Contents

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner. .......................... 1

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner. .......................... 3

IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY OF GUAM OF ATTY. LEON G.

MAQUERA ............................................................................................................................................................... 5

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, ....................................................................................... 10

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent. ....................................................... 14

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR

EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARIA BAR,............... 18

ROSALINDA BERNARDO VDA DE ROSALES, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARIO G. RAMOS, respondent. .............. 21

PASTOR EDWIN VILLARIN, PACIANO DE VEYRA, SR., and BARTOLOME EVAROLO, SR., complainants, vs.

ATTY. RESTITUTO SABATE, JR., respondent. ...................................................................................................... 24

EMELITA SOLARTE, complainant, vs. ATTY. TEOFILO F. PUGEDA, respondent. ................................................ 27

FELICIDAD VDA. DE BERNARDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE R. RESTAURO, respondent............................. 29

SEVERO SALES, ESPERANZA SALES BERMUDEZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LEONILO

GONZALES, respondents. ...................................................................................................................................... 32

LAQUINDANUM V. QUINTANA .............................................................................................................................. 36

ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY ........................................................................................................................................ 43

 1

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
B.M. NO. 1678

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in
December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail
of Canadas free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May
2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003),
petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before
the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to
resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership
in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and
Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Every applicant for admission as a
member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for
membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines,
conditioned on his retaking the lawyers oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the
Philippine bar.

We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. 2 It is so delicately affected with public interest that it is
both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the
public welfare.3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of
the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment
of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good
standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions
 2

makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise
of his professional privilege.4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory
requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for admission to
the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the
Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral
and other qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyers oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys
and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice. 10

The second requisite for the practice of law membership in good standing is a continuing requirement. This
means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in the IBP; 11 payment of the
annual professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement; 13 faithful
observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary
control.14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save
in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof
terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In
other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The
practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. 16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA
9225]."17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his
Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have
terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can
resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

 3

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially
significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal
developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a
lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the
conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake
his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-
Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.

B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in
December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail
of Canadas free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May
2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003),
petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before
the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to
resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership
in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and
Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
 4

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Every applicant for admission as a
member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for
membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines,
conditioned on his retaking the lawyers oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the
Philippine bar.

We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. 2 It is so delicately affected with public interest that it is
both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the
public welfare.3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of
the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment
of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good
standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions
makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise
of his professional privilege.4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory
requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for admission to
the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the
Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral
and other qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyers oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys
and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice. 10

The second requisite for the practice of law membership in good standing is a continuing requirement. This
means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in the IBP; 11 payment of the
annual professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement;13 faithful
observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary
control.14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.
 5

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save
in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof
terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In
other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The
practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. 16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA
9225]."17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his
Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have
terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can
resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially
significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal
developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a
lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the
conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake
his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-
Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.

IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY OF GUAM OF ATTY. LEON
G. MAQUERA

RESOLUTION
 6

TINGA, J.:

May a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from the practice of law in a foreign
jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney be meted the same sanction as a member of the
Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction? There is a Rule of Court provision
covering this cases central issue. Up to this juncture, its reach and breadth have not undergone the test of an
unsettled case.
In a Letter dated August 20, 1996,[1] the District Court of Guam informed this Court of the suspension of Atty.
Leon G. Maquera (Maquera) from the practice of law in Guam for two (2) years pursuant to the Decision rendered by
the Superior Court of Guam on May 7, 1996 in Special Proceedings Case No. SP0075-94,[2] a disciplinary case filed
by the Guam Bar Ethics Committee against Maquera.
The Court referred the matter of Maqueras suspension in Guam to the Bar Confidant for comment in
its Resolution dated November 19, 1996.[3] Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar in a foreign jurisdiction, where he has also been
admitted as an attorney, is also a ground for his disbarment or suspension in this realm, provided the foreign courts
action is by reason of an act or omission constituting deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral
conduct, or a violation of the lawyers oath.
In a Memorandum dated February 20, 1997, then Bar Confidant Atty. Erlinda C. Verzosa recommended that the
Court obtain copies of the record of Maqueras case since the documents transmitted by the Guam District Court do
not contain the factual and legal bases for Maqueras suspension and are thus insufficient to enable her to determine
whether Maqueras acts or omissions which resulted in his suspension in Guam are likewise violative of his oath as a
member of the Philippine Bar.[4]
Pursuant to this Courts directive in its Resolution dated March 18, 1997,[5] the Bar Confidant sent a letter dated
November 13, 1997 to the District Court of Guam requesting for certified copies of the record of the disciplinary case
against Maquera and of the rules violated by him. [6]
The Court received certified copies of the record of Maqueras case from the District Court of Guam on
December 8, 1997.[7]
Thereafter, Maqueras case was referred by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from the IBPs receipt of the case records. [8]
The IBP sent Maquera a Notice of Hearing requiring him to appear before the IBPs Commission on Bar
Discipline on July 28, 1998.[9] However, the notice was returned unserved because Maquera had already moved from
his last known address in Agana, Guam and did not leave any forwarding address. [10]
On October 9, 2003, the IBP submitted to the Court its Report and Recommendation and its Resolution No.
XVI-2003-110, indefinitely suspending Maquera from the practice of law within the Philippines until and unless he
updates and pays his IBP membership dues in full.[11]
The IBP found that Maquera was admitted to the Philippine Bar on February 28, 1958. On October 18, 1974, he
was admitted to the practice of law in the territory of Guam. He was suspended from the practice of law in Guam for
misconduct, as he acquired his clients property as payment for his legal services, then sold it and as a consequence
obtained an unreasonably high fee for handling his clients case. [12]
In its Decision, the Superior Court of Guam stated that on August 6, 1987, Edward Benavente, the creditor of a
certain Castro, obtained a judgment against Castro in a civil case. Maquera served as Castros counsel in said
case. Castros property subject of the case, a parcel of land, was to be sold at a public auction in satisfaction of his
obligation to Benavente. Castro, however, retained the right of redemption over the property for one year. The right of
redemption could be exercised by paying the amount of the judgment debt within the aforesaid period. [13]
 7

At the auction sale, Benavente purchased Castros property for Five Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$500.00), the
amount which Castro was adjudged to pay him. [14]
On December 21, 1987, Castro, in consideration of Maqueras legal services in the civil case involving
Benavente, entered into an oral agreement with Maquera and assigned his right of redemption in favor of the latter. [15]
On January 8, 1988, Maquera exercised Castros right of redemption by paying Benavente US$525.00 in
satisfaction of the judgment debt. Thereafter, Maquera had the title to the property transferred in his name. [16]
On December 31, 1988, Maquera sold the property to C.S. Chang and C.C. Chang for Three Hundred Twenty
Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$320,000.00).[17]
On January 15, 1994, the Guam Bar Ethics Committee (Committee) conducted hearings regarding Maqueras
alleged misconduct.[18]
Subsequently, the Committee filed a Petition in the Superior Court of Guam praying that Maquera be
sanctioned for violations of Rules 1.5[19] and 1.8(a)[20] of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) in
force in Guam. In its Petition, the Committee claimed that Maquera obtained an unreasonably high fee for his
services. The Committee further alleged that Maquera himself admitted his failure to comply with the requirement in
Rule 1.8 (a) of the Model Rules that a lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly
acquire a pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless the transaction and the terms governing the lawyers
acquisition of such interest are fair and reasonable to the client, and are fully disclosed to, and understood by the
client and reduced in writing.[21]
The Committee recommended that Maquera be: (1) suspended from the practice of law in Guam for a period of
two [2] years, however, with all but thirty (30) days of the period of suspension deferred; (2) ordered to return to
Castro the difference between the sale price of the property to the Changs and the amount due him for legal services
rendered to Castro; (3) required to pay the costs of the disciplinary proceedings; and (4) publicly reprimanded. It also
recommended that other jurisdictions be informed that Maquera has been subject to disciplinary action by the
Superior Court of Guam.[22]
Maquera did not deny that Castro executed a quitclaim deed to the property in his favor as compensation for
past legal services and that the transaction, except for the deed itself, was oral and was not made pursuant to a prior
written agreement. However, he contended that the transaction was made three days following the alleged
termination of the attorney-client relationship between them, and that the property did not constitute an exorbitant fee
for his legal services to Castro.[23]
On May 7, 1996, the Superior Court of Guam rendered its Decision[24] suspending Maquera from the practice of
law in Guam for a period of two (2) years and ordering him to take the Multi-State Professional Responsibility
Examination (MPRE) within that period.The court found that the attorney-client relationship between Maquera and
Castro was not yet completely terminated when they entered into the oral agreement to transfer Castros right of
redemption to Maquera on December 21, 1987. It also held that Maquera profited too much from the eventual
transfer of Castros property to him since he was able to sell the same to the Changs with more than US$200,000.00
in profit, whereas his legal fees for services rendered to Castro amounted only to US$45,000.00. The court also
ordered him to take the MPRE upon his admission during the hearings of his case that he was aware of the
requirements of the Model Rules regarding business transactions between an attorney and his client in a very
general sort of way.[25]
On the basis of the Decision of the Superior Court of Guam, the IBP concluded that although the said court
found Maquera liable for misconduct, there is no evidence to establish that [Maquera] committed a breach of ethics in
the Philippines.[26] However, the IBP still resolved to suspend him indefinitely for his failure to pay his annual dues as
a member of the IBP since 1977, which failure is, in turn, a ground for removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules of Court.[27]
 8

The power of the Court to disbar or suspend a lawyer for acts or omissions committed in a foreign jurisdiction is
found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by Supreme Court Resolution dated
February 13, 1992, which states:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for
his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of
the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis supplied).

