Bigelow v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 93 U.S. 284 (1876)

93 U.S.
284
23 L.Ed. 918
BIGELOW
v.
BERKSHIRE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.
October Term, 1876
ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District
of Illinois.
This is an action on two policies issued by the defendant on the life of
Henry W. Bigelow. Each contained a condition in avoidance, if the
insured should die by suicide, sane or insane; and in such case the
company agreed to pay to the party in interest the surrender value of the
policy at the time of the death of Bigelow. The defendant pleaded that
Bigelow died from the effects of a pistol-wound inflicted upon his person
by his own hand, and that he intended by this means to destroy his life. To
this the plaintiffs replied, that Bigelow, at the time when he inflicted the
pistol-wound upon his person by his own hand, was of unsound mind, and
wholly unconscious of the act. A demurrer to this replication was
sustained by the court below, and the plaintiffs bring the case here for
review.
Argued by Mr. Thomas Hoyne for the plaintiff in error.
An act of self-destruction has never been held to avoid a policy of life
insurance, when the insane person has been so unsound of mind as to be
unconscious of the act he was committing. Borradaile v. Hunter, 5 Mann.
& Gr. 639; Hartman v. Keystone Ins. Co., 21 Penn. 466; Dean v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 4 Allen, 96; Cooper v. Mass. Life Ins. Co., 102 Mass. 227;
Eastbrook v. Union Ins. Co., 54 Me. 224; Breasted v. Farmers' Loan and
Trust Co., 4 Hill, 73; 4 Seld. 299; 2 Bigelow, Life Ins. Cas. 4; Bliss, Life
Ins., sect. 243, p. 415; Pierce v. Travellers' Ins. Co., 3 Ins. Law J. 422;
Van Zandt v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 55 N. Y. 177.
In all cases, sane or insane, the law allows the plaintiff to show that death
was not intended by the deceased; but that it was an involuntary act, or a
result of mental disease. Borradaile v. Hunter, supra; Hopps' Case, 31 Ill.
392.
The decided cases all establish that only persons capable of discriminating
the particular act are to be held in law accountable. Van Zandt v. Mutual
Benefit Life Ins. Co., supra; Bliss, Life Ins., supra; Pierce v. Travellers'
Ins. Co., supra; Breasted v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., supra; Life Ins.
Co. v. Terry, 15 Wall. 580, and cases there cited.
A suicide, 'sane or insane,' is a connection of words without meaning, if
taken apart from their literal signification, or out of the context. Their real
meaning as they stand connected with the other words of the proviso is,
that, if the insured be sane or insane at the time he intentionally commits
suicide, i.e., self-murder, the policy is to be void and of no effect.
Even if it be conceded that a death self-inflicted, whether a suicide or not,
is within the terms of the policy, yet the fact that the death was not
intentional, by reason of the insured's mental unconsciousness of his act,
would clearly render the company liable.
Mr. H. G. Miller, contra .
MR. JUSTICE DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court.
There has been a great diversity of judicial opinion as to whether selfdestruction by a man, in a fit of insanity, is within the condition of a life policy,
where the words of exemption are that the insured 'shall commit suicide,' or
'shall die by his own hand.' But since the decision in Life Ins. Co. v. Terry, 15
Wall. 580, the question is no longer an open one in this court. In that case the
words avoiding the policy were, 'shall die by his own hand;' and we held that
they referred to an act of criminal self-destruction, and did not apply to an
insane person who took his own life. But the insurers in this case have gone
further, and sought to avoid altogether this class of risks. If they have
succeeded in doing so, it is our duty to give effect to the contract; as neither the
policy of the law nor sound morals forbid them to make it. If they are at liberty
to stipulate against hazardous occupations, unhealthy climates, or death by the
hands of the law, or in consequence of injuries received when intoxicated,
surely it is competent for them to stipulate against intentional self-destruction,
whether it be the voluntary act of an accountable moral agent or not. It is not
perceived why they cannot limit their liability, if the assured is in proper
language told of the extent of the limitation, and it is not against public policy.
The words of this stipulation, 'shall die by suicide (sane or insane),' must
receive a reasonable construction. If they be taken in a strictly literal sense,
their meaning might admit of discussion; but it is obvious that they were not so
used. 'Shall die by his own hand, sane or insane,' is, doubtless, a more accurate
mode of expression; but it does not more clearly declare the intention of the
parties. Besides, the authorities uniformly treat the terms 'suicide' and 'dying by
one's own hand,' in policies of life insurance, as synonymous, and the popular
understanding accords with this interpretation. Chief Justice Tindall, in
Borradaile v. Hunter, 5 Mann. & Gr. 668, says, 'The expression, 'dying by his
own hand,' is, in fact, no more than the translation into English of the word of
