one of its central tenets. It applies equally to the
abstracting of specific concepts from the historical situation under
which they arose. The claim, frequently made and repeated in the
literature, that the contemporary British and American states are
examples of a peaceful, non-revolutionary, path of development is
one striking example of this. The 'expansion' of Western society or
of international society was achieved through the subjugation,
plunder, and in some cases massacre, of colonial societies. A more

recent case is the prevailing discussion of the concept of
'interdependence' and the related issue of 'ungovernability': this
almost elides the importance of the particular event that, at the
political level, brought this question to the fore, namely the
Vietnam War, and its impact on the US political and social
systems. 29
The third central theme of the historical materialist approach is
the centrality of classes as actors in political life, both domestic and

international. 3 Classes are defined, very broadly, by reference to
their ownership and control of the means of production, a power
that is seen as defining the other forms of social power that they
exercise. If within a particular state classes act to subject and
control those less powerful than themselves, they act internation-
ally to ally with groups similar to themselves when this is
beneficial, and to compete with them by peaceful or military
means, when rivalry is preferred. Conflict between them, or what
is known as 'class struggle', therefore takes place at two levels:
between groups at different positions on the socio-economic
ladder, and between groups with similar positions. Such struggle
also takes place both within specific states and internationally: as
the spread of capitalism has increased the size of the capitalist
world, rivalry with other ruling classes at an international level has
continued side-by-side with conflict within specific states. Each
ruling class has been able to use the international character of
capitalism both to find support for the preservation of its own
position within society, by allying with others, and to see in the
international arena a domain for the extension of its own interests
and power.
This prominence of classes as analytic tools has two immediate
consequences for International Relations. First, it invests the
major conflicts of international politics with a distinct socio-
economic character. Though it may be untrue to say, paraphrasing
Marx, that all the history of International Relations has been one
of class struggle, it has certainly been a major and at times decisive
component. The competitive spread of the European empires, the
outbreaks of the two world wars, the gold standard crisis of 1931,
the OPEC price rises of 1971-73, the disputes over trade and
interest rates within the Atlantic Alliance in the early 1980s, US-
Japanese trade conflict in the 1990s- all now appear as, in broad
terms, part of conflict between capitalist ruling classes, between

old established capitalist powers and their new rivals, the latter
produced by the development of capitalist social relations within
their own countries. Many of the disputes that have marked
twentieth century history became inter-imperialist and inter-
capitalist disputes, beyond their specific national, geographic and
historical characteristics: as already noted, this issue of conflict
between great powers, not the dynamics of 'North-South'
relations was the main question addressed by Lenin and others, in
the debate on imperialism before the First World War.
Secondly, in this light, the debates that have flourished within
International Relations for so long appear to be founded on some
questionable premises. Since the state is not an independent
entity, but is rather located in a particular socio-economic and
class context, the debate on whether the state is losing power to
non-state actors changes character. For the question now becomes
not whether the state has recently, i.e. since 1945 or 1970, lost pre-
eminence to non-state actors but how far the 'non-state' actors
who have always affected the power and character of the state act
through the state or through other channels. These non-state
actors, i.e. classes, have always been there, but have exercised
their power in a variety of ways. The question of how far the
boundary between domestic and international politics has broken
down also acquires a different significance; in capitalism classes
have always operated internationally, from the bankers and
trading companies of the sixteenth century onwards, and have in
turn been affected domestically by changes in the international
economic and political situation. 31
The primacy of classes therefore serves in a dual sense to place
in question the concept of the 'nation-state': it shows, first, that
the state itself is, to a considerable extent, a function of wider
social forces, and secondly that the impermeability of domestic
politics is an appearance which conceals a permanent, underlying,
internationalisation of political and economic factors. In Marx's
own writings, there is an interesting tension on this issue: his
political instincts led him to emphasise the international character
of the proletariat, the working class, and their aspiration and
ability to organise on an international basis against their class
enemies; yet his theory contained within it another suggestion,
namely that it was not the working class, but the bourgeoisie, who
were the most international, since their education and culture on

the one hand, and their very economic interests on the other, were
such as to lead them to act more and more internationally. The
subsequent history of capitalism has, as much as anything, been
one in which the internationalisation of the ruling class has
proceeded as fast as, or even faster than, that of the working class
- hence, as Jeff Frieden, Stephen Gill, Kees van der Pijl and
others have shown, the EC (European Community), the Trilateral
Commission, the Group of 7 and many others are examples of
transnational elite coordination, for the better management of the
economy, both national and international.
The fourth central concept of historical materialism is that of
conflict and its apogee, revolution. Much of the literature on and
within Marxism has been concerned with the issue of conflict at the
philosophical and methodological level, as reflected in the
question of 'dialectics'. This is a debatable venture, a relic of the
Hegelian influence on Marx and of the widespread nineteenth-
century view that a single 'method' for natural and social sciences
could be ascertained. Conflict is taken here to be a historical and
social concept, pertaining to relations between different classes
and other social groups, and generated by differences in socio-
economic positions. Historical materialism not only argues that
such conflict is inevitable, given inequalities in wealth and
economic position in contemporary society, but also that it is a
major dynamic factor in the politics of the international system as
well as being so in that of individual societies.
The culmination of such conflicts can take place in one of two
ways, or in a combination of the two: wars and revolution. In
Marxism, wars represent conflicts between social classes of similar
character, rivals for a monopoly of control over markets, resources
and territory. Marx distinguishes between 'political' revolutions,
which only change the form of government; and 'social' revolu-
tions that alter the system of class rule: he is concerned with the
latter. Revolutions represent conflicts between social classes of
different character, within particular states. Revolutions are the
events which, arising out of the deep conflicts within a socio-
economic structure, lead to changes in the social character of
states, and to substantial shifts in the character of international
politics. Far from representing aberrations, breakdowns, or
interruptions of normal politics, they are widespread and central
transition points within the history of nations and of the

international community generally. They are, in Marx's words, the
'locomotives of history'. 32
If this tenet of historical materialism is extended to the
international, then it suggests that the central concern of Inter-
national Relations becomes not security, and the actions of the
nation-state directed to defending and enhancing it, but rather
conflict, and the ways in which this is generated, conducted, and
resolved. Underlying the myriad events of international affairs lies
social conflict, within and across frontiers, the pursuit of wealth
and economic power as the source of these manifold events. 33
Taking the historical determination of specific states into account,
it becomes necessary to enquire whence these came, or, more
precisely, out of what historical conflicts they emerged. The most
apparently pacific of states may have issued from extremely
bloody pasts - the superficially tranquil Netherlands has a history
replete with revolution, invasion and sanguinary internal strife.
The currently smooth workings of democracy in Germany or
Japan betray the fact that this political system was imposed but
two generations ago through foreign military intervention. The
sudden arrival of close to one hundred new states on the world
scene in the period since 1945 is often adduced merely as a
numerical addition, a complicating or diluting expansion, of an
otherwise continuous states system: the fact that this process was a
result of intense conflicts, between colonies and colonial power
and, as a major precondion, derived from the weakening of the
colonial empires in the Second World War, receives less than its
appropriate share of attention.
Marx was aware of this in his writings on the mid-nineteenth
century: writing on the challenge to the five-nation balance of
power, the pentarchy, he warned of the presence of a sixth great
power, revolution. Thus, the dominant problem of twentieth-
century international politics is seen by conventional international
relations theory as being that of security: but for much of that
period it can equally be seen as having been that of containing
inter-capitalist conflict on the one hand, and social revolution on
the other. In other words, the management of social conflict is the
issue that has most concerned politicians and academic analysts of
foreign policy alike. 34 As Arno Mayer has shown, an apparently
neutral international event like the Versailles Peace Conference of
1919 was preoccupied with the issue of counter revolution and

containing disorder. Marx was mistaken to invest revolution with
the mystical and deterministic overtones that came to be associ-
ated with it, and equally wrong to believe that some radically
different and emancipated society would emerge from such
upheavals: but he was right to see social conflict, over ownership,
power, resources, as a central feature of politics, and to ask how
such conflict underlay the apparently autonomous world of
political strife and international conflict.
This he was able to do, in part, by introducing the materialist
and historical contexts. When it is said that the pursuit of
international politics is one of 'order' one has to ask 'order' for
whom, and in whose interests? Similarly, when it is said, as by
Hedley Bull, that international society is 'anarchical', this both
recognises and avoids the question: it recognises it in so far as it
acknowledges that there is conflict and that it is endemic to the
international system, but it avoids it, in so far as it denies that
there is an underlying source of this conflict, beyond the states
system, and locates the coherence of the system only at the level of
the mechanisms, or so-called 'institutions', evolved to manage this
conflict. But the assertion of anarchy conceals the fact that this
superficially incoherent conflict is itself the product of factors that
are definable and intelligible, even if they cannot be controlled as
the principal actors would like. Moreover, for Marxism, it is above
all not the anarchy of the states system but that of the market and
of capitalism itself that is determinant. 35
The theme of conflict opens the way to an evaluation of the
place within Marxist thought of an issue already touched on, the
question of will, and of conscious human activity. Marx emphasised
the importance of socio-economic and historical determination:
these forces bore heavily upon human actors and set both limits to
what they could achieve and directions in which their actions
tended.
A central theme of historical materialism is a recognition of the
realm of necessity, and of the power of unrecognised factors to
influence our behaviour. In this sense, Marx asserted the
importance of unacknowledged social and historic factors, in some
ways as powerful as Freud's individual unconscious. But, as with
Freud, he believed that human will, and the work of making the
unconscious explicit and conscious, had a purpose and was, within
certain limits, attainable. Moreover, such a recognition was the

path not to the celebration of the inevitable, to surrender in the
face of the determined, but rather was a precondition for the
exercise of that degree of freedom which circumstances permitted.
Social groups could the more easily change their position if they
saw the extent of the factors that determined their situation.
Similarly, the possibility of action to alter the existing system of
international relations, to wage a conflict with some degree of
success, depended upon a comparable recognition of necessity.
Conflicts are, to a considerable extent, waged by actors who are
blind, or who cannot attain the goals they rationally set them-
selves. In international relations this, in Hegel's terms, 'cunning of
history' encourages the appearance of an international system that
is random and anarchical, or one that is unchangeable: historical
materialism provided both an alternative explanation and a
prescription. It indicated an alternative international system,
albeit one that is attainable only through sustained effort and an
unrelenting attempt to recognise the degree to which all human
actors remain prisoners of the forces, social and historical, that
bear upon them. More than other theories it was historical
materialism that asserted that human agency had created one
world, a capitalist one.
The Inhibitions of Theory
These four general themes provide an outline, brief and in-

adequate as it may be, of a possible historical materialist approach
and a suggestion of the implications of it for International
Relations. That this paradigm has not, as yet, yielded either the
theoretical or the empirical work on International Relations that is
its potential indicates that the paradigm also contains major
difficulties, ones that inhibit its development and deflect its
practitioners.
The most powerful inhibiting factor in Marxism is the tone of its
overall approach, something that inhibited its theoretical develop-
ment and blunted its understanding by others. This denotes the
dogmatism and intolerance of part of the analysis that appears
under its name, and, as a dominating part of this dogmatism, the
immanence of a historical teleology, i.e. the belief that history
was/is moving in a particular, ultimately emancipatory, direction.

This dogmatism was a product of the political considerations of
many who used it, and in particular of the rulers of communist
states, and their supporters elsewhere. Ironically, it was to provide
contradictory vindication of perhaps the only international
concept produced by orthodox communism that did have general
validity, that of the 'correlation of forces', a broad dynamic
conception of inter-bloc relations that combined military with
cultural, political and economic factors: more elaborated than the
alternative, 'balance of power', it was, however, in error on the
direction in which the correlation was moving. 36
But the dogmatism of much Marxism reflects something more
than the fact that it is associated with state power in a range of
dictatorial countries. It is also a product of factors engrained in
classical Marxism itself, and which spring from the belief in the
inevitability of the capitalist crisis and the advent of socialism.
Consciousness of determinism produces a sense of rectitude, and
hence of intolerance. Such an attitude, present as it was in Marx, is
in one sense thoroughly un-Marxist, in that it ascribes a perman-
ence to ideas that their very historical and socio-economic
contingency precludes. This dogmatism, and unrelenting assertion
of specific arguments within a paradigm, is by no means specific to
Marxism, as students of International Relations and all other
social sciences are well aware. Yet it is a powerful, warping, force
within historical materialism itself, one that stunted its growth,
made it the easier for its foes to dismiss or distort it, and is still far
from being extinct. Nowhere was this more evidence thari in the
later thinking on 'imperialism', where a set of absolute assertions
about the impact of the industrialised countries on the third world
blocked analysis of what was actually happening in these societies
and the possibilities for change within them.
The first of the limitations within Marxism concerns the very
concept of 'determination', the degree to which political events or
actors or even the state itself can be seen as mere expressions of
the underlying socio-economic structure of a society. This problem
is as relevant for International Relations as it is for any other
branch of human activity - art, psychology, social behaviour,
philosophy. While the writings of independent, 'western' Marxists
were able to evade this, the tendency towards reductionism
maimed much Marxist analysis for the past century and more.
What appears much more fruitful, and empirically plausible, is to

see determination as western Marxists did not in an absolute
sense, that evacuates all non-material phenomena of any meaning
and individual capacity for action and change, but rather to see it
as providing a context, a set of limits and significances within
which these other factors can be assessed. To see such factors -be
they individuals, parties, governments or ideologies- outside their
socio-economic context is to abstract them from the forces that
bring them into being and invest them with much of their potency.
This general problem with the level of determination of the
socio-economic does much to account for another area of
inhibition: the relative autonomy of politics. Although Marx,
Engels, Lenin and their successors wrote copiously on politics, as
they were avid political practitioners, there remained within their
writings a deep and unresolved problem about how to analyse
politics itself. This problem is as pertinent for international politics
as it is for domestic. Beyond demonstrating the ways in which
socio-economic factors influence politics, historical materialists
have often been unsuccessful in adequately defining the workings
of politics itself, i.e. of that dimension of politics that is not simply
an expression of the socio-economic.
Marx's own writings on the politics of his time betray this
problem, amidst the tactical astuteness of his observation. Nowhere
is this more so than in his writings on the Great Power conflicts of
his day, where a deep hostility to Czarist Russia led him into a
world of moralising and conspiracy theory that bore no substantive
relation to his general theoretical approach. Lenin's naivety about
the revolutionary state in early 1917, and his ignoring of the
dangers of a new dictatorship after 1918, illustrate the same
weakness. The illusion that the state would wither away in its
internal dimension, i.e. vis-a-vis society, is reproduced in the
illusion that the division between states will be overcome by
capitalist interdependence or socialist revolution.
Perhaps the greatest and most eloquent example of this
underestimation of the state is the abiding difficulty which
orthodox Marxists have had in explaining two of the most
enduring features of twentieth-century politics: nationalism and
capitalist democracy. For all the talk of false consciousness,
mystification and leadership betrayal, these major phenomena
presented a theoretical problem to Marxism. The former has
persistently proved itself superior to class loyalties as a means of

mobilising mass support, amongst oppressed and oppressor alike.
The latter has secured the loyalty or at least acquiescence of the
mass of the population in the more developed capitalist countries
for half a century or more, with resort to only limited coercion and
intimidation on the part of the ruling classes.
These difficulties have important implications for the study of
International Relations. Within International Relations, there are
a variety of specific sub-disciplines that go to make up the overall
subject-matter of the discipline. These include, international law,
institutions, security, decision-making, economic relations, and
philosophy. A recognition of their theoretical and practical
dependence upon the determinations of the socio-economic and
the historical, such that they do not become abstracted and
detotalised from their context, can be balanced by a recognition
that they are, as in domestic politics governed by rules and
tendencies of their own, ones that cannot be reduced to those of
the socio-economic. For example, to see the NATO (North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation) alliance merely as an alliance of
capitalist states, without any geographical, cultural and historical
specificity, would be almost as misleading as to see it in
International Relations terms as an alliance in general without
reference to the socio-economic interests, offensive and defensive,
of the governments that created and sustain it. Similarly, it is
possible to analyse the OPEC states both as insecure oil-
producers, the majority of them Arab states of the Middle East,
and as products of the combined and uneven development of
capitalism in the post-war epoch with corresponding behaviour for
commodity suppliers in a monopoly position.
Marxism beyond Cold War
Historical materialism, therefore, is a body of concepts that claims

to analyse the full range of social behaviour, international
relations included. Writers working with its theoretical approach
have already produced some specific analysis of issues and events
within international relations, and have generated general
concepts that have the potential of being applied systematically to
this discipline. Historical materialism can present a theoretical and
empirical alternative to work within the lnternati<-'nal Relations

discipline as hitherto conventionally constituted. But it can only do
so by recognising the challenge which international relations
itself pose to it, as well as its own need to develop its analytic
potential in open response to the events and some of the
alternative theories of the contemporary world.
To argue for the recognition of the relevance of historical
materialism in the aftermath of the Cold War and the collapse of
the communist system may, at first sight, appear perverse, if not
forlorn. Yet such an endeavour is possible not only in spite of, but
in certain respects because of, that turn of events. At the most
straightforward level, the pertinence of historical materialism as
an explanatory system has never been dependent upon the success
of dictatorial movements that claimed to speak in its name, any
more than has capitalism relied on the success of the authoritarian,
racist and belligerent regimes that it produced. The evolution,
separate from and in conflict with official communism, of
independent Marxism over most of the twentieth century is
evidence enough of that. But beyond this consideration lies the
possibility that historical materialism may prove to be just as
relevant as it ever was as an explanatory system, and one that, in
origin and development, takes as its starting point and focus of
analysis precisely that phenomenon that now more than ever
dominates the world, namely capitalism.
Marxism was wrong to assert the imminence of a revolutionary
alternative to capitalist society, and it consistently underrated the
potential for change, and improvement within capitalism. As we
shall see in Chapter 10, the claim that capitalism inevitably leads to
war may turn out to be itself historical, a reflection on states that
were not yet fully democratic. But its twin claims, that the mode of
production provides the context for the analysis of political
phenomena, national and internationaL and that the capitalist
system is riven with conflicts, dangers and failures, grounded in
these socio-economic factors, would seem to be as valid today as
they ever were.
The concluding chapters of this book provide one set of answers
to this, exploring how a broad historical materialist approach may
provide explanations both of the Cold War, and of its uneasy
aftermath. With the end of the long confrontation with commun-
ism, and the attendant compulsion to conceal socio-economic
issues, IR may now admit the extent to which specific political and
social interests determined its agenda, and the foreign policy of
states: in such a context, historical materialism, itself freed from
dogmatism and conformity, may become more, not less, significant
within the study of the international.
4
State and Society in
Impasse on the State
Since the early 1970s much of the theoretical debate within

International Relations has focused on the question of the state.
Some discussion has been around the analytic primacy of the state
as the constitutive actor in international relations, while some has
focused on normative questions, of the degree to which the state
can be regarded as the primary guarantor of what is good, within
and between states. 'State-centric' realism has reasserted tradi-
tional positions on the state and has, through the emergence of
neo-realism, affirmed new ones, especially in the field of inter-
national economic relations. Other paradigms have challenged the
primacy of the state, either by asserting the role of non-state
actors, as in theories of interdependence and transnationalism, or
by asserting the primacy of global systems and structures over
specific actors, state or non-state. All three of these approaches
have been influenced by broader trends within political science:
realism by mainstream political theory; transnationalism by the
pluralist and behavioural rejection of the state in favour of
studying actions; structuralism by theories of socio-economic
determination.
By the late 1980s, however, it would seem that this debate
within International Relations had reached an impasse. The three
paradigms, with their many variations and reformulations,
remained vigorous, and the numbers of their adherents waxed and
waned with professional development and intellectual fashion.
However, there was no sign that any one of them could or would
prevail over the others. The challengers to realism were still
74
State and Society in International Relations 75
seeking to refute it and displace it, while proponents of realism

repeated the reasons why the challengers are inadequate. 1 The
search for a single paradigm, for a 'normality' defined in Kuhnian
terms, produced a situation of, for many, unsatisfactory indeed
sterile pluralism.
It can, however, be argued that a pluralism of paradigms is, in
fact, more of an indication of a healthy discipline than a mono-
paradigmatic normalcy in which other perspectives, the research
programmes they suggest, the very concepts and indeed facts they
point us to, are precluded. The exclusive and chloroforming world
of the 1950s in many social sciences, where one paradigm reigned
in an institutionalised self-confidence, is one to which few friends
of International Relations or social science more generally would
want to return. It can, moreover, be argued that the very pursuit
of paradigm refutation, on narrowly intellectual grounds, is a
misplaced venture, since the reasons for the attractiveness and
tenacity of a specific approach are multiple: these include not only
intellectual coherence, but also institutional support, the influence
of trends and conventional wisdoms within social science as a
whole and the broader climate of the times. 2
To accept the legitimacy and inevitability of paradigmatic
pluralism is not, however, to suggest that the reasons for
theoretical diversity are not of interest, nor that all paradigms can
be treated as equally valid: in the case of the debate on the state, it
is worth posing the question as to why the debate of the last three
decades has made so little progress. There has been no resolution,
and relatively little conceding of ground. One reason, inscribed in
Kuhn's own work and in that of his followers, is that paradigms are
incommensurable, i.e. because they deploy different concepts and
conceptual systems, and ask different questions and select differ-
ent facts, their arguments cannot be matched one against the
other. 3 Any cogent paradigm can provide a plausible explanation
of 'anomalies', or trends in the real world, that others might see as
threatening its validity: thus realists can incorporate multinational
corporations (MNCs), interdependence theorists the continued
role of security issues, and structuralists the rise of the newly
industrialised countries (NICs). As Kuhn has written: 'All
historically significant theories have agreed with the facts, but only
more or Jess'. The impasse on the state is, therefore, in part a
product of a deeper theoretical impasse that itself determines a
non-encounter on the state. A second reason, identified in,

amongst other places, much literature on international political
economy, is that the development of perspectives of the state's
place in international relations has itself been a contradictory
process confirming neither simple realist nor non-realist analyses.
The identifying and accumulating of ways in which the state has
lost its previous dominance can be countered by another list of
ways in which it has maintained or even enhanced it: the state has
both strengthened and weakened its position. No simple empirical
resolution of these competitive listings is possible, any more than
is one in theory. If the realists do appear to be unduly complacent
in the assertion that little or nothing has really changed, the
challengers often overstate the degree to which states are no
longer central actors: this is so both in their analysis of the recent
course of international relations and in the recurrent tendency to
extrapolate current trends into an apparently proximate and, in
most cases desirable, stateless future. The theoretical compre-
hension of the contradictory process (state-enhancement/state-
displacement) is one that can take us beyond the present
polarisation.
There is, however, a third reason for the impasse, one that goes
to the heart of International Relations, to the concepts it bases
itself upon, to the research programmes it stimulates, and to its
relation with other disciplines within the social sciences. This is the
question of the definition of 'state' which is used. It sometimes
appears as if theorists of International Relations are working with
the concepts of antique political theorists. For parallel to, but
largely unacknowledged within, the International Relations
debate on the state over the past twenty years there has been
another debate on the state, within sociology and within Marxism,
on how exactly the state operates. Most significantly perhaps, at
the very time when the innovators and proponents of new
paradigms within International Relations have been seeking to
reject or reduce the salience of the (undefined) state, the
comparable trend within sociology has been to re-examine the
state and to reassert its centrality in historical and contemporary
contexts, while Marxist debate has focused not on the supercession
of the state but on how to analyse its relation to social classes. 4 A
major change in favour of the state has been taking place. The
title of a collection of sociological essays on this issue, Bringing the
State Back In, 5 which resumes this debate and contains articles by
many of its leading practitioners, suggests a contrary but crucially
relevant development in a cognate discipline to International
Relations which has considerable implications for IR's, often
unwarrantedly solipsistic, discussion on this issue. Equally, the
Marxist debate cuts through any counterposing of states and non-
state actors. What these developments suggest is that one way to
reassess the debate on the state within International Relations is to
study these parallel discussions and in so doing to question the
exclusive definition of the state around which much of the
International Relations debate has implicitly revolved. The argu-
ment is not about whether we are or are not 'state-centric', but
what we mean by the state.
This revival of state theory is particularly relevant to those who
have claimed the term should be abandoned. In a succession of
books and articles published from the mid-1980s onwards Yale
Ferguson and Richard Mansbach have argued that so confused
and inappropriate is the concept of the 'state', that it cannot
provide a basis for theoretical work on international relations. Yet
while they are right to draw attention to the multiplicity of
meanings attached to the state, they are not justified in many of
their other arguments or their conclusions. On the one hand, there
is nothing inherent in the concept of the state, as defined below, to
preclude discussion of the varieties of state power and value
allocation that they draw attention to. On the other hand, they
skirt around, indeed fail seriously to engage with, the literature on
the state that has developed within the sociological literature and
which indeed produced a range of work just at the time when they
were pronouncing the concept unusable. The claim that the term
'state' necessarily has normative connotations is quite unfounded.
Their attempt to relate the uselessness of the concept 'state' to the
broader crisis in IR theory is equally mistaken, based as it is on an
electicism of method and an indeterminacy of concept. The
conclusion that their work leads to is not so much that,
emancipated from the concept of 'state', a new International
Relations is possible, but rather that, if this concept is abandoned,
further confusion ensues. 6
Definitions Contrasted
It is not at first obvious that there is a problem about the definition

of the state in International Relations, for the simple reason that
the operative distinction is implicit and not conventionally subject
to extended theoretical or empirical analysis. It is indeed para-
doxical that a concept so central to the whole discipline should
escape explication as this one has. One can find many discussions
of war, sovereignty, institutions and so forth, but one can search in
vain in the textbooks for comparable discussion of the state.
International Relations theorists assume we know what it is: e.g.
Bull that it is a political community. Waltz that it is in practice
coextensive with the nation. 7 The reason is that International
Relations as a whole takes as given one specific definition: what
one may term the national-territorial totality. Thus the 'state' (e.g.
Britain, Russia, America, etc.) comprises in conceptual form what
is denoted visually on a political map- viz. the country as a whole
and all that is within it: territory, government, people, society.
There could be no better summary of this view than that of
Northedge in the introductory chapter to his The International
Political System:
A state, in the sense used in this book, is a territorial association
of people recognized for purposes of law and diplomacy as a
legally equal member of the system of states. It is in reality a
means of organizing people for the purpose of their participa-
tion in the international system. 8
It is not argued by those who use this concept favourably,
especially realists, that such a state exists empirically, but only that
an abstraction of this kind, derived from political theory and
international law, is heuristically the most appropriate for Inter-
national Relations. 9 In other words, theory based on this concept
explains more about international relations and should, therefore,
be maintained. This is a valid reason for maintaining an abstrac-
tion: the question is not whether it provides a basis for explana-
tion, but rather how adequate the explanation it provides is. It
should be evident, of course, that once this concept is accepted
then, by definition, the question of non-state actors is largely
prejudged.
The alternative concept of the state, as it is used in much recent

sociological writing and in the parallel Marxist debate, is of a more
limited kind. It denotes not the social-territorial totality, but a
specific set of coercive and administrative institutions, distinct
from the broader political, social and national context in which it
finds itself. Influenced by the German tradition of Max Weber and
Otto Hintze, Skocpol defines the state 'a set of administrative,
policing and military organizations headed, and more or less well
coordinated, by an executive authority'. 10 Many alternative
definitions of the state can be provided within this sociological
approach. However, this concept of coercive and administrative
institutions serves to distinguish a quite separate concept of the
state, and to suggest an alternative way in which the concept can
be incorporated within discussion of international relations.
Within the sociological discussion of the state that has emerged
over the past decades many problems remain unresolved. One is
the question of delimiting the extent of the state: if the state is seen
as the mechanism for dominating, regulating and reproducing a
society under given social relations then the question arises of
where to locate institutions that are formally independent but
which are influenced by the state and parallel its regulatory and
reproductive functions: schools, universities, churches, and, in
some of its roles, the family. The debate on Althusser's conception
of educational establishments as Ideological State Apparatuses
was an example of this. 11 A second debate, well represented in
Bringing the State Back In, concerns the 'autonomy' of the state:
once the state is seen as institutionally distinct from society, the
question arises of the degree to which it can act autonomously, and
represent values separate from that society, even if it is ultimately
constrained by it. The institutional concept of the state is, in part,
a means of resisting those Marxist theories that see the state as, to
a greater or lesser extent, an expression of class or economic
interest. The degree to which those in power can pursue policies
against the apparent wishes of much of society (by imposing
reforms or pursuing wars that are unpopular and destructive)
poses this issue of autonomy quite clearly. One explanation is that
the state has the longer-term strategic interests of society in mind.
For some, such as Skocpol, there is a distinct area of autonomy
which is greatly enhanced by the state's international role. A
Marxist such as Fred Block can also take this position. 12 For
others, such as Robert Brenner, a division of labour between

societal administration and private appropriation should not be
confused with any real autonomy, and the Marxist theory of the
state as a class instrument remains valid. 13 A third debate, one
located more specifically within the Marxist sociological tradition,
has concerned the relation of the contemporary state to capitalism
and to classes. Going beyond the initial Marxist-Leninist view of
the state as a mere instrument of class rule, this debate has
generated a variety of alternative theses from the capital logic
approach to that which stresses the management of intra-elite
conflicts, to the approach influenced by one reading of Gramsci
according to which the function of the state is to maintain class
hegemony in .all its dimensions - coercive, administrative,
regulative and ideological. This alternative theory, generally
described as 'structural', allows a much greater degree of autonomy
to the state.
The difference between these two conceptions of the state is
reflected in everyday language. In discussing land, we distinguish
between the territory of the state, in its total sense, and the areas
of land owned by the state, in its institutional sense. Similarly we
distinguish between the population or working population of a
state, and the percentage of that population who are directly
employed by the state. In revolutions the institutional state is
overthrown, but the total state remains. Yet much of the
International Relations debate does seem to involve a confusion of
these two meanings. Thus when critics of Marxism say it is a form
of realism because it is 'state-centric', this mixes up the two
concepts of the state: Marxists use the term 'state' quite differently
from realists. The result is a prevailing dominance of the totality
concept that, because of the very definition involved, precludes
other areas of theoretical investigation. This is what a paradigm
should do: realists can and do argue that the issues, and data,
identified as relevant by other paradigms, are relatively insignific-
ant.
Whether or not the sociological concept has greater analytic and
explicatory potential than the national-territorial totality concept
is a matter of debate. Yet, whatever the final judgement on this
score, two broad contrasts are immediately evident. The first is
that, for a discipline concerned with the interpretation of reality,
the sociological concept is far less of an ideological abstraction
than is the national-territorial totality one. The concept normally

used in International Relations is not merely an analytic conveni-
ence, but also one replete with legal and value assumptions (i.e.
that states are equal, that they control their territory, that they
coincide with nations, that they represent their peoples). There
could indeed be few concepts less 'realistic' than that of the
sovereign state in its conventional International Relations guise. A
second immediately relevant contrast is that the sociological
approach enables us to pose much more clearly the question of the
effectivity of the international dimension; i.e. why and how
participation in the international realm enhances and strengthens
states, and, in particular, why it enables them to act more
independently of the societies they rule. This most central feature
of the modern world, that states can be less responsive to, and
representative of, their societies precisely because of their inter-
national role, is submerged, ab initio, by the assumptions of the
'national-territorial' concept.
The least that can be said, therefore, is that an alternative
conceptualisation of the state permits analytic questions and
avenues of research markedly different from those permitted
within the totality approach. In the first place this alternative
definition of the state opens up a set of conceptual distinctions that
are often confused and conflated in literature on International
Relations, but which need to be separated out if the state-society
relationship is to be more clearly identified. The very concept
'international' has, as many critics have pointed out, confused the
issue by denoting as between nations what are usually relations
between states. Morgenthau's classic, Politics Among Nations is,
like the United Nations itself, symptomatically mistitled.
One distinction is that between the state, in this delimited
sociological sense, and society, i.e. the range of institutions,
individuals and practices lying beyond the direct control and
financing of this central entity .14 Society itself is not homogeneous,
comprising as it does different social classes and ethnic and interest
groups, and the access of these to the state will be different,
depending upon the power, wealth and political skill of these
groups. The state-society relation is therefore variable: it is
here that the Marxist debate has been the sharpest, and where
many Marxists have most criticised the institutional approach. 15
A second distinction is between state and government, i.e.,
between the ensemble of administrative apparatuses and the

executive personnel formally in positions of supreme control.
Conventional political discourse assumes that these are identical,
just as the state-government pair are assumed to represent society
as a whole. Thus, in orthodox usage, the indications 'prime
minister' or 'president' of a country are readily replaced with the
name of the country itself: 'Britain's position on disarmament is
... ', etc. However, the state-government distinction may, in
some situations, become of considerable relevance as elements
within the state resist or actively oppose the policies of govern-
ment. This may take relatively innocuous forms (press leaks,
dragging of feet, arrangements of an agenda) but it can take much
more acute forms, culminating in that most extreme of state-
government contradictions, the military coup d'etat.
A third central distinction is that between state and nation. The
term 'nation-state', based as it is on an assumption of ethnic
homogeneity and political representativity, is, in empirical terms,
inappropriate to the modern world. Coercive states may well not
represent the nation (i.e. the society they rule) at all; where there is
ethnic diversity, as there is in most states of the world, the state
may represent the interests of one national group more than those
of another. The question is therefore open as to how far the state
represents the nation. While some International Relations theory,
notably foreign policy analysis, has challenged the realist confla-
tion of these terms, no alternative conceptualisation of the state
has so far been counterposed to it. 16
The sociological approach suggests, secondly, an alternative and
less benign view of the origins of states. Its emphasis is on the state
as initially an instrument of coercion and extraction, both against
the populations subjected to states and against rivals. As Tilly has
shown, on the basis of historical investigation, European states
began as instruments of subjugation, as protection rackets. 17 It
may be that over the centuries these protection rackets have
developed a more representational function, but this is contingent,
something that varies in degree from country to country and may
not be a completed process. It is worth remembering that the
principle of one person one vote is only something introduced into
major Western states since the Second World War. 18 The fact that
in its origins the main functions of the state are the seizure of land
and goods, the subjugation of populations, and the waging of war
against rivals is rather understated in conventional accounts of the

rise of the modern system, which imply that states have been
representative ever since 1648.
A third central theme, touched on in Chapter 1, is that states,
and their internal organisation, have developed in a world-
historical context, i.e. in interaction with, and imitation of, other
states. Far from the internal constitution of states and societies
being immune, at least until recently, to international phenomena,
the international dimension provided the context and formative
influence for these states, not only for the majority of the world
states that are post-colonial and so shaped by the colonial
experience, but equally for European states. The world economy,
the Reformation, the values of legitimacy, and above all, the
pressures of economic and military competition ensured this. 19
Important as this is in the critique of Marxism (as in Giddens and
Mann) it is equally relevant as an alternative international theory
to that of realism, which derives the system from states.
A fourth constitutive theme is that states are formative of
societies: of national consciousness; of the national ideologies that
turn the arbitrary assemblages of people into nations; of national
economies. States have always played a role in forming economies,
not just through planning, taxation, and the promotion of sectors
tied to the national, specifically military interest, but also through
the regulation of economies through legislation specifying what is
and is not legitimate and through the financial mechanisms of
central banks. However international capital may or may not be in
the late twentieth century, it recognises the regulatory powers
of states. This is nowhere clea:rer than in the fluctuations of the
international money markets in response to varying prospects for
elections in major Western states, and in the face of the changing
regulatory powers of states, as well as in the sometimes nervous
responses of the stock exchanges to the appointment of new
central bank chairmen. If the policies of the British, German,
Japanese and US states did not affect the money markets, the
latter would more easily ignore pre-election polls and the advent
of the new forms of regulation. The fallacy of much current writing
on the state's role in the economy, in identifying state control only
with formal state ownership of productive and financial services,
ignores the much broader powers that states have historically
maintained and still maintain vis-a-vis their economies.
Finally, there is an important set of questions pertaining to the

state's own internal composition and relation to society that are
raised by the development of historical sociology. As Michael
Mann has shown, the question of state capacities, of how states
administer populations and territories, and the manifold mechan-
isms for imposing and extending control, is one that richly repays
comparative and historical investigation. 20 This approach frees the
study of the state from the concept of sovereignty, the assumption
that the state does have a monopoly of power and legitimacy
within a delimited territory, and instead asks how, and how far,
and with what changes, such control has developed. The premise
of much International Relations writing is that the state is
sovereign, in controlling effectively the territory and population
over which it rules. This is, however, an empirical simplification,
even for the most effective of states. It precludes analysis of just
how control is exercised and developed and how other factors,
including international ones, may modify and affect a state's
capacity to control.
These broad themes, recurrent in much of the recent socio-
logical and historical-sociological literature, suggest areas in which
the alternative concept of the state can affect the study of
International Relations. What follows are some more specific
suggestions as to how, given this alternative paradigm, the study of
the relations may be developed.
The State as Domestic and International Actor
The most significant theme for International Relations pervading

this literature is that the state is seen as acting in two dimensions,
the domestic and the international. In its simplest form, the state
seeks both to compete with other states by mobilising resources
internally, and to use its international role to consolidate its
position domestically. For example, a state may appropriate
territory, go to war, or pursue an arms control agreement to gain
domestic advantage, while it may promote industrialisation,
introduce educational change, raise taxes, or treat an ethnic
minority better, in order to achieve international goals. Conducted
successfully, this two-front policy may work to the benefit of the
state, and it is evident that those holding state power have many
advantages in pursuing this approach. This two-dimensionality

does, however, involve major risks. A state that places undue
pressure on its own society in order to mobilise resources for
international competition may provoke such an intense reaction
that it is overthrown. 21 Alternatively, the pursuit of a domestically
advantageous policy may lead the state into destructive conflicts
with other states. Successful or not, however, this two-dimensional
perspective on state policy indicates that for all actors within a
specific society the international dimension is important for the
conducting of policy and the waging of conflicts. Those in state
power, and those associated with the state, will deploy inter-
national resources to contain domestic threats. These resources
may be military, up to and including allied troops; economic,
whether from other branches of a multinational corporation or
from international economic institutions as aid to embattled
holders of state power; or political, in the form of moral support,
treaties, or alliances provided by friendly states. Much of
international relations can be seen therefore as an internationalis-
ation of domestic conflicts, of relations between state and society.
Those opposed to states also seek such international contacts, and
have, throughout modern history, made much of this dimension.
There is certainly room for an International Relations of anti-
systemic forces, a substantial study of how those opposed to
established states have, and can, internationalise their support.
However, the reality would seem to be that here, as in purely
domestic conflicts, the state and its associates have a distinct
advantage and can mobilise resources within and beyond state
boundaries far in excess of those who challenge them. The latter
often lack resources and access to mechanisms for appropriate,
and sufficiently powerful, international integration of anti-
systemic activity. 22 Chapter 3 suggests that Marx's theory of the
internationalisation of classes can apply as much, or more, to the
dominant than to the dominated classes.
The sociological perspective on the state indicates the need to
study, in a comparative and historical context, just how the
international functioning of the state has affected the internal
workings of the state apparatus itself. This theme in Hintze's
studies of state formation involves examining how the inter-
national activities of states (war, territorial appropriation,
diplomacy) have affected the social origin of personnel in the
state, the predominance of some administrative branches within it,

the values of state personnel, and the overall size and financing of
the state. The role of military elements (the army as a whole, or
individual commanders) within states and societies is the most
eloquent example of this international determination of state
formation. The longevity of aristocratic influence within European
states, persisting long after the displacement of aristocratic landed
power in the societies concerned, is an index of how the diplomatic
function has affected the state as a whole. The influence on the US
state of its post-1945 adoption of a global role has been much
commented upon and has led some liberal critics to talk of a
'national security state' in the US. In broad terms this was a one-
sided argument, in that the Cold War coincided with the
extension, not the reduction, of democracy in the USA: 23 but the
enhanced power of the president, the ebb and flow of Congres-
sional controls, the rise of new bureaucracies with international
functions (the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Council), and the changed character of the State Department are
all instances of this impact of the international realm on the state
apparatus. Nor is it necessarily the case that the ideologies and
personnel of state apparatuses reflect only current changes in the
outside world: the enduring influence of a colonial and great
power past upon the post-1945 British state and its senior
personnel is evident enough. In embattled revolutionary states,
where the survival of the state is uncertain from month to month,
the practicalities of ensuring security against invasion and sub-
version take an enormous toll on the allocation of resources, and
on the time, nerves and concentration of those in power, as well as
affecting the conception of what is licit dissent.
State Interests and Social Forces
Equally, the relation of state to society is constantly affected by

the international function. This is clear in all four of the
dimensions that Michael Mann has seen as constitutive of state
power: the ideological, the military, the administrative and the
political. The economic benefits of imperialism to the British state
have been much debated, but few can doubt the ideological
benefits that did, and still do, accrue to the state because of its
assertion of British power in far-flung places. The need to sustain

armed forces, in peace as well as in war, has given the state a
fundamental interest in intervention in the economy and in
establishing close relations with those in society most relevant to
this issue. This was as true in early modern Europe as it is today.
The supportive role of the military lobbies in the US, and the
mechanisms (personal, institutional, financial) of interaction
between defense contractors, Congress, and the Pentagon have
been well documented, as has the link (e.g. in the Irangate affair)
between covert operations abroad and private interests at home in
the implementation of state policies.
The state recruits sections of domestic society for its inter-
national activities. At the same time both the state and society
seek to gain support for their internal conflicts from international
sources. Earlier, it was pointed out that the institutional concept of
the state makes it possible to distinguish between the terms state,
society, government and nation. Much of the relationship between
these is constituted within specific societies, but there are many
ways in which these relations acquire an international dimension:
states seek to regulate their own position by obtaining inter-
national support; governments, social groups and ethnic groups try
to enhance their position, vis-a-vis their own states, by obtaining
international backing such as economic or military aid; and
external actors seek to advance themselves against competitor
states by establishing direct relations with elements within the
latter's societies. One obvious case of such an interaction is the
sponsoring of military coups in independent states: the promotion
of government-state conflicts in rival countries. Another is the
promotion of social unrest or ethnic upheaval in rival countries
through money, arms, radio broadcasts and diplomatic backing.
Overall, the existence of the state-society relation permits
alternative means of conducting international relations: it
encourages states and social forces to pursue international policies
that will enhance their domestic positions in relation to each other.
Societies and State Systems
The reciprocal interaction of international society and specific

societies is not, however, effected solely through the mediation of
the state or with the purpose of eventually influencing the state.

There are other processes within society that are influenced by,
and which can themselves influence, the relationship of a
particular state to the international system, but which reflect
processes quite separate from that of state activity on the
international level. There are, on the one hand, long-term changes
within a specific society that, at a moment of increasing impact on
the state and on the politics of the government or executive, have
major impact on the international activities of that state. Short of
revolutionary upheavals, these can be changes of balance between
different social groups, changes in ideology and attitude, and
geographical shifts reflecting economic change. The rise of a
merchant bourgeoisie in Western Europe in the early modern
period, with its resultant impact on state policy and religious-
ideological orientation, was one of the constituent influences upon
the emergence of the international system. The shifts in the US
polity, with the decline of the north-east hegemonic bloc in favour
of the sun belt, do much to explain the sharp changes in US policy
between the 1970s and the 1980s. At the same time, the
international may have a major impact on the social composition
of a society such that it may also shape and influence the state. The
most extreme instances of this are conquest and. colonial rule,
when new state systems may simply be imposed on subjugated
societies. Short of such dramatic impositions of the international
upon the individual society, there are many other means through
which international economic and social changes can affect a
particular society, enhancing the position of some social groups,
and reducing the influence of others. Incorporation into the
world system affects not only the international balance of
(military) power, but also the balance of social power within
societies.
This focus on the state-society relation may also help in re-

examining, and re-theorising, the manner in which social groups
that have an international interest themselves relate to state
power. Some of this is encapsulated in empirical work on lobbies:
campaigns to keep out foreign goods, to back associated enter-
prises abroad, to put pressure on foreign states to make conces-
sions. Yet much of the debate on the relative influence of states
and non-state actors has assumed a polarity in this regard, as if the
multinational corporation (MNC) operating abroad wishes to act

independently of states. This touches upon the unresolved
question of the autonomy of the state: the state is 'autonomous' in
some respects, and more so in some periods, most notably
wartime, but the least that can be said is that in many areas the
state is acting in harness with, and at the behest of, influential
interests within society. Herein lies the strength of the 'structural'
theory of the state.
Here again, a traditional black box approach to the state makes
it difficult to answer the question of the MNC-state relationship,
since it only permits us to examine the relationship internationally.
Once it becomes possible, however, to examine the relation within
a society, and to identify the degree of collaboration in the relative
symbiosis of state and some sectors or classes of society, then the
nature of the international collaboration and apparent division of
labour becomes clearer. There are cases where MNCs defy states
by trading with countries, such as in the 1980s Nicaragua, Angola,
South Africa or Russia, upon which the state wishes to impose
economic pressure. In many other cases the state acts to promote
and defend the MNC. When International Telephone and
Telegraph (IT&T) ran into trouble in Chile in 1970, Harold
Geneen (president of the firm) called the White House. Congress
has imposed conditions on US aid to countries that nationalise US
firms without adequate compensation arrangements. If the
relationship of state and (some parts of) society is seen as
constituted domestically, and the international activities of each
are seen in this light, then it may become easier to resolve the
vexed question of how far states or non-state actors act independ-
ently of each other in world affairs.
As we shall see in greater detail in Chapter 6, the state-society

relationship is central to another dimension of international
relations, namely that of social upheaval and revolutions, and in
particular the question of why revolutions have international
effects. International Relations literature, in general, has relegated
revolutions to a marginal position, while most of the sociological
literature on revolutions tends to neglect the international implica-
tions. 24 It is the great merit of Skocpol's work that it seeks to
interrelate the two, by showing the degree to which revolutions are
to a considerable extent a product of inter-state and international
factors, and by suggesting how the post-revolutionary consolida-

tion of states and the extension of state power are influenced by
international pressures. There could be no clearer demonstration
of the interlinking of internal and international politics than the
ways in which revolutions can be stimulated by international
factors, whether the mobilisation of dominated groups, or the
weakening of previously secure dominators. Equally, however,
the international consequences of revolutions suggest further
consequences of the state-society relation: the compulsion of
revolutionaries to promote, if not 'export', revolution abroad, and
the anxiety and counter-revolutionary response which revolutions,
even in the weakest of states, may provoke in hegemonic powers.
The answer to both questions may lie to a considerable extent in
the state-society relationship. Revolutionary states see an inter-
nationalisation of their struggle as part of domestic consolidation:
militarily, in the gaining of like-minded aBies; economically, in the
winning of collaborative relationships with such allies; and
ideologically, in the promotion at the international level of similar
ideals to those which legitimate their own regime. On the side of
those opposed to revolution, similar concerns may operate: the
loss of a comparable society to a rival system weakens a state
internationally, but also domestically; it serves to weaken its
domestic legitimacy. As Raymond Aron has indicated, and as will
be discussed in Chapter 5, it is the preference for homogeneity in
political arrangements for international legitimacy and stability
that shows up both the crucial, if often understated, dependence of
domestic power arrangements upon international factors, and the
degree to which domestic factors, including the state-society
relationship itself, influence the foreign policy of states. 25 The
historical record of the past two centuries suggests that both
projects (the promotion of revolution in other states and the
overthrow of revolutionary regimes) usually fail in their declared
goals. However, as with economic sanctions, the purposes of such
ventures may be multiple, and may reflect broader ideological and
domestically orientated goals as much as the specifica1Iy declared
goal of the operation. The study of the international dimensions of
revolutions may, therefore, provide insight both into the consider-
able area of international relations that is affected by such
upheavals and into the broader transnational causes of, and
influences upon, domestic change. 26
This theorisation of the state-society relationship also has

implications for the comprehensive question concerning the nature
of the international system. As discussed in Chapter 1, within
current theory the term 'system' is used in a variety of ways, from
the realist conception of a system of states, in which the term is
used in the loosest sense, to the applications of systems theory to
International Relations (with rather modest results) and assertions
of an international capitalist system by writers of Marxist or
Marxist-influenced persuasion. The problem with the realist
theorists is that they avoid the question of the relationship of
socio-economic factors within states and internationally to the
functioning of the system, the latter being seen in narrowly
political terms. The problem with much Marxist writing is that it
understates the role and distinct efficacy of states. This latter
paradigm begs the question of why, if there is a world economy in
which class interests operate transnationally, there is a need for
states at all. What, in other words, is the specificity and effectivity
of distinct states within a single economic totality? These conun-
drums (the determinacy of the socio-economic, the specificity of the
political) cannot be answered within either a uniquely domestic or
international context; rather, they suggest the need to identify
how far each level does determine the system, and how states
function not only as independent actors in the system, but also as
mediators and regulators of a broader set of interactions that,
taken as a totality, constitute international society (however this
'society' is conceived).
Beyond an alternative grounding of the concept of system at the
international level, and as it affects analysis of the contemporary
world, such an alternative theorisation of the state also suggests
another variant of conventional International Relations
approaches, namely an alternative history of the international
system. Hitherto we have been offered a predominant realist view,
through which the international system, constituted by states,
develops, grows and 'expands' through the multiplication of states
and the acceptance by states of what Bull in The Anarchical
Society has termed the 'institutions' of interstate relations. That
such a view has an implicitly evolutionist and diffusionist founda-
tion does not need underlining, i.e. as if it all grew in a relatively
easy way. For all the pessimism of the realist view, it tends to
suggest an international history that is rather too benign, and at
variance with the sanguinary process of imposition, resistance and

reassertion of control that is characteristic of international
relations in the colonial or third world over the past four centuries.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the alternative, and to date minority,
view of the system is that outlined by writers such as Wallerstein
and Wolf, whose surveys of the expansion of capitalism since 1450
have offered a quite distinct international history depicting a
system based on capitalist market relations. 27 The theoretical
presupposition of Wallerstein's approach, that the development of
international society is constituted by the spread of a social system
at the international level, as distinct from the realist stress upon a
growth of relations between separate and analytically primary
states, is cognate with that of historical sociology with its stress
upon the world-historical context of international developments
and the multiple conflicts, intra- and inter-national, that have
marked it. However, where this history of world society may be
questioned, as already indicated, is in its neglect of the political
instance, the state, and in its market-based assumption about the
capitalist homogeneity of the cold war world.
To stress the broader, capitalist, character of the international
system is not to argue that social relations are in any simple sense
transnational. Marx in the nineteenth century and much apparently
contemporary sociological thinking make the same mistake in
assuming that the state was simply being swamped by trans-
national processes. This view, rather, takes the state seriously, but
questions more precisely its role within this broader socio-
economic context. In other words, it examines the function of
distinct states within such a socio-economic context: whether it
is to represent different ruling groups, or to represent distinct and
autonomous state interests, or to regulate and maintain a system
of international hierarchy. There is the further question concern-
ing the implications of a world such as that between 1945 and 1989
composed of two socio-economic systems: in broad terms, one
capitalist and one centrally planned. The functions of states, and,
not least, of their military aspects, in administering, prosecuting
and controlling this rivalry between competitive and contrasting
social systems, are discussed further in Chapter 8. Many is the
writer on international relations who has told us, on the basis of
exhaustive comparative data, that there is little or no correlation
between foreign policy output and socio-economic system: at the
risk of profanity, students of post-1945 history may be forgiven for

questioning this conclusion.
The implications for International Relations of this alternative
conceptualisation of the state will take time to work out, and will
involve greater recognition of trends in other social sciences,
sociology, and the more sociologically literate branches of history,
that have hitherto received little recognition. There is no doubt
that any such evolution will involve uncertainties and disappoint-
ments: a world in which the state is no longer conveniently taken
to represent the totality, and in which 'nation-state', 'sovereignty'
and 'national interest' are no longer secure landmarks, will be
harder to chart. On the other hand, there are substantial areas of
International Relations, notably foreign policy analysis and
international political economy, where significant work along
these lines has already taken place. Since, ultimately, the validity
and relevance of any conceptual approach lies in the relevance of
its conclusions and the degree of explanatory power they display,
it may be that one way to overcome IR's recurrent immobility on
the state will be to redefine the state itself.
5
International Society as
Homogeneity
The Meanings of 'International Society'
The concept of 'international society' occupies a significant place,

at once constitutive and spectral, in the study of international
relations. A number of reasons for this ambivalent position will be
discussed below, but perhaps the most important of all is the
variance of meanings that attaches to the term. Within realism,
'international society' refers to a relationship between states,
based on shared norms and understandings: this is the sense in
which it is used by Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, James Mayall and
other theorists of the English school. Within transnationalism, it
refers to the emergence of non-state links of economy, political
association, culture, ideology that transcend state boundaries and
constitute, to a greater or lesser extent, a society that goes beyond
boundaries. Originally pioneered by writers within International
Relations influenced by behaviouralism and a liberal Inter-
nationalist approach (John Burton, Robert 0. Keohane, Joseph
Nye) it has been developed in some more recent international
relations literature (Evan Luard) and separately but relatedly in
the sociological literature on globalisation (Michael Featherstone,
Roland Robertson, Leslie Sklair, John Urry). Both of these uses,
the inter-state and the transnational, have, within their theoretical
frameworks, important explanatory power.
There is, however, a third possible use of the term 'international
society'. This denotes a set of norms shared by different societies
and which are promoted by inter-state competition. This is based
neither on inter-state nor on transnational models, but on the
assumption of inter-societal and inter-state homology. This refers
94
International Society as Homogeneity 95
to a similarity of domestic values and organisation, i.e. to what has

been termed 'homogeneity', in the way societies are organised.
This third concept of 'international society' has distinct implica-
tions for the study of International Relations, 1 since it denotes the
relation between the internal structure of societies and the
international. Briefly, this approach investigates how, as a result
of international pressures, states are compelled more and more to
conform to each other in their internal arrangements. Unlike the
realist concept, 'homogeneity' pays considerable attention to what
happens within states and societies, and examines the interaction
of international activity with domestic legitimacy and stability.
Unlike the transnationalist, it accords considerable importance to
the concept of the state, in the second sense in which this is defined
in Chapter 4; indeed it sees comparative state formation as an
important part of the process, and takes competition between
states as a factor at least as formative as the growth of more
harmonious inter-societal, transnational, links.
This 'homogeneous' conception of international society covers
some of the material included in the first two concepts - the
organisation of political systems as conceived of by realists, and
transnational linkages. Its starting point, however, is -rather
different, since it begins with the need of societies and of policies
that remain distinct nonetheless to conform to an internationally
defined model. It is, therefore, a concept that pertains equally to
internal development and international relations.
'Homogeneity' is evident, if implicitly, in much social and
political theory. The account of economic development found in
economic historians such as Gerschenkron and others, focusing on
the need of states to 'catch up', is based on this idea of competitive
homogenisation. 2 This chapter will explore how 'homogeneity' is
used, in political theory, by three thinkers of as different
orientation as the historical periods in which they wrote: Burke,
Marx and Fukuyama. This concept is based not on international
relations between states as in some sense 'social', but on analysis
of how social, and for that matter political and economic, relations
within states are themselves constituted by the international. If
applied, the result would be that part of the subject-matter of
International Relations becomes not the study of states alone,
important as they have been and will remain: rather International
Relations, in its historiographic and theoretical forms, becomes the
study of how international processes contribute to,i.e. both drive

and to a considerable extent are driven by, the internal workings
of states. It is this concept of international society, one denoting
the transnational formation of society, that is characterised here as
the 'constitutive' tradition.
The argument to be developed below is that this 'homogeneous'
concept merits closer attention, not only because of the
importance of the international in forming societies, but, most
pertinently for the student of International Relations, because it
has considerable theoretical implications, analytic and normative,
for the study of the international itself. This stronger, but
displaced, concept of international society has been present
throughout the history of thinking on the international system, if
occurring in systems of thought normally considered rather
disparate. But, beyond the rewards of classical recuperation, there
are particular reasons why it may be of interest to examine it more
closely in the contemporary context.
On the one hand, developments in cognate areas, notably
historical sociology and the sociology of 'global' relations, have
indicated new ways in which the uniquely inter-state concept of the
international and hence of international society may be limited. 3
They have, if only in reaction to extra-disciplinary intrusions,
prompted the need for students of International Relations to
define rather more closely what they mean by their subject.
On the other hand, a range of developments in the contemporary
world have presented challenges to International Relations theory
that may be elucidated by using this alternative concept of
international society. Students of 'globalisation' and of the
increasing transnationalisation of societies, not least in the
European Community, will find plenty to offer here. But it can
also be argued that the concept is pertinent to the subject matter of
Chapters 8-10- recent changes in the international system, namely
the Cold War, the manner in which the Cold War ended, and the
prospects for an end to great power military conflict - whose
theoretical implications may not be so evident.
As I have argued at greater length in Chapters 8 and 9 and
elsewhere, 4 theorisation of the Cold War has lagged behind its
historiography, and has been dominated by short-term, rather
instrumental, reflections on 'strategy': it may only be now, with
the conflict over, that the theoretical problems it raises can be
examined. The argument is that international pressure for homo-

geneity destroyed the Soviet Union: the Cold War was ultimately
about two varying concepts of international society, and that it
ended because, through international social rather than inter-state
reasons, one side prevailed over the other. It was the T-shirt and
the supermarket, not the gunboat or the cheaper manufactures
that destroyed the legitimacy and stability of the Soviet system.
Bruce Springsteen was the late-twentieth-century equivalent of the
Opium Wars.
Conventional realism cannot explain the end of communism. The
theoretical question posed by the Cold War and its conclusion is
precisely that of looking at the mechanisms of international
competition and interaction that orthodox inter-state theory
obscures; this includes the concept, as defined here, of 'inter-
national society'. In sum, the argument being made is not only that
this is a conception of 'international society' meriting recognition in
its own right, but that it has major implications for the way we look
at individual states/societies and at the international system. Its
suffusion of other conceptualisations of international society has
helped to obscure the explanatory power it may have, for the past,
the present and, without any scientistic pretensions about fore-
casting, the future of the system. In the post-Cold-War era, the
question of homogeneity is posed in another way: the issue is how
far, if liberal democratic forms consolidate themselves in the major
states, a new era of international relations, based on a homo-
geneous international society, can be realised.
In so far as the term 'international society' in International

