Perkins v. Linkedin - Settlement Approved PDF

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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SAN JOSE DIVISION
United States District Court

Northern District of California
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PAUL PERKINS, et al.,
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Plaintiffs,
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Case No. 13-CV-04303-LHK

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
FINAL APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT
AND GRANTING MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS FEES, COSTS, AND
REPRESENTATIVE PLAINTIFF
AWARDS
v.
LINKEDIN CORPORATION,
Defendant.
Re: Dkt. Nos. 116, 126
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This matter is before the Court on Class Counsels motion for final approval of the
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proposed class action settlement (Settlement) between individual and representative Plaintiffs
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Paul Perkins, Pennie Sempell, Ann Brandwein, Erin Eggers, Clare Connaughton, Jake Kushner,
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Natalie Richstone, Nicole Crosby, and Leslie Wall, and the Class they represent (collectively,
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Plaintiffs), and Defendant LinkedIn Corporation (LinkedIn or Defendant). ECF No. 126
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(Mot. for Final Approval). Class Counsel has also filed a motion for approval of attorneys fees,
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costs, and Class Representative awards. ECF No. 116 (Mot. for Attys Fees). LinkedIn does
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not oppose either motion. The Court held a Final Approval Hearing on February 11, 2016.
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Having considered these motions, the parties Settlement Agreement, the record in this
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ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT AND GRANTING MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS FEES, COSTS, AND REPRESENTATIVE PLAINTIFF AWARDS
case, and the arguments at the Final Approval Hearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
Unless otherwise defined herein, all terms contained herein shall have the same meaning as
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set forth in the Settlement Agreement.

The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Settlement Agreement with

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respect to and over all parties to the Settlement Agreement, including all Class Members and
Defendant.
I.
The Settlement Is Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable
In evaluating a proposed class action settlement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(e), the standard is whether the settlement is fundamentally fair, adequate and reasonable.
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Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Commn, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982); accord Torrisi v.
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Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1375 (9th Cir. 1993). A district court may consider some or
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all of the following factors when making this determination: the strength of plaintiffs case; the
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risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class
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action status throughout the trial; the amount offered in settlement; the extent of discovery
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completed, and the stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of counsel; the presence of
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a governmental participant; and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.
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Officers for Justice, 688 F.2d at 625. The Court finds that the Settlement is fair, adequate, and
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reasonable in light of these factors.
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First, the Settlement reflects the strength of Plaintiffs case as well as the Defendants
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position. This Court has been exposed to the litigants, and their strategies, positions and proof,
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Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Officers for Justice, 688
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F.2d at 626), and finds that the judicial policy favoring the compromise and settlement of class
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action suits is applicable here, see Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir.
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1992). The Court is also satisfied that the Settlement was reached after arms length negotiations
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by capable counsel, aided by two experienced mediators, and was not a product of fraud,
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overreaching, or collusion among the parties. Class Plaintiffs, 955 F.2d at 1290.
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Second, the risks, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation also
support final approval. Had litigation proceeded without settlement, Plaintiffs would have had to
move for class certification, which LinkedIn intended to contest on multiple bases. Additionally,
based on LinkedIns representations at the Final Approval Hearing, it is likely that Plaintiffs
would have had to defend against a motion for summary judgment. Further litigation would have
also required Plaintiffs to undertake significantly more discovery. Moreover, any litigation
outcome would be subject to potential appeals, which would have (at best) substantially delayed
any potential recovery. Lastly, claims under Californias statutory right of publicity, Cal. Civ.
Code 3344, raise the additional risk that, should Plaintiffs not prevail, Defendants would be
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entitled to an award of attorneys fees. See Cal. Civ. Code 3344(a); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v.
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Giganews, Inc., No. CV 11-07098-AB (SHx), 2015 WL 1746484, at *14-*15 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24,
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2015) (discussing 3344s fee-shifting provision). Taken together, these circumstances suggest
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that further litigation would have delayed any potential recovery for the Class and have been
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costly and risky. By contrast, the Settlement provides the Class with timely and certain recovery.
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Third, as a result of this Settlement, LinkedIn has revised the disclosures relating to the
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Add Connections service challenged in the instant suit. In particular, the disclosures now clarify
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that up to two Reminder Emails will be sent for each Add Connections invitation. These
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disclosures enable LinkedIn members to make fully-informed decisions before sending an Add
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Connections invitation. On its website, LinkedIn has added language to its Import Permission
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Screens, including new Learn More and Help Center buttons, which alert LinkedIn users that
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importing contact information in the Add Connections process entails a one-time upload of [the
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users] address book contacts as well as their detailed contact information. It also notifies users
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that, in the course of importing a users email contacts, [LinkedIn] automatically selects all
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contacts on the displayed list to be invited and offers users the option to uncheck the Select All
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box rather than manually de-selecting the contacts, as previously required. LinkedIn has
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amended its Invitation Permission Screens, adding that [i]f someone you invite doesnt respond
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right away, well send up to two reminders. Finally, LinkedIn has implemented functionality
allowing users to manage their contacts, including viewing and deleting contacts and sending
invitations, as well as added functionality allowing members who invite contacts to connect
through Add Connections to withdraw those invitations. This withdrawal functionality stops
Reminder Emails from being sent. This non-monetary relief benefits millions of Class Members,
including those who did not submit a Claim Form. The Court finds that this non-monetary relief
weighs in favor of final approval.

Moreover, the Settlement provides for meaningful considerationa total of $13 million
where the class size is approximately 20.8 million. The size of this fund provides more recovery
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to the Class than other settlements that have been approved in privacy cases in this district, even
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when factoring in the carve-outs for attorneys fees and service awards. See In re Google Referrer
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Header Privacy Litig. (In re Google), 87 F. Supp. 3d 1122, 1128, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
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(granting final approval to $8.5 million settlement where the class size was estimated 129 million
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members); Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 2d 939, 940, 943-44 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (granting
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final approval of $20 million cash fund where the class size was estimated 150 million members);
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In re Netflix Privacy Litig., No. 5:11-CV-00379 EJD, 2013 WL 1120801, at *6-*7 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
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18, 2013) (granting final approval to $9 million settlement where class size was estimated 62
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million members). Additionally, there is no possibility of reversion to LinkedIn.
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Fourth, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of proceedings support approval.
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The parties litigated two motions to dismiss, and Plaintiffs filed four complaints. Plaintiffs
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propounded requests for production and interrogatories to LinkedIn, which timely served
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responses. Plaintiffs assert that, before the Settlement, Plaintiffs were preparing to notice
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depositions of eight senior LinkedIn employees. ECF No. 116-1, Decl. of Nicholas Diamand
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(Diamand Decl.), 17. Discovery was thus underway, and both parties had developed a
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perspective on the strengths and weaknesses of their respective cases.
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Fifth, the views of Plaintiffs counsel, who are experienced in litigating and settling
complex consumer class actions, weigh in favor of final approval. Linney v. Cellular Alaska
PShip, No. 96-3008-DJL, 1997 WL 450064, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 1997), affd 151 F.3d 1234
(9th Cir. 1998). Class Counsel endorses the Settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable. ECF
No. 126-1, Decl. of Nicholas Diamand in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Final Approval
(Diamand Final Approval Decl.) 2; ECF No. 126-2, Decl. of Nathan D. Meyer (Meyer
Decl.), 2.
Finally, the reaction of the Class Members supports the Courts final approval of the
Settlement. Out of 20.8 million Class Members, only nine individuals submitted valid objections.
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ECF No. 126-4, Decl. of Daniel Burke (Burke Decl.), 27. An additional 77 individuals
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submitted objections that failed to comply with the procedural requirements set forth in this
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Courts order granting preliminary approval. See id. 28. Thus, in total, 86 individuals objected
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to the Settlement, or 0.0004% of the Class. Moreover, only 145 Class Members have opted out of
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the Settlement (0.0007% of the Class). Burke Decl. 30. Such low rates of objections and opt-
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outs are indicia of the approval of the class. Hughes v. Microsoft Corp., No. C98-1646C, C93-
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0178C, 2001 WL 34089697, at *1, *8 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 26, 2001) (finding indicia of approval
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when 9 class members out of 37,155, or just over .02%, who received notice submitted objections,
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and less than 1% opted out); see also Sugarman v. Ducati N. Am., Inc., No. 5:10-CV-05246-JF,
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2012 WL 113361, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2012) (objections from 42 of 38,774 class members
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more than 0.1 percentis a positive response); Churchill Vill., LLC v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566,
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577 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming district courts approval of settlement where forty-five of 90,000
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class members objected to the settlement (.05%), and 500 class members opted out (.56%)).
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The Court has considered each objection and the arguments made by three objectors at the
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Final Approval Hearing. Attorney Alan Sherwood appeared at the Final Approval Hearing for
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Objectors Daniel Brown and Jenny Hill. Attorney Frederic Fletcher appeared at the Final
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Approval Hearing for Objector Mary Means. See ECF No. 133. The Court appreciates the
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concerns expressed by the objectors. However, the Court concludes that none of the objections
warrant rejection of the Settlement. See Browne v. Am. Honda Motor Co., No. CV 09-06750 MM
DTBX, 2010 WL 9499072, at *15 (C.D. Cal. July 29, 2010) (The fact that there is opposition
does not necessitate disapproval of the settlement. Instead, the court must independently evaluate
whether the objections being raised suggest serious reasons why the proposal might be unfair.
(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court first addresses general objections to
the Settlement and to the Settlement fund. The Court then addresses objections to the Notice Plan,
the distribution plan, attorneys fees, and incentive awards respectively.

