Reyes vs. Sisters of Mercy Hospital, G.R. No. 130547, Oct.

3, 2000

Reyes vs. Sisters of Mercy Hospital

G.R No. 130547 (October 3, 2000)

A. Legal Issue
Whether or not Sisters of Mercy Hospital is liable for the death of Jorge Reyes.
B.

Facts
Petitioner, Leah Alesna Reyes, is the wife of the deceased patient, Jorge Reyes. Five days
before the latters death, Jorge has been suffering from recurring fever with chills. The doctors
confirmed through the Widal test that Jorge has typhoid fever. However, he did not respond to
the treatment and died. The cause of his death was Ventricular Arrythemia Secondary to
Hyperpyrexia and typhoid fever. Consequently, petitioner filed the instant case for damages
before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, which dismissed the case and was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
The contention was that Jorge did not die of typhoid fever. Instead, his death was due to
the wrongful administration of chloromycetin. They contended that had respondent doctors
exercised due care and diligence, they would not have recommended and rushed the performance
of the Widal Test, hastily concluded that Jorge was suffering from typhoid fever, and
administered chloromycetin without first conducting sufficient tests on the patients
compatibility with said drug.

C.

Ruling
Sisters of Mercy Hospital is not liable for the death of Jorge Reyes.

D.

Reasoning of the Court

There is no showing that the attending physician in this case deviated from the usual
course of treatment with respect to typhoid fever. Jorge was given antibiotic choloromycetin and
some dose of triglobe after compatibility test was made by the doctor and found that no adverse
reactions manifested which would necessitate replacement of the medicines. Indeed, the standard
contemplated is not what is actually the average merit among all known practitioners from the
best to the worst and from the most to the least experienced, but the reasonable average merit
among the ordinarily good physicians. Here, the doctors did not depart from the reasonable
standard recommended by the experts as they in fact observed the due care required under the
circumstances.

E.

Policy

In Medical Negligence cases, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish that the usual
procedure in treating the illness is not followed by the doctor. Failure to prove this, the doctor is
not liable. Physicians are not insurers of the success of every procedure undertaken and if the
procedure was shown to be properly done but did not work, they cannot be faulted for such
result.

CONCEPT:
Petitioners action is for medical malpractice. This is a particular form of negligence which consists in the
failure of a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine that degree of care and skill which is
ordinarily employed by the profession generally, under similar conditions, and in like surrounding
circumstances. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that the physician or
surgeon either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would have done,
or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would not have done, and
that the failure or action caused injury to the patient. There are thus four elements involved in medical
negligence cases, namely: duty, breach, injury, and proximate causation.
Elements of Medical Malpractice
1.
2.

duty the existence of a physician-patient relationship

breach of duty

3.
4.

injury caused
causal connection between the breach of duty and the injury caused
Evidentiary Rule
TWO-PRONGED EVIDENCE:

1.
2.

evidence of the recognized standards

the physician negligently departed from these standards
EXPERT TESTIMONY ESSENTIAL:
In the present case, there is no doubt that a physician-patient relationship existed between respondent
doctors and Jorge Reyes. Respondents were thus duty-bound to use at least the same level of care that
any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is
breach of this duty which constitutes actionable malpractice. As to this aspect of medical malpractice, the
determination of the reasonable level of care and the breach thereof, expert testimony is essential.
Inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of
scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the
conclusion as to causation. (Reyes vs. Sisters of Mercy Hospital, supra)

EXCEPTION:
There is a case when expert testimony may be dispensed with, and that is under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. As held in Ramos v. Court of Appeals:
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician
has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitor is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with
because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the
necessity of expert testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science,
and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone
familiar with the facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are competent to
testify as to whether a patient has been treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill and
care. However, testimony as to the statements and acts of physicians and surgeons, external
appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by any one may be given by non-expert
witnesses. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a
physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where
the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. Where common
knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care
had been exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred
but how and why it occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a
nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the
custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish
the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitor is allowed because there is no other way, under usual and
ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him. (Reyes vs.
Sisters of Mercy Hospital, supra)
Standard of Diligence Required
- the standard of care in the locality (Locality Rule)
- a physician is not liable for error in judgment (Error in Judgment Rule), provided he applied reasonable
skill and care
STANDARD OF DILIGENCE REQUIRED:
Indeed, the standard contemplated is not what is actually the average merit among all known practitioners
from the best to the worst and from the most to the least experienced, but the reasonable average merit
among the ordinarily good physicians.
STANDARD IS NOT EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE:
The standard of extraordinary diligence is peculiar to common carriers. The Civil Code provides: "Art.
1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to

observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to the circumstances of each case. . . ."
The practice of medicine is a profession engaged in only by qualified individuals. It is a right earned
through years of education, training, and by first obtaining a license from the state through professional
board examinations. Such license may, at any time and for cause, be revoked by the government. In
addition to state regulation, the conduct of doctors is also strictly governed by the Hippocratic Oath, an
ancient code of discipline and ethical rules which doctors have imposed upon themselves in recognition
and acceptance of their great responsibility to society. Given these safeguards, there is no need to
expressly require of doctors the observance of extraordinary diligence. As it is now, the practice of
medicine is already conditioned upon the highest degree of diligence. And, as we have already noted, the
standard contemplated for doctors is simply the reasonable average merit among ordinarily good
physicians. That is reasonable diligence for doctors or, as the Court of Appeals called it, the reasonable
skill and competence . . . that a physician in the same or similar locality . . . should apply. (Reyes vs.
Sisters of Mercy Hospital, supra)
Responsibility of the Hospital
Ramos vs. CA, G.R. No. 124354, Dec. 29, 1999
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE HOSPITAL:
The unique practice (among private hospitals) of filling up specialist staff with attending and visiting
"consultants," who are allegedly not hospital employees, presents problems in apportioning responsibility
for negligence in medical malpractice cases. However, the difficulty is only more apparent than real.
In the first place, hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring and firing of consultants and in the
conduct of their work within the hospital premises. Doctors who apply for "consultant" slots, visiting or
attending, are required to submit proof of completion of residency, their educational qualifications;
generally, evidence of accreditation by the appropriate board (diplomate), evidence of fellowship in most
cases, and references. These requirements are carefully scrutinized by members of the hospital
administration or by a review committee set up by the hospital who either accept or reject the application.
This is particularly true with respondent hospital.
After a physician is accepted, either as a visiting or attending consultant, he is normally required to attend
clinico-pathological conferences, conduct bedside rounds for clerks, interns and residents, moderate
grand rounds and patient audits and perform other tasks and responsibilities, for the privilege of being
able to maintain a clinic in the hospital, and/or for the privilege of admitting patients into the hospital. In
addition to these, the physician's performance as a specialist is generally evaluated by a peer review
committee on the basis of mortality and morbidity statistics, and feedback from patients, nurses, interns
and residents. A consultant remiss in his duties, or a consultant who regularly falls short of the minimum

standards acceptable to the hospital or its peer review committee, is normally politely terminated.
In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting
"consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not, technically employees, a point which respondent hospital
asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient's condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and the
right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with
the exception of the payment of wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control
test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the purpose of allocating
responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between
hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. This being the case, the question now arises as to
whether or not respondent hospital is solidarily liable with respondent doctors for petitioner's condition.