The Court must therefore determine whether Maqueras acts, namely: acquiring by assignment Castros right of
redemption over the property subject of the civil case where Maquera appeared as counsel for him; exercising the
right of redemption; and, subsequently selling the property for a huge profit, violate Philippine law or the standards of
ethical behavior for members of the Philippine Bar and thus constitute grounds for his suspension or disbarment in
this jurisdiction.
The Superior Court of Guam found that Maquera acquired his clients property by exercising the right of
redemption previously assigned to him by the client in payment of his legal services. Such transaction falls squarely
under Article 1492 in relation to Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Paragraph 5 of Article
1491[28] prohibits the lawyers acquisition by assignment of the clients property which is the subject of the litigation
handled by the lawyer. Under Article 1492,[29] the prohibition extends to sales in legal redemption.
The prohibition ordained in paragraph 5 of Article 1491 and Article 1492 is founded on public policy because, by
virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client [30] and unduly
enrich himself at the expense of his client.
The case of In re: Ruste[31] illustrates the significance of the aforementioned prohibition. In that case, the
attorney acquired his clients property subject of a case where he was acting as counsel pursuant to a deed of sale
executed by his clients in his favor. He contended that the sale was made at the instance of his clients because they
had no money to pay him for his services. The Court ruled that the lawyers acquisition of the property of his clients
under the circumstances obtaining therein rendered him liable for malpractice. The Court held:

Whether the deed of sale in question was executed at the instance of the spouses driven by financial necessity, as
contended by the respondent, or at the latters behest, as contended by the complainant, is of no moment. In either
case an attorney occupies a vantage position to press upon or dictate his terms to a harassed client, in breach of the
rule so amply protective of the confidential relations, which must necessarily exist between attorney and client, and of
the rights of both.[32]

The Superior Court of Guam also hinted that Maqueras acquisition of Castros right of redemption, his
subsequent exercise of said right, and his act of selling the redeemed property for huge profits were tainted with
deceit and bad faith when it concluded that Maquera charged Castro an exorbitant fee for his legal services. The
court held that since the assignment of the right of redemption to Maquera was in payment for his legal services, and
since the property redeemed by him had a market value of US$248,220.00 as of December 21, 1987 (the date when
 9

the right of redemption was assigned to him), he is liable for misconduct for accepting payment for his legal services
way beyond his actual fees which amounted only to US$45,000.00.
Maqueras acts in Guam which resulted in his two (2)-year suspension from the practice of law in that jurisdiction
are also valid grounds for his suspension from the practice of law in the Philippines. Such acts are violative of a
lawyers sworn duty to act with fidelity toward his clients. They are also violative of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 which states that [a] lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be
mindful the trust and confidence reposed in him; and Rule 1.01 which prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the Philippine Bar but is also a continuing requirement to maintain ones goods standing in the legal
profession.[33]
It bears stressing that the Guam Superior Courts judgment ordering Maqueras suspension from the practice of
law in Guam does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines. Under Section
27,[34] Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the acts which led to his suspension in Guam are mere grounds for
disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction, at that only if the basis of the foreign courts action includes any of the
grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. [35] Likewise, the judgment of the Superior Court of Guam
only constitutes prima facie evidence of Maqueras unethical acts as a lawyer. [36] More fundamentally, due process
demands that he be given the opportunity to defend himself and to present testimonial and documentary evidence on
the matter in an investigation to be conducted in accordance with Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule
mandates that a respondent lawyer must in all cases be notified of the charges against him. It is only after
reasonable notice and failure on the part of the respondent lawyer to appear during the scheduled investigation that
an investigation may be conducted ex parte.[37]
The Court notes that Maquera has not yet been able to adduce evidence on his behalf regarding the charges of
unethical behavior in Guam against him, as it is not certain that he did receive the Notice of Hearing earlier sent by
the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline. Thus, there is a need to ascertain Maqueras current and correct address in
Guam in order that another notice, this time specifically informing him of the charges against him and requiring him to
explain why he should not be suspended or disbarred on those grounds (through this Resolution), may be sent to
him.
Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the IBP that Maquera should be suspended from the practice of law for
non-payment of his IBP membership dues from 1977 up to the present. [38] Under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the
Revised Rules of Court, non-payment of membership dues for six (6) months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the IBP, and default in such payment for one year shall be ground for removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.[39]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Leon G. Maquera is required to SHOW CAUSE, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
this Resolution, why he should not be suspended or disbarred for his acts which gave rise to the disciplinary
proceedings against him in the Superior Court of Guam and his subsequent suspension in said jurisdiction.
The Bar Confidant is directed to locate the current and correct address of Atty. Maquera in Guam and to serve
upon him a copy of this Resolution.
In the meantime, Atty. Maquera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR or until he shall
have paid his membership dues, whichever comes later.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Maqueras personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant
and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.
 10

[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997]

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi
City, respondent.

DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners
Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of
court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of
one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection
therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of
Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:

" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement
entered into between me and your company, as represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of
your company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said
contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made
said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests."

He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the "grounds which could
evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous
sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even
as I inform you that I categorically state on record that I am terminating the contract **. I hope I do not have to resort
to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually
fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro
City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand
corner above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD 26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit &
Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City,
repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan in
connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other
things, he said:
 11

" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the 'manipulated
contract' entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales
agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully
secured and pursued the housing loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to
be void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud,
deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between me and the
swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me."

And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the anomalous actuations of
Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May
3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and
discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account thereof. a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon
M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to
stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he
was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent."b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions on
Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of **
(Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the refund of ** (his) payments." c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a
verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned
envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage PD 26."[1] In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad
faith;"

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"

3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc." without "even a
bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible,
"all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her
dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be
dismissed from the service, or be appropriately disciplined (sic) ** "
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably with established usage that
notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this
case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court. [2]
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"[3] in which he questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to
require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court
investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice,
and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty.
Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not
only "the Executive Clerk of court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a Royal
Family **."[4]
 12

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious
tones,[5] Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment
thereon.[6] He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that
Sophia Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing
loan contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he who had
suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,"
considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[7] He declared that there was
no basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He
denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate
whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26," were typewritten on the
envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV
(subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J); [8] and as far as he
knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were
indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of an honest mistake. [9]
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with
"Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney"
because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local
legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and
injured."[10] He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. [11] He was induced
to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed document to him later for
correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where
the property -- subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is situated;[12] He says
Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do
so until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his
signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key
of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw. [13]
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations," and complainant Alawi
having come to the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and
demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April 19,
1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed as
"Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU
ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation.[14]
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous charges
(against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to
(her) and blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial to ** (his) rights and
interests;"
 13

3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and
pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority and against ** (his) will," and "concealed the real facts **."

Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense of his rights,
and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish,
sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total
of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[15]
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates
the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. [16] Section 4 of
the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times respect the rights of others, and ** refrain
from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest."[17] More than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee
of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among
others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary."[18]
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or respect for
the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed -- however sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent or
malicious, in excessively intemperate. insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right
of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or
vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy,
public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith."[19] Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or downright
name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct
more stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is
abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. [20] As a judicial employee, it is expected that he
accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be
characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps
be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons
who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before
Shari'a courts.[21] While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the
Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are
authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in his region, there
are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination,
valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of
attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the record contains no evidence
adequately establishing the accusation.
 14

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate,
insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and
he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

[B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in
the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The
practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law
even if he passes the bar examinations.

The Facts

Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of
the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of
Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct,
violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22
May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign
the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the
scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges
that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the
Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent
 15

filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of
Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for
and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan
(Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee,
being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act
as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as
counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents
services. Complainant claims that respondent filed thepleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning
vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but disallowed him
from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court
required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to represent him before the
MBEC. Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows
the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the
canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an
attorney in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his
resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification
of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further
claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the
losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit
and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted the claim of respondent
that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on
19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor.
Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the
MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer;
and (2) he was an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant
administrative case is motivated mainly by political vendetta.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.

OBCs Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001
elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The
OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on 22
May 2001. The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a
member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his
 16

admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission to the
Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly violated
when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary
and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the
MBEC.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent appeared as
counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May
2001, respondent signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent
stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T.
BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel
to represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent as her counsel. On the
same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by
REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party. Respondent himself wrote
the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily
Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao
in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for
mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice
of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, [1] the Court elucidated that:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters
of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x

In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law
is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to
render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC
and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of
 17

law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself
out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a
member of the Philippine Bar.[3]
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good
moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes
possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust [4] since a lawyer is an officer of
the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The
practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person
seeking admission had practiced law without a license. [5]
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate passed the
bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for
practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person
who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. [7]
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing
in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent
should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to
be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. [9]
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to act as
counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as
constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor
and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning effective upon your
acceptance.[10] Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001. [11] Thus, the evidence
does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized
respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no
misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.

[B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004]

 18

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002
BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARIA
BAR,
ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,

RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:

The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the other has been
rendered moot by a supervening event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
a Petition[1] to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the
appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations
that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City,
namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for
Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly
uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people. Meling
also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title Attorney in his communications, as
Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to
the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have
been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Courts Resolution[2] dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer,[3] Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez
because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with
Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over
them, he being their former professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose
from a single incident and involving the same parties as closed and terminated. Moreover, Meling denies the charges
and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that some of his communications really contained the
word Attorney as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation[4] dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of non-
disclosure against Meling in this wise:

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take the Bar
Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases,
not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still pending. Furthermore,
granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to
ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should not be
taken lightly by an applicant.
 19

The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of concealing them which
constitutes dishonesty.

In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:

It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from
the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of
personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the
penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.

The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also answerable under Rule 7.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false
statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.[5]

As regards Melings use of the title Attorney, the OBC had this to say:

Anent the issue of the use of the appellation Attorney in his letters, the explanation of Meling is not
acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as attorney whoever
may have typed the letters.

Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is signing his
communications as Atty. Haron S. Meling knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar
Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation attorney may render a person liable for indirect contempt of
court.[6]

Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and sign the Roll of
Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that Melings membership in
the Sharia Bar be suspended until further orders from the Court. [7]
We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar
Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and
signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate sanctions upon him
as a member of the Sharia Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia Court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral
character.[8] The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of
law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. [9]
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations requires the
applicant to aver that he or she has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation
before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal
of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her. Despite
the declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate
silence constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of good
moral character of the applicant.[10] The nature of whatever cases are pending against the applicant would aid the
Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the
 20

existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be
unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.
Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks of his lack of
the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of
the Sharia Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation Attorney, knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use, cannot go
unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,[11] the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of the title Attorney
by members of the Sharia Bar who are not likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an
executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Sharia District in Marawi City, used the title Attorney in several
correspondence in connection with the rescission of a contract entered into by him in his private capacity. The
Court declared that:

persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law
before Sharia courts. While one who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one who has been admitted to the
Philippine Bar, may both be considered counselors, in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an attorney. The title attorney is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary
degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law
in this jurisdiction.[12]

The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The solemn task of
administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be part of service therein, from the highest official to
the lowliest employee, must not only be competent and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues of
honesty and integrity. Anything short of this standard would diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes
infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application to take the Bar
examinations and made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the respondent grossly unfit
and unworthy to continue in the practice of law and suspended him therefrom until further orders from the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron
S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the
Philippine Sharia Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect
immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the
Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and
academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Sharia Courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
 21

[A.C. No. 5645. July 2, 2002]

ROSALINDA BERNARDO VDA DE ROSALES, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARIO G.

