Rule 61 Support Pendente Lite

G.R. No. L-59906 October 23, 1982

BUENAVENTURA SAN JUAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL E. VALENZUELA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and
DOROTEA MEJIA, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
FACTS:
- On September 16, 1981, marriage between respondent Dorotea Mejia and Petitioner
Buenaventura San Juan was declared null and void by CFI Rizal;
- Ground: Prior and subsisting marrriage between petitioner and Isabel Bandin;
- Mejia then filed an action against San Juan seeking support for herself and her twon minor
children;
- Judge Valenzuela ordered the granting of support pendente lite
- San Juan filed a Motion for Recon . Grounds: (1) the amount is grossly disproportionate to
petitioners means; (2) petitioner is not obliged to support respondent Mejia as their marriage is
null and void; (3)no evidence was presented as to petitioners present resources. DENIED
-Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE AMOUNT FIXED IN THE ORDER OF SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE IS FINAL IN
CHARACTER
HELD:
The amount of support pendente lite is not final in character in the sense that it can be the
subject of modification, depending on the changing conditions affecting the ability of the obligor
to pay the amount fixed for support.

Rule 62 Interpleader

1. LUI ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioner, v. ZUELLIG PHARMA CORPORATION AND THE

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, Respondents, G.R. No. 193494, March 07,
2014
LEONEN, J.:

FACTS OF THE CASE: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals decision.

Petitioner Lui Enterprises, Inc. (Lui Enterprises) and respondent Zuellig Pharma
Corporation (Zuellig Pharma) entered into a 10year contract of lease over a parcel of land
located in Barrio Tigatto, Buhangin, Davao City. Zuellig received a letter from the Philippine Bank
of Communications (PBC) claiming to be the new owner of the leased property, the bank asked
Zuellig Pharma to pay rent directly to it. Zuellig Pharma promptly informed Lui Enterprises of
PBC claim. However, Lui Enterprises wrote to Zuellig and insisted on its right to collect the
leased propertys rent.
Due to the conflicting claims of Lui Enterprises and the PBC over the rental payments,
Zuellig Pharma filed a complaint for interpleader with the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
Zuellig Pharma: Alleged that it already consigned in court P604,024.35 as rental payments. It
also prayed that it be allowed to consign in court its succeeding monthly rental payments and
that Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications be ordered to litigate their
conflicting claims.

Lui Enterprises: Filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Zuellig Pharmas alleged
representative did not have authority to file the complaint for interpleader on behalf of the
corporation. According to Lui Enterprises, an earlier filed nullification of deed of dation in
payment case pending with the Regional Trial Court of Davao barred the filing of the interpleader
case. Lui Enterprises filed this nullification case against PBC with respect to several properties it
dationed to the bank in payment of its obligations. The property leased by Zuellig Pharma was
among those allegedly dationed to PBC.
Lui Enterprises allegedly filed for nullification of deed of dation in payment with the Regional
Trial Court of Davao. It sought to nullify the deed of dation in payment through which the
Philippine Bank of Communications acquired title over the leased property. Lui Enterprises
argued that this pending nullification case barred the Regional Trial Court of Makati from hearing
the interpleader case. Since the interpleader case was filed subsequently to the nullification
case, the interpleader case should be dismissed.
Zuellig Pharma filed its opposition to the motion to dismiss. It argued that the motion to
dismiss should be denied for having been filed late. The Philippine Bank of Communications
joined Zuellig Pharma] in moving to declare Lui Enterprises in default, and in moving for the
denial of Lui Enterprises motion to dismiss.
The RTC of Makati found that Lui Enterprises failed to file its motion to dismiss within the
reglementary period, hence, denied Lui Enterprises motion to dismiss and declared it in default.
Court of Appeals dismissed Lui Enterprises appeal and affirmed in toto the Regional Trial Court
of Makatis decision and ruled that Lui Enterprises failed to show the excusable negligence that
prevented it from filing its motion to dismiss on time. On its allegedly meritorious defense, the
Court of Appeals ruled that the nullification of deed of dation in payment case did not bar the
filing of the interpleader case, with Zuellig Pharma not being a party to the nullification case.
ISSUE: (1) Whether the Regional Trial Court of Makati erred in denying Lui Enterprises motion to
set aside order of default. NO
(2) Whether the annulment of deed of dation in payment pending in the Regional Trial Court of
Davao barred the subsequent filing of the interpleader case in the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
NO

