Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 127930 December 15, 2000

MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JASPER BRIONES, JEROME GOMEZ, RELLY CARPIO,
ELIZABETH VALDEZCO, JOSE MARI RAMOS, CAMILLE PORTUGAL, JOEL TAN
and GERALD GARY RENACIDO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

"Obscene," "vulgar," "indecent," "gross," "sexually explicit," "injurious to young readers," and
devoid of all moral values."1 This was now some members of the Miriam College community
allegedly described the contents of the September-October 1994 issue (Vol. 41, No. 14) of
Miriam College's school paper (Chi-Rho), and magazine (Ang Magasing Pampanitikan ng Chi-
Rho). The articles in the Chi-Rho included:

. . . a story, clearly fiction, entitled 'Kaskas' written by one Gerald Garry Renacido . . .
Kaskas, written in Tagalog, treats of the experience of a group of young, male, combo
players who, one evening, after their performance went to see a bold show in a place
called "Flirtation". This was the way the author described the group's exposure during
that stage show:

"Sige, sa Flirtation tayo. Happy hour na halos . . . he! he! he! sambit ng kanilang
bokalistang kanina pa di maitago ang pagkahayok sa karneng babae na kanyang
pinananabikan nuong makalawa pa, susog naman ang tropa.

". . . Pumasok ang unang mananayaw. Si 'Red Raven' ayon sa emcee. Nakasuot
lamang ng bikining pula na may palamuting dilaw sa gilid-gilid at sa bandang
utong. Nagsimula siya sa kanyang pag-giling nang tumugtog na ang unang tono
ng "Goodbye" ng Air Supply. Dahan-dahan ang kanyang mga malalantik at
mapang-akit na galaw sa una. Mistulang sawa na nililingkis ang hangin, paru-
parong padapo-dapo sa mga bulaklak na lamesa, di-upang umamoy o kumuha ng
nektar, ngunit para ipaglantaran ang sariling bulaklak at ang angkin nitong
malansang nektar.

"Kaskas mo babe, sige . . . kaskas."

Napahaling ang tingin ng balerinang huwad kay Mike. Mistulang natipuhan, dahil
sa harap niya'y nagtagal. Nag-akmang mag-aalis ng pangitaas na kapirasong tela.
 Hindi nakahinga si Mike, nanigas sa kanyang kinauupuan, nanigas pati ang nasa
gitna ng kanyang hita. Ang mga mata niya'y namagnet sa kayamanang ngayo'y
halos isang pulgada lamang mula sa kanyang naglalaway na bunganga. Naputol-
putol ang kanyang hininga nang kandungan ni 'Red Raven' ang kanyang kanang
hita. Lalo naghingalo siya nang kabayuhin ito ng dahan dahan . . . Pabilis ng
pabilis.'

The author further described Mike's responses to the dancer as follows (quoted in
part):

. . . Nagsimulang lumaban na ng sabayan si Mike sa dancer. Hindi nagpatalo ang

ibong walang pakpak, inipit ng husto ang hita ni Mike at pinag-udyukan ang
kanyang dibdib sa mukha nito.

"Kaskas mo pa, kaskas mo pa!"

Palpakan at halagpakan na tawanan ang tumambad sa kanya ng biglang halikan

siya nito sa labi at iniwang bigla, upang kanyang muniin ang naudlot niyang
pagtikim ng karnal na nektar. Hindi niya maanto kung siya ay nanalo o natalo sa
nangyaring sagupaan ng libog. Ang alam lang niya ay nanlata na siya."

After the show the group went home in a car with the bokalista driving. A pedestrian
happened to cross the street and the driver deliberately hit him with these words:

"Pare tingnan natin kung immortal itong baboy na ito. He! He! He! He! Sabad ng
sabog nilang drayber/bokalista."

The story ends (with their car about to hit a truck) in these words: . . . "Pare . . .
trak!!! Put . . .!!!!

Ang Magasing Pampanitikan, October, 1994 issue, was in turn, given the cover
title of "Libog at iba pang tula."

In his foreword which Jerome Gomez entitled "Foreplay", Jerome wrote: "Alam ko,
nakakagulat ang aming pamagat." Jerome then proceeded to write about previous
reactions of readers to women-writers writing about matters erotic and to gay literature.
He justified the Magazine's erotic theme on the ground that many of the poems passed on
to the editors were about "sekswalidad at iba't ibang karanasan nito." Nakakagulat ang
tapang ng mga manunulat . . . tungkol sa maselang usaping ito . . . at sa isang institusyon
pang katulad ng Miriam!"

Mr. Gomez quoted from a poem entitled "Linggo" written by himself:

may mga palangganang nakatiwangwang -

mga putang biyak na sa gitna,

 'di na puwedeng paglabhan,

'di na maaaring pagbabaran . . ."