RAMOS, respondent.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

This complaint for disbarment was filed in behalf of complainant Rosalinda Bernardo Vda. de Rosales by the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) against respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos for violation of Act No. 2711 of
the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, Title IV, Ch. 11, otherwise know as the Notarial Law, particularly Secs. 245
and 246 thereof.
In September 1990 Manuel A. Bernardo, brother of complainant Rosalinda Bernardo Vda. de Rosales,
borrowed from Rosalinda the Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. 194464 covering Lot No. 1-B-4-H in her
name. The lot measures 112 square meters and is located at the back of Manuel's house on Fabie Street, Paco,
Metro Manila. On 25 November 1990 Rosalinda sold this lot to one Alfredo P. Castro. When she asked her brother
Manuel to return her title he refused.
On 22 October 1990 Rosalinda executed an Affidavit of Loss of her title and presented the affidavit to the
Register of Deeds of Manila.
On 3 September 1991 the Register of Deeds informed Rosalinda that her title to the property was already
transferred to Manuel by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale she purportedly executed in favor of Manuel on 5
September 1990. The document was notarized by respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos on 1 October 1990 and entered
in his Notarial Register as Doc. No. 388, Page No. 718, Book No. 10, Series of 1990. Rosalinda however denied
having signed any deed of sale over her property in favor of Manuel.
On 3 September 1991 Rosalinda filed with the NBI a complaint for falsification of public document against her
brother Manuel. The NBI invited respondent Atty. Ramos for questioning. The complaint alleged among others that
on 12 September 1991 Atty. Mario G. Ramos executed an affidavit before the NBI admitting that when Manuel
presented the purported Deed of Absolute Sale to him for notarization, he (Atty. Ramos) found some defects in the
document and that complainant Rosalinda was not around. The NBI Questioned Documents Division also compared
Rosalinda's signature appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale with samples of her genuine signature, and found that
the signature in the purported Deed of Absolute Sale and her genuine signatures were not written by one and the
same person.
On 5 October 1992 the NBI transmitted its findings to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila with the
recommendation that Manuel and Atty. Ramos be prosecuted for Falsification of Public Document under Art. 172 in
relation to Art. 171 of The Revised Penal Code, and that Atty. Ramos be additionally charged with violation of the
Notarial Law.
The NBI also transmitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
photocopies of the NBI investigation report and its annexes, and a verified complaint [1] for disbarment signed by
Rosalinda. The CBD received the records on 5 October 1992. On the same date, the CBD through Commissioner
Victor C. Fernandez directed respondent to submit an answer to the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice.
Respondent admitted in his Answer[2] that he had affixed his signature on the purported Deed of Absolute Sale
but failed to enter the document in his Notarial Registry Book. He also admitted executing before the NBI on 12
September 1991 an affidavit regarding the matter. Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the complaint since
according to him he only inadvertently signed the purported Deed of Absolute Sale and/or that his signature was
 22

procured through mistake, fraud, undue influence or excusable negligence, claiming that he simply relied on the
assurances of Manuel that the document would not be used for purposes other than a loan between brother and
sister, and that he affixed his signature thereon with utmost good faith and without intending to obtain personal gain
or to cause damage or injury to another.
The CBD set the case for hearing on 3 March 2000, 28 April 2000, 16 June 2000 and 5 October
2000. Complainant never appeared. The records show that the notices sent to her address at 1497 Fabie Street,
Paco, Manila, were returned unclaimed.[3]
On 26 January 2002 the IBP Board of Governors approved the report and recommendation of the CBD through
Commissioner Fernandez that the case against respondent be dismissed in view of complainant's failure to
prosecute and for lack of evidence on record to substantiate the complaint. [4] The Investigating Commissioner found
that the notices sent to complainant were returned unclaimed with the annotation "moved out," and that she did not
leave any forwarding address, and neither did she come to the CBD to inquire about the status of her case. From
these actuations, he concluded that complainant had lost interest in the further prosecution of this case, [5] and so
recommended its dismissal.
We cannot wholly agree with the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. It is clear
from the pleadings before us that respondent violated the Notarial Law in failing to register in his notarial book the
deed of absolute sale he notarized, which fact respondent readily admitted.
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of a notary public. It requires him to keep a notarial
register where he shall record all his official acts as notary, [6] and specifies what information with regard to the
notarized document should be entered therein.[7] Failure to perform this duty results in the revocation of his
commission as notary public.[8]
The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. [9]Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making
that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. [10] A notarial document is by law entitled
to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon
the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument. [11]
For this reason notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of
their duties.[12] Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be
undermined.[13] Hence a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are
the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what
are stated therein.[14] The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the
signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act and deed. [15]
The notary public is further enjoined to record in his notarial registry the necessary information regarding the
document or instrument notarized and retain a copy of the document presented to him for acknowledgment and
certification especially when it is a contract. [16] The notarial registry is a record of the notary public's official
acts. Acknowledged documents and instruments recorded in it are considered public documents. If the document or
instrument does not appear in the notarial records and there is no copy of it therein, doubt is engendered that the
document or instrument was not really notarized, so that it is not a public document and cannot bolster any claim
made based on this document. Considering the evidentiary value given to notarized documents, the failure of the
notary public to record the document in his notarial registry is tantamount to falsely making it appear that the
document was notarized when in fact it was not.
We take note of respondent's admission in his Answer that he had affixed his signature in the purported Deed
of Absolute Sale but he did not enter it in his notarial registry. This is clearly in violation of the Notarial Law for which
he must be disciplined.
 23

Respondent alleges that he merely signed the Deed of Absolute Sale inadvertently and that his signature was
procured through mistake, fraud, undue influence or excusable negligence as he relied on the assurances of Manuel
A. Bernardo, a kababayan from Pampanga, that the document would not be used for any illegal purpose.
We cannot honor, much less give credit to this allegation. That respondent notarized the document out of
sympathy for his kababayan is not a legitimate excuse. It is appalling that respondent did away with the basics of
notarial procedure in order to accommodate the alleged need of a friend and client. In doing so, he displayed a
decided lack of respect for the solemnity of an oath in a notarial document. He also exhibited his clear ignorance of
the importance of the office of a notary public. Not only did he violate the Notarial Law, he also did so without thinking
of the possible damage that might result from its non-observance.
The principal function of a notary public is to authenticate documents. When a notary public certifies to the due
execution and delivery of the document under his hand and seal he gives the document the force of
evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring documents to be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition
to the solemnity which should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to authorize such documents to
be given without further proof of their execution and delivery. [17] Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver
responsibility is placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to
the doing of any.[18] Failing in this, he must accept the consequences of his unwarranted actions.
From his admissions we find that Atty. Mario G. Ramos failed to exercise the due diligence required of him in
the performance of the duties of notary public. We do not agree however that his negligence should merit
disbarment, which is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction. Disbarment should never be imposed unless it is
evidently clear that the lawyer, by his serious misconduct, should no longer remain a member of the bar. Removal
from the bar should not really be decreed when any punishment less severe - reprimand, temporary suspension or
fine - would accomplish the end desired.[19] Under the circumstances, imposing sanctions decreed under the Notarial
Law and suspension from the practice of law would suffice.
WHEREFORE, for lack of diligence in the observance of the Notarial Law, the commission of respondent Atty.
Mario G. Ramos as Notary Public, if still existing, is REVOKED and thereafter Atty. Ramos should be
DISQUALIFIED from reappointment to the office of Notary Public.
Respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months
effective immediately. He is DIRECTED to report to this Court his receipt of this Decision to enable it to determine
when his suspension shall have taken effect.
The Clerk of Court of this Court is DIRECTED to immediately circularize this Decision for the proper guidance of
all concerned.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
 24

A.C. No. 3324 February 9, 2000

PASTOR EDWIN VILLARIN, PACIANO DE VEYRA, SR., and BARTOLOME EVAROLO,

SR., complainants,
vs.
ATTY. RESTITUTO SABATE, JR., respondent.

RESOLUTION

BUENA, J.:

Complainants Pastor Edwin Villarin, Paciano de Veyra, Sr. and Bartolome Evarolo, Sr. prays that administrative
sanctions be imposed on respondent Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. for not having observed honesty and utmost care in
the performance of his duties as notary public.

In their Affidavit-Complaint,1 complainants alleged that through their counsel Atty. Eduardo D. Estores, they filed a
complaint against Paterno Diaz, et al. under SEC Case No. DV091, Region XI Davao Extension Office, Davao City.

Respondents in the SEC Case filed their "Motion to Dismiss With Answer To Villarin's Et. Al., Complaint To The
Securities and Exchange Commission"2 prepared and notarized by Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. The verification of the
said pleading reads:

V E R I F I C AT I O N

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)

CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY) S.S.

WE, REV. PASTORS PATERNO M. DIAZ, MANUEL DONATO, ULYSSES CAMAGAY, LEVI PAGUNSAN,
ALEJANDRO BOFETIADO, All of legal ages after having been sworn in accordance with law depose and
say:

1. That we were the one who caused the above writings to be written;

2. That we have read and understood all statements therein and believed that all are true and correct to the
best of our knowledge and belief.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF hereunto affixed our signatures on the 6th day of February, 1989 at the City of
Cagayan de Oro, Philippines.

By: (Sgd.) Lilian C. Diaz (Sgd.) Camagay (Sgd.) M Donato

By: (Sgd.) Atty. Restituto B. Sabate

(Sgd.) Dr. Levi Pagunsan (Sgd.) Pastor A. Bofetiado

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before the above-named affiants on the 6th day of February, 1989 at the
City of Cagayan de Oro, Philippines.
 25

(Sgd.) RESTITUTO B. SABATE, JR.

Notary Public3

Complainants alleged that the signature of Paterno Diaz was not his, but that of a certain Lilian Diaz; that with regard
to the signatures of Levi Pagunsan and Alejandro Bofetiado, it was Atty. Sabate, Jr. who signed for them; and that
herein respondent Sabate, Jr. made it appear that said persons participated in the said act when in fact they did not
do so. Complainants averred that respondent's act undermined the public's confidence for which reason
administrative sanctions should be imposed against him.

In his Answer,4 respondent alleged that Paterno Diaz, Levi Pagunsan and Alejandro Bofetiado swore to the
correctness of the allegations in the motion to dismiss/pleading for the SEC through their authorized representatives
known by their names as Lilian C. Diaz, wife of Paterno Diaz, and Atty. Restituto B. Sabate, Jr. manifested by the
word "By" which preceded every signature of said representatives. Respondent allegedly signed for and in the
interest of his client backed-up by their authorization5; and Lilian Diaz was authorized to sign for and in behalf of her
husband as evidenced by a written authority.6 Respondent alleged that on the strength of the said authorizations he
notarized the said document.