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that at least five of the objectors are not members

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of the ClassBoyan Boyanov, Nora Cordero, Johnnie Graham, Keith Miller, and Olen York
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and LinkedIn could not verify the class membership of an additional 29 objectors due to
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insufficient information.1 ECF No. 131, Supplemental Decl. of Nicholas Diamand (Diamand
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Supp. Decl.), 13. The Court need not consider the objections of non-Class members. See
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Chavez v. PVH Corp., No. 13-CV-01797-LHK, 2015 WL 9258144, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18,
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2015) (declining to consider objections of individuals who do not appear to be class members).
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Additionally, 77 of the objections are procedurally improper.2 On this basis alone, the Court may
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The objectors for whom Class Counsel determined insufficient information was available to
determine class membership are: June Barrett, Antuan Booker, William Calterwood, Ian Cornell,
Leanna Denham, Mary Don, Susan Entin, Melodie Ford, Elizabeth Garcia, Ashley Houston,
Anthony Krauch, Gloria Larravide, Tom Lucas, Gerald Monge, Donald Muldoon, Caleb Nelson,
Christopher Peters, Daniel Pratt, Karrie Reuter, Talita Robinson, Christine Ryan, Doug Smith,
Jeanine Thompson, Domenic Vitanza, K. Weeks, Steven White, Daniel Whitinger, Philip Wronga,
Farage Yusupov. See Diamand Supp. Decl. 14; see also ECF No. 126-7, Decl. of Kenneth Jue
on Behalf of Settlement Administrator Gilardi & Co. LLC, Attaching Objections, (Jue Decl.),
Exs. 2, 7, 11, 14, 16-18, 21-22, 30, 38, 41, 44, 49, 50-51, 53, 56, 59, 61, 63, 64, 72, 76-77, 79-80,
83, 85.
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For example, the Courts order granting preliminary approval required objectors to file their
objection with the Court, as well as provide the objectors name and contact information, an
explanation of the basis upon which the objector claims to be a member of the Class, and the
grounds for the objection. See ECF No. 106, at 5-6; Settlement 6.3. Of the 77 procedurally
improper objections, 27 were not filed with the Court. Burke Decl. 27-28, Ex. 3. The remaining
50 objections lacked some of the information required by the Courts order granting preliminary
approval. Id. Ex. 3. According to the Settlement Administrator, the only procedurally valid
objections are from Daniel Brown and Jenny Hill, Susan House, Dylan Jacobs, Kin Wah Kung,
Timothy Lezon, Mary Means, Carol Tomcyzk, and Olen York. See id. 27. One of those
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refuse to consider these objections. See id.; see also Moore v. Verizon Commcns Inc., No. C 09-
1823 SBA, 2013 WL 4610764, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2013) (overruling objections that were
submitted because these objections fail[ed] to comply with the procedural requirements for
objecting to the Settlement). Nevertheless, the Court also rejects these objections on the merits.

The majority of objectors44 of the 863object on the grounds that this case should
never have been brought. These objections do not comment on any aspect of the Settlement but,
rather, oppose the claims alleged as being frivolous. Because such objections appear to support no
recovery for the Class, these objectors interests are adverse to the Class, and the objections are
overruled. See Ko v. Natura Pet Prods., Inc., No. C 09-02619 SBA, 2012 WL 3945541, at *6
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(N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2012) ([A]n objection based on a concern for the Defendants and an apparent
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non-substantive assessment of the frivolity of the action are not germane to the issue of whether
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the settlement is fair.); Wren v. RGIS Inventory Specialists, No. C-06-05778 JCS, 2011 WL
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1230826, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2011) (overruling objections submitted that do not go to the
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fairness of the settlement).
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By contrast, 32 objectors wrote in support of the instant lawsuit. Youssef Rifai wrote, I
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am requesting the case system administrator to consider my letter and approve the settlement.
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Jue Decl. Ex. 60. Lindsay Finnie wrote that she objects to the Settlement but agree[s] with the
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terms of the lawsuit and expect[s] reimbursement. Id. Ex. 19. Nineteen additional individuals
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wrote to object to the conduct of LinkedIn at issue in this case.4 For example, June Barrett wrote
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objectors, Olen York, is not a Class Member. Diamand Supp. Decl. 13.
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These 44 objections were filed by Jamie Anderson-Stewart, Claude Baudoin, Erich Berg, Boyan
Boyanov, William Calderwood, Ian Cornell, BC Crothers, Stephen Foerster, Melodie Ford, Gary
Gill, Julie Gordon, Kevin Grell, Kira Harris, Ashley Houston, Mark Howard, Michael Hughes,
Cassandra Jones, Roland Klose, Chinmay Kommuru, Anthony Krauch, August Lasseter, Timothy
Lezon, Tom Lucas, Timothy McDonald, William McNamara, Keith Miller, Donald Muldoon,
Caleb Nelson, Robert Petersen, Lyle Polyak, Philip Reinemann, Karrie Reuter, John Rollinson,
Doug Smith, Gabriel Smith, Ken Stuczynski, Jeanine Thompson, Nozima Tojimatova, Carol
Tomczyk, K. Weeks, Frederick Wells, Steven White, Daniel Whitinger, and Philip Wrona. Jue
Decl. Exs. 1, 3-4, 8, 11, 14-15, 17, 20-21, 23, 25, 27-28, 30-32, 34-35, 37-38, 42, 46, 48, 50-51,
54-55, 58-59, 62, 64-65, 69, 72-74, 77-80, 93.
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These 19 objections were filed by June Barrett, Shataia Blocker, Anuan Booker, Anne Butman,
Rustin Coburn, Nora Cordero, Susan Entin, Elizabeth Garcia, Julius Gonzalez, Johnnie Graham,
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I did not agree to the two follow-up emails. That persistence was annoying. Id. Ex. 2; see also,
e.g., Ex. 24 (I Julius Gonzalez object to LinkedIn[s] improper use of Add Connections.); Ex. 40
(Objection of Diane Kushmer ) (I did not give LinkedIn permission to send Reminder
endorsement emails to people in my personal email contact list through their Add Connections.
I see this as an invasion to my privacy and to the privacy of the people in my contacts.). These
individuals do not object to any specific terms of the Settlement, but object to the Settlement
generally. Their disapproval of LinkedIns conduct suggests that these individuals believe that the
Settlement is too low.

Lastly, eleven of the 32 objectors in support of the instant lawsuit expressly argue that the