Relations is generally recognised to be the central concept for a
part of the realist tradition, it would seem appropriate to begin
discussion of the concept here. The 'part' is important because,
although not confined to writers of the English School, the term is
far less frequently found in the school of Germanic-American
realism predominant on the western side of the Atlantic: by
contrast to its position in Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, James
Mayall it rates hardly a mention in the work of Hans Morgenthau,
Henry Kissinger and Kenneth Waltz. The last, for example, for all
his general sympathy for British philosophic traditions, shows no
interest in the supposed originator of the English School, Hugo
Grotius.
Within the writings of those who do use it, 'international society'

serves its constitutive function in three important respects: as
explanation for the operations of the international system beyond
Hobbesian conflict, as theoretical resolution for the absence of a
single authority in the international domain, and as central
category in an account of the diffusion of the north-west European
system across the globe. 5 Yet while within British realism
this concept serves these functions and is given formal recognition
of its importance, it remains curiously vague, as much a guardian
angel as a hegemonic concept. If this is so for reasons internal to
the concept itself, namely the foreclosing of what is meant by the
very word 'society', it is even more so because, in asserting one
concept of what an international society may be, namely relations
between states, this conventional realist category appears to
preclude discussion of other, equally suggestive, theorisations of
the international system relating to other forms of relation.
The concept of international society as developed by the English
realists has been summarised best by Bull, who wrote:
A society of states (or international society) exists when a group

of states, conscious of certain common interests and common
values, form a society in the sense that they conceive them-
selves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations
with one another, and share in the working of common
institutions. 6
And later: 'the element of a society has always been present,

and remains present, in the modern international system, although
only as one of the elements in it, whose survival is sometimes
precarious'. 7 With some variations, Bull's enumeration of what
compromises a society- interests, values, rules, institutions- and
his historical interpretation designed to prove that at least
'elements' of it have existed for some time, goes for the school as a
whole.
In the posthumously published extension of this argument,
Wight, trawling history with his usual taxonomic serendipity, gives
us three variants of the international society argument: these
correspond to his realism, rationalism, and revolutionism schools. 8
These vary in their analytic focus, from Hobbesian war, through
Grotian-Suarezian community to Kantian civitas maxima. The first
corresponds to what, in English School terminology, could be

termed a 'system', without any additional 'social' attributes. The
third variant, that of Kant, corresponds in some respects to the
transnationalist perspective, with a more overt moral programme
and an implicit, pacifist, teleology, since peace follows from the
gradual breaking down of barriers between states as well as of the
authority of states. All three of Wight's variants are based on
conceptions of inter-state or inter-social relations, and avoid the
issue of domestic constitution or homogenisation. The second
corresponds most closely to the Wight-Bull conception of inter-
national society itself, i.e. a system plus some additional elements.
It is above all with the realist concept, diffused through theory and
history, and serving the three functions mentioned above, that
students of the international therefore have to contend.
The concept of 'society' is supposedly taken from sociology, and
emerged in its main current usage; that which International
Relations claims to use, during the nineteenth centuryY While
variations on theoretical usage as between disciplines are hardly
surprising (one need only think of the peregrinations of 'structure'
and 'realism', to name but two), it is worth beginning by noting
some obvious differences between the ways in which the term
'society' is used in the two disciplines. 10 First, within sociology, as
within political theory, the concept 'society' has meaning primarily
in contrast to the 'state', the very thing whose absence, seen as
supreme authority, at the international level realist theorists have
emphasised. The consequence of this for International Relations
theory is that the term 'society' lacks its counterpart: given this
definition of 'society' there can be no realist equivalent of the
concept 'civil society', since this, by definition, is that area of
political or social activity not controlled by the state.
A second consequence of the definition is that the usage in
International Relations seems to occlude what is one of the most
central distinctions in sociology, expounded by Tonnies in 1887,
that between the looser, more informal, society ( Gesellschaft) and
the tighter, more morally coherent, community (Gemeinschaft).
Indeed, in the Bull-Wight usage the two are interchangeable, and
if anything, their 'society', with its stress on shared values, is closer
to Gemeinschaft.
Thirdly, the main concern of theorisation of society within
sociology is to look at forms of constraint, in other words to get
away from the idea of the individual as free and untrammelled.

Durkheim's 'social facts', for example, were limits on the
individual. Within International Relations this function is per-
formed by the concept 'system', a term which in sociology is not
contrasted to society, but serves as the basis for alternative
theorisations of social relations, such as those of Parsons. The
usage of the term 'society' which corresponds most closely to that
within realist International Relations may not be that of sociology
at all, but the earlier, and still current, uses of the term: either to
denote a club or self-selected group (as in 'building' or 'debating'),
or simply to denote a social, often fashionable, elite. 11
The elitist, exclusionary character of the society of states is, of
course, the basis upon which the whole story developed, and the
'expansion' occurred. In origin, the 'society' of European states
was a club of (western) Christian monarchs and produced its first
forms of organisation against the Muslim, i.e. 'infidel', Turk. This
was, indeed, the meaning given to the term by Wight himself, who
defined society as, 'a number of individuals joined in a system of
relationships for certain common purposes'. 12 As it evolved, its
central membership condition, 'sovereignty', was reserved for
those states that saw fit, and had the ability, to subject the rest of
the world to their hegemonic, largely colonial, rule. Jane Austen's
'polite society' or Cole Porter's 'High Society' may be as close to
International Relations' usage as the reflections of Auguste Comte
or Ferdinand Tonnies.
Three other broad issues posed by this usage of the term
'international society' need to be discussed. The first arises from
within the inter-state perspective, particularly where the influence
of Hobbes is strong. This realist usage would deny that the term
'society' can be used at all to define a grouping in which war, and
the threat of war, have remained so central. A usage that confined
the term to those states, and those alone, which did not threaten
force in their relations with each other, would be more defensible,
but this has not been a restriction that those using the term, in the
tradition of Bull and Wight, have made. Proponents of the concept
are usually careful not to define which states are, and which are
not, part of the society, i.e. which are, in their terms, in the system
but not in the society.
A reading of the literature would, however, suggest that for
most of those who use the term, all sovereign states of the
twentieth century are part of this society by dint of their

participation in diplomatic practice alone. The reply, as in Chapter
8 of The Anarchical Society, using the word 'institution' in the
functional sense that is particular to the approach, may or may not
be convincing: it certainly stretches and dilutes the concept of
'society' much further than a more rigorous usage would suggest.
A further critique of the term stems from an examination not of
how far the inter-state system corresponds to a model of society,
but from what definition of the concept 'society' itself is being
used. Here, as elsewhere in International Relations theory, there
tends to be an element of definitional absolutism, achieved not by
edict, but by ellipsis: just as with 'state', 'power' and 'nation', so
with 'society'. The argument in favour of a particular conceptual-
isation of the international is reinforced by the simplest mechanism
of all, namely reluctance to recognise that there are alternatives, in
this case alternative concepts of 'society'. As introduced by Bull,
society means norms plus interests plus rules plus values: the only
question that remains is how far this model does, or does not,
accord with international reality.
Bull's use of his concept of society is certainly consistent, and
forms the basis for a cogent picture of the international system.
Yet, as with the term 'state', it is precisely here that interesting
questions may be foreclosed. The question is not whether
international relations, defined as inter-state relations, correspond
to one definition of society, but rather to which definition they
may most closely correspond. As already noted, within socio-
logical theory, the concept 'society' itself has evolved over the past
two centuries to encompass a range of meanings: all those within a
community, the elite of that community, or that element of a
nation that is distinct from the state (as in the currently revived
'civil society'). There is, consequently, no one single definition of
'society'. Bull's account can be termed 'communitarian' since it
implies that 'a society' is a grouping with shared values; it can be
contrasted with other understandings of the concept, such as those
based on Marxism, which stress stratification and power, if not a
formal hierarchical system. One can apply to the international the
same arguments that have been applied to specific societies, as to
how far the functioning of a society and the transmission of values
within it reflects acceptance of a common interest, and how far it
reflects coercion. In no society is the answer entirely one or the
other: the point is that asking this question raises important

concerns about what constitutes a society and the degree of
inequality and force within it, concerns that are precluded by
Bull's communitarian model.
Inter-state relations may therefore constitute a society, not so
much because of the shared values involved, but because it is a
grouping established by the coercion of some states by others and
maintained, with a variety of ideological and military mechanisms,
by the more powerful members. In this vein, the other terms that
realists using the 'society' approach invoke will also change
meaning: thus 'socialisation' becomes not the inculcation and
diffusion of shared values, but the imposition of a set of values by
states, schools, families, clergy, media on others, whether or not
those who have them imposed actually believe them. The
mechanisms identified in Gramsci's concept of hegemony,
whereby the subjugated accept their ruler's values, would also
apply in the international arena (as would the theoretical
ambiguities that Gramsci's thesis raises such as whether those who
are subordinate actually accept the values, 'believe' in them, or
pretend to, or are in fact subjugated by their espousing a different,
subaltern value system). 13
In so far as Bull recognises this problem with his concept of
society, it has produced a tension within his thought between his
definition of international society and his actual account - hence
the role of the Great Powers, and of war, as two of his five
institutions. What he does not do is to develop the implications of
this tension to question the definition, explicit and implicit, of
society that he gives at the beginning of his exposition. An
international society created and maintained by the Great Powers
may be the best the human race can come up with, but it is far
from being a society based uniquely on shared values.
The third critique of the concept 'international society' arises
out of the variation of theories of society, and particularly those,
already adumbrased in Chapter 3, which are derivative of
historical materialism. Two components of what could be a
historical materialist critique have already been suggested - the
role of coercion in maintaining a society, and the particularistic,
class-specific, nature of the supposedly common or universal
values.
But there is a more fundamental critique based on what it is that
binds societies together and indeed constitutes them. Opposed to

the thesis that it is norms and values, or political institutions, that
perform this function, is the argument that it is performed by the
economy. What this entails is a definition of the international
system as primarily one constituted by economic activity, and the
spread of capitalist social and economic relations on a world scale.
As indicated in Chapter 3, alternative theory entails alternative
histories- Immanuel Wallerstein, Eric Woolf and Eric Hobsbawm
- as against the expansion of international society. 14 These
alternative histories should not exclude the importance of norms,
and the transmission of values through the system. Coercive or
not, norms and values are an essential part of the working of any
society. But this diffusion of norms, apart from being hierarchical,
itself rests on another layer of human activity that sustains and
forms the society itself. The spread of Christianity had not a little
to do with force. The question therefore becomes not how and
how far these norms spread - the historiographic problem of
orthodox theories of 'international society' -but how capitalism as
a socio-economic system spreads, the role that values and norms,
including the concept of sovereignty, play within it, and the
changing balance of coercion and consent involved in the
reproduction of that society. In this way, alternative theory
suggests alternative history: the subjugation of pre-capitalist
peoples, the unification of the world through economic processes,
the formation of a bloc of economically developed and liberal
democratic countries. 15
Transnationalism and its Limits

The transnational definition of international society and its
implications for International Relations theory also need no
extensive recapitulation here. As we have seen in Chapter 1,
starting from the behaviouralist concern to avoid the paralysis of
institutionalism, and an awareness, from an empirical perspective,
that many cross-frontier processes were not conducted or
controlled by states, transnationalist writers sought from the 1970s
onwards to present an alternative picture of the international
system in which inter-state relations were increasingly bypassed or
influenced by these non-state processes.
Out of this intellectual shift arose the theories of interdependence
of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, the world society paradigm of

John Burton, and much of international political economy. 16
Susan Strange's four structures of power was an outstanding
attempt to retain the importance of the military-security dimension
while identifying the emergence, growth and in many cases
predominance of the non-state processes. In another study, Evan
Luard has argued that there is an increasing convergence of
domestic and international societies: just as individual societies are
becoming less and less homogeneous and centralised, so inter-
national relations are acquiring a range of interactions, some
organised by states, many not, which produce relationships akin to
those within society. 17
In a parallel development within sociology, a number of writers
have come to identify what they take to be a globalisation or
internationalisation of social relations and the breaking down of
what had previously been discrete social entities: 'society' in the
traditional sense. Leslie Sklair identifies three sets of TNPs
('transnational practices'): economic, political and cultural-
ideological. 18 The first encompasses the activities of transnational
corporations, not least their impact on third world and socialist
countries; the se.cond, linkages between political forces, mainly
those in power; and the last encompasses the spread of consumerist
and other practices and beliefs across the world.
In a cognate field of analysis, strongly influenced by the work of
Roland Robertson, and by post-modernist insights into the
possibility of multiple ('deconstructed') structures and meanings
within the international system, Arjun Appadurai has identified
five dimensions of global cultural flow: ethnoscapes, mediascapes,
technoscapes, financescapes, ideoscapes. 19 Within each of these
dimensions different actors intersect across frontiers, be these
tourists, immigrants, refugees, migrant workers, political activists,
fashion models or pop stars. In a closing of the theoretical circle,
the concept 'international society' has returned to the discipline
from which it, putatively at least, originated. 20
Rich in insight as these various theories of transnationalism are,
they leave open a range of questions, four of which can be
summarised here. First, the issue of determination and signific-
ance is unresolved: it is not clear if we are to regard all
transnational processes as equally important, and equally auto-
nomous, or not. Orthodox realists would suggest that the role of

the state cannot be dissolved entirely into some mesh of global
interactions, and that this is just as much a problem with the
globalisation theories as with the world society approach. Marxists
and proponents of international political economy might suggest
that the role of the economy, and of its hierarchic structures, is
central to much of the story of how international society
developed. A proliferation of levels, '-scapes' or meanings, may
tell us very little. Sudden breathless discoveries of new areas of
interaction - the global village or 24hour financial markets one
day, the transnational flaneur or satellite communications the next
-substitute for measured assessment of what constitutes the global
social totality.
Second, and in contrast to a sober assessment of where real
change is occurring, there is in much of the transnationalist
literature an element of historical foreshortening. Many of the
processes - economic, political and religious - that characterise
contemporary transnationalism were present, if not to the same
degree, decades and even centuries ago. The Reformation, the
Industrial Revolution, the spread of universal suffrage, to name
but three transnational processes, predate obsession with
immediacy and a foreshortened historical framework. Migration
was as important a phenomenon in the nineteenth century, and
indeed, for some countries, in the eighteenth, as it has been in the
twentieth. One can hardly say that states are less involved in this
process now than they were in the past. Nowhere is this historical
foreshortening more misleading than in much of the literature on
'post-modernity', as something specific to the post-1945 era: this
implies ruptures in society or the world that are exaggerations, a
product of ahistorical whim. That certain phenomena are specific
to the contemporary age cannot be doubted, but the hype of
'post-modernity' as an explanatory concept or historical category
often obscures where change has, and has not, occurred.
Third, there is an implicit teleology in much of this writing,
whether it be the enthusiasm for European integration found in
writings on the European Community, or the belief that a global
culture based on youth, satellite TV, sport, or religion is engulfing
humanity as a whole. This applies in particular to the speed with
which the state itself is dismissed from consideration. The
trajectory of Keohane, transcendent of the state in the 1970s,
accommodating and rehabilitating in After Hegemony of the

1980s, is an indication of the difficulties encountered by those who
seek to marginalise its role.Z 1 There is so much of this underlying
optimism and teleology in liberal internationalist writing that as a
body of work it is eerily reminiscent of an earlier generation of
literature on the transition to socialism: 'setbacks' and 'lags' there
may be, but in the end it is all bound to happen.
Finally, theorisation of a globalisation or transnationalisation of
culture too often ignores the comparable process of fragmentation
and division, at both the global and domestic social levels, which
are a direct result of internationalisation. This is, of course, the
underlying paradox of nationalism, a global phenomenon, and a
response to international pressures, which spawns particularism
and fragmentation. Nowhere was this clearer than in the cruelly
divided Europe of 1992 with the customs union, Maastricht and
the Barcelona Olympics in the west, and genocide, ferocious
ethnic strife and murderous hatred in the Balkans. Trans-
nationalists often point to phenomena that, in their view, vindicate
the claim of a growing common society across frontiers. However,
within many ofthe flows that they identify, new forms of division,
chauvinism or particularist hegemony may be arising - religion,
sport and satellite TV being cases in point. Any theory of the
impact of international processes on the world has to encompass
both elements of this process, the integrative and the fragmentary,
just as it has to identify the historical continuities as well as
discontinuities in the process, and the enduring, often changing,
role of the state in international and indeed transnational
processes. 22
The greatest difficulty with the transnational concept of inter-
national society revolves around its treatment of the state:
precipitate behaviouralist overriding in some cases, eclectic multi-
plication of structures and 'levels' in others, or an accommoda-
tionist retreat to modified state-centrism. 23 As I have argued in
Chapter 4, part of this confusion is the result of two very different
meanings of the 'state', which lead to the false counterposing of
'state' to transnational and social processes, and the preoccupation
with what is in many ways a non-question, that of the degree to
which the state is, or is not, being overtaken by transnational
processes. In this chapter, the argument is focused on another
consequence of the state/non-state polarity, namely the way in
which this false contrast makes it difficult to see how transnational

or international processes, far from weakening the state, develop
and alter it: how, in other words, the very processes of political
and social change within countries are the result of external
processes, and how, in turn, the divergence or convergence of
states with regard to the norms of homogeneity affect the course of
international relations.
The 'Constitutive' Tradition and its Protagonists:

Burke, Marx, Fukuyama
So far, the discussion has been about two variants of 'international

society' the realist, inter-state, rendering, and the transnationalist
account. It is now possible to turn to the other reinterpretation of
the concept 'international society', one that does not seek variant
interpretations of the inter-state, or the dimensions of trans-
national interaction: this conception seeks, while not denying the
force of these dimensions, to locate the discussion in another
context, to which the term 'international society' may be more
appropriately applied. In this context, inter-state relations, and
their conflicts, including war, are not dissolved, but are located
within a broader framework.
At first sight, this may appear to be but another variant of the
sociological usage of the term 'international society' in the sense of
transnational society. The latter concept is, however, one that
posits a single international society, a transnational entity, linked
by a variety of processes and institutions and which is seen to
supplant gradually the interaction of states. In so far as this is its
focus, it is little interested in the orthodox questions of inter-
national relations understood as relations between states. The
'homogeneous' concept offered here is rather different, ascribing a
permanent and continuously adapting role to states, but seeking to
explain state behaviour by identifying a broader context of
transnational relations, and the means by which these two levels of
international activity intersect with the domestic. The elements of
this theory will become clearer by examining three theoretically
and historically disparate writers, in whose work it is possible to
discern this third conception of international society.
The idea of separate societies being linked by common
characteristics, and of their foreign policy as being positively

affected by such a similarity, was widely held in the thinking of the
eighteenth century. The years from the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713
to the French Revolution of 1789 appeared at the time, and in
retrospect, to be ones of relative harmony between the great
European powers. One, much repeated, explanation is that this
peace rested upon the balance of power, but at the time and later,
explanations also invoked the shared principles of domestic
political and social legitimacy which the states of Europe enjoyed.
Thus Voltaire spoke of Christian Europe ('give or take Russia') as
'a sort of great commonwealth' in which the same basic religious
beliefs and 'the same principles of public and political law
unknown in the other parts of the world' prevailed. Heeren, the
Hanoverian analyst of the states system whose work greatly
influenced Wight, Bull and their associates in 'the English School',
defined a states system in both inter-state and domestic terms as
'the union of several contiguous states resembling each other in
their manners, religion and degree of social improvement, and
cemented together by a reciprocity of interests'. 24 Commonplace
in the relatively untroubled decades before 1789, this idea was, as
is often the case, to receive sharper articulation once the
assumptions upon which it rested were thrown into question: it
was in this context that the idea of an 'international society' based
on shared political and social ideas was to receive its exposition in
Burke.
The outlines of Burke's theory of politics are well known and
need little rehearsal here. Similarly, the general tenor of his views
on international issues have been well presented?5 Burke held the
view that society, and political systems, were maintained by
intangible factors - sentiments, values, inherited practices,
manners - and that, if these were abruptly or too rationally
interfered with, chaos would ensue. If he was a conservative, he
was not against change, and his record on America, India and
Ireland bore this out. 26 His methodology was broadly speaking
pre-sociological, innocent of concern with industrialisation or
'modern' society, yet employing, without using the term, a concept
of ideology as the precipitate of social development and the main
guarantor of peace and stability. His opposition to the French
Revolution followed from this: it was not just the actual deeds of
the Jacobins- his Reflections were written in 1790, well before the
worst of the terror or the Napoleonic expansions - that he

abhorred, but the very application of reason, the rejection of
tradition, and the pursuit of progress and perfection. Instead of
the three pillars of stability- monarch, aristocracy and the church
- there was a new dangerous trio - regicide, atheism and
Jacobinism.
The implications of this, hinted at in one or two passages of the
Reflections of 1790,27 are spelt out at greater length in his Letters
on a Regidice Peace, written in 1795--6. Fragmented and bilious as
these texts are, they contain within them a very distinctive theory
of international society as homogeneity, and the analytic and
normative conclusions which follow from it. In essence, Burke's
theory of international society can be summarised as follows.
First, an international society exists by virtue of the common
political and social norms prevailing within societies. Burke argues
that stable relations between states rest upon their having broadly
similar forms of political and social order: they are, in central
respects, homogeneous. Applying to the international the concep-
tion of social cohesion he had developed internally, Burke argues
as follows:
Men are not tied to one another by papers and seals. They are
led to associate by resemblances, by conformities, by
sympathies. It is with nations as with individuals. Nothing is so
strong a tie of amity between nation and nation as correspond-
ence in laws, customs, manners, and habits of life. They have
more than the forces of treaties in themselves. They are
obligations written in the heart.
He goes on to talk of the 'confirmity', 'analogy' and 'similitude'

between the nations of Europe and their customs and manners and
continues:
At bottom, these are all the same. The writers on public law
have often called this aggregate of nations a commonwealth.
They had reasons. It is virtually one great state having the same
basis of general law, with some diversity of provincial customs
and local establishments. From this resemblance in the modes
of intercourse, and in the whole form and fashion of life, no
citizen of Europe could be altogether an exile in any part of it.
There was nothing more than a pleasing variety to recreate and

instruct the mind, to enrich the imagination, and to meliorate
the heart.
It follows that the threat presented by the French Revolution

lies not in any particular policy that the revolution may pursue, but
in the very fact of the revolution itself, the very challenge which,
by its example, it poses to the whole order upon which British
society rests. In Burke's words, the French Revolution constitutes
a 'faction' which, merely by continuing to exist, will undermine
other states in Europe where other, comparable, factions either
exist or may come into existence: as such, revolutionary France is
a danger of a very different kind from that which existed before.
Burke writes:
A sure destruction impends over those infatuated princes, who,

in the conflict with this new and unheard-of power, proceed as
if they were engaged in a war that bore a resemblance to their
former contest. I was always steadily of the opinion, that this
disorder was not in its nature intermittent. I conceived that the
contest, once begun, could not be laid down again, to be
resumed at our discretion: that but our first struggle with this
evil would also be our last. I never thought we could make
peace with the system; because it was not for the sake of an
object we pursued in rivalry with each other, but with the
system itself that we were at war. As I understood the matter,
we were at war not with its conduct, but with its exist-
ence; convinced that its existence and its hostility were the
same. 29
In this final phrase, the essence of the theory of homogeneity is

summed up: revolutionary France was a mortal danger, merely by
dint of its being. The stability of other societies in Europe required
that France too be like them. Without homogeneity, there could
be neither internal nor international peace.
For Burke, the French Revolution represented such a great
threat not just because of the challenge it posed to the 'resemb-
lance' and 'similitude', Burke's phrases for homogeneity of the
countries of the ancien regime, but also from what he termed
'vicinity'.
There is a law of neighbourhood which does not leave a man

perfectly master on his own ground. When a neighbour sees a
new erection, in the nature of a nuisance, set up at his door, he
has a right to represent it to the judge; who, on his part, has a
right to order the work to be stayed; or, if established, to be
removed. . .. No innovation is permitted that may redound,
even secondarily, to the prejudice of a neighbour.
Burke then applies this to the international arena:
This principle, which, like the rest, is as true of nations! as of

individual men, has bestowed on the grand vicinage of Europe a
duty to know, and a right to prevent, any capital innovation
which may amount to the erection of a dangerous nuisance ...
[T]he vicinage of Europe had not only a right, but an
indispensable duty, and an exigent interest, to denunciate this
new work before it had produced the danger we have now
sorely felt, and which we shall long feel. ... It violates the
rights upon which not only the community of France, but those
on which all communities are founded. The principles on which
they proceed are general principles, and are as true in England
as in any other country. 30
From these principles follows a theory of political and social

security, and the programme of international counter-revolutionary
intervention, for which Burke is best known. Once the principles
of homogeneity and of vicinity are accepted, then it follows that no
country or state can defend its interests or its way of life on its
own. Reflecting on Britain in the late eighteenth century, Burke
argues that while internally it appears to be strong, the French
Revolution by dint of its example alone constitutes a threat to it:
If we look to nothing but our domestic condition, the state of

the nation is full even to plethora: but if we imagine that this
country can long maintain its blood and its food, as disjoined
from the community of mankind, such an opinion does not
deserve refutation as absurd, but pity as insane. 31
Burke argues, in effect, for a pre-emptive war against revolu-

tionary France, to strike it down before it engulfs the rest of
Europe. 'Example is the school of mankind, and they will learn at

no other. This war is a war against that example'. 32 In Letter II he
argues that while some may mistakenly see the conflict with
France as a foreign war, and the Jacobins themselves may
encourage this, it is in fact a civil war:
It is a war between the partisans of the ancient, civil, moral, and

political order of Europe, against a sect of fanatical and
ambitious atheists which means to change them all. It is not
France extending a foreign empire over other nations: it is a
sect aiming at universal empire, and beginning with the
conquest of France. 33
Burke's analysis of the international consequences of the French

Revolution, and of the appropriate response to it, have normally
been read in the light of his theory of intervention, or, more
broadly, his views on appropriate and inappropriate forms of
change within society. Yet present within his Letters are the
elements of another theory, pertinent to the whole discussion of
international relations. For what he is arguing is that relations
between states rest above all not on the conduct of foreign policy
in the narrow sense, but on convergence arid similitude in
domestic arrangements, in other words on the prevalence of a
homogeneous international society. The conclusion he draws is
that for any international order to maintain peace it needs not only
to evolve norms of inter-state behaviour, but to produce a
community of states with broadly similar internal constitutions.
Few theorists could have a more different starting point, and

apparently different conclusions, from Burke than Karl Marx,
who, two generations later, produced an alternative theory of the
implications of the French Revolution and of what constituted
social and political cohesion. If Burke opposed the French
Revolution, Marx regarded it as but the beginning of a process of
global human emancipation; if Burke invoked tradition and
custom, Marx denounced this as ideology and invoked reason; if
Burke saw ideas as constitutive of society, Marx saw the
productive process, in both its material and social form, as its
basis.
Yet beyond or within these enormous differences, there are
three points of convergence of particular relevance to this

argument. First, both gave importance in their analysis of society
to what we would today term 'ideology', i.e. a set of values about
what is desirable in social and political relations, how far it is
possible to change them, and who the appropriate agents of
change and stability might be. Burke did not derive his concept of
ideology from socio-economic relations as Marx did, but he did see
that they were tied closely to the interests of those with power in
society - monarch, aristocracy and church- and that acceptance
by the mass of the population of these values constituted an
important form of political and social power: Burke's theory was
proto-Marxist, or more precisely proto-Gramscian, providing a
concept of hegemony without the concept of domination.
Second, their belief in the importance of ideology within any
one society produced a shared international perspective. Burke
and Marx saw the stability and development of individual societies
and states as being determined by broader, international,
processes. This led them to their third common position, that
revolutions were international events, in both their causes and
consequences, and the ethical requirements this imposed. The
normative conclusions of their two theories display a compelling
counterpoint: for Burke, the obligation was to intervene to crush
revolution before it consolidated and spread; for Marx the
obligation was to act to support it, in order to ensure that the
international processes it unleashed were sustained. The duty to
intervene was common to both, reached from contrasting starting
points.
Most analysis of Marx's writings treats his ideas on specific
political issues as derived from his general theory, and such
derivations are no doubt valid: but in many cases, rather than
positing some derivation of a vertical kind, it may be equally
pertinent to look at the influence of other thinkers and the general
intellectual climate of the time, what one can term horizontal
influences. In the case of Marx's views on nationalism this may
have much to recommend it: Marx's idea may be as much
explained by what others, such as John Stuart Mill, were saying as
by his theories of surplus value or capitalist development. 34 A
similar, horizontal, linkage can be made with regard to his views
on international society, as becomes evident from looking at one
of his precursors in the socialist tradition, Saint -Simon.
Saint-Simon believed that European society was becoming more

and more homogeneous, and indeed that no major changes were
possible in one country alone: 'France does not by any means have
a moral life all its own. It is merely one member of European
society and a forced community exists between its political
principles and those of its neighbours'. Inverting Burke, Saint-
Simon argues that the rest of Europe should conform to the
changes France was undergoing: 'The French nation cannot be
treated and cured in isolation; the remedies which can cure it must
be applied to all Europe'. This solidarity arises in part from the
moral requirement that they renounce war, but it has a deeper
root in the continuing process of industrialisation, which both
subjects these societies to a common fate, and produces a new,
shared, set of interests in peace. In the end, argues Saint-Simon,
industrial society, beyond creating homogeneity, also creates an
international peace interest. Homogeneity is therefore both an
objective process, and an ethical and political goal. 35
The clearest statement of Marx's view of international society
comes in the Communist Manifesto, where he lays out the manner
in which the capitalist mode of production, with the bourgeoisie as
agent, transforms all societies across the whole world. As much as
any liberal thinker of his age, Marx believed in the inevitable
triumph of one model of society over the others, and in an
increasing convergence and homogenisation of society. Whereas
Burke, reflecting on the 'commonwealth' of eighteenth-century
Europe, regarded the homogeneity of international society as an
established reality, albeit one under threat from the French
Revolution, Marx saw international society as an emerging global
order being created by the spread of capitalism, in which
individual societies were becoming more and more like each other.
The need of a constantly expanding market for its products

chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It
must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connec-
tions everywhere. The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement
of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated
means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian,
nations into civilization. The cheap prices of its commodities
are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese
walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate
hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on

pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production;
it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their
midst, i.e. to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it
creates a world after its own image?6
At first sight, Marx's conception of international society may

appear to have more in common with the transnational conception
than with the constitutive one. Certainly, he shares the view of
liberal internationalists, such as Adam Smith and Richard Cobden
whose rightful heirs are the transnationalists of the 1970s and
1980s, that growing contact between societies produces greater
integration and unity in world affairs. But the focus of Marx's
analysis is not only the growing links between societies, the subject
matter of transnationalism, but also the degree to which, across
the globe, societies increasingly come to conform to each other.
Marx recognised the process of international homogenisation and
the centrality of this internal conformity to international relations.
For Marx, the core issue in international relations is how this
growing homogenisation, a result of the spread of capitalism,
affects not only the domestic and international politics of different
countries, but also their social structure. This is the principle that
underlies his most important work of all, Capital, which takes one
society, Britain, as the exemplar of capitalist development as a
whole, and seeks, by examining its structure and development, to
posit a universal model. The implicit premise of Capital is that an
international society is being created by the global spread of
capitalism. For Marx, the workings of the economy, and the
ownership patterns associated with it, perform those functions
which manners and customs do for Burke.
There are, as discussed in Chapter 3, manifest weaknesses in
Marx's theory, with implications for this conception of inter-
national society, and international relations as a whole. First, the
fundamental historical perspective, the teleology, upon which his
theory rested was false: capitalism, while riven with irrationality,
inequality and cyclical upheaval, was not inevitably creating a set
of contradictions that would then destroy it. Furthermore, as he
himself began to recognise in some of his later work, capitalism
was not creating a homogeneous world, in the sense of one in
which an economy comparable to that of the most developed
would be reproduced across the globe. 37 Capitalism was unifying

the world, and creating its own world system, but this was to be on
the basis of manifold inequalities and hierarchies, not the
homogenisation assumed, with liberal insouciance, in the
Manifesto.
Marx was also mistaken about the political and international
implications of this homogenisation. For, far from leading to the
creation of one single bourgeoisie the world over, or to coopera-
tion between bourgeoisies for mutual economic benefit, this
increasing unification of the world, and homogenisation of
societies, went hand in hand with growing antagonisms between
the bourgeoisies of different countries. It was left to the theoretical
generation that succeeded him- Karl Kautsky, Rudolf Hilferding,
Rosa Luxemburg, V. I. Lenin and Nikolai Bukharin- to produce,
from within a Marxist framework, a theory of how capitalism, in
unifying the world, also created uneven development which led
the ruling classes of the more advanced countries to go to war with
each other. Such, indeed, was the context in which the Marxist
debate on imperialism occurred in the first two decades of this
century. Later, this was to be formalised as the theory of combined
and uneven development. 38
Yet, if Marx was mistaken in his understanding of both the
underlying conception of historical development, and the degree
to which homogenisation or harmonisation did in fact occur, he
was right in identifying the spread of capitalism and its impact on
the economies, political systems and cultures of all countries. Re-
examination of where he was right, and where mistaken, was to
become rather easier a century or so after his death, with the
ending not only of the great interlude in capitalist homogenisation
represented by colonialism, but also of the ultimately fruitless
attempt by his followers to pursue an alternative, heterogeneous,
path of development. Capitalism battered down the Chinese walls
not only of the pre-capitalist empires and societies, but also of
those who tried to erect a 'post-capitalist' bloc. If nothing else this
was, as we shall see in Chapters 8-10, a rather striking example of
the workings of international society.
It might appear inappropriate to include in this discussion a
consideration of the work of Francis Fukuyama, the American
political scientist whose essay on 'The End of History' and later
book, The End of History and the Last Man, made him one of the
more controversial intellectual figures of the early 1990s. 39

Fukuyama has been dismissed by many academic commentators,
and there is indeed much in his work that is questionable or
unresolved. However, as will be discussed at greater length in
Chapter 10, his work, and the moment at which it appeared, do
pose a set of important questions for analysing not only the end of
the Cold War, but also the course of international relations, not
least because, in his idiosyncratic but revealing invocation of a
range of classical thinkers, most notably Kant, Hegel and
Nietzsche, he seeks to re-establish a connection between
contemporary debates and an earlier tradition of political thought.
Fukuyama sets out to examine whether it is possible to write, in
the Kantian sense, a 'universal history from a cosmopolitan point
of view'. His answer is that it is possible, that history has a
direction. This direction is determined by two processes: the
dynamic of modern science, and the push towards liberal
democracy. He sees the dynamic of modern science as an
unceasing process that not only determines how and why economic
and social development occurs and evolves, but also explains why
this process increasingly produces similar societies.
The first factor Fukuyama identifies here is the impact of
military competition which, he argues, encourages the rationalisa-
tion of societies and the forming of uniform social structures, a
much more accurate account of interaction than one based merely
on benign non-state transnationalism. Fukuyama provides many
examples of defensive modernisation forcing countries to conform,
ending up with Russia in the late 1980s:
Modern natural science forces itself on man, whether he cares

for it or not: most nations do not have the option of rejecting
the technological rationalism of modernity if they want to
preserve their national autonomy. We see here a demonstration
of the truth of Kant's observation that historial change comes
about as a result of man's 'asocial sociability': it is conflict
rather than cooperation that first induces men to live in
societies and then develop the potential of those societies more
fully. 40
The second factor that leads to growing convergence of societies

through science is economic development and the requirements
this creates for the organisation of labour, the state and education:
All countries undergoing economic modernization must

increasingly resemble one another: they must unify nationally
on the basis of a centralized state, urbanize, replace traditional
forms of social organisation like tribe, sect, and family with
economically rational ones based on function and efficiency,
and provide for the universal education of their citizens. Such
societies have become increasingly linked with one another
through global markets and the spread of a universal consumer
culture. 41
Fukuyama does not argue that this scientific-developmental

imperative necessarily entails democracy, and his great historical
caveat is that an authoritarian society might succeed in economic
terms equally well, in, for example, East Asia. But he does claim
that in certain respects, as in the freedom of information and of
decision-making, liberal democracy is conducive to such develop-
ment. He also argues, on quite separate grounds, that .liberal
democracy, for all its failings, is better than any other system in
meeting what he sees as the most fundamental of human needs:
recognition and respect. The combination of the two needs,
contingent but reinforcing, provides the basis for his two most
comprehensive claims that a universal history can be written,
replete with teleology, and that, since an answer to the main
problems of human development has been found in theory and to
some extent implemented in practice in the stronger and more
influential states of the world, history, in the sense of a conflict
between global models, is over.
There are two important implications of Fukuyama's theory for
this discussion of 'international society', both of which are, to
some extent, worked through in his book. The first is that as a
result of the processes he identifies, and the conflict and rivalry of
states, countries are forced more and more to conform, to produce
that resemblance, that similitude, that Burke identified. Fukuyama
does not accord to ideology, custom or manners the primacy
allotted by Burke, but he does see culture as an important
constituent of the modernity that all societies are forced to move
towards. Furthermore, culture is one of the mechanisms through
which societies are forced by others to conform: his analysis of the
end of the Cold War, based on the transmission to an educated

population within the communist countries of an image of a more
successful Western world, makes considerable use of ideological
factors.
Second, Fukuyama, taking up the argument of Michael Doyle
and others, develops the thesis that liberal democracy will mean
the end of inter-state conflict as we know it: since liberal
democracies do not, for significant reasons, go to war with each
other, the spread of liberal democracy reduces the likelihood of
military conflict and military rivalry between developed states and
progressively confines war to relations with or between un-
democratic states. 42 As liberal democracy spreads, so the domain
of war will be reduced. Ultimately the end of history will mean the
end of international relations as we have hitherto known it. The
creation, for the first time, of an international society in the
constitutive sense means that Kant's vision of a universal peace
will be realised. Marx will find a perverse vindication, not through
the creation of a world-wide communist society, but through the
full realisation, a century and half after the publication of the
Manifesto, of the world created in capitalism's image. The
Bolshevik Revolution challenged the capitalist world 'on pain of
extinction': 43 in the end, it was extinguished.
The disputes raised by Fukuyama's theory are many, and touch
on issues far removed from the analysis of international society.
Three, in particular, merit critical attention: agency, democracy,
development. I shall return to these in the final chapter, in the
context of an overall assessment of his work. Suffice it to say here
that the difficulties with his theory, as well as the overall
perspective he offers, pertain directly to the issue of international
society, and the very meanings of 'society' itself that are deemed to
operate at the international level.
Implications for International Relations

Such, in outline, are the elements of what may be identified as the
third, 'constitutive', model of international society. As with any
theoretical shift, its introduction is designed not so much to deny
the coherence and explanatory potential of the other two
concepts, although some difficulties with them have been identi-
fied, as to point to another interpretation of the concept that may,
in its own context, suggest an additional programme of investiga-

tion. International society construed as those processes making for
'homogeneity' may help us to look at areas of international
relations that have hitherto been under-recognised, or which, by
dint of recent developments, be these theoretical or historical,
have been cast in a new light.
In the first place, any approach based on the 'homogeneity'
concept invites an alternative history of both international
relations and the development of individual societies. For the
latter, the shift is evident: what may previously have been seen as
discrete, isolated, national histories, now appear much more
clearly as the result of international processes, of imitation,
competition, defensive modernisation and influence. As the work
of the historical sociologists on the state discussed in Chapter 4 -
Otto Hintze, Michael Mann- has shown, the growth of adminis-
trative and coercive institutions has throughout history been
influenced by competition with other states. This international
historical sociological perspective can be employed to explain not
only economic development, but also political and social change
within countries. The implications for International Relations are
many. If we ask how the 'international' matters, and, by
extension, what international processes merit greatest attention,
then this process of imitation, homogenisation, and resistance to
it, becomes central. Conflict between states, and orthodox
diplomatic activity, are not excluded, but form part of a broader
pattern of significant international interaction.
One phenomenon that this conceptual approach helps to
identify and explain is what one may term, in retrospect, the
pathos of semi-peripheral escape. By this is meant the attempt
over the past century by a range of countries that were not in the
forefront of Western capitalist development to take develop-
mental routes that defied the established model of political and
economic organisation.
In one sense these were examples of Gerschenkronian 'catching-
up': but what is pertinent here is how, in the end, they had to
abandon the exceptional means of trying to do so. What is striking
about these attempts is that, while successful for some decades in
their own right, they were ultimately broken by international
pressures, whether those of war, non-military competition or
cultural-ideological influence. The most obvious examples were
the communist states, which for a fair period of time, from