RULING:

(1) Under Rule 62, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a person may file a
special civil action for interpleader if conflicting claims are made against him or her over a
subject matter in which he or she has no interest. The action is brought against the claimants to
compel them to litigate their conflicting claims among themselves.
Rule 62, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: Section 1. When
interpleader proper. Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may
be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest
which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the
conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims
among themselves.
An interpleader complaint may be filed by a lessee against those who have conflicting claims
over the rent due for the property leased. This remedy is for the lessee to protect him or her
from double vexation in respect of one liability. He or she may file the interpleader case to
extinguish his or her obligation to pay rent, remove him or her from the adverse claimants
dispute, and compel the parties with conflicting claims to litigate among themselves.
In this case, Zuellig Pharma filed the interpleader case to extinguish its obligation to pay rent.
Its purpose in filing the interpleader case was not defeated when the Makati trial court
declared Lui Enterprises in default.
At any rate, an adverse claimant in an interpleader case may be declared in default. A
claimant who fails to answer within the required period may, on motion, be declared in default.
The consequence of the default is that the court may render judgment barring the defaulted
claimant from any claim in respect to the subject matter. The Rules would not have allowed
claimants in interpleader cases to be declared in default if it would ironically defeat the very
purpose of the suit.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati declared Lui Enterprises in default when it failed to answer the
complaint within the required period. Lui Enterprises filed a motion to set aside order of default
without an acceptable excuse why its counsel failed to answer the complaint. It failed to prove
the excusable negligence. Thus, the Makati trial court did not err in refusing to set aside the
order of default.

(2) In this case, the nullification of deed of dation in payment case was filed by Lui
Enterprises against the Philippine Bank of Communications. The interpleader case was filed by
Zuellig Pharma against Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications. A different
plaintiff filed the interpleader case against Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of
Communications. Thus, there is no identity of parties, and the first requisite of litis pendentia is
absent.
As discussed, Lui Enterprises filed the nullification of deed of dation in payment to recover
ownership of the leased premises. Zuellig Pharma filed the interpleader case to extinguish its
obligation to pay rent. There is no identity of reliefs prayed for, and the second requisite of litis
pendentia is absent.
Since two requisites of litis pendentia are absent, the nullification of deed of dation in
payment case did not bar the filing of the interpleader case. All told, the trial court did not err in
proceeding with the interpleader case. The nullification of deed of dation in payment case
pending with the Regional Trial Court of Davao did not bar the filing of the interpleader case with
the Regional Trial Court of Makati.

2.

MAKATI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PEDRO C.

TANJUATCO and CONCRETE AGGREGATES, INC., defendants-appellees, G.R. No. L26443, March 25, 1969

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

FACTS OF THE CASE: This is an appeal by plaintiff Makati Development Corporation from an
order of dismissal of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), predicated upon lack of
jurisdiction.

On February 21, 1963, plaintiff Makati development Corporation and defendant Pedro C.
Tanjuatco entered into a contract whereby the latter bound himself to construct a reinforced
concrete covered water reservoir, office and pump house and water main at Forbes Park, Makati,
Rizal, furnishing, the materials necessary therefor.
Before making the final payment of the consideration agreed upon, plaintiff inquired from the
suppliers of materials, who had called its attention to unpaid bills therefor of Tanjuatco, whether
the latter had settled his accounts with them. In response to this inquiry, Concrete
Aggregates, Inc. hereinafter referred to as the Supplier made a claim in the sum of
P5,198.75, representing the cost of transit-mixed concrete allegedly delivered to Tanjuatco.
With his consent, plaintiff withheld said amount from the final payment made to him and, in
view of his subsequent failure to settle the issue thereon with the Supplier, on September 16,
1955, plaintiff instituted the present action, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, against
Tanjuatco and the Supplier, to compel them "to interplead their conflicting claims."
Tanjuatco moved to dismiss the case, upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over
the subject-matter of the litigation, the amount involved therein being less than P10,000.00.
The lower court granted the same, over plaintiffs opposition thereto, and, issued an order
dismissing the case.
Hence, this appeal, in which plaintiff maintains that the subject-matter of this litigation is not
the aforementioned sum of P5,198.75, but the right to compel the defendants "to litigate among
themselves" in order to protect the plaintiff "against a double vexation in respect to one liability."
ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI have jurisdiction over the case. NO