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Settlement is too low or otherwise insufficient. These objectors are Gregory Berning, Daniel
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Brown and Jenny Hill, Mary Don, Dylan Jacobs, Kim Wah Kung, Mary Means, Darline Spencer,
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Gessica Still, Olen York, and Farage Yuzupov. See id. Exs. 5, 9, 17, 33, 39, 47, 66-67, 84-85. For
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example, Daniel Brown and Jenny Hill assert that the Settlement is too low given that the
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Settlement releases LinkedIn from potentially hundreds of millions of dollars in liability. Id. Ex.
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9. At the Final Approval Hearing, the attorney for Daniel Brown and Jenny Hill argued that the
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Settlement does not fully account for the level of harm caused by LinkedIns conduct. Objector
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Farage Yuzupov wrote that it is unjust for the Class Members to receive only $10 each. Id. Ex.
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85.
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In objecting to the size of the Settlement, none of these Class Members adequately take
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into account the risks and delays involved in proceeding to class certification, summary judgment,
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and/or trial. They ignore that the Settlement provides the class with a timely, certain, and
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meaningful cash recovery, while further litigation and any subsequent appeal are uncertain, would
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entail significant additional costs, and in any event would substantially delay any recovery
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achieved. [T]he very essence of a settlement is compromise, a yielding of absolutes and an
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Diane Kushmer, Gerald Monge, Christopher Peters, Donata Ray, Carol Stocks, Scott Teague,
Efrain Valdez, Melanie Wobig, and Quintena Woodward. Jue Decl. Exs. 2, 6-7, 10, 12-13, 18, 22,
24, 26, 40, 49, 53, 57, 68, 71, 75, 81-82.
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abandoning of highest hopes. Linney v. Cellular Alaska Pship, 151 F.3d 1234, 1242 (9th Cir.
1998) (quoting Officers for Justice, 688 F.2d at 624) (affirming settlement approval). Estimates
of what constitutes a fair settlement figure are tempered by factors such as the risk of losing at
trial, the expense of litigating the case, and the expected delay in recovery (often measured in
years). Browne, 2010 WL 9499072, at *12. Thus, [t]he fact that a proposed settlement may
only amount to a fraction of the potential recovery does not, in and of itself, mean that the
proposed settlement is grossly inadequate and should be disapproved. Linney, 151 F.3d at 1242
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, these objectors do not account for the fact that the Settlement fund does not
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constitute all of the relief to the Class. As discussed above, LinkedIn has also implemented new
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disclosures and added functionality regarding the Add Connections service. Objector Mary Means
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argues that this non-monetary relief is a scam and that LinkedIn should be disclosing (1) that
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LinkedIn intend[s] to sell the data collected on the open market for profit, and (2) any data
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LinkedIn collects is at risk for cybercrime or a security breach. Jue Decl. Ex. 47. The Court
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disagrees. The instant lawsuit did not raise concerns about the sale of data or possible data
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breaches. Instead, the lawsuit challenged LinkedIns practice of harvesting contact information
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from LinkedIn members external email accounts and sending two reminder emails to those
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harvested contacts for each Add Connections invitation. See ECF No. 70 (Third Amended Class
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Action Complaint); cf., e.g., Jue Decl. Ex. 10 (Objection of Anne Butman) (I am not happy with
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LinkedIns decision to send the two follow [u]p emails to contacts listed in my mail account.); id.
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Ex. 13 (Objection of Nora Cordero) (Linkedin has not been given my consent to remind my
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contacts twice to connect with me. I think it is annoying and pesters people who I respect
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professionally.). The disclosures secured by the Settlement precisely target this challenged
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conduct, and substantially benefit the Class by enabling LinkedIn members to make fully-
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informed decisions before sending an Add Connections invitation. The added functionality also
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provides LinkedIn members the ability to cancel the reminder emails for many Add Connections
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invitations at once. Moreover, contrary to Mary Meanss assertion, Class Counsel has confirmed
that all of the non-monetary relief has been implemented. See ECF No. 105-4, Decl. of Adam I.
Kaplan 3-5, Exs. A-E; ECF No. 126-3, Decl. of Dorian S. Berger.
A number of objectors5 contend that the result here is inadequate because Californias

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statutory right of publicity, Cal. Civ. Code 3344, provides for $750 in statutory damages, much
more than the total amount that will be distributed to each Class Member through this Settlement.
Objector Mary Means, for example, argues that the statutory penalty alone would have resulted in
a recovery of $1.56 billion for the 20.8 million members of the Class. Jue Decl. Ex. 47. While
such a recovery may theoretically have been possible, the Settlement represents a fair and
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adequate compromise in light of significant risks faced by the class and the delay in any potential
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recovery from proceeding with litigation. As explained by Class Counsel at the Final Approval
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Hearing, Plaintiffs may have had difficulty in certifying a class and in demonstrating mental
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harm, a requirement for claims under 3344. See also ECF No. 69 (Courts Order Granting in
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Part and Denying in Part Defendants Motion to Dismiss), at 21-27 (noting that a plaintiff must
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plead mental harm in order to claim minimum statutory damages under 3344). Additionally, if
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Plaintiffs failed to prevail on the 3344 claim, Plaintiffs risked being ordered to pay LinkedIns
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attorneys fees. See Cal. Civ. Code 3344(a); see also Perfect 10, Inc., 2015 WL 1746484, at
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*14-15 (discussing 3344s fee-shifting provision). Even if Plaintiffs were to prevail after further
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litigation, recovery would be delayed by the time needed to finish discovery, resolve motions for
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class certification and summary judgment, conduct a trial, and possibly defend against any
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appeals.
That certain Class Members evaluate the risks differently, or would prefer to go to trial
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despite those risks, does not prevent the Court from granting final approval to the Settlement. See
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Browne, 2010 WL 9499072, at *15 (The fact that there is opposition does not necessitate
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Daniel Brown and Jenny Hill, Susan House, Dylan Jacobs, and Mary Means. Jue Decl. Exs. 9,
29, 33, 47.
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disapproval of the settlement. Instead, the court must independently evaluate whether the
objections being raised suggest serious reasons why the proposal might be unfair. (citation
omitted)). Accordingly, these objections are overruled.

Next, five individuals object to the Settlement approval, but do not provide the grounds for

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their objections: Leanna Denham, Shirley Kollenberg, Talita Robinson, Christine Ryan, and
Domark Vitanza. Id. Exs. 16, 36, 61, 63, 76. For example, one objection reads My name is
Leanna Denham, I do not believe that any settlement should be approved for LinkedIn Corp. Jue
Decl. Ex. 16. It is not clear whether these objectors believe that a settlement is inappropriate
because the instant lawsuit should not have been brought; believe that this specific Settlement is
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insufficient; or object on another basis. Although the Court notes the concerns of these objectors,
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their general opposition to settlement does not convince the Court that the instant Settlement is
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inadequate. By contrast, the Court finds that the Settlement provides substantial benefit to the
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Class.
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Finally, Mary Means claims that the Release goes too far by releasing all related claims
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including future claims. Id. Ex. 47. In fact, the Release applies to claims that were asserted or
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could have been asserted arising from or related to allegations in the Action regarding the alleged
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use of Add Connections to grow LinkedIns member base. Claims based upon LinkedIns
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theoretical future conduct were not, and could not, have been asserted in this action and, thus, are
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outside the scope of the Release. Further, in releasing claims arising from or related to the
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allegations in the Action, the Release is within the bounds set by precedent in this District. See
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Custom LED, LLC v. eBay, Inc., No. 12-cv-00350-JST, 2013 WL 6114379, at *4, *9 (N.D. Cal.
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Nov. 20, 2013) (approving class settlement release of claims arising out of or relating in any way
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to any of the legal, factual, or other allegations made in the Action, or any legal theories that could
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have been raised on the allegations of the Action); Hesse v. Sprint Corp., 598 F.3d 581, 590 (9th
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Cir. 2010) (A settlement agreement may preclude a party from bringing a related claim in the
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future even though the claim was not presented and might not have been presentable in the class
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action, but only where the released claim is based on the identical factual predicate as that
underlying the claims in the settled class action. (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Accordingly, the Court overrules objections to the Settlement and the Settlement relief.

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The Court next addresses the Notice Program and objections thereto.
II.
The Notice Program Was Appropriate
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2)(B) requires that the settling parties provide
settlement Class Members with the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances,
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The
notice must clearly and concisely state in plain, easily understood language: (i) the nature of the
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action; (ii) the definition of the class certified; (iii) the class claims, issues, or defenses; (iv) that a
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class member may enter an appearance through an attorney if the member so desires; (v) that the
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court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion; (vi) the time and manner
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for requesting exclusion; and (vii) the binding effect of a class judgment on members under Rule
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23(c)(3).
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The Court finds that the Notice Plan has been fully implemented in compliance with this
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Courts Order, ECF No. 106, and complies with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). Notice was sent to
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Class Members by direct email. The Email Notice, which was reviewed and approved by this
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Court, provided a clear description of who is a member of the Class and Class Members rights
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and options under the Settlement. The Notice explained the conduct at issue in the litigation, how
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to receive money from the Settlement, how to opt-out of the Settlement, how to object to the
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Settlement, how to obtain copies of relevant papers filed in the case, and how to contact Class
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Counsel and the Settlement Administrator. See ECF No. 106-2 (Email Notice attached to the
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Courts order granting preliminary approval).
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The Court approved this Notice Plan. ECF No. 106. The Court ordered LinkedIn to send
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the Email Notice to each person in the Class using the email address that LinkedIn has on file for
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the LinkedIn account. Id. at 4. Additionally, the Court ordered LinkedIn to attempt to re-send the
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Email Notice if emails resulted in a bounce-back or were otherwise undeliverable. Id. LinkedIn
distributed the Email Notice as directed. See ECF No. 126-5, Decl. of Kurt Andersen, 5.
Through these efforts, approximately 95% of the Class successfully received the Email Notice. Id.
6. The Court also ordered the Settlement Administrator, Gilardi & Co., LLC, to publish the
Website Notice through the Settlement Website, and to develop, host, and maintain such
Settlement Website. ECF No. 106, at 4. The Settlement Administrator did so. Burke Decl. 2.
The Court found the Notice and Notice Plan are consistent with the requirements of Rule 23 and
due process, and constitute the best notice practicable under the circumstances. ECF No. 106, at
4. Moreover, additional Notice was provided to the Class through extensive media coverage of
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the Settlement and Notice, which further supports a finding that Class Members received adequate
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notice of the Settlement. See Diamand Final Approval Decl. 11-13, Exs. 1-6.
12
Class Members could submit a Claim Form either electronically, through the Settlement
13
Website, or by mail. To show membership in the Class, the Claim Form permitted Class Members
14
to provide the unique Claim ID included in each Email Notice, or simply the email address
15
associated with their LinkedIn account. Claimants were offered two options to receive payment:
16
direct deposit into the claimants bank account, or payment by check.
17
Class Members also had a variety of methods by which to view relevant documents,
18
contact the Settlement Administrator or Class Counsel, opt out of the Settlement, or object to the
19
Settlement. These methods included mail, telephone, the Settlement Website, and email. For
20
example, the Settlement Administrator responded to 12,194 emails and 909 voicemails. Burke
21
Decl. 7, 13. Additionally, the Settlement Administrator received 143 requests for mailed copies
22
of the Notice over the telephone, by email and by mail. Id. 12. The Settlement Administrator
23
sent a copy of the Notice whenever one was requested. Id. Class Counsel responded to
24
approximately 10,000 calls from Class Members. Meyer Decl. 8.
25
26
27
28
Six individuals have objected to the Notice: Daniel Brown and Jenny Hill, Susan House,
Mary Means, Jorge Pardo, and Hannah Tanner. Jue Decl. Exs. 9, 29, 47, 52, 70. Specifically,
13

