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Geopolitics and Cyber Power: Why Geography Still

Matters
John B. Sheldon
Published online: 03 Nov 2014.

To cite this article: John B. Sheldon (2014) Geopolitics and Cyber Power: Why Geography Still Matters, American
Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, 36:5, 286-293, DOI:
10.1080/10803920.2014.969174

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 American Foreign Policy Interests, 36:286293, 2014
Copyright # 2014 NCAFP
ISSN: 1080-3920 print=1533-2128 online
DOI: 10.1080/10803920.2014.969174

Geopolitics and Cyber Power:

Why Geography Still Matters
John B. Sheldon
ABSTRACT Implicit in many analyses of the use of cyber power in
international politics and foreign policy is that realist geopolitics no longer
matter. Even when the term geopolitics is used in such analysis, it is as
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though the geography has become unmoored from the politics. While there
is undoubtedly a geographic foundation to cyberspace because of its
physical infrastructure of networked computers, cables, and satellites, it is
widely assumed that the geographic setting has no relevance to the political
use of cyber power by states and non-state actors. This article argues that
while cyberspace shrinks time and space in many obvious ways, the
geographic setting still matters in the use of cyber power. Further, compre-
hending the geopolitics of cyber power can help policymakers and analysts
understand the identity, motivations, and intentions of actors.

KEYWORDS cyber power; cyberwarfare; geography; geopolitics; information

operations; international politics; littoral; urbanization

What role, if any, does cyber power play in classical geopolitics? This
question is the inspiration for this article, which seeks to discern the
interplay between the use of cyber powerthe ability in peace, crisis,
and war to exert prompt strategic effect to, from, and in cyberspaceand
John B. Sheldon, Ph.D., is the executive geopoliticsthe relation of international political power to the geographi-
director of the George C. Marshall cal setting.1
Institute in Arlington, Virginia; founder
and owner of the Torridon Group LLC, a As a phenomenon that is thought to render time and space irrelevant,
space and cyberspace consultancy; senior cyberspace at one point seemed to many to have finally killed off the tyr-
fellow at the Atlantic Council; and a senior
fellow in Global Security Studies at the
anny of geography and the concept of territorial sovereignty. This irrational
Munk School on Global Affairs at the exuberance has given way to a quiet, if rather vague, acknowledgment that
University of Toronto in Canada. Prior to cyberspace is, indeed, tied to a geographic setting and has geopolitical
his current positions, John was Professor
of Space and Cyberspace Strategic Studies meaning. Yet analyses about how and why this is the case are few and
at the U.S. Air Forces School of Advanced far between.2
Air and Space Studies (SAASS) at Maxwell
AFB, Alabama. For over six years, John
The reality is that geography and geopolitics do matter and matter a great
taught the National Security Space course deal in the use of cyber power. Furthermore, that reality goes well beyond
and founded, directed, and taught the the commonplace fact that the physical segment of cyberspacethe compu-
Intelligence, Information, and Cyberspace
course. A former British diplomat, John ters, cables, and satellites, among other physical infrastructureis geo-
holds bachelors and masters degrees graphically situated and operated and maintained by human beings who
from the University of Hull, UK, and a
Ph.D. in politics and international relations
must, by necessity, live on the land in politically organized communities
from the University of Reading, UK. in physically distinct and demarcated territories. Rather, geography and
286
 geopolitics suffuses cyberspace in most, if not all, of philosophical reason to regard that future as less than
its characteristics and uses around the world and, desirable.
in fact, exerts influence on how and where cyber As a partial remedy to this unwarranted optimism
power is applied. That this is the case should not and the generally vague notion that geography and
come as a surprise since the rise of the information geopolitics somehow matter, outlined below are
age and all that it has given us has not obviated the the various ways in which cyber power is suffused
fact that, as maritime strategic theorist Sir Julian by geography and geopolitics and also how the prac-
Corbett noted in the early twentieth century, tice of cyber power can impact the geopolitical con-
text. The article examines the geographic and
Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great
issues between nations at war have always been geopolitical implications of the physical infrastruc-
decidedexcept in the rarest caseseither by what your ture of cyberspace; the fact that targets in cyberspace
army can do against your enemys territory and national have a geographic setting and geopolitical meaning;
life or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible
the rise of megacities along an increasingly urba-
for your army to do.3
nized littoral; and the implications for classical geo-
It is only natural and inevitable, therefore, that cyber politics in the traditions of the great theorists of
power should have a significant geopolitical dimen- geopolitics, Sir Halford Mackinder and Nicholas
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sion, just like the other strategic domains of land, Spykman.