Gomez stated that the poems in the magazine are not "garapal" and "sa mga tulang ito
namin maipagtatanggol ang katapangan (o pagka-sensasyonal) ng pamagat na "Libog at
iba pang Tula." He finished "Foreplay" with these words: "Dahil para saan pa ang libog
kung hindi ilalabas?"

The cover title in question appears to have been taken from a poem written by Relly
Carpio of the same title. The poem dealt on a woman and a man who met each other,
gazed at each other, went up close and "Naghalikan, Shockproof." The poem contained a
background drawing of a woman with her two mammary and nipples exposed and with a
man behind embracing her with the woman in a pose of passion-filled mien.

Another poem entitled 'Virgin Writes Erotic' was about a man having fantasies in his
sleep. The last verse said: "At zenith I pull it out and find myself alone in this fantasy."
Opposite the page where this poem appeared was a drawing of a man asleep and
dreaming of a naked woman (apparently of his dreams) lying in bed on her buttocks with
her head up (as in a hospital bed with one end rolled up). The woman's right nipple can
be seen clearly. Her thighs were stretched up with her knees akimbo on the bed.

In the next page (page 29) one finds a poem entitled "Naisip ko Lang" by Belle
Campanario. It was about a young student who has a love-selection problem: ". . . Kung
sinong pipiliin: ang teacher kong praning, o ang boyfriend kong bading." The word
"praning" as the court understands it, refers to a paranoid person; while the word
"bading" refers to a sward or "bakla" or "badidang". This poem also had an illustration
behind it: of a young girl with large eyes and sloping hair cascading down her curves and
holding a peeled banana whose top the illustrator shaded up with downward-slanting
strokes. In the poem, the girl wanted to eat banana topped by peanut butter. In line with
Jerome's "Foreplay" and by the way it was drawn that banana with peanut butter top was
meant more likely than not, to evoke a spiritedly mundane, mental reaction from a young
audience.

Another poem entitled "Malas ang Tatlo" by an unknown author went like this:

'Na picture mo na ba

no'ng magkatabi tayong dalawa

sa pantatluhang sofa -

ikaw, the legitimate asawa

at ako, biro mo, ang kerida?

 tapos, tumabi siya, shit!

kumpleto na:

ikaw, ako at siya

kulang na lang, kamera."

A poem "Sa Gilid ng Itim" by Gerald Renacido in the Chi-Rho broadsheet spoke of a fox
(lobo) yearning for "karneng sariwa, karneng bata, karneng may kalambutan . . . isang
bahid ng dugong dalaga, maamo't malasa, ipahid sa mga labing sakim sa romansa' and
ended with 'hinog na para himukin bungang bibiyakin."2

Following the publication of the paper and the magazine, the members of the editorial board,3
and Relly Carpio, author of Libog, all students of Miriam College, received a letter signed by Dr.
Aleli Sevilla, Chair of the Miriam College Discipline Committee. The Letter dated 4 November
1994 stated:

This is to inform you that the letters of complain filed against you by members of the
Miriam Community and a concerned Ateneo grade five student have been forwarded to
the Discipline Committee for inquiry and investigation. Please find enclosed complaints.

As expressed in their complaints you have violated regulations in the student handbook
specifically Section 2 letters B and R, pages 30 and 32, Section 4 (Major offenses) letter
j, page 36 letters m, n, and p, page 37 and no. 2 (minor offenses) letter a, page 37.

You are required to submit a written statement in answer to the charge/s on or before the
initial date of hearing to be held on November 15, 1994, Tuesday, 1:00 in the afternoon at
the DSA Conference Room.4

None of the students submitted their respective answers. They instead requested Dr. Sevilla to
transfer the case to the Regional Office of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS) which under Rule XII of DECS Order No. 94, Series of 1992, supposedly had
jurisdiction over the case.5

In a Letter dated 21 November 1994, Dr. Sevilla again required the students to file their written
answers.

In response, Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, lawyer for the students, submitted a letter6 to the Discipline
Committee reiterating his clients' position that said Committee had no jurisdiction over them.
According to Atty. Valmonte, the Committee was "trying to impose discipline on his clients on
account of their having written articles and poems in their capacity as campus journalists."
Hence, he argued that "what applies is Republic Act No. 7079 The Campus Journalism Act and
its implementing rules and regulations." He also questioned the partiality of the members of said
Committee who allegedly "had already articulated their position" against his clients.
The Discipline Committee proceeded with its investigation ex parte. Thereafter, the Discipline
Board, after a review of the Discipline Committee's report, imposed disciplinary sanctions upon
the students, thus:

1. Jasper Briones Expulsion. Briones is the Editor-in-Chief of Chi-Rho and a 4th

year student;
2. Daphne Cowper suspension up to (summer) March, 1995;
3. Imelda Hilario suspension for two (2) weeks to expire on February 2, 1995;
4. Deborah Ligon suspension up to May, 1995. Miss Ligon is a 4th year student
and could graduate as summa cum laude;
5. Elizabeth Valdezco suspension up to (summer) March, 1995;
6. Camille Portugal graduation privileges withheld, including diploma. She is an
Octoberian;
7. Joel Tan suspension for two (2) weeks to expire on February 2, 1995;
8. Gerald Gary Renacido Expelled and given transfer credentials. He is a 2nd year
student. He wrote the fiction story "Kaskas";
9. Relly Carpio Dismissed and given transfer credentials. He is in 3rd year and
wrote the poem "Libog";
10. Jerome Gomez Dismissed and given transfer credentials. He is in 3rd year. He
wrote the foreword "Foreplay" to the questioned Anthology of
Poems; and
11. Jose Mari Ramos Expelled and given transfer papers. He is a 2nd year student
and art editor of Chi-Rho.7

The above students thus filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary
injunction/restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City questioning the
jurisdiction of the Discipline Board of Miriam College over them.

On 17 January 1995, the Regional Trial Court, Branch CIII, presided by Judge Jaime N. Salazar,
Jr., issued an order denying the plaintiffs' prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order. It held:

There is nothing in the DECS Order No. 94, S. 1992 dated August 19, 1992 that excludes
school Administrators from exercising jurisdiction over cases of the nature involved in
the instant petition. R.A. 7079 also does not state anything on the matter of jurisdiction.
The DECS undoubtedly cannot determine the extent of the nature of jurisdiction of
schools over disciplinary cases. Moreover, as this Court reads that DECS Order No. 94,
S. of 1992, it merely prescribes for purposes of internal administration which DECS
officer or body shall hear cases arising from R A. 7079 if and when brought to it for
resolution. The said order never mentioned that it has exclusive jurisdiction over cases
falling under R.A. 707.8
 The students thereafter filed a "Supplemental Petition and Motion for Reconsideration."
The College followed with its Answer.

Subsequently, the RTC issued an Order dated 10 February 1995 granting the writ of
preliminary injunction.

ACCORDINGLY, so as not to render the issues raised moot and academic, let a writ of
preliminary injunction issue enjoining the defendants, including the officers and members
of the Disciplinary Committee, the Disciplinary Board, or any similar body and their
agents, and the officers and members of the Security Department, Division, or Security
Agency securing the premises and campus of Miriam College Foundation, Inc. from:

1. Enforcing and/or implementing the expulsion or dismissal resolutions or orders

complained of against herein plaintiffs (a) Jasper Briones; (b) Gerald Gary
Renacido; (c) Relly Carpio; (d) Jerome Gomez; and (e) Jose Mari Ramos, but
otherwise allowing the defendants to impose lesser sanctions on aforementioned
plaintiffs; and

2. Disallowing, refusing, barring or in any way preventing the herein plaintiffs (all
eleven of them) from taking tests or exams and entering the Miriam campus for
such purpose as extended to all students of Miriam College Foundation, Inc.;
neither should their respective course or subject teachers or professors withhold
their grades, including final grades, if and when they meet the requirements
similarly prescribed for all other students, this current 2nd Semester of 1994-95.

The sanctions imposed on the other plaintiffs, namely, Deborah Ligon, Imelda Hilario,
Elizabeth Valdezco, Camille Portugal and Daphne Cowper, shall remain in force and shall
not be covered by this Injunction: Provided, that Camille Portugal now a graduate, shall
have the right to receive her diploma, but defendants are not hereby prevented from
refusing her the privilege of walking on the graduation stage so as to prevent any likely
public tumults.

The plaintiffs are required to post an injunction bond in the sum of Four Thousand Pesos
(P4,000.00) each.

SO ORDERED.9

Both parties moved for a reconsideration of the above order. In an Order dated 22 February 1995,
the RTC dismissed the petition, thus:

4. On the matter raised by both parties that it is the DECS which has jurisdiction,
inasmuch as both parties do not want this court to assume jurisdiction here then this court
will not be more popish than the Pope and in fact is glad that it will have one more case
out of its docket.
 ACCORDINGLY, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the parties
going to another forum.

All orders heretofore issued here are hereby recalled and set aside.

SO ORDERED.10

The students, excluding Deborah Ligon, Imelda Hilario and Daphne Cowper, sought relief in this
Court through a petition for certiorari and prohibition of preliminary injunction/restraining
order11 questioning the Orders of the RTC dated 10 and 24 February 1995.

On 15 March 1995, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) for
disposition.12 On 19 May 1995, the CA issued a resolution stating:

The respondents are hereby required to file comment on the instant petition and to show
cause why no writ of preliminary injunction should be issued, within ten (10) days from
notice hereof, and the petitioners may file reply thereto within five (5) days from receipt
of former's comment.