Daniel Brown, Jenny Hill, Susan House, and Jorge Pardo assert that the Notice should have
provided information on the size of the Class and the payment per Class Member. At the Final
Approval Hearing, Daniel Brown and Jenny Hill argued, through their attorney, that the Notice
should have provided an estimate or range of potential recovery. The Court disagrees that these
objections render the Notice defective. First, a precise award estimate for each Class Member
cannot be computed until the [Settlement] Administrator confirms and processes all [Claim
Forms] . . . [and] considers the Courts determination of the requests for attorneys fees,
unreimbursed out-of-pocket costs, Named Plaintiff service awards, and Settlement administration
costs. See In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-02509-LHK, 2015 WL
10
5159441, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2015). Second, the Notice sufficiently apprised Class
11
Members of the Settlements plan of allocation as well as the gross Settlement amount, the
12
proposed deductions for attorneys fees and Class Representative awards, and the contact
13
information for Class Counsel. The Court previously found a similar notice sufficient. See id.
14
(concluding, under similar circumstances, that Notice did not need to include individual allocation
15
amounts because such amounts could not be calculated at the time of the Notice). Third, the
16
Notice indicated that LinkedIn would have to pay an additional $750,000 if pro rata payments
17
were less than $10 per Class Member. See ECF No. 106-2. The Notice also indicated that there
18
may be no pro rata payments at all. See id. Thus, the Notice provided Class Members some
19
indication of the possible payment amount.

Daniel Brown, Jenny Hill, Susan House and Mary Means also object to the failure of the
20
21
Notice to disclose the California Civil Code 3344 claim and the associated possible $750
22
statutory penalty.6 Jue Decl. Exs. 9, 29, 47. The Email Notice does not list any of the causes of
23
action asserted in the instant lawsuit, while the Website Notice identifies only the causes of action
24
25
26
27
28
Susan House also argues that the Notice should have informed Class Members that statutory
penalties are available under Californias Unfair Competition law (UCL). Jue Decl. Ex. 29, at 4.
In fact, the UCL provides for such penalties only in circumstances not applicable here, such as in
an action by certain government entities. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17206, 17206.1.
14

asserted in the original complaint (which did not assert a claim under 3344). Although the Court
recognizes that it would have been preferable for the Website Notice to have listed every cause of
action asserted throughout the Action, the Court finds that the failure to do so was not erroneous.
First, in contrast to the objectors belief, Rule 23 does not require detailed analysis of the
statutes or causes of action forming the basis for the plaintiff classs claims, and it does not require
an estimate of the potential value of those claims. In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 779
F.3d 934, 946 (9th Cir. 2015). Instead, notice must generally describe[] the terms of the
settlement in sufficient detail to alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come
forward and be heard. Churchill Vill., 361 F.3d at 575. In fact, courts in this district regularly
10
approve notices that do not identify the specific causes of action. See, e.g., Keller v. Natl
11
Collegiate Athletic Assn, Nos. 4:09-cv-1967CW, 4:09-cv-3329CW, 2015 WL 5005901 (N.D. Cal.
12
Aug. 19, 2015).7 In the instant case, the Email and Website Notices described the conduct at issue
13
in the litigation, stated the amount of the Settlement fund, and explained how to receive money
14
from the Settlement, how to opt-out, how to object, how to obtain copies of relevant papers filed
15
in the case, and how to contact Class Counsel and the Settlement Administrator. Additionally, the
16
Settlement Website provided Class Members links to the important documents in the case and
17
explained how to access the entire case file through the PACER Service Center.8
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Notice form available at NCAA and EA Videogame Likeness Settlements, http://www.ncaa-ealikeness-settlement.com/case-documents.aspx (last accessed February 16, 2016).
8
Susan House contends that the Settlement Website should have posted Class Counsels motion
for final approval during the Notice period. Jue Decl. Ex. 29, at 4. Mary Means asserts that the
Settlement Website should have posted the motion for preliminary approval. Id. Ex. 47, at 10.
Susan House and Mary Means rely on the Procedural Guidance for Class Action Settlements
(Procedural Guidance) produced by the Northern District of California, which states that notice
should include . . . the address for a website, maintained by the claims administrator or class
counsel, that has links to the . . . motions for approval. Available at
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/ClassActionSettlementGuidance (last accessed February 16, 2016).
The Court concludes that the failure to post these two documents during the Notice period is not
legally erroneous. First, the Procedural Guidance does not constitute a legally binding
interpretation of Rule 23. Second, Class Counsel complied with the Courts order granting
preliminary approval, which required the motion for final approval to be posted to the Settlement
Website on the date of filing with the Court. ECF No. 106, at 7. The motion for final approval
was not filed with the Court until after the Notice period, on January 14, 2016. The Court did not
order the parties to post the motion for preliminary approval on the Settlement Website. Third,
15

Second, the Email Notice alerts Class Members that, even if Class Members do nothing,
they will also be giving up any claims [they] may have against LinkedIn based on its alleged
improper use of Add Connections to grow its member base. The Website Notice provides the
exact terms of the Release, which releases claims that were asserted or could have been asserted
arising from or related to allegations in the Action regarding the alleged use of Add Connections.
ECF No. 106-3 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Class Members were apprised that causes of
action not listed in the Noticeor asserted in Plaintiffs four complaintsmay be released in the
Settlement.
Finally, Susan House, Mary Means, and Hannah Tanner contend that the Claim Form, in
10
conjunction with the Notice, deterred Class Members from filing claims. Jue Decl. Exs. 29, 47,
11
70. Specifically, these objectors assert that the Claim Form should not have required each
12
claimant to declare under penalty of perjury that I believe I was injured. See ECF No. 106-1
13
(Claim Form). The Court finds these objections are not well taken. Claim forms may require the
14
claimant to attest to some fact under penalty of perjury. See California v. IntelliGender, LLC, 771
15
F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting district court granted final approval to settlement, where
16
notice required attestation under penalty of perjury); Tarlecki v. bebe Stores, Inc., No. C 05-1777
17
MHP, 2009 WL 3720872, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2009) (granting final approval to settlement,
18
when notice required attestation under penalty of perjury). Additionally, the Court does not find
19
the penalty of perjury language to be too frequent or likely to deter the Class from completing
20
the Claim Form. The original claim form submitted by the parties in support of the motion for
21
preliminary approval included the phrase penalty of perjury five times. See ECF No. 96-1.
22
However, at the Courts insistence, the final Claim Form required a claimant to make only one
23
24
25
26
27
28
during the Notice period, the Settlement Website included the Courts order granting preliminary
approval. Any interested party could thus determine the basis for preliminary approval during the
Notice period. Lastly, the Settlement Website told Class Members how to access the entire case
file, and how to contact Class Counsel. Accordingly, the Court overrules the objections of Susan
House and Mary Means to the Settlement Website. See Keller, 2015 WL 5005901 (granting final
approval, although settlement website did not include motion for preliminary approval).
16
declaration under penalty of perjury. See ECF No. 106-1 (Claim Form). Lastly, if Class Members
were unsure as to the meaning of the term injured, Class Members had a variety of mechanisms
for obtaining advice from Class Counsel. In fact, Class Counsel provided clarification of the
meaning of the term injured to Class Members who reached out to Class Counsel with
questions. Meyer Decl. 21.