sea, air, and space power.
Why this reality is underappreciated by many in THE PHYSICAL SEGMENT OF
the cybersecurity and strategic theory field is a matter CYBERSPACE: FROM CABLES TO
of general speculation, but what cannot be dis-
counted is the assertion that one reason among many
THE INTERNET OF THINGS
is that the influence of cyber power is less tangible The physical infrastructure of cyberspace maps
than other forms of power (such as, for example, the contours of contemporary geopolitics more than
air power), while, at the same time, is so blindingly we might think and has become even more reflective
obvious that it does not merit even a mention. It is of geographic and geopolitical realities in the physi-
less tangible because in many ways information, cal realm with the advent of the Internet of Things.
the currency of cyber power, cannot be seen directly; All too often the physical infrastructure of cyberspace
blindingly obvious because the hardware that tends to be treated in (and as) a utilitarian manner
generates, transmits, and receives that information devoid of geopolitical context.
currency is physically ubiquitous and the direct ben- The physical infrastructure of cyberspace com-
eficiaries (or victims, as the case may be) are similarly prises the land and undersea cables that provide
ubiquitous. Just like the nose on our face, we hardly connectivity across landmasses and oceans; com-
notice the powerful impact information technologies munication satellites in low-Earth and geostationary
have on our modern existence. orbits; server farms, routers, and other key hardware
More specifically, however, there is a sense that dotted all over the world; and the physical locations
many in the cyber field have gotten ahead of them- of key corporate, government and research centers,
selves and, in the process, have become untethered headquarters, and so forth, such as the physical
quite literally from the ground. Breathless exhorta- facilities of computer emergency response teams
tions of revolutions in military affairs and the unal- (CERTs); and computers and other devices used by
loyed goodness of the information age have led too people worldwide. This infrastructure is vast, com-
many to believe that rather than expected and plex, interconnected, and covers the globe.4 Further-
phenomenally unremarkable changes in the charac- more, the majority of this infrastructure is privately
ter of war and strategy as a result of the rise of cyber owned, with the rest owned by governments. This
power, we are instead in the midst of some change in is geopolitically significant because it suggests that
the nature of things that renders crusty old geogra- cyberspaceat least in how it manifests itself in its
phy and corrupt geopolitics utterly irrelevant to physical infrastructureis a global domain rather
our endlessly bright future. If only it were so and, than a global commons as is popularly claimed.5 This
even then, taken on its own terms, there is ample reality is increasingly evident with states imposing

