Statutory Construction (EH307MC)

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IV. GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN THE
CONSTRUCTION AND INTEPRETATION OF
LAWS
i. Statutes as a Whole
- Statutes should be construed as a whole;
one portion may be qualified by others
JMM Promotions v NLRC
G.R. No. 109835 (November 22, 1993)
Facts: Following Secs. 4 and 17, Rule II,
Book II of the POEA Rules, the
petitioner, a recruiting agency, made the
following:
a. Paid the license fee (Sec. 4)
b. Posted a cash bond of
100k and surety
bond of 50k(Sec. 4)
c. Placed money in escrow worth
200k (Sec.
17)
The petitioner wanted to appeal a
decision of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) to the
respondent NLRC, but the latter dismissed
the appeal because of failure of the
petitioner to post
an appeal bond required by Sec. 6, Rule
V, Book VII of the POEA Rules. The
decision being appealed involved a
monetary award.
The petitioner contended that its
payment of a license fee, posting of cash
bond and surety bond, and placement of
money in escrow are enough; posting
an appeal bond is unnecessary. According
to Sec. 4, the bonds are posted to answer
for all valid and legal claims arising from
violations of the conditions for the grant
and use of the license,
and/oraccreditation and contracts of
employment. On the other hand,
according to Sec. 17, the escrow shall
answer for valid and legal claims of
recruited workers as a result
of recruitment violations or money claims.
Sec. 6 reads:
In case the decision of the Administration
involves a monetary award, an appeal by
the employer shall be perfected only upon
the posting of a cash or surety bond
The bonds required here are different from
the bonds required in Sec. 4.
Issue: Was the petitioner still required to
post an appeal bond despite the fact that

it has posted bonds of 150k and placed

200k in escrow before?
Held: Yes. It is possible for the monetary
reward in favor of the employee
to exceed the amount of 350,000 because
of the stringent requirements posed upon
recruiters. The reason for such is that
overseas employees are subjected to
greater risks and hence, the money will be
used to insure more care on the part of
the local recruiter in its choice of foreign
principal to whom the worker will be sent.
Doctrine: Construction:
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that
in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules
as in this case), care should be taken that
every part thereof be given effect, on the
theory that it was enacted as an
integrated measure and not as a hodgepodge of conflicting provisions. Ut res
magis valeat quam pereat. That the
thing may rather have effect than be
destroyed.
The rule is that a construction that would
render a provision inoperative should be
avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent
provisions should be reconciled whenever
possible as parts of a coordinated and
harmonious whole. With regard to the
present case, the doctrine can be applied
when the Court found that Sec. 6
complements Sec. 4 and Sec. 17.
Casela v CA
L-26754 (October 16, 1970)
Facts: (Oct 26, 1956) In CAR Case No.
5666-R-Z of the Court of Agrarian
Relations of Iba, Zambales, Mateo Casela,
was the defendant, and Exequiel
Magsaysay, the plaintiff. The said court
decided against the defendant and the
decision become final and executory
commanding Casela to vacate the
premises and remove his house therefrom.
Casela refused to comply with the said
writ.
(Aug 12, 1957) the court issued another
writ commanding the defendant to vacate
the premises and remove his house. He
again refused to comply with the writ.
(May 6, 1958) the court again issued
another writ.
(April 14, 1959) and another writ.

Statutory Construction (EH307MC)

Instead of obeying the writ, the defendant

instituted a Civil case before the Court of
First Instance of Zambales asking
Magsaysay to pay him the value of his
house in the amount of 5,000 and
improvements of 2,000. In addition to
damages in the sum of 1,600. At the same
time, he also filed a motion for suspension
of the implementation of the writ of
execution pending the final outcome of
the said civil case.
Magsaysay filed a countermotion against
the motion of suspension to declare
Casela and the provincial sheriff in
contempt of court.
After hearing the respective mtions, the
court granted Casela motion for
suspension until the Civil Case would have
been disposed of on the merits.
(Oct 6, 1965) The civil case eventually
reached the Court of Appeals and the
court dismissed Caselas appeal. The court
ruled the the claims of Casela for
indemnification were in the nature of of
compulsory counterclaims and must be
pleaded before the agarian court and not
the court of first instance where they were
brought. Magsaysay could not be
compelled to pay the claims. By reason of
this pronouncement, Magsaysay filed a
motion (DEC 2, 1963) and another (FEB
11, 1964) praying for the issuance of an
alia writ of execution attaching a copy of
the appealed decision.
(March 5, 1964) The agarian court denied
Magsaysays motion holding that its
decision on mere motion for the reason
that a period of five years had already
elapsed from the said date.
(April 10, 1964) Magsaysay moved for a
reconsideration of the order of denial of
March 5, 1964; this was granted by the
Court in its order of October 1, 1964,
which forthwith directed the execution of
its judgment of October 26, 1956.
Issue: That the agrarian court denied
Magsaysays motion holding that its
decision on mere motion for the reason
that a period of five years had already
elapsed from the said date.
Held: That the decision of October 26,
1956 of the Court of Agrarian Relations
became final and executory on December
17, 1956, is not controverted. Counting
five years from December 17, 1956, the
plaintiff Exequiel Magsaysay had until
December 17, 1961 within which to move
for execution of the said decision. It would

thus appear that Magsaysay's motion for

execution of December 11, 1963, having
been filed beyond the five-year
reglementary period, was time-barred.
This would indicate that the said motion
for execution was filed on time.
Where the writs of execution were not
implemented because of petitioner
Casela's stubborn refusal to vacate the
premises and because of the lower court's
order sustaining Casela's for suspension of
execution twice, all covering a period of 3
yrs. 9 mos. and 25 days, respondent
Magsaysay should not be considered to
have incurred in delay in the enforcement
of the judgment when he filed a motion for
execution 6 yrs. 11 mos. and 24 days after
the decision in question became final and
executory. From this latter period must be
deducted the time during which the writs
of execution could not be served, or a
period of 3 yrs. 9 mos. and 25 days.
Consequently, only 3 yrs. 1 month and 29
days can be charged against the five year
reglementary period. Undoubtedly,
Magsaysay's motion for execution was
filed well within the five-year reglementary
period.
Conscience and equity should always be
considered in the construction of statutes.
The courts are not to be hedged in by the
literal meaning of the language of the
statute; the spirit and intendment thereof
must prevail over its letter. This rule of
construction is especially applicable where
adherence to the letter of the statute
would result in absurdity and injustice.
ii. Legislative Intent must be
ascertained from the statute as a
whole
- Legislative intent is the vital part, the
essence of the law. The intent of the
legislature is the law, and the key to, and
the controlling factor in, its construction or
interpretation. Intent is the spirit which
gives life to legislative enactment. It must
be enforced when ascertained, although it
may not be consistent with the strict letter
of the statute. The term intent includes
two concepts, that of purpose and that of
meaning, it has been held, however, that
the ascertainment of legislative intent
depends more on a determination of the
purpose and object of the law.
A. Optima statuli interpretatix est ipsum
statutum
the best interpreter of the statute is the
statute itself
B. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat.
because a statute is enacted in whole