In order not to render ineffectual the instant petition, let a Temporary Restraining Order
be issued enjoining the public respondents from enforcing letters of dismissal/suspension
dated January 19, 1995.

SO ORDERED.13

In its Decision dated 26 September 1996, respondent court granted the students' petition. The CA
declared the RTC Order dated 22 February 1995, as well as the students' suspension and
dismissal, void.

Hence, this petition by Miriam College.

We limit our decision to the resolution of the following issues:

(1) The alleged moot character of the case.

(2) The jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain the petition for certiorari filed by the
students.

(3) The power of petitioner to suspend or dismiss respondent students.

(4) The jurisdiction of petitioner over the complaints against the students.

We do not tackle the alleged obscenity of the publication, the propriety of the penalty imposed or
the manner of the imposition thereof. These issues, though touched upon by the parties in the
proceedings below, were not fully ventilated therein.
 I

Petitioner asserts the Court of Appeals found the case moot thus:

While this petition may be considered moot and academic since more than one year have
passed since May 19, 1995 when this court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from enforcing the dismissal and suspension on petitioners . . .14

Since courts do not adjudicate moot cases, petitioner argues that the CA should not have
proceeded with the adjudication of the merits of the case.

We find that the case is not moot.

It may be noted that what the court issued in 19 May 1995 was a temporary restraining order, not
a preliminary injunction. The records do not show that the CA ever issued a preliminary
injunction.

Preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the
judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to perform to refrain
from performing a particular act or acts.15 As an extraordinary remedy, injunction is calculated to
preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is generally availed of to prevent actual or
threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard.16 A preliminary injunction persists until
it is dissolved or until the termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction.

The basic purpose of restraining order, on the other hand, is to preserve the status quo until the
hearing of the application for preliminary injunction.17 Under the former 5, Rule 58 of the Rules
of Court, as amended by 5, Batas Pambansa Blg. 224, a judge (or justice) may issue a temporary
restraining order with a limited life of twenty days from date of issue.18 If before the expiration
of the 20-day period the application for preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary order
would thereby be deemed automatically vacated. If no action is taken by the judge on the
application for preliminary injunction within the said 20 days, the temporary restraining order
would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to
that effect being necessary.19 In the instant case, no such preliminary injunction was issued;
hence, the TRO earlier issued automatically expired under the aforesaid provision of the Rules of
Court.20

This limitation as to the duration of the temporary restraining order was the rule prevailing when
the CA issued its TRO dated 19 May 1995.21 By that time respondents Elizabeth Valdezco and
Joel Tan had already served their respective suspensions. The TRO was applicable only to
respondents Jasper Briones, Jerome Gomez, Relly Carpio, Jose Mari Ramos and Gerald Gary
Renacido all of whom were dismissed, and respondent Camille Portugal whose graduation
privileges were withheld. The TRO, however, lost its effectivity upon the lapse of the twenty
days. It can hardly be said that in that short span of time, these students had already graduated as
to render the case moot.
Either the CA was of the notion that its TRO was effective throughout the pendency of the case
or that what is issued was a preliminary injunction. In either case, it was error on the part of the
CA to assume that its order supposedly enjoining Miriam from enforcing the dismissal and
suspension was complied with. A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.22
To determine the moot character of a question before it, the appellate court may receive proof or
take notice of facts appearing outside the record.23 In the absence of such proof or notice of facts,
the Court of Appeals should not have assumed that its TRO was enforced, and that the case was
rendered moot by the mere lapse of time.

Indeed, private respondents in their Comment herein24 deny that the case has become moot since
Miriam refused them readmission in violation of the TRO. This fact is unwittingly conceded by
Miriam itself when, to counter this allegation by the students, it says that private respondents
never sought readmission after the restraining order was issued.25 In truth, Miriam relied on legal
technicalities to subvert the clear intent of said order, which states:

In order not to render ineffectual the instant petition, let a Temporary Restraining Order
be issued enjoining the public respondents from enforcing letters of dismissal/suspension
dated January 19, 1995.

Petitioner says that the above order is "absurd" since the order "incorrectly directs public
respondent, the Hon. Jaime Salazar, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
not to dismiss or suspend the students."26

We do not agree. Padua vs. Robles27 lays down the rules in construing judgments. We find these
rules to be applicable to court orders as well:

The sufficiency and efficacy of a judgment must be tested by its substance rather than its
form. In construing a judgment, its legal effects including such effects that necessarily
follow because of legal implications, rather than the language used, govern. Also, its
meaning, operation, and consequences must be ascertained like any other written
instrument. Thus, a judgment rests on the intent of the court as gathered from every part
thereof, including the situation to which it applies and attendant circumstances.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Tested by such standards, we find that the order was indeed intended for private respondents (in
the appellate court) Miriam College, et al., and not public respondent Judge. In dismissing the
case, the trial judge recalled and set aside all orders it had previously issued, including the writ of
preliminary injunction. In doing so, the trial court allowed the dismissal and suspension of the
students to remain in force. Thus, it would indeed be absurd to construe the order as being
directed to the RTC. Obviously, the TRO was intended for Miriam College.

