Pioneer Texturizing Corp Vs NLRC

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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATEDVOLUME280
806
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pioneer Texturizing Corp. vs. NLRC
*
G.R. No. 118651. October 16, 1997.
PIONEER TEXTURIZING CORP. and/or JULIANO LIM,

petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, PIONEER TEXTURIZING WORKERS
UNION and LOURDES A. DE JESUS, respondents.
Labor Law Illegal Dismissal Due Process Lack of a just
cause in the dismissal from service of an employee renders the
dismissal illegal, despite the employers observance of procedural
due process.Gleaned either from the Labor Arbiters
observations or from the NLRCs assessment, it distinctly appears
that petitioners accusation of dishonesty and tampering of official
records and documents with intention of cheating against de
Jesus was not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
Petitioners simply failed, both before the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC, to discharge the burden of proof
______________
*
EN BANC.
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and to validly justify de Jesus dismissal from service. The law, in

this light, directs the employers, such as herein petitioners, not to
terminate the services of an employee except for a just or
authorized cause under the Labor Code. Lack of a just cause in
the dismissal from service of an employee, as in this case, renders
the dismissal illegal, despite the employers observance of
procedural due process.
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000015288e733b694962cd9003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False
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Same Same Management Prerogatives While an employer

has the inherent right to discipline its employees, this right must
always be exercised humanely, and the penalty it must impose
should be commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree
of its infraction.We also find the imposition of the extreme
penalty of dismissal against de Jesus as certainly harsh and
grossly disproportionate to the negligence committed, especially
where said employee holds a faithful and an untarnished twelve
year service record. While an employer has the inherent right to
discipline its employees, we have always held that this right must
always be exercised humanely, and the penalty it must impose
should be commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree
of its infraction. The employer should bear in mind that, in the
exercise of such right, what is at stake is not only the employees
position but her livelihood as well.
Same Same Loss of Confidence While loss of confidence is
one of the valid grounds for termination of employment, the same,
however, cannot be used as a pretext to vindicate each and every
instance of unwarranted dismissalto be a valid ground, it must
be shown that the employee concerned is responsible for the
misconduct or infraction and that the nature of his participation
therein rendered him absolutely unworthy of the trust and
confidence demanded by his position.Equally unmeritorious is
petitioners assertion that the dismissal is justified on the basis of
loss of confidence. While loss of confidence, as correctly argued by
petitioners, is one of the valid grounds for termination of
employment, the same, however, cannot be used as a pretext to
vindicate each and every instance of unwarranted dismissal. To
be a valid ground, it must be shown that the employee concerned
is responsible for the misconduct or infraction and that the nature
of his participation therein rendered him absolutely unworthy of
the trust and confidence demanded by his position. In this case,
petitioners were unsuccessful in establishing their accusations of
dishonesty and tampering of records with intention of cheating.
Indeed, even if petitioners allegations against de Jesus were true,
they just the same failed to prove that her position needs
808
808

the continued and unceasing trust of her employers. The breach of

trust must be related to the performance of the employees
functions. Surely, de Jesus who occupies the position of a
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reviser/trimmer does not require the petitioners perpetual and