Mary Means also contends that the Claim Form deterred individuals from filing a claim

6
7
because the Claim Form required the claimant to provide sensitive banking information. Jue Decl.
Ex. 47, at 7. However, the Claim Form clearly stated that claimants could request payment by
check, which did not require banking information. See ECF No. 106-1 (Claim Form).
10
Additionally, all website submissions were encrypted, and the Settlement Administrator has
11
received an independent certification and accreditation with regard to information technology
12
infrastructure and security requirements. Burke Decl. 16.

In sum, the Court finds that the Notice Plan was fully implemented and complies with both
13
14
due process and Rule 23.
15
III.
16
The Plan of Distribution is Fair, Reasonable and Adequate.

The Plan of Distribution is fair, reasonable and adequate. It will provide each Class
17
Member with a pro rata payment from the monetary relief available for such payments. Each
18
Authorized Claimant will receive approximately $20. Such pro rata distributions are cost-
19
effective, simple, and fundamentally fair. High-Tech, 2015 WL 5159441, at *8 (quoting In re
20
Airline Ticket Commn Antitrust Litig., 953 F. Supp. 280, 285 (D. Minn. 1997); see also In re
21
Elec. Carbon Prods. Antitrust Litig., 447 F. Supp. 2d 389, 404 (D.N.J. 2006) (finding pro rata
22
distribution eminently reasonable and fair to the class members).
23
The Court also notes that there will be no reversion of unclaimed funds to LinkedIn.
24
Instead, any funds from checks not cashed within ninety days of issuance and funds from failed
25
bank deposit transfers shall revert to the Settlement Fund. Settlement, 3.1.2(b). If, in
26
consultation with the Settlement Administrator, the parties determine that such reverted funds can
27
28
17
be distributed again pro rata to the Authorized Claimants in an economically feasible manner,
the funds shall be distributed accordingly. Id. If not, the Settlement Administrator will distribute
the reverted funds pro rata to the three cy pres recipients: Access Now, Electronic Privacy
Information Center (EPIC), and the Network for Teaching Entrepreneurship (NFTE). Id.

Five individuals object to the cy pres distribution: Susan House, Dylan Jacobs, Mary
Means, Daniel Pratt, and Hannah Tanner. Jue Decl. Exs. 29, 33, 47, 56, 70. Dylan Jacobs and
Daniel Pratt appear to object to the practice of cy pres distribution. Id. Exs. 33 (Objection of
Dylan Jacobs) (stating that a better alternative [to cy pres] would be to distribute further rounds
of payments to class members who cash their initial checks); 56 (Objection of Daniel Pratt) (I
10
believe that there is no amount too small to be economically feasible, even if it results in a check
11
for pennies to each potential recipient of the settlement class.). However, federal courts
12
frequently use the cy pres doctrine in the settlement of class actions where the proof of individual
13
claims would be burdensome or distribution of damages costly. Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d
14
1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, it is common
15
practice for the parties to a settlement to select the cy pres recipients, subject to court approval.
16
Dylan Jacobs states that it is troubling that no recipient is identified in the settlement agreement.
17
Jue Decl. Ex. 33. In fact, however, the three cy pres recipients are identified in the Settlement,
18
1.12, and on the Settlement Website.
19
Further, the Settlement provides for a second round of payment to Class Members from
20
any uncashed checks or other reverted funds, unless pro rata distribution is not economically
21
feasible. Settlement 3.1.2(b). Daniel Pratt disapproves of the failure of the Settlement to more
22
precisely define when it is economically feasible to distribute funds to the Class. However, the
23
parties agreed to work together, with the neutral and experienced Settlement Administrator, to
24
determine what is economically feasible. Additionally, as LinkedIn acknowledged at the Final
25
Approval Hearing, the parties are guided by case law on cy pres distribution. See Lane v.
26
Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 825 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming cy pres distribution when it would be
27
28
18
burdensome and inefficient to pay the funds to the class because each class members
recovery under a direct distribution would be de minimis).
3
4
and no money to the Class. This objection is denied as moot, as each Class Member who
submitted a valid Claim Form will receive approximately $20. Additionally, the Settlement
provides for a second round of payment to Class Members from any unclaimed funds resulting
from uncashed checks or failed bank transfers, unless further pro rata distribution is not
economically feasible. Settlement 3.1.2(b).

Mary Means objects on the basis that all of the Settlement will go to the cy pres recipients,
Susan House, Daniel Pratt, and Hannah Tanner object to the specific cy pres recipients
10
selected. Jue Decl. Exs. 29, 56, 70. Under Ninth Circuit law, cy pres distribution must be guided
11
by (1) the objectives of the underlying statute(s) and (2) the interests of the silent class members.
12
Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1039. There must be a driving nexus between the plaintiff class and the cy
13
pres beneficiaries. Id. at 1038-39. In Nachshin, the Ninth Circuit noted three guiding
14
standards from earlier case law. A cy pres distribution should (1) address the objectives of the
15
underlying statutes, (2) target the plaintiff class, or (3) provide reasonable certainty that any
16
member will be benefitted. Id. at 1039. However, courts do not require as part of [cy pres]
17
doctrine that settling parties select a cy pres recipient that the court or class members would find
18
ideal. Lane, 696 F.3d at 821.
19
First, all three of the selected cy pres recipients are organizations with programs or
20
activities across the United States, which accounts for the broad geographic distribution of the
21
class. Susan House and Hannah Tanner believe that Access Now spends less than two percent of
22
its programming resources in the United States. Jue Decl. Exs. 29, 70. Hannah Tanner points to
23
a chart from Access Nows most recent tax filing, which she claims indicates that only 2% of
24
Access Nows programming budget goes to activities in North America. Id. Ex. 70, at 4-5.
25
However, a review of Access Nows 2014 tax return indicates that the chart identified by Hannah
26
Tanner addresses spending in North America, excluding in the United States. See Diamand Supp.
27
28
19
Decl. 16, Ex. 3. The 2014 tax return indicates that Access Now actually spends somewhere over
65-70% of its funding on programming and expenses within the United States. See id.
Second, the Court concludes that the three cy pres recipients are sufficiently related to the
3
4
instant lawsuit. At the Final Approval Hearing, Class Counsel indicated that the recipients were
selected to address different aspects of the lawsuit: the promotion of digital rights, the protection
of privacy, and the furtherance of networking opportunities for professionals. The first two goals,
Class Counsel explained, target the objectives underlying the claims asserted in the lawsuit, while
the third goal targets the Class Members.

The first cy pres recipient, Access Now, works on securing and promoting digital rights.

9
10
While Susan House and Hannah Tanner claim that Access Now is anti-American and overtly
11
political, political advocacy does not disqualify a cy pres recipient.9 See In re Netflix Privacy
12
Litig., 2013 WL 1120801, at *7 (approving leading consumer and privacy advocacy groups and
13
academic institutions as cy pres recipients); In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., No.
14
96-CV-5238 (JG), 2011 WL 5029841, at *6, 9 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2011) (approving cy pres award
15
to organizations engaged in advocacy before Congress, federal agencies, and federal courts). In
16
fact, Access Nows promotion of digital rights is what creates a nexus between Access Now and
17
the claims in this lawsuit. Access Now is also connected to the plaintiff Class, which includes
18
users of the Internet who are concerned about digital rights.