RULING:

There is no question in this case that PLAINTIFF may compel the defendants to interplead
among themselves, concerning the aforementioned sum of P5,198.75. The only issue is who
among the defendants is entitled to collect the same is the object of the action, which is not
within the jurisdiction of the lower court. As a matter of fact, the Supplier sued Tanjuatco in the
Municipal Court of Manila, for the recovery of said amount of P5,198.75, and the decision therein
will settle the question as to who has a right to the sum withheld by plaintiff herein.
The plaintiff relies upon Rule 63 of the present Rules of Court, prescribing the procedure in cases
of interpleading, and Section 19 of Rule 5 of said Rules of Court, which, unlike section 19 of Rule

4 of the Old Rules, omits the Rules on Interpleading among those made applicable to inferior
courts. This fact does not warrant, however, the conclusion drawn therefrom by plaintiff herein.
To begin with, the jurisdiction of our courts over the subject-matter of justiciable controversies is
governed by Rep. Act No. 296, as amended, pursuant to which municipal courts shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil cases "in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the
value of the property in controversy", amounts to not more than "ten thousand pesos." Secondly,
"the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts" belongs to
Congress and is beyond the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, which is limited to matters
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law. Thirdly, the failure of said section 19 of Rule 5 of the present Rules of Court to
make its Rule 63, on interpleading, applicable to inferior courts, merely implies that the
same are not bound to follow Rule 63 in dealing with cases of interpleading, but may apply
thereto the general rules on procedure applicable to ordinary civil action in said courts.

3. G.R. No. L-25138

August 28, 1969

JOSE A. BELTRAN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION, defendants-appellees.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
FACTS:
The plaintiffs occupied their respective housing units at Project 4, under lease from the People's
Homesite & Housing Corporation (PHHC) and paying monthly rentals therefor.
PHHC announced to the tenants that the management, administration and ownership of Project 4
would be transferred by the PHHC to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in
payment of PHHC debts to the GSIS.
PHHC announced that all payments made by the tenants after March 31, 1961 would be
considered as amortizations or installment payments.
Pursuant to the PHHC-GSIS arrangement, collections from tenants on rentals and/or installment
payments were delivered by the PHHC to the GSIS.
The agreement of turnover of administration and ownership of PHHC properties, including Project
4 was executed by PHHC in favor of GSIS.
Subsequently, however, PHHC through its new Chairman-General Manager, Esmeraldo Eco,
refused to recognize all agreements and undertakings previously entered into with GSIS, while
GSIS insisted on its legal rights to enforce the said agreements and was upheld in its contention
by both the Government Corporate Counsel and the Secretary of Justice.
This interpleader suit was filed by plaintiffs in their own behalf and in behalf of all residents of
Project 4 in Quezon City.
The two defendant corporations represented by the Government Corporate Counsel filed a
Motion to Dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
The trial Court heard the motion and thereafter issued its Order dismissing the Complaint, ruling
that: "During the hearing of the said motion and opposition thereto, the counsel for the