full confidence.
Same Same Reinstatement Statutory Construction As a
rule, shall in a statute commonly denotes an imperative
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretionthe
presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute, is
mandatory.We note that prior to the enactment of R.A. No.
6715, Article 223 of the Labor Code contains no provision dealing
with the reinstatement of an illegally dismissed employee. The
amendment introduced by R.A. No. 6715 is an innovation and a
far departure from the old law indicating thereby the legislatures
unequivocal intent to insert a new rule that will govern the
reinstatement aspect of a decision or resolution in any given labor
dispute. In fact, the law as now worded employs the phrase shall
immediately be executory without qualification emphasizing the
need for prompt compliance. As a rule, shall in a statute
commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent
with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the
word shall, when used in a statute, is mandatory. An appeal or
posting of bond, by plain mandate of the law, could not even
forestall nor stay the executory nature of an order of
reinstatement. The law, moreover, is unambiguous and clear.
Thus, it must be applied according to its plain and obvious
meaning, according to its express terms.
Same Same Same Same To require the application for and
issuance of a writ of execution as prerequisites for the execution of
a reinstatement award would certainly betray and run counter to
the very object and intent of Art. 223 of the Labor Code, i.e., the
immediate execution of a reinstatement order.Article 224 states
that the need for a writ of execution applies only within five (5)
years from the date a decision, an order or award becomes final
and executory. It can not relate to an award or order of
reinstatement still to be appealed or pending appeal which Article
223 contemplates. The provision of Article 223 is clear that an
award for reinstatement shall be immediately executory even
pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer shall not
stay the execution for reinstatement. The legislative intent is quite
obvious, i.e., to make an award of reinstatement immediately
enforceable, even pending appeal. To require the application for
and issuance of a writ of execution as prerequisites for the
execution of a reinstatement award would certainly
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betray and run counter to the very object and intent of Article
223, i.e., the immediate execution of a reinstatement order. The
reason is simple. An application for a writ of execution and its
issuance could be delayed for numerous reasons. A mere
continuance or postponement of a scheduled hearing, for instance,
or an inaction on the part of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC could
easily delay the issuance of the writ thereby setting at naught the
strict mandate and noble purpose envisioned by Article 223. In
other words, if the requirements of Article 224 were to govern, as
we so declared in Maranaw, then the executory nature of a
reinstatement order or award contemplated by Article 223 will be
unduly circumscribed and rendered ineffectual.
Same Same Same Same In introducing a new rule on the
reinstatement aspect of a labor decision under R.A. No. 6715,
Congress should not be considered to be indulging in mere
semantic exercise On appeal the appellate tribunal concerned may
enjoin or suspend the reinstatement order in the exercise of its
sound discretion.In enacting the law, the legislature is
presumed to have ordained a valid and sensible law, one which
operates no further than may be necessary to achieve its specific
purpose. Statutes, as a rule, are to be construed in the light of the
purpose to be achieved and the evil sought to be remedied. And
where the statute is fairly susceptible of two or more
constructions, that construction should be adopted which will
most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker
and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a
construction should be rejected which would tend to render
abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object
which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. In
introducing a new rule on the reinstatement aspect of a labor
decision under R.A. No. 6715, Congress should not be considered
to be indulging in mere semantic exercise. On appeal, however,
the appellate tribunal concerned may enjoin or suspend the
reinstatement order in the exercise of its sound discretion.
Same Same Same Same Henceforth, an award or order for
reinstatement is selfexecutoryafter receipt of the decision or
resolution ordering the employees reinstatement, the employer has
the right to choose whether to readmit the employee to work under
the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or
to reinstate the employee in the payroll.Furthermore, the rule is
that all doubts in the interpretation and implementation of labor
laws should be resolved in favor of labor. In ruling that an order
or award for rein
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statement does not require a writ of execution the Court is simply

adhering and giving meaning to this rule. Henceforth, we rule
that an award or order for reinstatement is selfexecutory. After
receipt of the decision or resolution ordering the employees
reinstatement, the employer has the right to choose whether to
readmit the employee to work under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or to reinstate the
employee in the payroll. In either instance, the employer has to
inform the employee of his choice. The notification is based on
practical considerations for without notice, the employee has no
way of knowing if he has to report for work or not.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Law Firm of Chan, Robles and Associates for
petitioners.
Clara Rita A. Padilla for private respondents.
FRANCISCO, J.:
The facts are as follows:
Private respondent Lourdes A. de Jesus is petitioners
reviser/trimmer since 1980. As reviser/trimmer, de Jesus
based her assigned work on a paper note posted by
petitioners. The posted paper which contains the
corresponding price for the work to be accomplished by a
worker is identified by its P.O. Number. On August 15,
1992, de Jesus worked on P.O. No. 3853 by trimming the
cloths ribs. She thereafter submitted tickets corresponding
to the work done to her supervisor. Three days later, de
Jesus received from petitioners personnel manager a
memorandum requiring her to explain why no disciplinary
action should be taken against her for dishonesty and
tampering of official records and documents with the
intention of cheating as P.O. No. 3853 allegedly required no
trimming. The memorandum also placed her under
preventive suspension for thirty days starting from August
19, 1992. In her handwritten explanation, de Jesus
maintained that she merely committed a mistake in
trimming P.O. No. 3853 as it
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has the same style and design as P.O. No. 3824 which has
an attached price list for trimming the ribs and admitted
that she may have been negligent in presuming that the
same work was to be done with P.O. No. 3853, but not for
dishonesty
or
tampering.
Petitioners
personnel
department, nonetheless, terminated her from employment
and sent her a notice of termination dated September 18,
1992.
On September 22, 1992, de Jesus filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against petitioners. The Labor Arbiter who
heard the case noted that de Jesus was amply accorded
procedural due process in her termination from service.
Nevertheless, after observing that de Jesus made some
further trimming on P.O. No. 3853 and that her dismissal
was not justified, the Labor Arbiter held petitioners guilty
of illegal dismissal. Petitioners were accordingly ordered to
reinstate de Jesus to her previous position without loss of
seniority rights and with full backwages from the time of
her suspension on August 19, 1992. Dissatisfied with the
Labor Arbiters decision, petitioners appealed to public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC).
1
In its July 21, 1994 decision, the NLRC ruled that de
Jesus was negligent in presuming that the ribs of P.O. No.
3853 should likewise be trimmed for having the same style
and design as P.O. No. 3824, thus petitioners cannot be
entirely faulted for dismissing de Jesus. The NLRC
declared that the status quo between them should be
maintained and affirmed the Labor Arbiters order of
reinstatement, but without backwages. The NLRC further
directed petitioner to pay de Jesus her back salaries from
the date she filed her motion for execution on September
21, 1993 2 up to the date of the promulgation of [the]
decision. Petitioners filed their partial motion for
reconsideration which the NLRC denied, hence this
petition anchored substantially on the alleged NLRCs
error in holding that de Jesus is entitled to reinstatement
and back salaries. On
_______________
1
Second Division: Perez, Pres. Comm. Calaycay, Rayala, Comms.
NLRC Decision, p. 7 Rollo, p. 35.