October 1917 to August 1991 to be precise, sought to map out such
an alternative path. Of these, the most significant was the USSR,
which although remarkably unbelligerent by the standards of most
modern states, nonetheless became involved in protracted military
conflict with Great Power capitalist rivals: it prevailed over its first
rna j or challenge, that of capitalist authoritarianism in Germany,
but succumbed to the second challenge, that of liberal capitalism
of the post-1945 period.
The pathos of semi-peripheral escape did not, however, apply
only to regimes of the left. On the right, several countries, notably
Germany, Italy and Japan, sought their own alternative path in the
1920s and 1930s, only to be brought into line by the firmest
instrument of homogenisation of all, namely military defeat and
occupation. What the Second World War did for these three
countries, the allure of a broader market, and middle-class
pressures for cultural and political modernisation, did for the
smaller, less belligerent, European states of the right, namely
Spain, Portugal and Ireland. 44 Each of these had acquired
conservative regimes after civil wars in the inter-war period, but
had judiciously prolonged their existence by staying out of the
global conflict of the 1940s. Although their strategic exclusion
delayed their homogenisation, nevertheless from the late 1950s
onwards, they began to experience the attractions of the Common
Market and were, by the late 1970s, integrated into the EEC, and
appropriately homogenised. 45 The same applied, with some
variation, to Greece.
Even the US and the UK, arguably the purest cases of capitalist
development, did not escape such abrupt externally fuelled
intrusions: the USA tried, up to the 1860s, to maintain the most
extreme case of capitalist oligarchy, in the slave-owning South,
while the United Kingdom delayed extending suffrage to the
working class and women until forced to by the First World War.
It is not to deny the importance of endogenous and specific
factors, to note how far external factors, and in particular the
pressure to conform, contributed to these outcomes.
This understanding of international society as 'homogeneity' has
considerable implications for the issue discussed in Chapters 8-10,
analysis of the Cold War and its end: first in the explanation it
suggests as to why the Soviet system collapsed, a unique case of a
hegemonic bloc disappearing in the absence of inter-state war; and

secondly in the implications it raises for the pattern of post-Cold-
War international relations.
Any International Relations theory worth its salt can, presum-
ably, come up with an explanation of why the Cold War ended.
The particular character of the Soviet collapse would, however,
suggest that some mechanisms of international pressure, separate
from either inter-state conflict or transnational economic inter-
action, were in play; that, in other words, the mechanisms of
homogeneity in the end took their toll. A further illustration of
this argument came in 1992 from the rhetoric of the American
electoral campaign. Whereas in the Cold War era, the main
dimension and leitmotif of international competition as reflected
in electoral speeches was the military rivalry with the USSR, by
1992 it had switched to the arena of economic competition, with
Japan and the European Community. The solutions offered, by
Bush and even more so Clinton, rested explicitly on international
comparisons on education, social expenditure, investment policy
and wage levels. Both main candidates argued that only by
becoming more like their competitors could the United States
retain or regain its international position. 46
As for the future, if the claim that liberal democracies do not go
to war holds, and if this political system prevails in a significant
part of the world - most specifically if it establishes itself and holds
out in Russia - then the establishment of an international society
in the stronger, 'homogeneous', sense of the word will mean that a
new era of international relations has begun. The 'end of history'
would translate into the end of international relations as hitherto
understood.
These analytic and historic considerations leave unresolved the
theoretical question of how homogenisation works. What needs to
be specified is a third dimension of international relationships,
interlinked with but separate from, the two identified by the other
conceptions of international society, namely the inter-state, and the
transnational. This would be legitimately termed 'socialisation', but
it would denote not the socialisation of which realism talks, namely
getting other sovereign states to accept certain norms in their
international behaviour, but the reproduction within societies of
norms established elsewhere in the systemY This third dimension,
that of social, political and ideological influence and homogenisa-
tion, may at any particular time be subordinate to the other two,

but may at others prevail over them. The least one can say is that,
whether the framework, be it the evolution of the system over the
past five centuries and the role within that evolution of capitalism
or the fate of semi-peripheral countries in the twentieth century,
the salience of this homogenisation process seems to be consider-
able. The end of history may mean the end of international
relations as power politics. It may also presage the beginning of
International Relations as a comprehensive and adequately
theorised interpretation of the multiple dimensions of inter-
national society.
6
'The Sixth Great Power':
Revolutions and the
International System
A Case of Mutual Neglect
The discipline of International Relations has long had an uneasy

relationship with revolution. Hannah Arendt's remark that the
twentieth century has been shaped by wars and revolutions is often
quoted, but it is striking how, within the institutionalised research
and teaching on International Relations, these two historically
formative processes receive differential treatment. Courses,
journals, departments and institutes on war are plentiful. Study of
war, in its historical, strategic and ethical dimensions, as well as in
policy terms, is central to the academic study of IR. Revolutions,
by contrast, have enjoyed a marginal existence. Standard text-
books and theoretical explorations devote little space to them.
There is no journal specialising in this question. We have yet to
meet the Oliver Cromwell Professor of Revolutionary Studies:
there are no invitations to speak at the Thomas Paine Inter-
national Institute for the Comparative Study of Revolutionary
Change.
There is no single reason for this marginalisation. A variety of
factors within the intellectual tradition and institutional context of
IR have converged to produce this situation. IR itself began as a
study of war and the causes of war, and remains focused, as do
such war-preventing documents as the UN Charter, on the belief
that war between states is to be seen in terms of rationally decided
aggression rather than in the internationalisation of social conflict.
The subsequent theoretical development of IR has, in several
124
Revolutions and the International System 125
ways, confirmed this. In the incorporation of US and British

political science into IR there was a complementary disdain and
neglect of revolutions, which were seen as breakdowns of
otherwise regular processes in national and international society.
With the rise of behaviouralism, the concept of 'revolution', along
with that of the state, was dissolved into a spectrum of violence
and 'internal war' that denied it analytic and historical specificity. 1
Neo-realism in its Waltzian version, casting all references to
internal and transnational processes as 'reductionist', has in its
turn blocked off consideration of the interaction of international
and internal change. 2
Other factors can be traced to the broader climate of the social
sciences. The study of revolution is not at home in any of the social
sciences, although it has received more attention within sociology
and history. In these disciplines, however, it has tended to do so
with little reference to the international dimensions of the
phenomenon. Most sociological works until Skocpol's States and
Social Revolutions treated revolutions as if they happened within
discrete national-political entities. 3 The other major recent
contribution to the comparative and theoretical study of revolu-
tions, the work of Jack Goldstone and his associates, has drawn
attention to certain international factors in the weakening of
states, notably economic-fiscal pressures, and destabilising alliance
politics; however, these are given a secondary place within what
remains predominantly the analysis of discrete national and
political entities. The most important comparative dimension of
Goldstone's work, that of demographic pressure, is of uncertain
international origin, and, as he himself indicates, international
factors are ambivalent in their impact on states, with the potential
both to strengthen and to weaken them. 4
Within the theoretical approaches to IR, realism does discuss
revolutions but they are usually invoked not as objects of study in
themselves, but in order to prove the pressures of conformity, the
socialisation, that the constraints of the system impose on even the
most deviant or revisionist of states. No realist textbook is
complete without the assertion, of dubious validity, that the
Bolsheviks had settled into the system by 1922. The lesson drawn
is that even revolutions cannot duck the system. 5
The most extended discussion of revolutions from a realist
perspective is David Armstrong's Revolution And World Order:
The Revolutionary State in International Society. Armstrong

departs somewhat from the conventional Wight-Bull conception of
'international society', first by including in the 'norms' of that
society issues relating to internal constitution of states, such as
slavery, or democratic conduct, and secondly by accepting that,
even as they are socialised, revolutionary states may force status
quo powers to revise the norms by which states relate to each
other, as in the Soviet Union's success in provoking the establish-
ment of the International Labour Organisation in the 1920s and
the end of colonialism after the Second Wor1d War. 6 However,
even if it breaches the realist canon on accepting the pertinence of
internal political and social structures, this is at best, a partial
adjustment: on the one hand, it avoids the question of what it is in
the internal constitution of states that is seen as constituting the
norm, not least the issue of property relations; on the other, it
neglects the operations of international society in the broader
sense identified in Chapter 5, going well beyond the actions of
governments.
Other IR trends of the 1970s and 1980s allow equally little space
to revolutionary upheavals: international political economy and
interdependence are concerned with relations within the capitalist
world, and mainly its developed capitalist parts, without much
need to look at poorer or revolutionary states. The role of the
Vietnam War in provoking awareness of 'interdependence' is
forgotten. Strategic studies of the Cold War period, long adrift of
its Clausewitzian and historical moorings, examined East-West
arms racing in almost complete abstraction of the conflicting socio-
economic compositions of the Soviet and US systems. Too little
attention was paid to the social and political conflicts of the Third
World that, far from constituting another, secondary, dimension
of the Cold War, were central to it and a major catalyst of the
nuclear arms race itself. 7 In terms of shaping the post-war world,
guerrilla warfare, in its revolutionary and counter-revoiutionary
forms, was at least as influential as nuclear weapons: yet it hardly
figured in the orthodox curriculum of strategic studies.
Beyond factors of academic and intellectual climate, other
influences, what Kuhn politely terms 'institutional' ones, have
certainly also played their part: with the brief exception of the late
1950s and early 1960s, there has been a shying away from a
difficult and contentious topic, and, as the price of greater
academic integration with the 'real' world, a growing concentra-

tion on those aspects of 'reality' deemed suitable for study by
donors, at corporate and state levels. 8
There are, none the less, three respects in which this mutual
neglect has not been absolute and where elements of an
interaction of IR and revolution can be identified. There is, first of
all, the body of literature within IR that has explicitly focused on
analytic and comparative issues presented by revolutions: the
works of Kissinger, Rosecrance, Wight, Rosenau, Kim, Calvert,
and, already mentioned, that of Armstrong. 9 The compensation
here is that, despite its exiguous quantity, the quality, the
sharpness with which central issues are posed, is usually high.
Even those works produced prior to the more recent sociological
work on revolutions are of a high standard: the questions they
pose have stood the test of time.
Secondly, revolutions have been present within IR in a disguised
form, within topics presented from an alternative analytic starting
point, but where the existing literature can be re-read and
reconstituted so as to be of relevance to revolutions: this is true of
some of Rosenau's works on transnational linkages, of the
literature on intervention (causes, practicalities, ethics) and, albeit
in a most distracted way, in some of the literature on terrorism. 10
Thirdly, there is some literature in cognate social sciences that is
accessible and relevant for the construction of an IR discussion of
revolutions: if this is true of certain historical works that stress
international aspects of revolution (Palmer, Rude, Hobsbawm on
the late eighteenth century, Carr, Liebman, Deutscher, Harding
on the Bolshevik Revolution), 11 it is even more so with the 'third
wave' of sociological writings on revolution, and most notably that
of Skocpol and Goldstone: via their interest in the weakening and
breakdown of states, they stress the role of inter-state competition
in the causing of revolutions and in the formation of post-
revolutionary states. As with the IR writings on the subject, these
sociological texts may be meagre in number, and they may, as
already noted, tend to focus on national systems: but their analytic
and theoretical implications are considerable. 12
Examination of the place of revolutions in IR would seem to
comprise three broad areas of enquiry. The first is historical: that
of locating the place and influence of revolutions in the history of
the international system, and in the formation of the international
milieu of the twentieth century. The least that can be said here is
that the role of revolutions, a Ia Hannah Arendt, has been
systematically understated.
The second area of enquiry is descriptive, the examination of
the international dimensions of revolutions themselves, to ascertain
how far any regularities of political behaviour can be identified.
The existing, mainly realist, account of the international system
assumes that it has already ascertained what these regularities are,
and finds them confirmatory of realism's assumptions: there may,
however, be more to the story than that.
The third, most fundamental, area of enquiry concerns theory,
that is, what theoretical issues the study of revolutions poses for
IR. This leads to an examination of how far each of the established
paradigms can, and cannot, cope with a proportionate
acknowledgement of the importance of revolutions, and how far
apparently central assumptions of the discipline may need re-
examination in the light of such an investigation. This theoretical
probing, however, takes us beyond the domain of IR: it involves a
two-way process, one that should examine not only how revolutions
affect IR, but how far proper consideration of the international
context can pose questions for established sociological or political
explanations of revolution.
Revolutions and their Effects
The use to which concepts are put within IR depends, to a degree

unacknowledged within the discipline, on definitions imported
from other areas. If this is true of concepts such as state, power,
and system, revolution is no exception. As with all other concepts
in social science, the concept 'revolution' has evolved over time,
and contains variant meanings. The discussion that follows here
uses it to refer to revolutions in the restricted, discriminatory,
sense of the term, defined by Skocpol and others: that is, social
and political revolutions of a major kind. It rests, in particular, on
three major contributions to the study of revolutions which serve
to delimit them as separate and comparatively rare historical
events, but ones that, far from being marginal or atypical for the
history of states and the international system, are points of
transition and formation without which the modern world would
not be as it is.
The first of these contributions, published in 1979, is Theda

Skocpol's States and Social Revolutions. This identified revolutions
on the basis of degree of transformation of the society, and
destruction of the old state, as a distinct category of historical
event:
Social revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of a society's

state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part
carried through by class-based revolts from below. Social
revolutions are set apart from other sorts of conflicts and
transformative process above all by the combination of two
coincidences: the coincidence of societal structural change with
class upheaval; and the coincidence of political with social
transformation. 13
Beyond these specifications, Skocpol, while allowing for mass

mobilisation and democratic aspiration, focused on the relation of
revolutions to states- they sought both to overthrow existing ones
and to consolidate new ones. In doing so, she highlighted how
inter-state competition, through economic, military and political
domains served to weaken states and so prepared the way for
revolution - something evident in the three cases she considers,
France, Russia and China.
The second foundation of this study of revolutions is J. B.
Barrington-Moore's The Social Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy, published in 1967. This examined the contrasting
paths to industrialisation and liberal democracy of a range of
major states and showed how their contrasted trajectories owed
much to the patterns of agrarian power present in the pre-
industrial period. But Barrington-Moore's work also developed
two arguments that ran in the face of much conventional thinking
on revolution. In contrast to the prevailing idea of a 'peaceful',
non-revolutionary, path pursued by England and the USA, he
pointed to the extremely violent chapters through which those
countries made the transition to modernity, the latter including the
first industrialised war of modern history, that of 1861-5, which he
considered to be a revolution. At the same time, in discussing
countries which apparently avoided violent transitions by not
having revolutions, Germany and Japan, he brought out the
violence that did. accompany their transitions, both through
repression within and through aggression without. In sum he

argued that there was not a choice between a violent and non-
violent path, but that both the revolutionary and the non-
revolutionary paths were riven with human cost. Revolutions
were, therefore, not aberrations from a non-violent alternative,
but one form of an inevitably violent transition to a modern society
and often a form that, on the international scale, was less violent
than that of the German-Japanese alternative.
The third constituent of the conception of social revolution used
here is the as-yet-untranslated classic by the German writer Karl
Griewank, Der Neuzeitliche Revolutionsbegriff, Entstehung und
Entwicklung. 14 Griewank traced the development of the concept
'revolution' from its early astronomical and constitutional sources
through to the 'modern' concept that issued from the French
Revolution. 15 This enabled him not only to identify different
meanings of the term, but also to discern more clearly the
constituents of that modern usage: that revolutions involved not
only political or constitutional change, but also mass involvement
in that process; that the central object in revolutions was control of
the state, and, hence, that no concept of revolution was possible
before the modern state emerged (the same being true, incident-
ally, of any concept of the inter-state or international system); that
revolutions were now seen as moments of transition to a new,
better or even perfect, world, the beginnings of an age when all
would be different. It is this 'modern' conception of revolution,
analysed by Griewank and inherited from the French Revolution,
that has permeated so much subsequent discussion.
The questions of definition and historical role of revolutions are,
of course, central to any discussion of these upheavals in the
international context. Much of the discussion of revolutions in the
IR literature uses revolutions in a much looser sense to include
coups and outbreaks of violence, where it does not simply dissolve
them into a behaivouralist spectrum. Most IR literature also
assumes that revolutions are moments of breakdown, rather than
transition, and that these moments are distinguished by violence,
in contrast to stable but repressive regimes, which are not. In fact,
while each of the major contemporary IR paradigms consider
revolutions to some degree, the conceptual bases of these
considerations vary to such an extent that their findings approach
the incommensurable. This is not only because of general
conceptual differences, but because each uses a different concept

of revolution. A condensed, necessarily summary, overview of
how each of these three main paradigms treats revolutions can
make this clearer.
For realists, revolutions tend to be seen in terms of the changing
foreign policy styles and priorities of states, such that these now
constitute a 'revisionist', 'dissatisfied' or unbalancing factor in the
international system and must be suitably tamed: revolutions are a
breakdown in an otherwise orderly world. In themselves, they
require neither explanation nor historical contextualisation. Even
a perceptive realist analysis, such as that of Rosecrance, operates
with this model; Kissinger's A World Restored exemplifies it.
Armstrong, as already discussed, goes some way to locating
revolutions more centrally within the course of international
history, but at some violence to the realist paradigm itself.
For behaviouralists, such as Rosenau, revolutions are part of the
spectrum of violence, and like viruses can spread transnationally:
but this violence is seen in psychological terms, abstracted from
social cause or international context, and is again implicitly
contrasted with a supposedly non-violent, because stable, altern-
ative.
Historical materialism, present in IR in its tamed 'structuralist'
variant, pays much more attention to revolutions and sees them as
forming precisely the formative, transitional, role identified by
Skocpol and Barrington-Moore, and as involving substantial social
and political change. In contrast to the realists and behaviouralists,
historical materialists regard revolutions in a positive light, and
also start by looking at the international factors, defined by
capitalism and imperialism, as the context in which any one
individual revolution is to be located. In an apt aside, Marx
criticised the assumptions of a theory based on the Great Powers
by stating that the pentarchic nineteenth-century order, that of the
Five Powers, would be swept aside by 'the sixth great power',
revolution.
However, such is the focus of historical materialism on the
international dimension of revolutions that it has difficulty in
explaining why revolutions appear to be confined to specific states
and exhibit such distinctly national and nationalist characteristics.
Moreover, the historical materialist conception of revolution, in
both its practical and theoretical forms, rested upon a view of
history as moving, through stages, towards a determinate historical

goal: it was, in this sense, 'teleological', and presumed that
revolutions were somehow transitions, or staging posts, in a
unilinear evolution of human society. While there may be room
for some concept of progress in human society, this determinist
one was an illusion and constituted a major flaw in the whole
Marxist approach. In so far as it is present, in disguised form, in
the writings of others influenced by Marxism, including Barrington-
Moore and Skocpol, it is also a source of weakness in their work.
A summary examination of three areas of analysis already
identified - historical, descriptive, theoretical - may bring these
respective anomalies more clearly into focus.
The Formation of the International System
In a striking passage in chapter 6 of his Power Politics, itself

entitled 'International Revolutions', Martin Wight observes: 'It
might well be asked why unrevolutionary international politics
should be regarded as more normal than revolution, since the
history of international society has been fairly equally divided
between the two'. 16 In an attached footnote he develops this point:
'If, taking conventional dates, we regard 1492-1517, 1643-1792
and 1871-1914 as unrevolutionary, and 1517-1648, 1792-1871 and
1916--60 as revolutionary, there are 256 years of international
revolution to 212 unrevolutionary'. There can be dispute about a
date or phase here or there, but the underlying point Wight is
making is cogent: that for much of the history of the international
system, relations between states have been determined not by
'normal' factors- Wight names law, custom and power politics-
but by abnormal, revolutionary, ones. These are ones in which
ideological divisions play an important part, and in which it is the
aim of states to alter, in a substantial way, the political and social
orders of others. Wight argues that in the end, doctrine gives way
to power politics, but his recognition of the importance of
revolution in the international system, dominant for over half the
history of the system, is striking. The 'anarchy' has been as much
one of ideology as of a sovereignless system of states.
The earlier examples of this ideological diversity need only the
briefest of mentions: in the sixteenth century, the ideological and
political upheavals of the Reformation, itself a case of trans-

national 'linkage' and ideological interaction; in the seventeenth
century, the wars and revolutions of the 1640s, when no less than
six European states saw upheaval in the same year, 1648/7 in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the 'Atlantic
Revolution' of 1760-1800. 18
The importance of revolution in the twentieth century has been
immense. The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 established the
fundamental fissure of this century's international relations, one
that, on the basis of two competing and distinct socio-political
systems, respectively contributed to and then dominated the
frictions of the inter-war period and of the post-war world. How
far it was the antagonism to the Bolshevik Revolution, and the
fear of its impact on central Europe, which provided the spur for
the rise of Nazism, is an open question: Hitler himself had other
concerns, but the willingness of the German middle classes and
army to rally behind him may have been considerably affected by
the communist challenge. No such doubt attaches to the course of
world history in the four decades after 1945: the already
constituted divide between capitalist and communist states was
compounded by, and interacted with, the spate of third world
revolutions whose very enumeration is that of the major post-war
crises- China, Korea, Cuba, Vietnam and, in the late 1970s and
1980s, Cambodia, Angola, Ethiopia, Iran, Nicaragua,
Afghanistan.
As discussed in more detail in Chapter 8, the Cold War was an
inter-systemic conflict, one between two social and political
systems and its extension to, and shaping of, third world conflicts
provided the most dangerous and violent episodes of the second
half of the twentieth century. From 1945 to 1989 it was these issues
of third world conflict above all that fuelled international tensions:
one index of this is that it was policy towards third world
revolutions that led to US presidents giving their names to
'doctrines'. 19 Equally, it was Third World challenges that did more
than anything to challenge the positions of US presidents - as
Truman, Johnson and Carter especially had cause to reflect. The
partial decline of US hegemony in the 1960s was to a considerable
extent a result of Vietnam. The history of the world from the end
of the Second World War to the end of the 1980s was largely, but
not exclusively, that of the response of the international system to
revolution. In the four decades up to the late 1980s, revolution

provided the historical foundation for the bipolar system, fuelled
the nuclear arms race, provided case after case of great power
competition, and threatened the domestic political stability of
major powers. 20
The inter-systemic conflict of the Cold War was followed by the
upheavals in Eastern Europe of 1989, which dealt a mortal blow to
the bipolar world that had subsisted since 1945. In one sense, these
revolutions appeared to go against the pattern of the upheavals of
the past two hundred years, the conception of revolution identified
by Griewank: they took place with relatively little violence, and
were carried out not in the name of some heterogeneous
alternative, but in order, or so it was hoped, to bring these
countries into line with prevailing western norms, of society, polity
and economy. In foreign policy as in domestic policy, they did not
seek to defy the prevailing international norms: they accepted not
only the general practices of diplomacy and law, but wanted to be
incorporated into the major institutions of the west, including
NATO and the European Community (EC).
As discussed later, in Chapters 9 and 10, these revolutions were
therefore original in several respects: but, whatever else, their
importance for international politics could not be doubted. The
Cold War ended not because of understanding, or detente,
between the great powers, but by the prevailing of one side over
the other: in other words, it was revolution, not mutual under-
standing, which broke the mould of the post-1945 world and
ushered in a new historical period. It was also these revolutions
which set in train a series of conflicts within and between states of
a kind they had not seen for decades, if at all; these threatened,
and in some cases led to, wars between states over territory. It may
be too early to assess fully the impact of these upheavals; that they
were revolutions, and that they did alter the course of inter-
national history is already apparent.
Historical Patterns
Revolutions are international events in their causes and effects

and, with the partial exception of those of 1989, betray a striking
degree of uniformity. Generalisation on the basis of historical
examples cannot provide a substitute for theoretical investigation,

but it can provide raw material for identifying a number of
problems that themselves affect theoretical work. In the case of
revolutions, there are at least four areas in which such generalisa-
tions can be examined: cause - that is, how far international
factors produce revolutions; foreign policy- that is, how revolu-
tionary states conduct their foreign relations; responses- that is,
the reactions of other states; formation - that is, how, over a
longer time-span, international factors, and the system as a whole,
constrain the post-revolutionary internal development of states
and shape their political, social and economic evolutions.
As already observed, revolutions occur when two broad
conditions are met: that the dominated revolt, and the rulers
cannot go on ruling. Most intuitive discussion of international
causes of revolutions focuses on the first of these two facts, the
stimulation of revolt, and critics are quick to identify, or invent, a
foreign hand in the subversion and agitation, in some cases
arming, of revolutions.
Yet, as the work of Skocpol, Goldstone and others of the 'third
wave' have shown, it is mainly via the other dimension, the
weakening of states, that international factors promote revolution.
International factors play a multiple role in bringing about
revolutions, but it is above all because of this weakening of states,
that they contribute to change: through defeat or crisis in war,
through international economic changes that destroy traditional
orders, through provoking conflict between states and societies as
a result of the states' mobilisation of resources to pursue
international competition, through the removal of guarantees by a
hegemonic power. In other words, while states may use the
international dimension and the resources it provides to consolidate
their position at home, they may also find themselves weakened
internally as a result of their international activities and alliances.
This was true of many earlier cases, not least France, Russia and
China, but it was equally so in 1989. As discussed in Chapters 9
and 10, the collapse of the Eastern European communist regimes
in 1989 was in the immediate context a result of the removal of a
Soviet guarantee to intervene militarily on their behalf, and, over
the longer run, a consequence of the loss of international
legitimacy of these regimes, in the economic and political spheres.
The other kind of cause, the encouragement of revolutionaries,
is evidently important: arms, political backing, above all ideo-

logical encouragement and the force of example. But without the
concomitant weakening of states such external stimulation is
limited in its effects: witness the example of South Africa, where,
despite immense pressure from below, the state retained its power
for many years, and only changed in the late 1980s when external
economic pressures, specifically the US investment boycott,
threatened the regime.
The foreign policy of revolutionary states of the pre-1989 period
is a large area in itself, and remarkably under-studied. Some of the
literature focuses on the issue of 'new diplomacy', i.e. the role of
revolutionary ideology and unconventional action in the foreign
policy of revolutionary states. 21 But this ideological challenge to
the norms of international behaviour is, at most, a secondary
issue: ideology and interference also play a part in the foreign
policies of status quo powers, and revolutionary states have
distinctive foreign policies above all because of the different goals
they pursue, rather than the methods they use.
This last point is significant because in much of the literature,
realist and liberal, there is an assumption that the goals of
revolutionary states are little different from those of other states.
Liberals, for their part, argue that if only revolutionary states were
treated better, they would not seek to 'export' revolution, to alter
relations within other states. The historical record is rather
different: all revolutionary states, almost without exception, have
sought to promote revolution in other states. The challenge they
pose to the international system is not so much that they propound
a new form of diplomacy, or conduct international relations in a
distinct manner, but that they make the altering of social and
political relations in other states a major part of their foreign
policy and regard themselves as having not just a right, but an
obligation, to conduct their foreign policies on this basis.
Much of the literature, realist and transnational, understates
this, as does much of the policy produced to resolve differences
between the USA and third world revolutions in the post-war
epoch: with regard to China, Cuba, Iran, or Nicaragua. No such
resolution was, however, possible given the internationalist
commitment present within the foreign policies of these states: this
reflected both ideological components of their revolutions and
domestic pressures to pursue such a foreign policy. 22 Over time,
such commitments are tempered, but this should not detract from
the recurrence of the internationalist commitment in modern
revolutions, from the Girondins, through the Comintern, Lin Piao
and Che Guevara, to the pan-Islamic appeals of Khomeini, and his
espousal of sudur-i inqilab, or 'export of revolution': indeed in
this, as in many other respects, it is striking how true to form, how
conventional, Iranian revolution has been, beyond its particular
religious form. 23
The argument as to which provokes which, international
revolution or international counter-revolution, is in historical
perspective misplaced: both processes can begin autonomously,
for internal and systemic reasons, and, feeding on each other, lead
to confrontation. If revolutionary internationalism is an almost
universal result of revolutions, so is its opposite, counter-
revolutionary internationalism, the attempt by status quo powers
to prevent the spread of revolutions and reform and, where
possible, overthrow revolutions.
Two more issues that this interaction poses are perhaps more
rewarding and take us to the heart of the international system.
One is the issue raised by Richard Rosecrance and Raymond
Aron, and further developed by Stanley Hoffmann (and discussed
in Chapters 5 and 8), of the tendency of the international system to
homogeneity, that is, towards a similar organisation not just of
relations between states, but of the internal political and social
systems of states. 24 Both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary
internationalism derive from this tendency to homogeneity, which
goes beyond any specific international security considerations
about the military threat posed by one state to another (the point
is not whether the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua in the 1980s,
did, or could ever, pose a military threat to the USA).
The second issue which the record of both forms of inter-
nationalism points to, despite the claims of intervention, is the
durability of the states system. All revolutionary states have tried
to promote revolution abroad to 'export' it; in the straightforward
sense of the term, none has ever succeeded. Khomeini's failure to
promote revolution in Iraq in the early 1980s, or the Sandinistas to
ensure a guerrilla victory in El Salvador in the same period, were
true to form: there can be few images of international relations
more inaccurate than that of the 'domino theory'. The creation of
comparable regimes in neighbouring states has come only through
inter-state wars that in the context of broader struggles then

permit the implantation of homologous regimes (the republiques
soeurs in the 1790s, the 'People's Democracies' in the late 1940s).
In the same vein, state-led counter-revolution nearly always fails,
except in rare cases, either of inter-state war again (France 1815,
Hungary 1919) or of severe internal division within the revolu-
tionary regime itself (Finland 1918, Iran 1953, Dominican Republic
1965, Grenada 1983). For all the battering that it takes in periods of
revolutionary conflict, the state system tends to hold in the short
run.
This 'short run' is, however, significant in that most of the realist
discussion of 'socialisation' of states focuses upon the immediately
post-revolutionary period and the apparent taming of states. The
fact that they introduce truces, abandon internationalist rhetoric
and participate in diplomacy does not, however, mean that
revolutionary states have been entirely 'socialised'. A brief look at
the longer-run record of revolutionary states shows that, as long as
post-revolutionary internal orders remain intact, they continue to
pose a challenge to the system in other states. The USSR
promoted revolution abroad effectively not in the 1920s when it
was weak, but in the 1940s, in the aftermath of the Second World
War, and in the 1970s when the USA was challenged by a tide of
Third World revolutions. The Cuban revolutionary wave failed in
Latin America in the 1960s: but in 1975 Cuban forces intervened
to consolidate the left-wing MPLA (People's Movement for the
Liberation of Angola) in Angola, in 1977 they helped fight off the
Somali invasion that threatened, with a degree of external
encouragement, the Ethiopian Revolution, and in 1979 the
Sandinistas, to a considerable extent armed and encouraged by
Cuba, came to power in Nicaragua. In January 1989 most experts
were arguing that the Iranian Revolution, humbled by war and
economic crisis, would now make its peace with the West. One old
man thought differently: the Rushdie crisis ensued.
This longer-run perspective suggests that the 'socialisation' of
revolution is less easy than realist orthodoxy would have us
believe, and it also suggests that this recurrent, if usually
frustrated, challenge of revolutions is a product as much of
internal as of external factors. The conclusion this leads to is that
until there is a reimposition of homogeneity, that is, until the
internal orders of divergent revolutionary states revert to the
conventional orders of other powers, revolutionary and non-

revolutionary powers will remain in conflict. There could be no
more obvious example of this than the decline of the USSR: here,
from 1985 onwards, a new, more conciliatory foreign policy
evolved pari passu with a reform of Soviet politics and economics.
The expectation was that, on the basis of greater mutual
understanding, detente and a settlement of international disputes
could be arrived at. Yet, in the final analysis, this reconciliation in
the international sphere became possible only when the socio-
political system inside the USSR itself had changed. It was the end
of the heterogeneity of the two systems, not accommodation in
treaties and diplomacy, that ended the Cold War.
The interaction of revolutions and the international system
therefore raises questions not only for the study of revolution, but
also for IR itself. By way of eliciting these implications, it is
possible to outline five areas in which, by placing revolutions more
centrally in the picture of IR, some broader theoretical rethinking
may follow.
International and Domestic Links
Revolutions force us to question the central, realist, assumption

that internal/domestic structures can be excluded from the study of
international relations. The major exponents within IR of the
international effects of revolutions - such as Rosecrance and
Rosenau - have recognised this by arguing for the inclusion of
domestic factors in the study of foreign policy making and its
effects; it is not an accident that Waltz, in his 1979 restatement of
realism, should have argued so strongly against this. His division of
theories into 'systemic' and 'reductionist', 'elegant' as it may be, is
untenable: the briefest examination of how revolutions have
contributed to international conflict, to war in its strictest sense,
shows how the interactive chain - international system/domestic
system/international system- is a central feature of how these wars
came about. 25
The wars of the 1760s contributed to the French Revolution
which led to the Napoleonic wars. The pressure on the Ottoman
Empire led to the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, which
precipitated the Balkan wars and hence stimulated the First World
War. The First World War led to the Bolshevik Revolution which
determined Russia's role in the Second World War and beyond.
Inter-state conflict, and more broadly inter-societal conflict, led to
the collapse of communism in the late 1980s. By focusing only on
the 'systemic', Waltz's model paradoxically downplays the force of
the international. Following inter-state competition and its impact
within society, changes occur that then lead to further inter-state
conflict. As discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, this is the
formative interaction that has shaped so much of international
history.
Chapter 4 has already outlined an argument on differing
implications of the concept 'state' for international relations: here
it is possible only to summarise the implications for the study of
revolution. Revolutions are about states, and yet IR operates with
a problematic, increasingly contested, concept of the state itself.
As much as other developments in IR and elsewhere in the social
sciences, revolutions compel introduction of the new, second,
concept of the state, a sociological category of the state as an
administrative-coercive entity, in addition to the legal-political one
normally used in IR.
The concept of the state conventionally used (if rarely defined)
in IR precludes examination of precisely those processes that
make revolutions international: the effects of inter-state competi-
tion on state-society relations, the weakening of state-society
links by the impact of revolutions in other states, the determina-
tion of revolutionary foreign policy by the state-society conflicts of
post-revolutionary periods.
The second, more restricted concept of the state enables us to
see states in their Janus-like character, as the two-faced entities
that look both inwards, towards the society they seek to dominate,
and externally, towards other states and/or societies with which
they interact with the goal of strengthening their own internal
positions. With this two-faced concept of the state it also becomes
possible to re-examine a feature of the international system that
conventional theory takes for granted but to which it supplies
tautological or axiomatic replies, namely, why states compete; in
particular one can ask why, as the realists themselves often note,
competition between ideologically antagonistic, i.e. hetero-
geneous, states is more enduring and comprehensive than those
between states of similar orientation. The conventional answers,
in terms of maximisation of power in the international arena, leave

out the domestic determinants of such inter-systemic conflicts.
The domestic factor in inter-state activity brings us to the still
unpacked question posed by Rosecrance, Aron and Hoffmann,
and discussed at greater length in Chapter 5, namely, that of
homogeneity and heterogeneity. At one level, it might appear
excessive to see a tendency to homogeneity of internal orders
within the international system. After all, states with different
orders can trade and exchange ambassadors with each other. If
they respect non-interference and agree to a diversity of internal
system, that is, 'co-exist' peacefully, then heterogeneity should not
be a cause of conflict: Kim, for example, on the basis of his study
of the French Revolution, sees this as a practicable solution. 26
Moreover, an element of heterogeneity could be seen as
beneficial to states, since it provides an 'other', an alien and
menacing object in the external world, on the basis of which states
can mobilise social and political support within. These are not
imaginary considerations: cases where such toleration or re-
inforcement through diversity have operated are plenty. But the
balance is, on the historical evidence, in the other direction: that
is, heterogeneity does promote conflict. There is, in other words, a
presumption of homogeneity within the system. This is most
obviously true in a negative sense: if states are organised on
different bases, then they are more likely to feel threatened by
each other.
The most important international and internationalist iinpact of
revolutions lies not in the deliberate actions of states, but in the
force of example: the French Revolution proclaimed the rights of
man, seized the land of the aristocrats and beheaded the king and
queen. The Bolshevik Revolution overthrew the monarchy,
nationalised property and proclaimed a state of the working class.
Iran's impact has been exemplary and ideological, way beyond the
identifiable reach of the Islamic Republic.
Even where states do not seek to promote their model, as most
do - the 'malignant charity' denounced by Burke - the knowledge
of what they have done, or are believed to have done, acts as a
catalyst: it disturbs established orders. The serial collapse of the
communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989 was a remarkable
instance of such a demonstration effect. Once it became evident,
in June of that year, that a non-communist government would be
able to come to power in Poland, the fate of the other regimes was
sealed.
The problem of homogeneity goes, however, beyond this issue
of alternative examples, in that it obscures what is perhaps a more
fundamental issue: namely, the role of homogeneity in a positive
sense in reinforcing states, that is, in reinforcing the 'normal'
interaction of stability of states. States are not isolated units: they
exist in an international context, and their practices, constitutions,
social and economic orders derive reinforcement from the fact that
other states behave like them. Nor is this a recent development, as
the literature on 'interdependence' too easily implies. Capitalism
and the modern state arose in an international context, not the
other way around.
This points to the idea that the international dimension is central
to explanation not only of the destabilisation of states when there
is heterogeneity, but also to the stability of political and social
orders when there is homogeneity. Most of the sociological
literature on this underplays the international dimension: whether
in the Durkheimian debate on common culture and its role in
social cohesion, or in the Marxist debate on the dominant
ideology, there is inadequate recognition of how the force of
international example through similarity and reinforcement serves
to consolidate specific social orders. 27 Yet the most important
underpinning of any ideology, the claim that what exists in a given
social and political order is eternal, natural and immutable,
derives confirmation from such a reinforcement. Once it becomes
evident that there can be different orders in other states - that
there can be republics, or countries where women have the vote,
or where houses can be properly insulated- then the 'naturalness'
of any given order collapses.
In other words, the key to understanding the ideological
challenge of heterogeneity lies in identifying the pre-existing
ideological role of homogeneity and reinforcement. If nothing
else, this serves to bring out the importance of the 'international'
in analysing any one social or political order: the 'international'
does not just become relevant when things break down - when
there is a political menace from outside, an invasion, a rival
economic power- but is equally important in the constitution and
reproduction of stable, apparently self-standing and autonomous,
states. The 'international' (like health) matters when things 'go
right' as much as when they 'go wrong'. As the historical

sociologists have reminded us, the 'international' created the state,
not vice versa. 28
Revolutions and War
As indicated in the discussion of domestic-international 'linkage',

the relationship of revolutions to wars hardly needs underlining,
both in the ways wars cause revolutions and vice versa. If it has
often been noted how wars, by undermining states, lead to
revolutions, it is equally important to note how revolutions have
led to wars: 1789 led to the Napoleonic wars, and the outbreak of
the First World War, conventionally seen as a result of the
breakdown of the balance of power, was preceded by a spate of
revolutions in the semi-peripheral world, from China to Mexico,
and, with most direct consequences for the European inter-state
system, in Turkey.
This connection was vividly present in the conflicts of the early
1980s: in Cambodia, Afghanistan, Iran, Angola, Nicaragua. The
historical record alone suggests that any study of the causes of war,
and of means to predict or prevent war, requires identification of
the onset and impact of revolutions. Yet to do this involves
broaching a difficult but recurrent feature of the debate on
international relations, namely the relation of security between
states: 'vertical' security, and security within states, 'horizontal'
security. The assumption of most literature, and of the UN
Charter, is that it is possible to discuss the one, vertical security,
without addressing the second, what goes on within states. The
reason for avoiding this is evident, since if too close a relation is
established, then the unwelcome policy and moral conclusions
may follow that those concerned to prevent wars, conflicts
between states, should prevent radical changes within them.
Security then requires stability and 'counter-revolution'.
Those who establish a close linkage between the two kinds of
security are inclined either to be consistent and thoroughgoing
counter-revolutionaries, or to argue for a permanent world-wide
revolutionary process, on the grounds that conflict between
revolutionary and counter-revolutionary states is inevitable and
that therefore there cannot be security for revolutionary states as
long as its opponents remain in existence. Of those who have

drawn the first connection, Metternich and, in his A World
Restored, Kissinger, were perhaps the most prominent and lucid,
but the Brezhnev Doctrine, insisting on the 'limited sovereignty' of
communist countries, expressed a similar outlook. Lenin, Stalin
and Mao, with their theory of the inevitability of war between
socialism and capitalism, have represented the second conclusion.
Even before nuclear weapons, however, it was evident that
despite the close link between the two dimensions of security such
a combination of the two was not inevitable. The consensus has
been to avoid the problem and deny that revolutions lead to war;
the result was that the international community was unprepared
for the outbreak of wars that followed the third world revolutions
of the 1970s. Beyond more realistic and historically informed
awareness of how inter-state conflict may follow social revolution,
this recurrent linkage also suggests that greater attention needs to
be given to ways of making the international system more flexible,
so that challenges to security within states do not lead to inter-state
war. The greatest mistake would be to maintain the idea that
conflict at the international level can be isolated from that within
states.
These four issues within IR theory as a whole lead to a fifth one,
underlying the way in which each of the major paradigms within
IR treats the question of the international dimensions of revolu-
tion: namely, the character of the international system itself. As
with the concept of revolution, so with that of international
system, each of the paradigms presumes concepts that differ
significantly from each other.
For realists the system is constituted by interacting states. For
pluralists and behaviourists states remain important, but the
system allows of other interactions that do not operate through
states, variously categorised as linkages, interdependence, trans-
national processes.
For historical materialists, the international system is constituted
by one global socio-economic system, that of capitalism, super-
imposed on which there exist political structures playing various
important, but ultimately secondary, derivative or superstructural,
roles. During the Cold War this broad view encompassed two
approaches: for one, orthodox, school of historical materialists,
the communist countries had abstracted themselves from this
system; for others, such as Wallerstein, no such partial escape had

occurred. In either case there existed an international system not
by virtue of interaction between separate units, as is the case with
the realists and transnationalists, but by virtue of the unity of the
determinant level, the socio-economic. 29 For structuralists, forma-
tion and development of states, later nation-states, takes place
within an already established system. International politics is not
politics between states but civil war within one, international,
social system.
The implications of revolutions for these three models of the
'system' are considerable and parallel the conclusions of Chapters
3-5. On the one hand, the realist and transnational theorists
under-state the degree to which the apparently separate states and
societies have been formed and continue to exist within an
international context defined by common social, economic and
ideological features. In other words, their model of the 'system'
makes it difficult to discern why revolutions have international
effects.
The conventional Marxist model suffers, however, from the
opposite problem, namely the exaggeration, on the basis of socio-
economic factors, of the unity of the international system, and the
underestimation of how states- artificial, arbitrary, interactive as
they may be - and associated nationalist ideologies nevertheless
act to fragment and cushion the international system as a whole
from revolutions in particular states. The argument therefore leads
to an examination of how the international character of the
economy and of capitalist society and culture as a whole interact
with the division of the world into states and the attendant
fragmentation of territories, populations, coercive capacities and
particularist ideologies this entails. The choice comes down to a
theory that sees international relations as, in the end, dominated by
states, and an alternative that looks at the system as one of social
conflict on a world scale, mediated and fragmented by states.
It may be argued, following upon the collapse of communism
and the end, or at least attenuation, of the revolutionary
perspective inherited from the French Revolution, that the issue of
revolution will cease to be central to the course of international
relations. Even were this the case, it would not detract from the
need to look again at the history of the international system over
the past five hundred years and examine possible theoretical and
historical consequences. But there are reason to suggest that,

whatever the immediate future may bring, a longer-term certainty
in this regard is imprudent.
In the first instance, if we accept that revolutions are unlikely or
impossible in democratic states, we are still only talking of around
three dozen of the near two hundred states in the world: as Chapter
10 suggests, there may be a very wide gap between the ideological
consequences of 1989, 'the end of history', and the realisation of
that potential with the generalisation of democracy across the
world. Moreover, if we take seriously the implications of
Goldstone's argument, that a crisis of state power combined with
demographic upsurge is likely to lead to revolution, and combine it
with projections of global population, then we may be defining the
predominant pattern of crisis for the century ahead. 30
The historical sociologists, international political economists
and analysts of revolution all confront this question of what
constitutes the system, also the central issue in IR. The least we
can say is that no adequate answer, framed in historical and
theoretical terms, has yet been arrived at. The study of revolutions
as international phenomena, beyond its intrinsic validity, can
provide one means of approaching that question, and quite a few
others. It is, moreover, rather to early to suggest that this is merely
a matter of historical or retrospective interest; it will take a century
or two at least for this question to be resolved. Were it to transpire
that revolution was indeed no longer relevant to the study of
international relations, we would have to revise Martin Wight's
historical summary: a third, rather than a half, of the history of the
international system would then have to be characterised as
dominated by the conflict between revolutionary and counter-
revolutionary states. This would still invest the issue with not a
little importance.
7
Hidden from International
Relations: Women and the
International Arena
The Silence of International Relations
Over the last two and a half decades questions of gender, and
particularly those concerning the place and role of women, have
acquired much greater importance within the social sciences as a
whole. In response to the rise of a women's movement in some
Western societies, and to the production of a growing body of
analytic literature pertaining to women's position, there has been a
marked development in the agenda and concepts studied in a
range of academic disciplines. If this has been especially noticeable
in history and sociology, it has also been evident in political
science, economics and anthropology, and has acquired great
importance in the most ideologically constitutive of the humanities,
literature. 1 Until the very end of the 1980s there was, however,
one outstanding exception to this growing awareness of gender
issues, namely International Relations.
A survey of the articles published in, and books reviewed by,
the main British and American journals of international relations
during the 1970s and 1980s will reveal little if anything on gender
questions, and little that reflects an awareness of the expansion of
interest in related areas of the social sciences. 2 If one looked at the
contents of standard introductory courses on international
relations, at the major textbooks, at the relevant shelves of
academic bookshops, a similar absence was evident. In the flood
of books published on nuclear strategy, terrorism, third world debt
and the other preoccupations of the 1980s, there appeared to be
147
nothing, not a single book, devoted to this question. To borrow

from the image popularised in Sheila Rowbotham's study of
women and history, women have been hidden from international
relations. 3 It is as if the issues raised by feminism were simply not
considered relevant to the international sphere and did not need to
form part of the academic agenda for the study of international
relations.
To overcome the invisibility of women requires analysis of why
the concealment takes place and of the several reasons that
combined to enforce this occultation. One explanation is institu-
tional inertia within the IR discipline. As long as a virtually
complete silence on the issue exists, those concerned with it are
either discouraged from working on it or choose to do so in other,
more receptive academic disciplines - or in extra-academic
contexts. In their time-honoured role as gate-keepers, 'refereed
journals', often the twentieth-century academic equivalent of the
Inquisition, excluded such material.
A second factor is the selective insulation of international
relations from developments in other social sciences. International
relations is in some respects an enthusiastic importer, one might
even at times suggest comprador, of concepts from other discip-
lines. However, there are large areas of social science theory that
appear to be unrecognised within international relations: as
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, sociological concepts, except where
borrowed in an instrumental manner, as with 'society', are almost
wholly ignored; the field of international political economy, while
keen to assess theIR of some factors of production, such as money
and technology, has been almost wholly silent on the international
relations of another factor, namely labour. The growth of women's
studies was, equally, long ignored in the IR field.
There is, moreover, the conventional definition of what
constitutes the subject-matter of international relations, namely
high politics: issues of state policy, especially those concerning
security and macroeconomic management. Gender issues have
little apparent place in this hierarchy. Even the broadening of
international relations to encompass more transnational questions,
those distinct from security and not necessarily mediated through
states, has done little to rectify the situation. The literature on
transnationalism and world society has been almost as silent on
gender issues as has the high politics alternative.
Women and the International Arena 149
Academic reserve is compounded by the fact that the domain of

international practice - in foreign ministries, ministries of defence
and related policy bodies - is itself an especially male-dominated
reserve, beyond even the norms prevalent in policy-making bodies
as a whole (as the meagre number of women foreign ministers or
ambassadors the world over indicates). In conventional ideology,
women are not 'suited' for such responsibilities and cannot be
reiied on in matters of security and crisis. Nothing could, it
appears, be further from the traditional realm of women's
concerns than international security and other global issues. 4
There is a more fundamental reason for the gender blindness of
most of the field of International Relations, namely an assumption
of separation between the two spheres of gender and international
relations. This is, moreover, an assumption which is shared both
by IR and by much feminist literature. On the one hand it is
presumed in academic writing that international relations as such
are little if at all affected by issues pertaining to women. To put it
in simplistic terms, the assumption is that one can study the course
of relations between states without reference to questions of
gender. Moreover, by neglecting the dimension of gender,
International Relations implicitly supports the thesis that inter-
national processes themselves are gender neutral; that is, that they
have no effect on the position and role of women in society, and on
the relative placement of women and men. For its part, feminism,
concerned above all with the interpersonal, the subjective and the
private, has approached its analysis of forms of domination,
ideology, division of labour in terms of the classic framework of
orthodox sociology and psychology: the discrete society and the
family or individual. The chasm between IR and femihism is,
therefore, one that both have contributed to reinforcing.
The fact is that, in common with other social practices,
international processes do have gendered effects - from military
and economic ones to the formation and diffusion of images of
women and fashions of feminism. The history of state policy on
what may, at first sight, appear to be the most private and
individual issue of all, namely human reproduction, is one replete
with cases where states have sought to influence the birth rate
(until very recently in the direction of boosting the number of
children born) as part of inter-state competition. In the nineteenth
century, a range of countries - Britain and France included- saw
child-rearing, in both its biological and social forms, as a central

part of the new imperial and militaristic order; in the words of one
imperial eugenist, Caleb Saleeby: 'The history of nations is
determined not on the battlefield but in the nursery, and that
battalions which give lasting victory are the battalions of babies.
The politics of the future will be domestics'. Or in more graphic
terms: 'There is no State womb, there are no State breasts, there is
no real substitute for the beauty of individual motherhood'. 5 In
France, women who bore ten children were given state awards.
What this established was a link between inter-state competition
and the birth rate, an ideology and state policy of natalism that
mixed stereotypes about women and their reproductive and
socialising roles with conceptions of national grandness and
patriotic duty. Echoes of similar state ideas can be found in many
twentieth-century nationalist states, from the Nicaragua of the
Sandinistas, to the Iraq of Saddam Hussein. 6
The language of international politics also suggests a strong
conventional masculine and often homophobic content, with its
emphasis on toughness and competition. If this was explicit in the
imperial rhetoric of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, with the social Darwinist cult of 'virile' nations, and
their right to conquer weaker, presumably less virile ones, it has
remained present in the discourse and imagery of Great Power
conflict. 7
In classic political theory, and language, the masculine virtues
are held up as those most desired in international relations:
indeed, as analysis of Machiavelli's use of the term has shown, the
very term 'virtu', the quality of the vir or male, contrasts with the
fickleness of its feminine alternative, fortuna. 8 Among many such
possible quotations the injunctions of Edmund Burke can serve to
illustrate the point furtherY Writing in 1796 on the need to
confront the threat of revolutionary France, Burke chided the
English for their belief in their own weakness, and for accepting
the argument that 'a frivolous effeminacy was become the national
character'. Instead, he argued, the English overcame their
weakness:
We emerged from the gulf of that speculative despondency; and

were buoyed up to the highest point of practical vigour. Never
did the masculine spirit of England display itself with more
energy, nor ever did its genius soar with a prouder preeminence
over France, than at the time when frivolity and effeminacy had
been at least tacitly acknowledged as their national character,
by the good people of this kingdom.
One hardly needs to be a post-modernist to deconstruct the layers

of gendered symbolism here.
In contemporary political parlance, gendered political language
is frequent: it is insulting to be called a Pollyanna, a wimp or limp-
wristed. Those women who have come to occupy top political
positions have, in the main, sought to reassure their male
counterparts, and their male, and female, public opinions, that
they can be as strong as men: Golda Meir, Margaret Thatcher,
Jean Kirkpatrick all conform to this. The saying 'All's fair in love
and war' should suggest a connection between these two Hobbesian
domains. Indeed analysis of the language of military strategy, and
particularly its nuclear variant, has revealed a striking incidence of
gendered language in the analysis of weaponry and its possible
deployment. 10
The emergence of women's issues within International Relations
involves a dual challenge to any assumed separation of the two
domains, and a challenge to both IR and feminism: if the former
would have to recognise the degree to which awareness of gender
could subject the discipline, the latter would have to overcome its
denial of the relation between gender relations and international
processes, and to formulate its analysis, and suggestions for an
alternative, in more than abstract or declamatory terms.
One aspect of the challenge is to reveal how gender issues and
values could and do play a role within international relations; the
second is to analyse the gender-specific consequences of inter-
national processes, be these military, economic, political or
ideological. The latter modification has broad implications for the
study of international relations as a whole, since it rests upon the
argument, developed at greater length in earlier chapters, that
international relations should study the consequences of inter-
national processes within societies, and the resulting impact of
these internal changes .on international relations, as well as
analysing the sphere of international processes tout court.
An Emerging Concern: Four Dimensions
Twenty years after the emergence of feminism within the social

sciences, some awareness within international relations of the
relevance of this topic has become evident. It may be valuable to
identify the factors that have prompted the change. There has
been some measure of interaction between International Relations
and other social sciences on questions of gender, so that questions
and concepts raised in cognate disciplines can be seen as relevant
to the international domain.
Gender and Theory
The growth of a feminist current within political and social theory

has produced analyses with evident implications for International
Relations theory. 11 These include critiques of power and its
symbolisation in gender terms, as well as discussions of specifically
gendered definitions of security, rights and authority. Human
rights, for example, have become a much more important issue in
international relations and, in so far as they have acquired a
gender dimension, it is directly relevant to analysis of the role of
states and other actors in promoting or denying rights to women.
This is so in the broader political arena, as well as in contested
areas such as marriage and family law, contraception and
abortion, policies on female employment, and responses to rape
and other forms of violence against women.
Discussions surrounding the problems associated with a concept
of national interest have made its often partisan and group-specific
character more evident. While much of the critique of national
interest focuses on differences involving social groups, bureau-
cratic interests or ethnic and religious groups, this critique could
evidently be extended to question whether definitions of national
interest are gender specific and benefit men more than women
under particular circumstances. The least that can be said is that
different policies, be these military or economic, may have variant
effects on men and women, and that any assumption of gender
neutrality is debatable. Whether this critique of IR categories in
terms of feminist theories also has broader epistemological
implications, as some feminists have suggested, entailing altern-
ative forms of rationality, conceptualisation and expression, is

another issue, to which I shall return later in this chapter.
Transnational Processes
The second dimension of interaction between women and the

international sphere is the extent to which international policies
and processes, far from being gender neutral, in practice play an
important role in determining women's place in society and in
structuring economic, social and political relations between the
sexes. This is most clearly and often brutally evident in the activity
that is the quintessential domain of IR, and of inter-state conflict,
namely war.
Leaving aside the question of whether or not there is a specific
'women's position' on war itself, there can be no doubt that war
has multiple implications for women: women come to symbolise
much of what war is about (the country or patria, the defence of
women from attack) and are also mobilised .and reallocated by the
state into a range of new activities, reproductive, productive and,
to a limited extent, military. One of the most revealing dimensions
of this relocation is that of women into areas of work that in
peacetime are the preserve of men, such as engineering and
munitions factories, from which, as the film Rosie the Riveter well
demonstrated, they are removed once peacetime returns.
Women are also prime victims of war, not just as ungendered
'civilians', but as objects of rape. The wars in ex-Yugoslavia that
began in 1991 have drawn especial attention to the role of rape, as
a symbol of subjugation and humiliation, a means of propagating
the superior race, and a theme for mobilising ethnic rage. 12 Rape
has recurred in modern wars, as both side-effect and instrument of
policy: a history of world war as a gendered conflict, ranging from
the Japanese 'rape' (in both senses) of Nanking in 1937 through to
the legitimation of rape by the Red Army as it advanced
westwards, remains to be written. 13
In non-military contexts the impact of international processes on
women is perhaps most obvious in economics: international
economic processes have strongly affected women in both
developed and less developed countries in recent decades. The
newly industrialised countries have seen mass recruitment of
women into high technology industries. 14 In other third world
countries, changes in agricultural employment, as well as high

levels of male out-migration to richer third world states or to more
developed countries have had great impact on the roles and
responsibilities of women. The structural adjustment policies
pursued by a number of third world governments in the 1980s,
often at the behest of the IMF and World Bank, have had gender-
specific consequences: as wage levels deteriorate, women are
often compelled to work in the least remunerated areas while
publicly financed services on which women and children are
particularly dependent deteriorate. Thus women bear a dispro-
portionate burden in debt repayment strategies.
In the developed countries industrial change has promoted the
employment of women in some areas and reduced it in others. 15
The growth in some developed countries of an underclass,
composed largely of women and children, is in part a product of
new forms of international competition.
In the political sphere, the entry of women into political life as
voters and political subjects, an international phenomenon,
usually experienced and subsequently presented as a purely
national one, has been one of the most marked changes of the
twentieth century.
Even the most apparently insulated arena of all, family
relations, has been affected in many ways by international changes
in this century: by changes in medicine, especially with respect to
contraception; by the spread of domestic technologies; by the
diffusion of new role models and ideologies of male-female and
parent-child relations; by, as already noted, state policies,
motivated by the supposed needs of inter-state competition, on
birth rates. The constitution of women's position in society and
economy, and of women's position in the home (for all that it is
private and subject to national variations) owes much to changes
and trends that are international and transnational.
There is no dimension of transnational relations more
contentious and long running than the religious. It is not difficult
to see how the changes in religious policy and fashion have, in
recent years as earlier, had direct consequences for women. This is
true for women in Islamic countries, where the rise of Islamicist
movements in the 1970s and 1980s has affected many aspects of
women's lives. It is also true within Catholic communities, where
the reassertion of traditional doctrine on reproduction has
provoked widespread resistance. At the cost of some exaggera-

tion, it is possible to extend the slogan of the women's movement,
that the personal is political, to assert that the personal is
international, in the sense that interpersonal, micro-political
relations are greatly influenced by transnational processes. If there
are many ways in which this does not apply, there are far more
ways in which it is true than conventional wisdom would have us
believe. International processes often are not gender neutral, and
gender relations, for all their autonomy, are not insulated from
international factors.
Many of these factors have come together in an international
process that began in the 1980s and which has marked all the
women that were living in the countries affected, namely the
collapse of communism. This was, in several respects, an inter-
national and transnational phenomenon: the communist regimes
collapsed, above all, because of their inability to sustain inter-state
competition; the changes that then took place within them
involved the gradual encroachment and in some cases imposition
of Western modes of social, economic and political behaviour, and
the emergence of indigenous nationalist and religious, forms of
ideology. The effects on gender relations were multiple: the end of
communist controls led to an increase in prostitution and
pornography (the latter associated with western freedom and
modernity), the unemployment of millions of women, the collapse
of welfare systems, including ones specifically designed to help
working mothers. The new masculinism stressed the return of
women to the home, the need to respect 'traditional' values on the
family, as against the imposed or cosmopolitan values of com-
munism.
Women did not experience the transition to post-communism
uniquely as victims and in several respects stood to benefit, most
obviously in terms of political freedoms. But whether positive or
negative the changes to which they were subjected were ones that
originated from an international crisis and which had broadly
similar impact in different countries. 16
Women as International Actors
Third, despite the subordination that women have and do

experience, they have in recent years acquired much greater
prominence as international actors. This has been true on issues of

war and peace, in economic and social development, and in the
growth of the women's movement itself which, in its concern to
alter the position and thinking on a range of social and personal
issues, has spread throughout the developed world and has had
considerable resonance in the third world as well.
The spread of women's organisations and campaigns across
frontiers since the late 1960s is a striking example of transnational-
ism. Here is one of the clearest cases of non-state actors since, it
can reliably be reported, women as a group do not hold state
power in any of the 190 independent countries in the world. This
development is marked by both the growing transnationalism of
organisation and debate on women's issues and by the combina-
tion of mobilisation on women's questions with action on other,
more conventionally international questions. As with many other
aspects of transnationalism and feminism, this combination is less
novel than is often supposed. One of the most striking trans-
national movements of modern times was the movement in
support of women's suffrage in the first two decades of this
century.
While questions of gender are seen as personal or single issues,
they have long formed part of a broader political and ideological
outlook, as is evident both in the campaigns to promote women's
equality and in those that oppose it. The link between women's
issues and political and international change was evident at the
time of the French Revolution, in the writings of Mary Wollstone-
craft among others. One of the originators of socialist inter-
nationalism in the 1840s was the feminist Flora TristanY
Similarly, opposition to women's equality may often correlate with
certain attitudes to international issues. In the early 1980s one of
the most active opponents of the Equal Rights Amendment to the
US Constitution was Phyllis Schlafly, a right-wing leader who had
also written three books on nuclear strategy in which she called for
the US to have first-strike nuclear capability against the USSR and
denounced Nixon and Kissinger as dupes of Moscow.
Women and Foreign Policy
Many areas of foreign policy have a gender-specific component.
Starting with the question of war, the conventional core of the
subject, there is a wealth of discussion about the specific
contribution of women to preventing war. There is often a

conceptual ambiguity here since, as Ruth Roach Pierson has
shown, there is a distinction between deriving a feminist position
on peace from woman's role as mother, and arguing for such an
approach because women are people normally separate from
access to the means of warfare. 18 None the less, the argument on
women and peace has a long militant and analytic tradition. If this
connection was evident in the 1980s, in campaigns against nuclear
weapons, it was equally a feature of the peace campaigns prior to
and during the First World War. 19
In addition, there is substantial discussion of the role of women
in war- as combatants in situations of resistance to occupation and
as supporters of militaristic policies. 20 The spread within NATO
countries of female recruitment to regular peacetime armies in
recent years has prompted a wide-ranging debate on how women
can and do integrate themselves into military structures. 21 The
dispute over the role of women on active duty in the US invasion
of Panama and in the Gulf War (where 30,000 women were among
the half million US soldiers deployed) served to underline how
much resistance to change there is on this question by the military
apparatus and the public, as well as the complexity of the
underlying issues, not least from a feminist perspective.Z2 It was by
chance that in 1993, his first year in office as US Defense
Secretary, Les As pin faced three critical issues each em bodying an
issue of gender- women in combat, homosexual rights and sexual
harrassment.
If there is therefore a significant gender dimension to what is
supposedly the core topic of international relations, comparable
dimensions can be found in other areas of the subject. Inter-
national institutions have come to devote much more attention to
the position of women within societies as well as in relations
among them, and the UN Decade for Women (1976-85) prompted
widespread interest in issues of international law, development
and national policies on women. 23 Both the UN and the EC have
produced a substantial body of policy and analysis on the position
of women. 24 A great number of non-governmental organisations
are active on women's issues, ranging from the general, such as for
example the Gender and Development Unit at Oxfam, to the
specific, such as the French-based Women Living under Muslim
Laws.
The gender dimensions of international economic policy, be

these in regard to employment, sexual divisions of labour,
development or migration are also, as already noted, receiving
much more attention. Foreign aid, one of the most prominent
aspects of developed states' international economic policy, has
acquired an overt gender component. A commitment to assisting
women through development programmes has, since the mid-
1970s, become widespread in OECD (Organization for Economic
Development and Co-operation) countries. A number of European
countries, most notably Sweden, include benefit to women among
the conditions of their aid programmes. The Percy Amendment,
passed by the US Congress in 1973, stipulated that USAID
programmes should spend at least $10 million annually on projects
specifically designed to benefit women.
Gender and women in particular play one further role in foreign
policy, namely as symbols or instruments of inter-state competi-
tion and of the superiority of one society over another. That this
has little or nothing to do with concern about women themselves
should be evident, nor does the revelation of these gendered
discourses mean that foreign policy or international relations are
generally or in some ultimate sense solely concerned with women.
It none the less illustrates further the intersection of gender
with foreign policy in ways that have hitherto been under-
stated.
While Western states, in contrast to an increasing number of
non-governmental organisations, have been cautious about
making official statements about women's rights in other countries,
third world states, opposed to what they see as 'imperialist' values,
have not been so reticent. The Islamic Republic of Iran, for
example, has often attacked what it considers to be Western
mistreatment of women. Thus a report of a speech by the Iranian
President Khamene'i in 1989:
The plight of women in Western society is appalling,' said