Volume 36, Number 5, 2014 287

 their sovereignty in cyberspace through enforced from the British Isles to North America, it was not just
legislation and implemented policies that influence because London felt it necessary to maintain high-
to some degree or another how it is exploited by speed communications with its Canadian dominion,
users at the national level.6 States are also [re]claim- but was also reflective of the massive British invest-
ing their sovereignty in cyberspace through the pro- ments in the United States.10 The proceedings of the
motion of international regimes.7 Paris Peace Conference in 1919 regarding the dispo-
Cables traverse ocean floors and satellites circle sition of Germanys former cables laid bare just how
the Earth in orbits as high as 22,360 miles above the important this issue was, including for the United
planets surface. On land, cabling that literally wires States, which was emerging as a global power.11 Simi-
cyberspace usually utilizes existing infrastructure larly, today the United States and, to a lesser extent,
such as railways. Satellite ground stations and anten- Great Britain can leverage geopolitical advantage
nas are located on land and so, naturally, are subject through their ability to control the contemporary
to the laws of the states that govern those lands. undersea cable network.12
Server farms, including network switches and routers, The physical infrastructure of cyberspace is more
and data centers are also located on land, often near than just network and civil engineering. It is shaped
conurbations and near the large power sources and influenced by practical geographic imperatives
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needed to run the thousands of computer servers and by powerful geopolitical forces. Its structure is
located therein. also shaped by the existence and emergence of
Geographic and political considerations are central urban clusters, growing economic power, and mili-
to deciding where to place landing points for under- tary (geostrategic) requirements. These factors gave
sea cabling, such as taking into account transoceanic rise to the cyberspace we have today and will also
distances to control costs as well as shipping traffic influence the cyberspace we will have in years to
near the landing point in order to mitigate the risk comenot only in terms of network speeds,
of a ship tearing the cable.8 Similar considerations reliability, and access, but also in terms of the
framed decisions about the landing of submarine international governance of cyberspace and who, if
cables in the late nineteenth and early twentieth anyone, controls the Internet.13
centuries. Communication satellites in Earth orbit
must maintain their orbital positions and station in
what is, in fact, a complex EarthMoon space terrain THE TARGET IS ALWAYS IN THE
comprising the Earths gravity well, the drag
produced by traces of the Earths atmosphere even
PHYSICAL REALM
at 22,360 miles altitude, as well as the crowded In the continuous back and forth of what many
and increasingly contested geostationary territory call cyberwarfare, the shadow of geopolitics and
where orbital slots are becoming scarce. Further, geography also looms large. For starters, and
the launch of communication satellites can only be especially with regard to state-to-state (and their
done from a handful of locations around the world, proxies) cyber exchanges, geopolitical considera-
with the location of satellite ground control stations tions often determine the targets. Further, the target
chosen based on their ability to send signals to and itself is geographically located in that the computer
receive signals from satellites and distribute those network penetrated, the data pilfered or otherwise
signals via terrestrial networks.9 manipulated, and the political, economic, and mili-
Geographic imperatives suffuse the physical tary significance of that data are owned by and
infrastructure of cyberspace, and geopolitical consid- within the sovereign territory of some political entity.
erations further influence the makeup of how cyber- As a result, the actual and potential geopolitical
space is created. For example, in the late nineteenth implications of cyber exchanges should be obvious,
and early twentieth centuries, undersea cabling was although their overall impact is often mitigated by
dominated by Great Britain and its geopolitical the challenges posed in attributing the source of a
agenda centering around the maintenance of its cyber exchange. Attribution, of course, is important
empire and its domination of global trade. When and the forensic science behind it is improving rap-
Britain laid undersea cables across the North Atlantic idly. The problem: the forensics of attribution can