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March 6, 1996, petitioners filed its supplement to the

petition amplifying further their arguments. In a resolution
dated February 20, 1995, the Court required respondents
to comment thereon. Private respondent de Jesus and the
Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public
respondent NLRC, subsequently filed their comments.
Thereafter, petitioners filed two rejoinders [should be
replies] to respondents respective comments. Respondents
in due time filed their rejoinders.
There are two interrelated and crucial issues, namely:
(1) whether or not de Jesus was illegally dismissed, and (2)
whether or not an order for reinstatement needs a writ of
execution.
Petitioners insist that the NLRC gravely abused its
discretion in holding that de Jesus is entitled to
reinstatement to her previous position for she was not
illegally dismissed in the first place. In support thereof,
petitioners quote portions of the NLRC decision which
stated that respondents [petitioners herein] cannot
be
3
entirely faulted for dismissing the complainant and that
there4 was no illegal dismissal to speak of in the case at
bar. Petitioners further add that de Jesus breached the
trust reposed in her, hence her dismissal from service is
proper on the basis of loss of confidence, citing as authority
the cases of Ocean Terminal Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 197
SCRA 491 CocaCola Bottlers Phil., Inc. v. NLRC, 172
SCRA 751, 5 and Piedad v. Lanao del Norte Electric
Cooperative, 154 SCRA 500.
The arguments lack merit.
The entire paragraph which comprises the gist of the
NLRCs decision from where petitioners derived and
isolated the aforequoted portions of the NLRCs observation
reads in full as follows:
_______________
3
Petition, p. 12 Rollo, p. 13.
Id. Rejoinder [should be Reply] to the Comment of the Office of the
Solicitor General, pp. 23.

5
Piedads correct citation is 153 SCRA 500, and not 154 SCRA 500 as
inadvertently stated by the petitioners.

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We cannot fully subscribe to the complainants claim that she
trimmed the ribs of PO3853 in the light of the sworn statement of
her supervisor Rebecca Madarcos (Rollo, p. 64) that no trimming
was necessary because the ribs were already of the proper length.
The complainant herself admitted in her sinumpaang salaysay
(Rollo, p. 45) that Aking napansin na hindi pantaypantay ang
lapad ng mga ribs PO3853mas maigsi and nagupit ko sa mga
ribs ng PO3853 kaysa sa mga ribs ng mga nakaraang POs. The
complainant being an experienced reviser/trimmer for almost
twelve (12) years should have called the attention of her
supervisor regarding her observation of PO3853. It should be
noted that complainant was trying to claim as production output
447 pieces of trimmed ribs of PO3853 which respondents insists
that complainant did not do any. She was therefore negligent in
presuming that the ribs of PO3853 should likewise be trimmed for
having the same style and design as PO3824. Complainant cannot
pass on the blame to her supervisor whom she claimed checked
the said tickets prior to the submission to the Accounting
Department. As explained by respondent, what the supervisor
does is merely the submission of tickets and do some checking
before forwarding the same to the Accounting Department. It was
never disputed that it is the Accounting Department who does the
detailed checking and computation of the tickets as has been the
company policy and practice. Based on the foregoing and
considering that respondent cannot be entirely faulted for
dismissing complainant as the complainant herself was also
negligent in the performance of her job, We hereby rule that
status quo between them should be maintained as a matter of
course. We thus affirm the decision of Labor Arbiter reinstating
the complainant but without backwages. The award of backwages
in general are granted on grounds of equity for earnings which a
worker or employee has lost due to his illegal dismissal. (Indophil
Acrylic Mfg. Corporation vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 96488 September 27,
1993) There being no illegal dismissal to speak in the case
at bar,
6
the award for backwages should necessarily be deleted.
We note that the NLRCs decision is quite categorical in

finding that de Jesus was merely negligent in the
performance of her duty. Such negligence, the Labor
Arbiter deline
___________
6
NLRC Decision, pp. 57 Rollo, pp. 3335.