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and not in parts or sections, which implies
that one part is as important as the other,
the statute should be construed and given
effect as a whole. 3 approaches in
determining the legislative intent: (1)
Literal Rule (2) Purpose Rule (3) Golden
Rule depart from the ordinary meaning.
Datu Michael Abas Kida v Senate of the
Philippines
G.R. No. 196271 (February 28, 2012)
FACTS: These cases are motions for
reconsideration assailing the SCs Decision
dated October 18, 2011, where it upheld
the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA)
No. 10153. Pursuant to the constitutional
mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153
postponed the regional elections in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) (which were scheduled to be held
on the second Monday of August 2011) to
the second Monday of May 2013 and
recognized the Presidents power to
appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to
temporarily assume these positions upon
the expiration of the terms of the elected
officials.
ISSUE: Does the Constitution mandate
the synchronization of ARMM regional
elections with national and local
elections?
HELD: The framers of the Constitution
could not have expressed their objective
more clearly there was to be a single
election in 1992 for all elective officials
from the President down to the municipal
officials. Significantly, the framers were
even willing to temporarily lengthen or
shorten the terms of elective officials in
order to meet this objective, highlighting
the importance of this constitutional
mandate. That the ARMM elections were
not expressly mentioned in the Transitory
Provisions of the Constitution on
synchronization cannot be interpreted to
mean that the ARMM elections are not
covered by the constitutional mandate of
synchronization. The ARMM had not yet
been officially organized at the time the
Constitution was enacted and ratified by
the people. Keeping in mind that a
constitution is not intended to provide
merely for the exigencies of a few years
but is to endure through generations for
as long as it remains unaltered by the
people as ultimate sovereign, a
constitution should be construed in the
light of what actually is a continuing
instrument to govern not only the present
but also the unfolding events of the
indefinite future. Although the principles
embodied in a constitution remain fixed

and unchanged from the time of its

adoption, a constitution must be
construed as a dynamic process intended
to stand for a great length of time, to be
progressive and not static.
Meridian Assurance Corporation v Dayrit
G.R. No. 59154 (April 3, 1990)
FACTS: The sole issue of this special civil
action for certiorari concerns the rate of
interest properly imposable in relation to a
judgement for the payment of money: 6%,
as provided by Article 2209 of the Civil
Code, or 12%, conformably with Central
Bank Circular No. 416. The petitioner,
Meridian Assurance Corporation, was a
defendant in Civil Case No. 62317 of the
then Court of First Instance in Manila. The
case resulted in a verdict adverse to the
defendants making them liable jointly and
severally, for the sum of $21,933.38 or its
equivalent in Pesos at the rate of P3.9390
to a dollar. The Trial Courts judgment was
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals on
October 9, 1980. On September 16, 1980
offered to pay the amount of the
judgement with 6% interest per annum
and the approved costs of P237.00. The
offer was rejected by First Western, in its
letter of September 21, 1981, its view
being that the rate of interest should be
12% per annum in accordance with
Central Bank Circular No. 416. Meridian
thereupon proceeded to this Court praying
for a writ of certiorari to annul the orders
denying its aforementioned motion to
deposit, etc. dated September 1981, and
to authorize it "to satisfy the amount of
the judgment with 6% interest per annum
and the approved costs of P237.00
totaling P170.061.03
ISSUE: WON Circular No. 416 of the
Central Bank of the Philippines
amending Section 1 of the Usury Law (Act
No. 2655) by prescribing twelve percent
(12%) per annum as the "rate of interest
for the loan, or forbearance of any money,
goods, or credits and the rate allowed in
judgments, in the absence of express
contract as to such rate of interest be
applied to all kinds of monetary
judgement.
HELD: Petition granted. Any other kind of
monetary judgment which has nothing to
do with, nor involving loans or forbearance
of any money, goods or credits does not
fall within the coverage of the said law
(P.D. No. 116) for it is not within the ambit
of the authority granted to the Central
Bank. The Monetary Board may not tread
on forbidden grounds. It cannot rewrite
other laws. That function is vested solely
with the legislative authority. It is
axiomatic in legal hermeneutics that
statutes should be construed as a whole

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and not as series of disconnected articles
and phrases. In the absence of a clear
contrary intention, words and phrases in
statutes should not be interpreted in
isolation from one another. A word or
phrase in a statute is always used in
association with other words or phrases
and its meaning may thus be modified or
restricted by the latter. The Orders
promulgated on October 15, 1981 and
December 2, 1981 are ANNULLED AND
SET ASIDE. The petitioner's deposit with
the Trial Court of the amount of
P170,061.03 is declared to constitute full
satisfaction.
Socorro Ramirez v Hon. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 93833 (September 25, 1995)
FACTS: Petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez filed
a civil case in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City alleging that the private
respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a
confrontation in the latter's office,
allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated
her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in
a manner offensive to his dignity and
personality, contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy. In support of
her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim
transcript of the event and sought moral
damages, attorney's fees and other
expenses of litigation in the amount of
P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests
and other reliefs awardable at the trial
court's discretion. The transcript on which
the civil case was based was culled from a
tape recording of the confrontation made
by petitioner. As a result of petitioner's
recording of the event and alleging that
the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private
respondent filed a criminal case before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for
violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An
Act to prohibit and penalize wiretapping
and other related violations of private
communication, and other purposes.
ISSUE: Whether or not the applicable
provision of Republic Act 4200 does not
apply to the taping of a private
conversation by one of the parties to the
conversation.
RULING: No. Section 1 of the Republic
Act 4200 states that it shall be unlawful
for any person, not being authorized by all
the parties to any private communication
or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable,
or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication
or spoken word by using a device

commonly known as a dictaphone or

dictagraph or detectaphone or walkietalkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described.
The law is clear and unambiguous. Where
the law makes no distinctions, one does
not distinguish. The Supreme Court
affirmed the appealed decision. The
instant petition is hereby DENIED. Cost
against petitioner.
iii. Verba Legis
- plain meaning rule: Where the statute is
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and
applied without interpretation. This plain
meaning rule or verbal legis derived from
the maxim index animi sermo est (speech
is the index of intention) rests on the valid
presumption that the words employed by
the legislature in a statute correctly
express its intention or will and preclude
the court from construing it differently.
SSC and SSS v Teresa G. Favila
G.R. No. 170195 (March 28, 2011)
FACTS: Respondent Teresita Favila filed a
claim with the SSS for pension benefits,
and averred therein that after she was
married to Florante Favila (Florante) on
January 17, 1970, the latter designated
her as the sole beneficiary in the E-1 Form
he submitted before petitioner Social
Security System (SSS), Quezon City
Branch on June 30, 1970.When they begot
their children Jofel, Floresa and Florante II,
her husband likewise designated each one
of them as beneficiaries. Teresa further
averred that when Florante died on
February 1, 1997, his pension benefits
under the SSS were given to their only
minor child at that time, Florante II, but
only until his emancipation at age
21.Believing that as the surviving legal
wife she is likewise entitled to receive
Florantes pension benefits, Teresa
subsequently filed her claim for said
benefits before the SSS. The SSS,
however, denied the claim.
Resolving Teresitas claim, the SSC stated
that the surviving spouses entitlement to
an SSS members death benefits is
dependent on two factors which must
concur at the time of the latters death, to
wit: (1) legality of the marital relationship;
and (2) dependency for support. As to
dependency for support, the SSC opined
that same is affected by factors such as
separation de facto of the spouses, marital
infidelity and such other grounds sufficient
to disinherit a spouse under the law. Thus,