President Ali Khamene'i and went on to detail their historic
oppression as 'mere objects of pleasure' despite the West's
deceptive claim of women's freedom and their role in society.
In stark contrast with the honour and respect accorded to
women in Islam, Western society has degraded her to the
meanest level, said the President, and deplored the 'culture of
permissiveness and nudity which gives man a free rein to exploit

and insult her personality'. 25
A striking example of this state exploitation of the gender issues

comes from one of the most famous episodes of the Cold War
when Nixon and Khrushchev met in 1959 in the model kitchen of
an American exhibition in Moscow. This 'Kitchen Debate', known
as an argument about which system was superior to the other, in
fact revolved around the most domestic and gendered of issues,
women and housework. This did not mean that the Cold War was
wholly, or even mainly, about subjugating women or reorganising
domestic labour: but it did show how symbols of gender were one
of the ideological resources used in this inter-state competition.
A historian of the Cold War gives both sides of the story,
beginning with Nixon's account:
They left the studio and, with a huge press contingent fighting
to get their tape recorders in between the two men, they
stepped into a model American kitchen. The argument
continued as Nixon pointed to all the latest gadgets. 'Anything
that makes women work less is good.' Khrushchev shook his
head, 'We don't think of women in terms of capitalism. We
think of them better.' Nixon said that a prefabricated home like
this one cost only $14,000 in America, well within reach of the
average worker ...
Khrushchev's version of the famous debate with Nixon is slightly

different. Completely disregarding anything said in the television
studio, he claimed that when they got to the kitchen he picked up a
lemon squeezer and muttered what a silly thing it was.
All you need for tea is a couple of drops of lemon juice. I think
it would take a housewife longer to use this gadget than it would
for her to do what our housewives do, which is to slice a piece of
lemon, drop it into a glass of tea, then squeeze a few drops out
with a spoon. That's the way we always did it when I was a
child, and I don't think this appliance of yours is an improve-
ment in any way. 26
Whatever their other differences, of course, both assumed that it
would be women who would make the tea.
To sum up, there are at least four distinct ways in which issues
pertaining to women and the international arena have, through a
variety of processes, received greater recognition in recent years:
through the encounter of feminism with International Relations
theory; through growing recognition of the gender-specific
consequences of a range of transnational processes; through the
emergence of women as distinct actors on the international scene;
and through an increased awareness of the gender component of
foreign policy issues.
States and Women: Nationalism and Human Rights
Many of the questions raised in these four broad aspects of the

gender dimension of international relations can be illustrated by
examining areas in which questions of gender intersect with
established values and policies. One of the most contentious and
relevant of all these topics is that of women and nationalism;
another, equally difficult, is the place of women's rights in the
formulation of inter-state relations. Both lead to what are, in
conventional terms, unacceptable conclusions. This alone may
suggest that they pose questions that are important in their own
right, and also are relevant to the identification and discussion of
the underlying assumptions of international relations as a whole.
The shift in meaning of the word 'motherland', within the
English language at least, is itself revealing: in its original,
eighteenth-century, meaning it denoted land as 'mother', i.e.
source, of something, be it minerals or art, and this was the
meaning it retained as late as the 1840s. But with the rise of
nationalism in the mid-nineteenth century it acquired a new,
ideological, meaning, namely one's country of origin.
This fusion of an image of maternity with national identity
served its purposes: if there is an assumption that national
independence and national interest take precedence over the
claims of any specific group within the nation, there has also been
an assumption that, in general, the spread of nationalism is
beneficial to women since they are a part of the nation.
Nationalism mobilises women into political life, exalts particular
national traditions pertaining to women, and by granting them
Rethinking International Relations 161
political rights as citizens provides a foundation for overcoming

specific gender inequalities. 27
There is, however, another side to the story. Nationalist
movements subordinate women in a particular definition of their
role and place in society, enforce conformity to values that are
often male-defined and make it possible to delegitimise alternative
policies on the grounds that these are alien. As the founder of
modem nationalist theory, Mazzini, made clear, nationalism was
abov~ all about obedience. 28 The use made of nationalist and anti-
imperialist arguments to discredit and silence feminist movements
in recent years is indication enough of this. States, not least newly
independent states, exist to enforce hierarchies. Throughout the
world, men have seen in the state and in the ideologies
legitimating it - of which nationalism is the most potent - a means
of enforcing their control over women: that this control is often
exercised via a rhetoric of exaltation and respect, or through state
policies that 'improve' the position of women, does not detract
from the instrumental and subordinating character of this practice.
Nationalism is far from being gender neutral. It seeks to
mobilise women in support of its goals: independence and the
consolidation of a specifically defined post-independence regime.
Its effects for women are contradictory. How particular national-
isms have affected women in the countries concerned is an
important topic for research and analysis; so is the broader
theoretical question of how far an awareness of the position of
women can lead to a questioning of the predominant values in
international relations, namely state sovereignty and the primacy
of national independence. Here, of course, the long tradition of
association between feminism and internationalism may be
pertinent, where the latter is seen not just as .a faith in
international solidarity, but as a moral and political position from
which to criticise nationalist claims, and the authority of govern-
ments.
Mention has already been made of the internationalism of Flora
Tristan, and perhaps the most famous statement of women's
internationalism of all is that of Virginia Woolf. Writing of a woman
who is asked to support the war effort she replies:
She will find that she has no good reason to ask her brother to
fight on her behalf to protect 'our' country. ' "Our country" ',
she will say, 'throughout the greater part of its history has
treated me as a slave; it has denied me education or any share in
its possessions. "Our" country still ceases to be mine if I marry a
foreigner. "Our" country denies me that means of protecting
myself, forces me to pay others a very large sum annually to
protect me, and is so little able, even so, to protect me that Air
Raid precautions are written on my wall. Therefore if you insist
upon fighting to protect me, or "our" country, let it be
understood, soberly and rationally between us, that you are
fighting to gratify a sex instinct which I cannot share; to procure
benefits which I have not shared and probably will not share;
but not to gratify my instincts, or to protect either myself or my
country. For', the outsider will say, 'in fact, as a woman, I have
no country. As a woman I want no country. As a woman my
country is the whole world. ' 29
Powerful as it is, Woolf's argument raises as many difficulties as

it resolves. Her formulation of the reasons why women want no
country or have none is based on three different considerations:
instinct, exclusion from equality with men, inadequate protection
by men. The implication is, therefore, that in the latter two cases
at least, the woman's position would change if these difficulties
were resolved. Her moral appeal clashes also with the history of
women in the twentieth century: beyond the symbolism by women
of patriotism, possibly dismissible as the work of men, is the very
active way in which women have mobilised to support war efforts,
and have mobilised in nationalist movements. The mass actions by
women in the Yugoslav conflict of 1991-3, acting as women to
block food supplies going to other communities, is a graphic
illustration of this. Resort can always be made to the classic
concept of 'false consciousness', but this certainly suggests no
automatic political identification by women with internationalism,
or with women in other national groups. Yet 1 whether the relation
is a nationalist and patriotic or an anti-nationalist one, it certainly
suggests a number of significant, and recurrent, connections
between women and the international sphere.
One possible way of approaching the broader question is by way
of what one may term a feminist Luxemburgism. Rosa Luxemburg
argued that the independence of nations should be seen as
conditional upon how far it advanced the interests of the working
class; in the case of pre-1914 Poland, she argued that Poland

should, on these grounds, remain part of the broader Russian
state. 30 A comparable argument could be raised with respect to
women and national independence, namely that the independence
of specific states should be judged by a range of criteria, including
how far that independence has advanced the position of women.
In one sense Luxemburgist arguments are no longer relevant: a
world of independent states has been created and the question of
support, qualified or not, for their creation no longer applies.
None the less, it is conceivable that in cases where national and
national-religious ideologies subordinate women even more than
was the case under foreign domination, the authority of the
independent states and their officially sanctioned cultures should
not be taken as self-evident: women have the right to challenge the
authority of the state that supposedly embodies the nation, or
indeed to reject its claims altogether, and depart. In countries such
as Ireland and Malta, where divorce is still banned, the identifica-
tion of nation with clerical authority has especially pernicious
effects.
As in the case of the original Luxemburgist argument, there are
many obvious counter-arguments: that women's position as
members of a nation takes precedence over their position as
members of a subordinate gender; that national independence as
such is a superior goal to that of the rights of individual members
of a nation; that it is not possible to overcome sectoral inequalities
of class, ethnicity or gender within a nation until independence has
been achieved. These are all strong arguments and would probably
carry the day in any context. However, the feminist critique of
nationalism and national sovereignty would, at least, open these
issues up for discussion in a way that an assumption of the
automatic primacy of national independence and sovereignty does
not permit. In virtually all cases where nationalism has had
deleterious consequences for women, discussion of the implica-
tions of this has been silenced or marginalised by appeal to
supposedly higher values. Given the predominance of a nationalist
framework for argument, women opposed to forms of oppression
legitimated as traditional, authentic, popular and so forth have
had to argue that such policies are not really those of the nation or
are not historically justified. In this way the nationalists have
forced the argument on to their terrain, denying the legitimacy of a
discussion of the rights of women as such. It should be possible to

reject, on universalist grounds, repugnant ideas and practices, be
they traditional or otherwise. Similar nationalist distortion is, of
course, evident with regard to other political issues, such as the
rights of ethnic minorities, workers and intellectuals. 31
There has, to date, been little discussion of an area in which
gender could come to play a significant role in foreign policy,
namely human rights. Yet the scope for such a modification is
enormous. We have seen, in the 1980s especially, states make the
future of their relations with other countries conditional upon their
domestic performance with regard to some forms of human rights
and impose, or threaten to impose, sanctions of various kinds if
expectations are not met. Such demands have not, to date,
encompassed the rights of women. But there is no reason in
principle why comparable arguments should not be advanced.
Countries with a commitment to gender equality could shape their
foreign policies accordingly, and could try to mobilise coalitions in
the UN, as they do on other issues, to put pressure upon
delinquent states responsible for gendered apartheids.
In the latter part of the 1980s, there began to be a shift in the
definition of human rights to encompass feminist concerns, a shift
that was most evident, as is so often the case, in the work of the
non-governmental organisations. 32 At the 1992 United Nations
World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna, a consider-
able number of groups supporting women's rights attended, and
the final declaration included nine paragraphs on 'the equal status
and human rights' of women.
A number of cases could, however, be observed where states, or
state activity, had begun to make the rights of women an element
of foreign policy. One striking case was that of the Republic of
Korea which sought compensation from Japan for the treatment of
Korean women as 'comfort women', prostitutes for the army,
during the Second World War: between 100,000 and 200,000
women were reportedly involved. 33 Subsequently, prostitutes who
had worked around US bases in the Philippines also began to
demand compensation for sexual diseases they had caught.
A second example concerned an important shift in the immigra-
tion policy of the Canadian Government in 1993: for the first time
a woman (from Saudi Arabia) was permitted to claim political
asylum on the grounds that as a women she was denied her human
rights in her country of origin. A third case concerned the pressure

put on the Irish Government to alter its absolute ban on abortion,
following the rape of a fourteen-year-old girl who subsequently
became pregnant. Beyond straining Ireland's membership of the
EC, it also created considerable animosity among the Unionist
population of Northern Ireland who saw in the ban a mediaeval
policy, confirming the fear that incorporation into the South would
lead to the domination of the Catholic Church. 34
The most common inter-state disputes of all concerning women's
rights were those surrounding marital disputes, over the domicile
of wives, and, most explosively, over the custody of children when
divorce occurred. Britain, France and Australia were all involved
in disputes with Muslim countries where fathers from those states
had, in alleged defiance of court instructions in the original
countries, taken their children back to their countries of origin and
denied reasonable access to the mothers. At the popular level,
these questions, played up in the press, did more than any-
thing to register the importance of gender and international
relations.
The development of an international policy on women's rights is
not a question merely of recognising the issue: as the Vienna 1993
UN conference showed there are great differences of approach
within any such general commitment, notably that between an
approach based on human rights and one emphasising equal
status, the latter being concerned with poverty and employment,
as well as forms of discrimination.
There are, moreover, many practical problems with this option
of making the rights of women an issue in foreign policy, not least
the problems of backlash and retribution. These dangers, common
to all human rights campaigns, should not conceal what is likely to
be the most profound source of resistance to such campaigns,
namely the belief that while some forms of human rights violation
are proper subjects for foreign policy those pertaining to women
are not. It is, in conventional terms, 'preposterous' that questions
of gender should play this kind of role in relations between
sovereign states. There will, inevitably, be much talk of differing
national traditions, and official spokesmen and spokeswomen will
be produced from the countries concerned to denounce external
interference in the internal affairs of the society in question.
National and, where relevant, anti-imperialist sentiments will be
mobilised to check any such external challenges to male domina-

tion, and to the state powers that reinforce and embody it.
There are difficult issues here of both policy and theory: but the
failure of such policies to emerge at all, and the probable response
to them, illustrates clearly how important issues of women's
subordination are in the overall constitution of national ideologies.
It also shows how a commitment to gender equality, beyond any
domestic or internal political consequences, does pose a challenge
to prevailing conceptions of authority and sovereignty in inter-
national relations itself. 35
Implications and Problems
The scope of what is conventionally seen as the discipline of

International Relations has expanded considerably in recent years
to encompass new thematic and conceptual areas. In the 1980s
alone, the rise of international political economy altered much of
the academic content of teaching and research. In the case of
women, it has been argued here that, on the basis of four general
considerations, the discipline can and should adjust to a set of
issues that have, to date, received little attention.
It is not as if consideration of gender will alter the teaching and
research of international relations as a whole. It will, however, do
more than just add another subject to the list of topics already
considered, since in addition to the specific questions it raises and
the alternatives to established values it suggests, the question of
gender and International Relations will reinforce a shift already
present in much of the literature on transnationalism and
international political economy. This involves asking not only how
states and societies relate to each other, but also how international
processes, be these inter-governmental or not, make themselves
felt within societies. The force of the historical sociological
literature lies in its demonstration of how the processes regarded
as internal to states and economies are to a considerable degree
products of international factors. 36
One of many potential contributions of a gender and Inter-
national Relations approach could be to show how gender relations
in the economy, polity and family are shaped and changed by
processes external to the society in question. This issue could
therefore be part of a broader reorientation of International

Relations towards the study not only of inter-state behaviour but
also of how states and societies interact.
That such a development will pose considerable difficulties in
teaching and research is evident. The most general source of
resistance will be reluctance to accept a general reorientation of
international relations, a curmudgeonly rejection of the implica-
tions of feminism for the international. 37 But there are also more
specific problems, and it may be worth identifying some of them
briefly. The production of a literature on the subject has begun,
but will take time to consolidate itself: yet some materials are
available from related areas - sociology, development studies,
history- and can be used as the bases for initial work. There is also
the question, recurrent in women's studies, of the balance between
autonomy and integration. Should a distinct teaching and research
programme be established, or should this work be integrated into
the broader, established academic structure? A pragmatic initial
response would seem to be that both approaches are needed, with
specialist options and research reinforcing the inclusion of gender
as a regular item in any comprehensive International Relations
course or textbook. 38
Other theoretical problems can be seen as relevant to this topic,
and are well-established points of debate in other areas of social
science. One is the problem of cultural relativism - the claim that
values pertaining to women and other social actors vary among
societies and that it is therefore difficult or impossible to make
general statements about what constitutes discrimination or
domination in different societies. This has arisen directly in
considerations of the position of women in national and religious
contexts. For all the dangers of external misunderstanding, there
may well have been rather too much concession to this, at the
expense of assessing and criticising ideologies and practices that, in
the name of national traditions and authenticity, do oppress
women. A similar tendency operates with other forms of power,
along lines of race, class or age. While an awareness of relativity
and difference is essential to an explanation of how and why
systems of domination originate and are maintained, such a
recognition need not necessarily lead, out of a misplaced anthro-
pological generosity, to denying that forms of oppression do exist
and recur in a wide range of societies and historical contexts.
The other theoretical problem is what inight be termed

precipitate totalisation: that is the tendency, once connections
between different levels of social and political practice have been
established, to see all as the expression of a single mechanism or
process. In this context, assertion of the relation between gender
and international relations does not necessarily lead to the claim
that gender issues constitute the core of international affairs (as if
there needs to be 'one') and the key to understanding the
international arena as a whole, nor does it follow that all aspects of
women's location and experience can be derived from the
international- hot wars or cold war, sovereignty or nationalism,
can be shown to have significant gendered components, without
this implying that gender determines these or that all aspects of
any international event or process are necessarily related to each
other. To argue this, in some feminist reworking of the Hegelian
concept of the totality, would be to distort the case.
At the same time, enough has been done to show that, whatever
distinctions prevail, issues pertaining to women do have a place in
the study of international relations. Much of the resistance to this
linkage stems not from a view of International Relations in
particular, but from a refusal to accept the validity of feminist
concerns in general. As with other disputes on International
Relations and method, it may be best to shift discussion on to this
general terrain rather than trying to resolve it in a necessarily
restricted International Relations context.
A third issue, and one that pertains to broader methodological
debates within IR, involves the relation between this topic and the
debate on epistemology and method raised by IR. Post-modernism
and associated approaches have, as indicated in Chapter 2, a
contradictory import: while providing tools for an innovative
examination of discourses and identities, they also introduce a
randomness of ethic and explanation that is inimical to substantive
analysis and normative engagement alike. In the context of a
widespread interest in post-modernism, feminist theory has been
increasingly influenced by the latter and this has had its impact in
IR, with predictable results. While the authority of traditional
approaches has been weakened, the alternative proposed has itself
become a new orthodoxy, of a vague and often self-defeating kind.
Methodological issues of broad relevance are fought out within the
context of IR; alternative epistemologies are offered, but all that is
provided is confusion; the very ethical assumption on which the

topic began, and on which feminism was initiated, namely a
commitment to some form of emancipation through equality, is
rejected in a frenzy of wordiness and meandering.
Here, in addition to bearing in mind the general criticisms of
post-modernism, as analytic foundation or political position, it is
relevant to bear in mind the particular criticisms made of any
attempt to promote post-modernism as a general approach for
feminists. 39 Those easily scorned as espousing gendered epistem-
ologies or partial remedies may, in the end, have more to offer
than the protagonists of hermeneutic verbosity. To their charge
that all that is being done is 'add women and stir', it might be
replied that their approach comprises an even more unproductive
menu, 'add epistemology and stir'. It would be catastrophic indeed
if by integrating itself with IR, feminism, as explanation and
prescription, was to find itself voided of impact and content by
submission to the banalities of intellectual fashion: the result
would be that, having overcome the denial of conventional IR, it
would be 'hidden' again under the new vapidity.
If these dangers are recognised, they in no way detract from the
possibility, and desirability, of a feminist engagement with IR.
Without any overstatement, it would appear that there is a great
deal of work to be done on women and International Relations. It
can only be hoped that this question will find recognition as an
important and distinct topic within the overall research pro-
gramme of the discipline, and that it will become an established
element in its teaching agenda. Such a recognition is long overdue.
8
Inter-Systemic Conflict:
The Case of Cold War
A Distinct Form of Conflict
The argument of Chapter 5 was based on the proposition that

International Relations encompasses more than relations between
states and indeed more than 'transnationalism', the interaction
and coming together of societies. The 'constitutive' variant of the
concept 'international society' discussed here denotes the manner
in which societies are affected by the very internal structure of
other states and are drawn into particular forms of conflict when
these systems diverge, when, in other words, the international
society is characterised by 'heterogeneity'. The purpose of this
chapter is look in more detail at the workings of such conflict,
'inter-systemic' in the sense that it is between two societies, or
groups of society, based on radically different, and incompatible,
forms of social and political organisation. The main focus will be
on the Cold War of the post-1945 period: but the implications are
broader, and go to the heart of the debate on international society,
and international relations, themselves.
Inter-systemic conflict is a specific form of inter-state and inter-
societal conflict, in which the conventional forms of rivalry -
military, economy, political - are compounded by, and often
legitimised in terms of, an overall divergence of political and social
norms. The conventional forms of competition, including war,
may play a role here, but the competition of values is at least
equally so, and may time and again be the main dimension in
which one party to the conflict prevails over the other. That such
conflict is not specific to the Soviet-Western rivalry of the post-
1945 epoch is evident from such earlier cases as the rivalry of the
Ottoman and Manchu empires with the West, further examples of
170
Inter-Systemic Conflict: Cold War 171
protracted rivalries in which the military and the strategic were

overlain by the challenge which was posed to a system of social and
political organisation. In even earlier periods, the conflicts
between strategic powers, or blocs, defined in religious terms, had
some of the same characteristics.
The picture of a conflict between the 'West' and 'Islam' in the
late twentieth century is a myth since, despite diverse claims to the
contrary religion no longer plays this role; but much of the period
between the seventh and sixteenth centuries took the form of a
triangular inter-systemic conflict framed in religious terms, not
just between Christianity and Islam, but between two rival
branches of the Christian world - the Roman and the Orthodox -
and a succession of Islamic empires based in the eastern
Mediterranean. The Ottoman and Manchu instances, to be
examined at the end of this chapter, provide a comparative
example, but also significant contrasts, with the collapse of the
Soviet bloc.
Theories of Cold War
At first sight the issue of 'inter-systemic' conflict is almost wholly

absent from discussion of Cold War. In the academic and policy-
related literature on Cold War and East-West rivalry since 1945
there have been two main debates: one, a historical argument,
concerning the causes and 'responsibility' for Cold War, the other,
framed partly in the language of the peace movement and partly
within IR itself, on the underlying dynamic of the conflict. The
former debate fell into three main phases - the initial anti-
communist consensus, the 'revisionist' challenge, and a new 'post-
revisionist' consensus. 1 Although developed around the first Cold
War of 1947-53, the same debate, about causes and responsibility,
elaborated simultaneously rather than sequentially, can be
identified with regard to the second Cold War, of 1979-1985. 2 Yet
although rich in historical detail, this debate on Cold War suffered
from two obvious limitations: on the one hand, it arose out of a
specific political conjuncture and was dominated by the concerns
of that situation - as much for the 'revisionists' as for the anti-
communists; secondly, it was conducted in almost complete
innocence of theoretical issues as such, reflecting the empiricism
both of Anglo-Saxon historiography and of the, off-stage, political

debate itself.
The second debate, on the dynamic of East-West conflict,
contained some greater awareness of theoretical issues but in
neither of its two contexts, the peace movement or the IR
literature, was the theoretical underpinning substantially
developed: some specific aspects of the conflict - the role of
ideology, the arms race, crisis management - did receive
theoretical treatment within IR, but not the Cold War as a whole.
The analysis of what Cold War was remained very much at the pre-
theoretical level, in the sense of having implicit rather than explicit
theoretical positions and of failing to ask what the implications of
the Cold War for IR theory as such might be. Abstracting from
this literature, however, this second debate can be said to have
encompassed four main approaches. For sake of convenience, and
at the risk of some foreshortening, these can be categorised as:
realist, subjectivist, internalist, inter-systemic. 3
For realism, and those historical sociologists who have recently
adopted it, the Cold War was a continuation of Great Power
politics, albeit with certain additions such as nuclear weapons,
arms racing and capitalist-communist ideological rivalry. The
assertion of this continuity within international conflict was
facilitated by focusing on the foreign policy of the USSR itself,
which was seen as continuing the foreign goals of the pre-1917
regime, and/or of the USA, which was seen as just another
imperial power, 4 not only vis-a-vis the third world or the
Europeans and Japanese, but also vis-a-vis the USSR.
By 'subjectivist' is meant those theories that analysed the Cold
War in terms of perception and misperception. The IR literature
on perception developed in the 1960s and 1970s in the writings of
sueh people as Janis and Jervis. It suggested that foreign policy in
general, and foreign policy mistakes in particular, could to a
considerable extent be attributed to the perceptions held, indi-
vidually and collectively, by those making foreign policy and by
the populations that influenced or constrained them. This argu-
ment was not specifically directed to discussion of Cold War, but
had implications for it. Whether the argument was explicitly
extended in this way or not, it paralleled and reinforced an
argument common amongst liberal writers on the Cold War, and
on revolutions generally, to the effect that the conflict could be
avoided if only each side had been better informed about the other
(a 'different' policy towards Russia after 1917, China after 1949,
Cuba after 1959, or, for that matter, France after 1789). 5 Such
arguments tended to downplay the necessity of ideological
commitments on either side (to world revolution, solidarity/
rollback, intervention and so forth) and to stress the need for
better information and contact between states supposedly, but not
really, committed to each other's transformation.
The term 'internalist' denotes those approaches that locate the
dynamic of Cold War within rather than between the contending
blocs. This approach has several variants: it can locate the source
of conflict either within the domestic politics and socio-economic
structure of the two major states themselves, and, by extension,
within the other constituent states; or it can do so within the
internationally constituted bloc itself, seen as an ensemble where
Cold War is functional to the maintenance of bloc cohesion and
the hegemony of the dominant states within it.
The most straightforward version of this is Chomsky's 'two
dungeons' thesis, according to which the USA and the USSR
pursued the Cold War in order to discipline their own societies and
their respective junior partners: 'The Cold War is a highly functional
system by which the superpowers control their own domains. That
is why it continues and will continue'. 6 Mary Kaldor's work has a
similar thrust to it. Arguments such as those of Alan Wolfe, which
attribute Cold War to the workings of US domestic politics, are an
alternative version. 7 Michael Cox has, in several articles,
developed an analysis that is rich in diplomatic detail but which,
equally, denies that the Cold War is 'about' anything, other than
the conventional rivalry of two broadly similar, blocs. 8
Many expositions of the 'internalist' thesis focus on the pressure
for confrontation from economic sectors, characteristically the
'military-industrial' complex. E.P. Thompson's theory of
'exterminism' is one of the more elaborate variants of this thesis,
since it sees the arms race not just as the product of what arms
manufacturers themselves want, but of a dynamic that has come to
characterise the societies in question as a whole. 'Internalist'
arguments tend to deny the efficacy of East-West conflict as such
and to imply a degree of homology between the foreign policies
and internal structures of the two blocs. 9
Although mainly formulated in the 1980s, this work had
significant antecedents within the critical approach to society and

to international relations: a classic instance of this was the work of
the American sociologist C. Wright Mills, whose The Origins of
the Third World War, published in 1957, argued that a nuclear war
was increasingly inevitable, not because of relations between the
blocs or developments in the third world, but because of the power
structures within each country. Developing insights first enunci-
ated by Max Weber, on the development of the bureaucratic and
militaristic state as a result of international conflict, Mills, whose
main contribution to sociology was the theory of the 'power elite'
and of the 'military-industrial complex', argued that both camps
were ruled by such elites, which would inevitably bring the world
to war. What was symptomatic in Mills's work was that, as in
Weber, the international was seen as the source of the degenera-
tion of states and the loss of democratic control, and secondly
how, in taking an abstract sociological definition of power elites,
any substantive differences between the two systems were dis-
solved. Hence Mills, like Thompson, while striking a timely
warning as to the dangers of war and uncontrolled military
influence, failed to provide any substantive analysis either of why
or how the two blocs were competing on the international sphere,
and also of what the underlying political and social differences
between them were.
The 'inter-systemic' argument can be quickly distinguished from
all three of the other approaches: 10 in contradistinction to realism
it denies that East-West rivalry is merely a continuation of
traditional Great Power politics, not only by questioning the
validity of this supposedly universal and classical model, but by
allotting a central place in the conflict to the diverse, hetero-
geneous, character of the competing states, at both internal and
international levels; in opposition to theories of misperception, it
asserts that the competing political programmes and ideological
perspectives of the two blocs were to be taken seriously, while not
at face value, and that the states comprising the blocs were, in
broad terms, committed to their realisation; as against the
internalists, the 'inter-systemic' approach asserts that international
conflict did have a reality, in other words that the two blocs were
concerned not just with internal issues, profits, hierarchy or
'order', but also with improving their relative positions vis-a-vis
each other and with prevailing over the other.
Inter-systemic theory can be summarised in terms of three core

propositions: (a) East-West rivalry was a product of conflict
between two distinct social systems; (b) this competition involves a
competitive and universalising dynamic; and (c) it could only be
concluded with the prevailing of one bloc over the other. The term
'system' is not used here to denote the 'international system' in
general, as designated in conventional IR theory, nor 'the Cold
War as system', in the sense of mutual reinforcement characteristic
of the internalists, but to denote the internal organisation of the
societies and polities of each bloc.
There was, consequently, something specific and necessary, an
underlying contradictory and universalising dynamic in East-West
relations. Cold War was, above all, a product of heterogeneity in
the international system- to repeat, in both internal organisation
and international practice - and could only be ended by the
attainment of a new homogeneity. The implication of this was
that, as long as two distinct systems existed, Cold War conflict was
bound to continue: Cold War could not end with compromise, or
convergence, but only with the prevailing of one of these systems
over the other. Only when either capitalism had prevailed over
communism, or the other way around, would inter-systemic
conflict cease.
Although suppressed in most of the historical discussion of the
Cold War, and denied by the biases of realism, this conception of
Cold War was recognised by some of those who participated in it:
on the Soviet side it took a range of forms, from the original
Leninist view of an ongoing process of world revolution, through
Stalin's 'two camps' theory, to the more varied and in its way quite
perceptive Brezhnevite theory of the 'correlation of forces'.
On the Western side, politicians had no difficulty in articulating
a theory of the contest between the 'communist' and 'free' worlds,
but this tended to lead to a set of more immediate, usually
military, implications, and to a repeated exaggeration of Soviet
capabilities and the threat they posed. One exception to this is the
analysis of George Kennan, first formulated in his long telegram of
February 1946 and then published in revised form in 1947 in the
journal Foreign Affairs: 11 this analysis is best known for the policy
of military 'containment' construed as the checking of Soviet
strategic advances, in Europe or the third world. But perhaps its
most important, and in retrospect telling, argument is the
prescription as to how, once containment has been achieved, to

work towards the long-run erosion of Soviet confidence and hence
of the Soviet bloc. In Kennan's analysis the goal is very clear:
strategic containment is the precondition for the ultimate failure of
the communist system, this latter goal to be achieved by the force
of example and by the confounding of revolutionary idealism. He
stresses that the conflict will take a long time:
The Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish

its purposes in a hurry. Like the Church, it is dealing in
ideological concepts which are of long-term validity, and it can
afford to be patient. It has no right to risk the existing
achievements of the revolution for the sake of vain baubles of
the future.
In reply he proposes a strategy equally long-term, and patient, but

definitive in its outcome:
But in actuality the possibilities for American policy are by no

means limited to holding the line and.hoping for the best. It is
entirely possible for the United States to influence, by its
actions, the internal developments, both within Russia and
throughout the international Communist movement, by which
Russian policy is largely determined. This is not only a question
of the modest measure of informational activity which this
government can conduct in the Soviet Union and elsewhere,
although that, too, is important. It is rather a question of the
degree to which the United States can create among the peoples
of the world generally the impression of a country which knows
what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problems of
its internal life and with the responsibilities of a World Power,
and which has a spiritual vitality capable of holding its own
among the major ideological currents of the time. To the extent
that such an impression can be created and maintained, the
aims of Russian Communism must appear sterile and quixotic,
the hopes and enthusiasm of Moscow's supporters must wane,
and added strain must be imposed on the Kremlin's foreign
policies. For the palsied decrepitude of the capitalist world is
the keystone of Communist philosophy. Even the failure of the
United States to experience the early economic depression
which the ravens of the Red Square have been predicting with
such complacent confidence since hostilities ceased would have
deep and important repercussions throughout the Communist
world ... no mystical, Messianic, movement- and particularly
not that of the Kremlin - can face frustration indefinitely
without eventually adjusting itself in .one way or another to the
logic of that state of affairs.
Thus the decision will really fall in large measure in this
country itself. The issue of Soviet-American relations is in
essence a test of the overall worth of the United States as a
nation among nations. To avoid destruction the United States
need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself
worthy of preservation as a great nation (italics added). 12
Shorn of its specific references to the USA, and of its

vainglorious tone, this presented a clear programme for the
conduct of a long-term inter-systemic conflict, based above all on
the competition between two systems and the goal, not of peace or
compromise, but of ultimately prevailing over the other. What is
striking is how this realisation, spelt out in one of the classic
strategy statements of the Cold War, found so little reflection in
the theory of IR or in subsequent reflections on the underlying
character of the conflict.
Sources of Theoretical Resistance
While present in an implicit way in some discussion of the Cold

War, inter-systemic conflict theory was little represented in either
IR literature or peace movement writing. If it draws its most
obvious inspiration from Marxism, it can also be seen as a
continuation of a strain of argument within IR that has little or
nothing to do with Marxism and which stresses the importance of
ideological difference in international conflict. 13 The reasons
operating against its acceptance were several. Itemising them may
help not only to clarify the claims of the 'inter-systemic' approach,
but also to identify what some of the underlying issues within IR
theory raised by this issue may be.
For conventional realist theory, as in Bull and Waltz, the issue
of systemic determination of foreign policy is irrelevant, indeed
technically inconceivable: since all that matters are relations

between states, no such admission of the relevance of internal
processes, causes or consequences, is allowed within such theory.
Relations between 'states' can be analysed irrespective of internal
correlates. Moreover, by positing an abstracted 'international
system' which determines the behaviour of states and imposes
certain rules on component members, realism denies the possibility
of fundamentally variant forms of international conflict.
To argue for inter-systemic theory in its fullest form requires
having an adequate concept of the difference between the systems,
not just in terms of some international slogans and goals, but in
terms of the constitution of the societies themselves and the basis
of their disagreement. Here the very strong resistance of IR theory
both to identifying internal characteristics and to the concept of
'capitalism' becomes relevant: a naive visitor to the field of the
international might think that if anything characterised the
development of the international system over the past five
hundred years it would be this phenomenon. It is at least as
important as war, natio11alism, statehood and the other familiar
terms: yet it is almost never mentioned, except in muffled
formulations about the 'development of the international economy'
and 'industrial society', latterly, 'interdependence'. To develop a
concept of inter-systemic theory involves, however, having some
concept of what constitutes the West at both the internal and
international levels, namely 'capitalism', and of its comparatively
short-lived twentieth-century challenger, whatever the latter may
be called. This is something which can be provided either within
Weberian sociological or Marxist theory, yet, precisely because of
IR's silence, it is almost impossible to do within mainstream
international theory.
Even where the internal is considered relevant, as in foreign
policy analysis, there is little support for the inter-systemic
approach: on the one hand, what are seen as transnational
'linkages' are limited, specific, forms of interaction quite different
from the comprehensive view of inter-systemic interaction
envisaged here, and based on an often flimsy, behavioural,
concept of society; on the other hand, 'empirical' correlations
carried out within foreign policy analysis are supposed to not
confirm any distinct correlations between type of political system
(e.g. monarchical/republican, totalitarian/democratic) and foreign
policy output. Since totalitarian societies can be aggressive or

defensive the issue of systemic determination does not arise. The
alternative explanation would, of course, be that the wrong
questions are being asked.
A theory based on inter-systemic conflict is all the more
unattractive because of what it appears to resemble: it can easily
be assimilated to either, or both, of the paradigms of old Cold War
thinking itself, i.e. dogmatic Soviet conceptions of the 'two camps'
and of a capitalism-socialism conflict, or Western presentations of
the Cold War as a conflict between two rival but morally opposite
political and economic systems, a 'free' world versus one of a
communist dictatorship. The compulsion to distance themselves
from both of these stereotypes does much to explain the espousal
by liberal and peace-movement writers of approaches involving a
degree of causal, and ethical, symmetry i.e. the subjectivist and
internalist. A similar concern can be seen in the liberal writings
that accompanied the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s when it
was suggested, in the face of all evidence, that somehow both sides
had been exhausted by the Cold War and were therefore the
losers: of course the USA had paid the cost, but it was not Soviet
bankers that were coming in to supervise the US transition to
socialism. Those using Marxist categories to explain the Cold War
were almost inevitably assimilated to orthodox pre-1985 Soviet
analyses: 14 this was not only because of bias in those making this
assimilation but also because the theoretical underpinnings of the
Marxist analysis were not made sufficiently clear.
A further inhibiting factor is that one of the central themes of
inter-systemic theory, that Cold War is a product of heterogeneity,
does not necessarily command assent. As against the supposedly
intuitive view that heterogeneity makes for instability and homo-
geneity for stability, there is the counter-view, equally intuitive,
that it is heterogeneity that makes for stability.
In realist theory this informs the view, espoused by Waltz and
others, of the stability of bipolarity. In regard to systemic
heterogeneity it is the assumption implicit in the 'two dungeons'
theory: it is not explicit in most IR theory, since this is only
concerned with relations between states, but in the now fashion-
ably resurrected German theorist Carl Schmitt, who argued the
need for an 'adversary' in political life, domestic and by extension
international, and earlier, in the general thesis popularised by
Arnold Toynbee of 'challenge and response'. 15 Schmitt, like the

inter-systemic theory, has suffered by association, in this case with
Nazism: but, as the presence of this thesis within the benign liberal
and peace-movement writing indicates, his argument has broader
relevance or at least unacknowledged following. It reinforces the
view, initiated by denying that capitalism or communism have any
serious universalising dynamic, that East-West conflict was a
mirage, and was really functional for ruling groups on both sides.
Differing theoretical approaches aside, there are cogent
historical, indeed commonsense, reasons for denying the validity
of the inter-systemic approach. On the one hand, there appears to
be little reason to attribute conflict to the inter-systemic when
modern history is so full of conflicts between homogeneous states:
from the inter-capitalist explosions of 1914 and 1939 to the
disputes and wars of the socialist bloc. On the other hand, the
pattern of post-war alliances, and informal strategic alignments,
suggests that heterogeneity is no obstacle to such collaboration:
thus a capitalist India collaborated with a socialist USSR, while a
socialist China aligned with the USA.
The Salience of Heterogeneity
The difficulties with the inter-systemic approach are, therefore,

considerable: there are at least three major alternative approaches
to analysing Cold War; there are strong reasons, theoretical and
empirical, for rejecting it; it has unsavoury political associations.
Above all, however, it is underdeveloped in its own terms: those
who have espoused it have thrown out occasional arguments as to
its validity and components, or have implied that there is a 'read
off the shelf' theory within Marxism for explaining such a
phenomenon. Once an attempt is made to Jay out what the claims
of the inter-systemic theory are then it becomes evident that even
greater theoretical complexities underlie it and inhibit its adop-
tion. It is, however, only through such a construction and
identification of the broader theoretical implications that the
argument can be taken further. In the light of this discussion, the
inter-system argument would seem to rest on five core proposi-
tions:
(i) The socio-economic heterogeneity of 'East' and 'West', i.e. of

communist and capitalist societies. This pertains, at least, to the
economic and political levels within each state and bloc. The
starting point for the inter-systemic argument is this difference, in
fundamental, constitutive, terms, between the two kinds of society
and polity. This 'difference' may be formulated in Weberian or
Marxist terms, but does involve some conception of the political
and social system as a whole. Constitutional, bureaucratic or
behaviouralist political science approaches, theories based on
convergence, or those which saw the USSR as just another form of
'capitalist' society, deny this heterogeneity and will necessarily
preclude analysis on inter-systemic lines, as will those that, for
diplomatic reasons or out of 'fairness', treat the two symmetrically.
If it is not admitted that the Soviet and US blocs were fundamentally
different in internal constitution then the argument cannot
proceed.
(ii) This socio-economic and political composition must be shown

to be determinant, in a broad sense, of foreign policy and
international relations more generally. There is no 'foreign policy'
as such, but only the foreign policy of specific kinds of state and
society. This thesis of determination in some ways overlaps with,
but is theoretically quite distinct from, that found in foreign policy
analysis with its examination of the domestic determinants of
foreign policy output. The difference lies in the conception of what
constitute relevant domestic determinants, and in the (unstated)
differences in what constitutes the state-society relationship: as in
the discussion of heterogeneity, the discussion inevitably leads
back to the general conception of society and polity.
(iii) The thesis of inter-systemic conflict implies an international-

ising and indeed universalising dynamic within each bloc and
system: in other words, it implies that each bloc is impelled to seek
not only to protect its own state and economy, to maximise its
advantage within the constraints of a 'balance of power', and to
appear to challenge the other for reasons of ideological credibility
within, but to dominate as much of the world as possible, and to
undermine and hopefully abolish the alternative system. Such an
argument goes against the orthodox IR conception of international
relations tending to preserve whether by design or of necessity, a
'balance of power', and also against the liberal assertion that

neither side had any compelling ideological aspirations and that
the conflict was all about power maximisation. Yet, apart from a
rather large amount of historical evidence with regard to the drives
of capitalism, elements of this universal dynamic are recognised in
existing theories: the drive of capitalism to maximise markets and
access to raw materials, the commitments of the USSR to world
revolution, the competition of each for allies in the third world to
enhance their military and political security and strength. As
already noted, Kennan's long telegram acknowledged that both
sides had such an aspiration, and potential.
But these are at best fragments of a broader theory of
universalisation, which is as yet obscure. 16 For example, the drive
of capitalism is not merely economic: otherwise it would have been
quite content to leave the communist states with their political
systems intact, provided trade was conducted between them. This
drive to universalisation is linked to that of heterogeneity: that
each system, beyond any immediate compromises or obstacles,
was committed to the transformation of the other. The least that
can be said about the outcome of the late 1980s is that, at first sight
and more, it lends credence to this. One side did prevail over, and
subordinate, the other.
(iv) Inter-systemic conflict operates on multiple dimensions, not

just that of inter-state relations as conventionally conceived: the
issue of what 'foreign policy' states pursue comprises only a part of
how each of the two socio-economic systems operated internation-
ally. Inter-systemic competition took place at three main levels:
that of inter-state relations as such, i.e. 'foreign policy' conven-
tionally conceived; that of socio-economic interaction more
broadly interpreted to include the actions of entities other than
states/governments, most notably financial and industrial enter-
prises; that of ideological interaction, and in particular the impact
on one communist society of the example, the demonstration effect,
of capitalist others.
A clear example of this triple interaction, with the mutual
reinforcement of each level, was that of FRG-GDR (West
German-East German) relations in the late 1980s, up to and
through the collapse of the East Germany regime in 1989-90: the
project of the FRG as a whole was, in the classic Clausewitzian
wrestling sense, to defeat, not annihilate, i.e. to 'throw down'