True, respondent-students should have asked for a clarification of the above order. They did not.
Nevertheless, if Miriam College found the order "absurd," then it should have sought a
clarification itself so the Court of Appeals could have cleared up any confusion. It chose not to.
Instead, it took advantage of the supposed vagueness of the order and used the same to justify its
refusal to readmit the students.

As Miriam never readmitted the students, the CA's ruling that the case is moot has no basis. How
then can Miriam argue in good faith that the case had become moot when it knew all along that
the facts on which the purported moot character of the case were based did not exist? Obviously,
Miriam is clutching to the CA's wrongful assumption that the TRO it issued was enforced to
justify the reversal of the CA's decision.

Accordingly, we hold that the case is not moot, Miriam's pretensions to the contrary
notwithstanding.

II

"To uphold and protect the freedom of the press even at the campus level and to promote the
development and growth of campus journalism as a means of strengthening ethical values,
encouraging critical and creative thinking, and developing moral character and personal
discipline of the Filipino youth,"28 Congress enacted in 1991 Republic Act No. 7079. Entitled
"AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND PROMOTION OF CAMPUS
JOURNALISM AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,"29 the law contains provisions for the selection
of the editorial board30 and publication adviser,31 the funding of the school publication,32 and the
grant of exemption to donations used actually, directly and exclusively for the promotion of
campus journalism from donor's or gift tax.33

Noteworthy are provisions clearly intended to provide autonomy to the editorial board and its
members. Thus, the second paragraph of Section 4 states that "(o)nce the publication is
established, its editorial board shall freely determine its editorial policies and-manage the
publication's funds."

Section 7, in particular, provides:

A member of the publication staff must maintain his or her status as student in order to
retain membership in the publication staff. A student shall not be expelled or suspended
solely on the basis of articles he or she has written, or on the basis of the performance of
his or her duties in the student publication.

Section 9 of the law mandates the DECS to "promulgate the rules and regulations necessary for
the effective implementation of this Act."34 Pursuant to said authority, then DECS Secretary
Armand Fabella, issued DECS Order No. 94, Series of 1992, providing under Rule XII that:

GENERAL PROVISIONS

SECTION 1. The Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) shall help ensure and
facilitate the proper carrying out of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.
7079. It shall also act on cases on appeal brought before it.
The DECS regional office shall have the original jurisdiction over cases as a result of the
decisions, actions and policies of the editorial board of a school within its area of administrative
responsibility. It shall conduct investigations and hearings on the these cases within fifteen (15)
days after the completion of the resolution of each case. (Emphasis supplied.)

The latter two provisions of law appear to be decisive of the present case.

It may be recalled that after the Miriam Disciplinary Board imposed disciplinary sanctions upon
the students, the latter filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Regional Trial Court
raising, as grounds therefor, that:

DEFENDANT'S DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE AND DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF

DEFENDANT SCHOOL HAVE NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE. 35

II

DEFENDANT SCHOOL'S DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE AND THE DISCIPLINARY

BOARD DO NOT HAVE THE QUALIFICATION OF AN IMPARTIAL AND
NEUTRAL ARBITER AND, THEREFORE THEIR TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE
CASE AGAINST PLAINTIFFS WILL DENY THE LATTER OF THEIR RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS.36

Anent the first ground, the students theorized that under Rule XII of the Rules and Regulations
for the Implementation of R.A. No. 7079, the DECS Regional Office, and not the school, had
jurisdiction over them. The second ground, on the other hand, alleged lack of impartiality of the
Miriam Disciplinary Board, which would thereby deprive them of due process. This contention,
if true, would constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the trial court. These were the same grounds invoked by the students in their refusal to
answer the charges against them. The issues were thus limited to the question of jurisdiction - a
question purely legal in nature and well within the competence and the jurisdiction of the trial
court, not the DECS Regional Office. This is an exception to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
As the Court held in Phil. Global Communications, Inc. vs. Relova.37

Absent such clarity as to the scope and coverage of its franchise, a legal question arises
which is more appropriate for the judiciary than for an administrative agency to resolve.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction calls for application when there is such competence
to act on the part of an administrative body. Petitioner assumes that such is the case. That
is to beg the question. There is merit, therefore, to the approach taken by private
respondents to seek judicial remedy as to whether or not the legislative franchise could be
so interpreted as to enable the National Telecommunications Commission to act on the
matter. A jurisdictional question thus arises and calls for an answer.