Statutory Construction (EH307MC)

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although Teresa is the legal spouse and
one of Florantes designated beneficiaries,
the SSC ruled that she is disqualified from
claiming the death benefits because she
was deemed not dependent for support
from Florante due to marital infidelity.
The CA, however, reversed the SSCs
decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Teresita is a
primary beneficiary in contemplation of
the Social Security Law as to be entitled to
death benefits accruing from the death of
Florante
HELD: The petition is granted.
LABOR LAW: Meaning of a dependent
spouse entitled to pension benefits Under Sec. 8(e) and (k) of RA 1161, for a
spouse to qualify as a primary beneficiary
under paragraph (k) thereof, he/she must
not only be a legitimate spouse but also a
dependent as defined under paragraph
(e), that is, one who is dependent upon
the member for support. There is no
question that Teresa was Florantes legal
wife. What is at point, however, is whether
Teresa is dependent upon Florante for
support in order for her to fall under the
term "dependent spouse" under Section
8(k) of RA 1161.
In this case, aside from Teresas bare
allegation that she was dependent upon
her husband for support and her
misplaced reliance on the presumption of
dependency by reason of her valid and
then subsisting marriage with Florante,
Teresa has not presented sufficient
evidence to discharge her burden of
proving that she was dependent upon her
husband for support at the time of his
death. She could have done this by
submitting affidavits of reputable and
disinterested persons who have
knowledge that during her separation with
Florante, she does not have a known
trade, business, profession or lawful
occupation from which she derives income
sufficient for her support and such other
evidence tending to prove her claim of
dependency.
On the contrary, what is clear is that she
and Florante had already been separated
for about 17 years prior to the latters
death as Florante was in fact, living with
his common law wife when he died.
Whoever claims entitlement to the
benefits provided by law should establish
his or her right thereto by substantial
evidence. Hence, for Teresas failure to

show that despite their separation she was

dependent upon Florante for support at
the time of his death, Teresa cannot
qualify as a primary beneficiary. Hence,
she is not entitled to the death benefits
accruing on account of Florantes death.
Globe Mackay Cable v NLRC
G.R. No. 82511 (March 3, 1992)
Facts: Wage Order No. 6 increased the
cost-of-living allowance (COLA) of nonagricultural workers in the private sector.
Petitioner Corporation complied with said
Order by paying its monthly-paid
employees the mandated P3.00 per day
COLA. In its computation, Petitioner
Corporation multiplied the P3.00 daily
COLA by 22 days, which is the number of
working days in the company.
Respondent Union disagreed with the
computation alleging that prior to the
effectivity of the Wage Order, Petitioner
Corporation had been computing and
paying the COLA on the basis of 30 days
per month and that this constituted an
employer practice, which should not be
unilaterally withdrawn.
The Labor Arbiter sustained the position of
Petitioner Corporation by holding that the
monthly COLA should be computed on the
basis of 22 days, since the evidence
showed that there are only 22 days in a
month for monthly-paid employees in the
company.
The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter on
appeal, holding that Petitioner
Corporation was guilty of illegal
deductions considering that COLA should
be paid and computed on the basis of 30
days since workers paid on a monthly
basis are entitled to COLA on days
unworked; and the full allowance
enjoyed by Petitioner Corporations
monthly-paid employees before the CBA
executed between the parties constituted
voluntary employer practice, which cannot
be unilaterally withdrawn.
Issue: WON the computation and
payment of COLA on the basis of 30 days
per month constitute an employer practice
which should not be unilaterally
withdrawn.
Held: No. Section 5 of the Rules
Implementing Wage Orders Nos. 2, 3, 5
and 6 provides that all covered
employees shall be entitled to their daily
living allowance during the days that they
are paid their basic wage, even if
unworked. The primordial consideration

Statutory Construction (EH307MC)

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for entitlement of COLA is that basic wage
is being paid. The payment of COLA is
mandated only for the days that the
employees are paid their basic wage, even
if said days are unworked. On the days
that employees are not paid their basic
wage, the payment of COLA is not
mandated.
Moreover, Petitioner Corporation cannot
be faulted for erroneous application of a
doubtful or difficult question of law. Since
it is a past error that is being corrected, no
vested right may be said to have arisen
nor may any diminution of benefit under
Article 100 of the Labor Code be said to
have resulted by virtue of the correction.
Felicito Basbacio v Office of the Secretary,
DOJ
G.R. No. 109445 (November 7, 1994)
FACTS: Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and
his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were
convicted of frustrated murder and of two
counts of frustrated murder for the killing
of Federico Boyon and the wounding of the
latter's wife Florida and his son Tirso, at
Palo, Calanuga, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, on the
night of June 26, 1988. The motive for the
killing was apparently a land dispute
between the Boyons and petitioner.
Petitioner and his son-in-law were
sentenced to imprisonment and ordered
immediately detained after their bonds
had been cancelled.
Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed.
Only petitioner's appeal proceeded to
judgment, however, as the appeal of the
other accused was dismissed for failure to
file his brief. On June 22, 1992 the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision acquitting
petitioner on the ground that the
prosecution failed to prove conspiracy
between him and his son-in-law. He had
been pointed to by a daughter of Federico
Boyon as the companion of Balderrama
when the latter barged into their hut and
without warning started shooting, but the
appellate court ruled that because
petitioner did nothing more, petitioner's
presence at the scene of the crime was
insufficient to show conspiracy.
Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a
claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, sec. 3(a),
which provides for the payment of
compensation to "any person who was
unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned
but subsequently released by virtue of a
judgment of acquittal."
ISSUE: WON Petitioner can rightfully claim
compensation for damages on the grounds
of unjust imprisonment
HELD: Petition is dismissed. The law is
clear and does not call for interpretation. It

is believed therefor that the phrase any

person unjustly accused, convicted and
imprisoned in Section 3(a) of R.A. No.
7309 refers to an individual who was
wrongly accused and imprisoned for a
crime he did not commit, thereby making
him a victim of unjust imprisonment. In
the instant case, however, Claimant/
Appellant cannot be deemed such a victim
since a reading of the decision of his
acquittal shows that his exculpation is not
based on his innocence, but upon, in
effect, a finding of reasonable doubt.
iv. Spirit and Purpose of the Law
- The intent or spirit of the law is the law
itself. For this reason, legislative intent or
spirit is the controlling factor, the leading
star and the guiding light in the
application and interpretation of a statute.
- The spirit, rather than the letter, of a
statute determines its construction; hence
a statute must be read according to its
spirit or intent.
Elena Salenillas v Honorable Court of
Appeals, et. Al
G.R. No. 78687 (January 31, 1989)
Statutory Rule: Between two statutory
interpretations, that which better serves
the purpose of the law should prevail.
Facts: The parents of Elena Salenillas, one
of the petitioners, were grantees of free
patent. The subject property was later sold
to Elena Salenillas and her husband,
petitioners in the instant case. On
December 4, 1973, the property of
petitioners was mortgaged to Philippine
National bank as security for a loan of
P2,500. For failure to pay their loan, the
property was foreclose by PNB and was
bought at a public auction by private
respondent. Petitioner maintains that they
have a right to repurchase the property
under Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act.
Respondent states that the sale of the
property disqualified petitioner from being
legal heirs vis-a-vis the said property.
Issue: W/N petitioners have the right to
repurchase the property under Sec. 119 of
the Public Land Act.
Held: Yes. Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act
provides that "every conveyance of land
acquired under the free patent or
homestead provisions shall be subject to
repurchase by the applicant, his widow or
legal heirs within a period of five years
from the date or conveyance." The
provision makes no distinction between
the legal heirs. The distinction made by
respondent contravenes the very purpose