288 American Foreign Policy Interests

 rarely, if ever, give immediate results and can take have a discernable geopolitical context that can explain
days if not weeks to provide solid technical the wider causes behind them.16
evidence. Further, what is not always immediately This point is further emphasized by Chinese
apparent to a victim is that they are under cyber espionage through cyberspace. The most prominent
attack, further complicating attribution. targets appear to be high-technology corporations
When Iranian officials discovered the Stuxnet virus and government programs primarily in the United
in the Natanz nuclear processing plant, they had States, but also in Japan, Canada, Western Europe,
scant technical and physical evidence with which and Israelcountries where most of the worlds high
to precisely identify the perpetrator. What was technology is researched, designed, developed,
beyond doubt, however, to Iranians and third-party and manufactured. Hence the obvious geopolitical
observers alike, was that countries such as Mongolia, dimension to Chinese cyber activities in this regard.17
Uganda, and Greece, to pick three at random, were In the Middle East, cyber exchanges reflect the com-
not responsible. Instead, given Iranian geopolitics plex geopolitical dynamics with ongoing hostilities
since 1979 as well as publicly strained relations with between Israel and Palestinians (and their respective
the United States and Irans regional neighbors, the sympathizers), Israel and Iran, and Saudi Arabia
prime candidates were identified as being the United and Iran being the most prominent of the tensions
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States, Israel, certain European countries, and and conflicts.18 Wherever geopolitical rivalries and
perhaps even the Russians or Gulf Arab states.14 tensions are present and wherever the physical locus
European countries such as the United Kingdom, of power resides, cyber exchanges occur. Terrorist
Germany, and France would certainly have had the use of cyberspace also has a geopolitical dimension
technical and financial wherewithal to mount a in that efforts to raise money and recruit are geopoli-
Stuxnet-like operation (and history may yet show tically focused toward diasporas and co-religionists
that any of these may have provided assistance in who have a geographic footprint.19 Last, it might even
some way), but not necessarily the political will. be claimed that the criminal use of cyberspace can
The Gulf Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia and the have a geopolitical aspect. Just as criminals rob
United Arab Emirates, do not have the technical banks because that is where the money is, modern
capacity to undertake such an operation, but do have criminals, often taking advantage of countries with
the financial ability to bankroll it. The problem with cyberspace infrastructure but weak governance, use
that theory, however, is that their proximity to Iran cyberspace to further their geographic reach and take
would probably have precluded their involvement advantage of global financial networks by focusing
because of the real possibility of blowback. Last, their efforts on corporations and publics in wealthy
Russian involvement was very unlikely despite their parts of the world such as North America, Europe,
technical capacity to undertake an operation like Gulf Arab states, and Australasia.
Stuxnet because of their substantial commercial and The ubiquity of cyberspace and, in turn, cyber
strategic ties to Tehran. power should not confuse us about the role of
Neither the U.S. nor Israeli governments have geopolitics and geography in its use. In any cyber
officially acknowledged their involvement in the Stux- endeavor the geographic element looms large in that
net operation, but this has not stopped the Iranian activity must be started by a human being located
government from assigning blame to both. This charge somewhere geographically, on a machine and net-
has since been strengthened by leaks that point to a work similarly situated. That human being initiates
massive U.S.-Israeli operation that, if the stories are a cyber action for the purposes of national interest,
accurate, is remarkable in its scope, expense, and economic imperative, political ideology, perceived
complexity.15 Further, Iranian officials would have religious mandate, and=or criminal intent. The code
doubtless looked to the United States and Israel as that will in some manner manipulate data traverses
perpetrators given their technical, operational, and cyberspace through a number of physical entities
financial capacities to undertake such an endeavor, as natural and manmadeto its target that is also
well as their previously demonstrated political will in located somewhere geographically. That target
confronting Iranian nuclear activities. The larger point comprises machines and networks used by humans
here is that interstate cyber exchanges almost always (or even a targeted individual) who also reside