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ated, was brought

improvidence. Thus:
about
by
the
petitioners
plain
After careful assessment of the allegations and documents

available on record, we are convinced that the penalty of
dismissal was not justified.
At the outset, it is remarkable that respondents did not deny
nor dispute that P.O. 3853 has the same style and design as P.O.
3824 that P.O. 3824 was made as guide for the work done on P.O.
3853 and, most importantly, that the notation correction on P.O.
3824 was made only after the error was discovered by
respondents Accounting Department.
Be that as it may, the factual issue in this case is whether or
not complainant trimmed the ribs of P.O. 3853?
Respondents maintained that she did not because the record
in Accounting Department allegedly indicates that no trimming is
to be done on P.O. 3853. Basically, this allegation is
unsubstantiated.
It must be emphasized that in termination cases the burden of
proof rests upon the employer.
In the instant case, respondents mere allegation that P.O.
3853 need not be trimmed does not satisfy the proof required to
warrant complainants dismissal.
Now, granting that the Accounting record is correct, we still
believe that complainant did some further trimming on P.O. 3853
based on the following grounds:
Firstly, Supervisor Rebecca Madarcos who ought to know the
work to be performed because she was incharge of assigning jobs,
reported no anomally when the tickets were submitted to her.
Incidentally, supervisor Madarcos testimony is suspect
because if she could recall what she ordered the complainant to do
seven (7) months ago (to revise the collars and plackets of shirts)
there was no reason for her not to detect the alleged tampering at
the time complainant submitted her tickets, after all, that was
part of her job, if not her main job.
Secondly, she did not exceed her quota, otherwise she could
have simply asked for more.
That her output was remarkably big granting it is true, is well
explained in that the parts she had trimmed were lesser
compared to those which she had cut before.
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In this connection, respondents misinterpreted the handwritten

explanation of the complainant dated 20 August 1992, because
the letter never admits that she never trimmed P.O. 3853, on the
contrary the following sentence,
Sa katunayan nakapagbawas naman talaga ako na di ko inaasahang
inalis na pala ang presyo ng Sec. 9 P.O. 3853 na ito.
7
is crystal clear that she did trim the ribs on P.O. 3853.
Gleaned either from the Labor Arbiters observations or
from the NLRCs assessment, it distinctly appears that
petitioners accusation of dishonesty and tampering of
official records and documents with intention of cheating
against de Jesus was not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence. Petitioners simply failed, both before
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, to discharge the burden
of proof and to validly justify de Jesus dismissal from
service. The law, in this light, directs the employers, such
as herein petitioners, not to terminate the services of an
employee except
for a just or authorized cause under the
8
Labor Code. Lack of a just cause in the dismissal from
service of an employee, as in this case, renders the
dismissal illegal, despite
the employers observance of
9
procedural due process. And while the NLRC stated that
there was no illegal dismissal to speak of in the case at
bar and that petitioners cannot be entirely faulted
therefor, said statements are inordinate pronouncements
which did not remove the assailed dismissal from the realm
of illegality. Neither can these pronouncements preclude us
from holding otherwise.
We also find the imposition of the extreme penalty of
dismissal against de Jesus as certainly harsh and grossly
disproportionate to the negligence committed, especially
where said
________________
7
Decision of the Labor Arbiter, pp. 46 Rollo, pp. 4143.
Art. 279, Labor Code, as amended.
Oania v. NLRC, 244 SCRA 668 Citytrust Finance Corp. v. NLRC, 157
SCRA 87 Manila Midtown Commercial Corp. v. Nuwhrain, 159 SCRA

212 Stellar Services, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117418, January 24, 1996.
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employee holds a faithful and an untarnished twelveyear

service record. While an employer has the inherent right to
discipline its employees, we have always held that this
right must always be exercised humanely, and the penalty
it must impose should be commensurate 10to the offense
involved and to the degree of its infraction. The employer
should bear in mind that, in the exercise of such right,
what is at stake is not only the employees position but her
livelihood as well.
Equally unmeritorious is petitioners assertion that the
dismissal is justified on the basis of loss of confidence.
While loss of confidence, as correctly argued by petitioners,
is one of the valid grounds for termination of employment,
the same, however, cannot be used as a pretext to vindicate
each and every instance of unwarranted dismissal. To be a
valid ground, it must be shown that the employee
concerned is responsible for the misconduct or infraction
and that the nature of his participation therein rendered
him absolutely unworthy11 of the trust and confidence
demanded by his position. In this case, petitioners were
unsuccessful in establishing their accusations of dishonesty
and tampering of records with intention of cheating.
Indeed, even if petitioners allegations against de Jesus
were true, they just the same failed to prove that her
position needs the continued and unceasing trust of her
employers. The breach of trust must 12
be related to the
performance of the employees functions. Surely, de Jesus
who occupies the position of a reviser/trimmer does not
require the petitioners perpetual and full confidence. In
this regard, petitioners reliance on the cases of Ocean
Terminal Services, Inc. v. NLRC CocaCola Bottlers Phil.,
Inc. v. NLRC and Piedad v. Lanao del Norte
______________
10
Solmac Marketing, Inc., and Armando Macam v. NLRC, G.R. No.
116574, February 12, 1996.