Respondent also alleged that in signing for and in behalf of his client Pagunsan and Bofetiado, his signature was
preceded by the word "By" which suggests that he did not in any manner make it appear that those persons signed in
his presence; aside from the fact that his clients authorized him to sign for and in their behalf, considering the
distance of their place of residence to that of the respondent and the reglementary period in filing said pleadings he
had to reckon with. Respondent further alleged that the complaint is malicious and anchored only on evil motives and
not a sensible way to vindicate complainants' court losses, for respondent is only a lawyer defending a client and
prayed that the case be dismissed with further award for damages to vindicate his honor and mental anguish as a
consequence thereof.

The designated Investigating Commissioner of Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended that respondent Atty.
Restituto Sabate, Jr. be suspended from his Commission as Notary Public for a period of six (6) months. The Board
of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted the said recommendation and resolved to suspend the
respondent's Commission for six (6) months for failure to exercise due diligence in upholding his duty as a notary
public.

From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that respondent Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. notarized the Motion to Dismiss
With Answer prepared by him which pleading he signed for and in behalf of Levi Pagunsan and Alejandro Bofetiado
(while Lilian Diaz signed for her husband Pastor Diaz), three of the respondents in the SEC case, with the word "By"
before their signatures, because he was their counsel in said case and also because he was an officer of the
religious sect and corporation represented by the respondents-Pastors.

But while it would appear that in doing so, he acted in good faith, the fact remains that the same cannot be
condoned. He failed to state in the preliminary statements of said motion/answer that the three respondents were
represented by their designated attorneys-in-fact. Besides, having signed the Verification of the pleading, he cannot
swear that he appeared before himself as Notary Public.1wphi1.nt

The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements. 7 That function
would be defeated if the notary public were one of the signatories to the instrument. For then, he would be interested
in sustaining the validity thereof as it directly involves himself and the validity of his own act. It would place him in an
inconsistent position, and the very purpose of the acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud, would be thwarted. 8

Sec. 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides:

 26

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the
country to take acknowledgment of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary
public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or
document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the
same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to
keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.9

A member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who
signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before said notary public to
attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The acts of affiants cannot be delegated to anyone for
what are stated therein are facts they have personal knowledge of and swore to the same personally and not through
any representative. Otherwise, their representative's names should appear in the said documents as the ones who
executed the same and that is only the time they can affix their signatures and personally appear before the notary
public for notarization of said document.

As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties pertaining to
his office, such duties being dictated by public policy impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost
respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility
is incumbent upon and failing therein, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his professional
indiscretion.10

That respondent acted the way he did because he was confronted with an alleged urgent situation is no excuse at all.
As an individual, and even more so as a member of the legal profession, he is required to obey the laws of the land
at all times.11 For notarizing the Verification of the Motion to Dismiss With Answer when three of the affiants thereof
were not before him and for notarizing the same instrument of which he was one of the signatories, he failed to
exercise due diligence in upholding his duty as a notary public.

WHEREFORE, for lack of diligence in the observance of the Notarial Law, respondent Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. is
SUSPENDED from his Commission as Notary Public for a period of one (1) year.

SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

 27

A.C. No. 4751 July 31, 2000

EMELITA SOLARTE, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. TEOFILO F. PUGEDA, respondent.

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Before us is an administrative charge for gross misconduct, filed by complainant Emelita Solarte against a member of
the bar, respondent Atty. Teofilo F. Pugeda. Respondent was a municipal judge in the 1960s when, as notary
public ex officio, he allegedly notarized certain documents involving the sale of land situated in Cavite, particularly
two deeds of sale dated circa 1964 and 1967 involving parcels of land located at General Trias.

The lots belonged to Catalino Nocon, and was the subject of an extrajudicial partition made by Catalino and his
children. One of the children, Herminia, was not a signatory thereto because she was still a minor at that time.

Complainant claimed an interest in the lots sold because she was a descendant of the original owner, Catalino
Nocon. Complainant's paternal grandfather, Felimon, was one of Catalino's children. Some 30 years after the sale
thereof, or in mid-1990s complainant requested respondent for copies of the aforesaid deeds of sale. She suspected
them to be spurious and wanted to have them examined by the NBI. Unable to obtain copies from respondent, she
went to Herminia Nocon, another child of Catalino, who did not give her copies but allowed her to look at the
documents. Complainant recorded the contents of the document on video and retyped the contents.

Complainant avers that respondent Pugeda could not have legally notarized a document to which he also acted as
witness. She also cites as irregular or anomalous the absence of the vendee's signature in one of the deeds of sale.
Complainant claims that respondent and his wife are in fact administering the property at General Trias and they
were responsible for the wrongful partition of the property belonging to complainant's kin. According to complainant,
the acts of respondent constitute gross misconduct.

Complainant alleges in particular that respondent participated in the fraudulent partition and sale of the property of
Catalino. She discovered the fraud only recently according to her, when she sought the titling of his father's portion of
the property. She now assails the validity of the partition made by Catalino and his children particularly since
Herminia was not a signatory thereto and the deeds of sale pertaining to the property.

In his comment, respondent countered that, first, he was no longer under any obligation to provide petitioner with the
documents she was asking for because he is no longer a notary public ex officio. He says he was willing to look for
the documents he notarized some 30 years ago, but petitioner was impatient and had left for the United States of
America before he could find the documents.

Second, respondent says there is nothing in the law that prohibits the notary public from signing as witness the same
documents he notarized.

Third, as municipal judge, he avers he was empowered to notarize documents under the Judiciary Act of 1948 and
the Revised Administrative Code. The documents in question were notarized in the 1960s. According to respondent,
this was before the Supreme Court declared in 1980,1 that an ex officio notary public can only notarize documents if
such notarization is in connection with the exercise of his official functions and duties.
 28

Fourth, respondent denies that he or his wife was responsible for the partition of the lot subject of the deeds of sale,
so neither of them can be faulted therefor.

Attached to respondent's comment are copies of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch 1, in
Civil Case No. TM-273, and of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 49757-R. Both decisions upheld
the validity of the partition and the deeds of sale.

The complaint, together with respondent's comment, was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. The IBP recommends that the charge be dismissed, thus:

"It appears that complainant was not a party to the documents which respondent notarized and witnessed.
The respondent cannot be faulted for failure of the National archives to provide complainant with copies of
the requested documents. Nowhere in the records is it shown that respondent and his wife had a hand in
the partition and sale of the properties. Further, there is no prohibition for a notary public to witness a
document which he ratified nor for his wife to sign as witness." 2

We agree with the foregoing recommendation of the IBP.

Nothing in the law prohibits a notary public from acting at the same time as witness in the document he
notarized. 3The only exception is when the document to be notarized is a will. 4

Complainant offered no proof, but only mere allegations, that (1) respondent was involved in the partition of the
subject property, and that (2) respondent employed fraud to effect such partition. Such a grave charge against a
member of the bar and former municipal judge needs concrete substantiation to gain credence. It could not prosper
without adequate proof.

We note with dismay complainant's effort to mislead this Court when she claimed in her petition that she discovered
the fraudulent partition of the property only recently. For the records show that on June 7, 1967, Purificacion Alfaro,
petitioner's paternal grandmother, along with her children, had filed an action for partition and annulment of document
before the Court of First Instance of Cavite. 5 Purificacion and her co-plaintiffs lost their case in the trial court and
again in the Court of Appeals, which rendered its decision on July 31, 1979. 6 Complainant was not unaware of that
case.7 In fact, she was wondering why respondent also knew of the case when he was merely the notary public who
notarized the documents.

Ultimately, what complainant wants is to annul the partition and the sale of the subject property. However, both
matters were already brought before and upheld by the courts as far back as 1979. After the lapse of more than 20
years, without any appeal having been interposed, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 49757-R
upholding the validity of the partition and the deeds of sale has already attained finality. Complainant cannot now
resurrect issues involved in said case. This administrative charge against respondent lawyer, who as municipal judge
notarized the documents involved, is utterly without merit.

WHEREFORE, as recommended, the instant complaint is DISMISSED.

 29

AC. No. 3849 June 25, 2003

FELICIDAD VDA. DE BERNARDO, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE R. RESTAURO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

AZCUNA, J.:

Complainant Felicidad Vda. de Bernardo (married to the late Alberto Bernardo) and Marcelino G. Soriano (married to
Hildegarda Mejia) were co-owners of a parcel of land, with an area of 561 square meters, situated in Davao City, and
covered by TCT No. T-39100.1

On June 8, 1992, complainant filed a petition for the disbarment or indefinite suspension of respondent Atty. Jose R.
Restauro of Davao City for malpractice, deceit and grave misconduct.

Complainant averred that on July 19, 1990, respondent prepared and notarized a Special Power of Attorney 2making
it appear that she, Felicidad G. Soriano (complainants full maiden name), her deceased spouse, Alberto Bernardo
and Hildegarda Mejia appointed Marcelino G. Soriano, Jr. as their attorney-in-fact to sell a parcel of land situated in
Davao City covered by TCT No. T-39100 when they neither appeared nor executed and acknowledged said
document before respondent. The Special Power of Attorney was entered in the Notarial Register of respondent as
Doc. No. 380, Page No. 76, Book No. XIX, Series of 1990.

Complainant further alleged that her husband, Alberto Bernardo, could not have appeared and executed said Special
Power of Attorney before respondent on July 19, 1990 since her husband died on January 30, 1980 at the
Pangasinan Medical Center, as evidenced by a death certificate. 3 Hence, when the Special Power of Attorney was
executed, her husband was dead for more than ten years.

Complainant also alleged that to recover her share of the property which was sold to a third party, she hired the
services of her counsel whom she promised to pay 25 percent (on a contingent basis) of the value of her share.

Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred or indefinitely suspended, and that he be ordered to pay the value
of her pro indiviso half share of said property, the attorneys fees and the costs of the suit.

In his Answer, respondent asserted that he would not have known the names of Felicidad Soriano, Alberto Bernardo
and Hildegarda Mejia if said persons did not go to his office to request that he prepare the Special Power of Attorney.
Moreover, he stated that he would not have notarized the document if they did not appear before him and
acknowledge that it was their act and deed. He also mentioned that said persons brought with them the title (TCT No.
T-39100) to the property.