Volume 36, Number 5, 2014 289

 somewhere that can be found on a map. Invariably, as the challenges that persist with regard to curbing
there is a geopolitically symbiotic relationship illicit practices in electronic waste disposal.
between both geographically situated ends of the The rise of the megacity is taking place concurrent
cyber exchange. That symbiotic relationship has with the advent of the Internet of Things, as well as
geopolitical meaning that can be discerned through the emergence over the past decade or so of
the study of traditional, or classical, geopolitical so-called smart cities. Both of these technical trends
thought that dates back to Thucydides, via the works have tremendous geopolitical and geographic impli-
of Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman, cations for cyber power as the twenty-first century
through to the likes of Jakub J. Grygiel and C. Dale unfolds.23 Geopolitically, new centers of power will
Walton today.20 emerge along with megacities, the vast majority of
which will be within 100 miles of a coastline and in
many will contain large elements of potential insta-
URBAN GEOGRAPHY AND CYBER bility because of poor or partial governance and
POWER: THE RISE OF THE large economic inequalities. Further, with the grow-
ing number of people moving from rural areas to
MEGACITY more crowded conurbations, issues of food security
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The ubiquity of cyberspace, and, therefore, the will become more acute as local agricultural sectors
potential for the practice of cyber power, is hardly shrink in size and foodstuffs must be imported from
uniform in its geographic coverage. There are still, abroad. This leads to potentially fragile supply lines
and will remain, places on Earth where cyberspace into megacities because of potential disruptions
will be difficult to access or in which its penetration ranging from the everyday economic challenges of
in a population will be shallow at best. Changes cur- supply and demand through to deliberate inter-
rently under way in economics, demographics, as ference such as embargoes, piracy, or the cyber
well as political decisions affecting issues such as interdiction of logistical networks.
agriculture, city planning, and the building of infra- Geographically, the emergence of megacities is
structure, are all creating a growing trend of massive largely occurring along the littorals of Eurasia, Africa,
urbanization throughout the world and the creation and Latin America, with the result that more than 70
of megacities.21 This mass urbanization has signifi- percent of the worlds population will live within
cant implications for cyberspace in terms of its 100 miles of a coastline by 2050.24 As well as megaci-
physical infrastructure as well as its use. ties becoming cyber hubs of regional networks, we
Mass urbanization will likely result in global clus- are also likely to see the merging of cyberspace
ters of cyber activity that will also have their own and the maritime domain. In many ways, this trend
geopolitical narratives and imperatives. Further, is already under way with the digitization of maritime
while the global cyber infrastructure that will link transportation and policing and with the more
these clusters will probably be technically uniform, advanced of the worlds navies already adopting
and perhaps even subject to some form of global and integrating cyberwarfare into their policies, doc-
governance, the infrastructure within these clusters trines, and tactics, and techniques and procedures
of megacities will most certainly not be. Rather, the (TTPs). This adoption and integration of cyber
cyber infrastructures in these megacitiesespecially effects and fires will further expand, and change,
in the developing worldwill likely be a hybrid the influence of maritime power against the urba-
mix comprising hardware from commercial carriers nized littoral. Conversely, more advanced parts of
on one hand and improvised, often illegally the urbanized littoral, leveraging their own cyber
acquired, hardware and networks jury-rigged by power that is integrated with sea and air defenses
technically competent individuals in particular as well as maritime-domain-awareness networks,
neighborhoods and communities within a megacity. will be able to counter attempts to impose offensive
This phenomenon is already under way in cities such maritime power. Such circumstances point to the
as Mumbai, Karachi, Accra, and Nairobi, and will urbanized littoral as the focal point of stand-alone
only expand in the coming decades given the cyber conflict, with implications for maritime trade
ever-lower bar for entry into cyberspace,22 as well and law and order, as well as cyber-enabled military