11
Nevans v. CIR, 23 SCRA 1321 Galsim v. Philippine National Bank,
29 SCRA 293 Reyes v. Zamora, 90 SCRA 92 Tabacalera Insurance Co. v.

NLRC, 152 SCRA 667.
12
Quezon Electric Cooperative v. NLRC, 172 SCRA 88 Valladolid v.
Inciong, 121 SCRA 2053.

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Electric Cooperative, which when perused involve positions

that require the employers full trust and confidence, is
wholly misplaced. In Ocean Terminal Services, for instance,
the dismissed employee was designated as expediter and
canvasser whose responsibility is mainly to make
emergency procurements of tools and equipment and was
entrusted with the necessary cash for buying them. The
case of CocaCola Bottlers, on the other hand, involves a
sales agent whose job exposes him to the everyday financial
transactions involving the employers goods and funds,
while that of Piedad concerns a bill collector who
essentially handles the employers cash collections.
Undoubtedly, the position of a reviser/trimmer could not be
equated with that of a canvasser, sales agent, or a bill
collector. Besides, the involved employees in the three
aforementioned cases were clearly proven guilty of
infractions unlike private respondent in the case at bar.
Thus, petitioners dependence on these cited cases is
inaccurate, to say the least. More, whether or not de Jesus
meets the days quota of 13work she, just the same, is paid
the daily minimum wage.
Corollary to our determination that de Jesus was
illegally dismissed is her imperative entitlement to
14
reinstatement and backwages as mandated by law.
Whence, we move to the second issue, i.e., whether or not
an order for reinstatement needs a writ of execution.
Petitioners theory is that an order for reinstatement is
not selfexecutory. They stress that there must be a writ of
execution which may be issued by the NLRC or by the
Labor Arbiter motu proprio or on motion of an interested
party. They further maintain that even if a writ of
execution was issued, a timely appeal coupled by the
posting of appropriate supersedeas bond, which they did in
this case, effectively forestalled and stayed execution of the
reinstatement order of the Labor
_______________
13
Rollo, p. 39.
14
Article 279, Labor Code, as amended Pantranco North Express, Inc.
v. NLRC, G.R. No. 114333, January 24, 1996 Oania v. NLRC, 244 SCRA
668 Valiant Machinery and Metal Corporation and Jimmy Lua Sing v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 105877, January 25, 1996.
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Arbiter. As supporting authority, petitioners emphatically

cite and bank on the case of Maranaw Hotel Resort
Corporation (Century Park Sheraton Manila) v. NLRC, 238
SCRA 190.
Private respondent de Jesus, for her part, maintains
that petitioners should have reinstated her immediately
after the decision of the Labor Arbiter ordering her
reinstatement was promulgated since the law mandates
that an order for reinstatement is immediately executory.
An appeal, she says, could not stay the execution of a
reinstatement order for she could either be admitted back
to work or merely reinstated in the payroll without need of
a writ of execution. De Jesus argues that a writ of
execution is necessary only for the enforcement of
decisions, orders, or awards which have acquired finality.
In effect, de Jesus is urging the Court to reexamine the
ruling laid down in Maranaw.
Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No.
6715 which took effect on March 21, 1989, pertinently
provides:
ART. 223. Appeal.Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor
Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the
Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days
from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may
be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
x x x x x x x x x
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a
dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement
aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending
appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under
separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in
the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay
the execution for reinstatement provided herein.
x x x x x x x x x
We initially interpreted
the
aforequoted provision in
15
16
Inciong v. NLRC. The Court made this brief comment:
________________
15
185 SCRA 651, 655.
16
First Division: GrioAquino, J., ponente Narvasa [now C.J.], Cruz,
and Medialdea, JJ., concurring.

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819

The decision of the Labor Arbiter in this case was rendered on
December 18, 1988, or three (3) months before Article 223 of the
Labor Code was amended by Republic Act 6715 (which became
law on March 21, 1989), providing that a decision of the Labor
Arbiter ordering the reinstatement of a dismissed or separated
employee shall be immediately executory insofar as the
reinstatement aspect is concerned, and the posting of an appeal
bond by the employer shall not stay such execution. Since this
new law contains no provision giving it retroactive effect (Art. 4,
Civil Code), the amendment may not be applied to this case.
which 17the Court adopted and applied in Callanta

v.
18
NLRC. In Zamboanga City Water District v. Buat, the
Court construed Article 223 to mean exactly what it says.
We said:
Under the said provision of law, the decision of the Labor Arbiter
reinstating a dismissed or separated employee insofar as the
reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall be immediately
executory, even pending appeal. The employer shall reinstate the
employee concerned either by: (a) actually admitting him back to
work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his
dismissal or separation or (b) at the option of the employer,
merely reinstating him in the payroll. Immediate reinstatement is
mandated and is not stayed by the fact that the employer has
19
appealed, or has posted a cash or surety bond pending appeal.
We expressed a similar view a year earlier in Medina

v.
20
Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS)DZWX and laid
down the rule that an employer who fails to comply with an
order of reinstatement makes him liable for the employees
salaries. Thus:
_________________
17
225 SCRA 526 Third Division: Bidin, J., ponente Feliciano, Romero,
Melo and Vitug, JJ., concurring.