Statutory Construction (EH307MC)

7
of the act. Between two statutory
interpretations, that which better serves
the purpose of the law should prevail.
B/Gen. Jose Commendador, et. Al v B/Gen.
Demetrio Camera, et, al.
G.R. No. 96948 (August 2, 1991)
Statutory rule: When the reason of the law
ceases, the law itself ceases.
Facts: Petitioners are members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and were
charged with violations of Articles of War
in relation with their alleged participation
in a failed coup detat. Their case was
referred to General Court Martial No. 14.
At a hearing, petitioners manifested their
desire to exercise their right to raise
peremptory challenges against the
President and the members of the general
court martial invoking Art. 18 of CA No.
408. GCM No. 14 ruled that peremptory
challenges had been discontinued under
PD 39.
Issue: W/N the right to peremptory
challenge provide by Art. 18 of CA No. 408
has been discontinued under PD 39.
Held: No. Although PD 39 disallowed
peremptory challenged allowed under CA
No. 408, PD 39 however was issued to
implement General Order No. 8 issued
during martial law to create military
tribunals. With the lifting of Martial Law,
General Order No. 8 was revoked and
military tribunals were dissolved. As such,
the reason for the existence of PD 39
ceased automatically. When the reason of
the law ceases, the law itself ceases.
Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex.
v. Statute of Later Date Prevails
- because it favors the latest intention of
the legislature
Pacis v Averia
G.R. No. L-22526 (November 29, 1996)
FACTS: (December 26, 1963) Coast Guard
Cutter 115 of the Philippine Navy pursued
a fishing boat bearing the name of M/B
"Bukang Liwayway" off Ternate, Cavite.
Said fishing boat was boarded and found
loaded with untaxed foreign made
cigarettes, to wit:
495 cases Union cigarettes
1,385 cartons Union cigarettes
3,197 packs Union cigarettes
88 cases Chesterfield cigarettes
498 carton Chesterfield cigarettes
87 cases Salem cigarettes
799 cartons Salem cigarettes

50 cartons Winston cigarettes

The cigarettes and the fishing boat were
confiscated and turned over to the Flag
officer in command of the Philippine naval
base at Cavite City.
(December 27,1963) the cigarettes were
delivered to the custody of the Bureau of
Customs.
(January 13, 1964) Pedro Pacis, acting
Collector
of
Customs
of
Manila,
commenced
seizure
and
forfeiture
proceedings pursuant to Title VI of the
Tariff and Customs Code (Republic Act No.
1937) by issuing a warrant of seizure and
detention against the cigarettes and M/B
"Bukang Liwayway
On the same day, Eusebio Marges, the
alleged owner of M/B "Bukang Liwayway",
filed Civil Case in the Court of First
Instance at Trece Martires City for replevin
(a procedure whereby seized goods may
be provisionally restored to their owner
pending the outcome of an action to
determine the rights of the parties
concerned) against the Flag officer of the
Philippine Navy and others, alleging that
said fishing boat was stolen on December
15, 1963 while moored at Caacao Bay,
Cavite City and that notice of loss was
reported on December 16, 1963 to the
Philippine Constabulary, Cavite City Police
and the Collector of Customs of Manila.
(January 20, 1964) the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Bureau of
Customs, filed a motion for intervention.
(January 27, 1964) the Republic and
defendant base commander filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint and to lift the writ
of replevin on the grounds that: (1) the
Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction
over the object in litigation (2) that the
action for replevin was premature
inasmuch as administrative remedies have
not been exhausted; (3) that a criminal
action for smuggling was being prepared
against Marges under which case M/B
"Bukang Liwayway" would be liable for
forfeiture, as an instrument of the crimes;
(4) and that the surety bond of P40,000.00
was insufficient.
(February 17, 1964)The Court denied the
motion to lift writ of replevin on but
ordered Marges to post an additional
surety bond of P60,000.00.
(February 20, 1964) defendant Flag Officer
of the Philippine Navy delivered the M/B
"Bukang Liwayway" to Provincial Sheriff
Proceso P. Silangcruz.

Statutory Construction (EH307MC)

8
(February 29, 1964) the Collector of
Customs of Manila and the Commander of
the Philippine Naval Base of Cavite City
filed with this Court on the instant petition
for certiorari with preliminary injunction.
(February 25, 1964) Provincial Sheriff
Proceso P. Silangcruz had delivered the
M/B. "Bukang Liwayway" on to Eusebio
Marges
(March 17, 1964) Respondent Sheriff
however manifested on March 17, 1964
that he had already delivered the vessel in
question to its owner on February 25,
1964 after petitioners failed to object to
the sufficiency of the surety bond filed by
Eusebio Marges and after they failed to file
a counterbond needed for the retention of
the vessel.
(April 22, 1964) this court issued another
preliminary writ: Writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, commanding the
Provincial Sheriff of Cavite to take
possession
again
of
M/B
"Bukang
Liwayway" and to keep the same under his
custody until further orders from this
Court.
(April 28, 1964) Respondent Sheriff
received copy of the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction on. For more than
one month said sheriff did not make a
return of the writ. Not until the Solicitor
General moved on June 3, 1964 to require
respondent Sheriff to report to this Court
whether or not he has complied with the
aforesaid writ and required him to show
causes why he may not be declared in
contempt of court.
(June 11, 1964) When asked to comment
on the Solicitor's motion, respondent
Sheriff on returned the writ unsatisfied,
stating that said writ was served upon
Eusebio Marges on April 30, 1964, owner
of M/B "Bukang Liwayway" on who
informed him in writing that the vessel in
question was on a fishing expedition; that
Marges promised to surrender the same
upon its return; and that despite diligent
efforts said vessel could not be located.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not petitioners
could elevate the case at bar to this Court
on a petition for certiorari.
2. Whether or not the owner of M/B
"Bukang
Liwayway"
could
recover
possession of the same by way of a civil
case with replevin
3. Whether or not Provincial Sheriff
Proceso P. Silangcruz may be adjudged in
contempt of the Supreme Court for failure
to comply with the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction issued in this case
on April 22, 1964.