defendants made of record that the defendant Government Service Insurance System has no
objection that payments on the monthly amortizations from the residents of Project 4 be made
directly to the defendant People's Homesite and Housing Corporation. From what appears in said
motion and the statement made in open court by the counsel for defendants that there is no
dispute as to whom the residents of Project 4 should make their monthly amortizations
payments, there is, therefore, no cause of action for interpleading. In so far as payments are
concerned, defendant GSIS has expressed its conformity that they be made directly to defendant
PHHC.
Plaintiffs subsequently filed their motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court
in an Order.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the special civil action of interpleader would prosper when there are no
conflicting claims against the plaintiff.
HELD: NO.
We affirm the dismissal on the ground that where the defendants sought to be interpleaded as
conflicting claimants have no conflicting claims against plaintiff, the special civil action of
interpleader will not lie
Plaintiffs entirely miss the vital element of an action of interpleader. Rule 63, section 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court (formerly Rule 14) requires as an indispensable element that "conflicting
claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made" against the plaintiff-in-interpleader
"who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is
not disputed by the claimants." While the two defendant corporations may have conflicting
claims between themselves with regard to the management, administration and ownership of
Project 4, such conflicting claims are not against the plaintiffs nor do they involve or affect the
plaintiffs. No allegation is made in their complaint that any corporation other than the PHHC
which was the only entity privy to their lease-purchase agreement, ever made on them any claim
or demand for payment of the rentals or amortization payments. The questions of fact raised in
their complaint concerning the enforceability, and recognition or non-enforceability and nonrecognition of the turnover agreement between the two defendant corporations are irrelevant to
their action of interpleader, for these conflicting claims, loosely so-called, are between the two
corporations and not against plaintiffs. Both defendant corporations were in conformity and had
no dispute that the monthly payments and amortizations should be made directly to the PHHC
alone.
In fine, the record shows clearly that there were no conflicting claims by defendant corporations
as against plaintiff-tenants, which they may properly be compelled in an interpleader suit to
interplead and litigate among themselves.
As held by this Court in an early case, the action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person
who has property in his possession or has an obligation to render wholly or partially, without
claiming any right in both, comes to court and asks that the defendants who have made upon
him conflicting claims upon the same property or who consider themselves entitled to demand
compliance with the obligation be required to litigate among themselves in order to determine
who is entitled to the property or payment of the obligation. "The remedy is afforded not to
protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect
of one liability."

4. G.R. No.147812. April 6, 2005

LEONARDO R. OCAMPO, petitioner, vs.
LEONORA TIRONA, respondent.

CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Ocampo alleged that he is the owner of a parcel of land (subject land) located at Alvarez Street,
Pasay City. Ocampo bought the subject land from Rosauro Breton, heir of the subject lands
registered owner Alipio Breton Cruz. Tirona, on the other hand, is a lessee occupying a portion of
the subject land.
In recognition of Ocampos right of ownership over the subject premises, Tirona paid some
monthly rentals due.
However, Ocampo was informed that the subject premises was declared under area for priority
development, and, in connection thereto, Tirona stopped paying her monthly rentals.
On 7 August 1995, Ocampo wrote a letter to Tirona demanding upon Tirona to pay the rentals in
arrears for the months of April, May, June, July and August and to vacate the premises. Tirona
failed and refused to heed Ocampos demands.
On 11 September 1995, Ocampo filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against
Tirona before the MTC.
The MTCs Ruling
The MTC ruled that Tirona does not have any reason to suspend payment of rents until after PD
No. 1517, in relation to PD Nos. 1893 and 1968, is implemented in her favor. Tironas nonpayment of rents rendered her occupation of the subject land illegal.
The MTC rendered a judgment in favor of Ocampo and against Tirona, ordering the latter to
vacate and surrender possession to Ocampo the subject parcel of land and to pay the rentals in
arrears covering the period from April 1995 until such time Tirona shall have finally vacated the
subject premises at the rate of P1,200 a month, with interest at a legal rate;
On 4 March 1996, Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola, who claimed to be the owner of the subject
land, filed a motion with leave to file intervention before the RTC.
The RTCs Ruling
In an order issued, the RTC denied Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiolas motion with leave to file
intervention. The RTC stated that granting the motion to intervene would violate the 1964 Rules
of Court and jurisprudence.
Tirona filed her memorandum disclosing, for the first time, that Alipio Breton is the registered
owner of the subject land and that he is her landlord since 1962. When Alipio Breton died in
1975, his children, Rosauro Breton and Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola, inherited the subject
land. Tirona claims she has never stopped paying her rent to Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola.
Tirona also stated that Rosauro Breton could not transfer ownership to the subject land to
Ocampo. On 14 July 1978, Rosauro Breton executed a deed of conveyance and waiver in favor of
his sister, Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. Rosauro Breton executed another deed of conveyance
and waiver in favor of Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola on 9 March 1995. Thus, Tirona claims,
Ocampo cannot legally acquire title from Rosauro Breton in view of the waivers. Maria Lourdes
Breton-Mendiola is Tironas lessor, and is the only person who can validly file an ejectment suit
against Tirona.
The RTC rendered a judgment affirming in toto the decision of the MTC.
On appeal, the appellate court rendered judgment setting aside the decision of the respondent
court. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the interpleader is proper
HELD: YES.

