THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS,

MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO

CIVIL DIVISION

WELLS FARGO BANK N.A., AS TRUSTEE,

For Securitized Asset Backed Receivables
LLC 2006-OP1 Mortgage-Pass_through-Certificates
Series 2006-OP1
Plaintiff
Vs.

Case No. 08 cv 01936

Judge: Timothy OConnell

JOHN L. REED, et a.,___,

Defendant
Motion To Vacate A Void
Judgment and to Rule on the
Following:
Part I. INTRODUCTION
1.

Now comes Defendant John A. Reed pro se, moving this Court to Vacate a Void

Judgement of the Courts Decision and Entry Rendered on the 1st Day of October, 2008,
on the grounds that the Plaintiff has committed fraud by bringing into this court
fabricated, forged and fraudulent documents, specifically, Plaintiffs exhibit
(AFFIDAVIT) which purports to show Plaintiffs ownership interest and validity of the
alleged subject Mortgage & Note & Plaintiffs exhibit A Assignment from Option One
to Wells Fargo purporting to prove Plaintiffs ownership of alleged Mortgage & Note at
time of foreclosure initiation dated March 7th, 2008.
A void judgment which includes judgment entered by a court which
lacks jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter, or lacks
inherent power to enter the particular judgment, or an order

procured by fraud (emphasis added), can be attacked at any time, in

any court, either directly or collaterally, provided that the party is
properly before the court, Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182
F.3d 548 ( C.A. 7 Ill. 1999).
Please see attached Brief in Support of Void Judgments (Authorities
12)

1. Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank and/ or their assigns (hereinafter Bank and/or
Plaintiff), while lacking Legal Standing to initiate suit, did cause to be filed against an
alleged Defendant John L. Reed a foreclosure suit on February 27th, 2008 ultra vires.
3.Defendant John A. Reed, son of an alleged Defendant John L. Reed, was enjoined
within this foreclosure action only for reason of his total and complete ownership of his
residence, the subject property.
2.

Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank NA., claims to have become the alleged possessor or

Holder of the alleged Note and Mortgage through an assignment see (exhibit A)
dated after their initiation of this foreclosure action which was received from a
questionable Holder in Due Course, who allegedly received it from a questionable holder
in due course who allegedly received it from questionable holder in due course and on
and on. See below, Tracking The Mortgage Chronology.
4.

Upon Plaintiffs Counsels discovery of their own inconsistent and invalid

documentation and improperly perfected alleged Mortgage and Note used to foreclose
against the wrong Defendant, Plaintiffs counsel did then act mens rea to set out to
prove that the real owner of the property, Defendant John A. Reed, was the actual
creator of the aforesaid alleged Note and Mortgage, and not the alleged John L. Reed
evidenced upon the Note & Mortgage.
5.

Defendant John A. Reed neither affirmed nor denied his position as creator of the

alleged Note and/or Mortgage, instead relying upon his rights of Burden of Proof of
Plaintiff to prove Defendants ownership of the Note & Mortgage.
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6.

Lower Courts have found, and Plaintiff has agreed, that the Principal named on the

alleged Note and Mortgage as the Creator of the alleged Mortgage and Note, alleged
Defendant John A. Reeds Father, Defendant John L. Reed, was in fact not the property
owner at the time of alleged Mortgage and Note creation nor the creator of the alleged
Mortgage and Note.
7.

Plaintiffs Counsel, within his privileged position, has averred in Pleadings (libel

per se) (see: Wells Fargo Bank Motion For Summary Judgment for just one example),
and Defendant has denied, that Defendant John A. Reed altered any Federal Documents.
These same allegations carry imputations and aspersions of criminal conduct and
allegations injurious to defendant. As is evidenced on all of Plaintiffs documentation, all
documents were created at H&R Block Offices located in Tampa Florida to which
Defendant had no access. No one has found, that Defendant John A. Reed had broken
into the Lending Agents facility in Tampa Florida, and altered documents. This claim, is
entirely unsubstantiated, libelous, and was created and committed with malice, entirely in
an attempt to lower the value of the Defendant in the Courts eyes and have served only to
defame the good name and character of Defendant.
8.

Plaintiffs Counsel, again within his privileged position and with intentional malice,

has averred and Defendant has denied the above claim, and no one has even proffered a
reason why Defendant John A. Reed would substitute his Fathers name on the alleged
mortgaged property note for his own name, as would be necessary to substantiate
Plaintiffs next libelous per se claim, as statement of fact, (see: Wells Fargo Banks
Motion For Summary Judgment and previous Plaintiffs pleadings) of Defendant John A.
Reeds alleged forgery (libel per se 2nd count). These claims are entirely

unsubstantiated, libelous, created and committed intentionally with malice and without
cause and created entirely in an attempt to again lower the value of the Defendant in the
Courts eyes.
9.