Respondent further averred that a living Alberto Bernardo appeared before him in Davao City and signed the Special
Power of Attorney at the time of its execution. He also stated that Pangasinan and Davao City are far apart; hence,
events happening in either places (alluding to the death of complainants husband, Alberto Bernardo) are not always
known to everybody. Atty. Restauro prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.

On September 14, 1992, this case was referred by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation,
report and recommendation.
 30

The Investigating Commissioner set the case for hearing on November 16, 1993. During the hearing, only
complainant and her counsel were present. Complainant testified and identified the documents mentioned in her
Complaint. Thereafter, she submitted a Formal Offer of Evidence dated November 19, 1993.

On November 18, 1993, the Commissioner received from respondent a Manifestation dated November 9, 1993
stating that he could not attend the hearing set on November 16, 1993 due to previous commitments and that if the
hearing could not be postponed to a later date, he was waiving his right to attend it.

In his Comments/Objections on Complainants Formal Offer of Evidence, respondent stated that he acted in good
faith when he prepared the Special Power of Attorney and that the persons involved were all present, otherwise, the
execution of said document would not have been possible. He prayed for the non-admission of the evidence
submitted by complainant.

As directed by the Commissioner, complainant filed a Memorandum. But respondent did not.

In her Memorandum, complainant stated that whoever appeared before respondent at the time of the execution of
the Special Power of Attorney and claimed to be her, Felicidad G. Soriano, and her deceased husband, Alberto
Bernardo, were impostors. According to complainant, respondent could have been in good faith when the supposed
Alberto Bernardo went to his office for the first time for the preparation and notarization of the Special Power of
Attorney. Nevertheless, after complainant, through her counsel, had informed respondent on May 6, 1992 (nearly 2
years after the execution of said Special Power of Attorney) that the persons who appeared before him were
impostors, respondent was already in bad faith for not contacting said persons and for not retracting the unauthorized
Special Power of Attorney.

In her report, the Investigating Commissioner found that it was not satisfactorily established that respondent was a
party to the fraudulent execution of said Special Power of Attorney. Respondents participation was only in the
preparation and notarization of said document based on the parties identification papers and their representations
that they were the persons who they claimed to be. The notarial acknowledgment of said document showed that the
alleged impostors presented their Community Tax Certificates bearing the names of complainant Felicidad G.
Soriano and her deceased husband, Alberto Bernardo.

The Investigating Commissioner also stated, thus:

It is noteworthy to stress here that a notary public is duty bound to require the person executing a document
to be personally present, to swear before him that he is that person and ask the latter if he has voluntarily
and freely executed the same; also to require him to sign in his presence if it is an affidavit or any other
sworn statement. But if it is a document with an acknowledgment, it is sufficient that the party thereto
personally appears before the notary public and acknowledges that he was the one who executed such
document. It is enough that the Notary Public requires the party to produce identification papers like his
Community Tax Certificate, and I.D. The Notary Public is not obliged to go beyond the identification
papers/documents presented and to investigate further to ascertain the real identity of the executing party.
What suffices is for the Notary Public to determine if he has the required identification papers. If this were
not the rule, no lawyer or any other person authorized to act as Notary Public would accept the job and
perform its functions.

However, the foregoing rule does not disregard the nature of the corresponding responsibilities of a Notary
Public. His office is [imbued] with public trust and public service. He is obliged to exercise due diligence in
ascertaining the true identity of the person executing a document. In this particular case, the Notary Public
should have exerted utmost efforts to determine the real identity of the persons executing the Special Power
 31

of Attorney considering that it was a document which authorizes a certain Marcelino G. Soriano, Jr. to sell
one half of the pro-indiviso share of the complainant over a parcel of land situated in Davao City.

On the basis of her investigation, the Commissioner recommended the following:

Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. Restauro be penalized for his
aforementioned acts and negligence and that the penalty of reprimand be meted out on him. It is further
recommended that his Commission as Notary Public be revoked for an indefinite period until the time that
he will be able to show to the Honorable Supreme Court that he again deserves to be allowed to act as
Notary Public in his place.

Subsequently, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the following Resolution of August 3, 2002:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering respondents failure to exercise utmost diligence
in the performance [of] his functions as Notary Public and for his disregard without justifiable reason of the
Orders of the Commission, Respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED with REVOCATION of his Commission
as Notary Public for an indefinite period until the time that he will be able to demonstrate to the court that he
again deserves to be allowed to act as Notary Public.

On January 13, 2003, this Court noted the aforesaid Resolution.

The principal function of a notary public is to authenticate documents. 4 When a notary public certifies to the due
execution and delivery of a document under his hand and seal, he gives the document the force of evidence. 5Indeed,
one of the purposes of requiring documents to be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the solemnity
which should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to authorize such documents to be given without
further proof of their execution and delivery. 6 A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face.7 Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment
executed before a notary public and appended to a private instrument. 8 Hence, a notary public must discharge his
powers and duties, which are impressed with public interest, 9 with accuracy and fidelity.

The Court agrees with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that in this case, respondent, as notary public, should
have exercised utmost diligence in ascertaining the true identity of the persons executing the said Special Power of
Attorney considering that it authorized Marcelino G. Soriano, Jr. to sell the pro indiviso half share of complainant in
the land covered by TCT No. T-39100.

However, the act of respondent does not warrant his disbarment or indefinite suspension. Considering all the
circumstances in this case, particularly the absence of any evidence of fraud involved, this Court finds a suspension
of six (6) months as notary public sufficient. Respondent, and for that matter, all notaries public, are hereby cautioned
to be very careful and diligent in ascertaining the true identities of the parties executing a document before them,
especially when it involves disposition of a property, as this Court will deal with such cases more severely in the
future.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose R. Restauro is hereby SUSPENDED as notary public for six (6) months for
failure to exercise utmost diligence in the performance of his functions as notary public, and WARNED that a similar
incident in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
 32

G.R. No. L-40145 July 29, 1992

SEVERO SALES, ESPERANZA SALES BERMUDEZ, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LEONILO GONZALES, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming that of the then Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch III which upheld the validity of the deed of sale of a
parcel of land executed by petitioner Severo Sales in favor of respondent Leonilo Gonzales.

Severo Sales owned an unregistered parcel of land in Bugallon, Pangasinan. Covered by Tax Declaration No. 5861,
the property had an area of 5,733 square meters more or less. 1 On July 4, 1955, Sales mortgaged said property,
together with two other parcels of land, to Faustina P. Agpoon and Jose Agpoon to secure the payment of a loan in
the amount of P2,240.00 payable on or about July 4, 1956. 2 On October 30, 1957, Tax Declaration No. 5861 was
canceled and in lieu hereof, Tax Declaration No. 13647 was issued to Sales but the area of the property was stated
therein as 5,229 square meters more or less. 3

More than a year later, or on December 24, 1958, Sales, with the consent of his wife, Margarita Ferrer, donated nine
hundred (900) square meters of the same property in favor of their daughter, petitioner Esperanza Sales
Bermudez. 4 The duly notarized deed of donation was presented to the Assessor's Office on the day of its execution.
Hence, Tax Declaration No. 13647 was replaced by two tax declarations: Tax Declaration No. 13875 5 in the name of
Esperanza Sales Bermudez for the 900-square-meter lot donated to her and Tax Declaration No. 13874 6 in the
name of Sales covering the remaining portion or 4,339 square meters.

As a consequence of a case filed by Faustina P. Agpoon against Sales in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
sometime in January 1959, the mortgaged property of Sales was set for foreclosure. To prevent such foreclosure,
Sales requested his friend, Ernesto Gonzales, to pay his total indebtedness of P2,700 to the Agpoon
spouses. 7Ernesto Gonzales acceded to the request and asked Sales and his wife to sign a document transferring
the mortgage to him. According to the Sales spouses, they were not given a copy of said document. 8 Around a
month later, Sales had the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 5861 surveyed by a private surveyor. 9

On February 3, 1959, a document entitled "Deed of Sale" between Severo Sales and Leonilo Gonzales was
registered with the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. 10

In October 1968, Sales received a photostat copy of the deed of sale appearing to have been signed by him and his
wife on January 29, 1959 before ex-officio Notary Public Arturo Malazo in San Manuel, Tarlac. The document stated
that the Sales spouses had sold the land described under Tax Declaration No. 5861 in consideration of the amount of
P4,000 to Leonilo Gonzales, son of Ernesto Gonzales.

In the Intestate Estate Proceedings of Ernesto Gonzales, (SP 42692) in the then Court of First Instance of Manila, the
land in question was claimed by respondent Leonilo Gonzales. Subsequently, upon submission of the Deed of Sale
between Severo Sales and Leonilo Gonzales, the questioned land was excluded therefrom. 11 Said parcel of land
was declared by Leonilo Gonzales under Tax Declaration No. 12483. 12
 33

On November 7, 1968, Leonilo Gonzales filed an action for illegal detainer against Sales before the Municipal Court
of Bugallon. 13 Before the case could be tried, Sales and his daughter, Esperanza Sales Bermudez filed in the Court
of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch III a complaint for annulment of the deed of sale between Sales and Gonzales on
the ground of fraud. Consequently, the municipal court suspended the illegal detainer proceedings before it pending
the outcome of the annulment case.

On October 27, 1969, the Court of First Instance 14 rendered a decision finding that the allegation of fraud was not
supported by convincing evidence. Its dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant, and against the plaintiffs by:

1. Ordering the dismissal of the complaint;

2. Declaring that the defendant is the lawful owner of the land described in Exhibits "2" and "2-A"
(same as Exh. "H") and is, therefore, entitled to the possession thereof;

3. Ordering the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, to pay the defendant the sum of P2,000.00 by way of
attorney's fees; and

4. Ordering the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

The lower court noted that while plaintiffs counsel claimed that Sales and his wife were illiterates, their signatures on
each page of the two-page deed of sale revealed "striking features" of intelligence. The court added:

Defendant's defense hinges on the fact that the Deed of Sale is valid, it having been properly
executed and notarized, and is therefore a public document, and carries weigh as provided for in
Section 31, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Defendant likewise proved that the money paid by his
father, Ernesto Gonzales was his. Arturo V. Malazo, the Notary Public ex-officio and Justice of the
Peace, before whom the Deed of Sale was executed, testified personally in Court and confirmed
the genuineness and validity of the Deed of sale, together with the signatures appearing therein,
particularly those of the vendors Severo Sales and Margarita Ferrer, and the witnesses thereto.
The bare and naked assertions of the plaintiff Severo Sales and his wife, could not offset the
presumption of regularity as to the execution of the Deed of Sale, especially so, that the ratifying
officer was, and still is, a municipal judge. The contention of plaintiff Severo Sales that he was
made to sign the document hurriedly by the deceased Ernesto Gonzales does not deserve
credence, considering that he has affixed (sic) or signed the said Deed of Sale no less than three
(3) times, together with his wife and the other witnesses. Considering the interest of the plaintiff
Severo Sales and his wife in this case, it could not overthrow the testimony of the Notary Public ex-
oficio Arturo V. Malazo. 15

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied. Sales and his daughter elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals contending that the lower court erred in upholding the validity of the deed of sale and in not considering the
unschooled Sales as an illiterate executor thereof. On December 19, 1974, the Court of Appeals 16 affirmed the
decision of the lower court but added that the petitioners shall pay, jointly and severally, the amount of P1,000 as
attorney's fees. Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioners primarily invoke Art. 1332 of the Civil Code which provides that when one of the parties to a contract is
unable to read, "or if the contract is in a language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person
 34

enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully, explained to the former." Petitioners contend
that respondent Gonzales failed to prove that the contents of the deed of sale were ever explained to Sales, an
illiterate. They also argue that granting that the deed of sale was valid, the courts below failed to take into
consideration the fact that the deed of donation was executed ahead of the deed of sale and must not, therefore, be
disregarded considering that with reference to unregistered lands, an earlier instrument prevails over a later one.