290 American Foreign Policy Interests

 conflict that can enhance the attributes of maritime which to project military force over long distances
force on the one hand and land-based forces on can determine the relative superiority of the
the other. The ability to seize and sustain some sem- Heartland continentalist powers over the Pivot, or
blance of information superiority will likely provide Rimland, maritime-oriented powers. Propounded
the advantage in struggles over the urbanized littoral by early geopolitical theorists Sir Halford Mackinder
and its maritime approaches.25 and Nicholas Spykman, the Heartland is located on
This increasing urbanization of the littoral, along the Eurasian landmass and has moved eastward over
with the growing ubiquity of cyberspace within it, will the past 100 years from Germany, then to the Soviet
change the character of war in other ways as well. If Union=Russia, and, in the coming decades, is likely
strategic thinkers like David Kilcullen are right, urban to shift to China. The Heartland has access to an
warfare will become the norm in the emerging stra- abundance of resources and, with modern transpor-
tegic environment and will prominently feature cyber tation, such as railways, can leverage those resources
power and its attendant integration as a decisive into potentially overwhelming economic and military
domain.26 As a result, the armed forcesarmies, power. This can (and in the past has) led to a chal-
navies, and air forcesof many of the worlds lenge to the global balance of power, and so offshore
developed regional and great powers are training powers such as the United States and Great Britain
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for urban warfare where friendly and adversarial must use their maritime power to prop up the littoral
cyber power will be a major element of the oper- of the Eurasian landmassthe Rimlandto prevent
ational environment in peace, crisis, and war.27 This the Heartland from gaining dominance.28 Since the
emerging phenomenon will likely see innovations in end of the cold war, this geopolitical approach has
TTPs, defensive and offensive technologies, and oper- generally receded from the considerations of policy-
ational concepts appropriate to the complex urban makers, but with recent geopolitical perturbations in
environment where cyber power is ubiquitous. These Eurasia it is likely to enjoy a newly found applica-
innovations and operational concepts will probably bility.29 Cyber power can enhance, even critically
involve the ability to disrupt, deny, and otherwise enhance, the criteria for geopolitical success on a
manipulate local networks; conduct psychological global scale, but is unlikely to change the nature of
and other information operations in digitally rich this grand competition.
and complex geographies; and conduct sophisticated The geopolitical frameworks of Sir Halford Mack-
deception-and-denial operations against adversaries inder and Nicholas Spykman still have relevance in
and neutral audiences. Indeed, the 2014 conflict todays world and can easily accommodate the rise
between Israeli Defense Forces and Hamas in Gaza of cyber power that has occurred over the past few
will probably be seen as one of the progenitors of this decades.30 Looked at from the grandest of scales,
kind of warfare where the brutalities and horror of the competition between the United States and its
war in a crowded, complex urban environment are Western allies on one hand, and Russia, China, and
combined with an endlessly contested and chaotic their respective allies on the other, is, in essence, a
information environment. continuation of the competition over whether the
geopolitical Heartland can achieve superiority over
a geographically dispersed Rimland along the littoral.
BLURRED LINES: THE HEARTLAND, Cyberspace is suffused throughout both the Heart-
PIVOTS, AND RIMLANDS AND land and Rimland regions, but because of the grow-
CYBER POWERS INFLUENCE ON ing urbanization along the littoral, the strategic
expression of cyberspacecyber powerwill be
GEOPOLITICS more pronounced.31
On a global scale, cyber power is very unlikely to Diplomacy, economic statecraft, and land, sea, air,
change the nature of the eternal geopolitical struggle and space power still matter in the twenty-first-
between continental and maritime powers. This century geopolitical competition, but we can add
struggle centers around the idea that developments to this list of areas of competition the realm of
in transportation technologies (e.g., railways, ship cyberspace. What makes cyber power unique in geo-
propulsion, air power) and thus the means with politics is its influence not only as an instrument of

Volume 36, Number 5, 2014 291

 power in its own right, but its direct (as well as 2. For an exception to this, see the following exchange
indirect) influence on the other, more traditional, of views: Colin S. Gray, The Continued Primacy of
Geopolitics, Orbis 40, no. 2 (1996): 247259; and Martin
instruments of power. Throughout history, all instru- C. Libicki, The Emerging Primacy of Information, Orbis
ments of power have influenced other instruments to 40, no. 2 (1996): 261274.
some degree or another, thus changing the character 3. Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy
(London: Longman, Greens & Co., 1918), 12.
of these instruments and how their power is
4. By far the best treatment to date of the physical infrastruc-
exploited. For example, diplomacy has long had an ture of cyberspace is Andrew Blums Tubes: A Journey to
influence on trade, and vice versa; in warfare, the the Center of the Internet (New York: Ecco, 2012).
influence of air power in the first half of the twenti- 5. See John B. Sheldon, The Rise of Cyberpower, in Strategy
in the Contemporary World, 4th ed., ed. John Baylis, James J.
eth century had tremendous implications for sea Wirtz, and Colin S. Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
power; and the rise of space power in the latter half 2013), 310311.
of the twentieth century has had a significant impact 6. See Chris C. Demchak and Peter Dombrowski, Rise of a
on the conduct of warfare in the other domains. The Cybered Westphalian Age, Strategic Studies Quarterly 5,
no. 1 (Spring 2011): 3261.
influence of cyber power, in its own right as well as 7. For example, the UN Group of Governmental Experts on
on other instruments of power, is so profound that it Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommuni-
has changed not only the character of warfare in all cations in the Context of International Security emphasizes
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that states can assert sovereignty in cyberspace. See Report