During the course of these pleadings Plaintiffs Counsel did cause defamation of the

character and/or did libel per se, mens rea, Defendant John A. Reed on numerous
occasions (see: Wells Fargo Bank Motion For Summary Judgment for one instance), and
in the most public manner, in writing (per se), that has since been disseminated
irretrievably and globally, stating, as fact, that Defendant John A. Reed had forged his
Fathers signature and altered Federal documents. And, as Defendants viability in his
chosen and previously distinguished profession, of Novell Networking Consultant
(hourly rate $100 per hr.), requires a Top Security Clearance to perform, Plaintiffs
Counsel has effectively stripped Defendant of any chance of employment within his
profession, in perpetuity. Plaintiffs Counsel committed this offense mens re, attempting
to alter the Courts opinion of the Defendant to one of a lesser value and in so doing
attempting to prejudice the Court against Defendant. In so doing, Plaintiff did cause to be
published onto the Internet the charges indicated above and in the information technology
age we now live in, that same information was almost instantaneously disseminated
globally by data mining companies world wide, ie. Lexis-Nexus and many others, and is
now, unalterable. Plaintiffs Counsels libel, and defamation of character of Defendant,
which carry imputations and aspersions of criminal conduct and allegations, are not only
injurious to Defendant in his chosen and established profession, they were his studied
Professions death sentence.

10.

Subsequently the lower Court found Defendant John A. Reed to be the Creator of

the Note & Mortgage; then did, in violation of the U.S. Statute of Frauds, the U.S. Law of
Contracts and Civ.R. 17(A), and with Judicial fiat, the court altered the alleged Mortgage
& Promissory Note, effectively destroying the original Mortgage and Note and their
representations of fact, to represent that Defendant John A. Reed was the true owner and
responsible party for the alleged Mortgage and Note. Then, without any formal notice of
suit against Defendant John A. Reed, as court proceeded to collectively and summarily
change ownership of the Note & Mortgage, they also immediately foreclose on same,
effectively denying Defendant John A. Reed of any proper recourse through Due Process.
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. CivR. (17(A)
A real party in interest is one who is directly benefited or injured by the outcome of the
case. Please see attached authorities One
11.

Based primarily upon testimony of the Plaintiffs paid witness, who fails the

Daubert test (no statistical rate of success/failure) for admissibility (please see attached
authorities 7), and goes directly against CivR 1002 by using copies to identify
Defendants signature, and Plaintiffs witness of President of Option, who testified as to
not being present at Mortgage creation, and whos same testimony is entirely hearsay,
Plaintiffs counsel then did proceed to foreclose against Defendant John A. Reed, seeking
the property sold at Public Auction and unspecified damages, which the Court did award.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT AND ISSUES PRESENTED
In Paragraph 11 of the Original complaint Wells Fargo NA (Plaintiff) stated that it is
holder of the Note and mortgage. Upon information and belief, this statement was false,
and was know by Wells Fargo bank NA (plaintiff) at the time it was made in that Plaintiff
was not the owner of the Note; instead, the Note and Mortgage were securitized or owned

by another party. Thus, the securitization, Trust or other party , was the owner, if not
also the holder of the note.
In Paragraph 23 of the complaint, Wells Fargo Bank NA (plaintiff) stated it was te
holder of the Mortgage. For the reasons state dabove, upon information and belief, this
statement is false, and was known by Plaintiff to be false.
On October the 15th 2008 Defendant john A. Reed pro se filed his response to the
Complaint.
On July 25th, 2008 Plaintiff filed its Motion for Summary Judgment in the foreclosure
action claiming Son John A. Reed had forged his Father John L. Reeds signature on the
mortgage documents and that somehow and for some unknown reason it was somehow
wrong for Son to transfer the property into his own name before seeking alleged
financing with H&R Block and that they, Wlees fargo bank NA (plaintiff) had now the
right to foreclose on the property.
On Aug 15th, 2008 Defendant John A Reed filed his Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgement and request for Trial By Jury.
Stating clearly the Plaintiffs lack of standing to proceed with the case.
On August 26th 2008 the Court denied Wells Fargos Summary Judgment, stating The
Court cannot say, at this time, that John A. Reed and/or John L. Reed are not liable for the
mortgage and/or note, or that Plaintiff is entitled to foreclose on the property until the
disputes of fact are resolved.
On August 26th, 2008 Plaintiff caused an Affidavit to be filed. A copy of the Affidavit is
attached hereto as Exhibit *********
The Affidavit was allegedly signed by Ms Topako Love, who claimed to be an Assistant
Secretary for Option One Mortgage Corporation as servicing agent for Wells Fargo Bank,
national Association as Trustee for Securitized Asset backed receivables LLC 2006-OP1
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-OP1.
12. Defendant John A. Reed pro se wishes to bring the Court Judicial notice of the
fabricated, forged, fraudulent Documents Plaintiff has entered into this Court in their
attempt to prove their ownership and subsequent right to foreclose on the alleged
Mortgage and Note. Specifically, 1. The Assignment of Mortgage purporting to transfer
or Assign the or sell, assign, transfer and set over unto Wells Fargo Bank, National
Association as Trustee. .