(niederwerfen) the GDR. This was inter-systemic conflict in its
rawest form and operated at all three levels: Bonn's policies- the
undermining of the GDR, the mobilisation of a pro-unification
majority within it, the discrediting of any socialist or neutral
option - were accomplished by the pressure on the GDR on the
three levels. In contrast to what conventional realist theory, with
its stress on inter-state conflict, might suggest, the role of the Bonn
Government was perhaps the least important and that of West
German business secondary: the most influential level was the
impact on millions of East Germans of the image they had of the
West and then, once the frontier was opened, of visiting the West,
the Reiseschock ('travel shock'). This demonstration effect was
certainly compounded by the pressures of West German banks
and businesses on the GDR economy, whether or not this pressure
was formally coordinated with Bonn, and the specific actions
taken by Bonn itself: conditionality for economic aid, encourage-
ment through automatic citizenship and welfare benefits to GDR
population to leave, fostering of rumours about imminent collapse
of the GDR economy and so on. It would have been rather
difficult to interpret this instance of inter-systemic conflict without
some reference to the tendency of capitalism to expand, a
tendency realised not just through the actions of states as such but
also through the broader social and ideological interactions. 17
(v) Heterogeneity of internal socio-economic system implies hetero-

geneity of international relations, conceived in terms of broad goals
and mechanisms of internationalisation. The interests of the two
blocs were fundamentally opposed, and the kinds of world they
aimed to create diverged as indicated. From this it followed that
there would be other differences in the foreign policy and
international extension of these systems. This did not necessarily
mean that they pursued different kinds or styles of foreign policy,
i.e. that the instruments, conventions, operating procedures of
foreign policy themselves were heterogeneous. This is left open:
the states involved in the conflict may, or may not, have been
socialised in the realist sense of the term. The argument cannot be
settled by looking at 'socialisation' in the formal sense, of whether
they had the same kinds of diplomatic conventions or respected
sovereignty. The realist argument about 'international society' and
the socialising effects of the system is relevant in limited terms, but

does not answer this broader question.
On the other hand, heterogeneity of goals in general, since it
arises from a heterogeneity of system, is accompanied by a
heterogeneity at least three other levels. First, heterogeneity of
cause - the underlying reasons for the universalising dynamic -
may well be different in different socio-economic systems, being
more or less economic in one, more or less military or political in
the other. Secondly, the mechanisms for, and commitment to,
creating an international homogeneous bloc around a core,
hegemonic, state may well differ, as is at least evident from the
very different political and economic policies of the USA and
USSR within their respective blocs - the forms of integration and
mechanisms of hierarchy were markedly different. Thirdly, the
mechanisms for competition with the other bloc may also be
asymmetrical - this asymmetry reflecting not just differences in
'power' generally conceived, but the varying salience of different
components of a system's modus operandi, e.g. economic,
ideological, military, as reflected at the international level. The
relative balance of economic and military power in the influence of
the Soviet Union and USA was very different, just as was the
degree of direct political control exercised by each over their
respective bloc clients. The competition of blocs may therefore
involve not just a conflict of goals, but a conflict of the reasons for
which, and the mechanisms by which, international relations were
conducted.
Implications
This outline disinterment of the components of the inter-systemic

theory inevitably raises more questions than it answers. Two
points are immediately evident. First, whatever its analytic and
theoretical strengths, inter-systemic theory is far from having
attained adequate development; the appearance of such develop-
ment in earlier Soviet dogma concealed more than it revealed -
not least because of the immanent teleology within its concept of
'correlation of forces', which implied that history was moving
inexorably towards the triumph of the Soviet over the Western
blocs. 18
Secondly, any elaboration of a theory of inter-systemic conflict

entails a broader theoretical framework, loosely derivative of
either Weberian sociology or historical materialism: concepts such
as 'state, 'system', the 'international', while apparently common
currency between mainstream IR and sociology/historical
materialism, are on closer examination not.
More important still, as the above outline makes clear, and not
for reasons of canonical deference, the starting point for any
theory of inter-systemic conflict is not a generic difference in
foreign policy goals or styles, or a divergence derived from geo-
strategic asymmetry, but the difference in the constitution of
society itself, in both domestic and international variants. The
starting point for any related theory of IR is, therefore, the
concept of what in Marxist theory is the 'mode of production' and
of the relations between this and state: without these the theory of
inter-systemic conflict is unthinkable. An ecumenical mixing of
differences between an IR mainstream which precludes such
concepts and these other socio-economic theories is liable to
confuse. There can be no analysis of inter-systemic conflict that
cannot admit the category 'capitalism' and its variously named
antithesis.
If this argument is valid, then in addition to the development of
a theory of international conflict and international relations
generally based on social system, there are at least three other
areas of theoretical development suggested by inter-systemic
conflict theory:
(i) Dimensions and Mechanisms of International Interaction
If, as already indicated, inter-systemic conflict can be seen as

operating on three levels- inter-state, inter-socio-economic, inter-
ideological - then it becomes necessary to analyse how these
interact and how the relative balance shifts from period to
period for any specific state, and as between different kinds of
state.
What is entailed here is nothing less than a proper sociology of
international relations: not in the sense of tacking on some off-the-
shelf IR theory to existing sociology, or of making some broad and
possibly inapposite generalisations about how international
relations have social aspects (law, ideology, convention, etc.), but
in the sense of how examining within an international system,

constituted by different states, the socio-economic determines both
the individual states themselves and, transcending the states, the
system as a whole. In the light of the history of the last five hundred
years, and of the outcome of the Cold War itself, there is a special
need to re-examine and elucidate the universalising drive of
capitalism itself, both in terms of why it seeks to mould the world in
its image, and the variant mechanisms of so doing: if pop music and
T-shirts are the gunboats of the late twentieth century, there is an
underlying continuity in the multi-layered and aggressive drive of
capitalism to destroy and incorporate all rival socio-economic
systems.
(ii) Inter-systemic Conflict and Anti-Systemic Movements
The conflict of social systems, embodied in and mediated through

states (USA, USSR, etc.) in Cold War has been accompanied by
broader movements within and between states directed against
these states and the international orders they embody. In the
course of this century, these have taken a variety of forms
(revolutions, strikes, guerrilla wars, ideological challenges, etc.)
and have been directed against the hegemonic orders in both
blocs.
Three standard analyses of these anti-systemic movements are
available: the conventional IR approach, which subordinates them
to states, and denies their relevance to international relations
except where they receive the backing of states - viz. the almost
complete silence of IR literature on revolutions, and trades
unions; 19 the orthodox Soviet approach which assimilated non-
state anti-systemic movements to the state interests of the USSR
itself, thus dissolving the issues of autonomy and contradiction
involved in the relationship; and the 'world systems' approach
(e.g. that of Wallerstein, Arrighi et al.?0 which sees anti-systemic
movements as the motor of international history and as capable of
overriding the powers and fragmentations of states. In the case of
the latter, and analogous writings from the peace movement, these
anti-systemic movements are seen as directed against what is still
one, homogeneous, system, the divergence of capitalism and
communism being denied. Thus the workers' movements in
Poland and South Africa are part of one 'anti-systemic' dynamic.
(iii) The Comparative study of Inter-Systemic Conflict
The focus of this analysis has been on inter-systemic conflict of the

post-war period, that between the communist and capitalist blocs.
This has certain specific features not found in earlier epochs: the
technological and economic dimensions of its military competi-
tion, the specific ideological forms of hegemony claimed by both
sides, the mobilisation of large masses of a population into systemic
and anti-systemic activity. This particular inter-systemic conflict
would appear to be yielding one other unique feature: namely, the
historically contra-cyclical outcome whereby an already established
system, capitalism, generated and then suffocated its newer-
emerged rival.
Yet in other respects inter-systemic conflict is by no means
specific to the Cold War epoch: the conflicts of societies based on
feudalism and capitalism from the fourteenth century in Europe to
the last redoubts of pre-capitalism in the third world in the late
twentieth century would bear comparative analysis, as would more
specific localised conflicts between slave-owning and free-labour-
exploiting societies. The means by which capitalism has encircled,
undermined and then crushed the Soviet bloc have something in
common with the earlier capitalist assaults on the Chinese and
Ottoman empires, not least in the way alarmed reformers within
the besieged bloc have, in trying to alter their own system in order
the better to compete, accelerated the decomposition of their
social and political systems.
Equally, the economic historians have shown how the inter-
action of the more developed world with the less developed world
can, short of conquest and direct defeat in war, undermine the
weaker states: this was the impact of imperialism even where it did
not engage in direct colonial conquest. The fate of the Ottoman
and Chinese empires in the latter half of the nineteenth century up
to their final disappearances during the First World War are the
two classic cases of this. Defeat in war there certainly was, but
these were not in themselves explanation for decline (although in
the case of the Ottoman Empire the First World War delivered the
coup de grace). The process was a more complex one: defeat in
war on the edge of the imperial territory led to pressure for
administrative and economic reform; an oscillation between
reform and traditionalist reassertion marked state policy in the
decades prior to final demise; the reform process then provoked

greater internal dissension, within the state and in state-society
relations; the gradual intrusion of external trade, via concessions
and market forces, also weakened state power and promoted
social discontent; remoter regions proved harder to govern and
gradually broke away; insurrection (Taiping, the Boxers, the
Young Turks) challenged established authority. 21
It is evident that some of these features of Ottoman and Manchu
decline are present in the collapse of communism. The Soviet
system faced challenge from a rival that was (a) organised on
fundamentally different socio-economic and political principles
and (b) clearly superior to and stronger than it in all key respects,
except for some dimensions of the military. The conflict was,
therefore, both heterogeneous and unequal: the fact that the
USSR was, unlike Turkey or China, able to compete with the
West in certain selected areas of strategic military activity (space,
nuclear weapons) and that it, like the West, had global aspirations,
did not detract from its overall weakness. As in the conflict with
the Ottomans and the Manchus, the process of erosion was
gradual, not cataclysmic, and involved several dimensions:
military, economic, diplomatic. Like the earlier empires, the
Soviet system tried to sustain the military competition by more
intensive but enduringly inefficient mobilisation and concentration
of internal resources, while, at the same time, insulating its own
economy from the goods and practices of the competitor.
Yet, for all the similarities, the differences are greater. In the
first place, the military competition and its impact on the Soviet
system itself was of a different kind, strategically and techno-
logically. Ottoman and Manchu military policies were designed to
prevent the gradual erosion of their imperial territory by hostile
colonial powers and in no way presented a threat to the powers
themselves. There was no equivalent in the Soviet case to the
annexations and conquests that befell the Ottomans from the
1770s and the Chinese from the 1840s.
The greatest loss of the Soviet system, that of China in 1963,
while in some degree a result of Western diplomatic policies that
split the two, did not lead to the immediate annexation of China to
the West and was in any case followed by other advances, military
and strategic, of Soviet power in the third world. The two greatest
military challenges faced by Soviet allies - in Korea and Vietnam -
were both ones in which Soviet allies survived, and in the latter
won outright victory.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s US strategists did begin to talk
of 'eroding Soviet power at the margin', i.e. of encouraging revolt
in Soviet third world allies, notably, Cambodia, Afghanistan,
Nicaragua and Angola. But, draining as these contests were, it was
not here that the cracks later appeared, at the end of the 1980s. In
military-technological terms, the contest was equally different:
here, to a greater extent than in any sphere of competition, the
contest was in some respects an equal one, even as the USA was
able at almost every point to attain technical superiority over the
Soviet Union.
What is most relevant here is that, in economic terms, the
contrasts between the Ottoman-Manchu model and that of the
USSR were substantial. In addition to losing territory outright to
their strategic rivals, the position of the Manchu and Ottoman
empires, even in the territory over which they retained control,
was eroded by the intrusion of goods from the outside world,
which undermined existing social groups and economic systems; in
time, both empires accumulated foreign debt which they had to
meet by allowing concessions and the supervision of their customs
duties by Western officials.
No such processes occurred in the Soviet context. Given the
control by the state of economic activity in these countries, the
introduction of external goods was mediated by the state and had
virtually no impact on employment and status of social groups
within the countries. The role of foreign trade in the Soviet system
and the manner in which it affected that system were fundament-
ally different from that seen in the Ottoman and Manchu cases.
The provision of Western credit and technology, far from eroding
the power of the communist leadership, served to strengthen it
and, so the West at least believed, enhance its military capability.
Such was the control exerted by communist parties that there was
no question of external officials monitoring or affecting its
revenue-collecting and other functions. As far as export earnings
themselves were concerned, they were boosted in the 1970s by
increased prices for oil and gas, the main Soviet exports, whose
prices in the world market multiplied in that decade. If economic
interaction with, and competition from, the West played a part in
undermining the communist system it was not through weakening
state control of the economy, by allowing greater space for

Western economic actors to operate within these societies, or by
altering domestic patterns of production and distribution. It was
not the market in any direct sense that did it.
Only spasmodic mention has been made of the outcome of the
Cold War, with the rapid demise of Soviet power in the late 1980s.
This will be examined in more detail in Chapters 9 and 10. It
would, however, appear plausible to argue that in certain
important respects this bore out the suggestions of inter-systemic
conflict theory: first, in that the collapse of communism came not
through the conventional mechanism of inter-state conflict,
namely war, nor through the erosion of the Soviet bloc's territory
by Western military or commercial pressure, but rather with the
undermining of the system via the demonstration effect of Western
success In the social, economic and political fields; 22 secondly, that
the form in which the Cold War ended was not that of a balance of
power, or of a mutual exhaustion, but of the prevailing of one bloc
over the other, in other words a systemic victory. Other
interpretations of this outcome, and indeed of the underlying
character of the Cold War, are certainly possible: the hope must,
however, be that at least - even if rather late in the day - the
underlying theoretical assumptions -and implications of this, the
overriding dimension of international conflict in the post-1945 era,
are examined.
9
A Singular Collapse: The
Soviet Union and Inter-
State Competition
New Light on Old Questions
Chapter 8 provided a discussion of the Cold War itself and its

underlying dynamic. The collapse of the Soviet system within the
USSR and internationally in the late 1980s, in addition to its
manifold implications for global politics and policy, raised a range
of further issues within social and international theory of a
stimulating and as yet unresolved kind which will be examined
here. The first question confronting any analysis of this pheno-
menon is that of explanation, of providing an account that
provides reasons, weighted and interrelated, of why a specific
political and socio-economic system, one that was in broad terms
equal to its rival in military terms, should have collapsed as it did,
rapidly and unequivocally, and in the absence of significant
international military conflict. 1
Inexorably, this analytic question raises at least two others. The
first, little voiced in these times but of more than arcane interest, is
whether this collapse was inevitable, whether communism in the
Soviet variety was bound to fail sooner or later, or whether with
different fortune, policies or leadership, it could have continued
and even expanded or prevailed on a world scale -whether it was
always a blind alley or a contingently thwarted attempt to create
an alternative, non-capitalist, system. 2 The other, pertinent to
both explanation and assessment of communism's overall record,
is when and how the terminal crisis set in, whether it can be dated
to specific decisions, mainly those of the post-1985 leadership in
191
the USSR, or whether its decline was more prolonged, deriving

from, say, the visible onset of economic 'stagnation' in the mid-
1970s, or from the failure to democratise and reform the economy
in the early 1960s, or whether it was indeed a long-run conse-
quence of the system of command and terror created by Stalin in
the 1930s. Even if it is argued that in the long run communism
could never have 'worked', that it was necessarily doomed, the
timing and manner of its demise were not and require specific
analysis.
Challenging as these are, and informed as any answers must be
by conceptual and theoretical assumptions, whether explicit or
not, these historical questions are necessarily distinct from another
set of concerns raised by the communist collapse. The very variety
and bewildering speed of the recent changes, and the light they
cast on what had previously happened in these societies, constitute
a laboratory of uncontrolled social and political processes relevant
to the evaluation of conflicting theories. Among many, it is
possible to mention four processes which pertain to the interaction
of states and the international system; they are at the same time
relevant to the evaluation of states, state-society interactions and
the forms and limits of state capacities. One, the nature of Cold
War and of its underlying inter-systemic character, has already
been addressed, in Chapter 8. Here it is possible to examine three
other such broad issues: the patterns of transformation from above
and the role of international factors in shaping and limiting it; the
possibilities and prospects for a hitherto unique transition, that
from communism to capitalism; and the variant dimensions of
international competition and their role in the Soviet collapse.
Transformation from Above
The fate of communism is a major case for evaluating the thesis

that the constitution of revolutionary states involved a strengthen-
ing of state control - of an intervention in society - and did so to a
considerable degree in response to international pressures. 3
While, to varying degrees, communist regimes issued from
insurgent revolutionary movements, and were, in their initial
periods at least, based upon mass mobilisations and some popular
consent, they all became systems in which policy was decided by a
The Soviet Union and Inter-State Competition 193
small political elite. The capacities, methods and goals of these

elites were in part a result of their own, teleologically conceived,
goals, but were also to a great extent conditioned by international
factors: the goal of rivalling and supposedly overtaking capitalism,
imitation and collaboration with other Communist Party leader-
ships, in Eastern Europe after the Second World War the support
and control by the USSR of the local parties, and the orientation
and mobilisation of domestic resources to defend a 'socialist camp'
against external challenge, whether real or invented.
The communist leaderships were therefore engaged in a project
that was both national and international: it was international as a
result of systemic pressure, from other states, but also ideologic-
ally, in its own right, as an attempt to constitute a society that was
exemplary on an international scale, and to promote similar
movements in other countries. Yet if the overall failure of
communism must include discussion of how it failed to spread
world-wide, the starting point of analysing why the regimes
collapsed in the late 1980s needs to be the record of internal, top-
down, transformations which the regimes promoted.
These elites, present in the central committees and politburos of
the ruling parties, sought to transform their societies in accordance
with a theoretical blueprint of where socialist society should be
going. We now know that such a project is a failure, not only in the
sense that the goal towards which these societies were supposedly
proceeding was never reached, but also because much of what had
apparently been achieved was impermanent and superficial. If the
claims that 'developed socialism' or some other sort of more
perfect society had been reached were false, so too were the
apparently less apologetic claims that these societies, for all their
imperfections, were in some historical, and implicitly teleological,
sense 'in transition' to some new socio-economic model and
represented some permanent move beyond what capitalism had
provided or could provide.
This lack of permanency is as true for attempts to create a viable
and self-sustaining planned economy, as it is of those to forge a
politically viable one-party system, and for attempts to reform
attitudes to major areas of ideological importance, notably work,
gender, religion, ethnicity. The simplest explanation of the
collapse is to say that such a project was, in an absolute sense, a
'failure': this is the conclusion which many in the communist
countries now draw, as those who deny the efficacy of 'social

engineering' have always done. There are, however, reasons for
resisting such a conclusion. In terms of evaluating the capacities of
states to transform society from above, the record is not as
absolute.
First, it is far too early to see how much of the legacy of
communist rule will in fact endure and whether some of it may not
in fact survive. Secondly, it would be mistaken to take as evidence
of the failure of communism the emergence of forces that appear
to mark a return to pre-communist forms of behaviour, since many
of these have a character that has been shaped by the very impact
of communist transformation - ethnic conflict being an obvious
case. Similarly, as many who analysed the emergence of Gorbachev
have shown, the change in Soviet society was in some respects a
product of the very achievements of communism - expansion in
education and urbanisation being obvious contributory factors. 4
Thirdly, even if much or all of that which is associated with
communist rule does disappear, say in the space of a decade or
two, the historical fact of the communist achievement over at least
some decades will remain: this is evident in socio-economic
transformation, the raising of living standards and the imple-
mentation of a widespread social welfare system, the sustenance
and reproduction of a political system and, not least, a consider-
able success in the most testing area of all, inter-state competi-
tion.
It may be that the success of the latter - Soviet victory in the
Second World War, plus four decades of rivalry with the West
thereafter - itself inflated the illusion of communism's overall
efficacy, at home and abroad. But the record of inter-state
competition alone would suggest that the characterisation of the
communist record as a 'failure' is simplistic. Such a verdict would
have come as rather a surprise to, for example, the 250,000
Germans captured at Stalingrad as it would have to military
planners in the Pentagon faced with Soviet space advances in the
late 1950s or missile developments during the 1970s and early
1980s.
Assessment of why communism 'failed' involves, therefore,
looking at both its internal and external records even as far as state
performance and capacity is concerned. This involves a dis-
aggregation of different kinds of inter-state and inter-societal
competition: in the more conventional, military, dimension of

international competition communism was reasonably successful-
not only in the Second World War, but in subsequent Great Power
arms races and third world strategic competition; its failure at the
internal socio-economic level was, however, also an international
one, since it involved not an absolute failure but a comparative,
perceived, failure to match the performance of the competition. It
will be suggested that a central question in analysing the collapse
of the Soviet system is how, and when, this perception of
comparative socio-economic failure came about, at both leader-
ship and mass levels. Given the compulsion to compete, a result
both of a general systemic compulsion to do so and of the
particular ideological commitment to competition inherent in
communist ideology, and given the near impossibility of war, the
comparative domestic record of communism compared with its
main capitalist alternatives became the key dimension of rivalry
and ultimate demise.
The Transition from Socialism to Capitalism
The collapse of communism as a socio-economic system involves

what is, in effect, the transition from one socio-economic system,
in Marxist terms, from one mode of production to another. 5 What
that 'non-capitalist' mode was, and how far it had realised its
potential, is the subject of much debate: all we can do here is use
working definitions; but if the agonies of the current transition
make nothing else clear it should at least be that this system was in
fundamentals different from capitalism. It is, moreover, evident
that, as in the case of other transitions, the form, pace and
outcome of 'transition' cannot be decided by uniquely internal
factors, and that, in each country and in the post-communist world
as a whole, international factors play a major role.
The end of communism has involved a double disillusionment:
first, the realisation that the prevailing command economy, based
on centralised planning and the predominance of the state sector,
could not be expected to continue because of its increasingly
evident difficulties - what these 'difficulties' were is something to
which we shall return later; but secondly, that this system could
not be maintained in a reformed, liberalised, version- the fate of
Yugoslavia and of the new economic mechanism in Hungary was

indication of that. 6
If the Soviet leadership under Brezhnev held to the former
illusion, Gorbachev appears to have entertained the second for the
first few years of his period in office, before accepting the
impossibility of a reformed centralised system, a 'regulated
market' in the communist sense of the term, in 1990. Just as he
came into office believing in the one-party system and the 'leading
role' of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) and in
the success of the Leninist policy on the nationalities, so it took
some time before he realised that the economic system as a whole
needed transformation, and it required even longer for many
members of the CPSU to come to this conclusion as well. 7
The mere acceptance of this inevitability is not, however,
sufficient to ensure that such a transition takes place in the way its
proponents would like to see. History is not without cases of
transitions from one socio-economic system to another, but there
has not to date been one of this kind, from a centrally planned to a
free market system. Certain factors favour such a process: the
educational and social strengths of the societies in question, the
relative willingness of the advanced capitalist countries to provide
assistance through state and private channels, the probable
decrease in inter-state competition, the availability of an altern-
ative, and comparatively viable, model.
The difficulties are, however, evident: lack of capital, legal and
administrative context, entrepreneurial and other personnel, as
well as the conflicting pressures of political accommodation and
economic change. The end of communist rule has introduced a
new period of political, social and ethnic diversity in these
societies, producing struggles that will affect how, and how far, a
post-communist system is created: the social conflicts in Poland
and the GDR alone in the first half of 1990 indicate that no simple
'planned' or 'managed' transition can occur. Inter-state competi-
tion in the narrow sense may well decline, but inter-social conflict
may well not.
If history has any lesson to offer, it is that, in addition to the
character and relative strength of social forces within these
countries, the international character of this transition is of great
importance. In a broad historical scale, it is possible to distinguish
between what one can roughly call self-determined transitions, i.e.
ones such as that from feudalism to capitalism in Europe, which

happened at a pace and through processe~ largely generated from
within the societies in question, and imposed transitions, resulting
from the impact upon weaker, less developed societies, of stronger
ones, as in the colonial encounter.
The former were, we hardly need reminding, of an often
protracted and sanguinary character, from the wars of late
mediaeval Europe to what Arno Mayer has aptly termed the
'thirty years' war of the early twentieth century, that of 1914--45;8
yet imposed transitions were even more costly and disabling, since
they involved genocide, the enslavement of subject peoples, the
extermination of indigenous societies, and, not least, the
apparently chronic if not eternal locking of subjugated peoples
into a position of inferiority within the world system. 9
The aspiration of many in Eastern Europe and the USSR is that
they become like Western Europe in a relatively short time-frame,
of five to ten years. Many in the USSR now express their
aspiration as being that their country become in some generic
sense 'civilised'. The reality may be one of enduring political
conflict, on social and ethnic grounds, and a cycle of Latin-
American-style instability at both political and economic levels. If
the international precludes long-term heterogenicity, it simul-
taneously inhibits successful imitation. In the aftermath of Marxist
regimes, these societies would appear to vindicate the Marxist
theory of capitalist development as both combined and uneven.
It is here that it becomes possible to address a question of both
historical and theoretical importance, namely how far and in what
ways external competition contributed to the evolution and final
collapse of the communist system. That system was not destroyed
by war, nor was its collapse solely exogenous. Nor can the
outcome be understood solely by looking at states. But, in ways
that require some greater examination, external forces, including
economic ones, did contribute to the final collapse of 1989.
Various factors in inter-state competition will be examined: the
conclusion will be that, above all, it was neither of these but
competition in the fields of perceived economic and ideological
performance that determined the outcome.
Mention has already been made in Chapter 8 of the record of
inter-state competition between communist and capitalist states,
and of the need to distinguish between different dimensions of this
competition in order to ascertain why the communist system

failed. In the light of wpat the historical sociologists have written,
there are certain obvious starting points: war itself, the pressure on
state-society relations of the need to mobilise domestic resources
in preparation for possible war, the formation and deformation
of domestic institutions as a result of external competition. It
is not necessarily war itself, but also the costs of past wars and the
increased pressures placed by the concern with new ones that can,
as in France after 1763, lead to the increased tensions within and
ultimately to collapse of a political and social system. 11
International Factors and Cold War
Mention has already been made of the international factors

involved in the collapse of communism, and of those associated
with the fates of the Ottoman and Manchu empires, i.e. those
derived from the record of anterior interactions of heterogeneous
and unequal systems. The other set of international factors often
cited in connection with the fall of communism are more recent
and more singular, those which are commonly held to be
responsible for the collapse of the communist regimes, and in
particular for the crisis of the USSR, in the late 1980s. These
revolve around the argument that in one way or another the
pressure that the West placed upon the communist system from
the mid-1970s onwards, embodied in the policies of the Second
Cold War, was such that the Soviet system could not endure.
Breaking this general argument down, three specific factors are
often cited: the burden of the arms race, the economic and NATO
technological embargoes and the anti-communist guerrilla move-
ments in third world Soviet allies. On their own, or in some kind of
combination, these were, it is frequently argued, the forms of
international competition and pressure that brought the USSR to
its knees.
The Arms Race
Enough is now known for us to be able to chart the history and

significance of the East-West arms race to a reasonably satis-
factory extent. In summary form, its record was as follows:
(i) From the late 1940s onwards the USSR and the USA were
engaged in an arms race, conventional and nuclear, involving
growing expenditures, and a technological race, in which, for all
major dimensions except space in the late 1950s, tne USA was in
the lead, in the technological field, and remained, in most
dimensions, in the lead in the quantitative domain. 12
(ii) Despite this US lead, the relative burden on the USA was
significantly less, representing between 5 per cent and 10 per cent
of GNP (Gross National Product), whereas for the USSR arms
expenditure represented between 10 per cent and 20 per cent
throughout this period - some Russian officials now say it was as
high as 25 per cent.
(iii) Despite the lack of a direct US-Soviet military confronta-
tion, conventional or nuclear, this arms race represented, in a
Clausewitzian sense, a continuation of politics by other means: it
reflected a search for an elusive but strategically meaningful
measure of 'superiority' over the other, it embodied a pursuit by
both sides of prestige and status in the international arena, and it
constituted a means of pressure on the budget and hence on the
state-society relationship within the other. 13
Given the burden on the USSR, its inability to compete with the
USA, and the evident Clausewitzian rationales of the arms race, it
is frequently argued that it was this race which forced the USSR
into strategic retreat in the mid-1980s.
At least three variants of this argument can be noted: an
economic one, that the level of expenditure on arms and the
diversion of resources to the military sector were such that the
USSR could not continue to compete, and needed a drastic
reduction in military expenditure in order to divert resources for
domestic economic reorganisation; a technological argument, that
it was the continued US lead, acutely represented in the early
1980s by two developments, SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) and
the cruise missile, which forced the Soviet leadership to realise
that it could not continue to compete; and a political argument,
that the dangers of nuclear war and the costs involved forced the
CPSU to abandon the idea of the world as one divided between
two camps, locked in social conflict, in favour of a stress on
universal human values and the common interests of human
kind.
All three of these are, in varying degrees, found in the writings
of Soviet and Western writers and each must certainly have played
a role. Gorbachev himself consistently evoked the third, political,
argument: while the appeal to 'universal' values has a long history
in Soviet- and before that- Russian thought, the power of nuclear
weapons and the accident at Chernobyl in 1986 certainly served to
reinforce this awareness of the dangers of nuclear energy and, by
extension, nuclear weapons.
Important as it is, there are significant reasons for qualifying the
import of the arms race explanation as the major factor behind the
Soviet collapse. Certainly, the economic argument must have
considerable force: indeed the very quantitative figure of 10 per
cent or 20 per cent of GNP being spent on defence understates the
qualitative and distorting impact, with the allocation of the best
administrative and scientific personnel and of key material
resources to this sector.
On the other hand, military expenditure as 10 per cent or more
of GNP is far from being an adequate explanation for the failings
of the Soviet economy. Israel and Taiwan had comparable defence
allocations in the same time period, but enjoyed higher standards
of living and greater rates of growth. 14 Moreover, the very high
rate of military expenditure as a percentage of GNP is but another
way of saying that GNP itself was rather low - the figures for
overall expenditure as between the US and USSR show that in
absolute terms the USA was outspending the USSR. 15
The focus must, therefore, be as much on the efficiency and
allocative mechanisms of the civilian sector as on the claim of the
military on GNP: had the Soviet GNP been rather higher and had
the remaining 80 per cent of the Soviet economy been more
effidenify organised, the 'burden' of military expenditure would
have been less and would, given reasonable efficiency and growth
rates, have represented a lower percentage of GNP anyway.
Similar problems arise with the technological argument: the
assumption of much analysis of the arms race, and of the
conventional Soviet approach prior to this, was that, more or less,
the USSR was compelled by the necessities of inter-state competi-
tion to match the USA in qualitative and quantitative terms.
Previously, the USSR had imitated US advances - as in the
development of multiple-warhead missiles after 1972 and of a
submarine-launched intercontinental capacity: the challenge of
SDI and of cruise missiles were that the USSR had no comparable
riposte and that there was no evident antidote which it was capable
of producing.
Yet the USSR could have, without a mimetic rivalry, produced
counter-measures to these US challenges - low-flying strategic
missiles plus a system of decoys would have done much to in-
validate SDI, even had it proved viable. A policy of what was
termed 'minimum deterrence' would have made a substantial
difference and enabled the USSR to escape from its self-defeating
pursuit of 'rough parity'.
The third argument relevant to the arms race, the political
argument about the threat to humanity of nuclear weapons, had
great validity in itself and it is to the credit of Gorbachev that he
articulated it more clearly than anyone else: but it does not entail
the overall process of political and social change within the USSR
that accompanied the adoption of /these universal values
associated with 'new thinking'. It is conceivable that the USSR
would have opted out of the nuclear arms race as previously
pursued but insisted on preserving its distinctive political and
socio-economic system. To explain the latter involves looking
beyond the realm of the arms race and its economic, technical and
political costs.
Economic Pressures
The second set of factors commonly adduced to explain the Soviet

retreat is the economic, and in particular the impact on the USSR
of Western embargoes and restrictions in the field of high
technology. It is worth repeating here that this line of argument
runs counter to what would hitherto have been taken to be the
impact of international trade upon a distinctive system: in the
latter case it would be assumed that increased trade would
undermine the other system and so contribute to its demise,
whereas in this East-West contest it was argued that trade would
benefit the rival bloc and its demise be hastened by denying it such
interaction. Most post-war discussion of the relationship between
trade and security in the East-West context operated with the
assumption that increased commercial interaction between the two
blocs would contribute to the stability of the Soviet bloc: the
argument, as it developed in the 1970s, was between those who
believed that greater trade, by making the Soviet Union more
secure, would reduce areas of conflict between it and the West,

and those who thought it would encourage combative behaviour.
If the former view, drawing on theories of 'interdependence', was
dominant in the early 1970s, it was the latter view that prevailed in
the period of the Second Cold War.
On the basis of the partial evidence available, it would appear
that economic interaction and pressure of various kinds both
contributed to the collapse of the communist system, but that the
most important factor was not the vulnerability of the centrally
planned system to it, so much as its inability to make use of the
advantages which trade with the capitalist world brought.
In the case of certain Eastern European countries - Poland is
the most striking example- the opening up to the West in the early
1970s had short-term gains, in terms of availability of consumer
goods and investment, but led to a longer-run crisis, with foreign
debt and increased pressure on domestic earnings once debt-
repayment became necessary. The centrally planned economic
system could not make use of such external support adequately to
develop its own economy, and ended up being trapped by its
international commitments.
In the case of the USSR, all the evidence suggests that
straightforward commercial interaction with the capitalist world
had the effect of strengthening the existing system in the short run:
most obviously, higher oil prices bought time in the 1970s and
wheat imports provided a means of off-setting failures in agri-
culture. The rise in the price of oil in the 1970s gave the USSR a
windfall profit for much of the decade: however, as Soviet writers
have recently pointed out, the longer-run consequences of these
profits were inhibiting, since they enabled the central planners and
managers to postpone changes that might otherwise have had to be
introduced more rapidly.
The same applied in the field of technology: the record of
technological innovation in the USSR is by no means as bleak as is
often suggested, but there is no doubt that most of the major
technological innovations of recent decades originated in the west.
Here the USSR was at a disadvantage, in two respects, the second
of which was probably more important than the first. Self-
evidently, it did not make many major innovations itself and was
therefore compelled, in the civilian and military spheres, to copy
or simply steal new technologies from the capitalist world. The
degree of Soviet insulation from the international market was

never as great as conventional images sugge.st: the industrialisation
of the 1930s relied heavily on capital goods imports from Britain
and Germany; the history of Soviet aerospace is of reproduction of
Western aircraft and technologies. Yet in this pursuit of techno-
logical development, the USSR was always behind.
Even more important, however, it was unable to make proper
use of the technologies it did have: there was little interaction
between the military and civilian sectors; the system of central
planning contained built-in disincentives for innovation and
encouraged the use of inefficient and traditional methods of
production; political and ideological constraints inhibited the use
of information technology throughout the system. The pattern of
'conservative modernisation' identified as endemic to the centrally
planned ~conomies operated in this regard. 16 It was for this reason
above all that the third industrial revolution, of microtechnology
and computerised precision engineering, which began in the early
1970s, outstripped it more than ever.
The role of economic pressure and its political impact is two-
sided even when it comes to the embargoes. Here it has been
argued that Soviet behaviour in the international arena was
affected by Western restrictions, both those of a strictly national
security kind, through CoCom (the Co-ordinating Committee on
East-West Trade), and broader political embargoes announced in
the wake of Afghanistan. The former, it was said, would make it
more difficult for the USSR to compete in the arms race, the latter
would act as disincentives for unwelcome Soviet foreign policy
actions. Given the degree to which the USSR protested about
these restrictions, it would seem that their impact was consider-
ableY
Yet these pressures in themselves can hardly explain the change
in Soviet orientation from the mid-1980s onwards: the USSR,
faced with a dire technological lag in the military sphere, could
have made substantial concessions, such as withdrawing the SS-20s
or cancelling the SS-18 strategic missile, without placing their
overall strategy in question; in the short run at least, they did not
respond to Western political sanctions by making major foreign
policy concessions and were indeed more intransigent up to 1985
than had hitherto been the case. The very same factors that
diminished the import of Western commercial and technological
impact served to lessen the impact of their withdrawal: the

centralised political and economic system could absorb the shocks
as well as it could inhibit the diffusion of new technologies.
Erosion of the Bloc
A third major factor adduced to explain the retreat of Soviet

power was the cost of supporting its third world allies, at both the
economic and military levels. Numerous reasons for such an
explanation suggest themselves: Soviet writers themselves
complained openly about the costs, economic and diplomatic,
of backing third world allies and reversed the earlier
Khrushchevite view that the national liberation and third world
revolutionary movements made a positive contribution to the
power of the USSR; 18 the concept of 'imperial overstretch' would
seem to apply here and provide a comparative perspective on the
Soviet retreat; the very character of Soviet relations with third
world allies, resting as they did on substantial economic subsidies
in return for political and strategic rewards, made this set of
relationships especially burdensome; for US strategic planners in
the early 1980s the weakest link of the Soviet system lay in the
third world and this is why there evolved the 'Reagan Doctrine' of
support for anti-communist guerrilla movements.
On closer examination, however, the pressure of third world
commitments may have been different and in some regards less
than at first sight appeared. The greatest cost to the USSR of its
third world commitments was in the diplomatic field - in the way
that Soviet support for revolutionary allies and movements
worsened US-Soviet relations and, with the invasion of
Afghanistan, provided a means through which the West could for
the first time break the USSR's relationship with the third world as
a whole.
The other factors normally adduced, economic and military,
may well have been less significant. First of all, the figures for
Soviet 'aid' to the third world comprise a variety of forms of
support, including, in the case of the largest commitment- Cuba-
major long-term trading agreements that gave Cuba far better
terms of trade than it could have got on the world market (higher
prices for sugar, lower for oil) but were not net transfers of
resources in the ordinary sense. In the case of Cuba there were
benefits to the USSR- getting sugar and nickel that could be paid
for in rubles, rather than having to pay in hard currency; in other
cases, the third world ally was able to provide the USSR with
valuable imports- Afghan gas being one example. Secondly, and
despite current Soviet overstatement of their aid record, the
amount of aid, even on an extended definition, was in comparative
terms very low- 0.25 per cent of GNP, roughly equivalent to the
US record. 19 Politically convenient within the USSR as it may
have become to blame third world allies, who certainly were
mismanaging their economies, for the economic woes of the
USSR, this was hardly a major factor in the economic crisis of the
Soviet system.
As with military expenditure within the USSR itself, the focus of
criticism must go back to the overall system of planning and
production and the inefficiencies it contained, and which were,
incidentally, reproduced by Soviet aid programmes within third
world states themselves. The strategic cost of sustaining third
world allies in the 1980s was certainly rising, as a result of the
'Reagan Doctrine': but if the purpose of the anti-communist
movements was to weaken the USSR at its most vulnerable point
this turned out not to be the case. One of the major reasons for
Soviet and Western involvement in Afghanistan was the
demonstration effect of a ruling communist party being over-
thrown: the impact on Eastern Europe of Kabul falling would,
both sides believed, be potentially enormous. Yet in the end it was
not in Nicaragua nor Afghanistan that Soviet allies were first
overthrown, but in Eastern Europe itself. It was what happened in
Warsaw, Berlin and Prague that did so much to affect develop-
ments in Managua, Aden and Kabul, and not the other way
around.
A Comparative Failure
The argument so far has identified two categories of external

factor, the traditional-imperial, discussed in Chapter 8, and the
more recent and specifically East-West Cold War ones, discussed
here, which can be considered to have played a role in eroding and
undermining Soviet power. While both categories have some
explanatory power, reasons have been suggested as to why these
may prove inadequate in themselves. If this is so, then it pushes

the argument towards a re-examination of the reasons for the
collapse of Soviet power, at both historical and theoretical levels:
i.e. a re-examination both of what actually happened, and of how
our conception of inter-state competition may need modifying in
the light of the Soviet case.
The phenomenon that needs explanation is that an international
system of states collapsed in the absence of the most evident forms
of threat: it was not defeated in war (even in Afghanistan); it did
not face political challenges from below that it was unable to
contain - Poland being the only, partial, exception; it was not,
despite its manifold economic and social problems, unable to meet
the economic levels that its citizenry had become accustomed to. It
did not, therefore, 'collapse', 'fail', 'break down' in any absolute
sense. What occurred, rather, was that the leadership of the most
powerful state in the system decided to introduce a radically new
set of policies, within the USSR and within the system as a whole:
it was not that the ruled could not go on being ruled in the old way
so much that the rulers could not go on ruling in the old way. The
question is what it was that led these rulers, who cannot be accused
of having in the past lacked a desire to retain power or of being
initially covert supporters of the West, to introduce the changes
they did.
Two kinds of reason, one endogenous and the other exogenous,
seem to have led to this conclusion. They can be termed, in
summary form, as socio-economic paralysis and lack of inter-
national competitiveness. The paralysis was evident in a wide
range of spheres: falling growth rates, rising social problems,
growing corruption and disillusionment, ecological crisis. Not only
could the system not go on reproducing the rates of growth and
improvement in welfare provision characteristic of earlier phases-
the 1930s, the 1950s- but it seemed to have run out of steam in a
comprehensive manner. These phenomena were often referred to
in the Soviet literature of the late 1980s as 'stagnation', yet in many
ways this was a simplistic term: 20 it understated the degree to which
there was continued progress in some spheres, not least the
political; it still contained within it the teleological assumption that
the system could, under other circumstances, have continued to
grow and develop.
Most important, however, 'stagnation' left out what was in
many ways the vital factor in forcing the Soviet leadership, faced
with this trend, to introduce change, namely the awareness of the
system's comparative failure vis-a-vis the West. It is here, above
all, in the perceived inability of the Soviet system to catch up, let
alone overtake, the West that the central aspect of the Soviet
collapse may be seen. It was a failure to compete internationally
that led to the post-1985 changes in the USSR: once begun, an
attempt to reform the system the better to survive and compete
quickly capsized into the failure to save the state as such.
The awareness of the system's inability to compete in the 1980s
was the final in several stages of such loss of hope. The first,
historical, disappointment was that immediately after 1917 when
the Bolsheviks realised that their revolution would not be
reproduced in Germany. This realisation led to a double redefini-
tion of strategy - temporary abandonment of the idea of world
revolution, proclamation of the idea that a socialist regime could
be built in the USSR. With the victories in the Second World War
and the increase in the number of third world pro-Soviet allies it
appeared for the 1950s and 1960s as if the initial encirclement of
the USSR could be overcome concomitant with the development
of socialism within the USSR itself. The successes of post-war
reconstruction and space technology in the 1950s seemed to
confirm this: hence the new, secularly optimistic, programme of
Khrushchev which combined continued rivalry with the West in
the third world with a policy of socio-economic development
designed to 'catch up with and overtake' the West in two decades.
It would seem, difficult as it is to believe now, that this
perspective, modified by Brezhnev, dominated Soviet thinking
until the early 1980s: there were continued advances in the third
world, the USSR attained 'rough parity' with the USA in the arms
race, and at home it was official policy to state that the USSR was
now at a new state, a stage of 'developed socialism'.
The reality was, however, rather different, as each of the major
areas of inter-state and inter-bloc competition showed. In the most
public and privileged area of competition, the military, the USSR
was, as we have seen, always inferior, in numbers and quality,
except for its conventional strength in Eastern Europe. In the
early 1980s it faced new challenges which it was both forced to
accept and constitutionally unable to respond to, and it lacked
anything like the global deployment capabilities of the USA and
its allies. If this was the area where the Soviet Union was to
compete the most, it was evidently not doing anything like well
enough.
In the second place, the international system created by the
USSR was markedly weaker quantitatively and qualitatively than
that created by the West. Not only was the international capitalist
market far stronger in terms of economic output, technological
change, and numbers of countries included within it, but its degree
of integration was greater: one of the paradoxes of planning within
the USSR and the Soviet international system more generally was
its inability to integrate sectors beyond giving them separate, if
supposedly co-ordinated, production targets. In the military
sphere a similar disparity and qualitative inferiority prevailed in
the comparison between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. For all the
talk of constituting a new world order, the Soviet one was less
integrated and much weaker overall. 21 In many respects, not least
innovation and pricing, it remained dependent on the capitalist
system, and ineffectually imitative of it.
This failure to compete in international terms would, in itself,
have been a major problem, given the fact that underlying East-
West rivalry and Cold War was an attempt by both sides to provide
a new basis for an international order and to demonstrate the
superiority of the one over the other. But this external blockage,
one going right back to 1917 and only obscured by subsequent
international triumphs, was compounded by the internal limits of
the system in many spheres: the failure to match levels of output in
the West, the growing gap in living standards between developed
socialist and developed capitalist states and, obscured by rhetoric
about 'socialist' democracy, the contrast between a substantial
degree of democratic success in the West and centralised political
control in the East. Had the USSR been able to rival the West
successfully in other spheres these internal deficiencies, those
denoted by 'stagnation', might have been concealed the longer,
but it was the failure at the international level that forced the
leadership to face up to them.
Here we come to a central feature of the collapse: almost
impossible to believe as it may now be, it would seem that up to
the early 1980s this contrast in internal achievement was hidden
from, or at least not recognised by, most Soviet observers, in the
leadership or elsewhere. The underlying self-confidence of the
Soviet system, a product of the revolution's historic claims and of

victory in the Second World War, seemed to have lasted up to that
time, but at some point in the early 1980s it began to erode, first
amongst the leadership and then within the population as a whole.
The awareness of how most people lived in the West, and of the
enormous gap in living standards, produced a situation in which
the self-confidence that had lasted from 1917 evaporated in the
space of a few short years. It is not possible to disentangle the
economic from the political dimensions; but the evidence suggests
that it was the economic which played the major role in getting this
process going. Once the living standards gap became evident then
the legitimacy of the political system was swept away and that of
the alternative system, the Western variant of pluralism, was
enhanced.
Here it is worthwhile looking at the mechanism by which this
change of attitude seems to have occurred. The insulation of
Soviet society was both physical - lack of communication, radio
jamming, absence of travel, punishment of those who sought
contact with the outside world - and psychological - a belief that
whatever went wrong, 'u nas luchshe' - 'things are better with
us'. 22 Those who travelled abroad or had access to comparative
data were condemned to silence, even when they realised the
truth. Here the change of heart of the leadership was of pivotal
importance and opened the flood gates to popular discontent: the
breaking of the secular self-confidence of the top leadership must
certainly have been encouraged by the failures of international
competition in the military and economic spheres, but it would
appear that the very perception of the contrast in living standards,
highlighting the reality of internal paralysis in the late 1970s,
played the crucial part. In Gorbachev's case, for example, it would
seem that his visits to Canada provided such an occasion: it would
only take five minutes in an average Canadian supermarket for the
point to become clear, and for the specific experience of shortages
and administrative problems he experienced in running the
Stavropol region to be set in its decisive, internationalised,
context.
Once this change had occurred, then the process of broader
awareness followed. The liberalisation of the political system
within the USSR alone allowed of greater information about the
capitalist world, almost all of it favourable when not uncritical,
and for a more negative assessment of the record of the

USSR.
It is noticeable too how, in speeches made after 1985,
Gorbachev himself would make telling comparisons with the
capitalist world, in the field of social indicators- infant mortality,
hospital conditions, alcoholism, availability of basic foods- as well
as in broader macroeconomic and political terms. 23 His own
process of self-education seems to have followed such a path:
already dissatisfied with socialist performance, he came into office
in 1985 apparently believing that the socialist system could reform
itself by applying technology in a more intense way, the better to
'accelerate' production; but by 1989 he had moved much further
on both the economic and political fronts, in the face of the
evident inability of the system to reform itself within orthodox
socialist political and economic parameters. In other words, the
international comparison that had brought him to the point of
initiating major reform in 1985 pushed him after 1985 to envisage a
much more radical reform of the system. The fact that, though
forcing the comparison onto the Soviet public, he had unleashed
widespread additional dissatisfaction, only served to confirm this
trend.
Whether his project, in whatever form, could have succeeded,
given the difficulties of such a transition and the subordinated
international position of the USSR was, as indicated above, an
open question: what is clear is that under the combination of
international pressures, and in particular the perceived gap in
living standards, the top leadership decided they could not go on in
the old way.
Here it may be possible to distinguish between two broad phases
of the collapse: a first, conscious and controlled phase, from 1985
to 1989, and a second, uncontrolled phase, when the situation, in
Eastern Europe and the USSR itself, then got out of control,
culminating in the failed coup of August 1991 and the subsequent
dissolution of the USSR itself.
The first phase gave way to the second not because Gorbachev
and his associates foresaw what would happen, but rather because
they did not: they believed that some modified, reformed,
humanised, 'accelerated', socialist system could work and, more-
over, that the regimes in Eastern Europe would endure beyond
the removal of the Soviet military guarantee. Had they realised the
fragility of the communist system, in the USSR itself as in Eastern