18
232 SCRA 587 First Division: Quiason, J., ponente Davide, Jr., and
Bellosillo, JJ., concurring Cruz and Kapunan, JJ., on leave.

19
232 SCRA at p. 593.
20
222 SCRA 707 Third Division Melo, J., ponente Feliciano, Bidin,
Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concurring.

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Petitioners construe the above paragraph to mean that the

refusal of the employer to reinstate an employee as directed in an
executory order of reinstatement would make it liable to pay the
latters salaries. This interpretation is correct. Under Article 223
of the Labor Code, as amended, an employer has two options in
order for him to comply with an order of reinstatement, which is
immediately executory, even pending appeal. Firstly, he can
admit the dismissed employee back to work under the same terms
and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or to
a substantially equivalent position if the former position is
already filled up as we have ruled in Union of Supervisors (RB)
NATU vs. Sec. of Labor, 128 SCRA 442 [1984] and Pedroso vs.
Castro, 141 SCRA 252 [1986]. Secondly, he can reinstate the
employee merely in the payroll. Failing to exercise any of the
above options, the employer can be compelled under pain of
contempt, to pay instead the salary of the employee. This
interpretation is more in consonance with the constitutional
protection to labor (Section 3, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution). The
right of a person to his labor is deemed to be property within the
meaning of the constitutional guaranty that no one shall be
deprived of life, liberty, and property without due process of law.
Therefore, he should be protected against any arbitrary and
unjust deprivation of his job (Bondoc vs. Peoples Bank and Trust
Co., Inc., 103 SCRA 599 [1981]). The employee should not be left
without any remedy in case the employer unreasonably delays
reinstatement. Therefore, we hold that the unjustified refusal of
the employer to reinstate an illegally dismissed
employee entitles
21
the employee to payment of his salaries x x x.
The Court, however, deviated from this construction in the

case of Maranaw. Reinterpreting
the import of Article 223
22
in Maranaw, the Court declared that the reinstatement
aspect of the Labor Arbiters decision needs a writ of
execution as it is not selfexecutory, a declaration the Court
recently reiterated
and adopted in Archilles Manufacturing
23
Corp. v. NLRC.
______________
21
222 SCRA at pp. 710711.
22
First Division: Davide, Jr., J., ponente Padilla, Bellosillo, Quiason
and Kapunan, JJ., concurring.

23
244 SCRA 750 First Division: Bellosillo, J., ponente Padilla, Davide,
Jr., and Kapunan, JJ., concurring Quiason, J., on leave.
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821
VOL. 280, OCTOBER 16, 1997
821
We note that
prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 6715,
24
Article 223 of the Labor Code contains no provision
dealing with
_______________
24
ART. 223. Appeal.Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter
or compulsory arbitrators are final and executory unless appealed to the

Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10) days from receipt
of such awards, orders, or decisions. Such appeal may be entertained only
on any of the following grounds:
(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of
the Labor Arbiter or Compulsory Arbitrator
(b) If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or
coercion, including graft and corruption
(c) If made purely on questions of law and
(d) If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would
cause grave abuse or irreparable damage or injury to the
appellant.
To discourage frivolous or dilatory appeals, the Commission or the
Labor Arbiter shall impose reasonable penalty, including fines or
censures, upon the erring parties.
In all cases, the appellant shall furnish a copy of the memorandum of
appeal to the other party who shall file an answer not later than ten (10)
days from receipt thereof.
The Commission shall decide all cases within twenty (20) working days
from receipt of the answer of the appellee.
The decision of the Commission is appealable to the Secretary of Labor
on any of the following grounds:
(a) If there is a prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion
(b) If made purely on questions of law and
(c) If there is a showing that the national security or social and
economic stability is threatened.
The decision of the Commission shall be immediately executory, even
pending appeal, unless stayed by an order of the Secretary of Labor for
special reasons. The decision of the Secretary of Labor shall be
immediately executory Provided, That the President of the Philippines
may assume jurisdiction over any cases which he considers national
interest cases. (Note: PD 1367 promulgated May 1, 1978 eliminated
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appeals of the Office of the President and made the Office of the Secretary
the terminal appeal level. But PD 1391 promulgated May 29, 1978 further
delimited appeals to the NLRC. See texts of PD 1367 and PD 1391).
822
822