13. Please note the date of signature of One Ms Topako Love at the bottom to be March
7th, 2008. Please see Exhibit ****** alternate signatures & alternate employers of Ms.
Topako Love .
It is well documented that since 2007 Wells Fargo used so-called robo-signers in its
mortgage servicing division to expedite foreclosures. See *****************
Robo-signers are individuals whose sole job responsibility is to sign affidavits,
assignments of mortgage and oher legal documents used in foreclosures en masse so that
homeowners can be removed from their homes by banks as quickly and cheaply as
possible. Robo-signers may sign 10,000 or more such documents per month, including
affidavits attested to be made of personal knowledge.
Because they are required to sign so many documents in order to effectuate cost savings
for the banks, robo-signers do not even read the documents containing critical statements.
rather, the typical robo-signer simply attests under oath that he or she has personal
knowledge of the statements made, and swears that those statements are true and accurate
without even having read the document. In addition, in the rush to generate these
documents, the robo-signer will generally sign the documents outside the presence of the
notary who later notarizes them.
The above practices fail to comport with legal requirements, thereby rendering the
documents fraudulent and invalid.
In a case involving GMAC, as well as BOFA, a Maine court recently found that the use
of a robo-signer in a foreclosure action constituted a high volume and careless approach
toward the judicial system. The Court disregarded the subject affidavit, and ordered
sanctions against GMAC. See Federal national Mortgage Association v. Bradbury,
Bridgton, Maine District Court Docket No. BRI-RE-09-65, Order of September 24, 2010,
attached hereto as Exhibit **********
Even more recently,, the Attorney General filed an Action on behalf of the Citizens of
Ohio in Lucas County, Common Pleas court seeking injunctive relief and damages on
account of these same practices. A copy of that Complaint, without attachments, is
attached hereto as Exhibit ***********
Within the past two (2) weeks, BOFA belatedly acknowledged that its regular use of
robo-signers constituted an abuse of the legal system and a violation of the rights of
homeowners, by halting foreclosures in all 50 states.
Ms. Love is one of many signers used by Wells fargo. A KNOWN employee of
professional contract FORGER and PERJURER FIS Foreclosure Solutions, Inc., of
Mendota Heights, MN. Ms Tokao LOVE has been employed by FIS Foreclosure
Solutions, Inc., and/or its prior incarnations Fidelity National Default Solutions, Inc.
since March 2003. As such, in the course of her employment for FIS Foreclosure
Solutions Inc., she regularly executes affidavits, assignments and other legal documents

necessary to foreclosures as quickly and efficiently as possible for a number of different

companies. To accomplish this objective, Love does not read the affidavits she signs or
make any inquiry as to whether the statements made therein are true and accurate. Loves
robo-signer status is documented by Defendants Exhibit *********** thru *********
attached hereto. These documents demonstrate that:
an example of an affidavit given by Ms. Topako LOVE in another Ohio case
heard and dismissed in Federal Court (Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v.
JACKSON). In that affidavit, Ms. LOVE represented that she was a "duly appointed
officer of Option One Mortgage Corporation. In this affidavit, Ms. LOVE avers that she
is acting on behalf of Option One as the servicing agent of Deutsche Bank National Trust
Company.
I am also attaching an affidavit in which Ms. LOVE avers that she is the "Assistant
Secretary" of Option One Mortgage (HSBC Bank USA NA v BROYLES). In this latter
state court case from Summit County, she avers that Option One is the servicing agent for
HSBC Bank USA NA.
In a third attached affidavit, Ms. Topako LOVE also avers that she is the "Assistant
Secretary" of Option One Mortgage Corporation as servicing agent for Wells Fargo
Bank NA.
You will note that James C. MORRIS was the notary of the first of these. Jacqueline
FREEMAN was the notary for the second. Matthew Allan BANAZEWSKI was the
notary for the latter. Each of these is also an employee of FIS Foreclosure Solutions, Inc.
Finally, I have attached the unpublished opinion of Justice Karen MURPHY in a Nassau
New York case. You will find that this NY Justice DENIED an order of reference
(foreclosure) when Topaka LOVE was shown to be an officer of Option One but where
NO POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR OPTION ONE TO REPRESENT DEUTSCHE
BANK WAS PLEADED.
Im also attaching an exhibit of Ms. Loves signature on documents where she
attests she is the;
1. Assistant Secretary for Mortgage electronic registration Systems, Inc., as
nominee for The Money Tree Financial Corporation
2. Asst Secretary for Mortgage E,evtronic registration Systems, Inc., as nominee
for Indymac Bank FSB (1)
3. Asst. Secretary for Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as
nominee for Indymac Bank FSB (2)
4. Asst. Secretary for Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as
nominee for Cana Blanca Mortgage Inc., D/B/ Shearson Mortgage
5. Asst. Secretary for Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, inc., as
nominee for Mortgaget, Inc.
6. Assistant Secretary for Mortgage Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for
Impac Funding Corporation DBA Impac Lending Group