HELD: 1st issue: on the availability of the

remedy of certiorari with preliminary
injunction. It is pressed that the order of
the lower court in denying the motion to
dismiss and to lift the writ of replevin is an
interlocutory order, hence not appealable.
But it should be remembered that the case
before Us is not an appeal. It is a special
civil action of certioari under Section 1 of
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to annul the
aforesaid order for having been rendered
without or in excess of the lower court's
jurisdiction.
The pertinent provision of the Rules of
Court reads: 1 "Section 1. Petition for
certiorari When any tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial functions, has
acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings, as the law requires, of such
tribunal, board or officers."
Certiorari was therefore properly brought.
In a certiorari proceeding, the court is
confined to questions of jurisdiction. The
reason is that the function of the writ of
certiorari is to keep an inferior court within
its jurisdiction. It is available for such
purpose and not to correct errors of
procedure or mistakes in the judge's
findings or conclusion.
2nd issue: the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance of Cavite to entertain
Marges Civil Case (action for replevin) and
the existence of therein plaintiff's cause of
action.
Issuance of a writ of replevin by the court
of first instance will prevent the Bureau of
Customs from further proceeding with the
seizure and forfeiture for allegedly under
Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs
Code.
The original jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance under Section 44(c) of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by
Republic Act 3828, tends to encroach upon
and to render futile, the jurisdiction of the
Collector of Customs in seizure and
forfeiture proceedings, the Court of First
Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of
the Collector of Customs, because the
jurisdiction of the latter is provided for in
Republic Act 1937 which took effect on
July 1, 1957, much later than the Judiciary
Act of 1948. It is axiomatic that a later law

Statutory Construction (EH307MC)

9
prevails over a prior statute. Moreover, it
is reasonable to conclude that the
legislators intended to divest the Court of
First Instance of the prerogative to
replevin a property which is a subject of a
seizure and forfeiture proceedings for
violation of the Tariff and Customs Code.
Otherwise, actions for forfeiture of
property for violation of customs laws
could easily be undermined by the simple
device of replevin. Furthermore, Section
2303 of the Tariff and Customs Code which
requires the Collector of Customs to give
to the owner of the property sought to be
forfeited written notice of the seizure and
to give him the opportunity to be heard in
his defenses, clearly indicates the
intention of the law to confine in the
Bureau of Customs the determination of
all questions affecting the disposal of
property proceeded against in a seizure
and forfeiture case. The judicial recourse
of the property owner is not in the Court of
First Instance but in the Court of Tax
Appeals, and only after exhausting
administrative remedies in the Bureau of
Customs.
Last issue: whether or not respondent
Provincial Sheriff Proceso P. Silangcruz is in
contempt of this Court for failure to
comply with the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction issued by this Court
on April 22, 1964.
The writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction was received by respondent
Provincial Sheriff Proceso P. Silangcruz on
April 28, 1964. Nothing was heard of the
writ nor from said Sheriff. Only after June
3, 1964 when the Solicitor General filed a
motion charging him of contempt of court
for noncompliance with the writ did
Provincial Sheriff Proceso P. Silangcruz
oblige himself to make a return of the writ,
informing Us that he could not enforce the
same because the subject vessel was out
on a fishing expedition.
The more than one month's time when the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
stayed frozen in the hands of Sheriff
Silangcruz made it possible for interested
parties to whisk the boat in question from
the reach of the law.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the
case at bar, it cannot but be concluded
that respondent Sheriff's failure to enforce
the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction issued by the Supreme Court,
and his failure to make a return thereof for
quite a time had in effect prevented the
Court from taking possession of the vessel
in question, thus directly interfering
impeding or obstructing its processes. The
respondent Sheriff's non-performance has
resulted in the frustration of the mandates

of the Supreme Court and the setback of

the administration of Justice. The Court
cannot tolerate evasion of its commands
by any omission, negligence, artifice or
contrivance of any kind, nor would it
countenance any disregard of its authority.
It
is
essential
to
the
effective
administration
of
justice
that
the
processes of the courts be obeyed. Upon
no one else does this obligation of
obedience rest with more binding force
than a judicial officer such as respondent
Sheriff. The said respondent is therefore
liable for contempt punishable under
Section 6 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
granted. The writ of replevin issued on
January 14, 1964 and the order issued on
February 17, 1964 by the Court of First
Instance of Cavite are hereby declared null
and void. The mandatory injunction of
April 22, 1964 to deliver the Boat M/B
"Bukang Liwayway" is hereby reiterated.
Respondent Sheriff of Cavite, Proceso P.
Silangcruz, is hereby declared in contempt
of the Supreme Court, and considering all
attendant circumstances, sentenced to
imprisonment of six months and to pay a
fine of P1,000.00. No pronouncement as to
costs. So ordered.
vi. Generalia Specialibus Non
Derogant
- Special provisions prevail over a general
one.
vii. A special law prevails over a
general law.
Fiestan v CA
G.R. No. 81552 (May 28, 1990)
FACTS: For failure of petitioner spouses
Dionisio Fiestan and Juanita Arconada
(spouses Fiestan) to pay their mortgage
indebtedness to respondent Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP), the latter
was able to acquire at a public auction
sale on August 6, 1979 the parcel of land
(Lot No. 2-B covered by TCT No. T-13218)
that the spouses Fiestan owned in Ilocos
Sur after extrajudicial foreclosure of said
property. The Provincial Sheriff issued a
certificate of sale that same day which
was registered on September 28 in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos
Sur. Earlier, or on September 26, spouses
Fiestan also executed a Deed of Sale in
favor of DBP which was likewise registered
on September 28, 1979. When spouses
Fiestan failed to redeem their parcel of
land within the 1 year period which
expired on September 28, 1980, the
Register of Deeds cancelled their title over
the subject property and issued TCT No. T19077 to DBP upon the latters duly

Statutory Construction (EH307MC)

10
executed affidavit of consolidation of
ownership.
On April 13, 1982, the DBP sold the lot to
Francisco Peria, so the Register of Deeds
of Ilocos Sur cancelled DBPs title over
said property and issued TCT No. T-19229
to Perias name, who later secured a tax
declaration for said lot and accordingly
paid the taxes due thereon. He thereafter
mortgaged said lot to the PNB-Vigan
Branch as security for his loan of
P115,000.00. Since the spouses Fiestan
were still in possession of the property,
the Provincial Sheriff ordered them to
vacate the premises, but instead of
leaving, they filed a complaint in the RTC
of Vigan, Ilocos Sur for annulment of sale,
mortgage and cancellation of transfer
certificates of title against the DBP-Laoag
City, PNB-Vigan Branch, Ilocos Sur,
Francisco Peria and the Register of Deeds
of Ilocos Sur.
The lower court dismissed said complaint,
declaring valid the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property
in favor of the DBP and its subsequent
sale to Francisco Peria as well as the real
estate mortgage constituted in favor of
PNB-Vigan. The Court of Appeals likewise
affirmed said decision. The spouses
Fiestan herein seek to annul the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the
mortgaged property on the ground that
the Provincial Sheriff conducted the
foreclosure without first effecting a levy on
said property before selling the same at
the public auction sale.
ISSUE: Who has the right to acquire by
purchase the subject property?
HELD: In denying the petition, the
Supreme Court reiterated that the
formalities of a levy, which the Provincial
Sheriff of Ilocos Sur allegedly failed to
comply with, are not basic requirements
before an extrajudicially foreclosed
property can be sold at public auction. The
spouses Fiestan insisted that what prevails
over the case are par. (2) of Article 1491
and par. (7) of Article 1409 of the Civil
Code which prohibits agents from
acquiring by purchase, even at a public or
judicial auction either in person or through
the mediation of another, the property
whose administration or sale may have
been entrusted to them unless the
consent of the principal has been given.
However, the Supreme Court ruled that
the power to foreclose is not an ordinary
agency that contemplates exclusively the
representation of the principal by the
agent but is primarily an authority
conferred upon the mortgagee for the
latter's own protection, as provided under