With regard to the issue of whether or not there was compliance with the provision of Art. 1332 of the Civil Code,
before said article may be invoked, it must be convincingly established that the disadvantaged party is unable to read
or that the contract involved in written in a language not understood by him. 17 It is the party invoking the benefits of
Art. 1332 or Sales, who has the burden of proving that he really is unable to read or that English, the language in
which the deed of sale was written, is incomprehensible to him. Only after sufficient proof of such facts may the
burden or proving that the terms of the contract had been explained to the disadvantaged party be shifted to the party
enforcing the contract, who, in this instance, is Leonilo Gonzales.

The records of this case, however, show that although Sales did not go to school and knew only how to sign his
name, 18 he and his wife had previously entered into contracts written in English: first, when Sales mortgaged his
property to Faustina P. Agpoon and second, when he donated a portion of the property involved to his daughter,
petitioner Esperanza Sales Bermudez. 19 The court below also noted the fact that the signatures of the Sales
spouses in the deed of sale showed the "striking features of the signatures of intelligent" individuals. Coupled with
this is the fact that in court, the Sales spouses themselves admitted that the signatures on the deed of sale "looked
like" their signatures. 20

But more revealing is the fact that the deed of sale itself, specifically the notarial acknowledgment thereof, contains a
statement that its executors were known to the notary public to be the persons who executed the instrument; that
they were "informed by me (notary public) of the contents thereof" and that they acknowledged to the notary public
that the instrument was freely and voluntarily executed. 21 When he testified at the hearing, notary public Arturo
Malazo stated, "I know Mr. Severo Sales and he appeared before me when I notarized that document." Later, he
added that "the document speaks for itself and the witnesses were there and those were the persons present"
(sic). 22 Thus, the stark denial of the petitioners, specially Sales, that he executed the deed of sale pales in the face of
Malazo's testimony because the testimony of the notary public enjoys greater credence than that of an ordinary
witness. 23

The extrinsic validity of the deed of sale is not affected by the fact that while the property subject thereof is located in
Bugallon, Pangasinan where the vendors also resided, the document was executed in San Miguel, Tarlac. What is
important under the Notarial Law is that the notary public concerned has authority to acknowledge the document
executed within his territorial jurisdiction. 24 A notarial acknowledgment attaches full faith and credit to the document
concerned. 25 It also vests upon the document the presumption of regularity unless it is impugned by strong,
complete and conclusive proof. 26 Such kind of proof has not been presented by the petitioners.

While it seems improbable that Severo Sales sold the property described in Tax Declaration 5861 when in fact this
had been subsequently cancelled already by Tax Declaration 13875 in the name of Esperanza Sales Bermudez and
by Tax Declaration No. 13874 in Severo Sales' name, one can hardly ascribe bad faith to respondent, for unlike a
title registered under the Torrens System, a tax declaration does not constitute constructive notice to the whole world.
The issue of good faith or bad faith of a buyer is relevant only where the subject of the sale is a registered land but
not where the property is an unregistered land. 27

On the issue of whether or not the earlier deed of donation should "prevail" over the deed of sale or be "recognized",
petitioner invokes Nisce v. Milo 28 and Estate of Mota v. Concepcion 29 which purportedly ruled that "with reference to
unregistered lands, an earlier instrument, be it a sale or
mortgage, prevails over a later one, and the registration of any one of them is immaterial." 30
 35

The deed of donation explicitly provides that the land involved "has not been registered neither under Act 496 nor
under the Spanish Mortgage Law. The parties hereto have agreed to register this document under Act 3344." 31Such
agreement had to be expressly stipulated in the deed of donation 32 because under Act 3344, the Register of Deeds
is not authorized to effect any registration unless the parties have expressly agreed to register their transaction
thereunder. A perusal of the records shows, however, that the deed of donation was not registered at all. Besides, at
the hearing, petitioners failed to show any evidence proving registration. Petitioners' counsel even failed to secure a
certification from the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan of its due registration as directed by the trial judge.

Hence, while the deed of donation is valid between the donor and the donee thereby effectively transmitting the rights
to said property from Sales to his daughter, such deed, however, did not bind Leonilo Gonzales, a third party to the
donation. This is because non-registration of a deed of donation under Sec. 1 of Act No. 3344 does not bind other
parties ignorant of a previous transaction, notwithstanding the provision therein which petitioners invoke that "any
registration made under this section shall be understood to be without prejudice to a third party with a better right"
Petitioner Esperanza Sales Bermudez may not be a considered a third party 33 being the daughter of the vendor
himself and the "better right" possessed by a third party refers to other titles which a party might have acquired
independently of the unregistered deed such as title by prescription. 34

We take note of the fact that while the Deed of Donation was not registered, the Deed of Sale was registered as
evidenced by the notation made by Cipriano Abenojar, Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan 35 and the official
receipt issued by the Registry of Deeds. 36

Finally, we cannot be convinced that it is useless to register deeds or instruments affecting unregistered lands
because the books of registration provided under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code as Amended by
Act 3344 continue to remain in force even to this day. In fact, under Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
instruments dealing with unregistered lands can still be registered. 37

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

 36

EN BANC

LAQUINDANUM V. QUINTANA

JUDGE LILY LYDIA A.C. No. 7036

A. LAQUINDANUM,
Complainant, Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
Promulgated:
ATTY. NESTOR Q. QUINTANA,
Respondent. June 29, 2009
x------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

This administrative case against Atty. Nestor Q. Quintana (Atty. Quintana) stemmed from a letter [1] addressed to the
Court filed by Executive Judge Lily Lydia A. Laquindanum (Judge Laquindanum) of the Regional Trial Court of
Midsayap, Cotabato requesting that proper disciplinary action be imposed on him for performing notarial functions in
Midsayap, Cotabato, which is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court that issued his notarial
commission, and for allowing his wife to do notarial acts in his absence.
In her letter, Judge Laquindanum alleged that pursuant to A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, executive judges are
required to closely monitor the activities of notaries public within the territorial bounds of their jurisdiction and to see
to it that notaries public shall not extend notarial functions beyond the limits of their authority. Hence, she wrote a
letter[2] to Atty. Quintana directing him to stop notarizing documents within the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court of Midsayap, Cotabato (which is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court that issued
his notarial commission for Cotabato City and the Province of Maguindanao) since certain documents [3] notarized by
him had been reaching her office.
 37

However, despite such directive, respondent continuously performed notarial functions in Midsayap,
Cotabato as evidenced by: (1) the Affidavit of Loss of ATM Card[4] executed by Kristine C. Guro; and (2) the Affidavit
of Loss of Drivers License[5] executed by Elenita D. Ballentes.

Under Sec. 11, Rule III[6] of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Atty. Quintana could not extend his notarial
acts beyond Cotabato City and the Province of Maguindanao because Midsayap, Cotabato is not part
of Cotabato City or the Provinceof Maguindanao. Midsayap is part of the Province of Cotabato. The City within
the province of Cotabato is Kidapawan City, and not Cotabato City.
Judge Laquindanum also alleged that, upon further investigation of the matter, it was discovered that it was Atty.
Quintanas wife who performed notarial acts whenever he was out of the office as attested to by the Joint
Affidavit[7] executed by Kristine C. Guro and Elenita D. Ballentes.

In a Resolution dated February 14, 2006,[8] we required Atty. Quintana to comment on the letter of Judge
Laquindanum.

In his Response,[9] Atty. Quintana alleged that he filed a petition for notarial commission before Branch 18,
Regional Trial Court, Midsayap, Cotabato. However, the same was not acted upon by Judge Laquindanum for three
weeks. He alleged that the reason for Judge Laquindanums inaction was that she questioned his affiliation with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Cotabato City Chapter, and required him to be a member of IBP Kidapawan
City Chapter and to obtain a Certification of Payments from the latter chapter. Because of this, he opted to withdraw
his petition. After he withdrew his petition, he claimed that Judge Laquindanum sent a clerk from her office to ask him
to return his petition, but he did not oblige because at that time he already had a Commission for Notary
Public[10] issued by Executive Judge Reno E. Concha of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cotabato City.

Atty. Quintana lamented that he was singled out by Judge Laquindanum, because the latter immediately
issued notarial commissions to other lawyers without asking for so many requirements. However, when it came to
him, Judge Laquindanum even tracked down all his pleadings; communicated with his clients; and disseminated
information through letters, pronouncements, and directives to court clerks and other lawyers to humiliate him and be
ostracized by fellow lawyers.

Atty. Quintana argued that he subscribed documents in his office at Midsayap, Cotabato; and Midsayap is
part of the Province of Cotabato. He contended that he did not violate any provision of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice, because he was equipped with a notarial commission. He maintained that he did not act outside
the province of Cotabato since Midsayap, Cotabato, where he practices his legal profession and subscribes
 38

documents, is part of the province of Cotabato. He claimed that as a lawyer of good moral standing, he could practice
his legal profession in the entire Philippines.

Atty. Quintana further argued that Judge Laquindanum had no authority to issue such directive, because
only Executive Judge Reno E. Concha, who issued his notarial commission, and the Supreme Court could prohibit
him from notarizing in the Province of Cotabato.

In a Resolution dated March 21, 2006,[11] we referred this case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for
investigation, report and recommendation.