7. as a duly appointed officer of Option One Mort. Corp. as Attorney in Fact

working for same in the mortgage and foreclosure related services to
Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.
As noted earlier In addition, in the rush to generate these documents, the robo-signer
will generally sign the documents outside the presence of the notary who later notarizes
them.
Defendant John A. Reed pro se wishes to bring the Court Judicial notice of the fabricated,
forged, fraudulent Documents Plaintiff has entered into this Court in their attempt to
prove their ownership and subsequent right to foreclose on the alleged Mortgage and
Note. And below Ms. Loves signature is the signature of the Notary who has
supposedly witnessed Ms. Loves signature to the document.
On the above referenced Assignment of Mortgage (Exhibit A) the notary listed is one
James C. Morris.
On the above referenced Affidavit of Status of Account and Military Affidavit signed
by Ms. Topako Love, the notary listed is one Matthew Allen Banaszewski. Attached to
this Pleading
1. Massachusetts Foreclosure Deed (jan. 9th, 2009) by Corporation where on
page 2 we see Mr Banaszewskis signature. NPSB6EF.tmp.pdf
2. Minnesota Notary Matthew Allen Banaszewskis (an employee of FIS
Foreclosure Solutions, Inc of Mendota Heights, MN) Signature Page whch
contains 15 separate signatures of Mr. Banaszewski that even the most
inexperienced eye can tell were crafted by as many different people!

12. Defendant John A. Reed states Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank did act ultra vires to initiate
this foreclosure suit and that the Court erred in judging this matter for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction to whit; Wells Fargo Bank NA. Brought the foreclosure action against
Defendant John L. Reed, naming Defendant John A. Reed only as true owner of the
property, on February 27th, 2008 , yet Assignment of Mortgage from Option One
Mortgage Corp. to Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank NA. As Trustee For Securitized Asset
Backed Receivables LLC 2006-OP1 Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2006-

OP1 (see exhibit A or Plaintiffs exhibit# 11), did not occur until March 7th, 2008 and
as such Plaintiff lacked Legal Standing to initiate suit. Every action shall be prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest. Civ.R. 17(A). A real party in interest is one who
is directly benefited or injured by the outcome of the case. Please see attached
Authorities 1 & 2.
LAW AND ARGUMENT
11. Defendant, the State of Ohio, and its Citizens interests are best preserved by
assuring that the parties to the action are the proper parties. According to the Supreme
Court of Ohio a judgment rendered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction is void
ab initio. Patton v. Diemer (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 68, 70, 518 N.E.2d 941. As a result, if
the Court were to enter judgment without jurisdiction or without proper parties, the State
of Ohio would be prejudiced by having to participate in judicial proceedings to set aside
the sale and then relitigate hundreds, even thousands of foreclosures.
HOLDER IN DUE COURSE
12. The Holder in Due Course Defense is well-established in bankruptcy practice.
To quote (and incorporate as if my own) Bert Ely, a longtime analyst of the financial
services industry and a scholar at the conservative Cato Institute who was among the first
to predict the S&L scandal of the 1980s, this is well-established in bankruptcy practice,
that you have to properly perfect the security interest, and if you havent, youre
screwed.
Securitization ostensibly provides a source of capital so that more home loans are available to
borrowers. However, the series of corporate and banking transactions that make up securitization
cannot be permitted to avoid liability by those who are actually providing the funding _ and often
controlling the transaction. See Kurt Eggert, Held up in Due Course: Predatory Lending,
Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 Creighton L. Rev. 503 (2002).

13. If such basic legalities arent adhered to, a homeowner could pay his or her
way out of a foreclosure jam only to wind up in another when a new plaintiff emerges

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claiming to own the debt. Mortgage lending and servicing is a matter of dotting the Is
and crossing the Ts. Thats what puts the discipline in the process. Bert Ely.
14. Plaintiff attaches documents to its complaint and documents produced through
discovery conflict with the allegations of material facts in the complaint in which the
plaintiff claims that it owns the Note and Mortgage by virtue of a post-created and
post-recorded assignment. These allegations conflict with the alleged mortgage and note
attached to the complaint that identifies Option One Mortgage Corporation, as the lender
with the original security interest. These allegations therefore constitute serious
misrepresentations and could be construed as a fraud brought upon the court.
15. Plaintiffs own exhibits, fully scrutinized, purportedly show multiple
transference occurrences BEFORE and/or after an alleged transfer has allegedly already
taken place of the Note & Mortgage, and also show many instances of no actual legal
transference of the Mortgage and Note at all. Also, the transference dates purported
could not have existed within the Timeline represented. Upon a complete Mortgage
Document scrutinization, this is easily seen.
TRACKING THE MORTGAGE CHRONOLOGY
Please carefully notice all dates!
16. H&R Block Originates the alleged Mortgage Dated; June 9th, 2005
Plaintiff ERROR #1 Here is where the confusion/obfuscation begins.
17. Document titled CORPORATION ASSIGNMENT OF OPEN-END
MORTGAGE exhibit B dated June 9th, 2005 purports, along with the 1st Allonge, to
transfer the alleged Mortgage & Note from H&R Block to Option One Mortgage Corp.,
yet fails in its requirement to display just WHERE it recorded same, reading and
recorded as Document No. _________ on, ________ day of __________ in book