Section 5 of Act No 3135, as amended,

which is a special law that must prevail
over the Civil Code which is a general law.
Even in the absence of statutory provision,
there is authority to hold that a
mortgagee, and in this case the DBP, may
purchase at a sale under his mortgage to
protect his own interest or to avoid a loss
to himself by a sale to a third person at a
price below the mortgage debt
Bagatsing v Ramirez
G.R. No. 41636 (December 17, 1976)
FACTS: In 1974, the Municipal Board of
Manila enacted Ordinance 7522,
regulating the operation of public markets
and prescribing fees for the rentals of
stalls and providing penalties for violation
thereof. The Federation of Manila Market
Vendors Inc. assailed the validity of the
ordinance, alleging among others the
noncompliance to the publication
requirement under the Revised Charter of
the City of Manila. CFI-Manila declared the
ordinance void. Thus, the present
petition.
ISSUE: What law should govern the
publication of a tax ordinance? Is the
ordinance valid?
HELD: The Local Tax Code prevails. There
is no question that the Revised Charter of
the City of Manila is a special act since
it relates only to the City of Manila
whereas the Local Tax Code is a general
law because it applies universally to all
local governments. The fact that one is
special and the other general creates a
presumption that the special is to be
considered as remaining an exception of
the general, one as a general law of the
land, the other as the law of a particular
case. However, the rule readily yields to a
situation where the special statute refers
to a subject in general, which the general
statute treats in particular. The Revised
Charter of the City prescribes a rule for
the publication of ordinance in general,
while the Local Tax Code establishes a rule
for the publication of ordinance levying or
imposing taxes fees or other charges in
particular.
The ordinance is valid.
Lichano v Civil Aeronautics Board
43 SCRA 670
FACTS: Petitioner Lechoco contends that
by the enactment of Republic Act No. 2677
(on 18 June 1960) amending sections
13(a) and 14 of Commonwealth Act No.
146 (the original PSC Act), jurisdiction to
control rates of airships was taken away
from the Civil Aeronautics Board and

Statutory Construction (EH307MC)

11
revested in the PSC, since Republic Act
2671 impliedly repealed section 10 (c) (2)
of Republic Act No. 776, passed on 20 June
1952, conferring control over air rates and
fares on the CAB.
Respondents aver, on the other hand,
that, at the very least, jurisdiction over air
fares and rates was, under both statutes,
exercisable concurrently by the CAB and
the PSC, and that following the rule on
concurrent jurisdictions of judicial bodies,
the first to exercise or take jurisdiction
(CAB in this case) should retain it to the
exclusion of the other body.

and freight, subject to the regulations and

approval of the
Civil Aeronautics Board or such other
regulatory agencies as the Government
may designate for this purpose."
Such references to the Civil Aeronautics
Board after the enactment of Republic Act
No. 2677 would be difficult to explain if
said law had already repealed the power
of the CAB over fares or rates, as
contended by petitioner Lechoco.

ISSUE: Whether or not jurisdiction to

whether authority to fix air carrier's rates
is vested in the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) or in the Public Service Commission
(PSC).

- Statutes are in pari materia when they

relate to the same person or thing, or
have the same purpose or object, or cover
the same specific or particular subject
matter. It is sufficient that the 2 or more
statutes relates to the same specific
subject matter. Statutes in pari materia
should be construed together to attain the
purpose of an express national policy.
- Exception: If 2 or more statutes on the
same subject were enacted at different
times and under different conditions and
circumstances, their interpretation should
be in accordance with the circumstances
or conditions peculiar to each. A statute
will not be construed as repealing prior
acts or acts on the same subject matter.

HELD: Petition denied. The questioned

order of the CAB, asserting its jurisdiction
to fix the reasonable fares that air carriers
may demand, are in accord with law, there
being no showing that the PSC has fixed
any maximum rates therefor.
There is no irreconcilable inconsistency
between section 14 of the Public Service
Act, as amended by Republic Act 2677,
and section 10 (c) (2) of the prior Republic
Act 776, except for the fact that power
over rates to be charged by air carriers on
passengers and freight are vested in
different entities, the CAB and the PSC.
Even that will result in no more than a
concurrent jurisdiction in both supervisory
entities, and not in the divesting of the
power of one in favor of the other.
The absence of intent to repeal Republic
Act No. 776 by the enactment of Act 2677
is also evidenced by the explanatory note
to House Bill 4030 (that later became Act
2677). It expressly stated the desire to
broaden the jurisdiction of the PSC "by
vesting it with the power to supervise and
control maritime transportation . . . except
air transportation and warehouses which
are now subject to regulation and
supervision by the Civil Aeronautics Board
and the Bureau of Commerce
respectively."
The same legislative intent to maintain the
jurisdiction and powers of the CAB
appears from a consideration of the
legislation subsequent to the enactment of
Republic Act 2677.
Thus, Republic Act No. 4147, enacted 20
June 1964 (granting an air transportation
franchise to Filipinas Orient Airways), and
Republic Act No. 4501, passed in 19 June
1965 (granting a similar franchise to Air
Manila, Inc.), both uniformly require (in
their section 3) that the franchise grantee

"Shall fix just and reasonable and uniform

rates for the transportation of passengers

viii. PARI MATERIA RULE

ix. Reenacted statutes

- in relation to domestic statutes/laws
Montelibano v Ferrer
97 Phil 228
Facts: In 1940, the Subdivision Inc, of
which Montelibano is the president and
general manager, leased a lot to Benares
for five years, with an option in favor of
Benares of another five crop years. On
1951, the Subdivision instituted against
Benares an unlawful detainer case which
rendered a decision ordering him to eject
from the said lot. However, Benares
continued planting on the said lot, instead
of delivering it to Subdivision. Acting upon
Montelibano, his co-petitioners cleared the
land of sugarcane planted by Benares.
Hence, a criminal case was filed by
Benares against petitiioners. A warrant of
arrest was then filed to the petitioners.
Monteibano and his companions filed a
motion to quash the complaint and
warrant of arrest A civil case against
Municipal Judge and Benares was filed
alleging that the said judge had o
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
criminal case.