the reinstatement of an illegally dismissed employee. The

amendment introduced by R.A. No. 6715 is an innovation
and a far departure from the old law indicating thereby the
legislatures unequivocal intent to insert a new rule that
will govern the reinstatement aspect of a decision or
resolution in any given labor dispute. In fact, the law as
now worded employs the phrase shall immediately be
executory without qualification emphasizing the need for
prompt compliance. As a rule, shall in a statute
commonly denotes an imperative obligation
and is
25
inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the
presumption is that the
word shall, when used in a
26
statute, is mandatory. An appeal or posting of bond, by
plain mandate of the law, could not even forestall nor stay
the executory nature of an order of reinstatement. The law,
moreover, is unambiguous and clear. Thus, it must be
applied according to its plain and obvious meaning,
according to its express terms.
In GlobeMackay Cable and
27
Radio Corporation v. NLRC, we held that:
Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This
plainmeaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim index
animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the
valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a
statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court
from construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to
know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly,
and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are
found in the
______________
The Philippine Constabulary and other lawenforcement agencies may be
deputized by the Secretary of Labor in the enforcement of orders, decisions, or
awards.
25
Elmer v. Commissioner of Insurance, 23 N.E. 2d 95, 304 Mass. 194.
26
Swift v. Smith, 201 P. 2d 609, 119 Colo. 126 City of Gary v. Yaksich, 90 N.E.
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2d 509, 120 Ind. App. 121 Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757.
27
206 SCRA 701.
823
VOL. 280, OCTOBER 16, 1997
823
statute. Verba legis non est recedendum,

or from the words of a
28
statute there should be no departure.
And in conformity with the executory nature of the

reinstatement order, Rule V, Section 16 (3) of the New
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC strictly requires the Labor
Arbiter to direct the employer to immediately reinstate the
dismissed employee. Thus:
In case the decision includes an order of reinstatement, the Labor
Arbiter shall direct the employer to immediately reinstate the
dismissed or separated employee even pending appeal. The order of
reinstatement shall indicate that the employee shall either be
admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions
prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of
the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll.
In declaring that reinstatement order is not selfexecutory

and needs a writ of execution, the Court, in Maranaw,
adverted to the rule provided under Article 224. We said:
It must be stressed, however, that although the reinstatement
aspect of the decision is immediately executory, it does not follow
that it is selfexecutory. There must be a writ of execution which
may be issued motu proprio or on motion of an interested party.
Article 224 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 224. Execution of decisions, orders or awards.(a) The
Secretary of Labor and Employment or any Regional Director, the
Commission or any Labor Arbiter, or medarbiter or voluntary
arbitrator may, motu proprio or on motion of any interested party,
issue a writ of execution on a judgment within five (5) years from
the date it becomes final and executory. . . (emphasis supplied)
The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule VIII of the New Rules
of Procedure of the NLRC also provides:
The Labor Arbiter, POEA Administrator, or the Regional
Director, or his duly authorized hearing officer of origin shall,
motu proprio or on motion of any interested party, issue a writ of
execution on a judgment only within five (5) years from the date it
becomes final and executory. . . . No motion for execution shall be
entertained
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________________
28
Id., at p. 711.
824
824

nor a writ be issued unless the Labor Arbiter is in possession of

the records of the case which shall include an entry of judgment.
(emphasis supplied)
x x x x x x x x x
In the absence then of an order for the issuance of a writ of
execution on the reinstatement aspect of the decision of the Labor
Arbiter, the petitioner was under no legal obligation to admit back
to work the private respondent under the terms and conditions
prevailing prior to her dismissal or, at the petitioners option, to
merely reinstate her in the payroll. An option is a right of election
to exercise a privilege, and the option in Article 223 of the Labor
Code is exclusively granted to the employer. The event that gives
rise for its exercise is not the reinstatement decree of a Labor
Arbiter, but the writ for its execution commanding the employer
to reinstate the employee, while the final act which compels the
employer to exercise the option is the service upon it of the writ of
execution when, instead of admitting the employee back to his
work, the employer chooses to reinstate the employee in the
payroll only. If the employer does not exercise this option, it must
forthwith admit the employee
back to work, otherwise it may be
29
punished for contempt.
A closer examination, however, shows that the necessity for

a writ of execution under Article 224 applies only to final
and executory decisions which are not within the coverage
of Article 223. For comparison, we quote the material
portions of the subject articles:
ART. 223. Appeal. x x x
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a
dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement
aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending
appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under
separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in
the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay
the execution for reinstatement provided herein.
x x x x x x x x x
_______________
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29
238 SCRA at pp. 198199.
825
VOL. 280, OCTOBER 16, 1997
825
ART. 224. Execution of decisions, orders, or awards.(a) The