11

_________, page __________, of Official Records and attested to by a one Kristi

Canizio (the Lady of many hats) and Roseann Infusio . Clearly in violation of U.C.C.,
true sale obligations and other SEC., O.R.C. Rules & Regulations, and Contract &
Securities Laws stated elsewhere within this pleading.
18. Later, in an Assignment dated 10/27/05 and recorded on 11/22/05 Plaintiff
wants us to believe it again transfers the very same Note & Mortgage from the very same
entity (H&R Block) to the very same above mentioned entity (Option One). When
exhibits are inconsistent with the plaintiff s allegations of material fact as to whom the
real party in interest is, such allegations cancel each other out.
19. On June 9th, 2005, the same day of the creation of the alleged mortgage &
Note we see the first appearance of one Ms. Kristy Canizio. Ms Canizio does sign the
following documents, acting in many different positions, wearing many different hats,
and acting on behalf of, and of necessity to positions held, employed by both H&R Block
& Option One Mortgage Corporation.
She signs first ;
6/9/05 Allonge (exhibit K1)to Note as Assistant Secretary for Option One
Mortgage Corp.(INVESTORS)
6/9/05 Allonge (exhibit K2)to Note as Assistant Secretary for H&R Block
(HRBMC)
6/9/05 Corporation Assignment of Open End Mortgage as duly authorized
attestor exhibit B
6/9/05 as Funding/Closing
Department Contact exhibit K4

6/13/05 (my personal favorite) Employment Verification Funder/AM

Signature (4 days AFTER loan closing!) exhibit K9
6/14/05 as Reviewer/Closer on
HDMA Audit Sheet exhibit K5

6/14/05 as Data Integrity Verifier on Data Integrity Audit sheet 1 exhibit K6

6/14/05 as Data Integrity Verifier on Data Integrity Audit Sheet 2 exhibit K7

6/14/05 Document preparer for 049-8566 Wiring Instructions exhibit K8

20. Probably most interesting is that Ms Canizio holds the position of Assistant
Secretary to two separate Corporate Entities and also lets pass, until 4 days AFTER the

12

alleged Mortgage Loan closing, the alleged verification of the income of the Defendant.
The same Defendant who had no income, but who does have witnesss who are willing to
testify that they were present and heard (on speakerphone) Defendant tell Plaintiffs
Agent, of that fact of no income, during Defendants alleged Mortgage application
see attached exhibit K9! The very same employment verification purportedly taking
place 3 days AFTER the below titled Execution Copy has already purportedly sold the
alleged, but now certified as properly vetted by Option One Mort. and Ms. Canizio, as
good and fraud free, Mortgage and Note to Barclays Bank
21. Plaintiff introduces as evidence Plaintiffs exhibit no 25, Titled
EXECUTION COPY RE: Purchase Price and Terms Agreement Dated As of
June 10, 2005 One day after the alleged Mortgage creation! Purporting to explain how
Barclays Bank has bought the alleged Mortgage Note and debt from Option One after
Option One had combined that same note and debt into the not yet created Trust. Yet
next, you will notice that the alleged Mortgage has yet to be assigned to Option One.
That will not occur for another 140 days (over 4 months!), (its either that or Plaintiff
has brought fraud into the Courts with its Assignment of Mortgage to Option One from
H&R Block! ) It should also be noted that Plaintiffs exhibit 25 (exhibit E) lacks
any signatures or authentication by either Buyer or Seller clearly in violation of
U.C.C., SEC., O.R.C. Rules & Regulations and Contract & Securities Laws presented
elsewhere within this pleading and as such represents NOT a legally binding Contract as
previously noted.
Plaintiff ERROR #2 Plaintiffs exhibit 26 (exhibit G) titled EXECUTION
COPY FLOW AMENDED AND RESTATED MORTGAGE LOAN PURCHASE
AND WARRANTIES AGREEMENT

13

Dated August 15th, 2005 (2 Months and 5 days after the above referenced Plaintiffs
exhibit 25 and which lacks any reference to the TRUST Securitized Asset Backed
Receivables LLC 2006-OP1 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-OP1,
and is dated months before the Assignment from H&R Block (alleged Mortgage
Originator) to Option One. Plaintiffs exhibit 10(exhibit F)
22. This document catalogs the purchase of the Trust from the Company &
Seller Option One Mortgage to the Purchaser, Barclays Bank, PLC.
23. Again, it should be noted that Plaintiffs exhibit 26 lacks proper
signatures or authentication (see exhibits G2 thru G7) by Seller clearly in violation of
U.C.C., SEC., O.R.C. Rules & Regulations and Contract & Securities Laws presented
elsewhere within this pleading and as such fails to represent a legally binding Contract.
24. That said, the conclusion so far is that the alleged Note & Mortgage could not
have been included into the Trust nor into the ownership of Barlays Bank PLC until at
least the day of or after the day of the Assignment from H&R Block to Option One
Mortgage Corporation dated November 22nd, 2005 and still over a month before the
Trust was even created.
25. Plaintiffs ERROR # 3 plaintiffs exhibit 27 titled EXECUTION COPY
ASSIGNMENT AND CONVEYANCE (defendants exhibit H)
dated August 19th, 2005.
26. This document does purportedly represent the Assignment and Conveyance of
the Trust from Option One to Barclays Bank PLC. Again, it should be noted that
Plaintiffs exhibit 27 lacks any proper signatures (see exhibits H2 thru H4) or
authentication by either Buyer or Seller clearly in violation of U.C.C., SEC, O.R.C.,
and Contract & Securities Laws as stated elsewhere within this pleading and as such
represents NOT a legally binding Contract as previously noted. Also, Assignment from