In the February 28, 2007 Hearing[12] before the OBC presided by Atty. Ma. Crisitina B. Layusa (Hearing
Officer), Judge Laquindanum presented a Deed of Donation, [13] which was notarized by Atty. Quintana in
2004.[14] Honorata Rosil appears as one of the signatories of the document as the donors wife. However, Honorata
Rosil died on March 12, 2003, as shown by the Certificate of Death [15] issued by the Civil Registrar of Ibohon,
Cotabato.

Judge Laquindanum testified that Atty. Quintana continued to notarize documents in the years 2006 to 2007
despite the fact that his commission as notary public for and in the Province of Maguindanao and Cotabato City had
already expired on December 31, 2005, and he had not renewed the same. [16] To support her claim, Judge
Laquindanum presented the following: (1) Affidavit of Loss [of] Title[17] executed by Betty G. Granada with
subscription dated April 8, 2006 at Cotabato City; (2) Certificate of Candidacy[18] of Mr. Elias Diosanta Arabis with
subscription dated July 18, 2006; (3) Affidavit of Loss [of] Drivers License [19] executed by Anecito C. Bernabe with
subscription dated February 20, 2007 at Midsayap, Cotabato; and (4) Affidavit of Loss [20] executed by Santos V.
Magbanua with subscription dated February 22, 2007 at Midsayap, Cotabato.

For his part, Atty. Quintana admitted that all the signatures appearing in the documents marked as exhibits
of Judge Laquindanum were his except for the following: (1) Affidavit of Loss of ATM Card[21] executed by Kristine C.
Guro; and (2) Affidavit of Loss of Drivers License[22] executed by Elenita D. Ballentes; and (3) Affidavit of
Loss[23] executed by Santos V. Magbanua. He explained that those documents were signed by his wife and were the
result of an entrapment operation of Judge Laquindanum: to let somebody bring and have them notarized by his wife,
when they knew that his wife is not a lawyer. He also denied the he authorized his wife to notarize
documents. According to him, he slapped his wife and told her to stop doing it as it would ruin his profession.

Atty. Quintana also claimed that Judge Laquindanum did not act on his petition, because he did not comply
with her requirements for him to transfer his membership to the Kidapawan Chapter, wherein her sister, Atty. Aglepa,
is the IBP President.
 39

On the one hand, Judge Laquindanum explained that she was only performing her responsibility and had
nothing against Atty. Quintana. The reason why she did not act on his petition was that he had not paid his IBP
dues,[24] which is a requirement before a notarial commission may be granted. She told his wife to secure a
certification of payment from the IBP, but she did not return.

This was denied by Atty. Quintana, who claimed that he enclosed in his Response the certification of good
standing and payments of his IBP dues. However, when the same was examined, there were no documents attached
thereto. Due to oversight, Atty. Quintana prayed that he be given time to send them later which was granted by the
Hearing Officer.

Finally, Atty. Quintana asked for forgiveness for what he had done and promised not to repeat the same. He
also asked that he be given another chance and not be divested of his privilege to notarize, as it was the only bread
and butter of his family.

On March 5, 2007, Atty. Quintana submitted to the OBC the documents[25] issued by the IBP Cotabato City
Chapter to prove that he had paid his IBP dues.

In a Manifestation[26] dated March 9, 2007, Judge Laquindanum

submitted a Certification[27] and its entries show that Atty. Quintana paid his IBP dues for the year 2005 only on
January 9, 2006 per Official Receipt (O.R.) No. 610381. Likewise, the arrears of his IBP dues for the years 1993,
1995, 1996, and 1998 to 2003 were also paid only on January 9, 2006 per O.R. No. 610387. Hence, when he filed
his petition for notarial commission in 2004, he had not yet completely paid his IBP dues.

In its Report and Recommendation,[28] the OBC recommended that Atty. Quintana be disqualified from being
appointed as a notary public for two (2) years; and that if his notarial commission still exists, the same should be
revoked for two (2) years. The OBC found the defenses and arguments raised by Atty. Quintana to be without
merit, viz:

Apparently, respondent has extended his notarial acts in Midsayap and Kabacan,
Cotabato, which is already outside his territorial jurisdiction to perform as Notary Public.

Section 11 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides, thus:

Jurisdiction and Term A person commissioned as notary public

may perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of
the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first
day of January of the year in which the commissioning court is made,
 40

unless earlier revoked [or] the notary public has resigned under these
Rules and the Rules of Court.

Under the rule[,] respondent may perform his notarial acts within the territorial jurisdiction
of the commissioning Executive Judge Concha, which is in Cotabato City and the [P]rovince of
Maguindanao only. But definitely he cannot extend his commission as notary public in Midsayap or
Kabacan and in any place of the province of Cotabato as he is not commissioned thereat to do
such act. Midsayap and Kabacan are not part of either Cotabato City or [P]rovince of Maguindanao
but part of the province of North Cotabato. Thus, the claim of respondent that he can exercise his
notarial commission in Midsayap, Cotabato because Cotabato City is part of
the province of Cotabato is absolutely devoid of merit.

xxxx

Further, evidence on record also shows that there are several documents which the
respondents wife has herself notarized. Respondent justifies that he cannot be blamed for the act
of his wife as he did not authorize the latter to notarize documents in his absence.According to
him[,] he even scolded and told his wife not to do it anymore as it would affect his profession.

In the case of Lingan v. Calubaquib et al., Adm. Case No. 5377, June 15, 2006 the Court
held, thus:

A notary public is personally accountable for all entries in his

notarial register; He cannot relieve himself of this responsibility by passing
the buck to their (sic) secretaries

A person who is commissioned as a notary public takes full responsibility for all the entries
in his notarial register. Respondent cannot take refuge claiming that it was his wifes act and that he
did not authorize his wife to notarize documents. He is personally accountable for the activities in
his office as well as the acts of his personnel including his wife, who acts as his secretary.

Likewise, evidence reveals that respondent notarized in 2004 a Deed of Donation (Rollo,
p. 79) wherein, (sic) Honorata Rosel (Honorata Rosil) one of the affiants therein, was already dead
at the time of notarization as shown in a Certificate of Death (Rollo, p.80) issued by the Civil
Registrar General of Libungan, Cotabato.

Sec. 2, (b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides, thus[:]

A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document (1) is not in the notarys presence personally at the time of the
notarization; and (2) is not personally known to the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

Clearly, in notarizing a Deed of Donation without even determining the presence or

qualifications of affiants therein, respondent only shows his gross negligence and ignorance of the
provisions of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

xxxx
 41

Furthermore, respondent claims that he, being a lawyer in good standing, has the right to
practice his profession including notarial acts in the entire Philippines. This statement is barren of
merit.

While it is true that lawyers in good standing are allowed to engage in the practice of law
in the Philippines.(sic) However, not every lawyer even in good standing can perform notarial
functions without having been commissioned as notary public as specifically provided for under the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He must have submitted himself to the commissioning court by
filing his petition for issuance of his notarial (sic) Notarial Practice. The commissioning court may or
may not grant the said petition if in his sound discretion the petitioner does not meet the required
qualifications for [a] Notary Public. Since respondent herein did not submit himself to the
procedural rules for the issuance of the notarial commission, he has no reason at all to claim that
he can perform notarial act[s] in the entire country for lack of authority to do so.

Likewise, contrary to the belief of respondent, complainant being the commissioning court
in Midsayap, Cotabato has the authority under Rule XI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice to
monitor the duties and responsibilities including liabilities, if any, of a notary public commissioned
or those performing notarial acts without authority in her territorial jurisdiction. [29]

xxxx

We adopt the findings of the OBC. However, we find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six (6)
months and revocation and suspension of Atty. Quintana's notarial commission for two (2) years more appropriate
considering the gravity and number of his offenses.

After a careful review of the records and evidence, there is no doubt that Atty. Quintana violated the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility when he committed the following acts: (1) he
notarized documents outside the area of his commission as a notary public; (2) he performed notarial acts with an
expired commission; (3) he let his wife notarize documents in his absence; and (4) he notarized a document where
one of the signatories therein was already dead at that time.

The act of notarizing documents outside ones area of commission is not to be taken lightly. Aside from
being a violation of Sec. 11 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, it also partakes of malpractice of law and
falsification.[30] Notarizing documents with an expired commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws,
more specifically, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Since the public is deceived into believing that he has been
duly commissioned, it also amounts to indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer's oath
proscribes.[31] Notarizing documents without the presence of the signatory to the document is a violation of Sec.
2(b)(1), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice,[32] Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
the lawyers oath which unconditionally requires lawyers not to do or declare any falsehood. Finally, Atty. Quintana is
personally accountable for the documents that he admitted were signed by his wife. He cannot relieve himself of
 42

liability by passing the blame to his wife. He is, thus, guilty of violating Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which requires lawyers not to directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

All told, Atty. Quintana fell miserably short of his obligation under Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
That Atty. Quintana relies on his notarial commission as the sole source of income for his family will not serve to
lessen the penalty that should be imposed on him. On the contrary, we feel that he should be reminded that a notarial
commission should not be treated as a money-making venture. It is a privilege granted only to those who are
qualified to perform duties imbued with public interest. As we have declared on several occasions, notarization is not
an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not
qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative
offices in general. It must be underscored that notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a
public document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of the authenticity thereof. [33]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the notarial commission of Atty. Nestor Q. Quintana, if still existing, is hereby
REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is
also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately, with a WARNING that the
repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt
of this Decision to enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect.
 43

ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY

ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH A.C. No. 6010

SCHOOL (SLU-LHS) FACULTY and STAFF,
Complainant, Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,*
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
ATTY. ROLANDO C. DELA CRUZ, VELASCO, JR., JJ.

Respondent. Promulgated:

August 28, 2006

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the Saint Louis University-Laboratory High
School (SLU-LHS) against Atty. Rolando C. Dela Cruz, principal of SLU-LHS, predicated on the following grounds:

1) Gross Misconduct:
From the records of the case, it appears that there is a pending criminal case for child abuse allegedly committed by
him against a high school student filed before the Prosecutors Office of Baguio City; a pending administrative case
filed by the Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents before an Investigating Board created by SLU for his alleged
unprofessional and unethical acts of misappropriating money supposedly for the teachers; and the pending labor
 44

case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal deduction of
salary by respondent.

2) Grossly Immoral Conduct:

In contracting a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage; and

3) Malpractice:
In notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.
According to complainant, respondent was legally married to Teresita Rivera on 31 May 1982 at Tuba, Benguet,
before the then Honorable Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. He thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with one
Mary Jane Pascua, before the Honorable Judge Guillermo Purganan. On 4 October 1994, said second marriage was
subsequently annulled for being bigamous.

