PD 705 Jurisprudence

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 205015

November 19, 2014

MA. MIMIE CRESCENCIO, Petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This case stemmed from Ma. Mimie Crescencio's (petitioner) conviction for
violation of Section 681 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, 2 otherwise
known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (Forestry Code), as
amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277, 3 rendered by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) ofTalibon, Bohol, Branch 52, in Criminal Case No. 96-27, on
August 12, 2008.4 The Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 01162,
dismissed the appeal in its Resolution 5 dated April 15, 2011 for failure to
serve a copy of the Appellants Brief to the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG). The CA, in its Resolution6 dated November 19, 2012, also denied the
petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said resolution.
The Facts
Acting on an information that there was a stockpile of lumber or forest
products in the vicinity of the house of the petitioner, Eufemio Abaniel
(Abaniel), the Chief of the ForestProtection Unit of Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) - Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office, Talibon, Bohol, together with Forest Rangers Urcino
Butal (Butal), Alfredo Bastasa and Celso Ramos (Ramos) went to the
petitioners house at Balico, Talibon, Bohol on March 15, 1994 at 3:00 p.m.
Upon arriving thereat, they saw forest products lying under the house of the
petitioner and at the shoreline about two meters away from the petitioners
house. As the DENR personnel tried to investigate from the neighborhood as
to who was the owner of the lumber, the petitioner admitted its ownership.
Thereafter, the DENR personnel entered the premises of the petitioners
house without a search warrant.7
Upon inspection, 24 pieces of magsihagonlumber, which is equivalent to 452
board feet, were discovered. When the DENR personnel asked for documents

to support the petitioners claim of ownership, the latter showed to them


Official Receipt No. 35053 issued by Pengavitor Enterprises where she
allegedly bought the said lumber. However, when the DENR personnel scaled
the lumber, they found out that the dimensions and the species of the
lumber did not tally with the items mentioned in the receipt. The said receipt
showed that the petitioner bought 10 pieces of red lawaan lumber with sizes
2x6x18 and 5 pieces with sizes 2x8x16 on March 13, 1994. On the other
hand, the lumber in the petitioners house, on March 15, 1994, was 24 pieces
of magsihagonlumber of three different sizes, to wit: 20 pieces 2x6x18; 3
pieces 2x8x18; and 1 piece 2x10x12.8
Since the petitioner could not present any other receipt, Abaniel ordered the
confiscation of the lumber, asked for police assistance, and told the
petitioner that they were going to transport the confiscated lumber to the
DENR office for safekeeping. Seizure Receipt No. 004157 and a Statement
Showing the Number/Pieces and Volume of Lumber Being Confiscated, 9 which
showed the value of the lumber to be 9,040.00, were issued to the petitioner.
Forest Rangers Butal and Ramos corroborated Abaniels testimony.10
SPO1 Desiderio Garcia testified that upon the request of Abaniel for police
assistance, he and PO3 Antonio Crescencio went to the house of the
petitioner where they saw some lumberwhich was later loaded on a cargo
truck. Thereafter, they escorted the transport of the lumber to the DENR
office in San Roque, Talibon, Bohol.11
On the other hand, the lone witness of the defense, Lolita Crescencio,
admitted that the seized lumber were owned by the petitioner but claimed
that the latter bought it from Pengavitor Enterprises of Trinidad, Bohol and
from Java Marketing in Ubay, Bohol. 12 However, the defense had only the
Official Receipt No. 35053 issued by Pengavitor Enterprises which, however,
did not tally with the forest products confiscated.
On May 17, 1994, the petitioner was charged by the Provincial Prosecutor of
Tagbilaran City, Bohol, with violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended by E.O. No. 277. The Information13 alleged:
That on or about the 15th day of March, 1994, in the municipality of Talibon,
Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused with intent to possess and to gain for her own benefit,
without any legal document as required under existing jurisprudence, laws
and regulations, and without any lawful authority under existing rules and
regulation of DENR Forest Management Sector, willfully, unlawfully and
illegally possess and have under her custody and control forest products
consisting of twenty-four (24) pieces of magsihagon lumber with a volume of
452 board feet and a total value of Nine Thousand Forty (P9,040.00) Pesos,