However, when Miriam College in its motion for reconsideration contended that the DECS
Regional Office, not the RTC, had jurisdiction, the trial court, refusing to "be more popish than
the Pope," dismissed the case. Indeed, the trial court could hardly contain its glee over the fact
that "it will have one more case out of its docket." We remind the trial court that a court having
jurisdiction of a case has not only the right and the power or authority, but also the duty, to
exercise that jurisdiction and to render a decision in a case properly submitted to it.38
Accordingly, the trial court should not have dismissed the petition without settling the issues
presented before it.

III

Before we address the question of which between the DECS Regional Office and Miriam
College has jurisdiction over the complaints against the students, we first delve into the power of
either to impose disciplinary sanctions upon the students. Indeed, the resolution of the issue of
jurisdiction would be reduced to an academic exercise if neither the DECS Regional Office nor
Miriam College had the power to impose sanctions upon the students.

Recall, for purposes of this discussion, that Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act prohibits the
expulsion or suspension of a student solely on the basis of articles he or she has written.

A.

Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning
academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or
college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint.39 The essential freedoms subsumed in the term "academic freedom" encompasses the
freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds:

(1) Who may teach,

(2) What may be taught,

(3) How it shall be taught, and

(4) Who may be admitted to study.40

The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.e.,
"how it shall be taught." A school certainly cannot function in an atmosphere of anarchy.

Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution requires
rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational program
and the creation of an educational environment conducive to learning. Such rules and
regulations are equally necessary for the protection of the students, faculty, and
property.41

Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not
indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches
discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom
"what to teach."

Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty to develop discipline in its students.
The Constitution no less imposes such duty.

All educational institutions shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of
humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the
historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties of citizenship,
strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline,
encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge,
and promote vocational efficiency.42

In Angeles vs. Sison, we also said that discipline was a means for the school to carry out its
responsibility to help its students "grow and develop into mature, responsible, effective and
worthy citizens of the community."43

Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline more evident than in "who
may be admitted to study." If a school has the freedom to determine whom to admit, logic
dictates that it also has the right to determine whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon whom to
impose lesser sanctions such as suspension and the withholding of graduation privileges.

Thus, in Ateneo de Manila vs. Capulong,44 the Court upheld the expulsion of students found
guilty of hazing by petitioner therein, holding that:

No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the immediate reinstatement of respondent

students who have been investigated and found guilty by the Disciplinary Board to have
violated petitioner university's disciplinary rules and standards will certainly undermine
the authority of the administration of the school. This we would be most loathe to do.

More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university's academic freedom which
has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present 1987 Constitution.45

Tracing the development of academic freedom, the Court continued:

Since Garcia vs. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently upheld the salutary
proposition that admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a
school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While
under the Education Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose their field of
study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation,"
such right is subject, as all rights are, to the established academic and disciplinary
standards laid down by the academic institution.

"For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the
admission, discipline and promotion of students. This right . . . extends as well to
 parents . . . as parents under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation, individually and
collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools."

Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the
successful management of the college. The rules may include those governing student
discipline." Going a step further, the establishment of the rules governing university-
student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as
vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very
survival.

Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the academic
groves as collectively, the students demanded and plucked for themselves from the
panoply of academic freedom their own rights encapsulized under the rubric of "right to
education" forgetting that, In Hohfeldian terms, they have the concomitant duty, and that
is, their duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school.

. . . It must be borne in mind that universities are established, not merely to develop the
intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; may,
the development, or flowering if you will, of the total man.

In essence, education must ultimately be religious - not in the sense that the founders or
charter members of the institution are sectarian or profess a religious ideology. Rather, a
religious education, as the renowned philosopher Alfred North Whitehead said, is 'an
education which inculcates duty and reverence.' It appears that the particular brand of
religious education offered by the Ateneo de Manila University has been lost on the
respondent students.

Certainly, they do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution as the Ateneo de
Manila University as their own a minute longer, for they may foreseeably cast a
malevolent influence on the students currently enrolled, as well as those who come after
them.1avvphi1

Quite applicable to this case is our pronouncement in Yap Chin Fah v. Court of Appeals
that: "The maintenance of a morally conducive and orderly educational environment will
be seriously imperilled, if, under the circumstances of this case, Grace Christian is forced
to admit petitioner's children and to reintegrate them to the student body." Thus, the
decision of petitioner university to expel them is but congruent with the gravity of their
misdeeds.46

B.

Section 4 (1), Article XIV of the Constitution recognizes the State's power to regulate
educational institution:
 The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private institutions in the
educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all
educational institutions.

As may be gleaned from the above provision, such power to regulate is subject to the
requirement of reasonableness. Moreover, the Constitution allows merely the regulation and
supervision of educational institutions, not the deprivation of their rights.