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H&R Block to Option One does not happen until October 27th, 2005, nearly 2 months
AFTER the alleged assignment and conveyance of the Trust that Plaintiff would have
us believe already contained the mortgage, yet they submit proof it could not have had.
27. NOTICE ALL OF THE ABOVE OCCURRED BEFORE THE FIRST
ASSIGNMENT DATE to OPTION ONE!
H&R Block Assigns Note & Mortgage to Option One
see assignment dated: October 27, 2005 & Recorded November 22nd, 2005
plaintiffs exhibit 10-Defendants exhibit F
Plaintiffs ERROR # 4 Plaintiffs exhibit 28 ( attached exhibit I) titled
EXECUTION COPY BILL OF SALE dated January 26th, 2006.
27. Here we have a Bill of Sale that represents that BARCLAYS BANK PLC
(the Seller), in consideration of (i) the sum of $1,214,208,.30
Let me write that out. One Million, two hundred and fourteen thousand, two
hundred and eight dollars (I guess) then a coma(!) and then a decimal point (I
guess) and 30 cents (I guess) dollars. This NOT a typographical error on my part
(see Plaintiffs exhibit 28). Naming Option One as the Servicer, Mortgage
Ramp, Inc. as loan performance advisor and Wells Fargo Bank, National
Association , as trustee as of January 26, 2006.
to be paid to it in immediately available funds by SECURITIZED ASSET BACKED
RECEIVABLES LLC (the Purchaser) and (ii) the Class X, Class P and Class R
Certificates issued pursuant to a Pooling and Servicing Agreement, dated as of January 1,
2006 (the Pooling and Servicing Agreement) (Plaintiffs exhibit 18) ,, among the
Purchaser, as Depositor, Option One Mortgage Corporation, as servicer and
responsible party, MortgageRamp, Inc., as loan performance advisor, and Wells Fargo
Bank, National Association, as trustee, does as of January 26, 2006, hereby sell, transfer,
assign, set over and otherwise convey to the Purchaser without recourse, all the Sellers
right, title and interest in and to the Mortgage Loans described on Exhibit A attached

15

hereto and made a part hereof, including al interest and principal received by the Seller
on or with respect to the Mortgage Loans.. if this were a check I had to cash, it
wouldnt be cashable and it is signed and/or endorsed and/or authenticated by NO ONE!
28. In Summary; Barklays Bank PLC supposedly resells the Mortgage Loans
from the Trust to SECURITIZED ASSET BACKED RECEIVABLES LLC as
Purchaser & Depositor, to Option One Mortgage Corporation, as servicer and responsible
party, to MortgageRamp, Inc., as loan performance advisor, and to Wells Fargo Bank,
National Association, as trustee, as of January 26, 2006 for an undecipherable amount
and for Class X, P & R Certificates issued pursuant to a Pooling and Servicing
Agreement (they dont specify which one) and then divides ownership between the four
in some ethereal undisclosed manner .. as again, it does not specify.
29. Please note this next, the Pooling and Servicing Agreement document is
accompanied by an unspecified signature page (does it belong to this document?) which
is signed by one Paul Menefee Director from SECURITIZED ASSET BACKED
RECEIVABLES LLC, and one John Cuccoli (probably misspelled but close!), Managing
Director of BARCLAYS BANK PLC, and that there is no authentication given for either
signatures power to enter into this contract and also no Power of Attorney Stamp and
Seal accompanying this document and no signature date, clearly in violation of U.C.C.,
SEC., O.R.C. rules & Regulations and Contract & Securities Laws as previously stated
elsewhere within this pleading and as such represents NOT a legally binding Contract.
30. Please note also the date of January 26th, 2006 as the day of this transaction.
As per Pooling & Servicing Agreement.
On occurrence of a Credit Event