the other domains, but has also changed the charac-
of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in
ter of diplomacy, economics, and the expression of the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the
culture, while, at the same time, providing yet Context of International Security A=68=98 (New York: Uni-
another, albeit pervasive, tool with which states ted Nations, June 23, 2013), http://www.un.org/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=A/68/98.
compete with one another in various locations and 8. See Andrew Blum, Netscapes (WIRED), http://andrewblum.
over any number of issues.32 net/2009/netscapes-wired-magazine/.
This urbanized littoral is where the continuing 9. See Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in
grand geopolitical struggle between the Heartland the Space Age (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 6085.
10. See, for example, Niall Ferguson, The Cash Nexus: Money
and Rimland powers will take place and will be and Power in the Modern World, 17002000 (New York:
expressed in both traditional and nontraditional Basic Books, 2001), 296299.
ways. And, in these very same geographic and geo- 11. See U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United
States, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
political contexts, cyber power may prove to be an
States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. 4, Minutes of
instrument of power that could give the decisive a Meeting of the Council of Four (Washington, DC: U.S.
edge in that strugglewith the advantage going to Government Printing Office, 1919), 494500. See also P. J.
the side better able to exploit cyberspace for infor- Hugill, The American Challenge to British Hegemony,
18611947, The Geographical Review 99, no. 3 (July
mation operations, provide superior information 2009): 403425.
assurance, and coherently integrate cyber power into 12. On the geopolitics of British undersea cabling, see, among
all other instruments of power. others, P. M. Kennedy, Imperial Cable Communications
and Strategy, 18701914, The English Historical Review
86, no. 341 (October 1971): 728752.
CONCLUSION 13. On the ongoing struggle to preserve Internet neutrality and
to keep control of the global cyberspace domain out of
This article has demonstrated that both geography the hands of sovereign states, see Laura DeNardis, The
and geopolitics exert tremendous influence on cyber- Global War for Internet Governance (New Haven, CT: Yale
space and that, in turn, cyber powerthe strategic University Press, 2014).
14. On the initial uncertainty of Iranian officials about who was
effect generated from cyberspacehas geographical behind the Stuxnet attack, see William Young and Robert F.
and geopolitical meaning. Far from being every- Worth, Bombings Hit Atomic Experts in Iran Streets, New
where and nowhere, cyber power, while unique in York Times, November 29, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/
its technical character, is nothing new under the 2010/11/30/world/middleeast/30tehran.html?_r=2&hp&.
15. See Greg Miller and Sari Horwitz, Justice Dept. Targets
geopolitical sun. General in Leak Probe, Washington Post, June 27, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
Notes justice-dept-targets-general-in-leak-probe/2013/06/27/9ad8
bc4e-df7c-11e2-b2d4-ea6d8f477a01_story.html.
1. Saul B. Cohen, Geography and Politics in a Divided World 16. To date, the most authoritative account of the Stuxnet attack
(London: Methuen, 1964), 24. can be found in David E. Sangers Confront and Conceal:

292 American Foreign Policy Interests

 Obamas Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power Affairs, Population Division, World Urbanization Prospects:
(New York: Crown, 2012), 188225. The 2011 Revision (New York: United Nations, 2011), http://
17. On the use of cyberspace for espionage, see Joel Brenner, esa.un.org/unup/pdf/WUP2011_Highlights.pdf; on urbaniza-
America the Vulnerable: Inside the New Threat Matrix of tion along the littoral, see National Intelligence Council,
Digital Espionage, Crime, and Warfare (New York: Penguin Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World (Washington,
Press, 2011). DC: National Intelligence Council, 2008), 23.
18. See Terry Pattar, Cyber Attacks in the Middle East, Current 25. For an initial exploration of this issue, see Peter Dombrowski
Intelligence 5, no. 3 (Summer 2013), http://www.current and Chris C. Demchak, Cyber War, Cybered Conflict, and
intelligence.net/analysis/2013/7/29/cyber-attacks-in-the- the Maritime Domain, Naval War College Review 67, no. 2
middle-east.html. (Spring 2014): 7197.
19. On terrorist uses of cyberspace, see, among others, Gabriel 26. See David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of
Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the the Urban Guerilla (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
New Challenges (Washington, DC: United States Institute 27. See, for example, the Australian Army, Future Land Warfare
of Peace Press, 2006). Report: 2014 (Canberra: Directorate of Future Land Warfare,
20. See Robert B. Strassler, The Landmark Thucydides (New April 2014); and Paul McLeary, US Army Sees Megacities
York: Touchstone Books, 1996); Halford J. Mackinder, as the Future Battlefield, Defense News, August 30, 2014,
Democratic Ideals and Reality (London: Faber and Faber, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140830/DEFREG02/
2009; first published in 1919); Nicholas J. Spykman, 308300027/US-Army-Sees-Megacities-Future-Battlefield.
Americas Strategy in World Politics: The United States and 28. See Mackinder, op. cit., and Spykman, op. cit. Mackinder
the Balance of Power (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction promulgated the concept of the Heartland, whereas
Downloaded by [Northern Illinois University] at 19:08 25 November 2014

Publishers, 2007; first published in 1942); Jakub J. Grygiel, Spykman believed that Mackinder exaggerated its potential
Great Powers and Geopolitical Change (Baltimore, MD: The power. Spykman promulgated the concept of the Rimland,
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); and C. Dale Walton, arguing that it was susceptible to the influence of offshore
Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the Twenty-First maritime powers, thus hemming in any dominant Eurasian
Century: Multipolarity and the Revolution in Strategic power. Also implicit in these theories is that Heartland
Perspective (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2007). powers tend to be prone to authoritarianism, whereas
21. On the rise of megacities, see Frauke Krass, Surinder Aggarwal, offshore powers tend to be liberal democracies.
Martin Coy, and Gunter Mertins, eds., Megacities: Our Global 29. On these geopolitical perturbations, see Walter Russell
Urban Future (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2014). Mead, The Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the
22. On this, see Scott Smith, Shanzai! The Era of DIY Warfare, Revisionist Powers, Foreign Affairs 93, no. 3 (May=June
Current Intelligence 3, no. 8 (August 2011), http://www. 2014): 6979.
currentintelligence.net/columns/2011/7/18/shanzai-the-era-of- 30. See Colin S. Gray, In Defence of the Heartland: Sir Halford
diy-warfare.html. Mackinder and His Critics a Hundred Years On, Comparative
23. On smart cities, see Anthony M. Townsend, Smart Cities: Big Strategy 23, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 925.
Data, Civic Hackers, and the Quest for a New Utopia (New 31. See Walton, op. cit.
York: W. W. Norton, 2013). 32. See, for example, John B. Sheldon, Deciphering
24. On the increasing urbanization of the worlds population up Cyberpower: Strategic Purpose in Peace and War, Strategic
to the year 2015, see Department of Economic and Social Studies Quarterly 5, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 95112.

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