C.

In several cases, this Court has upheld the right of the students to free speech in school premises.
In the landmark case of Malabanan vs. Ramento,47 students of the Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation, believing that the merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of
Agriculture would result in the increase in their tuition, held a demonstration to protest the
proposed merger. The rally however was held at a place other than that specified in the school
permit and continued longer than the time allowed. The protest, moreover, disturbed the classes
and caused the stoppage of the work of non-academic personnel. For the illegal assembly, the
university suspended the students for one year. In affirming the students' rights to peaceable
assembly and free speech, the Court through Mr. Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, echoed the
ruling of the US Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines School District.48

Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They are entitled to
do so. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and
communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in
this case. They do not, to borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des
Moines Community School District, 'shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
or expression at the schoolhouse gate.' While, therefore, the authority of educational
institutions over the conduct of students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be
violative of constitutional safeguards. On a more specific level there is persuasive force
to this Fortas opinion. "The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to
accommodate students during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of
activities. Among those activities is personal intercommunication among the students.
This is not only inevitable part of the educational process. A student's rights, therefore, do
not embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing
field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on
controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without 'materially and
substantially interfering with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation
of the school' and without colliding with the rights of others. . . . But conduct by the
student, in class or out of it, which for any reason - whether it stems from time, place, or
type of behavior - materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech.49

The Malabanan ruling was followed in Villar vs. Technological Institute of the Philippines,50
Arreza vs. Gregorio Araneta University Foundation,51 and Non vs. Dames II.52
The right of the students to free speech in school premises, however, is not absolute. The right to
free speech must always be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment.53 Thus, while we upheld the right of the students to free expression in these cases,
we did not rule out disciplinary action by the school for "conduct by the student, in class or out
of it, which for any reason - whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior - which
materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others."54 Thus, in Malabanan, we held:

6. Objection is made by private respondents to the tenor of the speeches by the student
leaders. That there would be a vigorous presentation of view opposed to the proposed
merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture was to be
expected. There was no concealment of the fact that they were against such a move as it
confronted them with a serious problem ("isang malaking suliranin.") They believed that
such a merger would result in the increase in tuition fees, an additional headache for their
parents ("isa na naman sakit sa ulo ng ating mga magulang.") If in the course of such
demonstration, with an enthusiastic audience goading them on, utterances extremely
critical at times, even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite understandable. Student
leaders are hardly the timid, different types. They are likely to be assertive and dogmatic.
They would be ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious
language of the academe. At any rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to
accord full credence to their fiery exhortations. They take into account the excitement of
the occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate, the exuberance of youth. They
may give the speakers the benefit of their applause, but with the activity taking place in
the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public
disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for
conduct, which, to borrow from Tinker, "materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."55

It is in the light of this standard that we read Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act. Provisions
of law should be construed in harmony with those of the Constitution; acts of the legislature
should be construed, wherever possible, in a manner that would avoid their conflicting with the
fundamental law.56 A statute should not be given a broad construction if its validity can be saved
by a narrower one.57 Thus, Section 7 should be read in a manner as not to infringe upon the
school's right to discipline its students. At the same time, however, we should not construe said
provision as to unduly restrict the right of the students to free speech. Consistent with
jurisprudence, we read Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act to mean that the school cannot
suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles he or she has written, except when
such article materially disrupt class work or involve substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others.

IV.

From the foregoing, the answer to the question of who has jurisdiction over the cases filed
against respondent students becomes self-evident. The power of the school to investigate is an
adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules
and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to
learning.58 That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic
freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. We therefore rule that
Miriam College has the authority to hear and decide the cases filed against respondent
students.1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Miriam College is ordered to READMIT private respondent Joel Tan whose suspension has long
lapsed.

SO ORDERED.

Footnotes
1
Rollo, p. 66.
2
CA Rollo, pp. 41-44.
3
Jasper Briones, Editor-in-Chief; Jerome Gomez, Associate Editor, Deborah Ligon,
Business Manager; Imelda Hilario, News Editor Elizabeth Valdezco, Lay-Out Editor;
Jose Mari Ramos, Art Editor; Camille Portugal, Asst. Art Editor; Joel Tan, Photo Editor;
Gerald Gary Renacido, a member of the literary staff; and Daphne Cowper, Asst. Literary
Editor.
4
CA Rollo, p. 59.
5
Id., at 60.
6
Id., at 62.
7
Rollo, pp. 19-20.
8
CA Rollo, p. 29.
9
Id., at 48-49.
10
Rollo, p. 89-90.
11
Docketed herein as G.R. No. 119027.
12
CA Rollo, p. 76.
13
Id., at 78.
14
Rollo, p. 24.
15
Golangco vs. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 493 (1997).
16
Cagayan de Oro City Landless Residents Asso., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA
220 (1996).
17
Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 400 (1992).
18
Carbungco vs. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 313 (1990).
19
Board of Transportation vs. Castro, 125 SCRA 411 (1983).
20
Johannesburg Packaging Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 439 (1992).
21
Under 5, Rule 58 of the present Rules of Court, a TRO issued by the Court of Appeals
or a member thereof shall be effective for sixty (60) days from notice to the party or
person sought to be enjoined.
22
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals and Romeo Barilea, 291 SCRA 271
(1998).
23
4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error 40.
24
Rollo, p. 125. In their Rejoinder, private respondents attached a "Joint Affidavit"
stating:

xxx

4. That the claim of the petitioner, that we have not employed the TRO issued by
the Court of Appeals in filing for reinstatement or gaining entry into the campus
premises, is completely false and misleading. The truth of the matter being that
members of our group had initially tried to gain admittance into the school
premises but were barred from doing so by the guards who claimed it was for
security reasons, as mandated on them [sic] by the petitioners.

xxx

6. Except for the two [referring to Jose Mari Ramos and Elizabeth Valdezco], we
have stopped schooling and we are waiting for the case to be resolved to continue
our studies and finish the courses we started. We need only a year or two to do it.

xxx

8. We respectfully petition the court to admit this affidavit as proof against the
petitioners [sic] false manifestation. We hope that the facts we have provided will
help clear the cloud of confusion intentionally raised by the petitioners through
their allegations. We also hope that they be held in contempt of their attempt to
 intentionally mislead the honorable court. And we also pray that the court grant
the speedy resolution of the case in our favor, thereby facilitating in [sic] our
long-awaited vindication.

On October 21, 1998, the Court resolved to require the petitioner to file a Sur-
Rejoinder within ten (10) days from notice, directing the petitioner to address in
particular the above statements of private respondents in their "Joint Affidavit."
Petitioner, however, never filed the required Sur-Rejoinder and we resolve to
dispense with the same.
25
Id., at 157.
26
Reply, p. 2.
27
66 SCRA 485 (1975).
28
Section 2, Republic Act No. 7079.
29
Also known as the "Campus Journalism Act of 1991." (Section 1, Id.)
30
Sec. 4. Student Publication.-- A student publication is published by the student body
through an editorial board and publication staff composed of students selected by fair and
competitive examinations.

Once the publication is established, its editorial board shall freely determine its
editorial policies and manage the publications funds.
31
Sec. 6 Publication Adviser.- The publication adviser shall be selected by the school
administration from a list of recommendees submitted by the publication staff. The
function of the adviser shall be limited to one of technical guidance.
32
Sec. 5. Funding of Student Publication.- Funding for the student publication may
include the savings of the respective schools appropriations, student subscriptions,
donations, and other sources of funds.
33
Sec. 10. The Tax Exemption.- Pursuant to paragraph 4, Section 4, Article XIV of the
Constitution, all grants, endowments, donations, or contributions used actually, directly
and exclusively for the promotion of campus journalism as provided for in this Act shall
be exempt from donors or gift tax.
34
Sec. 9.
35
Id., at 95.
36
Id., at 96-97.
37
100 SCRA 254 (1980).
38
20 Am Jur 2d, Courts 93.
39
Tangonan vs. Pan, 137 SCRA 245, 256-257 (1985).
40
Isabelo, Jr. vs. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc. 227 SCRA 591, 595 (1993),
Ateneo de Manila University vs. Capulong, 222 SCRA 643, 660 (1993), Garcia vs. the
Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Tehology, 68 SCRA 277, 285 (1975).
The above formulation was made by Justice Felix Frankfurter in his concurring opinion is
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263.
41
Angeles vs. Sison, 112 SCRA 26, 37 (1982).
42
Section 3 (2), Article XIV Constitution.
43
Supra, at 37.
44
222 SCRA 643 (1993).
45
Id., at 659-660.
46
Id., at 663-665.
47
129 SCRA 359 (1984).
48
393 U.S. 503 (1968).
49
Id., at 367-368.
50
135 SCRA 706 (1985).
51
137 SCRA 94 (1985).
52
185 SCRA 523 (1990).
53
Healy vs. James, 408 US 169, 33 L Ed 2d 266, 92 S Ct 2338, citing Tinker vs. Des
Moines, supra.
54
Malabanan vs. Ramento, supra, at 368. See also Arreza vs. Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation, supra, at 97-98, and Non vs. Dames II, supra, at 535.
55
Id., at 369; Underscoring supplied.
56
Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634, at 643 (1945).
57
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 US 198, 202, 100 L ed 199, 76 Ct 273 (1955).
58
Angeles vs. Sison, 112 SCRA 26, 37 (1982).