Philippine Currency; to the damage and prejudice of the Republic of the


Philippines.14
During the arraignment on July 15,1997, the petitioner pleaded not guilty to
the offense charged.Thereafter, trial ensued.15
On August 12, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment 16 convicting the petitioner
of the offense charged and sentenced her to imprisonment of six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayoras minimum to eleven (11) years and six (6)
months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayoras maximum. The RTC
also ordered the confiscation of the seized lumber owned by the petitioner. 17
As expected, the petitioner appealed the decision to the CA. However, in its
Resolution18 dated April 15, 2011, the CA dismissed the appeal outright
because the petitioner failed to furnish the OSG a copy of the Appellants
Brief in violation of the Rules of Court. The petitioner moved for
reconsideration but it was denied by the CA,in its Resolution 19 dated
November 19, 2012. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The Issue
The core issue to be resolved is whether or not the CAs dismissal of the
appeal due to the petitioners failureto serve a copy of the Appellants Brief
to the OSG is proper, in view of the attendant factual circumstances and in
the interest of substantial justice.
Ruling of the Court
In this case, the petitioner asks for a relaxation of the rigid rules of technical
procedure and submits that the CA erred in dismissing her appeal purely on
the basis of mere technicalities.
Confronted with issues of this nature, this Court is mindful of the policy of
affording litigants the amplest opportunity for the determination of their
cases on the merits and of dispensing with technicalities whenever
compelling reasons so warrant or when the purpose of justice requires it. 20
The Court has constantly pronouncedthat "[t]he rules of procedure ought not
to be applied in a very rigid,technical sense, for they have been adopted to
help secure not override substantial justice. For this reason, courts must
proceed with caution so asnot to deprive a party of statutory appeal; rather,
they must ensure thatall litigants are granted the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just ventilation of their causes, free from the constraint of
technicalities."21

It is clear that without at all touching on the substantive aspects of the


petitioners cause, the appellate court opted not to decide the case on the
merits. The subject of the appeal was the decision of the RTC convicting the
petitioner of violation of the Forestry Code and sentencing her to suffer an
imprisonment of no less than six (6) years to eleven (11) years.
In this case, there is nothing in the record that shows any deliberate intent
on the part of the petitioner to subvert and delay the final disposition of the
case. In fact, when the petitioner learned that her appeal was dismissed by
the CA for failure to serve a copy of her Appellants Brief to the OSG, she
immediately confronted her previous counsel who denied having filed such
brief. Asthe petitioner was very much worried of being incarcerated, she
asked her previous counsel to withdraw from the case. Thus, the petitioner
submits that the outright denial of her appeal is due to the incompetence
and ignorance of her former counsel who even lied about the fact thathe has
indeed filed an Appellants Brief.
As a general rule, the inadvertence of counsel cannot be considered as an
adequate excuse as to call for the appellate courts indulgence except: (a)
where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due
process of law; (b) when application of the rule will result in outright
deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or (c) where the interests of
justice so require.22
Here, the petitioner submits that the inadvertence of her counsel to serve a
copy of the Appellants Brief tothe OSG is a persuasive reason or a
compelling justification to forego the Rules of Procedure as the wanton
recklessness or gross negligence of her counsel has deprived her of due
process of law which will result in the outright deprivation of her liberty.
In this regard, the Court agrees that the CA should have taken a liberal view
of the rules and ruled on the meritsof the appeal, especially when what is
involved is no less than the petitioners liberty.
Nonetheless, even if the Court brushes aside the technicality issue, it will still
find that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
petitioners culpability.
In attempting to escape liability, the petitioner contends that: (a) she had the
supporting documents to show that she bought the questioned lumber from
legitimate sources; and (b) the warrantless search and seizure conducted by
the DENR personnel was illegal and, thus, the items seized should not have
been admitted in evidence against her.
The Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secured in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and

seizures.23 Nonetheless, the constitutional prohibition against warrantless


searches and seizures admits of certainexceptions, one of which is seizure of
evidence in plain view.1wphi1 Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling
in the "plain view" of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to have
that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.24
There is no question that the DENR personnel were not armed with a search
warrant when they went to the house of the petitioner. When the DENR
personnel arrived at the petitioners house, the lumbers were lying under the
latters house and at the shoreline about two meters away from the house of
the petitioner. It isclear, therefore, that the said lumber is plainly exposed to
sight. Hence, the seizure of the lumber outside the petitioners house falls
within the purview of the plain view doctrine.
Besides, the DENR personnel had the authority to arrest the petitioner, even
without a warrant. Section 8025 of the Forestry Code authorizes the forestry
officer or employee of the DENR or any personnel of the Philippine National
Police to arrest, even without a warrant, any person who has committed or is
committing in his presence any of the offenses defined by the Forestry Code
and to seize and confiscate the tools and equipment used in committing the
offense orthe forest products gathered or taken by the offender. Clearly, in
the course ofsuch lawful intrusion, the DENR personnel had inadvertently
come across the lumber which evidently incriminated the petitioner.
The fact of possession by the petitioner of the 24 pieces of
magsihagonlumber, as well as her subsequent failure to produce the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations constitute
criminal liability for violation of the Forestry Code. Under Section 68 of the
Forestry Code, there are two distinctand separate offenses punished, namely:
(1) cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land withoutany authority; and (2) possession of timber
or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing
forest laws and regulations.26
In the second offense, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering,
collecting and removal of the forest products are legal or not. Mere
possession of forest products withoutthe proper documents consummates
the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is
immaterial because the Forestry Code is a special law which considers mere
possession of timber or other forest products without the proper
documentation as malum prohibitum.27
In the present case, the magsihagonlumber were admittedly owned by the
petitioner but unfortunately no permit evidencing authority to possess said
lumber was duly presented. Thus, the Information correctly charged the

