United States v. Laura Jones, 4th Cir. (2014)

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4770
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LAURA SUE JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (7:08-cr-00105-F-1)
Submitted:
June 19, 2014
Decided: June 23, 2014
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,

First
Assistant
Federal
Public
Defender,
Raleigh,
North
Carolina, for Appellant.
Thomas G. Walker, United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Shailika K. Shah, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
In 2008, Laura Sue Jones pled guilty pursuant to a
written plea agreement to conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute more than fifty grams of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C.
841(a)(1),
846
(2012).
She
was
sentenced
to
thirty-eight
months in prison and a five-year term of supervised release.

Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a), Jones was resentenced to
sixty months imprisonment and a five-year term of supervised
release.
2012.
Jones term of supervised release commenced in July

In
August
2013,
the
probation
officer
petitioned
for
revocation of Jones supervised release, based in part on Jones

arrest on state drug charges.
In the absence of any challenge
to the factual allegations supporting the motion for revocation,

the district court revoked Jones supervised release.
The court
subsequently imposed the statutory maximum sentence of thirtysix months imprisonment, finding Jones continued involvement
in the distribution of controlled substances posed a significant
risk to society.
On
appeal,
Jones
does
not
challenge
the
district
courts decision to revoke her supervised release or its policy

statement calculations.
sentence
failed
(BOP)
is
to
plainly
consider
drug
Rather, she argues her thirty-six-month
unreasonable
the
treatment
inadequacy
program
2
because
of
and
the
the
district
Bureau
whether
of
court
Prisons
community-based
programs
would
have
better
provided
Jones
with
the
needed
rehabilitative treatment.
A
district
court
has
broad
discretion
to
impose
sentence upon revoking a defendants supervised release.

States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010).
United
We will
affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release

if
it
is
within
the
applicable
plainly unreasonable.
437,
43940
(4th
statutory
maximum
and
not
United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,
Cir.
2006).
In
determining
whether
revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first assess the

sentence
for
unreasonableness,
follow[ing]
generally
the
procedural and substantive considerations that we employ in our

review of original sentences.
A
procedurally
supervised
reasonable
Id. at 438.
release
if
the
revocation
district
court
sentence
is
considered
the
Sentencing Guidelines Chapter 7 advisory policy statements and

the
18
U.S.C.
3553(a)
(2012)
factors
it
is
permitted
consider in a supervised release revocation case.

3583(e) (2012); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439.
to
18 U.S.C.
Such a sentence is
substantively reasonable if the district court stated a proper

basis for concluding the defendant should receive the sentence
imposed, up to the statutory maximum.
Only
if
unreasonable
sentence
will
we
is
found
then
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
procedurally
decide
3
whether
or
the
substantively
sentence
is
plainly
unreasonable.
Id.
at
439.
sentence
is
plainly
unreasonable if it is clearly or obviously unreasonable.
Id.
Jones argues her sentence is procedurally unreasonable

because the district court failed to adequately consider the
inadequacy of the BOPs substance abuse treatment.
Ideally,
Jones argues, the district court should have imposed a modest

active sentence of incarceration, and then imposed an additional
release period that required her to participate in a community
program.
However,
district
court
is
not
authorized
to
impose or lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender to

complete
treatment
rehabilitation.
(2011).
Cir.
program
or
otherwise
to
promote
Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2393
In United States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194, 197 (4th
2012),
sentencing.
we
held
that
that
Tapia
applies
to
revocation
We further added, [t]rial judges should thus make
plain that a defendants rehabilitative needs relate at most to

recommended programs or locationsnot to the fact or length of
imprisonment.
Id. at 199.
Upon review of the parties briefs and the record, we

conclude
that
Jones
thirty-six-month
prison
sentence,
which
represents an upward variance from the advisory policy statement

range
of
twelve
to
plainly unreasonable.
dispense
with
oral
eighteen
is
not
We therefore affirm Jones sentence.
We
argument
months
of
because
4
imprisonment,
the
facts
and
legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

United States v. Laura Jones, 4th Cir. (2014)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

United States v. Laura Jones, 4th Cir. (2014)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

United States v. Laura Jones, 4th Cir. (2014)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

June 19, 2014

Decided: June 23, 2014

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

months in prison and a five-year term of supervised release.

Jones term of supervised release commenced in July

revocation of Jones supervised release, based in part on Jones

In the absence of any challenge

to the factual allegations supporting the motion for revocation,

courts decision to revoke her supervised release or its policy

Rather, she argues her thirty-six-month

sentence upon revoking a defendants supervised release.

affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release

United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,

revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first assess the

procedural and substantive considerations that we employ in our

Sentencing Guidelines Chapter 7 advisory policy statements and

consider in a supervised release revocation case.

substantively reasonable if the district court stated a proper

Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.

unreasonable if it is clearly or obviously unreasonable.

Jones argues her sentence is procedurally unreasonable

Jones argues, the district court should have imposed a modest

impose or lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender to

Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2393

In United States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194, 197 (4th

We further added, [t]rial judges should thus make

plain that a defendants rehabilitative needs relate at most to

Upon review of the parties briefs and the record, we

represents an upward variance from the advisory policy statement

We therefore affirm Jones sentence.

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

You might also like