16

Trust Transfers Mortgage BACK to Option One

31. As per Pooling & Servicing Agreement section; 2:03 (d) attached exhibit
J, Plaintiffs exhibit 18; Within 30 days of the earlier of either discovery by or
notice to the Responsible Party that any Mortgage Loan does not conform to the
requirements.of any breach of a representation or warranty.that materially and
adversely affects the value of any Mortgage Loan the Responsible Party shall..
remove such Mortgage Loan (a Deleted Mortgage Loan) from the Trust and substitute
in its place a Substitute Mortgage Loan..
32. So, contractually, according to the alleged Pooling & Servicing Agreement
supplied by Plaintiff ( exhibit J) , 90 (it says 30, but Im using 90 because of any delay
in notification between the servicer and the Trust (with todays computing power, there
should be none)) days after the alleged default which occurred September, 2007 as of
Plaintiffs exhibit 20 (Payment History) , otherwise stated as January 2008, Option
One contractually regained sole possession of the Note and Mortgage (with no
assignment or any other authentication or recordation provided) and supplied a substitute
Note & Mortgage to take its place as is evidenced by Plaintiffs own sworn
evidentiary production of the Assignment from Option One Mortgage Corporation
to Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (Plaintiffs exhibit 11) dated March 3, 2008 and
recorded March 27th, 2008, such date being AFTER recordation of Foreclosure
action and as such voiding Plaintiffs argument of singular Note holdership at
time of foreclosure initiation and also voiding Plaintiffs standing in this action!
33. It should be noted that the signatory page(s) given at the rear of the Pooling &
Servicing Agreement each contain only but ONE signature, with empty signatory spaces

17

for each other and that there is no one Signatory page containing all signatures, no
authentication of any signatures, no dates of signatures and no certification of any
signatures by Power of Attorney clearly in violation of U.C.C., SEC., O.R.C. Rules &
Regulations and Contract & Securities Laws previously stated elsewhere within this
pleading, and as such represents NOT even a legally binding Contract.
Please note date of Re-Possession of Mortgage Note to Option One as January 2008.
As per Pooling & Servicing Agreement section; 203(d).
February 27th , 2008 Foreclosure Action is filed
34. Option One then assigns Note & Mortgage to Wells Fargo to act as
Foreclosure Special Servicer. See Assignment (exhibit A) Plaintiffs exhibit 11
dated; March 7th, 2008 and recorded March 27th, 2008. Signed by a Ms Topaka Love
who purports herself as assistant Secretary, who personally appeared for signature
somewhere in Minnesota, and that the document was prepared by Plaintiffs Counsel
LERNER, SAMPSON & ROTHFUSS located in Cincinnati, Ohio. Also, Mortgage was
assigned from Option One to Wells Fargo Bank for NO CONSIDERATION. Contract
Law states there is no value established unless there is a meeting of the minds and
consideration is passed, so once again, no legal contract is established, as no value has
been established because no consideration has been passed.
35. Of special Interest is the date the TRUST is Legitimized, January 1st,
2006. This is many months AFTER the Mortgage Companies have supposedly sold,
dissected, securitized, and transferred the subject mortgage in and out of the TRUST,
and sold securities based on its presence and quality, that hasnt yet even been created!
Hmmmmmm Organized Crime!
36. In Conclusion, keeping in mind that in each and every step of this Mortgage
& Note transferences, each and every entity bears the requirement by law of proper

18

Due Diligence. And realizing that all of the alleged loan origination papers, including the
Credit report, bear a Social Security number that does not correspond with the stated
name on the Mortgage Document, and that the inconsistencies within almost all of the
loan origination documents are easily identified, with minimal effort, especially by
schooled and learned professionals, Plaintiffs own exhibits prove only so many
irregularities and illegalities that unless each and every one is proved, and proved
within a chronology that actually CAN exist, then the Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank can
NOT be deemed the Holder in Due Course of the subject Mortgage and Promissory
Note and in fact, shows not only that Plaintiffs have a near total disregard for US
Federal, State & Local Law, Rules and Regulations, as previously indicated, as they
apply to Securities Transfer and documentation, but also that they didnt ever have the
proper documentation to bring this case to court in the first place so they threw a bunch
of documents into a pile and laid them upon the Court, testifying under oath as to their
validity, hoping the Courts would allow them to steam roll right over the Defendant and
use the Court as they deem fit.
37. Concurrently, they also demonstrate the sales of securities based on NO
underlying Securitized assets actually held, and/or utter incompetence, and/or criminal
intention and execution.
38. To Defendants belief and knowledge, Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank NA. has
foreclosed on tens of thousands of properties within the borders of Ohio and the United
States using these same tactics and practices on a regular basis (see authorities 4) even
despite previous court sanctions for these very same actions (see authorities 5 ). The
Plaintiffs have demonstrated, in the case at bar, and created by exhibits provided, a well-