As a stakeholder, Tirona should have used reasonable diligence in hailing the contending
claimants to court. Tirona need not have awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo against
her before filing a bill of interpleader. An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does
not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the property.
The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether personal or
real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in
both, or claims an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants,
comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said property or who consider
themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among
themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is
afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double
vexation in respect of one liability. When the court orders that the claimants litigate among
themselves, there arises in reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in
such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a
cross-complaint.

5. SUBHASH C. PASRICHA and JOSEPHINE A. PASRICHA,Petitioners,- versus -DON

LUIS DISON REALTY, INC.,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 136409
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
QUISUMBING,*
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.

Promulgated:
March 14, 2008
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Facts:

Respondent Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc. and petitioners executed two Contracts of Lease. While
the contracts were in effect, petitioners dealt with Francis Pacheco (Pacheco), then General
Manager of private respondent. Thereafter, Pacheco was replaced by Roswinda Bautista (Ms.
Bautista). Petitioners religiously paid the monthly rentals until May 1992. Consequently,
respondent was constrained to refer the matter to its lawyer who, in turn, made a final demand
on petitioners for the payment of the accrued rentals. A complaint for ejectment was filed by
private respondent through its representative, Ms. Bautista, before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Manila. Petitioners admitted their failure to pay the stipulated rent for the leased
premises starting July until November 1992, but claimed that such refusal was justified because
of the internal squabble in respondent company as to the person authorized to receive payment.
The MeTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for ejectment. It considered petitioners

non-payment of rentals as unjustified. The Regional Trial Court adopted the MeTCs finding on
petitioners unjustified refusal to pay the rent, which is a valid ground for ejectment. It, however,
faulted the MeTC in dismissing the case on the ground of lack of capacity to sue. Petitioners
moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid decision. In a Resolution, the CA denied the
motions for lack of merit.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners were correct in their choice of remedy of not paying the rentals?

Ruling:

The petition lacks merit.

What was, instead, clearly established by the evidence was petitioners non-payment of rentals
because ostensibly they did not know to whom payment should be made. However, this did not
justify their failure to pay, because if such were the case, they were not without any remedy.
They should have availed of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines on the
consignation of payment and of the Rules of Court on interpleader. Consignation shall be made
by depositing the things due at the disposal of a judicial authority, before whom the tender of
payment shall be proved in a proper case, and the announcement of the consignation in other
cases.

Moreover, Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. When interpleader proper. Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter
are or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or
an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action
against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims
among themselves.

Otherwise stated, an action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know to whom
payment of rentals should be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to
collect). The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against double liability but to protect him
against double vexation in respect of one liability.

Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies, petitioners opted to refrain from making
payments.

In light of the foregoing disquisition, respondent has every right to exercise his right to eject the
erring lessees.

6. G.R. No. L-23851 March 26, 1976

WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
LEE E. WON alias RAMON LEE and BIENVENIDO A. TAN, defendants-appellees.

CASTRO, C.J.:

Facts:

The Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. alleged, for its first cause of action, that the defendant
Lee E. Won claims ownership of its membership fee certificate 201, by virtue of the decision
rendered in civil case 26044 of the CFI of Manila, entitled "Lee E. Won alias Ramon Lee vs. Wack
Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc." and also at the same time, the defendant Bienvenido A. Tan, on
the other hand, claims to be lawful owner of its aforesaid membership fee certificate 201. The
Corporation prayed that (a) an order be issued requiring Lee and Tan to interplead and litigate
their conflicting claims; and (b) judgment. In separate motions the defendants moved to dismiss
the complaint upon the grounds of res judicata, failure of the complaint to state a cause of
action, and bar by prescription. The trial court dismissed the complaint.

Issue:

Whether or not the propriety and timeliness of the remedy of interpleader is correct?

Ruling:

The action of interpleader, under section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 2 is a remedy
whereby a person who has personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly
or partially, without claiming any right to either, comes to court and asks that the persons who
claim the said personal property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with
the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves in order to determine finally who is
entitled to tone or the one thing. The remedy is afforded to protect a person not against double
liability but against double vexation in respect of one liability. 3 The procedure under the Rules of
Court 4 is the same as that under the Code of Civil Procedure, 5 except that under the former the
remedy of interpleader is available regardless of the nature of the subject-matter of the
controversy, whereas under the latter an interpleader suit is proper only if the subject-matter of
the controversy is personal property or relates to the performance of an obligation.