Similarly, EPIC is dedicated to electronic privacy rights and thus has a nexus to Plaintiffs
19
20
claims. Susan House and Hannah Tanner call EPIC a repeat-player that has received millions of
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Hannah Tanner argues that donating funds to organizations engaged in political advocacy is
effectively a compelled political donation in violation of the First Amendment. Jue Decl. Ex. 70,
at 13-16. Tanner points to no authoritycase law or otherwiseaddressing free speech in the
context of a cy pres distribution. Cf. In re Google, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1137 ([O]bjectors to a class
action settlement bear the burden of proving any assertions they raise challenging the
reasonableness of a class action settlement. (citing United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 581
(9th Cir. 1990))). The Court, in its own research, has found none. Tanner also fails to explain
why a cy pres distribution upon a court order serves as speech by Tanner. Given the lack of
relevant authority and the fact that courts consistently approve cy pres awards to organizations
engaging in advocacy related to the classs claims, the Court declines to find the plan distribution
unreasonable based on this objection.
20

dollars in cy pres grants from countless privacy cases and has nothing to show for it. Jue
Decl. Exs. 29, 70. However, neither Susan House nor Hannah Tanner provide any authority that
an organization cannot receive multiple cy pres awards. Rather, the Court finds that EPICs
receipt of other cy pres awards in privacy cases demonstrates that EPIC is well-suited to be a cy
pres recipient in the instant privacy case. See In re Google Buzz Privacy Litig., 2011 WL
7460099, at *1 (EPIC has demonstrated that it is a well-established and respected organization
within the field of internet privacy.).
Lastly, Susan House and Hannah Tanner object to NFTE because Reid Hoffman, the co-
founder of LinkedIn, is on NFTEs Board of Overseers. Jue Decl. Exs. 29, 70. Class Counsel
10
responds that Class Counsel has investigated and found no evidence that either Mr. Hoffman or
11
LinkedIn have any pecuniary interest in funds provided to NFTE. Mot. for Final Approval, at 19.
12
Further, Class Counsel represented at the Final Approval Hearing that Class Counsel, not
13
LinkedIn, suggested NFTE as a cy pres recipient. Class Counsel also represented that, at the time
14
of selection, Class Counsel was unaware of NFTEs link to Reid Hoffman. While this may cast
15
doubt on the effectiveness of Class Counsels due diligence, it also undermines any assertions of
16
self-dealing by LinkedIn. Accordingly, Hoffmans connection to NFTE does not make the
17
Settlement distribution plan unreasonable. See Lane, 696 F.3d at 825-26 (overruling objection
18
based upon Notices failure to disclose that the defendants employee was on the board of the
19
organization distributing cy pres funds).
20
Additionally, NFTE aims to provide programs that inspire young people from low-
21
income communities to stay in school, to recognize business opportunities and to plan for
22
successful futures. Network for Teaching Entrepreneurship, mission & history,
23
https://www.nfte.com/what/mission (last accessed February 16, 2016). At the Final Approval
24
Hearing, Class Counsel explained that this organization targets the plaintiff Class, who use
25
LinkedIn for professional networking and to foster professional ambitions, and who are concerned
26
about their career-related reputations. See also Mot. for Final Approval, at 18 (noting the career-
27
28
21
related reputational issues at stake in this case). Class Counsel thus represented that NFTE is
likely to benefit members of the Class and to promote the interests of the Class. Although NFTE
does not specifically focus on privacy or digital rights, the Court finds that distribution to NFTE
has a sufficient nexus to the plaintiff Class, for the following reasons.

In approving a cy pres distribution plan, the Court must be guided by (1) the objectives of
the underlying statute(s) and (2) the interests of the silent class members. Nachshin, 663 F.3d at
1039. In Nachshin, the Ninth Circuit noted three guiding standards from earlier case law: a cy
pres distribution should (1) address the objectives of the underlying statutes, (2) target the
plaintiff class, or (3) provide reasonable certainty that any member will be benefitted. Id. at
10
1039. Nachshin, however, did not explain whether an individual organization must meet each of
11
these standards in order to be a proper cy pres recipient, or whether a strong nexus to one standard,
12
in the absence of a strong connection to the other standards, suffices to serve the interests of the
13
silent class members. In Nachshin, the Ninth Circuit reversed a cy pres award that fails to target
14
the plaintiff class and ha[s] no apparent relation to the objectives of the underlying statutes, and
15
it is not clear how [the cy pres recipient] would benefit the plaintiff class. Id. at 1040-41. Later,
16
in Dennis v. Kellogg Co., the Ninth Circuit again reversed a cy pres award when the cy pres
17
recipients did not relate to the underlying class claims and may not serve a single person within
18
the plaintiff class. 697 F.3d 858, 867 (9th Cir. 2012). The Ninth Circuit noted that a cy pres
19
distribution is unacceptable when the award has little or nothing to do with the purposes of the
20
underlying lawsuit or the class of plaintiffs involved. Id. at 866 (emphasis added) (quoting
21
Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1039). By contrast, the Ninth Circuit upheld a cy pres award when the cy
22
pres recipients promote[d] the causes of online privacy and security, which would benefit
23
absent class members and further the purposes of the privacy statutes that form the basis for the
24
class-plaintiffs lawsuit, and there [was] no issue in this case . . . [that] the cy pres entities
25
missions are unrelated to the classs interests or [] their geographic scope is too limited. Lane,
26
696 F.3d at 821.
27
28
22

Nachshin, Dennis, and Lane encourage the selection of cy pres recipients that both
promote the objectives of the underlying statute(s) and serve the interests of the silent class
members. Although the Court agrees that a nexus with both is preferable, the Court does not read
these cases to compel each cy pres recipient to have a nexus with both the underlying statutes and
the plaintiff class. Rather, the Court must be guided by these considerations and evaluate
whether the cy pres distribution is the next best distribution to giving the funds directly to the
class members. Dennis, 697 F.3d at 865. Here, the Court acknowledges that the connection
between NFTE and the underlying claims in the lawsuit is attenuated. However, after hearing
Class Counsel at the Final Approval Hearing, the Court finds Class Counsels explanation behind
10
the selection of NFTE to be credible, well-intentioned, and persuasive. Class Counsel has
11
convinced the Court that there is a nexus between NFTE and the plaintiff Class, and that it is
12
likely some plaintiff Class Members will benefit from designating NFTE as a cy pres recipient.
13
Thus, although cy pres distribution to NFTE does not serve the goals of the [underlying claims],
14
it does protect the interests of the silent class members. In light of this driving nexus between
15
the plaintiff class and the cy pres beneficiaries, Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1038-39, the Court finds
16
distribution to NFTE is not unreasonable.
17
The Courts conclusion is supported by two additional considerations. First, as discussed
18
above, Access Now and EPIC are closely tied to the underlying claims in the lawsuit. Thus, the
19
three cy pres recipients, together, target both the objectives of the underlying claims and the
20
plaintiff Class. Second, the amount of money that goes to NFTE is likely to be modest.
21
Settlement funds will only be distributed to the cy pres recipients if claimants do not cash their
22
checks or the bank deposits fail, and a second round of pro rata distribution to Class Members is
23
not feasible. The Class Members are highly motivated individuals who went through the trouble
24
of filling out a Claim Form under penalty of perjury. Thousands of Class Members even filled out
25
an additional form, after receiving notice from the Settlement Administrator that their Claim
26
Forms were deficient. Additionally, Class Members who chose to receive payment by direct
27
28
23
deposit submitted Claim Forms with their current bank account information only two months ago.
It is thus unlikely that many deposits will be rejected. Further, $20 is not a de minimis payment.
The Court does not believe that claimants who went through the effort of submitting a valid Claim
Form are unlikely to cash a $20 check. Finally, any cy pres distribution will be shared pro rata
among the three selected recipients. Accordingly, the Court finds that the cy pres distribution to
NFTE is likely to be small. See Lymburner v. U.S. Fin. Funding, Inc., No. C-08-00325 EDL,
2012 WL 398816, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2012) (noting that distribution to an organization with a
somewhat attenuated connection to the injured class was reasonable in light of the general focus
of the organization and the fact that the cy pres distribution would likely be minimal).
In sum, the Court finds that the pro rata distribution to Authorized Claimants is cost-

10
11
effective, simple, and fundamentally fair. High-Tech, 2015 WL 5159441, at *8 (internal
12
quotation marks omitted). Additionally, given the geographic diversity and varying substantive
13
focus of the cy pres recipients, the Court finds the cy pres distribution is sufficiently connected to
14
the Class and this lawsuit. Examining the distribution plan in its entirety, the Court concludes that
15
the distribution plan is reasonable.
16
IV.
17
The Request for Attorneys Fees Is Reasonable

Under Ninth Circuit law, the district court has discretion in common fund cases to choose
18
either the percentage-of-the-fund or the lodestar method. Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d
19
1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002). [T]he choice between lodestar and percentage calculation depends
20
on the circumstances, but [] either method may . . .have its place in determining what would be
21
reasonable compensation for creating a common fund. Six Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus
22
Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990) (ellipsis in original). To guard against an
23
unreasonable result, the Ninth Circuit has encouraged district courts to cross-check any
24
calculations done in one method against those of another method. Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1050-51.
25
Where the percentage-of-recovery method is employed, it is well established that 25% of a
26
common fund is the benchmark award of attorneys fees. See, e.g., In re Bluetooth Headset Prods.
27
28
24
Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2011) ([C]ourts typically calculate 25% of the fund as
the benchmark for a reasonable fee award, providing adequate explanation in the record of any
special circumstances justifying a departure.); Six Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d at 1311 ([W]e
established 25 percent of the fund as the benchmark award that should be given in common fund
cases.). The 25% benchmark rate, although a starting point for analysis, may be inappropriate in
some cases. Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1048. Upward departures may be warranted in particular
circumstances, while downward departures may be warranted where there is no realistic risk of
nonrecovery. In re Quantum Health Res., 962 F. Supp. 1254, 1257-58 (C.D. Cal. 1997).