Secretary of Labor and Employment or any Regional Director, the
Commission or any Labor Arbiter, or medarbiter or voluntary
arbitrator may, motu propio or on motion of any interested party,
issue a writ of execution on a judgment within five (5) years from
the date it becomes final and executory, requiring a sheriff or a
duly deputized officer to execute or enforce final decisions, orders
or awards of the Secretary of Labor and Employment or regional
director, the Commission, the Labor Arbiter or medarbiter, or
voluntary arbitrators. In any case, it shall be the duty of the
responsible officer to separately furnish immediately the counsels
of record and the parties with copies of said decisions, orders or
awards. Failure to comply with the duty prescribed herein shall
subject such responsible officer to appropriate administrative
sanctions.
Article 224 states that the need for a writ of execution

applies only within five (5) years from the date a decision,
an order or award becomes final and executory. It can not
relate to an award or order of reinstatement still to be
appealed or pending appeal which Article 223
contemplates. The provision of Article 223 is clear that an
award for reinstatement shall be immediately executory
even pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the
employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement. The
legislative intent is quite obvious, i.e., to make an award of
reinstatement immediately enforceable, even pending
appeal. To require the application for and issuance of a writ
of execution as prerequisites for the execution of a
reinstatement award would certainly betray and run
counter to the very object and intent of Article 223, i.e., the
immediate execution of a reinstatement order. The reason
is simple. An application for a writ of execution and its
issuance could be delayed for numerous reasons. A mere
continuance or postponement of a scheduled hearing, for
instance, or an inaction on the part of the Labor Arbiter or
the NLRC could easily delay the issuance of the writ
thereby setting at naught the strict mandate and noble
purpose envisioned by Article 223. In other words, if the
requirements of Article 224 were to govern, as we so
declared in Maranaw, then the executory nature of a
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reinstatement order or award contemplated by Article 223

will be unduly circumscribed and rendered ineffec
826
826

tual. In enacting the law, the legislature is presumed to

have ordained a valid and sensible law, one which operates
no further than may be necessary to achieve its specific
purpose. Statutes, as a rule, are to be construed in the light
of the purpose
to be achieved and the evil sought to be
30
remedied. And where the statute is fairly susceptible of
two or more constructions, that construction should be
adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest
intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which
the statute was enacted, and a construction should be
rejected which would tend to render abortive other
provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which
the
31
legislator sought to attain by its enactment.
In
introducing a new rule on the reinstatement aspect of a
labor decision under R.A. No. 6715, Congress should not be
considered to be indulging in mere semantic exercise. On
appeal, however, the appellate tribunal concerned may
enjoin or suspend the reinstatement order in the exercise of
its sound discretion.
Furthermore, the rule is that all doubts in the
interpretation and implementation of labor laws should be
resolved in favor of labor. In ruling that an order or award
for reinstatement does not require a writ of execution the
Court is simply adhering and giving meaning to this rule.
Henceforth, we rule that an award or order for
reinstatement is selfexecutory. After receipt of the decision
or resolution ordering the employees reinstatement, the
employer has the right to choose whether to readmit the
employee to work under the same terms and conditions
prevailing prior to his dismissal or to reinstate the
employee in the payroll. In either instance, the employer
has to inform the employee of his choice. The notification is
based on practical considerations for without notice, the
employee has no way of knowing if he has to report for
work or not.
_________________
30
See LVN Pictures, Inc. v. Philippine Musicians Guild and CIR, 110
Phil. 725.
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31
US v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85, 90.

827
VOL. 280, OCTOBER 16, 1997
827
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of

the Labor Arbiter is hereby REINSTATED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment of Labor Arbiter reinstated.
Notes.Loss of confidence constitutes a just cause for
terminating an employeremployee relationship. (Anderson
vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 252 SCRA 116
[1996])
Loss of confidence as a just cause for dismissal was
never intended to provide employers with a blank check for
terminating their employeesloss of confidence should
ideally apply only to cases involving employees occupying
positions of trust and confidence or to those situations
where the employee is routinely charged with the care and
custody of the employers money or property. (Mabeza vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, 271 SCRA 670
[1997])
The ground willful breach by the employee of the trust
reposed in him by his employer must be founded on facts
established by the employer who must clearly and
convincingly prove by substantial evidence the facts and
incidents upon which loss of confidence in the employee
may fairly be made to rest. (Equitable Banking Corporation
vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 273 SCRA 352
[1997])
o0o
828
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Pioneer Texturizing Corp Vs NLRC

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

G.R. No. 118651. October 16, 1997.

PIONEER TEXTURIZING CORP. and/or JULIANO LIM,

VOL. 280, OCTOBER 16, 1997