On the charge of malpractice, complainant alleged that respondent deliberately subscribed and notarized certain
legal documents on different dates from 1988 to 1997, despite expiration of respondents notarial commission on 31
December 1987. A Certification[1] dated 25 May 1999 was issued by the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Baguio City, to the effect that respondent had not applied for commission as Notary Public for and in the City
of Baguio for the period 1988 to 1997. Respondent performed acts of notarization, as evidenced by the following
documents:

1. Affidavit of Ownership[2] dated 8 March 1991, executed by Fernando T.

Acosta, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

2. Affidavit[3] dated 26 September 1992, executed by Maria Cortez Atos,

subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

3. Affidavit[4] dated 14 January 1992, executed by Fanolex James A. Menos,

subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

4. Affidavit[5] dated 23 December 1993, executed by Ponciano V. Abalos,

subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

5. Absolute Date of Sale[6] dated 23 June 1993, executed by Danilo Gonzales

in favor of Senecio C. Marzan, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

6. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinherited Parties[7] dated 5 March 1994, executed

by Evelyn C. Canullas and Pastora C. Tacadena, subscribed and sworn to before
Rolando Dela Cruz;

7. Sworn Statement[8] dated 31 May 1994, executed by Felimon B. Rimorin,

subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
 45

8. Deed of Sale[9] dated 17 August 1994, executed by Woodrow Apurado in

favor of Jacinto Batara, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

9. Joint Affidavit by Two Disinterested Parties [10] dated 1 June 1994, executed
by Ponciano V. Abalos and Arsenio C. Sibayan, subscribed and sworn to before
Rolando Dela Cruz;

10. Absolute Deed of Sale[11] dated 23 March 1995, executed by

Eleanor D.Meridor in favor of Leonardo N. Benter, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

11. Deed of Absolute Sale[12] dated 20 December 1996, executed by Mandapat in

favor of Mario R. Mabalot, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

12. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinterested Parties [13] dated 17 April 1996, executed
by Villiam C. Ambong and Romeo L. Quiming, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;

13. Conditional Deed of Sale[14] dated 27 February 1997, executed by

Aurelia Demot Cados in favor of Jose Ma. A. Pangilinan, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

14. Memorandum of Agreement[15] dated 19 July 1996, executed by JARCO

represented by Mr. Johnny Teope and AZTEC Construction represented by Mr. George Cham,
notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz.

Quite remarkably, respondent, in his comment, denied the charges of child abuse, illegal deduction of salary and
others which are still pending before the St. Louis University (SLU), National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
and the Prosecutors Office. He did not discuss anything about the allegations of immorality in contracting a second
marriage and malpractice in notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.

After the filing of comment, We referred[16] the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for investigation,
report and recommendation.
The IBP conducted the mandatory preliminary conference.

The complainants, thereafter, submitted their position paper which is just a reiteration of their allegations in their
complaint.

Respondent, on his part, expressly admitted his second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage, and the
subsequent nullification of the former. He also admitted having notarized certain documents during the period when
his notarialcommission had already expired. However, he offered some extenuating defenses such as good faith,
lack of malice and noble intentions in doing the complained acts.

After the submission of their position papers, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
On 30 March 2005, Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his report and recommended that:
 46

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent be

administratively penalized for the following acts:

a. For contracting a second marriage without taking the appropriate legal steps to
have the first marriage annulled first, he be suspended from the practice of law
for one (1) year, and

b. For notarizing certain legal documents despite full knowledge of the expiration
of his notarial commission, he be suspended from the practice of law for another
one (1) year or for a total of two (2) years. [17]

On 17 December 2005, the IBP Board of Governors, approved and adopted the recommendation of Commissioner
Pacheco, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex A and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Respondent contracted
a second marriage without taking appropriate legal steps to have the first marriage annulled, Atty.
Rolando C. dela Cruz is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and for
notarizing legal documents despite full knowledge of the expiration of his notarial commission Atty.
Rolando C. dela Cruz is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for another one (1) year, for a
total of two (2) years Suspension from the practice of law.[18]

This Court finds the recommendation of the IBP to fault respondent well taken, except as to the penalty contained
therein.

At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the
State on those who show that they possess the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to
practice law only during good behavior, and he can be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by
judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional
privilege or right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend, based on conduct
rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be
understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring him as an attorney is to remove from the profession a
person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an
office of attorney and, thus, to protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to
punish an attorney. Elaborating on this, we said on Maligsa v. Atty. Cabanting,[19] that the Bar should maintain a high
standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by
 47

faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A member of the legal fraternity
should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in
the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. Towards this end, an attorney may be disbarred or
suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds
enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these being broad enough to cover practically any
misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity.

Equally worthy of remark is that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards among its
members. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyers professional capacity or
in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a
mere citizen at another.[20] Thus, not only his professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may
reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any time be the subject
of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities. [21]

One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral
character. Possession of such moral character as requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice must
be continuous. Otherwise, membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral
conduct.[22]

In the case at bench, there is no dispute that respondent and Teresita Rivera contracted marriage on 31 May
1982 before Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. In less than a year, they parted ways owing to their irreconcilable
differences without seeking judicial recourse. The union bore no offspring. After their separation in-fact, respondent
never knew the whereabouts of Teresita Rivera since he had lost all forms of communication with her. Seven years
thereafter, respondent became attracted to one Mary Jane Pascua, who was also a faculty member of SLU-
LHS. There is also no dispute over the fact that in 1989, respondent married Mary Jane Pascua in the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Baguio City, Branch 68. Respondent even admitted this fact.When the second marriage was entered
into, respondents prior marriage with Teresita Rivera was still subsisting, no action having been initiated before the
court to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity or annulment of respondents prior marriage to Teresita Rivera or a
judicial declaration of presumptive death of Teresita Rivera.
Respondent was already a member of the Bar when he contracted the bigamous second marriage in 1989,
having been admitted to the Bar in 1985. As such, he cannot feign ignorance of the mandate of the law that before a
second marriage may be validly contracted, the first and subsisting marriage must first be annulled by the appropriate
court. The second marriage was annulled only on 4 October 1994 before the RTC of Benguet, Branch 9, or about five
years after respondent contracted his second marriage. The annulment of respondents second marriage has no
bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. Firstly, as earlier emphasized, the annulment came after the
respondents second bigamous marriage. Secondly, as we held in In re: Almacen, a disbarment case
 48

is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct
of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case
against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course, then neither will the
judgment of annulment of respondents second marriage also exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually
committed. So long as the quantum of proof - clear preponderance of evidence - in disciplinary proceedings against
members of the Bar is met, then liability attaches. [23]

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court cites grossly immoral conduct as a ground for disbarment.

The Court has laid down with a common definition of what constitutes immoral conduct, vis--vis, grossly
immoral conduct. Immoral conduct is that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community and what is grossly immoral, that
is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.[24]

Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes immoral conduct. But is it so gross as to warrant his disbarment? Indeed,
he exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. In particular, he
made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a
second marriage while the first marriage was still in place, is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. [25]
However, measured against the definition, we are not prepared to consider respondents act as grossly
immoral. This finds support in the following recommendation and observation of the IBP Investigator and IBP Board
of Governors, thus:

The uncontested assertions of the respondent belies any intention to flaunt the law and the high
moral standard of the legal profession, to wit:

a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a period of almost seven (7)
years, he has not been romantically involved with any woman;

b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for his wife, whom he
described to be very intelligent person;

c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child;

d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic) with relation to his wife;
e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways when the mother and child
went to Australia;

f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate.[26]

 49

In the case of Terre v. Terre,[27] respondent was disbarred because his moral character was deeply flawed as shown
by the following circumstances, viz: he convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and
void ab initio and that she was legally single and free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had
contracted their marriage, respondent went through law school while being supported by complainant, with some
assistance from respondents parents. After respondent had finished his law course and gotten complainant pregnant,
respondent abandoned the complainant without support and without the wherewithal for delivering his own child
safely to a hospital.

In the case of Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[28] respondent was also disbarred for his grossly immoral acts such
as: first, he abandoned his lawful wife and three children; second, he lured an innocent young woman into marrying
him; third, he mispresentedhimself as a bachelor so he could contract marriage in a foreign land; and fourth, he
availed himself of complainants resources by securing a plane ticket from complainants office in order to marry the
latters daughter. He did this without complainants knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity to assure
complainant that everything is legal.

Such acts are wanting in the case at bar. In fact, no less than the respondent himself acknowledged and
declared his abject apology for his misstep. He was humble enough to offer no defense save for his love and
declaration of his commitment to his wife and child.

Based on the reasons stated above, we find the imposition of disbarment upon him to be unduly harsh. The power to
disbar must be exercised with great caution, and may be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously
affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court. Disbarment should never be decreed
where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired. [29] In line with this philosophy, we find that a penalty of
two years suspension is more appropriate. The penalty of one (1) year suspension recommended by the IBP is too
light and not commensurate to the act committed by respondent.
As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized several documents during the years 1988-1997 after his
commission as notary public had expired, respondent humbly admitted having notarized certain documents despite
his knowledge that he no longer had authority to do so. He, however, alleged that he received no payment in
notarizing said documents.

It has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is
invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. Notarization of a private document converts the document into a public one making it admissible in court
without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face and,
for this reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their
duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined. [30]
 50

The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a mere casual
formality. The Court has characterized a lawyers act of notarizing documents without the requisite commission to do
so as reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification of public
documents.[31]

The Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar
at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action
or one, performing a notarial act without such commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more
specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for
all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath similarly proscribes. These
violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. By acting as a notary
public without the proper commission to do so, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs
every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
In the case of Buensuceso v. Barera,[32] a lawyer was suspended for one year when he notarized five
documents after his commission as Notary Public had expired, to wit: a complaint for ejectment, affidavit,
supplemental affidavit, a deed of sale, and a contract to sell. Guided by the pronouncement in said case, we find that
a suspension of two (2) years is justified under the circumstances. Herein respondent notarized a total of fourteen
(14) documents[33] without the requisite notarialcommission.
Other charges constituting respondents misconduct such as the pending criminal case for child abuse allegedly
committed by him against a high school student filed before the Prosecutors Office of Baguio City; the pending
administrative case filed by the Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents before an Investigating Board created by SLU;
and the pending labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged
illegal deduction of salary by respondent, need not be discussed, as they are still pending before the proper
forums. At such stages, the presumption of innocence still prevails in favor of the respondent.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Rolando Dela Cruz guilty of immoral conduct, in disregard of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, and
another two (2) years for notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission or a total of four (4) years of
suspension.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Court Administrator, as well as
the IBP, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and recorded in the personal records of the respondent.