Under the lodestar method, a lodestar figure is calculated by multiplying the number of
10
hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation (as supported by adequate
11
documentation) by a reasonable hourly rate for the region and for the experience of the lawyer.
12
In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 941 (citing Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 965 (9th Cir. 2003)).
13
The district court may adjust this lodestar figure upward or downward by an appropriate positive
14
or negative multiplier reflecting a host of reasonableness factors. Id. at 941-42.
15
Whether the Court awards the benchmark amount or some other rate, the award must be
16
supported by findings that take into account all of the circumstances of the case. Vizcaino, 290
17
F.3d at 1048. The Ninth Circuit has approved a number of factors which may be relevant to the
18
district courts determination: (1) the results achieved; (2) the risk of litigation; (3) the skill
19
required and the quality of work; (4) the contingent nature of the fee and the financial burden
20
carried by the plaintiffs; and (5) awards made in similar cases. See id. at 1048-1050.
21
Here, Class Counsel request 25% of the $13,000,000 Settlement, or $3,250,000. Mot. for
22
Attys Fees. This request is the benchmark for attorneys fees under the percentage-of-recovery
23
method. See In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 942. Additionally, the Court finds that the favors in
24
Vizcaino support the requested award.
25
First, Class Counsel has achieved monetary and non-monetary results in this case. Class
26
Counsel achieved a settlement in the amount of $13,000,000. That fund was made available to a
27
28
25
class of approximately 20.8 million people. The fund is non-reversionary, thus the entire Net
Settlement Fund (after deductions for attorneys fees, costs, incentive awards, and administrative
costs) will be fully paid to 441,161 Class Members with an average recovery for each participating
Class Members of approximately $20. Class Counsel also negotiated for the Email Notice to be
disseminated, and for claims to be validated, by LinkedIn at no additional cost to the Class, rather
than by the Settlement Administrator, which reduced administrative costs by approximately
$93,000.

Further, Ninth Circuit courts consistently have held that, where class counsel achieves
significant benefits that are not accounted for in the dollar value of the common settlement fund,
10
the court should consider the value of [such] relief obtained as a relevant circumstance in
11
determining what percentage of the common fund class counsel should receive as attorneys fees.
12
Staton, 327 F.3d at 974; see also Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1049 (affirming enhanced fee award where
13
the court found that counsels performance generated benefits beyond the case settlement fund);
14
Linney, 1997 WL 450064, at *7 (granting fee award of one-third common fund where settlement
15
provided additional non-monetary relief). As discussed above, as a result of the Settlement,
16
LinkedIn has revised its disclosures relating to its Add Connections service. In particular, the
17
disclosures now clarify that up to two Reminder Emails will be sent for each Add Connections
18
invitation. On its website, LinkedIn has added language to its Import Permission Screens,
19
including new Learn More and Help Center buttons, which alert LinkedIn users that importing
20
contact information in the Add Connections process entails a one-time upload of [the users]
21
address book contacts as well as their detailed contact information. Finally, LinkedIn has
22
implemented functionality allowing members who invite contacts to connect through Add
23
Connections to withdraw those invitations. This withdrawal functionality stops Reminder Emails
24
from being sent. Accordingly, the results achieved on behalf of the Class weigh in favor of
25
granting Class Counsels request for a fee award of 25%.
26
27
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Second, there were significant risks of litigation here. As discussed above, LinkedIn
26
contested its liability, and intended to contest class certification as well. This factor favors
granting Class Counsels request.
Third, with respect to the quality of litigation, Class Counsel is experienced in litigating
digital privacy class actions. Class Counsel assembled a team of three law firms with resources
and ability necessary to litigate these claims. They performed significant factual investigation
prior to bringing these actions, engaged in motion practice including opposing two motions to
dismiss, engaged in written discovery, and participated in protracted negotiations with LinkedIn,
including two full-day mediations, with the assistance of two different capable and experienced
mediators.

10
Fourth, Class Counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent basis with no guarantee
11
of recovery. All of the financial risk of litigation was assumed by Class Counsel, whose fee
12
arrangement with Plaintiffs requires Class Counsel to bear all of the costs of litigation and the
13
costs of attorney and paralegal time, which were substantial. Additionally, Class Counsel was, to
14
an extent, precluded from taking and devoting resources to other cases or potential cases, with no
15
guarantee that the time expended would result in any recovery or recoupment of costs.
16
Fifth, this award is consistent with attorneys fees awards made in similar cases. See In re
17
Google, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1135-36 (granting 25% benchmark attorneys fees); Fraley v. Facebook,
18
Inc., No. C 11-1726 RS, 2013 WL 4516806, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2013) (same); In re Netflix
19
Privacy Litig., 2013 WL 1120801, at *9-10 (same).
20
Moreover, cross-checking Class Counsels requested fee with Class Counsels lodestar
21
supports the reasonableness of Class Counsels request. Here, Class Counsels total lodestar was
22
$2,242,956, which results in a lodestar multiplier of 1.45. See Diamand Supp. Decl. 4. Class
23
Counsel asserts that the lodestar was calculated using the hourly rates Class Counsel normally
24
charges for class action litigation and is consistent with prevailing rates in this region. See Mot.
25
for Attys Fees at 15. This Court, within the last year, and other courts, have approved Class
26
Counsels customary rates used in calculating the lodestar here. See In re High-Tech Employee
27
28
27
Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-02509-LHK, 2015 WL 5158730, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2015); see
also Bayat v. Bank of the W., No. C-13-2376 EMC, 2015 WL 1744342, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15,
2015); In re TracFone Unlimited Serv. Plan Litig., No. C-13-3440 EMC, 2015 WL 4051882, at
*12 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2015). Additionally, Class Counsels reported time appears to adequately
reflect the amount of time reasonably spent on this litigation. See Diamand Decl. Ex. A (Lieff,
Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLPs hours); Diamand Supp. Decl. 2-6; ECF No. 116-2,
Decl. of Larry C. Russ (Russ August & Kabat, PCs hours); ECF No. 127-1, Supplemental Decl.
of Larry C. Russ; ECF No. 116-3, Decl. of Daniel P. Hipskind (Olavi Dunnes hours); ECF No.
127-3, Supplemental Decl. of Daniel P. Hipskind; see also ECF No. 129 (substituting Berger &
10
Hipskind LLP for Olavi Dunne LLP as Co-Lead Class Counsel).

The reported lodestar multiplier1.45is within the range of reasonableness. In

11
12
Vizcaino, the Ninth Circuit conducted a survey of attorneys fees awards in common fund cases
13
between 1996 and 2001. 290 F.3d at 1052-54. In the vast majority of cases (20 of 24, or 83%),
14
the multiplier ranged from 1.0-4.0. Id. at 1051 n.6. In a majority of cases, (13 of 24, or 54%), the
15
multiplier ranged from 1.5-3.0. See id. A multiplier of 1.45 falls within the lower end of this
16
range.
One additional consideration counsels in favor of Class Counsels request. Class
17
18
Counsels request is inclusive of costs, even though reasonable expenses may be reimbursed
19
separately in common fund cases. See Vincent v. Hughes Air W., Inc., 557 F.2d 759, 769 (9th Cir.
20
1977); accord Wininger v. SI Mgmt. L.P., 301 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, Class
21
Counsel effectively requests slightly less than the 25% benchmark.

Twenty-four objections were filed concerning the fees sought by class counsel.10 At least
22
23
eleven of these objectors appear to believe that the suit is frivolous, that no relief for the Class was
24
25
26
27
28
10
Boyan Boyanov, Daniel Brown and Jenny Hill, William Calderwood, Mary Don, Melanie Ford,
Gary Gill, Julie Gordon, Susan House, Mark Howard, Michael Hughes, Dylan Jacobs, August
Lasseter, Tom Lucas, Mary Means, Donald Muldoon, Robert Petersen, Karrie Reuter, Carol
Tomczyk, Steven White, Daniel Whitinger, Philip Wrona, Olen York, Farage Yusupov. Jue Decl.
Exs. 8-9, 11, 17, 21, 23, 25, 29, 31-33, 42, 44, 47, 50, 54, 59, 74, 79-80, 83-85.
28
necessary, and that any award of attorneys fees would be unwarranted.11 The remaining objectors
believe that the requested fee is unreasonably high and that Class Counsel did not perform
sufficient work to justify the award.