Latin origin, 'suicide." Life insurance companies indiscriminately use either
phrase, as conveying the same idea. If the words, 'shall commit suicide,'
standing alone in a policy, import self-murder, so do the words, 'shall die by his
own hand.' Either mode of expression, when accompanied by qualifying words,
must receive the same construction. This being so, there is no difficulty in
defining the sense in which the language of this condition should be received.
Felonious suicide was not alone in the contemplation of the parties. If it had
been, there was no necessity of adding any thing to the general words, which
had been construed by many courts of high authority as not denoting selfdestruction by an insane man. Such a man could not commit felony; but,
conscious of the physical nature, although not of the criminality, of the act, he
could take his own life, with a settled purpose to do so. As the line between
sanity and insanity is often shadowy and difficult to define, this company
thought proper to take the subject from the domain of controversy, and by
express stipulation preclude all liability by reason of the death of the insured by
his own act, whether he was at the time a responsible moral agent or not.
Nothing can be clearer than that the words, 'sane or insane,' were introduced for
the purpose of excepting from the operation of the policy any intended selfdestruction, whether the insured was of sound mind or in a state of insanity.
These words have a precise, definite, well-understood meaning. No one could
be misled by them; nor could an expansion of this language more clearly
express the intention of the parties. In the popular, as well as the legal, sense,
suicide means, as we have seen, the death of a party by his own voluntary act;
and this condition, based, as it is, on the construction of this language, informed
the holder of the policy, that, if he purposely destroyed his own life, the
company would be relieved from liability. It is unnecessary to discuss the
various phases of insanity, in order to determine whether a state of
circumstances might not possibly arise which would defeat the condition. It will
be time to decide that question when such a case is presented. For the purposes
of this suit, it is enough to say, that the policy was tendered void, if the insured
was conscious of the physical nature of his act, and intended by it to cause his
death, although, at the time, he was incapable of judging between right and
wrong, and of understanding the moral consequences of what he was doing.
2
Insurance companies have only recently inserted in the provisos to their policies
words of limitation corresponding to those used in this case. There has been,
therefore, but little occasion for courts to pass upon them. But the direct
question presented here was before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in 1874, in
Pierce v. The Travellers' Life Insurance Company, 34 Wis. 389, and received
the same solution we have given it. More words were there used than are
contained in this proviso; but the effect is the same as if they had been omitted.
To say that the company will not be liable if the insured shall die by 'suicide,
felonious or otherwise,' is the same as declaring its non-liability, if he shall die
by 'suicide, sane or insane.' They are equivalent phrases. Neither the reasoning
nor the opinion of that court is at all affected by the introduction of words
which are not common to both policies.
3
It remains to be seen whether the court below erred in sustaining the demurrer.
The replication concedes, in effect, all that is alleged in the plea; but avers that
the insured at the time 'was of unsound mind, and wholly unconscious of the
act.' These words are identical with those in the replication to the plea in
Breasted v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, 4 Hill, 73; and Judge Nelson
treated them as an averment that the assured was insane when he destroyed his
life. They can be construed in no other way. If the insured had perished by the
accidental discharge of the pistol, the replication would have traversed the plea.
Instead of this, it confesses that he intentionally took his own life; and it
attempts to avoid the bar by setting up a state of insanity. The phrase, 'wholly
unconscious of the act,' refers to the real nature and character of the act as a
crime, and not to the mere act itself. Bigelow knew that he was taking his own
life, and showed sufficient intelligence to employ a loaded pistol to accomplish
his purpose; but he was unconscious of the great crime he was committing. His
darkened mind did not enable him to see or appreciate the moral character of
his act, but still left him capacity enough to understand its physical nature and
consequences.
In the view we take of the case, enough has been said to show that the court did
not err in holding that the replication was bad.
Judgment affirmed.

Bigelow v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 93 U.S. 284 (1876)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Bigelow v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 93 U.S. 284 (1876)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Bigelow v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 93 U.S. 284 (1876)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

93 U.S.

You might also like