Europe, and even more so had the military and political elites
realised the impossibility of sustaining such regimes, then it is
possible that matters would not have taken the course they did:
the communist regimes could, with increasing demoralisation
and entropy, have survived for years, or even a decade or two
more.
Once the military guarantees were removed, the Eastern
European regimes collapsed. Within the USSR, once the restric-
tions in information and contact with the outside world were
removed, and once the role of confrontation and rivalry with the
West ended, then the political cohesion of that system collapsed.
In both cases, the removal of international constituents of the
stability of the system led to the later outcome.
To all of this must be added one further factor - the political
calculations, and selective initiatives, of Western leaders: this was
particularly the case with Germany where Helmut Kohl, realising
his historic opportunity to reunite Germany and abolish the
communist system in East Germany, applied a mixture of pressure
and enticement to achieve his goal. This conscious, political,
intervention was decisive in the course of events after the Berlin
Wall came down in November 1989, but it was possible only in the
context created by another set of international circumstances. 24
Three Levels of International Competition
This analysis of East-West competition up to the late 1980s and of

the subsequent collapse of the USSR and of the communist system
more generally has a number of implications for International
Relations theory generally and for theories of inter-state and inter-
society competition in particular - ones that return to the conclu-
sions of Chapters 4, 5 and 8. No one analysing East-West conflict
can deny the relevance within it of what can in IR phrasing be
termed 'realist' concerns, of conventional inter-state forms of
competition - at the military, economic and political levels. The
rivalry of the Soviet and US systems in the post-war period
involved a comprehensive competition in which the innovation
was not the role of states but rather the way in which this inter-
state competition developed into new domains - the nuclear arms
race, on the one hand, the comprehensive mobilisation of

ideological resources on the other.
Given its strong position in the economic field, it was natural
that the West should seek to use its economic strength to place
pressure on the USSR for security reasons: the international
political economy of East-West relations was, in essence, one of
the use of economic instruments by the stronger bloc, that of
Western states, for political and military ends. In the final phase of
the conflict, and once the communist states had opened the door
to Western influence on policy and its attendant conditions, then
the pressure was even clearer, general prescriptions on political
liberty being linked to specific conditions on the role of the state in
the economy.
This was most evident in the ten-point programme enunciated
by Kohl after the fall of the Berlin Wall: while presented in the
form of a set of agreements between two states, it was actually a
programme for the subjugation of the German Democratic
Republic. Points one and two spoke of cooperation between two
states, but point three made all this conditional on 'a fundamental
change of the political and economic system in the GDR' which
was to be irreversible i.e. capitulation. As his adviser made clear,
Kohl used the term 'confederative structures', not 'confederation',
in order to preclude the two state-relationship from acquiring a
lasting character. 25
This inter-state competition, comprehensive as it was, is not
sufficient to explain how, why and when the communist system
collapsed, how the West succeeded in prevailing over the East.
Earlier cases of inter-systemic conflict- the Ottoman and Manchu
cases- provide at best partial points of comparison: despite some
similarities, theirs was fundamentally a very different story. The
specifically Cold War instruments of inter-state competition -
arms race, embargoes, third world harassment - do not, in
themselves, explain why the Soviet leadership took the decisions it
did after 1985. To analyse this rivalry it is necessary to take a
broader look at East-West rivalry as a whole, one that en-
compasses the competition of systems within which state competi-
tion plays an important, but not exclusive, role.
In this perspective, it becomes possible to apply the three
dimensions of competition, interrelated but analytically distinct,
that were discussed in Chapter 8: the level of activities of states,
that of social and economic entities, most notably firms, and that
of ideology and culture - inter-state, inter-socio-economic, inter-
ideological. In addressing the question of 'how' the West put
pressure on the East this tripartite distinction may be helpful.
Operating on the first level, Western state action had effects,
but it was not the only story. The ability of Western states directly
to put such pressure became greater than ever before as the linking
of economic assistance to socio-economic change within the USSR
and Eastern Europe showed: perestroika created the conditions
for, not resulted from, such a socio-economic intervention by
the Group of 7. In the case of Eastern Europe, Western firms-
industrial enterprises, banks - also played a role, especially in
dealings with Poland in the early 1970s and in the handling of the
Soviet oil output. In the opening up that took place from late 1989
onwards, West German business enterprises have taken a role and
a lead, somewhat co-ordinated with, but separate from, that of the
Bonn Government itself. Once the wall had come down it was the
pressure of the West German state, plus the impact of West
German firms, and particularly banks, that combined to render
impossible any reformed regime in the East. It would be
analytically misleading either to reduce state policy in East-West
relations to the wishes of multinational corporations, or to see the
latter as acting simply within parameters laid down by or at the
behest of Western states. Their actions were parallel and usually-
though not always - convergent: the response of sectors of the
business community to political embargoes on communist states
was evidence enough of divergence in this regard.
The ideological and cultural dimension was, however, of even
greater importance: its role in the collapse of communism and in
the East-West rivalry that preceded it was in some ways decisive.
What above all forced the leadership of the CPSU to change
course, and what destroyed the support or acquiescence of the
peoples of Eastern Europe and the USSR to communism, was the
perceived contrast in living standards and in living conditions
between East and West. This ideological dimension is certainly
something that states help to promote and regulate, and which
their information and propaganda organs disseminate, and it is
something which rests upon economic performance, on the output
and sales policies of business corporations. During the Cold War
Western radio stations broadcasting to the East were, in a general
way, aware that programmes on Western culture and life-style

would erode the confidence and legitimacy of regimes in the East,
in a drip-by-drip process. 26 But this process is something distinct
from governments, encompassing as it does popular culture, the
media, fashion, and in broad terms the image of what constitutes a
good life. It combines the traditional concept of ideology with that
of consumerism. Moreover, the dissemination of images pertain-
ing to this is not simply the result of state or business enterprise
decision: it takes place in an uncoordinated but pervasive way,
through television and film, through popular music, through
impressions gained from travel and personal encounter. It is
informal and diffuse, but constitutes the most potent interface
between two societies. The abandonment by the majority of the
inhabitants of East Germany of any belief in a separate socialist
way or entity was above all a product of this encounter: years of
exposure to West German images on television, followed by the
direct encounter itself, the Reiseshock.
In so far as this distinction is valid, and the importance of
ideological-cultural factors in international relations is accepted,
then it suggests another interpretation of the Cold War and its
end, and of international relations more generally, one involving
the pressures for homogeneity and the force of example already
discussed in Chapter 5. Relations between states retain their
importance and the particular mechanisms of conflict and resource
mobilisation at any one time are open to analysis on a contingent
basis. The denial of state efficacy and the premature reduction of
its role is as misleading as the realist insistence that all inter-
national relations can be seen, or deemed, to be ones between
states.
At the same time, international competition involves two other
major dimensions: the unofficial, socio-economic, and the ideo-
logical. The latter has always operated - it would be impossible to
follow the history of Christianity, its diffusion and division,
without it. But the ideological has a special salience in a world
where material well-being, fashion and consumerism occupy a
special role in the constitution of specific societies, and in an
international situation characterised by immediate transmission of
sound and images. There is clearly a relationship between power
in one domain and power in the ideological - through control of
images and their means of diffusion. Never was Gramsci's
conception of hegemony, in the sense of ideological and cultural

factors as instruments of domination, so relevant as in analysing
the international system today. If communism surrendered, almost
without firing a shot, it was because the instrument of inter-
national competition in the late twentieth century was as much the
T-shirt as the gunboat.
10
International Relations and
the 'End of History'
The preceding two chapters have examined the Cold War and its
outcome in the light of two of the themes that run through this
book: the role of 'heterogeneity' of values in international conflict,
and the contribution of socio-economic and ideological factors to
the collapse of the Soviet model. This chapter takes a broader look
at the evolution of the international system, including the collapse
of communism, in order to suggest some ways in which these
events may cast light on the questions raised in preceding chapters
and the degree to which new issues, and priorities, are raised by
them.
In the late 1980s &nd early 1990s the world underwent a strategic
and intellectual earthquake, comparable in effects- though not, at
least initially, in the human suffering - caused by the First and
Second World Wars. A hegemonic system, and its attendant
distribution of power, collapsed. The map of states was redrawn,
and around twenty new sovereign states were created. A degr~e of
uncertainty unparalleled since the 1930s prevailed in the inter-
national arena. The world created by this set of changes
corresponded to no easy model, and rightly provoked considerable
bewilderment. The following chapter, after some general observa-
tions on what it is that occurred in this period, examines different
interpretations of these events, and some contemporary responses
to them. If it avoids prediction, it does, none the less, hope to offer
some analysis of where the international system is going, and of
some possibilities for the future.
Aftermaths of the Cold War
The historical outlines and hence originality of what happened in
216
International Relations and the 'End of History' 217
the late 1980s can be summarised in brief. 1 A bloc of states,

dominated by the USSR, which had since the 1940s been engaged
in great power competition with the West, and which had, in the
form of the USSR itself, been challenging the Western world since
1917, collapsed. The originality of this system's collapse needs
recognition: as discussed in Chapter 9, it occurred without inter-
state war, in a very short space of time, without the presence of
evident forms of political vanguards or organisation and without
significant bloodshed. Moreover, in contrast to other revolutions
since 1789 which had to some degree claimed to defy the
international norm or propound something 'new', those pro-
pounding change in this context wanted not, as had hitherto
almost always been the case, the creation of something 'new', an
alternative to the prevailing world order, but rather conformity to
that order, a recruitment and incorporation, as rapid and painless
as possible, into what was deemed to be the prevailing norm, be it
'civilisation' 'democracy', the 'west', or 'modernity'. 2
Certain qualifications to this picture of a major kind are
necessary: most of those ruled by Communist Parties in 1988 (1.7
billions) still were (1.4 billions); there is no certainty about what
kinds of government will emerge in the former Soviet Union, or in
many of its former allies; the future pattern of Russian foreign
policy is obscure. None the less a cataclysm of great proportions
had occurred, and one that brought to an end not only the Cold
War and the challenge of the Bolshevik Revolution but
also a longer period of international history in which a move-
ment of contestation of the hegemonic capitalist form was
identifiable.
At the risk of what one could term 'megalo-presentism', it could
be suggested that 1989 brought to the end a period of history that
began in 1789 with the French Revolution. In this sense the
argument of Fukuyama, that what was new about the contemporary
situation was that there was only one set of answers now
acceptable on a world scale, was to a degree valid. It is in this,
above all, that the historic importance of 1989 consists: a year that
began with a political and journalistic elite of the West nervously
opining that, on the eve of the bicentenary of the French
Revolution, such upheavals and changes could not occur, and that
the 'masses' no longer made history, if indeed they ever did,
produced as much surprise, or what Hegel would have called 'the
cunning of reason', as any other dramatic period of modern

history. 3
In this perspective the 'end of the Cold War' was a composite
phenomenon involving several broad historical trends, with the
prospect that they would take a long time to work themselves out.
In the first place, and in many ways in the most important, the end
of Cold War marked the end of the inter-state conflict that had
dominated the world since 1945 and the end of the Soviet-US
nuclear confrontation. Two obvious prospective issues were
whether this marked an end of Great Power military rivalry as a
whole, at least for a generation or so, and whether a new pattern
of inter-state blocs and of hegemony would emerge to replace the
old.
The argument for the former would seem to have had
considerable historical force - that for a century since the Sino-
Japanese war of 1894 Great Powers had been engaged in major
military confrontation, or in the threat thereof. The prospect of
this now seemed definitely to have receded: while there were those
who foresaw new Great Power conflicts in the near future, the
pattern of the past century would appear to have been
broken. 4
There was speculation about new conflicts emerging around
trade blocs - a dollar bloc, a yen bloc and an ecu bloc. But while
trading blocs in a loose sense were clearly forming, and while there
was friction over trade, the world was a long way from trade wars
or exclusive systems of the kind that had prevailed before the
Second World War, and it was hard to see them forming.
Moreover, even if there was conflict over trade and a flood of
nationalism directed against commercial competitors, there was no
inevitability, and initially not much likelihood, of this leading to a
military confrontation.
As for hegemony, and the dangers of a new imperialism, we
now saw a situation of great fluidity in which no bloc of states
seemed likely to emerge to match the USA, but where the USA
itself appeared reluctant to play the 'Roman' role which the
collapse of the USSR had allotted to it. The argument that war
between states is almost precluded when they are liberal
democratic states, well explicated in the writings of Michael
Doyle, has much to recommend it, although it has been put
to apologetic use in obscuring the degree to which democratic
states wage war against undemocratic ones: 5 if true in a strict

sense, it would focus our attention on the revival of authoritarian
regimes in some major states, and hence of whether some of the
great powers, Russia or Japan, or depression-ridden US, UK or
Germany, may in the longer run diverge from this model.
The second dimension of the end of the Cold War was the end of
communism as a political force. As already indicated this was, at
first, a phenomenon confined to Europe and the Asian regions of
the former USSR: but the trend within China seemed to indicate a
move towards capitalism, if not liberalism, and the remaining
communist states were unable to provide an international altern-
ative (Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea). Two large questions arose
here: first, what the future of an alternative to capitalism now was,
and if it had one at all, and secondly, what the historical import of
the whole communist experience was.
In regard to the first it seems that no programme of revolutionary
political challenge to liberal capitalism from the left now had any
serious credit or support: the communist challenge was now
exhausted. What remained were variants of social-democratic
adaptation within advanced capitalism, but ones that were more
and more restricted in part by international conditions, in part by
changing social and political configurations within individual
countries themselves. It is conventional to state that the collapse of
social democracy was in part a result of the failure of communism:
the reverse may, however be the case - the dynamic of social
democracy and its equivalents was broken in most advanced
countries in the 1970s (Britain, USA, Australia, Germany). The
very lack of a credible middle, or third, road meant that the
choices facing communist reformers in the late 1980s were all the
starker.
The question of what was communism, too near to allow of an
easy perspective, has occasioned several candidate explanations: a
dictatorial tendency whereby revolutionary elites seized control of
societies, a flawed movement for the self-emancipation of the
working class, an expression of Judaeo-Christian messianism, a
product of oriental despotism, a failed developmentalist project. 6
One judicious author suggested that communism may end up
being comparable to the Jesuit experiment in Paraguay, a rational
attempt at insulating a section of the world from international
pressures and sustaining an alternative development path, and one
that was much idealised by intellectuals at the time, but one which
was in the end to collapse almost without trace. 7
Some explanation involving different elements of the candidates
listed above may be most appropriate: it is easy, in retrospect, to
say that it 'never worked', but this attempt to escape the
conventional path of capitalist development was for a time
remarkably successful, not least in the ideological and military
challenge it posed to the West, even if it was in the end forced to
capitulate, and to do so almost without resistance. Although now
seen as inevitable, this was not how the communist experiment
appeared for many decades: both amongst those who supported it,
and those who feared it, there was a belief in the efficacy of
socialist state intervention that subsequent events have belied. If
nothing else, as suggested in Chapter 9, the communist collapse
deservescareful study from the perspective of those who believe in
elite-led or state-dictated social and economic development.
The third element in the end of the Cold War was the break-up
of the USSR, and of its attendant alliance system. Here it was not
at all clear if the process was complete by the end of 1991, not only
with regard to Eastern Europe but also to Russia itself: the
Russian Federation was subject to substantial centrifugal forces
and could yet break up into three parts under international and
internal pressure. Yet even if the process of fragmentation was
complete already, it had unleashed powerful changes in the
international arena. It had created a situation in which, with the
break-up of the pre-existing order, new regional alliances and new
potential hegemons have emerged: in Europe, Germany; in the
Caucasus, Black Sea and Central Asia, Turkey. In the Far East the
realignments were less major, because Soviet power was weaker,
but it encouraged, and coincided with, an increase in both Chinese
and Japanese power. The Far East was indeed the area with the
greatest political and economic range, and promised to be the
fulcrum of the twentieth-first century: whether it could contain
these changes without major military conflict was as yet not
evident. The impact on Indo-China, with the removal of the Soviet
role in Cambodia and Vietnam, and in the North-East Asian
region, was none the less substantial and continuous.
Some of these regional changes took the world back to a
situation before 1914- the pattern of alliances in the Balkans and
in the Baltic were cases in point. Others were new - the Turkish-
Iranian contest in Central Asia being only a remote descendant of

earlier ones. It would seem probable that some of these powers
would assume major international responsibilities and roles in the
century ahead: Germany and Japan, politically quite different
from their Second World War characters, were reluctant to play
such a role, especially in the military field, but would in the end be
forced to do so. Some saw this reticence as a just recognition of
their criminal pasts: but the problems with their pasts did not lie in
their contemporary foreign policy. What was most worrying about
these countries was not any proximate danger of their becoming
aggressive military powers again, but the evasion and euphemism
that still prevailed in much of their internal life. A healthier
recognition of the past could have enabled a more commensurate
international role in the economic and security dimensions.
The fourth broad consequence of the collapse of communism
was that it broke a 'regime' that had prevailed since the end of the
Second World War, in terms of which the existing map of the
world, with its iniquities and arbitrariness, was maintained. For all
the talk of secession and unification that marked the post-1945
epoch, it is striking how, until 1989, the map more or less held.
States became independent, some lost bits of territory, but the
actual division into 170-odd states was more or less frozen.
Unification or fusion occurred only by force and at moments of
uncertainty arising from decolonisation (Palestine, Western
Sahara, Timor and, it can be argued, Tibet), or through the
voluntary merging, again at the moment of independence of
formerly separate colonial entities (Cameroun, Somalia). Secession
only occurred in the case of Bangladesh in 1971, but that was of an
entity that was already geographically separated from the rest of
Pakistan. 8
After 1989 both fusion and fission came again onto the order of
the day: it was expected that the fusion of the Yemens and the
Germanies would be followed, albeit with some delay, by that of
the Koreas and probably, in some form or other, of the (three)
Chinas. On the other hand, fission was the fate of the multi-ethnic
states of the former communist system (USSR, Yugoslavia,
Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia), with the result that in the space of two
years over twenty new sovereign states came into existence.
No one could yet tell what the longer-term demonstration
effects of this process were going to be, but there could be little
doubt that the breaking of the post-1945 regime would encourage

many others to think that they too could achieve separate
statehood. This affected some areas more than others, and it may
turn out that only those states where communist regimes had been
ousted would actually fragment; but parts of Europe and Africa,
as well as India, were likely to be subject to increased strains, now
that it had been shown that secession is allowed. It is for this
reason above all that it was essential for states and international
bodies to develop some more adequate means of assessing and
regulating this process. The behaviour of the international
community over the issue of secession has been a striking example
of the void between ideal and practice: while the system is founded
on the claim that peoples are sovereign and are entitled to their
own states, the practice has been to oppose secession until the last
moment, except where a direct self-interest (often of an
expansionist kind) prevails. The break-up of the USSR, and of its
three associated multi-ethnic states in the period 1989-93,
occurred despite, not because of, international encouragement.
l:he international response was one of reluctant and belated
acquiescence, well summed up in the informal observation by the
British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd in June 1993: 'I hope we
do not see the creation of any more nation-states'.
Varieties of Historical Evaluation
In broad terms, there were three kinds of response to these

changes. One was a secular pessimism, a gloomy sobriety of the
right, which saw the breakdown of the Cold War order as in many
respects a return to the world before 1914, or between the two
world wars, leading to greater inter-state conflict, nuclear
proliferation and hyper-nationalism. The second was a pessimism
of the left which asserted that we were in a new imperialist epoch-
that the north was incapable of assisting in the development of the
South, that ecological destruction was ongoing, that the USA
would, on its own, or in association with its old allies, use the new
opportunities to dominate the world. The third approach was an
optimistic one, that saw the world as having moved decisively
forward and as being in a period when certain desirable goals -
peace, democracy, greater prosperity - were now available to all.
Though these approaches had the merit of providing broad

interpretations, in some obvious respects they were all defici-
ent.
The pessimistic perspective of a return to 1914 appeared to draw
sustenance from new forms of inter-state conflict and from the rise
of nationalism, but it forced the analogy too far: the major powers
were not in the grip of nationalism directed against each other, and
were relatively uninterested in preparing for military action
against each other; there was a torrent of nationalism, but it took a
communal, inter-ethnic as distinct from strategic, form. 9 Much was
made of the cruel fate of Sarajevo, with the sombre joke that only
world wars which begin in years with even numbers start there.
But for all the horror and suffering, and the differences of
approach between Security Council members, this was not a
conflict that threatened to provoke war between great powers.
The states themselves involved on the international scene had
changed dramatically since 1914, most notably by the universalisa-
tion of democracy (no major states had universal suffrage in 1914)
and by the growth of economic prosperity. Germany, for one, was
not the state it was in 1914, or 1939: neo-Nazi youth was
repugnant, but it was not yet dangerous for other states, as was the
Kaiser or Adolf Hitler.
In a mood of historical analogy, some compared this period of
history to that of the belle epoque, the decades preceding 1914
when industrial Europe appeared to be at a new height of
economic, political and culture success, only to plunge into the
wars of the twentieth century. There are analogies with the belle
epoque, not least the complacent belief that the rich states of the
west have solved their problems, and the modishness of various
forms of irrationalism.
But there are striking differences, not least all that had
happened in the intervening century. Few in the industrialised
countries now believed, as many did a hundred years ago with
varying degrees of social Darwinist conceit, that war was a viable,
let alone desirable, means of resolving conflict between major
states. Equally importantly, the world was not in a period when
new ideological challenges were emerging from situations of social
and political conflict: one of the most striking, and in its way
depressing, features of the post-1989 international conflict was
that no one was saying anything new, and many were making the
same kinds of claim as had been heard a century before. The

verities of Balkan nationalism or the conflicting aspiration around
Nagorno-Karabagh, were, whatever their other problems, not the
communism or fascism of their day. Indeed what was in some ways
most dispiriting about all this fractious and strident clamour is how
utterly familiar it all was. We knew Mr Karadzic, the Bosnian
Serbian leader, group therapist for a second division football team
turned demagogue: we had met him many times before. The world
was, therefore, in what was in many respects a new international
situation, both with regard to the pattern of the post-1945 period,
and more generally.
The contrary position, the pessimism of the left, received much
support from the Gulf War, and there were many who sought to
draw general lessons about the post-communist world from that
event. 10 Leaving aside the, often solipsistic, analysis of why the
war occurred, the critics of the war were, in most respects, and not
least with regard to the longer-run significance of the conflict,
proved wrong. First of all, and for all the destruction visited on
Iraq, the cost was far less than its critics suggested at the time: total
Iraqi dead were around 10,000- a twentieth of what was claimed-
and, despite rhetoric about Iraq being bombed back to the stone
age, most of the wa~; damage had within a year or so of the war
been repaired. 11 Despite imperial dreaming on the right, and
speculation about the character of a new world order on the left,
the US was not able to use its victory to put pressure on its
economic rivals, or on other third world countries; militarist
sentiment showed no permanent increase in the US, as George
Bush found out to his disappointment; there was movement on a
range of Middle Eastern issues, including the Arab-Israeli issue
and freedom of expression, for Kuwaitis at least, in Kuwait.
The Gulf War was an important, but essentially diversionary,
chapter in world affairs.
Where the critique of the left pessimists had more force was
elsewhere: first, in regard to the marginalisation of organised
dissent and of radical criticism within the developed and under-
developed world, and secondly in regard to the issue of inter-
national economic relations and the question of whether the
wealth of the richer countries can, given constraints historical and
new, be diffused in any reasonable way to the rest of humanity.
The latter is an issue which will be discussed later in this chapter,
and where the conventional certainties of left and right can no

longer be deemed to prevail.
Both the pessimism of the left and of the right share a common
view, on the reduced role of the state, and the increasing
globalisation of the world at the economic, political and cultural
levels. At the theoretical level, the most challenging issue to
confront is that of producing a response to changes in the outside
world, but a change that has now been reflected in a growing body
of academic literature: namely, how to conceive of the growing
internationalisation of the world. This internationalisation is
apparently clear for all to see: in international trade, in the growth
of communications, in the shrinking of distances, in the creation of
a global financial system and the decreasingly national locations of
specific enterprises. 12 Within Europe we have a process of
increasing transfer of powers to the institutions of the Economic
Union, and the introduction of a single market in 1992. This
picture of growing internationalisation is usually accompanied by
two other concerns: namely, the beliefs that the position of the
state as previously established is eroding, and that the nature of
power in the contemporary world is changing, from being largely
confined to military power to being more based on economic and
even cultural factors. The world is, we are led to believe,
becoming more and more international.
At the same time, there is a strong pessimistic argument to be
made about the global trends - demographic, technological,
ecological - and their differential national implications: a cogent
example of this approach is that of Paul Kennedy in his Preparing
for the Twenty-First Century. 13 He is a qualified, and unenthusi-
astic, prophet of doom: in contrast to Fukuyama, he neglects
politics and the role of ideas almost completely, focusing on
economic and scientific change. On the other hand, his pessimism
is of a baneful and resigned kind, free of the Nietzschean or social
Darwinist undertow found in writers of an earlier age.
Kennedy begins with the analysis of Thomas Malthus, first
published in 1798, according to which the rise in world population
would outstrip the rise in food output. He argues that, in his time,
Malthus was wrong, for at least three reasons: emigration drained
off surplus population from the countries with the fastest growth
rates; agricultural productivity rose faster than he expected;
industrialisation pmvided new forms of employment. His claim
now is that, two centuries later, a pessimism comparable to that of

Malthus is far more valid: world population is increasing at a rate
faster than ever before; demographic, economic and social
pressures are creating ever greater tensions in the third world;
technological change, through robotisation and the biotechnology
revolution, are reducing the number of jobs available, and
promoting greater inequalities of wealth and productivity.
Hence he is not saying, as Malthus did, that the world will run
short of food, but rather that a set of other contradictions will
provoke internal and international conflict: population is rising
where ecological crisis is most extreme, technological change is
separated from demographic explosion, the number of jobs
available is being reduced. While he stresses, in a set of country
and regional analyses, that performance and potential vary
enormously between countries, he warns against any idea that the
richer countries of the world can be fenced off from the tensions in
the third world: migration, political and military upheaval,
economic clashes and, above all, ecological degradation ensure
that this is a global conflict.
Kennedy is not fatalistic about these trends, but he does stress
that most of them are unavoidable over the next decades and that
the state, while remaining the main instrument for addressing
them, is increasingly inadequate to the task of confronting what
are global problems. He has nothing to say about one often-
proposed solution, global governance and international institu-
tions, and he manages to paint a grim picture without discussing
the revival of nationalisms and ethnic conflicts. Kennedy does not
claim that the world is bound to deteriorate in the manner he
indicates, and he suggests, as Malthus did before him, that there is
something states can do. But he is far from sure that all, or indeed
any, states will respond, or that, if they did all that was in their
power, this would be sufficient.
There is, therefore, a considerable amount of truth in this claim
of globalisation, but it needs qualification. First, many of the
themes to which people refer - migration and transnational
religious movements are obvious examples - long predate the
contemporary world. Secondly, the indisputable trends towards
globalisation in some domains coincide with - indeed to some
extent stimulate - greater division on the other: the politics of
ethnicity is one such obvious response. Most important of all, both
suggest, for better or worse, and usually worse, that the power of
states has been eroded by these transnational forces and that there
is less and less that elected governments, or indeed unelected
ones, can do to manage the affairs of their countries. Here, there
has to be considerable caution. First, as discussed in Chapter 4,
globalisation is itself to a considerable extent the work of states,
who direct, stimulate, assist companies to do what they want to do:
no one believes that Japanese or German business operates
independently of the state, nor is it true of their French or Anglo-
Saxon competitors. Moreover, there is much that states can do to
stimulate competition on the internal plane, even if they have lost
some of their control of capital flows and interest rates.
We may, indeed, have to distinguish between two questions: the
first, whether any form of human agency- state-based, or other-
can cope with the problems we face; the second, whether, given
that some purposive strategic response to these questions is
possible, this should be based on the state or an international
body. The concept of 'global governance' has gained currency in
recent years and, shorn of unrealistic aspirations, can be seen as
having several components: the strengthening of existing global
and regional institutions, the evolution of law and norms prevail-
ing to international behaviour, the protection and promotion of
international 'public goods', be these the environment, space,
minerals, or the high seas. Yet however far we go, and can go,
down that road, the components of that governance structure will,
in the main be states, and the considerations that move politicians
or publics to accept them will have to encompass a state-based
('national') interest as much as a global one. 14
The same applies to the domain of legitimate international
competition, and of the major global trends threatening society
which Paul Kennedy has surveyed. If we take the three factors that
Paul Kennedy considers to be the keys to a state's long-run
international competitiveness- the quality of education, the status
of women, the quality of political leadership - then states, and
societies, retain a large measure of freedom in all of these and
have only themselves to blame if they fail to act, or blame
everything on external pressures. The same applies to the great
ecological and demographic threats which Kennedy rightly points
out as hanging over the next century: these are not going to be
addressed, contained or solved, by a global community, or by
transnational forces. States, and only states, albeit urged on and

assisted by unofficial bodies, have the power to do something
about these. If anything, the challenges that Kennedy and others
have identified make the need for states greater than ever before:
the disciplines, and the cost, of adjustment policies are ones that
only they can impose.
The growing importance of the international, both real and
apparent, is therefore a more historically complex, and two-sided,
process than a simple assertion of how international the world has
become would lead us to suspect. The world is moving in at least
two contradictory directions simultaneously. That much was
evident in the broad process of change already taking place: it is
even more clear in the world we have entered most recently, as a
result of the changes of the latter half of the 1980s.
This brings us to the last of the perspectives on the contemporary
world, the optimistic one that somehow we have found an answer,
both internationally and domestically, and that things are going to
be better. If I would agree that military competition between
major states is, for a time at least, improbable, this does not mean
that conflict in international relations will decline or that anything
approaching a 'new world order' has been, or can be, created. For
a brief period in 1988 and 1989, when the USA and USSR were
working together to reduce points of tension, the term 'new world
order' had a real, if limited, meaning. The collapse of the USSR
has deprived it of that meaning, and the proliferation of conflict,
not only in the third world, but in the Balkans as well, shows how
unfounded this oneiric outlook was. Even in its liberal inter-
nationalist form, according to which the great powers will do their
best to help sort out the world, it is misleading, since it overstates
the willingness of the governments, or populations, of the
developed world to assume their global responsibilities.
The 'End of History'
The collapse of communism and the apparent spread of liberal

democratic political forms to a range of countries, post-communist
and third world, has led some to suggest that a new era of global
democracy is at hand. This is in essence the argument of Francis
Fukuyama, although he is careful to state that he distinguishes
between the claim that there is no other viable model on offer

from the claim that its consolidation in all countries is imminent or
even plausible. The discussion of the end of the Cold War may,
therefore, serve as an introduction to the last of the underlying
themes brought out by this survey- the question of whether we are
now confronted with what Fukuyama calls the end of history. 15 By
history, Fukuyama means a period in which humanity is in conflict
over fundamental values and marshals its forces in the inter-
national arena for such a competition of values. It has been
fashionable to denigrate Fukuyama, but there are several ways in
which his arguments merit more serious attention.
First is his assertion of the importance of progress in contem-
porary history: Fukuyama is not saying that progress is without
costs, nor that it is destined to continue, but he does assert that
humanity as a whole has made progress of a significant kind over
recent centuries and that it has the capacity, ecological and nuclear
disaster aside, to continue. In this way he rejects both the
pessimism of the right- that history is circular, unintelligible, or
straight decadent - and that of the left, based on various forms of
historical romanticism or, in the case of Wallerstein, on a
combative assertion of overall human decline since 1400. 16 This
cautiously but confidently optimistic note is worth asserting, not
only because there is something which most people would
recognise as progress (like 'imperialism' and 'patriarchy' it leaves
much to be desired as a concept, yet faute de mieux we need to go
on using it) but also because in order to argue about progress, and
whether or not one accepts that it has occurred, one needs some
universal analytic and moral criteria. In the contemporary intel-
lectual climate, of nationalist and religious particularism, and post-
modernist confusion of all kinds, this firm eighteenth-century
assertion of the possibility of universal criteria, whatever their
historic, social and geographical origins, is to be welcomed. In that
sense those who deny there has been progress, Wallerstein included,
are themselves allies against those who say we cannot know.
Secondly, Fukuyama has something important to say about the
Cold War. His account of why and how communism collapsed is
contestable, but his judgement of the end, that one side won and
the other side lost, needs asserting. This may seem rather obvious,
and no doubt it is to those who have been on the losing side and
who are scrambling to get as much of capitalism as they can. But it
has to be said that it is not obvious in much left and liberal

discourse in the West. As has been discussed in Chapter 8, prior to
1989 the dominant view here was that the Cold War was not about
an ideological or inter-systemic conflict at all -this was the myth of
the Pentagon, the KGB and odd people such as myself who tried
to say so - but about a pas de deux of two hegemonic systems.
Each pretended to rival the other, but in fact used the pretence of
conflict to hold down their own people, make money out of useless
military production and so on. Such analysis went from the
perfectly justifiable claims that some people, such as arms
manufacturers, benefited from the Cold War and the attendant
arms race, that many of the ideological claims about free worlds
and socialist democracy were false, and that the Cold War enabled
other forms of intra-bloc hegemony to be preserved, to the quite
different and unwarranted conclusion that the inter-systemic
conflict was an illusion. Even after 1989 there was a solipsistic
argument to the effect that, while the former Soviet system
collapsed and failed, so in some ways did the West- viz. the social
and economic crisis in the USA: as if anyone could fight and win a
war without some losses, or that the end of one titanic conflict, be
it the Second World War or the Cold War, would not lead to
further conflicts in the future. 117 The reality, as Fukuyama
underlines, is that the advanced capitalist West did win the Cold
War. Is
The third issue on which Fukuyama is interesting is that of
liberal democracy itself. Of course, his invocation of this concept
is selective and ahistorical. That most classical liberals did not
believe in universal suffrage, or the equality of nations, and did
believe i!l an interventionist state is not recognised by him. He
seems to espouse the view that 'markets' can somehow effect
social change, neglecting the fact that markets, like houses and
sausages, are man-made: there can no more be a market-led
account of history than a house-driven or for that matter a
sausage-driven theory.
The main thrust of his argument is, moreover, inclined towards
the complacent, that a solution has been found, in 'liberal
democracy', and that it will, more or less, last for ever. But there is
another reading of Fukuyama possible, not least in this age of the
dethroned author: namely, that while liberal democracy will
prevail as the dominant solution to politics in the contemporary
world it is itself inherently unstable, and liable to self-destruction.

This, eminently Hegelian and pre-Marxist, argument rests upon
the destabilising effects of thymos, what he regards as the human
drive for recognition and respect, both with regard to relations
within states and to those between them. His reasons as to why this
model may not mark the end of history are to be questioned, but
are less important than this cogent assertion of the inherent limits
and contested future of the political form now claimed to be the
solution to humanity's problems. And even those Marxists who
still hold the inevitability of revolutionary socialist outcome as
capitalism digs its own grave, need to be reminded that there is an
alternative path which liberal democracy could take: namely, a
regression to various forms of barbarism, national and inter-
national, via the prevailing of some mixture of capitalist-
authoritarian, nuclear, ecological, racist and recidivist trends.
The fourth area where Fukuyama's argument is to be welcomed
concerns his analysis of the trend towards universalisation in the
contemporary world, the theme of Chapter 5. Here again his thesis
might appear to be self-evident, were it not for the fact that
substantial theoretical resistance to it can be detected from several
quarters. One source of this resistance has already been noted with
regard to the argument on the Cold War, on the part of those who
denied that both Soviet communism and Western capitalism
sought to prevail over the other. Underlying this view is a belief
that persists even in a post-Cold-War situation, namely that
capitalism in some way 'needs' an enemy.
The theoretical import of this idea has been discussed in
Chapter 8. Here it is worth spelling out the practical consequences:
with communism gone, it is suggested, some other bogey, such as
ethnic minorities, or Islam, has to be evoked. In some cases, this is
used to explain the genesis of the Gulf War. In fact, as Marx and
Engels pointed out so well in section two of the Communist
Manifesto, capitalism does not need an enemy at all, but seeks to
make the world like itself, 'on pain of extinction' - more or less
what happened to the Bolshevik Revolution. Rarely articulated,
this 'needed enemy' argument underpins much of the critical
literature on Cold War, in its reluctance to see why and how
capitalism has developed a universalising dynamic, not just at the
level of markets and productive relations, but also in political
forms and cultural patterns.
Resistance to this idea is also found in a theoretical school that

Fukyama criticises, but not enough, namely the 'realism' of
state-centric International Relations theory, epitomised by Waltz
and discussed in Chapter 2, according to which all that matters are
relations between states, and the internal character of them is to
be disregarded as 'reductionist'. Fukuyama criticises realism as
being inapposite to a post-Cold-War situation where inter-
dependence is growing: 19 but here he fails to see the import of his
argument as a whole, which is that realism was never an adequate
explanation of international relations. There was always a
universalising element in the system, ever since capitalism began
to develop transnationally in the sixteenth century.
Prospects for Liberal Democracy and Peace
The problems with the Fukuyama argument are many, but

suggest, for their part, what a programme of future theoretical and
historical work may be. Absent from the 1989 article, there is here
a powerful psychological component to the historical thesis based
on the Greek term thymos: his interpretation of this may raise as
many problems as it solves. 20 Much has been made of how
Fukuyama's confident extrapolations are supposedly wrong- wars
will continue, Islam is a threat, the 1.4 billion people still lived
under communist party rule as opposed to 1.7 billion before 1989,
and so forth. These do not really challenge his central theme, since
neither post-Maoist modernisation, nor Islamic fundamentalism,
are challenges on a global stage: the 'Islamic threat' is little more
than a malign combination of clerical bombast and Western
paranoia. The real challenge to the 'West' (a hypostatisation we
could well do without) is from Japan, not Iran or Algeria: where,
one might ask, is the technological or investment challenge from
these latter states?
Where Fukuyama is, on empirical grounds, more shaky is in two
other respects: first, in his belief that capitalism can bring the
whole of the world up to current developed levels; second, in the
degree to which he believes liberal democracy is now spreading.
In the former, a restatement in RAND corporation terms of the
view cogently expressed by Bill Warren, he is right to criticise the
myths of dependency theory, but ignores the facts which stare at
one every year from Table 1 of the World Bank Report, namely
that while few countries outside Africa are getting poorer, the gap
between rich and poor states is widening. Moreover, as Giovanni
Arrighi has so well pointed out, 21 the membership of the club of
rich states has remained constant for over a century- no one has
left, although the members have changed places in the pecking
order, and only one state has joined, namely Japan.
The belief in liberal democracy understates the degree to which
capitalist democracy is precarious: it needs to last for a generation
at least before it can be assumed it will endure. One only has to
think about the Weimar Republic, or about such states as Sri Lanka,
Liberia, Argentina, Lebanon in the 1960s to see how dictatorship
can be re-established. In this, historically more cautious, perspect-
ive, there are only about two dozen established liberal democracies
in the world today, out of what are now over 180 independent
states.
This historically superficial view of democracy is linked to an
idealist and most misleading account of how democracy came
about. The dates he gives for the establishment of liberal
democracy -1790 for the USA, 1848 for Britain ~tc.- are those of
constitutional myth. The reality, which Goran Therborn has so
well shown, is that full democracy, including, among other
criteria, one person, one vote, and only one vote per person, came
to these two states in the 1960s, and, as a result not of the
evolution of the system in some idealist manner, but of political
action, of struggle. 22
Here we come to the central theoretical problem of Fukuyama's
work which is not about whether history has come to an end, but
of what constitutes history and, more specifically, historical
agency. Behind all theories of the end of history there lies a theory
of agency. That most people have some working answer to this
question is evident if we just list some of the candidates for motor
of history that have occurred in recent centuries: God, gods, the
stars, Reason, the balance of power, the working class, the
bourgeoisie, the peasantry- indeed virtually every class except the
one that may have done more than any other to shape the
twentieth century, the petty bourgeoisie - the intelligentsia,
conspiracy theories of all shapes and sizes, the economy, and, as
we have recently seen, the market. No doubt more are to come.
Fukuyama's answer is idealist, it being economic scientific
development combined with the evolution of human freedom that

constitutes the motor of history, or, as he calls it, 'the Mechanism'.
Here there is a lot to disagree with. His account of the evolution of
science is singularly innocent of the Kuhnian and other institutional
studies of how power relations determine scientific progress -
compare the amount of money being spent on arms as against
AIDS research. He seems to ascribe to it a direction independent
of human intent and interest. More to the point, he ignores what is
the main motor of human history, in this and previous centuries,
namely collective political action, action by groups be these
classes, nations, states. The span of world history since Hegel and
Marx, and not least the collapse of communism, encourages us to
rethink how collective action operates and to enlarge the range of
such possible actors, while taking away the priority and historical
role ascribed in socialist theory with too much ease to the
proletariat.
Indeed it is the retheorisation of this question that constitutes
the major challenge of Fukuyama's book. Faced with the evident
discrediting of the teleology and the agency underlying most
Marxist theory, it is not necessary to revert simply to the idealist
assertion of a world spirit, now presented as science and thymos,
shaping the course of events, any more than it is to collapse into
post-modernist vacuity and frivolity. The problem with Fukuyama's
theory, and his account of history, is fundamentally the same as
that of Hegel himself. There is, of course, a classical solution to
this problem: to do to Fukuyama what Feuerbach did to Hegel,
namely turn him on his head.
In International Relations we have been rather too cavalier
about this issue, moving from states to system and back again, and
ignoring other candidates. We have been particularly coy about
the word 'capitalism', a term of which sociologists are not shy and
which one supposes can characterise the international system of
the past few centuries as aptly as any other. International
Relations has indeed proceeded as if agency was a marginal
category, compared to the various determinations of the inter-
state or global hierarchical systems that are normally upheld as the
proper objects of study. To answer Fukuyama involves, however,
an answer to this level of his argument, the positing of an
alternative theory of agency in international affairs, and hence of
both an alternative past and an alternative present. This would
seem, in the face of the rather deplorable record of much of the

twentieth century and of the daunting problems that confront the
world as it heads towards the end of that century, to be a task with
some normative as well as analytic urgency. It is also one that
brings International Relations into the orbit of other social
sciences. Exculpatory abstractions about history, system, structure
and the like have little more validity than the invocation of the
divine, or the astrological. We are all participants in the making of
the future.
11
Conclusion: The Future of
This book has been concerned with ideas as to how the

international has been, or may be, changed; it has also suggested
processes and mechanisms for such change, be it the transnational-
ism of society and ideology, the 'emancipatory' forces of class and
group, or the construction of forms of global governance. Any
such agency evokes questions not only of efficacy, but also of
ethical foundation. The preceding chapters have been focused
elsewhere, on the relationship between domestic and international
politics, and on the implications of this for analysing how the
international system works. In conclusion, however, it seems
appropriate to turn to the moral questions raised by the turn in
international events of the the late 1980s and to offer what any
theoretical approach should offer, a programme for future work.
The Challenge of the Normative
International affairs are, notoriously, the area where moral

considerations apply least, and we have come to accept different
moral criteria for states than for individuals. But at the same time
the international is a domain replete with moral claims and
counter-claims, not least from nationalists, and even to accept a
supposed reality is itself to take a moral position. It is worth
noting, as well, that in recent years some moral questions,
separate from the claims of nations and states, have come, if
anything, to play an even greater role in public discussion, and
public justification, than before: economic justice, human rights,
ecological responsibility. The 'ought' will not go away. What turns
236
Conclusion 237
out to be less developed is the set of criteria and discriminations

which we are able to make in this domain. 1
Two normative questions raised most directly by recent inter-
national crisis, and indirectly by the fall of communism, are those
of nationalism and of intervention. Most of the work done on
nationalism in recent years has been on its historical and
sociological aspects: yet what has attracted much less attention are
the normative claims underlying it. These are that we all belong to
a nation, that the nation, embodied in its leaders has a claim over
us, that it gives us an identity. Closely related, and brutally present
in the Balkan wars of the early 1990s, is the further normative
claim that nations, defined by their leaders, have claims, given by
God, gods or history, to territory.
It is utopian, in the bad sense, to envisage a world in which the
claims of nations, on people or on territory, have no salience at all.
But it is important to note just how threadbare both of these
claims are: there is little beyond a casual utilitarianism to justify
why one should owe loyalty to a motley collection of people into
whose midst one happens to be born, or why one can assert one
particular claim over territory when every bit of the earth's surface
bears multiple claims, if not from the living then from the dead.
Here there is considerable force in the views of Ernest Gellner,
who stressed the contingency of national identity and the existence
of nations and of the late Elie Kedourie, who saw in the spread of
both these principles - the claim of community over individual,
and of these self-defined communities over territory - a bane of
the modern world. 2
These principles do, however, now prevail, but we have to find
ways to temper and to reduce them. And yet much of what we
aspire to introduce into the international system still rests on the
acceptance of both as valid and permanent features of inter-
national relations. People have a right to live in communities and
in a way that meets their wishes, and that usually means, and will
go on meaning, in national communities, with, hopefully, a state
and territory to reflect this. But we have gone far too far in
accepting either of these principles as supreme, given the ethical
weakness, and nefarious consequences, that accompany them.
The issue of intervention abuts not so much onto the question of
ethnicity or national rights, but onto that of state sovereignty, and
it was sharply posed by the end of the Gulf War and by events
elsewhere, in Bosnia and Somalia. This is arguably the greatest

change in the international agenda in recent years, and poses a set
of questions, moral as well as practical, for us all?
In the case of the Gulf War it was posed not so much by the war
over Kuwait as by decisions taken, after the war, and after the
Iraqi popular uprising, to establish a 'safe haven' in northern
Iraq. 4 For in the post-war situation, the US, UK and France
intervened to establish a form of separate state within northern
Iraq, and in support of the indigenous Kurdish population.
There is no precedent for this in post-war history: seen in some
of the Arab world as a form of colonialism, or of the old
imperialist policy of partition, it nonetheless accorded with the
wishes of the Kurdish people themselves, whose subsequently
elected leaders made clear that they wanted the safe haven policy
to continue. This was a practical and innovative implementation of
the policy of humanitarian intervention, meaning by this not that
the intervening powers had only humanitarian motives, a condi-
tion that would be impossible to meet, but that it had in part a
humanitarian motivation and that its consequences were of clear
and substantial benefit to the populations concerned. This action
constituted a direct challenge to the sovereignty of Iraq, and a
dramatic innovation in the field of human rights policy. The
questions which it raised on the moral level were several and were
posed in classical form by John Stuart Mill: first, what degree of
tyranny or oppression justifies or obligates such an intervention;
secondly, at what cost such an intervention could be carried out;
thirdly, whether it could be carried out only in support of an
identifiable ethnic group or more generally. But once the principle
is admitted reasonable, and general, answers to these questions
can be formed. 5
At one level intervention involves not norms, but prudence. But
there is nonetheless a normative question here, pertaining both to
the issue of state sovereignty and equally to the obligations of
states. Much of the western discussion focused on the issue not of
what the consequences of not intervening are, itself a considera-
tion of moral import, but of whether 'we' meaning Britain and
other states ought to have done so. From where does this 'ought'
come? From where, indeed, does the 'ought' come with regard to
third world poverty, or individual cases of human rights? The
answer is that, in the first instance, it comes from the UN Charter,
Conclusion 239
paragraph 24 of which obligates the members of the Security

Council to 'assume primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security'.
Here we come to a question that is much discussed in the
literature of international relations, but which public discussion
fights shy of for understandable reasons, namely the role of the
great powers. In law, all states are sovereign and equal, but in
reality they are not, and they are far more unequal than
individuals in a state. For much of the past century, the
international system was run by great powers through the
mechanisms of imperialism, which held subject peoples down, and
which led these imperial powers to contend with, and fight, each
other on a variety of pretexts. Imperialism in the sense of formal
domination or colonialism, even in the rather peculiar Soviet
form, is over, and, so might it be thought, is any pre-eminent role
for the Great Powers.
As I have argued, conflict between the great powers may no
longer be the motor of international politics, and the public
opinions of the major states are reluctant to incur the kinds of risks
once acceptable. But this only poses, in sharper form, the dilemma
for international diplomacy, since, if these powers are not going to
take the lead, who is? The record of the Gulf crisis is clear, and in
the eyes of many discredits it: without the US lead nothing would
have happened. In the case of the Balkans, one of the reasons so
little did happen, and why the Serbians believed, rightly, that they
could press on with their campaigns, is that the US appeared to
regard this as a European matter. One of the arguments used for
Congress's refusal to ratify Woodrow Wilson's support for the
League of Nations was, precisely, anxiety about becoming
involved in Balkan wars.
Yet some leading role for the great powers would seem to be
inevitable and indeed desirable, just as the role of the major
economic and financial powers is desirable and necessary in the
field of international economic managements. The question is not
whether they do or do not play a role, but rather whether this is
unilateral, competitive and short-sighted, or whether it is a
multilateral, more cooperative, and long-term policy. The altern-
ative to Article 24 is not international harmony, but a world in
which no one takes primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security. The inhabitants of the Balkans
saw quite a lot of this in 1991-4: one can doubt if they would
recommend it to the world as a whole.
These two questions, of nationalism and intervention, and the
related issues of the great powers, touch upon what is perhaps the
most pervasive and difficult of all the normative issues confronting
the world at the moment, namely that of universal versus
particular values. Since the eighteenth century there has been a
current in Western thought that has asserted the validity of certain
universal, rationally based, moral principles of relevance to
political life- the rights of the individual, secularism, democracy
in some form or another. It has been amplified in recent times to
include more explicit recognition of the equality of gender and of
race. These values are by no means universally supported, nor do
they permit of unequivocal interpretation. But they are now
enshrined in political documents, national and international, and it
is very much part of the optimistic post-Cold-War view of the
world that they are now set to prevail. It has already been
suggested in Chapter 10, that, in any immediate sense, they are
not set to prevail, because the conditions under which, say,
democracy can sustain itself are not given in most countries in the
world.
But there has increasingly been another challenge, to the effect
that these values are in themselves questionable, and that other
value systems, of other provenances, have equal or even greater
value. The proponents of religious fundamentalism are front-
runners in this regard, but there is a broader current, evident in
East Asia, of contesting what is said to be a Western and
ethnocentric value system. Out of sympathy, or support for a
position loosely termed post-modernist, many in the West have
also subscribed to this relativistic challenge to any single grand
normative code.
There is, historically, much validity in this critique: these codes
were produced in particular countries, reflecting their background
and values, and it was not accident that these were in large
measure the same countries who occupied and dominated much of
the rest of the world. 6 Increasing liberty at home coincided with
spoliation abroad. There has also been a great degree of hypocrisy
in the claims made for normative rectitude on the part of the
dominant Western powers: they did more than any others to
violate sovereignty over the past century or two; the greatest
Conclusion 241
crimes against humanity have been committed in this century on

European soil.
But these reservations do not invalidate the larger claim that on
matters of primary normative and political concern there is a
measure of international consensus around a set of values that, on
grounds quite independent of their origin, can be based on reason
and which bear, for reasons that social scientists can happily argue
over, some relationship to economic prosperity and peace, both
domestic and international. It is a pity, indeed it is very dangerous,
that just at the moment when a new international situation
emerges, there should be a faltering of political nerve in the
countries with the greatest international influence on what does,
and does not, constitute a desirable political system. This may
please the more critical in these societies, but one may doubt if it
will do much to help those in the rest of the world who, when
asked, tend to want more rather than less of the universal
principles happier countries take for granted. In the international
debate, it is often those in power, and who benefit from current
variations in international norm, who are the first to tell us that
universal criteria do not apply: governments, clergymen, indeed
men in general, are those who trumpet normative exceptionalism.
Yet independence, secularism, equality, the rule of law, and a
range of economic and social privileges, constitute a good life as
internationally defined.
Here we come back to the issue of intervention and how far, and
in what ways, the international community should seek to enforce
these norms, pertaining not just to relations between states, but
also to those within them. We cannot construe international
relations, or the role of the great powers, primarily in terms of a
muscular normative police: but we can see that any realistic, and
cooperative, policies designed to further respect for these principles
is desirable, and develop policies to make it so. If we do not do so,
this will constitute a great abdication, even if it is defended in the
name of individuality, anti-hegemonism or plain post-modernist
whimsy.
Alternatives in Research
The neglect of the normative in most International Relations

literature of the post-1945 epoch, be it in its north American or

British variants, is in part to be attributed to the fear of falling into
the mistakes of the inter-war 'utopians', in part to the rather too
close identification of the discipline with the priorities, and
temper, of states. Methodological orientation, in this case a
complacency of value, is as much the servant of power as is
apologetic explanation. Yet the neglect of the normative is, as
much as anything, highlighted by the uncertainty which has come
to prevail in public discussion, academic and other, in the
aftermath of the Cold War, with anxiety about the overall
direction of political life intersecting with the vacuities of post-
modernism and ethical relativism. The only suitable response to
this double crisis, of international analysis and ethical meandering,
is to offer an alternative set of themes on which to base research
and analysis.
What this particular survey of International Relations suggests is
one such agenda for the study of international relations, based on
greater awareness of a range of concepts that have hitherto had a
secondary or marginal place in the discipline, and on a methodo-
logical orientation that eschews the cult of quantification, predic-
tion and 'scientificity' for a commitment to theoretical and
historical explanation. In this light, the preceding chapters can be
summarised to suggest the following research programme:
(1) the forms of expansion of the capitalist system, from, the

fifteenth century onwards, its contradictory impact on the pre-
capitalist world, the evolution of forms of inter-capitalist
relationship and capitalism's conflict with the transitory non-
capitalist bloc of twentieth century communism;
(2) the examination of how capitalism operates as an international
system and of the specific political forms, the sovereign state
and the ideology of nationalism, that it has produced and
maintained, with, in the present context in particular, a
measured assessment of the changing forms of interaction
between states and global processes;
(3) the manner in which agency, including but not specifically that
of classes, operates transnationally, both in its constitution
and in its influence, taking into account the impact of
informed and active non-governmental actors, e.g. on matters
of ecology or human rights, the international organisation of
Conclusion 243
hegemonic social groups, and the, fragmented but recurrent,

international actions of subordinated groups;
(4) the study of conflict in its social and political context, the
analysis of war, beyond the fetishism of arms races and
balances of power, and of the role of both ethnic mobilisation
and social revolution in fracturing and constituting the
international system;
(5) the formulation and potential implementation of moral
principles, and, where agreement is not possible, a minimal
agreed form of legitimate moral debate, on issues pertinent to
the international - loyalty, identity, security, equality,
freedom, amongst others.
Given the combination of political turmoil and theoretical

confusion that appear to be accompanying the end of the twentieth
century, the challenge, and responsibilities, of a discipline
concerned with the international would appear to be larger than
ever. The greatest dangers would be agnosticism, analytic or
moral, or a relapse in the conformities of either side of the
Atlantic. Those conformities may now have exhausted themselves,
as much as the international context in which they originated.
However, it would be equally mistaken to confuse what is
undoubtedly a major turning point in world history with an
assumed necessity to overthrow all established conceptual
systems. The 'presentism' of international affairs need not, though
it may, entail a revision of theoretical approaches, analytic or
moral. The least one can say is that the two issues, of change in
world history and change in philosophical and theoretical orienta-
tion, have to be kept separate: the collapse of the Berlin Wall, or
the internationalisation of capital and labour, do not imply that
there is no longer a distinction between 'ought' and 'is', or that
basic forms of rationalism are now invalidated, any more than it
means the earth is flat or the moon is really, after all, made of
cheese. The research programme outlined here, and developed
through the critical chapters of this book, would suggest that there
are many conceptual tools available to analyse, and provide moral
orientation in, the post-Cold War world.
If there is validity in the claim that we have as citizens, as
politicians, as academics, been 'sleep-walking' through history,
then the conclusion, evident enough, is that we need to be a little
more alert and awake. We shall hear, and indeed are already
hearing, much reflection on the end of the century, and the start of
a new millennium. All of this may be portentous irrelevancy, not
least because for much of the world the millennium corresponds to
another chronological system: there are at least six other systems
of counting the years to be found in the world to date - the
Judaic, the Muslim, the Zoroastrian Persian, the Ethiopian, the
Chinese and the Japanese- and their millennia come and go at
different times. There is nothing more ethnocentric than the year
2000. But if the idea of millennium, like that of examinations,
helps to focus minds, so much the better.
Political leaders, elected and unelected, have had a pretty poor
record over the past hundred years, but the scientists, natural or
social, have also had mixed reports. The danger has been not that
social scientists have been too removed from the concerns of
power, political or entrepreneurial, but that they have not had
enough distance from them, have not exerted themselves force-
fully enough to rise above the supposed common sense of their
epoch, and have consoled themselves with the vacuous and the
insignificant: hence, on the part of the natural sciences, the effort
devoted to weapons of mass destruction and the failure, till very
late in the day, to predict the impact of mankind on the
environment, distortions amply reproduced by the social scientists,
including those in International Relations. Here, above all, the
social scientists have often failed to display independence and
intellectual enterprise. For all, politicians and academics, natural
scientists and social scientists, the least that can be said is that the
record of the past hundred years has not been a very good one and
that the enormous suffering visited on humanity can teach us the
better to address the questions we face. Many of the forces that
will shape the next century, and the next millennium, and which
will shape the agenda of politicians and social scientists alike, have
already been unleashed: they had better take stock of them now.
Perhaps it would not be too unrealistic to hope that a better job
can be done in the next century than was made of it in the last.
Notes
1 Introduction: The Pertinence of the 'International'
1. The belief in a single paradigm as 'normal' and desirable received

confirmation from Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolu-
tions (London: University of Chicago, 1962). The contrary argument,
that diversity is desirable, was made in Paul Feyerabend's Against
Method (London: NLB, 1975).
2. This 'international' context for the spread of nationalism is recognised
by a variety of theories, whether the political theory of Elie Kedourie
(Nationalism, London: Hutchinson, 1960) or the sociological
approach of Ernest Gellner (Nations and Nationalism, Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1983).
3. Robin Blackburn, The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, I776-I848
(London: Verso, 1988).
4. Ulrich Albrecht, Internationale Politik (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1986)
ch. 9, 'Das Demokratieproblem in der internationalen Politik'.
5. For surveys of this see Howard Williams, International Relations in
Political Theory (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1992);
Torbjorn Knutsen, A History of International Relations Theory
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992); Terry Nardin and
David Mapel (eds) Traditions of International Ethics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992); Martin Wight, International
Theory: The Three Traditions (Leicester University Press, 1991).
6. For general histories and surveys of IR see, amongst others, Margot
Light and A.J.R. Groom (eds) International Relations: A Handbook
of Current Theory (London: Frances Pinter, 1985; 2nd edn forth-
coming 1994); Steve Smith (ed.) International Relations: British and
American Perspectives (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985); Hugh Dyer
and Leon Mangassarian (eds) The Study of International Relations:
The State of the Art (London: Macmillan, 1989); Marc Williams (ed.)
International Relations in the Twentieth Century: A Reader
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989); A.J.R. Groom and William Onuf,
International Relations then and now (London: Routledge, 1992).
7. Woodrow Wilson, 'The coming age of peace' from The State (1918)
excerpted in Evan Luard (ed.) Basic Texts in International Relations
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992) pp. 267-71.
8. E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis (London: Macmillan, 1966);
Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5th edn (New York:
Alfred Knopf, 1978); Henry Kissinger, A World Restored (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1957); Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1954).
245
246 Notes
9. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1977); Fred Northedge, The International Political System
(London: Faber & Faber, 1976).
10. Alan James, Sovereign Statehood (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986)
and his counter-attack against recent theoretical developments in IR,
'The realism of realism: The state and the study of international
relations', Review of International Studies, vol. 15, no. 2, July 1989;
Michael Donelan, Elements of International Political Theory (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1990); James Mayall, Nationalism and International
Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Adam
Watson, The Evolution of International Society (London: Routledge,
1992).
11. Carl Schmitt, The Concept of The Political (New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press, 1975).
12. Charles Merriam, Political Power (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939);
Harold Lasswell, Who Gets What, When, How (Cleveland, Ohio:
The World Publishing Company, 1958).
13. For a cogent critique of the assumptions of realism see Justin
Rosenberg, 'What's the matter with realism?' Review of International
Studies, vol. 16, no. 3, October 1990.
14. Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (New York:
Wiley, 1953); James Rosenau (ed.) Linkage Politics (New York: Free
Press, 1969); Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International
Politics (New York: Wiley, 1957).
15. This debate is resumed in Klaus Knorr and James Rosenau (eds)
Contending Approaches to International Politics (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1969). See also the contemporaneous
debate between Rosenau and Northedge in Millennium, vol. 5, no. 1,
1976.
16. I am particularly grateful to my colleague Michael Banks for his
assessment of this debate: see, for example, his 'The inter-paradigm
debate' in Light and Groom (eds) International Relations.
17. See in particular the chapter in Light and Groom (eds) International
Relations by Christopher Hill and Margot Light.
18. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (eds) Transnational Relations and
World Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).
19. Kenneth Waltz, 'The myth of national interdependence' in Charles
Kindelberger (ed.) The International Corporation (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1970).
20. Stephen Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against
Global Liberalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
21. Robert Tucker, The Inequality of Nations (London: Martin
Robertson, 1977).
22. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Relations (New York:
Random House, 1979).
23. John Burton, World Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1972). For a critique of Burton see Christopher Hill,
'Implications of the world society perspective for national foreign
Notes 247
policies' in Michael Banks (ed.) Conflict in World Society: A New