Statutory Construction (EH307MC)

12
Issue: Whether or not the municipal court
may entertain the criminal case relying
upon CA 326, section 22 (Charter of the
City of Bacolod) which provides that the
City Attorney shall charge of the
prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors,
and violations of city ordinances, in the
Court of First Instance and the Municipal
Court of Bacolod.
Held: No, the Judge of Municipal Court has
no jurisdiction over the case.
In the interpretation of reenacted statutes
the court will follow the construction which
they received when previously in force.
The legislature will be presumed to know
the effect which such status originally had,
and by reenactment to intend that they
should again have the same effect.
Two statutes with a parallel scope,
purpose and terminology should, each in
its own field, have a like interpretation,
unless in particular instances there is
something peculiar in the question under
consideration, or dissimilar in the terms of
the act relating thereto, requiring a
different conclusion.
In the case at bar, the same provisions
were contested in Sayo v. Chief of Police
wherein it was held that in the City of
Manila, criminal complaints may be filed
only with the City Fiscal who is given the
exclusive authority to institute criminal
cases in the different courts of said city,
under the provisions of its Charter found in
Sec 39 of Act # 183. The provisions of the
Charter of City of Bacolod which are
substantially identical to that of Manila
should then be interpreted the same.
Therefore, the decision appealed
is reversed and the warrant of arrest
issued by the judge shall be annulled.
x. Adopted Statutes
- Where local statutes are patterned after
or copied from those of another country,
the decisions of courts in such country
construing those laws are entitled to great
weight in the interpretation of such local
statutes.
xi. Common Law Principle v Statutory
Provision
- between the two, the latter should
prevail
- the former will only apply if there is no
other law applicable

Alvendia v Intermediate Court

G.R. No. 72138 (January 22, 1990)
&
Bonamy v Justice Paras
G.R. No. 72373 (January 22, 1990)
FACTS: The case traces to a simple
collection suit, (Civil Case No. 5182-M)
filed on September 12, 1977, by Bonifacio
Bonamy against the spouses Jesus F.
Alvendia and Felicidad M. Alvendia before
the then Court of First Instance (CFI Bulacan) for the sum of P107,481.50
representing construction materials which
the Alvendias had purchased on credit
from Bonamy.
On January 6, 1978, both parties
submitted to the trial court a "Compromise
Agreement" providing, among other
things:
"(1) That defendants do hereby
acknowledge the indebtedness of their
family corporation, Doa Felisa Village and
Housing Corporation, in the amount of
P107,481.50, representing the cost of
construction materials bought on credit
from plaintiff from June 20 - August 12,
1975 and hereby bind themselves to pay
said obligation out of the first release of
funds from the GSIS for housing units and
lots sold by the said corporation to
members of the GSIS.
"(2) That the plaintiff and defendants shall
thereby join hands in asking the
GSIS to expedite the releases of the funds
due to said corporation; and
"(3) That for and in consideration of this
agreement the plaintiff and defendants
hereby waive any and all further claims
monetary or otherwise against each other
regarding the subject matter of this case.
On the same date, the trial court approved
and adopted the same as the decision of
the case. Subsequently, Bonamy moved
for execution of judgment, alleging that
the Alvendias "have not submitted any
finished project with the GSIS, thereby
preventing the full realization of the
aforesaid decision. In a motion dated April
23, 1980, Bonamy sought the issuance of
an alias writ of execution, the first writ
having been returned unsatisfied. He
admitted though in the same motion that
he received P20,000.00 in cash from the
Alvendias sometime in January 1980 and
an additional amount of P4,000.00 by way
of proceeds of the sale of the Alvendias'
vehicle. Pursuant to the alias writ issued
by the Court on May 2, 1980, the Bulacan
provincial sheriff levied on the Alvendias
"leasehold rights" over a fishpond and a
certificate of sale over said leasehold right
was executed in favor of Bonamy on Sept.
10, 1984.

Statutory Construction (EH307MC)

13
On February 2, 1982, the spouses moved
for the quashal and annulment of the writ
of execution, levy and sale such motion
was denied and the trial court.
In a nutshell, the spouses argued as
follows: [1] that the writ and the alias writ
of execution levied upon properties not
referred to in the judgment by
compromise; [2] the writs made only the
Alvendias liable, when under the
"agreement" their family corporation was
also supposed to be liable; [3] the writ was
premature because the Compromise
Agreement contained a condition which
had not yet been fulfilled, namely, the
release of a loan from the GSIS; [4] the
fishpond, owned by the government
though leased to the Alvendias, cannot be
a proper subject of a levy on execution;
and [5] the leasehold rights possessed by
the Alvendias had already expired before
the issuance of the order.
ISSUE: WON the judgment debtors may
successfully ask that they be allowed to
pay the judgment debt in cash long after
they have failed to pay or redeem their
properties which have been sold in
execution.
HELD: In any event, it is axiomatic that
there is no justification in law and in fact
for the reopening of a case which has long
become final and which has in fact been
executed. The doctrine of finality of
judgments is grounded on fundamental
consideration of public policy and sound
practice that at the risk of occasional error
the judgments of courts must become
final at some definite date fixed by law.
There is no question therefore, that the
Alvendias failed to pay on time the
judgment of which the execution sale was
a necessary consequence. They also failed
to redeem the property within the required
period despite the fact that the Final Deed
of Sale was issued only on January 25,
1983, long past the aforesaid period;
undeniably showing a lack of intention or
capability to pay the same.
Statutory Principle: Equity has been
aptly described as "a justice outside
legality"; which is applied only in the
absence of and never against statutory
law or as in this case, judicial rules of
procedure. The rule is "equity follows the
law" but where a particular remedy is
given by the law and that remedy is
bounded and circumscribed by particular
rules, it would be very improper, for the
court to take it up where the law leaves it
and to extend it further than the law
allows.

Andres v Manufacturers Hanover & Trust

Corp.
G.R. No. 82670 (September 15, 1989)
FACTS: Andres, using the business name
Irenes Wearing Apparel was engaged in
the manufacture of ladies garments,
childrens wear, mens apparel and linens
for local and foreign buyers. Among its
foreign buyers was Facts of the United
States.
Sometime in August 1980, Facts instructed
the First National State Bank (FNSB) of
New Jersey to transfer $10,000 to Irenes
Wearing Apparel via Philippine National
Bank (PNB) Sta. Cruz, Manila branch. FNSB
instructed Manufacturers Hanover and
Trust Corporation (Mantrust) to effect the
transfer by charging the amount to the
account of FNSB with private respondent.
After Mantrust effected the transfer, the
payment was not effected immediately
because the payee designated in the telex
was only Wearing Apparel. Private
respondent sent PNB another telex stating
that the payment was to be made to
Irenes Wearing Apparel.
On August 28, 1980, petitioner received
the remittance of $10,000.
After learning about the delay, Facets
informed FNSB about the situation. Facts,
unaware that petitioner had already
received the remittance, informed private
respondent and amended its instruction y
asking it to effect the payment to
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
(PCIB) instead of PNB.
Private respondent, also unaware that
petitioner had already received the
remittance, instructed PCIB to pay
$10,000 to petitioner. Hence, petitioner
received another $10,000 which was
charged again to the account of Facets
with FNSB.
FNSB discovered that private respondent
had made a duplication of remittance.
Private respondent asked petitioner to
return the second remittance of $10,000
but the latter refused to do so contending
that the doctrine of solution indebiti does
not apply because there was negligence
on the part of the respondents and that
they were not unjustly enriched since
Facets still has a balance of $49,324.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private
respondent has the right to recover the
second $10,000 remittance it had
delivered to petitioner