petitioner with the second offense which is consummated by the mere


possession of forest products without the proper documents. The prosecution
adduced several documents to prove that the lumber was confiscated from
the petitioner, namely: a Statement Showing the Number/Pieces and Volume
of Lumber Being Confiscated on March 15, 1994, seizure receipt, a
photograph of the house of the petitioner, and a photograph of the
confiscated lumber. Moreso, the direct and affirmative testimony of the DENR
personnel as state witnesses on the circumstances surrounding the
apprehension well establishes the petitioners liability.
As to the imposable penalty on the petitioner, the RTC imposed an
indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayoras
minimum to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of
prision mayoras maximum.
The Court does not agree. This Court notes that the estimated value of the
confiscated pieces of lumber, as appearing in the Statement Showing the
Number/Pieces and Volume of Lumber Being Confiscated is P9,040.00 which
is alleged in the Information. However, except for the testimonies of Abaniel
and Butal that this amount is the estimate based on prevailing local price as
stated in the apprehension receipt they issued, the prosecution did not
present any proof as tothe value of the lumber.
Clearly, this evidence does not suffice. The Court had ruled that in order to
prove the amount of the property taken for fixing the penalty imposable
against the accused under Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the
prosecution must present more than a mereuncorroborated "estimate" of
such fact. In the absence of independent and reliable corroboration of such
estimate, courts may either apply the minimum penalty under Article 309 or
fix the value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of
the case.28 Hence, the lower court erred in finding that the value of the
confiscated lumber is P9,040.00 for no evidence of such value was
established during the trial.
Accordingly, the Court imposes on the petitioner the minimum penalty under
Article 309(6)29 of the RPC, whichis arresto mayorin its minimum and medium
periods. However, considering that violation of Section 68 of the Forestry
Code is punished as Qualified Theft under Article 310 30 in relation to Article
309 of the RPC, the statutory penalty shall be increased by two degrees, that
is, to prision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods or within the
range ofthree (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days to four (4)
years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days, considering that there are no
attending mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the commission of the
offense.

In accordance with current jurisprudence31 and taking into account the


Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court finds it proper to impose on the
petitioner, in view of the circumstances obtaining here, the penalty of frmr
(4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years,
six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, as
maximum. WHEREFORE, the Decision on August 12, 2008 of the Regional
Trial Court of Talibon, Bohol, Branch 52, in Criminal Case No. 96-27, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Ma. Mimie Crescencio is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four ( 4) months and one
(1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO*


Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.


Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.
PRESBITERO R. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court's Division.

Justice

Footnotes
* Additional member per Special Order No. 1872 dated November 4,
2014 vice Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza.
1

Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest


Products without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,
removed timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land,
without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products
without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the
case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who
ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable,
and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation.
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where
the timber or forest products are found.
2

Revising PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 389, otherwise known AS THE


FORESTRY REFORM CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
3

Amending Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended,


otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, for
the purpose of penalizing possession of timber or other forest products
without the legal documents required by existing forest laws,
authorizing the confiscation of illegally cut, gathered, removed and
possessed forest products, and granting rewards to informers of
violations of forestry laws, rules and regulations.
4

Issued by Presiding Judge Irma Zita V. Masamayor; rollo, pp. 45-56.

Penned by Associate Justice Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez, with Associate


Justices Portia AlioHormachuelos and Gabriel T. Ingles, concurring; id.
39-40.
6

Id. at 42-44.

Id. at 50.

Id. at 52-53.

Id. at 62.

10

Id. at 52.

11

Id. at 52, 65.

12

Id. at 50-51.

13

Id. at 57-58.

14

Id. at 57.

15

Id. at 45.

16

Id. at 45-56.

17

Id. at 55.

18

Id. at 39-40.

19

Id. at 42-44.

20

The Government of the Kingdom of Belgium v. Hon. Court of Appeals,


et al., 574 Phil. 380, 388 (2008).
21

Atty. Calo v. Spouses Villanueva, 516 Phil. 340, 349 (2006), citing
Remulla v. Manlongat, 484 Phil. 832, 841 (2004).
22

23

Supra note 20, at 396.

Article III. Bill of Rights x x x x Sec. 2. The right of the people to be


secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the

complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly


describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
24

Miclat, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 176077, August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA
539, 552-553, citing People v. Lagman, et al., 593 Phil. 617, 628
(2008).
25

Sec. 80. Arrest; Institution of Criminal Actions. A forest officer or


employee of the Bureau or any personnel of the Philippine
Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest even without
warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his
presence any of the offenses defined in this chapter. He shall also seize
and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment
used in committing the offense, and the forest products cut, gathered
or taken by the offender in the process of committing the offense. x x
x.
26

Aquino v. People, 611 Phil. 442, 450 (2009).

27

Id. at 451.

28

Merida v. People,577 Phil. 243, 258-259 (2008).

29

Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
xxxx
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such
value does not exceed 5 pesos.

30

Art. 310. Qualified theft. The crime of qualified theft shall be


punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those
respectively specified in the next preceding article x x x.
31

Merida v. People, supra note 28.

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