Perspective on International Relations (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1984).
24. For an alternative, sociological, approach to foreign policy, see David
Gibbs The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: Mines,
Money, and U.S. Policy in the Congo Crisis (London: University of
Chicago Press, 1991).
25. Examples of this interaction between historical sociology and the
international include John Hall, Powers and Liberties (London:
Pelican, 1986) and Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, vol. 1
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). These issues were
explored further at a series of seminars, funded by the Economic and
Social Research Council, under the title 'Structural Decline in the
West' held at Cambridge between 1988 and 1991. The proceedings of
the first of these conferences are in Michael Mann (ed.) The Rise and
Decline of The Nation State (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990).
26. Two examples: the role of 'imperialism' in shaping and distorting the
national economies of third world states; the role of the Cold War in
strengthening centralised government in the USA and producing a
'national security state'.
27. For work on this see references in Note 5, above, also Charles Beitz,
Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1979) and 'Sovereignty and morality in international
affairs' in David Held (ed.) Political Theory Today (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1991 ); Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the
Theory of International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1981) and
Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International
Relations (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990); John Vincent, Human
Rights and International Relations (Oxford; Oxford University Press,
1988).
28. This is, amongst other things, the domain of international economy.
See in particular Susan Strange, States and Markets: An Introduction
to International Political Economy (London: Pinter, 1988).
2 Theories in Contention
1. This is a point well made in the stimulating work of Charles Reynolds,

The World of States: An Introduction to Explanation and Theory
(Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1992).
2. Yosi Lapid, 'The third debate: On the prospects of international
theory in a post-positivist era', International Studies Quarterly,
September 1989. What theory needed was not 'post-positivism' but a
return to some good, 'pre-positivist', foundations.
3. For two, among many, examples see Michael Howard, The Lessons
of History (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), and Walter Laqueur, World of
Secrets, The Uses and Abuses of Intelligence (London: Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, 1985).
4. In the Anglo-Saxon world in particular empiricism has the status of a
248 Notes
secular religion: intellectual ability is conflated with 'general

knowledge' -hence the UK competition for someone who knows as
many facts as possible goes under the title 'Brain of Britain'.
5. For two powerful critiques of empiricism see C. Wright Mills, The
Sociological Imagination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959),
and David and Judith Willers, Systematic Empiricism: Critique of a
Pseudoscience (Heme) Hempstead: Prentice-Hall, 1973).
6. On this see the perceptive essay 'History and International Relations'
by Christopher Hill in Steve Smith ( eds) International Relations:
British and American Approaches (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985)
and his own Decision-making in British Foreign Policy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990).
7. For earlier critiques of the 'English school' see Michael Nicholson,
'The enigma of Martin Wight', Review of International Studies, 1981,
vol. 7 January 1981; Roy Jones 'The English school of international
relations: A case for closure?' Review of International Studies, vol. 7,
no. 1, 1981.
8. For two overviews see Quentin Skinner (ed.) The Return of Grand
Theory in the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1985); Perry Anderson, A Zone of Engagement (London:
Verso, 1992).
9. In Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds) Diplomatic Investiga-
tions (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966). Deference to the historians'
definition of the subject is present even in the title of the volume.
10. See Chapter 3, below, pp. 56-8, 61-3.
11. For materials in this debate see the exchange between Fred
Northedge and James Rosenau in Millennium, vol. 5, no. 1, 1976, and
the chapters in Klaus Knorr and James Rosenau (eds) Contending
Approaches to International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University
Press 1969). For an earlier perceptive 'British' critique of US political
science, touching on many of the same issues raised in the IR debate,
see Bernard Crick, The American Science of Politics (London,
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959).
12. Ekkehart Krippendorff, 'The dominance of American approaches in
IR', in Hugh Dyer and Leon Margassaran (eds) The Study of
International Relations: The State of the Art (London: Macmillan,
1989).
13. James Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, 2nd edn
(London: Pinter, 1980); J.P. Singer (ed) Quantitative International
Politics (New York: Free Press, 1965).
14. For two other rather different critiques of the orthodox view of
scientific method see Rom Harre, The Philosophies of Science
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1972) and Paul Feyerabend,
Against Method (London, NLB, 1975).
15. For an account see James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff,
Contending Theories of International Relations, 2nd edn, pp. 347-50
(New York: Harper & Row, 1981). As the authors prudently put it:
'Up to now, statistical techniques have provided no startling results,
Notes 249
and few conclusive ones, useful for the development of a coherent

theory of war' (p. 347). The phrase 'up to now' contains, of course,
the promise of a breakthrough: more than a decade later none has
been reported.
16. Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the
World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1987).
17. Karl Kautsky, socialist German leader, was the originator of the
theory of 'ultra-imperialism', according to which the major powers
would reduce their tensions and proceed to collaborate against the
rest of the world. Few analyses in the social sciences can have had
such an unfortunate short-term fate, since this theory was enunciated
in the summer of 1914, as the First World War began. See Karl
Kautsky, 'Ultra-imperialism', New Left Review, no. 59, January-
February 1970.
18. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random
House, 1979); significant portions were re-published in Robert
Keohane (ed.) Neo-Realism and its Critics (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1986), which also included a further text by Waltz,
'Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A response to my
critics'. Subsequent references will give both sources.
19. Waltz, Theory, p. 66; Keohane, Neo-Realism, p. 53.
21. Goran Therborn, 'The economic theorists of capitalism', New Left
Review, nos 87-88, September-December 1974, p. 125.
22. Keohane, Neo-Realism, p. 329.
26. Keohane, Neo-Realism, pp. 323-30.
27. Ibid., p. 323.
28. Ibid., pp. 127-8.
29. For accounts of the emergence of this school see James DerDerian
and Michael Shapiro International/Intertextual Relations: Post
Modern Readings of World Politics (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath,
1989); Mark Hoffman, 'Restructuring, reconstruction, reinscription
and rearticulation: Four voices in critical international theory',
Millennium, vol. 16, no. 2, 1987.
30. See p. 256, n. 3.
31. One, confused, exception is Richard Ashley in Der Derian and
Shapiro, International/Intertextual Relations, pp. 317-19. Ashley
recognises the existence of these criticisms and then falls back on the
advice to listen to marginal groups. Yes, but ...
32. Der Derian and Shapiro, International/Intertextual Relations,
pp. ix-x.
33. Among the many critiques of post-modernism see Peter Dews, Logics
of Disintegration (London: Verso, 1986); Perry Anderson, In the
Tracks of Historical Materialism (London: Verso, 1983); Ernest
250 Notes
Gellner, Post-Modernism, Reason and Religion (London: Routledge,

1992).
34. Robert Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations and Political
Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
35. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations and Political Theory,
p. 1.
36. For an illuminating discussion of Weber's views on nationalism and
international conflict, and the place of these in his broader work, see
Anderson, A Zone of Engagement, ch. 9, p. 158.
37. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Revolutions of 1848 (London:
Penguin, 1973) pp. 70-1.
38. For one illuminating assessment of post-modernism and international
affairs see Christopher Norris, Postmodernism, Intellectuals and the
Gulf War (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1992).
39. One influential body of literature on the 'new social movements' was
that of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, notably their Hegemony
and Social Classes (London: Verso, 1985). Beyond their own, rather
more skilled, deployment of the language and indeed aura of the
Parisian debate, it is questionable, with hindsight, whether their
analysis had any more purchase on political reality in industrialised
democracies than that of the more orthodox Marxist school they
claimed to displace. On this see their spirited debate with Norman
Geras in New Left Review, nos. 163 (May-June 1987), 166
(November-December 1987) and 169 (May-June 1988).
40. See my debate with E.P. Thompson in Robin Blackburn (ed.) After
The Fall (London: Verso, 1991). Also Paul Hirst 'Peace and political
theory', Economy and Society, vol. 16, no. 2, May 1987.
3 Necessary Encounter: Historical Materialism and International

Relations
1. On the history of independent Marxism see Perry Anderson,

Considerations on Western Marxism (London: NLB, 1976). For one
representative of that tradition see Karl Korsch, Marxism and
Philosophy, translated and introduced by Fred Halliday (London:
NLB, 1970).
2. See Miklos Molnar, Marx, Engels et la Politique Internationale (Paris,
Gallimard, 1975); Vendulka Kubalkova and Andrew Cruickshank,
Marxism and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1986); Tony Thorndike, 'Marxism and International Relations'
in Trevor Taylor (ed.) Approaches and Theory in International
Relations (London: Longman, 1978).
3. Stephen Gill (ed.) Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International
Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Robert
Cox, 'Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond international
Notes 251
relations theory', Millennium, vol. 10, no 2, summer 1981. Cox's

work, a breakthrough in theoretical terms, relied rather too heavily
on an extrapolation from the doomed campaign for a New Inter-
national Economic Order.
4. Andrew Linklater, Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and
International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1990).
5. Martin Wight in International Theory: The Three Traditions, edited
by Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter (Leicester: Leicester University
Press) has four mentions of Marx, three of which turn out to be
repeating his view on force as the midwife of history (pp. 107, 214,
222). At no point does he assess the case for including Marx as a
theorist of one of his three categories 'revolutionism'. Morgenthau's
Politics Among Nations, 5th edn (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978)
is no better: all he does is to devote two pages to what he terms the
'devil' theory of imperialism: none of this comes from Marx, whose
works he fails to mention at all, and the rest is a simplification of
Lenin.
6. For a spirited critique of the orthodox approach see Bill Warren,
Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism (London: Verso, 1981).
7. On this see the very perceptive interpretation by Erica Benner, Marx
and Engels on Nationalism and National Identity: A Reappraisal
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
8. Valentino Gerratana, 'Marx and Darwin', New Left Review, no. 82,
November-December 1973.
9. In his otherwise judicious The World of States, Charles Reynolds
summarises Marx's theory as 'man is what he eats' (pp. 5, 29): this
German pun (man ist was er isst) is in fact the view of Feuerbach,
whom Marx rejected.
10. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology (London:
Lawrence & Wishart, 1965) pp. 46-7.
11. Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London: Weidenfeld
& Nicolson, 1969).
12. See, for example, the readings that formed the basis for the
innovative Open University course on world politics, in Richard Little
and Michael Smith (eds) Perspectives on World Politics, 2nd edn
(London: Routledge, 1991).
13. Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1, (London: Penguin Books in association
with New Left Review, 1976) pp. 929-30.
14. On Cox see Note 3, and the discussion by Linklater in Beyond
Realism and Marxism. On Habermas: Ian Craib, Modern Social
Theory (Brighton: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 1984), and Anthony
Giddens 'Jurgen Habermas' in Quentin Skinner (ed.) The Return of
Grand Theory in the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985).
15. Susan Strange, States and Markets (London, Pinter, 1988); Johann
Galtung, 'A structural theory of imperialism' in Michael Smith et al.
(eds) Perspectives on World Politics.
16. On this see, above all, Bill Warren Imperialism: Pioneer of
252 Notes
Capitalism, and Nigel Harris, The End of the Third World (London;
Penguin, 1985).
17. For an illuminating interpretation see Georg Lukacs, Lenin: A Study
in the Unity of his Thought (London: NLB, 1970), ch. 4.
18. For the original statement see Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern
World System (London: Academic, 1974). See Historical Capitalism
(London: Verso, 1983) for a more succinct statement of his view.
19. Peter Worsley, 'One World or Three: A Critique of the World System
of Immanuel Wallerstein' Socialist Register, 1980; Ernest Laclau,
Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory (London: NLB, 1977); Theda
Skocpol, 'Wallerstein's world capitalist system: A theoretical and
historical critique', American Journal of Sociology, vol. 82, no. 5,
1977.
20. E.P. Thompson, Fred Halliday and Rudolf Bahro, Exterminism and
Cold War (London: NLB, 1982).
21. Kees van der Pijl, The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class (London:
Vers9, 1984). Another influential body of work in parallel here is that
of the French 'regulation' school of Alan Lipiers and Michel Aglietta.
For a powerful critique of this school see Alice Amsden 'Third World
Industrialisation: "Global Fordism" or a New Model', New Left
Review, no. 182, July-August 1990).
22. Eric Wolf, Europe and The People Without History (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1982).
23. Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: NLB/
Verso, 1974).
24. The Age of Revolutions 1789-1848 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
1962); The Age of Capital 1848-1875 (London: Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, 1975); The Age of Imperialism 1875-1914 (London:
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987).
25. For the best surveys see Molnar, Marx, Engels et la Politique
lnternationale; on war see Bernard Semmel (ed.) Marxism and the
Science of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981); on nations
and nationalism, see Benner, Marx and Engels on Nationalism and
National Identity.
26. Derek Sayer, The Violence of Abstraction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987)
for a non-reductionist interpretation of Marx.
27. It is this argument which, in addition to forming the central theme of
the works of Wolf, Anderson and Hobsbawm mentioned above,
forms the basis of Justin Rosenberg's analysis of the origins and
development of the international system: The Empire of Civil Society:
A Critique of The Realist Theory of International Relations (London:
Verso, 1994). I am extremely grateful to Justin Rosenberg for the
many helpful suggestions he has made on the material in this chapter.
28. Eric Hobsbawm, 'Marx and History', New Left Review, no. 143,
January-February 1984.
29. The question of the impact of the Vietnam War on IR, and
specifically on the writing produced in the USA, might appear to be
unanswerable, since its main apparent consequence was to render
Notes 253
some subjects, such as the study of revolutions and social conflict, less
attractive. One answer is, however, that the impact is to be found in
the interest in 'interdependence', since the conflict in South-East Asia
was seen to be provoking major conflict within the USA.
30. Tom Bottomore, Classes in Modern Society (London: Allen &
Unwin, 1965). For one application to IR see Cox 'Social forces, states
and world orders'.
31. One obvious example of this interaction is the oil industry, where, for
a century or more, major corporations have influenced and utilised
states, in producer and consumer countries, to further their interests:
Simon Bromley, American Hegemony and World Oil (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991). For an outstanding account ofthe
interaction of US banks and the US state see Jeffery Frieden,
Banking on The World (New York: Harper and Row, 1987). For
another revealing study of US foreign policy in terms of the influence
of business see David Gibbs, The Political Economy of Third World
Intervention.
32. This is discussed at greater length in Chapter 6.
33. For one illuminating example of the application of Marxist method to
a major historical event see Ernest Mandel, The Meaning of World
War I/ (London: Verso, 1986).
34. Arno Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peace-Making: Containment
and Counter-Revolution at Versailles, 1918-1919 (New York: Knopf,
1967).
35. See Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society, ch. 5.
36. Julian Lider, Correlation of Forces: An Analysis of Marxist-Leninist
Concepts (Aidershot: Gower, 1988); Margot Light, The Soviet Theory
of International Relations (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1988).
4 State and Society in International Relations
1. The argument for a diversity of paradigms is energetically made in

Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (London: Verso, 1975). Feyer-
abend's anarchist theory that any paradigm 'goes' is implausible, but
his demonstration of the benefits of paradigm competition, and of the
many 'non-scientific' factors that go into scientific development, and
into the acceptance of paradigms, is convincing.
2. One notable discussion of this is Stanley Hoffmann's 'An American
social science: International relations', Daedalus, vol. 106, no. 3,
October 1977. Hoffman avoids the tendency of some others who have
criticised the manner in which a certain North American orthodoxy
has dominated International Relations: namely, to pose the question
in national terms as that of an 'American' approach. What both the
orthodox exponents of International Relations, and their nationalist
critics, obscure is that there is immense diversity within the US
literature, and that it is the denial of this diversity that constitutes the
real problem with the orthodox US presentation.
254 Notes
3. On incommensurability, see T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific

Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1970) pp. 148ff.
4. Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London: Weidenfeld
& Nicolson, 1969) is the classic analysis of this question. For an
overview of subsequent debates see Bob Jessup, The Capitalist State
(Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982).
5. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds)
Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1985). Among other contributions see John Hall and John Ikenberry,
The State (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1989); John Hall,
Powers and Liberties (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986); John Hall
(ed.) States in History (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) and his entry
'State' in Joel Krieger (ed.) The Oxford Companion to Politics of the
World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Michael Banks and
Martin Shaw (eds) State and Society in International Relations
(London: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 1991); and Anthony Giddens, The
Nation State and Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1985). Giddens, p. 17, distinguishes the two meanings of the state but
does not see this as posing a major problem. A recent discussion of
some implications of Giddens' work for international relations is
found in Linklater, Beyond Realism and Marxism, passim.
6. Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach, The Elusive Quest: Theory
and International Politics (Columbia, SC: University of South
Carolina Press, 1988) ch. 5: 'The state as an obstacle to international
theory'; Ferguson and Mansbach, The State, Conceptual Chaos, and
the Future of International Relations Theory (London: Lynne Reiner,
1989); Ferguson and Mansbach, 'Between celebration and despair:
Constructive suggestions for future international theory', Inter-
national Studies Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 4, December 1991. The
'constructive suggestions' turn out to be general ideas - to be
historically aware, etc. -little more than a random list of injunctions.
7. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (London: Macmillan, 1977) p. 8;
Kenneth Waltz, Man, The State and War (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1954) pp. 172-8.
8. F.S. Northedge, The International Political System (London: Faber &
Faber, 1976) p. 15. A more recent statement of this classical position
can be found in Alan James, Sovereign Statehood (London: Allen &
Unwin, 1986). James presents the concept of the state as straight-
forward, using it to comprise 'territory, people and a government'
(p. 13).
9. This is the argument of Cornelia Navari in her introduction to The
Condition of States (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991) pp.
11-15. Her awareness of the different meanings of state is not
replicated in the chapters of her other contributors.
10. Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1979) p. 29.
11. Louis Althusser, 'Ideology and ideological state apparatuses' in Lenin
and Philosophy (London: New Left, 1971).
Notes 255
12. Fred Block, 'Beyond relative autonomy: State managers as historical

subjects', Socialist Register, 1980.
13. Robert Brenner, 'The "Autonomy" of the State', Isaac Deutscher
Memorial Lecture, London School of Economics, 21 November 1986.
14. Any concept of 'international society' presupposes a concept of
domestic society. On this see Chapter 5.
15. Paul Cammack 'Bringing the State Back In?', British Journal of
Political Science, vol. 19, April 1989.
16. The long-run implications of foreign policy analysis are such as to
challenge the prevailing totality concept of the state: but much of the
literature has been within a behavioural framework that ignores the
relevance of sociological writing on the state, or has become restricted
by a fetishism of decision-making as an end in itself.
17. Charles Tilly, 'War making and state making as organised crime' in
Evans et al. (eds) Bringing the State Back In, and Charles Tilly (ed.)
The Formation of National States in Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1975). For a masterful exposition of the role of
violence in constituting modern states see J.B. Barrington Moore,
The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (London: Allen
Lane, 1966).
18. Goran Therborn, What Does the Ruling Class do When it Rules?
(London: New Left, 1978) provides an illuminating survey of the
relationship of external factors to the functioning of state apparatuses.
19. Felix Gilbert (ed.) The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1975) chs 4 to 8, provides detailed historical
analysis of the relationship between individual state formation and
the international competition between states in modern European
history. For an illuminating study of the impact of international
political factors on state economic policies see Gautam Sen, The
Military Origins of Industrialisation and International Trade Rivalry
(London: Frances Pinter, 1984). Karl Polanyi's The Great Trans-
formation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1957) provides an overview of nineteenth- and
twentieth-century history in similar vein.
20. Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, vol. 1 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1976); 'The autonomous power of the
state: Its origins, mechanisms and results' in John Hall (ed.) States in
History (Oxford, Blackwell, 1986); Mann, States, War and Capitalism
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), especially Chapter 1.
21. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, ch. 1.
22. A pioneering survey of the relative international accesses of
hegemonic and dominated classes is that of Carolyn Vogler, The
Nation State (Aidershot: Gower, 1985).
23. Goran Therborn, 'The rule of capital and the rise of democracy', New
Left Review, no. 103, May-June 1977. As Therborn points out, the
principle of 'one person- one vote' was not effective in either the US
or the UK until the 1960s.
24. The briefest glance at standard International Relations textbooks can
256 Notes
show how little the implications, theoretical and empirical, of

revolutions have been taken into account, with the partial exceptions
of discussion of intervention and 'subversion'. For a comparable
neglect of the international dimension within most conventional
sociological literature on revolution see Stan Taylor, Social Science
and Revolutions (London: Macmillan, 1984).
25. Raymond Aron, Peace and War (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
1966) pp. 373-81.
26. See Martin Wight, Power Politics (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1979) p.
92. In an illuminated footnote, Wight suggests that for the majority of
the years between 1942 and 1960 international relations have been
'revolutionary' rather than 'normal'. The implications of this have
not, however, been conventionally recognised.
27. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System (London,
Academic, 1974) and Eric Wolf, Europe and the People Without
History (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982).
5 International Theory as Homogeneity
1. For an early discussion of 'homogeneity', see Raymond Aron, Peace

and War (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1966), pp. 373-81.
2. Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical
Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962).
3. See, for example, Leslie Sklair, Sociology of the Global System
(Hemel Hempstead: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 1991); and essays by
Featherstone, Urry, Robertson and Apparudai in Michael Feather-
stone (ed.) Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and
Modernity, special issue of Theory, Culture and Society (London,
Sage, 1990).
4. 'The ends of Cold War' in Robin Blackburn (ed.) After the Fall
(London: Verso, 1991) pp. 78-99.
5. See, among others, James Mayall, 'International society and inter-
national theory' in Michael Donelan (ed.) The Reason of States
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1978) pp. 122-141; and Hedley Bull and
Adam Watson, The Expansion of International Society (London:
Oxford University Press, 1984).
6. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World
Politics (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1977) p. 13. Emphasis in the
original.
7. Ibid., p. 41, and indeed all of chapter 2.
8. Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions, edited by
Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter (Leicester: Leicester University
Press; London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs) ch. 3.
9. On the development in English usage of the term 'society', see
Raymond Williams, Keywords (London: Fontana, 1976).
10. For an account of the term in classical and modern thinking see David
Notes 257
Frisby and Derek Sayer, Society (Chichester: Ellis Horwood,

London: Tavistock, 1986).
11. An interesting further example of this elitist usage is found in early
twentieth-century Russian political vocabulary, where the word
obshchestvo tended to mean 'educated urban and landowning noble
society'. 'The term described those members of the population who,
by virtue of education, wealth or public service had an implied right to
participate in politics but were thwarted by the state' (David McLaren
Macdonald, United Government and Foreign Policy in Russia, I900-
19I4, London: Harvard University Press, 1992, p. 222, note 5).
12. Martin Wight, Power Politics (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1979) p.
105.
13. On these three interpretations of the concept of hegemony see Brian
Turner, Paul Abercrombie and Stephen Hill, The Dominant Ideology
Thesis (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981). On Gramsci's theory of
hegemony, a rather more robust and specific one than its recent
occurrence within International Relations literature would suggest,
see: Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, edited
and trans. by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London:
Lawrence & Wishart, 1971); John Cammett, Antonio Gramsci and
the Origins of Italian Communism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1967) ch. 10; and Perry Anderson, 'The antinomies of Antonio
Gramsci', New Left Review, no. 100, November-December 1976, pp.
5-78.
14. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System (London:
Academic Press, 1979); Eric Wolf, Europe and the People Without
History (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982); and
Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire (London: Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, 1987).
15. I am particularly grateful to Justin Rosenberg for his many insights on
this matter: see his, 'What's the matter with realism?', Review of
International Studies, vol. 16, no. 4, October 1990, pp. 285-303.
16. Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); John Burton, World Society and Susan
Strange, States and Markets (London, Pinter, 1988).
17. Evan Luard, International Society (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990).
18. Sklair, Sociology of the Global System.
19. Featherstone (ed.), Global Culture.
20. For a historical overview of the enduring sociological concern with
international formation of individual societies see the essay by Bryan
Turner, 'The two faces of sociology: Global or national?' in Michael
Featherstone (ed.) Global Culture.
21. See Chapter 2, pp. 30--1.
22. For an excellent discussion see Joseph Camilleri and Jim Falk, The
End of Sovereignty? (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1992).
23. For critiques of theories of an increasingly 'transnational' economy,
see David Gordon, 'The global economy: New edifice or crumbling?'
New Left Review, no. 168,. March-April 1988, pp. 24--64; and Paul
258 Notes
Hirst and Graeme Thompson, 'The problem of "Globalisation" ',

Economy and Society, vol. 21, no. 4, November 1992, pp.
357-96.
24. As quoted in Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society
(London: Routledge, 1992) pp. 206-8. Watson (p. 8) also quotes
Gibbon as claiming that 'a philosopher may be permitted to consider
Europe as one great republic'. Despite his affiliation to the English
school, Watson seems little concerned with the distinction between
'systems' and 'societies' of states. On the eighteenth-century back-
ground, and its implications for ideas of a common set of values, see
Felix Gilbert 'The "new diplomacy" of the eighteenth century', World
Politics (1951) pp. 4--5.
25. For a general overview of the implications of Burke's theories for
international relations see John Vincent, 'Edmund Burke and the
theory of international relations', Review of International Studies, vol.
10, no. 3, July 1984, pp. 205-18, and Hans-Gerd Schumann, Edmund
Burke's Anschauungen von Gleichgewicht in Staat und Staatensystem
(Meisenheim: Glan, 1964). For discussion of his later writing on
France, with extended excerpts and some commentary, see Conor
Cruise O'Brien, The Great Melody: A Thematic Biography and
Commented Anthology of Edmund Burke (London: Sinclair-
Stevenson, 1992) pp. 542-69. He argues that, while Burke was wrong
to see the post-1794 regime as revolutionary, he was right in
foreseeing Napoleon's pursuit of 'honor, glory and riches' through
expansion (p. 555). A discussion of Burke's theory that closely
parallels the one here is to be found in Jennifer Welsh's 'Edmund
Burke and the Commonwealth of Europe', paper presented to annual
conference of British International Studies Association, December
1992.
26. For an interpretation of Burke as in some measure a radical, see
Conor Cruise O'Brien, Introduction to Reflections on the Revolution
in France (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968).
27. Burke, Reflections, pp. 125-6, 262-5 and 376-7. All other quotations
are from The Works and Correspondence of Edmund Burke, vol. 5
(London: Francis and John Rivington, 1852).
28. Burke, Works and Correspondence, pp. 305-6.
29. Ibid., pp. 320-1.
30. Ibid., pp. 307-9.
31. Ibid., p. 259.
32. Ibid., p. 313.
33. Ibid., p. 322.
34. On this similarity between Marx and other contemporaries see my
'Bringing the economic back in: The case of nationalism', Economy
and Society, vol. 21, no. 4, November 1992.
35. Quotations from Saint-Simon and discussion in Emile Durkheim,
Socialism and Saint-Simon, edited by Alvin Gouldner (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959) pp. 170-5.
36. Manifesto of the Communist Party in Karl Marx, The Revolutions of
Notes 259
1848: Political Writings, ed. David Fernbach, vol. 1 (Harmondsworth:

Penguin Books in association with New Left Review, 1973) p. 71.
37. On the changing focus in Marx's work see Teodor Shanin (ed.) Late
Marx and the Russian Road (London: Routledge, 1983).
38. See Tom Kemp, Imperialism (London: Dennis Dobson, 1967); and
Bill Warren, Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism (London: Verso,
1980); Michael Lowy, The Politics of Combined and Uneven
Development (London: Verso, 1981).
39. Francis Fukuyama, 'The end of history', The National Enquirer,
Summer 1989; and The End of History and the Last Man (London:
Hamish Hamilton, 1992).
40. Fukuyama, End of History, p. 76.
41. Ibid., pp. xiv-xv.
42. Michael Doyle, 'Liberalism and world politics', American Political
Science Review, vol. 80, no. 4, December 1986, pp. 115-69.
43. Manifesto, p. 71.
44. It may, at first sight, appear unfair to include Ireland in this category,
since, in contrast to the fascist countries, it allowed political pluralism
and a measure of constitutional liberty from independence in 1922. In
certain respects however, particularly under the Fianna Fail Govern-
ments of the 1930s and 1940s, it was engaged in a mild version of
semi-peripheral escape: ideological repression through censorship
and clerical control of education, economic delinking through import
substitution and trade controls, all of this topped off with nationalist
cant about Hibernian exceptionalism, in the economy and in the eyes
of God.
45. For a brief analysis of the Portuguese case, see my 'Whatever
happened to the Portuguese Revolution?', New Statesman, 15 April
1992. The argument here is that to see the Portuguese Revolution of
1974-5 as having been 'betrayed' or 'lost' misses the intentions of the
majority of those who organised and supported it, which was precisely
to fulfil the uncompleted agenda of the 1910 liberal constitutional
revolution, to integrate with the rest of Europe and cast off the
anachronistic burden of the African colonies.
46. Such comparisons were much less evident in the more insulated
political environment of the United Kingdom, where nationalist
appeals to British uniqueness, especially on issues of constitutional
reform, still seemed to carry the day. One striking exception was the
front page headline on the low educational standards in Britain:
'Bottom of the Class - Only Brazil, Mozambique andthe old Soviet
Union have WORSE schools', The Daily Mirror, 13 March 1992.
47. For one attempt to theorise precisely such a process see G. John
Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, 'Socialization and hegemonic
power', International Organization, vol. 44, no. 3, Summer 1990, pp.
283-315.
260 Notes
6 'The Sixth Great Power': Revolutions and the International

System
1. See Harry Eckstein, Internal War (New York: Free Press, 1964), and
James Rosenau, 'Internal War as an International Event' in Rosenau
(ed.) note 9 below.
2. This is a core tenet of realism and nco-realism, despite concessions by
many realists that the exclusion of internal factors is merely an
analytic convenience. Waltz's argument is clearly spelt out in Theory
of International Politics, ch. 4: I have discussed this assumption and
the shifts in argument involved in Chapter 2, above. Examples of
conventional IR suppression of the question of the international
dimensions of revolution are legion. For example, Jack Plano and
Roy Olton's The International Relations Dictionary, 4th edn (Santa
Barbara: Longman, 1988) has no discussion of the general inter-
relationship of the two subjects: an (unindexed)item on revolution
and war discusses only internal aspects. IR literature is replete with
discussion of alliances, yet rarely is it made clear that (a) many
alliances have as their original purpose the suppression of revolution
within member states and (b) that one of the main reasons for the
collapse or ending of alliances is that revolutions occur within some of
the constituents: the fates of SEATO, CENTO and the Warsaw Pact
should make this latter point evident enough- victims, respectively,
of the Vietnamese, Iranian and Eastern European upheavals. Indeed
CENTO fell victim to revolution twice over: its initial form, the
Baghdad Pact, had to be abandoned in favour of CENTO after the
Iraqi Revolution of 1958.
3. See for example the overview of the sociological literature in Stan
Taylor, Social Science and Revolutions (London: Macmillan, 1984).
4. Jack Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr and Farrokh Moshiri (eds)
Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century (Boulder and Oxford:
Westview, 1991) p. 41. See also Jack Goldstone, Revolution and
Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley and Oxford:
California University Press, 1991; Jack Goldstone (ed.) Revolutions:
Theoretical, Comparative and Historical Studies (London: Harcourt,
Brace, Jovanovitch, 1986). For extensive discussion of, and by,
Goldstone see Contention: Debates in Society, Culture, and Science
Winter 1993, no. 5, particularly the article by John Foran, 'Revolu-
tionising theory/Theorising revolutions', which assesses Goldstone's
Revolution and Rebellion. Foran (p. 73) poses the intriguing question
of how far demographic growth can be treated as an independent (by
which he means externally determined) variable, and how far it is the
result of different, national, processes.
5. Fred Northedge. The International Political System (London, Faber &
Faber, 1976), pp. 28-30; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp.
127-8. Despite non-conformity on other matters James Der Derian
comes to similar conclusions: On Diplomacy: The Revolutionary State
Notes 261
in International Society: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement

(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989) p. 198.
6. Revolution and World Order (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp.
8-11,40-1,75-8, 155-7,242-3,307-10.
7. I have developed this argument in my The Making of the Second Cold
War (London: Verso, 1983). Some writers on strategic studies,
including Alexander George, Raymond Garthoff and Michael
Mandelbaum, have discussed this interrelationship, but it has, in the
main, failed to find sufficient place in analyses of the post-war arms
race and strategic competition. For example, Garthoff's Reflections
on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington, Brookings Institution,
1987) makes mention of Soviet fears of a US invasion of Cuba but
greatly understates the importance of this, eminently rational,
concern in the Soviet decision to station missiles on the island. That
this was a possibility is confirmed by Pierre Salinger, at that time
Kennedy's press secretary: see 'Kennedy and Cuba: The pressure to
invade was fierce', International Herald Tribune, 6 February 1989. In
conventional British academic studies of the nuclear arms race the
impact of third world revolutions rates hardly a mention.
8. The chronology of funding and publication of US works on internal
wars and their international dimensions tells its own story: a rush of
interest, motivated by concern in the wake of the Cuban revolution,
in the early 1960s, followed by a taut silence once the difficulties of
the Vietnam War became evident. The impact, explicit and tacit, of
the Vietnam War on the academic study of International Relations has
yet to be analysed.
9. Henry Kissinger, A World Restored (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith,
1973); Richard Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in International
Politics (Boston: Little Brown, 1963); Martin Wight, Power Politics
(London: Penguin, 1966), ch. 7; James Rosenau (ed.) International
Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964);
Kim Kyong-won, Revolutions and the International System (London:
University of London Press, 1970); and Peter Calvert, Revolution and
International Politics (London: Frances Pinter, 1984).
10. The hypostatisation of 'terrorism' such that it becomes a term
covering a far wider range of actions than the use of terror itself, in
academic writing on IR has been one of the the discipline's more
sloppy chapters. Terrorism, in the sensational sense in which it has
normally been used, is a subaltern feature of international relations.
For historical, and some ethical, perspective see Walter Lacqueur,
Terrorism, 2nd edn (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989); Conor
Gearty, Terror, (London: Faber & Faber, 1991); Fred Halliday,
'Terrorism in historical perspective', Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 9,
no. 2 (Spring 1987).
11. R.R. Palmer, 'The world revolution of the West', Political Science
Quarterly, vol. 69, no. 1, March 1954; R.R. Palmer, The Age of the
Democratic Revolution, 1760-1800, 2 vols, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1959 and 1964); George Rude, Revolutionary
262 Notes
Europe 1783-1815 (London: Fontana, 1964); Jacques Godechot, La

Grande Nation (Paris: Aubier, 1956); Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of
Revolution: Europe 1789-1948 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
1962); E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, vol. 3 (London:
Penguin, 1973); Marcel Liebman, Leninism under Lenin (London:
Merlin Press, 1975), part 4; Isaac Deutscher, Marxism, Wars and
Revolution (London: Verso, 1984), and his biographies of Stalin and
Trotsky; Neil Harding, Lenin's Political Thought, vol. 2 (London:
Macmillan, 1981).
12. These points are well brought out in Jack Goldstone, 'Theories of
revolution: The third generation', World Politics, April 1980.
13. Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1979) p. 4.
14. Der Neuzeitliche Revolutionsbegriff, Entstehung und Entwicklung
(Weimar: Hermann Bohlaus Nachfolger, 1955). A section was
translated in Heinz Lubacs, Revolution (London: Macmillan,
1968). .
15. A classic article that covers some of the same ground as Griewank is
A.T. Ratto, ' "Revolution": An enquiry into the usefulness of an
historical term', Mind, October 1949.
16. Wight, Power Politics, p. 92.
17. On the revolutions of the 1640s, see Geoffrey Parker and Lesley
Smith (eds) The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978).
18. See Palmer, 'World revolution', and Democratic revolution.
19. Of the eight US presidents between 1945 and 1988 no less than six
gave their names to security doctrines designed to contain communist
and other radical challenges in the third world: Truman, Eisenhower,
Kennedy, Nixon, Carter, Reagan. Lyndon Johnson may have had no
doctrine to his name, but he certainly had a practice, in Vietnam and
in the Dominican Republic. Only Gerald Ford, a stopgap who
occupied the White House for two years after the resignation of
Richard Nixon in 1974, was an exception. See Fred Halliday, Cold
War, Third World (London: Radius/Hutchinson, 1989) ch. 3 for
further discussion.
20. I have gone further into the relation between East-West conflict and
third world revolution in my The Making of the Second Cold War
(London: Verso, 1983) and in Cold War, Third World. An interest-
ing, if belated, recognition of the linkage is to be found in the
Pentagon report, Discriminate Deterrence (Washington: Department
of Defense, 1989).
21. For example, Andrew Scott, The Revolution in Statecraft: Informal
Penetration (New York: Random House, 1965). Der Derian, On
Diplomacy has a similar discussion.
22. An example of such an argument with regard to the Iranian
Revolution is to be found in the conclusions to James Bill, The Eagle
and the Lion (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1988):
Bill proposes twelve ways in which US policy in such revolutionary
Notes 263
situations can be improved, to reduce conflict with the revolutionary

state. These are, in the main, counsels of perfection.
23. Fred Halliday, 'Iranian foreign policy since 1979: Internationalism
and nationalism in the Islamic Revolution', in Juan Cole and Nikki
Keddie (eds) Shi'ism and Social Protest (New Haven and London:
Yale University Press, 1986).
24. Raymond Aron, Peace and War (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
1966) pp. 373-81. As discussed in Chapter 5, this presumption of
homogeneity in internal political and social arrangements is distinct
from that found in the English school concept 'international society':
the latter is concerned only with homogeneity of international values
and practices.
25. Rosenau's concept of 'fused linkage' captures this interrelationship
well. On Waltz's refusal to accept this as a legitimate part of IR
theory, see Note 2 above.
26. Kim Kyong-won, Revolution and International System (New York:
New York University Press, 1970).
27. On the contrasting powers of 'dominant ideology' and 'common
culture' theses, see Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill and Brian
Turner, The Dominant Ideology Thesis (London: Unwin Hyman,
1980). These writers do not discuss how international factors,
ideological and more material, can contribute to the formation,
strengthening and weakening of specific ideologies, dominant or
subordinate, within any one society, but it is not difficult to see how
their argument can be extended to show how important such external
factors, confirmatory and challenging, can act upon a specific society.
The force of example alone plays an important part. One has only to
chart the global spread of such phenomena as universal suffrage or
respect for human rights, or of religious trends, be these in the
Reformation or contemporary Islamic societies, to see how external
forces can shape internal ideological systems.
28. Recent contributions to the field include John Hall, Power and
Liberties (London: Penguin, 1986) and Michael Mann, States, War
and Capitalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988).
29. For historical materialist analyses of international dimensions of
revolution, see: Giovanni Arrighi, Terence Hopkins and Immanuel
Wallerstein, Anti Systemic Movements (London: Verso, 1989);
Michael Lowy, The Politics of Combined and Uneven Development:
The Theory of Permanent Revolution (London: Verso, 1981); Jan
Pieterse, Empire and Emancipation, Power and Liberation on a
World Scale (London: Pluto, 1990); Franz Schurmann, The Logic of
World Power: An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents and Contradic-
tions of World Politics (New York: Pantheon, 1974).
30. This is one of the main arguments of Paul Kennedy's Preparing for the
Twenty-first Century (London: Harper Collins, 1993).
264 Notes
7 Hidden from International Relations: Women and the

International Arena
1. Among many other contributions to individual branches of the social

sciences see, for development studies, Ester Boserup, Women and
Economic Development (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970), perhaps the
first major irruption of feminism into the social sciences, and Kate
Young, Carol Wolkowitz and Rosalyn McCullagh (eds) Of Marriage
and the Market (London: CSE, 1981); for political theory, Anne
Phillips, Engendering Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 1991) and
Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Cambridge: Polity 1988); for
anthropology, Henrietta Moore, Feminism and Anthropology
(Cambridge: Polity, 1988); for history, Sheila Rowbotham, see Note
3, below.
2. Among the rare exceptions of relevant discussion of international
relations literature are Georgina Ashworth, 'The UN Women's
Conference and international linkages in the women's movement' in
Peter Willets (ed.) Pressure Groups in The Global System (London:
Frances Pinter, 1982), and Ellen Bonepath (ed.) Women, Power and
Policy (New York and Oxford: Pergamon, 1982) part 4.
3. Sheila Rowbotham, Hidden From History: Three Hundred Years of
Women's Oppression and the Fight Against It (London: Pluto, 1973).
4. For discussion of this issue see Edward Crapol (ed.) Women and
American Foreign Policy (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1987). In the
mid-1980s a Women's Foreign Policy Council was established by a
group of US worrien, including Bella Abzug and Mim Kelber, calling
for the location of a critical mass of women in senior foreign policy
and defence positions.
5. Quoted in Anna Davin, 'Imperialism and motherhood', History
Workshop Journal, no. 5, spring 1978, p. 29.
6. On the Sandinistas, see Maxine Molyneux, 'The politics of abortion in
Nicaragua: Revolutionary pragmatism - or feminism in the realm of
necessity?', Feminist Review, no. 29, spring 1988, p. 123. On Saddam
see 'Saddam Hussein awards medals to women, says their role more
important than men's', BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 4, 7
March 1992, ME/1323/N4-7.
7. Without claiming that this attitude was universal, or constituted the
inner truth of hegemonic expansion in the post-war epoch, it is worth
recording the fictional rendering of the US mission as conveyed in
Norman Mailer's account of the CIA in the Cold War, Harlot's Ghost
(London: Abacus, 1992) pp. 734-5. Ruminating on his colleague
Sherman's visits to the brothels of Montevideo the narrator speculates:
'He saw himself, good yeoman legionnaire of the American Empire,
as owning the females in the countries through which he travelled . . .
Or was I, all regional differences to the side, close to describing
myself as well?
Even as I was buying my hour from one girl that night, and a second
Notes 265
women for a second hour, and feeling freer with these strangers than
in all my twenty-five years ... maybe the taproot where my greed
was stored was pouring out at last into the American Century, and I,
too, was out there copulating for the flag. Greed having transmuted
itself into a more noble emotion, I felt a glow of inner power as if I
were finally attached to the great wheeling scheme of things.'
8. On Machiavelli, Hanna Fenickel Pitkin, Fortune is a Woman: Gender
and Politics in the Thought of Niccolo Machiavelli, (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1984). On Western theory more
generally, Susan Moeller Okin, Women in Western Political Thought
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Diana Coole, Women
in Political Theory (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1988).
9. 'Letters on a Regicide Peace', Letter I, in The Works and
Correspondence of Edmund Burke, vol. 5, p. 257.
10. The classic, and very funny, account of this is Carol Cohn, 'Sex and
death in the rational world of defense intellectuals', Signs, vol. 12, no.
4, summer 1987. The voyeurism suggested by Pentagon videos of
cruise missiles hitting their targets in the Kuwait war may not have
escaped viewers.
11. For general work on political theory and gender see Anne Phillips
Engendering Democracy (Cambridge, Polity, 19??) and Carol
Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Cambridge: Polity, 1988); and Okin
and Coole, note 7. For a critical overview of feminist-IR writing see
Marysia Zalewski, 'Feminist theory and international relations' in
From Cold War to Collapse: Theory and World Politics in the I980s
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). On international
political theory see the chapter by J. Ann Tickner in Rebecca Grant
and Kathleen Newland Gender and International Relations (Milton
Keynes: Open University Press, 1991) and her Gender in Inter-
national Relations (Oxford: Columbia University Press, 1992).
12. On this see the reports Dame Anne Warburton, EC Investigative
Mission into the Treatment of Muslim Women in the Former
Yugoslavia, Report to the EC Foreign Ministers, February 1993;
Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Rape and Sexual Abuse
by Armed Forces, January 1993.
13. On the Red Army see the symptomatic exchange between Stalin and
his Yugoslav interlocutors on the subject in Milovan Djilas,
Conversations With Stalin (London: Penguin, 1962) p. 87-8. Later (p.
132) we learn that Marshal Zhukov had been dismissed from his post
as commander of the Soviet forces for stealing jewellery in occupied
Berlin: 'You know, Comrade Stalin cannot stand immorality', one of
his advisers confides in the author.
14. For an overview of literature on this see Ruth Pearson, 'Latin
American women and the new international division of labour: a
reassessment', Bulletin of Latin American Research, vol. 5, no. 2,
1986, and, for an earlier analysis, Diane Elson and Ruth Pearson,
'The subordination of women and the internationalisation of factory
production' in Kate Young, Carol Wolkowitz and Rosalyn
266 Notes
McCullagh, Of Marriage and the Market: Women's Subordination in

International Perspective (London, CSE, 1981).
15. Haleh Afshar and Carolynne Dews (eds) Women and Adjustment
Policies in the Third World (London: Macmillan, 1992); Jeanne
Vickers, Women and the World Economic Crisis (London: Zed,
1991 ).
16. Maxine Molyneux, 'Marxism, feminism and the demise of the Soviet
model' in Grant and Newland (eds) Gender and International
Relations and her 'The "women question" in the age of perestroika',
New Left Review, 183, September-October 1990; Peggy Watson 'The
new masculinism in Eastern Europe', New Left Review, no. 198,
March-April 1993.
17. She was one of the originators of the theory of 'proletarian
internationalism'. Dominique Desanti, Flora Tristan: Vie, Oeuvre
Melees (Paris: Union generale d'editions, 1973).
18. For discussion of these issues see Sharon Macdonald, Pat Holden and
Shirley Ardener (eds) Images of Women in Peace and War (London:
Macmillan, 1987), especially the essay by Ruth Pearson who develops
the distinction between a feminist critique based upon ideas of
motherhood and one deriving from women's separation from the
means of warfare. An excellent discussion of issues involved is
Micaela di Leonardo, 'Morals, mothers and militarism: Anti-militarism
and feminist theory', Feminist Studies, vol. 11, no. 3, Fall 1985.
19. See Anne Wiltsher, Most Dangerous Women: Feminist Peace
Campaigners of the Great War (London: Pandora, 1985) and Lela
Costin 'Feminism, pacifism, internationalism and the 1915 Inter-
national Congress of Women' in Judith Stiehm (ed.) Women and
Men's War (Oxford: Pergamon, 1983). A fascinating study of the
relationship between the suffragette movement, the trades unions and
the Irish independence movement on the eve of the First World War
is given in George Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England
(New York: Capricorn, 1961). Dangerfield's thesis is that the
combination of these three opposition forces was threatening to
overthrow the British state, and that the challenge was only deflected
by the outbreak of war.
20. Stiehm (ed.), Women and Men's War; Jean Bethke Elshtain, Women
and War (New York: Basic, 1987). Elshtain's earlier work has been
subject to considerable debate as in Judith Stacey, 'The new
conservative feminism', Feminist Studies, autumn 1983.
21. Judith Stiehm, Bring Me Men and Women: Mandated Change at the
US Air Force Academy (Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press, 1972); Cynthia Enloe, Does Khaki Become You? The
Militarisation of Women's Lives (London: Pluto Press, 1983); Wendy
Chapkis (ed.) Loaded Questions: Women in the Military, (Amster-
dam: Transnational Institute, 1981).
22. On US military use of women in the Gulf War and elsewhere see,
inter alia, Helen Vozelinker, 'Women in the military: deceptive
feminist gain', In These Times, 17-23 April 1991. Discussing the case
Notes 267
of Captain Linda Bray, who led a troop of soldiers in Panama, she

writes:'I would like a woman who kills a battering spouse to get as
much publicity and praise as did Capt. Bray and the women who
served in the Gulf'.
23. On the UN Decade for Women see Carolyn Stephenson in Stiehm
(ed.) Women and Men's War. The classic study of women and
development remains Ester Boserup, Women's Role in Economic
Development. Also, Gita Sen and Caren Grown, Development, Crises
and Alternative Visions: Third World Women's Perspectives (New
York: Monthly Review, 1987).
24. On women and the EEC see Catherine Hoskyns, 'Women, European
law and transnational politics', International Journal of the Sociology
of Law, vol. 14, no. 3/4, winter 1986, and 'The community of women',
Marxism Today, January 1987.
25. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 4, 31 January 1989, ME/
0372 A/5.
26. Jeffrey Robinson, The End of the American Century; Hidden Agendas
of The Cold War (London: Hutchinson, 1992) pp. 290-1.
27. For a comprehensive overview, see Kumari Jayawardena, Feminism
and Nationalism in the Third World (London: Zed, 1986). For critical
assessments see Jan Pettiman, Living in the Margins: Racism, Sexism
and Feminism in Australia (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992) and Deniz
Kandiyoti, 'Identity and its Discontents: Women and the nation',
Millennium, vol. 20, no. 3, 1991; Nira Yuval Davis and Floya Anthias
(eds) Woman, Nation, State (London: Macmillan, 1989) and Deniz
Kandiyoti, Women, Islam and the State (London: Macmillan,
1991).
28. Norberta Bobbio, Liberalism and Democracy (London: Verso, 1990)
pp. 68-72.
29. Virginia Woolf, A Room of One's Own. Three Guineas (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1992) p. 313. The discussion of woman and
war in Woolf contrasts with the very different picture contained in a
work of literature produced in the very same year, Brecht's Mother
Courage and Her Children (London: Methuen Drama, 1990): in the
latter, the mother is not against war as such, since it enables her to
make money, and she indeed puts her commercial preoccupations,
epitomised in her cart, above her supposedly maternal ones,
embodied in her children, or any general 'womanly' commitment to
peace. At one point, when there are rumours of peace, Mother
Courage says: 'Peace'll wring my neck. I went and took Chaplain's
advice, laid in fresh stocks only t'other day. And now they're going to
demobilise and I'll be left sitting on me wares' (p. 63); her response to
the death of her daughter is to go on with her profiteering business (p.
87). Both works were written in 1938, in the shadow of the oncoming
world war and contain uncanny resonances of the classic IR work of
E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, written at the same time.
30. J.P. Nett!, Rosa Luxemburg, abridged edn. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1969) pp. 500--19; and Horace B. Davis (ed.) The
268 Notes
National Question: Selected Writings by Rosa Luxemburg (New York:

Monthly Review, 1976).
31. These issues of women's rights and nationalist 'authenticity' have
been posed especially sharply in countries where religion constitutes
the national position on women: Ireland, Algeria and Iran have all
been cases of this. A searing critique of 'reverse ethnocentricity' and
the use of national-religious ideology to subordinate women in Iran is
given by Azar Tabari, 'The women's movement in Iran: A hopeful
prognosis', Feminist Studies, vol. 12, no. 2, Summer 1986. Similar
issues with regard to Iran are posed by Kate Millett, Going to Iran
(New York: Coward, McCann and Geohegan, 1982). For a debate on
'feminist oriental ism', see Mai Ghoussoub, 'Feminism- or the eternal
masculine- in the Arab world', New Left Review, no. 161, January-
February 1981, and the articles in New Left Review, no. 170, July-
August 1988.
32. See, for example, two Focus briefings by Amnesty International,
'Women and human rights', March 1990, 'Against their will: Rape
and sexual abuse in custody', February 1992. The work of the Change
network and of its organiser Georgina Ashworth, was also important
in affecting non-governmental and state activity.
33. International Herald Tribune, 'Seoul tells Japan: Compensate
women', 22 January 1992; 'Of sex and lies: Japanese teacher debunks
"comfort women" myths', IHT, 29 January 1992; George Hicks 'They
won't allow Japan to push the "comfort women" aside', IHT, 10
February 1993. Later in 1993 the Japanese Government reached
agreement with the Korean Government on the compensation
question.
34. 'Rape victim's case stirs Unionist fears', The Guardian, 20 February
1992.
35. Georgina Ashworth, 'A Feminist Foreign Policy', talk given to LSE
International Relations Department General Seminar, February
1987.
36. See Chapter 5.
37. For one characteristic variant of this see Christopher Coker 'Women
and international relations', The Salisbury Review, June 1990.
38. Some of those concerned with this issue are also concerned with the
question of title: the arguments for 'women and international
relations' as against 'gender and international relations' have been
well rehearsed, with the former suggesting a marginalisation from the
mainstream of the discipline and the latter committing the course to
consideration of the constitution of gender beyond an examination of
women themselves. In practice, there may be less difference in the
course and research programmes of these two titles than at first sight
appears. A programme entitled 'Women and International Relations'
perhaps promises a less ambitious programme than a course claiming
to encompass the broader range of questions raised by analysing
gender, the latter comprising constructions and uses of masculinity
and of alternative sexualities within the international sphere.
Notes 269
39. On the feminist critique of post-modernism and with special reference

to IR see the trenchant remarks of Marysia Zalewski in 'Feminist
theory and international relations', Mike Bowker and Robin Brown
(eds) From Cold War to Collapse: Theory and World Politics in the
1980s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). More gener-
ally, see Sabina Lovibond, 'Feminism and postmodernism', New Left
Review, no. 178, November-December 1989, 'Feminism and
Pragmatism: A reply to Richard Rorty', New Left Review, no. 193,
May-June 1992, and Kate Soper 'Postmodernism, subjectivity and
the question of value', New Left Review, no. 186, March-April 1991.
8 Inter-Systemic Conflict: The Case of Cold War
1. J.L. Gaddis, 'The emerging post-revolutionist synthesis on the origins

of the cold war', Diplomatic History, Vol. 7, 1983.
2. For one overview of the critical literature see Michael Cox, 'Radical
theory and the new Cold War' in Mike Bowker and Robin Brown
(eds) From Cold War to Collapse: Theory and World Politics in the
1980s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Cox has many
pertinent things to say about the writings of radical writers on the
Cold War, but he misrepresents two issues with regard to my own
writing: first, while I argued that the historical responsibility of East
and West was distinct, my work was precisely an attempt to look at
the dynamic relationship between the two blocs and to see how each
had contributed; secondly, he appears to accept, in an uncritical way,
claims about Soviet expansionism in the third world. Most import-
antly, Cox seems to think that in the end the Cold War ended through
mutual accommodation, thus missing the rather large historical fact
that one side capitulated and its socio-political system collapsed. His
own, largely implicit, theory bears traces of a residual Trotskyism
('they are only two gangs of capitalists anyway'), evident in his earlier
work (see note 8). In these writings, still under the influence of a
'state capitalist' Trotskyist approach, Cox advances many of the
arguments with which he was later to belabour other writings,
including the thesis that only socialist renewal in East and West could
bring peace to the continent. Most pertinently, however, he argues
that the Soviet Union presented no challenge to the West or the West
to the Soviet Union.
3. For earlier discussion of this literature see my The Making of the
Second Cold War (London, Verson, 1983), ch. 2, and 'Vigilantism in
international relations: Kubalkova, Cruickshank and Marxist theory',
Review of International Studies, vol. 13, no. 3, 1987.
4. Thus in his textbook of realist theory, The Anarchical Society, Hedley
Bull treats East-West conflict in the post-war period as illustration
and confirmation of this broader argument. Many others -
270 Notes
Morgenthau, Waltz, etc.- did likewise. For realists, there was not a
conceptual problem.
5. As discussed in Chapter 6, the argument that the conflict between
revolutionary and status quo powers was in some sense avoidable is
found, inter alia, with regard to the French revolution in Kim Kyong-
won, Revolution and International System (New York: New York
University Press, 1970), and with regard to Iran in James Bill, The
Eagle and the Lion.
6. As quoted in Cox, 'Radical theory and the new Cold War', p. 44. For
an attempt to engage with Chomsky on these issues see my discussion
with him in Bill Bourne, Udi Eichler and David Herman (eds) Writers
and Politics (Nottingham: Russell Press, 1987).
7. Mary Kaldor, The Disintegrating West (London: Penguin, 1978) and
The Imaginary War: Understanding East-West Conflict (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1990); Alan Wolfe, The Rise and Fall of The 'Soviet
Threat' (Washington: Institute for Policy Studies, 1979).
8. 'Western capitalism and the Cold War Aystem' in Martin Shaw (ed.)
War, State and Society (London: Macmillan, 1984); 'The Cold War as
a System', Critique, no. 17, 1986.
9. E.P. Thompson, Fred Halliday and Rudolf Bahro, Exterminism and
Cold War (London: Verso, 1982).
10. For one recognition of this inter-systemic dimension see Oyrind
Osterud, 'Intersystemic rivalry and international order: Under-
standing the end of the Cold War' in Pierre Allan and Kjell
Goldmann (eds) The End of The Cold War (London: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1992).
11. 'The sources of Soviet conduct', Foreign Affairs, July 1947.
12. In Evan Luard (ed.) Basic Texts in International Relations
(Macmillan, 1992) pp. 478-9.
13. Two classic discussions of heterogeneity within mainstream IR
literature are Richard Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in Inter-
national Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963) and Raymond Aron,
Peace and War (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966).
14. Vendulka Kubalkova and Albert A. Cruickshank, 'The new Cold
War' in 'Critical international relations studies', Review of Inter-
national Studies, vol. 12, no. 3, July 1986, and Fred Haliday,
'Vigilantism in International Relations: Kubalkova, Cruikshank and
Marxist Theory' Review of International Studies vol. 13, no. 2, April
1987.
15. Carl Schmitt, The Concept of The Political (New Brunswick: Rutgers
University Press, 1976); Paul Hirst, 'Carl Schmitt's decisionism',
Telos, no. 72, summer 1987.
16. A powerful historical account of the universalising drive of capitalism
can be found in Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire (London:
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987). What is striking is that this generally
accepted historical thesis, and one eloquently stated in the
Communist Manifesto, should have had so little impact on much left-
wing writing on Cold War in the 1980s: assertions that capitalism did
Notes 271
have a tendency both to prevail over alternatives to it, and to establish

global hegemony, was deemed to play into the hands of Soviet policy;
instead we had the debatable symmetry of the internalists.
17. For accounts of the subjugation of the GDR, see the diary of Kohl's
political adviser Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage: Innenansichten der
Wiedervereinigung (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1991) and Ulrich
Albrecht, Die Abwicklung der DDR (Opladen: Westdeutscher
Verlag, 1992).
18. The Soviet term 'correlation of forces', a supposedly more dynamic
and materialist alternative to the 'balance of power' was never taken
seriously in the West and was abandoned in the 1980s in the USSR: in
fact, it has proved its validity, precisely because it did take socio-
economic and ideological factors in international competition into
account and did see the possibility of a decisive shift in favour of one
bloc. That it mistook which bloc would benefit from a shift in the
correlation was perhaps a secondary oversight. For a lucid analysis of
the concept see Margot Light, The Soviet Theory of International
Relations (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1988); and Julian Lider, Correla-
tion of Forces: An Analysis of Marxist-Leninist Concepts (Aldershot:
Gower, 1988).
19. Chapter 6.
20. Giovanni Arrighi, Terence Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, Anti-
Systemic Movements (London: Verso, 1989).
21. Roger Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy 1800-1914, 2nd
edn (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993).
22. For applications of these ideas to the collapse of the Soviet bloc see
also my 'The ends of Cold War', New Left Review, no. 180, March-
April 1990.
9 A Singular Collapse: The Soviet Union and Inter-State

Competition
1. It is striking that the end of the Cold War provoked rather more
theoretical reflection than did the Cold War itself. See Pierre Allan
and Kjell Goldmann (eds) The End of The Cold War (London:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1992); J.L. Gaddis, 'International relations theory
and the end of the Cold War', International Security, vol. 17, no. 3,
1992-3; Lynn Eden, 'The end of U.S. Cold War history? A review
essay', International Security, vol. 18, no. 2, 1993. See also my 'The
ends of Cold War', New Left Review, no. 180, March-April 1990;
George Schopflin, 'Why communism collapsed', International
Affairs, January 1990; Gale Stokes, 'The lessons of 1989', Problems
of Communism, vol. XL, no. 5, September-October 1991; Daniel
Deudney and John Ikenberry 'Soviet Reform and the end of the Cold
War: Explaining large-scale historical change', Review of Inter-
national Studies, vol. 17, no. 3, July 1991.
272 Notes
2. For the argument as to why, on economic grounds, the state socialist

model could not work, despite initial successes and a margin for
reform, see Wlodzimierz Brus and Kazimierz Laski, From Marx to
Market (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), and Daniel Deudney and
John Ikenberry 'Soviet Reform'.
3. Theda Skocpo\, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1979); Ellen Kay Trimberger, Revolu-
tion From Above (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1978).
4. Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon (London: Radius, 1988)
is a lucie! overview of the social and economic preconditions for the
breakdown of the Brezhnevite order in the 1980s.
5. Much has been made of the concept 'mixed economy' in the context
of both systems in the 1980s, yet, on more precise examination, two
kinds of mixed economy are indicated- a 'socialist' and a 'capitalist'
variant, e.g. a Yugoslavia and a Sweden. A clear distinction still
operated between those where the state played the dominant role,
with or without sectoral markets in some areas of production, and
those where the market, in both production and capital, prevailed,
with or without a significant state role in terms of ownership,
employment, fiscal regulation, policy coordination.
6. On the failure of the Yugoslav and Hungarian reforms see Brus and
Laski, From Marx to Market.
7. Gorbachev's declarations up to the end of 1987 at least endorsed the
traditional view that socialism had superior potential to capitalism. As
late as the autumn of 1989 he seems to have believed that Eastern
European countries would maintain socialism even after the Soviet
tanks had withdrawn (conversation with Georgi Shakhnazarov,
Gorbachev adviser, Moscow, 10 June 1993).
8. Arno Mayer, Why Did the Heavens Not Darken? (London: Verso
1990) ch. 1, in which the 'general crisis' of the twentieth century is
depicted.
9. Immanuel Wallerstein, Historical Capitalism (London: Verso, 1986)
for a cogent survey of this process.
10. See note 1 for further discussions of this theme.
11. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, remains a classic exposition of
this thesis.
12. On the arms race see Fred Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold
War (London, Verso, 1989) ch. 3.
13. This was conventionally known as the 'arms race theory of arms
control'.
14. In the early 1970s Taiwan spent 10 per cent of GNP on military
expenditure, Israel 20 per cent: International Institute of Security
Studies, The Military Balance, 1972-1973, London.
15. US expenditure in 1971 was $120 billions, as against Soviet $94
billions, in 1980 $111 billions as against $107. Total expenditure by
the Soviet Union and its allies was only half that of its opponents,
NATO and its Far Eastern allies (China, Japan): in 1980 $120
billions for the WTO (Warsaw Treaty Organisation) as against $243
Notes 273
billions. All data from SIPRI Yearbook 1981, figures in constant 1978
prices. US expenditure was conventionally understated by a number
of accounting devices: one calculation was that the 1980 figure of $127
billions should be adjusted upwards to $223 billions, i.e. from 5.2 per
cent to 9.5 per cent of GNP: James Cypher in Monthly Review,
November 1981.
16. See Brus and Laski, From Marx to Market.
17. For a Soviet view of the western embargo see Igor Artemiev
'International economic security' in International Economic Security:
Soviet and British Approaches, Chatham House Discussion Paper
no.7, 1988.
18. Galia Golan, The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in
the Third World (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988); Jerry Hough, The
Struggle For The Third World: Soviet Debate and American Options
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1986); Fred Halliday, Cold War,
Third World, ch. 4, for the rethinking of Soviet policy towards the
third world.
19. According to OECD DAC figures.
20. On 'stagnation' see Mikhail Gorbachev Perestroika: New Thinking
for Our Country and the World (London: Collins, 1987) ch. 1.
21. On the NATO-WTO comparison see Note 15, above. The degree of
economic integration between the Eastern European Comecon
members was far less than that within the EEC: most trade was on a
bilateral, Soviet-East European, basis.
22. Hedrick Smith, The Russians (London: Sphere Books, 1976) gives a
powerful evocation of this attitude in the period prior to the collapse
of Soviet confidence.
23. Gorbachev's Perestroika is replete with calls for the Soviet economy
to rise to 'world standards' i.e. those of the West.
24. On Kohl's calculations in this period see the diary of his political
adviser, Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung
(Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1991).
25. Teltschik, 329 Tage, pp. 54-6.
26. Seminar by Gerald Mansell, former head of BBC Overseas Broad-
casting, LSE, November 1992.
10 International Relations and the 'End of History'
1. For overviews see Mike Bowker and Robin Brown (eds) From Cold
War To Collapse: Theory and World Politics in the 1980s (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993); Robin Blackburn (ed.) After the
Fall: The Failure of Communism (London: Verso, 1991); Michael
Hogan (ed.) The End of The Cold War, its Meaning and Implications
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Gabriel Partos, The
World That Came in from the Cold (London: BBC World Service/
274 Notes
Royal Insitute of International Affairs, 1993); Horst Teltschik, 329

Tage: Inneinansichten der Einigung (Berlin: Seidler Verlag, 1991).
2. As in the term used by Jurgen Habermas, die Nachholende
Revolution, the 'catching-up' or 'recuperating' revolution: 'What does
socialism mean to-day? The revolutions of recuperation and the need
for new thinking' in Blackburn (ed.) After the Fall. Habermas may
have intended some contrast with the previous orthodox communist
view of the (socialist) revolution as uberholend, 'over-taking', the
capitalist west.
3. For one interesting optic see Gale Stokes, 'The lessons of 1989',
Problems of Communism, voJ. 40, no. 5, September-October 1991.
4. Richard Rosecrance, 'A new concert of powers', Foreign Policy, vol.
71, no. 2, spring 1992; John Mearscheimer 'Back to the future':
Instability in Europe after the Cold War', International Security, voJ.
15, no. 1, summer 1990.
5. 'Liberalism and world politics', American Political Science Review
vol. 80, no. 4, December 1986, and the two-part 'Kant, liberal
legacies and foreign affairs' in Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 12,
summer 1983, and autumn 1983. For a trenchant critique of
ideological misuses of the Doyle argument, but not of the core
argument itself, see Benedict Anderson, 'The new world disorder',
New Left Review, no. 193, May-June 1992.
6. For a perceptive, fictional, location of communism in the broader
current of rationalist and messianic thought, Christian and Judaic, see
George Steiner, Proofs and Three Parables (London: Faber & Faber,
1992).
7. Perry Anderson, A Zone of Engagement (London: Verso, 1992), pp.
367-9.
8. On secession see James Mayall, Nationalism and International Society
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) and Alexis
Heraclides, The Self-Determination of Nationalities in International
Politics (London: Frank Cass, 1991).
9. For a corrective to the prevailing view of nationalism as the dominant
ideology of the age see Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism
Since 1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
10. See Chapter 11, Note 3, p. 276.
11. For a general overview of the war see Lawrence Freedman and
Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in
the New World Order (London: Faber & Faber, 1992). On casualties
see John Heidenrich, 'The Gulf War; How many Iraqis died?',
Foreign Policy, no. 90, spring 1993.
12. For an excellent overview of the issues involved, see Joseph Camilleri
and Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and
Fragmenting World (A1dershot: Edward Elgar, 1992). On the
internationalisation of finance, see Susan Strange, Casino Capitalism
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
13. Preparing for the Twenty-First Century (London: Harper Collins,
1993).
Notes 275
14. I am grateful to Meghnad Desai and other colleagues in the LSE

Centre for the Study of Global Governance for stimulating discus-
sions on this issue.
15. On Fukuyama see Perry Anderson, 'The ends of history' in A Zone of
Engagement; History Workshop, After the End of History (London:
Collins & Brown, 1992); Gregory Elliott, 'The cards of confusion:
Reflections on historical communism and the "end of history" ',
Radical Philosophy, no. 64, summer 1993.
16. Immanuel Wallerstein, Historical Capitalism (London: Verso, 1983,
p. 98): 'It is simply not true that capitalism as a historical system has
represented progress over the various previous historical systems that
it destroyed or transformed'.
17. An example of this is to be found in the otherwise measured
assessment by Martin Walker, The Cold War and the making of the
Modern World (London: Fourth Estate, 1993), ch. 14, 'The Super-
losers'. A liberal critic of US policy, Christopher Lasch could write
(International Herald Tribune, 13 July 1990): 'If the West won the
Cold War, the United States can hardly be said to have shared in the
fruits of that victory. It would be closer to the truth to say that the
Soviet Union and the United States have destroyed each other as
major powers.'
18. On the debate with the socialist movement on the significance of Cold
War see the contributions by Mike Davis and myself to Exterminism
and Cold War (London: Verso, 1983), ch. 2 of my The Making of the
Second Cold War, and the exchanges in Robin Blackburn (ed.) After
the Fall (London: Verso, 1991).
19. Ch. 23, 'The "Unreality" of realism'.
20. For Fukuyama, humans demand recognition of their worth and
revolt, or fight, when they do not get it. This is why they are not just
content with economic well-being, which a prosperous dictatorship
could provide, but need democracy and a measure of equality as well.
He is on to something here: no one can deny that this is a factor in the
political activity of humans, at the interpersonal, national and
international levels. Yet, as rendered in his book, this invocation of
thymos is forced. First, even granting that there is a thymotic instinct
as he describes it, like other instincts- smiling, eating, touching, etc.
- it only takes on a meaning in a social context. Moreover, what
constitutes acceptable dignity or recognition varies from historical
period to period, and from one society to another: what is tolerable in
one place and time is not in another, let alone variations across
gender. Thymos is a social construct: there can be no meaningful
invocation of thymos if it does not take account of the socialisation of
people into groups and collectivities, and, regrettably, of what one
may only term the anti-thymotic, q.v. Dostoevsky.
The apparent authority of the concept of thymos is derived from
Fukuyama's reading of Plato's Republic, via Allan Bloom, but this
part of the operation is thin indeed, reminding the Marxist of nothing
so much as the attempt to squeeze a general theory of socialist politics
276 Notes
out of some decontextualised lines of Marx, Lenin or Mao. In

classical Greek the word thymos means rage, or lust (for food or
drink) and is a quality associated with animals and spirited horses.
Interestingly, in this original meaning it approximates to the Arabic
word thawra, contemporary Arabic for revolution, but in origin a
word denoting the spiritedness of bulls and other animals. In Plato
himself it has a more specific meaning akin to self-respect - 'the part
that loves honour and winning'. But even Plato's usage does not
square with that of Bloom/Fukuyama, as a reading of other
commentators indicates, and he is misreading Plato to imply that the
soul has 'parts' at all, since all Plato meant by 'parts of the soul' was
that people are complex. For different accounts of thymos in Plato see
R.C. Cross and A.D. Woozley, Plato's Republic: A Philosophical
Commentary (London: Macmillan, 1964) pp. 120-1; and Julia Annas,
An Introduction to Plato's Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981)
pp. 126-8. Thymos is identified with the irrational, since it is the seat
of anger and rage, akin to spirit or heart, and is something that
approximates, though Fukuyama evidently does not feel this is
appropriate, to psychoanalytic concepts of the id. The key story that
Fukuyama invokes, from Plato, to illustrate the concept itself points
in another direction: it concerns Leontius, the son of Aglaion, who,
while walking near the walls of Athens, sees some bodies lying under
the wall, at first turns away his eyes, and then out of curiosity looks.
He is then ashamed and angry with himself, suffering an attack of
thymos. This is a story anyone can understand, but it hardly illustrates
the Fukuyama concept of thymos, which is both relational, involving
what others think of one, and about recognition, not anger. All of
which suggests that whatever the validity of the insights on the role of
recognition in politics, the derivation of it amidst a flurry of textual
back-up is inconclusive.
21. Giovanni Arrighi, 'World income inequalities and the future of
socialism', New Left Review, no. 189, September-October 1989.
22. Goran Therborn 'The rule of capitalism and the rise of democracy',
New Left Review, no. 103, May-June 1977.
11 Conclusion: The Future of International Relations
1. For discussion of ethical issues in the international domain see, inter

alia: Janna Thompson, Justice and World Order: A Philosophical
Enquiry (London: Routledge, 1992); Terry Nardin and David Mapel
(eds) Traditions of International Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992); Charles Beitz, Political Theory and Inter-
national Relations (Guildford, Surrey: Princeton University Press,
1979); Mervyn Frost, Towards a Normative Theory of International
Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
2. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983);
Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London: Hutchinson, 1960).
Notes 277
3. For further discussion see Fred Halliday, 'The Gulf War and the study
of international relations', Review of International Studies, vol. 20,
no. 1, January 1994.
4. On the uprising and its aftermath see Kanan Makiya, Cruelty and
Silence (London: Century Hutchinson, 1993).
5. James Mayall, 'Non-intervention, self-determination and the "new
world order"', International Affairs, vol. 67, no. 3, July 1991;
Christopher Greenwood, 'Is there a right of humanitarian inter-
vention?' The World To-day, vol. 49, no. 2, February 1993; Adam
Roberts, 'Humanitarian war: Military intervention and human
rights', International Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 3, July 1993; Hedley Bull
(ed.) Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
6. For the debate in the Arab world see Kevin Dwyer, Arab Voices
(London: Routledge, 1991) and Anne Mayer, Islam and Human
Rights: Tradition and Politics (London:. Pinter, 1991). Mayer is
particularly interesting on the manipulation of the third world critique
by interested parties within Islamic states.
Name Index
Abercrombie, Nicholas 263 Clinton, William 122

Althusser, Louis 39, 52, 53, 79 Cobden, Richard 115
Anderson, Perry 43, 58 Cohn, Carol 265
Appadurai, Arjun 104 Comte, Auguste 100
Arendt, Hannah 124, 128 Cox, Michael 173, 269
Armstrong, David 125-6, 127, Cox, Robert 53, 251
131 Crick, Bernard 12, 248
Aron, Raymond 90, 137, 141 Cruise, O'Brien Conor 258
Arrighi, Giovanni 186, 233
Ashley, Richard 249 Darwin, Charles 51, 150, 223
Aspin, Les 157 DerDerian, James 39, 62
Derrida, Jacques 43
Bachelard, Gaston 42 Deutsch, Karl 12
Banks, Michael 246 Deutscher, Isaac 127
Barrington-Moore, J.B. 129, 131, Djilas, Milovan 265
132, 255 Donelan, Michael 11
Bentham, Jeremy 6 Dougherty, James 249
Bill, James 263 Doyle, Michael 119, 218
Block, Fred 79 Durkheim, Emile 100, 142
Brecht, Bertolt 267
Brenner, Robert 80
Eisenhower, Dwight 262
Brezhnev, Leonid 144, 175, 196, Engels, Friedrich 48, 59, 70, 231
207
Bukharin, Nikolai 116
Bull, Hedley 28, 177, 269 Falk, Richard 17
on anarchy of system 11, 67 Featherstone, Michael 38, 94
definitions 27, 99, 100--2 Ferguson, Yale 77
on interdependence 15, 16 Feuerbach, Ludwig 51, 234
on international society 94, 97, Feyerabend, Paul 245, 253
98, 100--1, 126 Foran, John 260
on state 78, 91, 108 Foucault, Michel 39
Burke, Edmund 95, 107, 108-15, Freud, Sigmund 67
118,141,150,258 Frieden, Jeff 65
Burton, John 17, 94, 104 Fukuyama. Francis 217, 225,
Bush, George 122, 224 275-6
on end of history 228-31, 232,
Calvert, Peter 127 233-4
Carr, Edward H. 10, 127 on homogeneity 95, 107,116--19
Carter, James 133, 262
Chomsky, Noam 173 Galtung, Johann 53
Cicero, M.T. 39 Gellner, Ernest 237, 245
Clausewitz, K. von 126, 199 Geneen, Harold 89
278
Name Index 279
Gerschenkron, Alexander 95, Khamene'i, Ali 158

120 Khomeini, Ruhallah, Ayatollah
Giddens, Anthony 43, 44, 83 137
Gill, Stephen 57, 65 Khrushchev, Nikita 159, 204, 207
Gilpin, Robert 57 Kim Kyong-won 127, 141
Goldstone, Jack 125, 127, 135, Kirkpatrick, Jean 151
146 Kissinger, Henry 10, 97, 127,
Gorbachev, Mikhail 194, 196, 131, 144, 156
200, 209-10, 272, 273 Kohl, Helmut 211, 212
Gramsci, Antonio 47, 80, 102, Kolko, Gabriel 57
113, 214, 257 Krasner, Stephen 16, 31
Griewank, Karl 130, 134 Krippendorf, Ekkehart 27
Grotius, Hugo 8, 97, 98 Kuhn, Thomas 29, 75, 126, 234,
Guevara, Ernesto Che 137 245
Habermas, Jiirgen 53, 273-4 Laclau, Ernesto 250

Hall, John 43, 247 Lapid, Yosi 247
Harding, Neil 127 Lasch, Christopher 275
Heeren, A.H.L. 108 Lenin, Vladimir I. 48, 50, 52, 54,
Hegel, G.W.F. 65, 68, 117, 217, 70, 80, 144, 175, 196
234 on imperialism 32, 64, 116
Hilferding, Rudolf 116 Liebman, Marcel 127
Hill, Stephen 263 Lin Piao 137
Hintze, Otto 79, 85, 120 Linklater, Andrew 48, 52
Hitler, Adolf 133, 223 Luard, Evan 94, 104
Hobbes, Thomas 8, 42, 98, 100 Luxemburg, Rosa 116, 162-3
Hobsbawm, Eric 27, 58, 103, 127
Hoffmann, Stanley 137, 141, 253 Machiavelli, Nicolo 8, 45, 59, 150
Hurd, Douglas 222 Mailer, Norman 264
Hussein, Saddam 150 Malthus, Thomas 225-6
Mann, Michael 43, 53, 83, 84, 86,
James, Alan 11, 254 120, 247
Jan is, Irving 172 Manning, Charles 11
Jervis, Robert 172 Mansbach, Richard 77
Johnson, Lyndon 133, 262 Mao Tse Dong 52, 144
Marx, Karl/Marxism 47-73, 85,
Kaldor, Mary 173 101, 105, 145, 197, 231
Kant, Immanuel 8, 42, 43, 45, 59, on history 234, 251
98, 99, 117, 119 on homogeneity 95, 107,
Kaplan, Morton 12, 28 112-16, 142
Karadzic, Radovan 224 inter-systemic theory 177, 178,
Kautsky, Karl 116, 249 179, 180-1, 185
Kedourie, Elie 237, 245 andiRtheories 8, 15,17-18,31,
Kennan, George 175-6, 182 32, 37, 42, 44
Kennedy, John F. 261, 262 on revolution 131-2
Kennedy, Paul 225-6, 227-8 on states 31, 76-7, 79-81, 83, 91,
Keohane, Robert 0. 14, 30-1, 92
57, 94, 104, 105 Mayall, James 11, 94, 97
280 Name Index
Mayer, Arno 66, 197 Strange, Susan 53, 57, 104

Mazzini, Giuseppe 161
Meir, Golda 151 Tabari, Azar 268
Metternich, C.L. 144 Thatcher, Margaret 151
Mill, John Stuart 28, 113, 238 Therborn, Goran 33, 233
Mills. C. Wright 174 Thompson, Edward 173, 174
Morgenthau,llans 10,49, 81,97, Thucydides 8, 33, 39
251 Tilly, Charles 43, 82
Mouffe, Chantal 250 Tonnies, Ferdinand 99, 100
Toynbee, Arnold 180
Nietzsche, Friedrich 38, 117 Tristan, Flora 156, 161
Nixon, Richard 156, 159, 262 Truman, llarry S. 133, 262
Northedge, Fred 11, 15, 28, 78 Tucker, Robert 16, 31
Nye, Joseph 14, 94, 104 Turner, Brian 263
Palmer, R.R. 127 Urry, John 94

Parsons, Talcott 100
Pearson, Ruth 266 van der Pijl, Kees 57, 65
Pierson, Ruth Roach 157 Voltaire, Fran<;ois 108
Pfaltzgraff, Robert 249 Vozelinker, llelen 266
Plato 275-6
Walker, Robert 41-2, 39. 43-5
Reagan, Ronald 204--5, 262 Wallerstein, Immanuel 27, 56-7,
Reynolds, Charles 247 92, 103, 145, 186, 229, 275
Robertson, Roland 38, 94, 104 Waltz, Kenneth 78, 97, 263
Rosecrance, Richard 127, 131, on foreign policy analysis 13,
137' 139, 141 177
Rosenau, James 28, 30, 43, 127, on interdependence 15, 16
131' 139, 263 realism of 10, 31-7, 125,
Rosenberg, Justin 27, 43, 246, 139-40, 232, 260
252 Warren, Bill 232
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 59 Watson, Adam 11, 258
Rowbotham, Sheila 148 Weber, Max 18, 42, 79, 250
Rude, George 127 inter-systemic theory 174, 178,
Ruggie, John 36 181
Rushdie, Salman 138 Wight, Martin 11, 42, 49, 62, 97
definitions 26-7, 99, 100, 108
Saint-Simon, C.ll. 113, 114 on international society 26-7, 94,
Saleeby, Caleb 150 99, 126
Sartre, Jean-Paul 39 on revolution 127, 132, 146,
Schlafly, Phyllis 156 256
Schmitt, Carl 179-80 Wilson, Woodrow 10, 239
Singer, J.D. 28 Wolf, Eric 27, 58, 92
Sklair, Leslie 94, 104 Wolfe, Alan 173
Skocpol, Theda 43, 79, 89, 125, Wollstonecraft, Mary 156
127, 128-9, 131, 132, 135 Wood, Ellen 43
Smith, Adam 115 Woolf, Eric 103
Stalin, Joseph 144, 175, 192, 265 Woolf, Virginia 161-2, 267
Subject Index
Afghanistan 143, 189, 203, 205, capitalism 49, 6(}-1, 142

206 anarchy of 67
agency, theory of 233-5 and Cold War theories 178,
American approaches 28, 29, 97, 182, 185, 186, 187
253-4 and conflict 72, 231
anarchy in international order 11, and development of states 34--5
67,68 effects of 54
Angola 138, 143, 189 and internationalisation of
arms race/s 126, 134, 195, 211, classes 64--5, 71
261 and IR 234
and collapse of communism 'needing' enemy 231
198-201' 203 and sovereignty 103
research requirements 243 spread of 63, 270--1; and
SDI 199, 200-1 homogeneity 114--16; and
inequalities 116; research
requirements 242
balance of power and state 80
and Cold War 181-2, 184 and world system approach 51
East-West 271 catch up 95, 120
research requirements 243 CENTO 260
theory 36, 37 China 187-9
and world system 88 classes
behaviour, human 52, 67 class struggle 63
see also behaviouralism; socio- international character of 63,
economic factors 64--5, 85
behaviouralism 27-31, 62, 74 and sovereignty 60--1
achievements 29 and state 52, 80
extension of theory 17 see also socio-economic factors
and history 46 coercion, legitimacy of 20
and Marxism 50--1 cohesion, social 109-13, 142
and realism 10--16 see also homogeneity
and revolutions 125, 131, Cold War 21, 47,126, 144--5,208,275
144 aftermath 216--22
Berlin Wall 211, 212, 213 anti-communist consensus 171
bipolar world see Cold War; and collapse of communism
great powers 134, 198
Bolshevik Revolution 37, 133, and elites 174
140, 141, 231 end of 134, 218-19, 220, 271;
Bosnia see Yugoslav conflict reasons for 122, 134, 139,
Brezhnev Doctrine 144 229-30, 269; as systemic
victory 190
Cambodia 143, 189 and foreign policy 172-3
281
282 Subject Index
Cold War (cont.) military expenditure 199-200,

and heterogeneity 179-80, 272
181--4 phases of 21~11
and homogeneity 96--7 and power elites 193
ideological dimension 213-14 reasons 97, 121-2, 135, 193-4,
inter-systemic approach 133--4, 198; internal 205-11; lack of
17~90, 230; dimensions of international competitiveness
182-3, 185-6; implications 206, 207-9
184--90; propositions 181--4 socio-economic paralysis 206,
internalist approaches 173-4 209-10
Kitchen Debate 159 'stagnation' 206--8
Marxism and 177, 178, 179, transformation from above
180, 181; aftermath 71-3; 192-5
concepts of 49 as unworkable 191, 192, 271-2
post-revisionist consensus 171 USSR 191-215
and realism 172, 177-80 and women 155
revisionist challenge 171 see also Cold War; inter-systemic
sources of theoretical resistance conflict
177-80 communitarian approach to society
theories 7, 57, 171, 172-7, 180; 101-2
limitations 46; subjectivist competition, East-West 205-11,
172-3 261
'two dungeons' approach 173, see also Cold War; inter-state
179 competition
and US 247; democracy 86 conflict 17, 31
see also inter-systemic conflict and bipolar system 33
collective action 234 and capitalism 72, 231
colonialism 66,116,197,239 causes of 31-2, 36, 37
and state formation 83 and homogeneity 141, 142
command economies 192-3, 194, inter-state 14~1
195-6 inter-systemic: Cold War as
communist regimes, collapse of 17~90; defined 170
145, 171, 217 internationalisation of domestic
as achievement of communism 85, 87, 136--7
194 Marxism on 65-6, 67-8
arms race 198-201, 203 research requirements 243
consequences 219-22, 228 socio-economic character of
demonstration effect 141-2 63--4, 66
economic pressures 200, 201--4, and state 85
272 trade 218
erosion of bloc 135, 204--5 see also Cold War; revolutions;
ideological dimension 213-15 war
implications for future 219-21 constitutive tradition 107-19
and inter-state competition critical theory 53, 56
155 Cuba 138, 204
international factors and Cold cultural flows 104--5, 106
War 198-205 culture 263
and Marxism 47, 72 and cohesion 142
Subject Index 283
and homogeneity 118--19, 142 scientific 27-31

and inter-state competition traditional 24-7
212, 213-15 English School 11-12, 26, 27
and history 24-7
Darwinism see Social Darwinism on international society 94, 97,
democracy 98--9, 263
liberal 230-1, 232-5; and peace on state 26, 27, 108
119, 122 ethnoscapes 104
and Marxism 70-1 Europe
new global 228--9 EC 122, 134, 225; and women
and post-modernism 45 157
as precarious 233 homogenisation 114, 121
as result of struggle 233 integration 105
spread of 3, 146
demographic changes 225-6, 227, feminism 264
260 implications for 151, 152, 167,
determination and Marxism 53, 168--9
69-70 influence of 18-19
development as irrelevant 148
alternative routes 120-1 and post-modernism 168--9
by conflict 129-30 and sovereignty 19
through subjugation 62-3 financescapes 104
discourse and post-modernism 38 force, use of
legitimacy 4, 20
East Germany 182-3, 211, 212, and realists 11
214 foreign policy analysis 12-14, 29,
East-West competition 205-11 255
Eastern Europe 134, 135, 141 and Cold War 172-3, 178, 181
see also communist regimes, contribution of Marxism 17-18
collapse of and women 156-60, 164, 165
EC 122, 134, 157, 225 Frankfurt School 53
ecology French Revolution 130, 145, 198,
concerns 226, 227, 236 217
research requirements 242, 244 Burke on 110-12, 113, 114
economic factors 64 international impact 139, 141
influences on states 31 and women 156
and inter-systemic conflict
189-90 GDR see East Germany
relations and international Gemeinschaft 99
system 5fr.7 gender issues 152-3
transnational practices 104 and employment of women
economic sanctions 90 153-4
elites 257 implications 16fr-9
and Cold War 174 marginalisation of 147-8, 268
and societies 86, 113 moral issues 240
and Soviet Union 193 as political 155, 15fr-7
empiricism in political language 150-1
critiques 25, 28 precipitate totalisation 168
284 Subject Index
gender issues (cont.) and English School 24-7

role of 151,158 historical determination 61-2
stereotypes and ideology 150 and historicity 23
theoretical problems 167-9 and post-modernism 38, 39,
transnational processes 153-5, 43--4
168 role of 61-2
Germany 129, 130, 182-3, 221 theory of agency 233-5
homogenisation 121 homogeneity 94-123, 263
see also East Germany and cohesion of society 109-11
Gesellschaft 99 and conflict 141, 142
global governance 226--7, 236 and considerations of state
globalisation 2, 104-5 105-7
considerations of state 105-7 and culture 118-19,142
current trends 225-6 Fukuyama on 116--19
global village 105 future implications 122-3
and international society 94, as goal 114
96 ideological role 142
government and state 81-2 implications for IR 119-23
great powers 15, 16, 33, 96 Marx on 114-15
conflict 121 and military competition 117,
and international society 102 119
moral role of 239, 240-1 and modernization 117-18
and order 30, 36 and revolutions 137
promoting revolutions 138 semi-peripheral escape 120-1
and realism 172 and socialisation 122-3
see also balance of power; Cold horizontal security 143
War human rights 236, 275
Gulf War (1990-91) 224, 231 and nationalism 160-6
morality of intervention 237-8, research requirements 242
239 women 152, 156, 157, 158
Hungary 196
hegemony 257
end of system 216, 218 ideology 214-15
new 220 Marxism on 142
heterogeneity and Cold War see also culture
179-80, 181--4 ideoscapes 104
historical materialism 47-73 imperialism 239
beyond Cold War 71-3 and British state 86--7
inhibitions of theory 68-71 effect of 247
paradigm 59-68 and historical materialism 53
potential of 55-9 Lenin on 32
and revolutions 131-2, 144 and Marxism 49, 54-5, 56--7,
see also Marxism 69, 116
historiography 28 theories 251
history 21-2 ultra-imperialism 249
and behaviouralism 46 inter-state competition
contribution of 46 and collapse of communism
end of 146, 216--35 155, 191-215
Subject Index 285
East-West 205-11 and women 147-69

economic 31, 211, 212 see also behaviouralism;
ideological 213-15 English School; realism
levels of 211-15 international society/system
military 211 anarchical nature of 67, 68
political 211, 212 Burke on 108-13
and women 158 capitalist character of 92
inter-systemic conflict constitutive tradition 107-19,
and anti-systemic movements 170
186 contribution of Marxism 58-9
Cold War as 133-4, 170-90, definitions 94-5, 97-9, 102, 103
230 economic powers of states 83
comparative study 187-90 end of hegemonic system 216,
and economic factors 189-90 218; evaluation of 222-8
history of 187-9 formation of 88, 132-4
see also Cold War; inter-state homogeneity 94-123; and
competition conflict 141, 142; and
interactionist theory 17 revolutions 137
interdependence 12, 14-15, 16, nature or nurture 62
29,31, 57, 63,103-4,253 and revolution 124-46
critique of 33 and states 94-5; role of 91-2
and state 74, 75 and transnationalism 103-7
international see also international; state/
defined 6, 20 states
interaction with national 4, 37 intervention
and Marxism 49-50 justification for 238
pathologies of 1-7 moral issues 237-9
status of 2 and United Nations 238-9
theoretical evolution 7-10 intervention, state, and
see also International Relations transnational processes 3-5
International Monetary Fund 154 Iran 137, 143, 262-3
International Relations 11 and women 158-9, 268
alternative research 241-4 Iraq 224, 238
definitions 27 Ireland 259
elements of 1, 8-9 and women 164-5
emergence of theory 7-10 Islam 154, 157,171,231,232,277
and end of history 216--35 Italy, homogenisation 121
future of 236-44
history of 5-{), 7-10, 21 Japan 122, 129, 130, 164, 221
legal approach 10 homogenisation 121
methodological debates 23-31, justice 19-20
46
myth and reality 5
neglect of normative 241-2 Kitchen Debate 159
rethinking 19-20; parameters Korea, women 164
20-2 Kurds 238
since 1970s 16--19
and sociology 18 League of Nations 10, 11, 239
286 Subject Index
liberal democracy 230--1 national, interaction with

prospects for 232-5 international 4, 37
see also democracy nationalism 245
British 259
Marxism and capitalism, research
and Cold War 177, 178, 179, requirements 242
180, 181 current 223
and conflict 177 as global phenomenon 2, 106
contribution of 47,48-9, 59-60 and Marxism 50, 70--1 , 113
and free will 52, 67 moral issues 237; intervention
on homogeneity 114-16 as 240
on ideology 142 Weber on 250
on imperialism 116 and women's rights 160-6
and inter-state relations 50 NATO 71, 134
and IR's three debates 50--5 female recruitment 157
limitations of 49, 68-71, 72, Nazism 133
115 neo-realism 16, 31-7, 74, 260
and realism 18 and revolution 125
relevant concepts 17-18, 59-60 New International Economic
on revolution 113, 131-2, 145 Order 16
on social cohesion 112-16 Nicaragua 137, 138, 143, 189
on states 31, 79-80, 81, 83, 91, non-state actors 15-16, 74
92 effects of 64
see also historical materialism influence of 88-9
mediascapes 104 and post-modernism 45-6
meta-theory 23 research requirements 242
methodology women as 155-6
debates 2~6 see also classes; socio-economic
requirements 2~, 46 factors
migration 105, 226 normative see moral
military norms see culture; homogeneity
and state 86-7 North-South relations 5~
and women 157 nuclear see arms race; Cold War
MNCs 75
autonomy of 89
obligation 19
relationship with states 89
occupation, foreign 3
modernity 105
OECD and women 158
modernization by conflict 129-30
oil industry 253
see also development OPEC 71
moral issues 236-7
price rises as class struggle 63
intervention 237-8
order 4
nationalism 237
beneficiary of 67
research requirements 243
and Great Powers 30
and theorisation 25
Ottoman empire 187-8, 189
multi-nationals see MNCs
nation and state 82 peace

nation-states see state/states prospects for 232-5
Subject Index 287
and spread of liberal religion 171

democracy 119, 122 fundamentalism 240
and women 157 movements 226
perestroika 213, 273 revolution 37, 65-7, 256, 260,
Poland 186, 202, 206 270
policy see foreign policy Bolshevik 133, 140, 141
political system Burke on French 110-12, 113,
as anarchic 33 114
bipolarity of 33 and concepts of system 144--5
transnational practices 104 contributory factors 90, 135--6
see also international society counter-revolutionary
political theory 19 internationalism 137
and homogeneity 95 defined 128-9, 130
and marginalisation of descriptive study 128
women 150 domestic to international 136--7
post-modernism 2, 37--46 effects 128-32, 134;
criticisms of 38--41 international 89-91, 139--43
and feminism 168-9 and historical materialism 131-2
and moral issues 240, 241 historically 127-8, 134--9
pretensions of 40-1 and international system
post-structuralism 40, 41 89-91' 113' 124--46
see also post-modernism and Marxism 145
power 20, 30-1 neglect of 124--5
four structures of 104 non violent 134
and security 4 research requirements 243
presentism 26, 217, 243 role of 129, 130--1; positive
production, mode and relations 131
60 and security 143--4
property systems 60 socialisation of 138
theoretical study 128
rape 153 and US 263
see also gender issues; war; and war 143--6; contribution to
women 139--40
realism 16, 31, 32, 246, 260 see also conflict; French
and behaviouralism 10-16, 131 Revolution; war
Cold War 172, 177-80 Russia see Soviet Union
critique of 36, 37, 232
on international society 91-2, sanctions, economic 90
94, 95, 97-9 Sandanista regime 137, 138
and Marxism 18, 50 'scapes' 38, 104--5
and revolutions 125--6, 128, SDI 199, 200-1
131, 144 security
on society 100 horizontal 143
and state 74--5, 76, 78, 80 international, and morality of
see also neo-realism intervention 239--40
reductionism 32, 36, 139 and power 4
and Marxism 69-70 and revolutions 143--4
regional changes 220-1 vertical 143
288 Subject Index
semi-peripheral escape 120-1, research requirements 242

259 and socio-economic forces
Serbia see Yugoslav conflict 60-1
social action, rational choice and state 84
models 20 and transnational processes 3
Social Darwinism 11 Soviet Union 122, 139
social movements 15-16, 250 collapse of communism
and post-modernism 45--6 191-215
social sciences and elites 193
failures of 244 future of 217
and post-modernism 38, 40 international factors and Cold
see also sociology War 198-205
socialisation transition to capitalism 195-8
defined 102 see also Cold War; communist
and homogeneity 122-3 regimes, collapse of
and inter-systemic approach state intervention, international
18~ influences 3-5
political 61 state-centred approach 51-2
of revolution 138 state/states 2
and state 32, 37 alternative theories 17
and war 32 autonomy of 79-80, 89
society catch up 95, 120
cohesion of 102-3, 109-13 and class hegemony 80
communitarian model 101-2 as coercive 18, 79, 82-3, 103
defined 99-101 competition between 140-1;
and state 74--93 and gender issues 149-50,
see also international society 158
socio-economic factors 59--61 concepts of 254; inappropriate
determination 74 77
and development of states 60-1 conflict between 120
influence on activity 67 definitions 35, 36, 76-7;
see also classes contrasted 78-84; need for
sociology 247 redefinition 93
and globalisation 104 dimensions of power 86-7
and International Relations 18 domestic and international
and international society 94, 96 dimensions 84--5
and revolutions 127 durability of 34
society and state 99-100 economic regulation by 83
on state 79, 80, 81, 82, 84, effect of revolutions 126, 129
85--6, 92 formation 20, 34, 36-7; by
South Africa 136, 186 force ~; and capitalism
sovereignty 34--5; and elites 86, 113;
and capitalism 103 influences 83; and inter-state
and concept of society 100 competition 95; and military
and feminism 19 86-7; through conflict 66,
and morality of intervention 103, 129-30
237-9, 240-1 functions of 2-3, 92; class
and post-modernism 42-3 hegemony 80
Subject Index 289
and government 81-2 and gender issues 152-3

interdependence view 14---15 research requirements 243
interests and social forces 86-7 see also International Relations
interrelation with international Third World 16
system 34, 35, 95 and collapse of USSR 204---5
legal-erritorial concept 18, 78 female employment 154
malignant charity 141 and international tension 133--4
and Marxism 70 revolutions 136, 138
and nation 82 and US security doctrines 262
as national-territorial totality thymos 231, 234, 275-6
78, 80-1 trade disputes 218
nationalism and women 160-6 as class struggle 63--4
and post-modernism 42-3 transnationalism 2, 8, 30-1,107
as protection rackets 82-3 dimensions of 104---5
relations between 36 and gender issues 156, 166
role of homogeneity 142 and interdependence 15-16
role of 4---5; and globalisation and international society 94,
105-7; reduced future 225 95, 96, 103-7
self-determined transitions and Marxism 52
196-7 and post-modernism 44, 45-6
semi-peripheral escape 120-1 and state 74, 105-7
socialisation of 138
and society 37, 74---93 United Kingdom, homogenisa-
and socio-economic forces tion 121
60-1, 64 United Nations
and sovereignty 84 and intervention 238-9
theoretical impasse 74---6 and women 157, 165
versions of international United States
homogeneity 107-11 global role 86
see also non-state actors homogenisation 121
structuralism 37, 74, 75 influence 30; of military 87
and Marxism 52-5 and third world revolutions 138
and North-South relations USAID and women 158
53--4 women and military 157
and revolutions 145 see also Cold War
structure in dominance 53 USSR see Soviet Union
systemic theories 8, 32, 36 utopian approach and Marxism
50
taxation and international
influences 4 vertical.security 143
technology and collapse of USSR Vietnam War 63, 126
201' 202-4, 210 impact on IR 252-3, 261
technoscapes 104
terrorism 261 war
theorisation 7-10, 23--4 cessation of 119, 122
contention 23--46 English School 11
diversity 1-2, 74---5 and feminism 19
explanatory power 24, 46 and function of state 82-3
290 Subject Index
war (cont.) Kitchen Debate 159

and inter-systemic conflict 170 and military 157
Marxism on 65-6 rights 157, 158; and
research requirements 243 nationalism 160-6
and revolutions 143-6 subordination of 160-3, 167,
and socialisation 32 265-6, 268
Waltz on 31-2 and transnationalism 156
and women 161-2, 266, 267; as and war 161-2, 266, 267
victims 153 see also feminism; gender issues
see also conflict World Bank 154
Western society, development World Order Modelling Project
through subjugation 62-3 17
see also Cold War; East-West; world system approach 186
United States and capitalism 51
women 227 and economic relations 56-7
changing role of 154, 156, 157 world wars as class struggle 63
cultural relativism 167
employment of 15~ Yugoslav conflict 223
and foreign policy 156-60, 164, morality of intervention 238,
165 239
as international actors 155-6 and women 162
and IR 147-69

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Rethinking International Relations

By the same author

Arabia without Sultans

No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or

Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this

First published 1994 by

ISBN 978-0-333-58905-2 ISBN 978-1-349-23658-9 (eBook)

1 Introduction: The Pertinence of the 'International' 1

3 A Necessary Encounter: Historical Materialism and

4 State and Society in International Relations 74

5 International Society as Homogeneity 94

6 'The Sixth Great Power': Revolutions and the

7 Hidden from International Relations: Women and

8 Inter-Systemic Conflict: The Case of Cold War 170

9 A Singular Collapse: The Soviet Union anrl Inter-State

10 International Relations and the 'End of History' 216

11 Conclusion: The Future of International Relations 236

Name Index 278

Subject Index 281

The author and publishers are grateful to the following for

The chapters in this book are elements of a double response - to

preparation of the text. I would also like to thank the members of

London FRED HALLIDAy

The purpose of this chapter is two-fold: to examine what is meant

The 'international' in Perspective

Theoretical diversity is a strength, not a weakness of International

focus of these disciplines: the 'international' has for long been a

Writers in Britain and the USA make much of the ways in

and ethical terms, reflects broad changes in international trade and

The subject of International Relations is, like all academic

the interaction of economic with military strength, the causes of

namely war, and to develop means of reducing its incidence in the

The former is, in academic terms, the purview of regional and

The Emergence of Theory

In the remainder of this chapter, I shall try to provide a brief

sciences IR has, however, tended to obscure some of these

international organisation, and a group of normative issues

interest of historical sociology in the dominance of strategic and

Realism and Behaviouralism

With the crises of the 1930s, 'idealism' gave way to 'realism',

compensated for by increased strength or expanded alliances on

'scientific' school of IR, almost wholly based in the US, sought to

analysis, interdependence and international political economy,

factors, whether or not the state was involved in this interaction.

dollar, the OPEC (Oil Producing and Exporting Countries) price

whether in situations of civil war (Lebanon, Sri Lanka), or in the

International Relations since the 1970s

The challenges to realism of behaviouralism, interdependence and

claims that interdependence was on the increase and they stressed

writing on international political economy, there was an applica-

interpersonal relations and locality. This mutual indifference has,

The Parameters of 'Rethinking'

This chapter has argued that the 'international' is not an

international does and does not play a determinant role. 26 Three

This relationship can, however, only be realised if the discipline

International Relations to a broader conception of social science,

Chapter 1 aimed to provide a summary account of the challenges

social sciences. The problems it has - of fact and value, of

Traditional Empiricism: History and the English School