Statutory Construction (EH307MC)

14
HELD: Yes. Art 2154 of the New Civil Code
is applicable. For this article to apply, the
following requisites must concur: 1) that
he who paid was not under obligation to
do so; and 2) that payment was made by
reason of an essential mistake of fact.
There was a mistake, not negligence, in
the second remittance. It was evident by
the fact that both remittances have the
same reference invoice number.
xii. Doctrine of Necessary
Implications
- No statute can be enacted that can
provide all the details involved in its
application. There is always an omission
that may not meet a particular situation.
The doctrine states that what is implied in
a statute is as much a part thereof as that
which is expressed. The principle is
expressed in the maxim, Ex necessitate
legis or from the necessity of law. The
greater includes the lesser, expressed in
the maxim, in eo quod plus sit, simper
inest et minus.
- The term necessary implication is one
that is so strong in its probability that the
contrary thereof cannot reasonably be
supposed. It is one which, under the
circumstances, is compelled by a
reasonable view of the statute, and the
contrary of which would be improbable
and absurd
Chua v Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992)
Statutory rule: Doctrine of necessary
implications. What is implied in a statute is
as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed.
Facts: RA 6683 provided benefits for early
retirement and voluntary separation as
well as for involuntary separation due to
reorganization. Sec. 2 provides for who are
qualified to avail of the benefits of RA
6683
which
includes,
"all
regular,
temporary,
casual
and
emergency
employees."
Petitioner
Lydia
Chua,
believing that she is qualified to avail of
the benefits of the program filed and
application with the respondent NIA which
was denied due to the fact that she is a
co-terminus employee. Her appeal with
respondent Commission was likewise
denied.
Issue: W/N petitioner's status as a coterminus employee is excluded from the
benefits of Ra 6683 (Early Retirement Law)
Held: No. There is no substantial
difference
between
a
co-terminus
employee and a contractual, casual or

emergency employee for all are tenurial

employees with no fixed term, non-career
and temporary. The Early Retirement Law
would violate the equal protection clause
of the constitution if the SC were to
sustain respondent's submission that the
benefits of said law are to be denied a
class of government employees who are
similarly situated as those covered by the
said law. The doctrine of necessary
implications should be applied in this case.
City of Manila v Gomez
No. L-37251 (August 31, 1981)
Statutory rule: Doctrine of necessary
implications. What is implied in a statute is
as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed.
Facts: The Revised Charter of Manila fixes
the annual realty tax at 1.5%. On the
other hand, the Special Education Fund
Law imposed an annual additional tax of
1% on the assessed value of real property
in addition to the real property tax
regularly levied thereon but the total
real property tax shall not exceed 3%
Since the maximum limit imposed is 3%,
the municipal board of Manila imposed an
additional .5% to fix the total imposable
tax on real property at 3% which is divided
into the following: 1.5% as per charter of
Manila, 1% as per Special Education Fund
law and .5% as per order of the municipal
board. Private respondent Esso Philippines
paid the additional one-half percent realty
tax under protest and later filed a
complaint for recovery of the said amount.
It contended that the additional one-half
percent is void because it is not
authorized by the city charter or any law.
Issue: W/N the additional one-half percent
imposed by the City of Manila is valid or
legal.
Held: Yes. The Real Property Tax Law
imposes that a city council, by ordinance,
may impose a realty tax of not less than
one-half perfect but not more than two
percent of the assessed value of real
property. The additional one-half percent
then is legal. Furthermore, the doctrine of
implications sustains the contention of the
City of Manila that the additional one-half
percent is sanctioned by the Special
Education Fund Law when the same states
that the total real property tax shall not
exceed a maximum of three per centum.
The doctrine of necessary implications
means that that which is plainly implied
in the language of a statute is as much a
part of it as that which is expressed.
xiii. CASUS OMISSUS
- This rule states that a person, object or

Statutory Construction (EH307MC)

15
thing omitted from an enumeration must
be held to have been omitted from an
enumeration must be held to have been
omitted intentionally. The principle
proceeds from a reasonable certainty that
a particular person, object or thing has
been omitted from a legislative
enumeration.
- In other words, the maxim operates and
applies only if and when the omission has
been clearly established, and is such a
case what is omitted in the enumeration
may not, by construction, be included
therein.
People of the Philippines v Guillermo
Manatan
G.R. No. L-14129 (July 31, 1962)
Statutory rule: The rule of casus
omissus pro omisso habendus est can
operate and apply only if and when the
omission has been clearly established.
Facts: Defendant Guillermo Manantan
was charged with a violation of the Section
54 of the Revised Election Code which
provides that No justice, judge, fiscal.
shall aid any candidate in any manner in
any election, except to vote. Defendant
contends that this provision excludes
justice of the peace and as such, he is
excluded from this prohibition. Because of
this, the lower court dismissed the case
against him. The Solicitor General
appealed.
Issue: W/N a justice of the peace is
included in the prohibition of Section 54 of
the Revised Election Code.
Held: Yes. Although petitioner argues that
when Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code omitted the words justice of peace
from the Revised Administrative Code
provision from which it was taken and thus
making the intention of the legislature
clear in the omission, the word judge in
the former provision was qualified or
modified by the phrase of first instance.
The term judge in Section 54 is not
modified or qualified, making it broader
and more generic to comprehend all kinds
of judges, like judges of the Courts of First
Instance, Courts of Agrarian Relations,
Courts of Industrial Relations and justices
of the peace. The rule of casus omissus
has no applicability to the case at bar for
the maxim only applies and operate if and

when the omission

established.

has

been

clearly

xiv. STARE DECISIS

- The legal maxim which requires the past
decisions of the court be followed in the
adjudication of cases is known as stare
decisis et non quieta movere. It means
one should follow past precedents and
should not disturb what has been settled.
The rule rests on the desirability of having
stability in the law.
J.M. Tuason and Co, Inc., et al. v Hon.
Mariano
G.R. No. L-33140 (October 23, 1978)
Statutory rule: Stare Decisis. Follow past
precedents and do not disturb what has
been settled. Matters already decided on
the merits cannot be relitigated again and
again.
Facts:
Respondents
Aquial
claimed
ownership of a parcel of land located in
Quezon City having an area of 383
hectares. They alleged that it had been
fraudulently or erroneously included in
OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal and that it was registered in the
names of Petitioners Tuason pursuant to a
decree issued on July 6, 1914 in Case No.
7681 of the Court of Land Registration.
Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735
and the titles derived therefrom be
declared void due to certain irregularities
in the land registration proceeding.
Issue: W/N OCT No. 735 is valid.
Held: OCT No. 735 is valid. The validity of
OCT No. 735 was already decided upon by
the Supreme Court in the cases of Benin
vs Tuason, Alcantara vs Tuason and Pili vs
Tuason. The ruling in these cases was also
applied in other cases involving the
validity of OCT No. 735. Considerng the
governing principle of stare decisis et non
quieta movere (follow past precedents and
do not disturb what has been settled), the
court ruled that respondents cannot
maintain their action without eroding the
long settled holding of the courts that OCT
No. 735 is valid and no longer open to
attack.