Robert Brock Cogdill v. Richard S. Lindler, Warden, Attorney General of South Carolina, 930 F.2d 23, 4th Cir. (1991)
Robert Brock Cogdill v. Richard S. Lindler, Warden, Attorney General of South Carolina, 930 F.2d 23, 4th Cir. (1991)
Robert Brock Cogdill v. Richard S. Lindler, Warden, Attorney General of South Carolina, 930 F.2d 23, 4th Cir. (1991)
2d 23
Unpublished Disposition
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina, at Columbia. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., District Judge. (CA-89646)
Robert Brock Cogdill, appellant pro se.
Donald John Zelenka, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Columbia, S.C.,
for appellees.
D.S.C.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
Before DONALD RUSSELL, K.K. HALL and MURNAGHAN, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Robert Brock Cogdill appeals the district court's denial of his petition for a writ
of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. Cogdill's petition was referred to a
magistrate judge for a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec.
636. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and
recommendation without de novo review because no objections from Cogdill
were filed. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). On appeal Cogdill claims
that he sent his objections to the district court but the Clerk of the Court refused
to file them and instead returned them to Cogdill because the objections did not
include a certificate of service. Cogdill also contends that he then served
opposing counsel and sent the objections back to the district court.
2
Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(d) states that "[a]ll papers after the complaint required to be
served upon a party shall be filed with the court either before service or within a
reasonable time thereafter...." Cogdill contends that instead of filing his
objections and then requiring him to serve opposing counsel, the district court
clerk refused to file the objections and returned them.
The record on appeal does not show whether Cogdill did indeed send
objections to the district court or whether the clerk refused to file these
objections for lack of service. Also, the record does not show whether Cogdill
has served opposing counsel. Therefore, we grant a certificate of probable
cause and remand this case to the district court for a determination of whether
Cogdill sent his objections to the court within the prescribed time period. If
Cogdill's objections were submitted in a timely manner, then the district court
should determine if opposing counsel has been served. If Cogdill has complied
with the applicable rules then de novo review is appropriate. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.