There is no question that the subject matter of the present controversy, i.e., the membership fee
certificate 201, is proper for an interpleader suit. What is here disputed is the propriety and
timeliness of the remedy in the light of the facts and circumstances obtaining.

It has been held that a stakeholder's action of interpleader is too late when filed after judgment
has been rendered against him in favor of one of the contending claimants, 13 especially where
he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and neglected the
opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment was entered. This must
be so, because once judgment is obtained against him by one claimant he becomes liable to the
latter.

The Corporation has not shown any justifiable reason why it did not file an application for
interpleader in civil case 26044 to compel the appellees herein to litigate between themselves
their conflicting claims of ownership. It was only after adverse final judgment was rendered
against it that the remedy of interpleader was invoked by it. By then it was too late, because to
he entitled to this remedy the applicant must be able to show that lie has not been made
independently liable to any of the claimants. And since the Corporation is already liable to Lee
under a final judgment, the present interpleader suit is clearly improper and unavailing.

It is the general rule that before a person will be deemed to be in a position to ask for an order of
intrepleader, he must be prepared to show, among other prerequisites, that he has not become
independently liable to any of the claimants. 25 Tex. Jur. p. 52, Sec. 3; 30 Am. Jur. p. 218, Section
8.

It is also the general rule that a bill of interpleader comes too late when it is filed after judgment
has been rendered in favor of one of the claimants of the fund, this being especially true when
the holder of the funds had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment
and had an opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit in which the judgment was
rendered. United Procedures Pipe Line Co. v. Britton, Tex. Civ. App. 264 S.W. 176; Nash v.
McCullum, Tex. Civ. 74 S.W. 2d 1046; 30 Am. Jur. p. 223, Sec. 11; 25 Tex. Jur. p. 56, Sec. 5; 108
A.L.R., note 5, p. 275. 16

Indeed, if a stakeholder defends a suit filed by one of the adverse claimants and allows said suit
to proceed to final judgment against him, he cannot later on have that part of the litigation
repeated in an interpleader suit. In the case at hand, the Corporation allowed civil case 26044 to
proceed to final judgment. And it offered no satisfactory explanation for its failure to implead Tan
in the same litigation. In this factual situation, it is clear that this interpleader suit cannot prosper
because it was filed much too late.

If a stakeholder defends a suit by one claimant and allows it to proceed so far as a judgment
against him without filing a bill of interpleader, it then becomes too late for him to do so. It is one
o the main offices of a bill of interpleader to restrain a separate proceeding at law by claimant so
as to avoid the resulting partial judgment; and if the stakeholder acquiesces in one claimant's
trying out his claim and establishing it at law, he cannot then have that part of the litigation
repeated in an interpleader suit.

It is the general rule that a bill of interpleader comes too late when application therefore is
delayed until after judgment has been rendered in favor of one of the claimants of the fund, and
that this is especially true where the holder of the fund had notice of the conflicting claims prior
to the rendition of such judgment and an opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the
suit in which such judgment was rendered.

To now permit the Corporation to bring Lee to court after the latter's successful establishment of
his rights in civil case 26044 to the membership fee certificate 201, is to increase instead of to
diminish the number of suits, which is one of the purposes of an action of interpleader, with the
possibility that the latter would lose the benefits of the favorable judgment. This cannot be done
because having elected to take its chances of success in said civil case 26044, with full
knowledge of all the fact, the Corporation must submit to the consequences of defeat.

Besides, a successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated adversary in an

interpleader suit and compelled to prove his claim anew against other adverse claimants, as that
would in effect be a collateral attack upon the judgment.

In fine, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because the Corporation had already been
made independently liable in civil case 26044 and, therefore, its present application for
interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final judgment in the said civil case;
the appellee Lee had already established his rights to membership fee certificate 201 in the
aforesaid civil case and, therefore, this interpleader suit would compel him to establish his rights
anew, and thereby increase instead of diminish litigations, which is one of the purposes of an
interpleader suit, with the possiblity that the benefits of the final judgment in the said civil case
might eventually be taken away from him; and because the Corporation allowed itself to be sued

to final judgment in the said case, its action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late, for which
reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable delay.