The Court overrules these objections. First, the Court has already found that this litigation

4
5
is not frivolous, by permitting some claims to survive two motions to dismiss. See In re High-
Tech Employee Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-2509-LHK, 2014 WL 10520478, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May
16, 2014) (finding objection that case should not have been brought at all. . . is not a valid
objection, particularly in light of the fact that the Court has found this litigation to be
meritorious). Second, as discussed above, the Court finds the fee to be reasonable, and finds that
10
the hours expended by Class Counsel are reasonable in light of the work undertaken in this case.
11
Class Counsel fully briefed and successfully argued two motions to dismiss, researched and
12
prepared amended complaints, engaged in formal and informal discovery, researched complex
13
class certification issues, engaged in further mediation-related discovery, twice mediated, and
14
ultimately, settled this case. Additionally, Class Counsel achieved substantial monetary and non-
15
monetary relief for the Class.

Two objectors, Daniel Brown and Jenny Hill, additionally contend that Class Counsels fee
16
17
request is improper because it seeks 25% of the total settlement fund, before deducting
18
administrative costs, citing In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d 935. Jue Decl. Ex. 9, at 3. However, In re
19
Bluetooth does not require the benchmark to be determined according to the net Settlement fund.
20
The rule proposed by Daniel Brown and Jenny Hill is not the law in the Ninth Circuit, and, indeed,
21
would contradict the precedent of this district. See, e.g., Chavez, 2015 WL 9258144, at *8
22
(awarding 25% of common fund calculated before deductions for costs or administrative
23
expenses); In re Google, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1135-36 (same); Fraley, 2013 WL 4516806, at *3
24
(same).
25
26
27
28
11
William Calderwood, Mary Don, Melanie Ford, Gary Gill, Julie Gordon, Tom Lucas, Donald
Muldoon, Robert Petersen, Karrie Reuter, Carol Tomczyk, Philip Wrona. Jue Decl. Exs. 11, 17,
21, 23, 25, 44, 50, 54, 59, 74, 83.
29
Lastly, Susan House and Mary Means object on the basis that Class Counsel did not

1
2
provide sufficient information for the Court to determine the reasonableness of the fee. [I]t is
well established that [t]he lodestar cross-check calculation need entail neither mathematical
precision nor bean counting . . . [courts] may rely on summaries submitted by the attorneys and
need not review actual billing records. Bellinghausen v. Tractor Supply Co., 306 F.R.D. 245,
264 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (citations omitted) (second and third alterations in original); Covillo v.
Specialtys Cafe, No. C-11-00594 DMR, 2014 WL 954516, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2014) (same).
In sworn declarations, Class Counsel has provided detailed summaries of their time,
demonstrating both the number of hours spent by specific individuals on the necessary work, and
10
the nature of the work performed. Class Counsels submission, under the circumstances of this
11
case, is sufficient for the Court to cross-check Class Counsels lodestar.

In sum, Class Counsels request represents an appropriate multiplier under the lodestar
12
13
method when compared to other common fund cases, and represents the benchmark award under
14
the percentage-of-recovery method. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that Class
15
Counsels request for $3,250,000 in attorneys fees is reasonable.
16
V.
The Request for Class Representative Awards is Reasonable
17
In evaluating whether representative plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable incentive
18
payments, district courts must evaluate their awards individually, using relevant factors
19
includ[ing] the actions the plaintiff has taken to protect the interests of the class, the degree to
20
which the class has benefitted from those actions, . . .the amount of time and effort the plaintiff
21
expended in pursuing the litigation . . . and reasonabl[e] fear[s of] workplace retaliation. Staton,
22
327 F.3d at 977 (alterations and ellipses in original) (quoting Cook v. Niedert, 142 F.3d 1004,
23
1016 (7th Cir. 1998)).
24
The Ninth Circuit has established $5,000 as a reasonable benchmark award for
25
representative plaintiffs. See In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d at 947-48; In re
26
Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 463 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, there are 9 Class
27
28
30
Representatives: Paul Perkins, Pennie Sempell, Ann Brandwein, Erin Eggers, Clare Connaughton,
Jake Kushner, Natalie Richstone, Nicole Crosby, and Leslie Wall. Class Counsel seeks $1,500 per
named plaintiff. See Mot. for Attys Fees, at 16. The Court finds this request reasonable in light
of the Staton factors discussed above.

First, with respect to the actions taken by the plaintiff to protect the interests of the class,
the Class Representatives have assisted Class Counsel with the prosecution of the Classs claims,
including relating the details of their embarrassment as a result of LinkedIns alleged conduct,
preserving relevant documentation and evidence for discovery, staying abreast of events in the
litigation and providing their opinions on the proposed settlement. Diamand Decl. 27. Two
10
Class Representatives, Pennie Sempell and Erin Eggers, also attended and participated in the
11
parties mediations. Id.
12
Second, as to the benefit to the Class, Class Members who submitted a valid Claim Form
13
will receive approximately $20 each, and all Class Members will benefit from the prospective
14
relief. Objector Susan Housethe only objector to the incentive awardsclaims that the
15
incentive awards are excessive compared to the pro rata recovery for each Class Member.
16
However, the requested incentive payments ($13,500 in total) would represent only 0.1% of the
17
Settlement. See In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d at 947-48 (holding that awards
18
cumulatively representing mere .17% of settlement fund were reasonable); Chavez, 2015 WL
19
9258144, at *9 (approving incentive awards of $5,000 and $2,500 to the two named Plaintiffs,
20
compared to a pro rata recovery of $130 for the unnamed Class Members, when the incentive
21
awards represented only 0.005% of the total settlement). Thus, Class Members have received a
22
significant benefit, and the requested awards to Class Representatives represent only a small part
23
of this benefit. Susan Houses objection is overruled.
24
Third, with respect to the amount of time and effort expended, Class Counsel declares that
25
each Class Representative has devoted substantial time and effort assisting Class Counsel on
26
this case. Diamand Decl. 27. Given that this case has been litigated for two and a half years,
27
28
31
and the stage of the proceedings, it is credible that named Plaintiffs spent time and effort helping
counsel to litigate this case. This factor favors incentive awards.

Fourth, as to the reasonable fears of workplace retaliation, none of the named Plaintiffs
3
4
worked for LinkedIn, and there is no allegation that any named Plaintiff will face workplace
retaliation. However, the named Plaintiffs may still suffer negative consequences in the
workplace for filing a lawsuit, especially as the instant case received significant media attention
and involves a high profile company.

Weighing all of the Staton factors, the Court concludes that Class Counsels request for
8
9
10

11
incentive awards of $1,500 for each Class Representative is reasonable.

VI.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs motion for final approval of the
12
proposed class action Settlement, and GRANTS Class Counsels motion for approval of attorneys
13
fees, costs, and incentive awards. Accordingly, the Court awards $3,250,000 in attorneys fees to
14
Class Counsel and $1,500 incentive awards each to Paul Perkins, Pennie Sempell, Ann
15
Brandwein, Erin Eggers, Clare Connaughton, Jake Kushner, Natalie Richstone, Nicole Crosby,
16
and Leslie Wall.
17
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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19
20
21
Dated: February 16, 2016

______________________________________
LUCY H. KOH
United States District Judge
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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

United States District Court

PAUL PERKINS, et al.,

Case No. 13-CV-04303-LHK

Re: Dkt. Nos. 116, 126

set forth in the Settlement Agreement.

United States District Court

The Settlement Is Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable

reasonable in light of these factors.

United States District Court

weighs in favor of final approval.

United States District Court

million members). Additionally, there is no possibility of reversion to LinkedIn.

perspective on the strengths and weaknesses of their respective cases.

United States District Court

the distribution plan, attorneys fees, and incentive awards respectively.

United States District Court

United States District Court

fairness of the settlement).

Settlement is too low.

United States District Court

achieved. [T]he very essence of a settlement is compromise, a yielding of absolutes and an

United States District Court

(internal quotation marks omitted).

United States District Court

omitted)). Accordingly, these objections are overruled.

United States District Court

United States District Court

The Notice Program Was Appropriate

Courts order granting preliminary approval).

United States District Court

direct deposit into the claimants bank account, or payment by check.

approximately 10,000 calls from Class Members. Meyer Decl. 8.

United States District Court

costs. See In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-02509-LHK, 2015 WL

indication of the possible payment amount.

United States District Court

United States District Court

questions. Meyer Decl. 21.

United States District Court

received an independent certification and accreditation with regard to information technology

infrastructure and security requirements. Burke Decl. 16.

due process and Rule 23.

The Plan of Distribution is Fair, Reasonable and Adequate.

effective, simple, and fundamentally fair. High-Tech, 2015 WL 5159441, at *8 (quoting In re

distribution eminently reasonable and fair to the class members).

United States District Court

1.12, and on the Settlement Website.

determine what is economically feasible. Additionally, as LinkedIn acknowledged at the Final

recovery under a direct distribution would be de minimis).

economically feasible. Settlement 3.1.2(b).

United States District Court

ideal. Lane, 696 F.3d at 821.