19

documented and clear history of violating every aspect of Due Diligence AND the Clean
Hands Doctrine. Plaintiffs own exhibits prove not only Plaintiffs Lack of Standing in
the subject case at hand, but also their eager willingness to bring fraud, greed and
incompetence to the Courts in their attempts at unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs Counsel also
clearly demonstrates his own lack of performance of Due Diligence in Representing
Plaintiff before a thorough investigation of same.
39.Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank Na. brings fraud into the Court with its allegations
of ownership of alleged Mortgage & Note as per Legal requirement which states U.C.C.
- 3-203 (b) which reads;
Transfer of an instrument, whether or not the transfer is a negotiation, vests in the
transferee any right of the transferor to enforce the instrument, including any right as a
holder in due course, but the transferee cannot acquire rights of a holder in due course
by a transfer, directly or indirectly, from a holder in due course if the transferee
engaged in fraud or illegality affecting the instrument.
40. As stated in Buckeye Federal Sav. & Loan Assn v. Garlinger (1991), 62 Ohio St.
3d 312, 315 (stating promissory notes are negotiable instruments under R.C
1303.3(A). According to Ohio Revised Code, in order for a negotiable
instrument to be properly transferred, it must be negotiated. R.C. 1303.21(B).
Negotiation includes not only the physical transfer of the instrument but also the
indorsement, U.C.C 3-201, by the holder to transferee, which of course, must be
in writing. Id.; R.C. 1303.22. The Assignments and other documentation
submitted by the Plaintiff fails to establish the necessary link between the original
lender and the Plaintiff. In just one instance of this case, Plaintiff submitted an
Assignment of the alleged Mortgage (assigned to Plaintiff post foreclosure
initiation) which allegedly transferred the alleged Note from Option One
Mortgage Corp. to Plaintiff, but documentation obtained through discovery
proves no legitimate transfer of the alleged Mortgage and Note from Originating
Broker (H&R Block) to Lender (Option One Mort.) until several months after
Lender (Option One) purports to have already sold the alleged note and mortgage
to Barclays Bank, gotten it back, deposited it within a Trust, that had not yet
been created, used it as collateral for the sale of asset backed securities, and
then, at time of default, the Lender (Option One) takes back the alleged Mortgage
& Note (contractually through the Pooling & Servicing Agreement) and then, post
foreclosure initiation, the Lender purportedly assigns that alleged Note &
Mortgage to Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank N.A.. However, there is no evidence that
in each and every occurrence of transfer of the alleged note & mortgage that there
was ever ANY proper recordation OR proper negotiation for the alleged Note &

20

Mortgage as per R.C. 1303.22, therefore, Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank N.A. not
only lacks Legal standing to initiate suit for reason of post assignment of note,
Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank N.A. also lacks standing to initiate this suit because
Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank Na. is not the rightful holder in Due Course of the
alleged Note & Mortgage. Lower courts decision fails to acknowledge the
missing links of negotiation, ie., lack of indorsements R.C 1303.22 lack of
Assignments of the Note at issue prior to Plaintiff initiating suit and lack of proper
assignment and/or transference of the alleged Mortgage & Note through each and
every purported step of this alleged Note & Mortgages entire chronology, from
birth to death. Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs Counsels lack of due diligence as defined
by the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 SEC. 10A (a)(1)(2)(3), was
detrimental and damaging to Defendant as found in Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 SEC. 9(a) (1)(A)(B)(C), (2), (4), (6)(b)(1)(2)(3), (6)(c),(d)(e), and
subsequently, while it may be true that an unrecorded mortgage can be an
effective transfer; the assignment must be executed in writing, from the true
holder in Due Course of the alleged Mortgage & Note prior to filing the
Complaint and before the Plaintiff can establish that it has standing to invoke the
jurisdiction of the Court. Standing is a necessary prerequisite to establish a courts
jurisdiction to hear a case. Cain v. Calhoun (1979), 61 Ohio A.. 2d 240, 242 fn. 2
(citintg State ex rel. Dallman v. Court of Common Pleas (1973), 35 Ohio St.2d
176).
41. Therefore, as raised by Defendant in initial proceedings, the appropriate time
to establish that the Plaintiff is the holder of the alleged Note and Mortgage is at the time
of filing the Complaint, not at the time of judgment rendered on the Complaint. Merely
alleging it is the holder of the alleged Note and Mortgage is insufficient where there is no
written proof of the alleged interest in the Note and supplying post documentation
representing a falsity is fraud.

Plaintiff Shows Lack of Standing

42. Plaintiffs allege, through documents provided by Discovery, that the alleged
Mortgage and Note, after its creation on June 9th, 2005, had been sold by Option
One to Barclays Bank and there was disassembled, without permission of the
Defendant, separating all risk associated with the mortgage & note from all
interest proceeds gained through ownership of same, without Defendants
permission and in violation of any contractual agreement as is represented upon
the alleged Note. The alleged Mortgage and Note was then repackaged, with
interest income proceeds being re-directed to the Securitized Trust Shareholders,
but with all risk still owned by Option One Mortgage Co., (thereby, without
insurance licensure, or even the ability to obtain insurance licensure, insuring
the Note) and with 2/3rds of all other ownership responsibilities divided equally
between Mortgage Ramp Inc., and Wells Fargo Bank. Documentation provided by

21

Plaintiff through Discovery proves that not only through lack of signatures,
dates, authentication and indorsements on each document (per Section R.C.
1335.04, 1303.21, 1303.22, 5301.01 ORC (A), 5301.25, 5309.79 and UCC
Article 3 & S.E.C. true sale obligations and others) ..
58 See,

e.g., Midfirst Bank, SSB v. C.W. Haynes & Co., Inc., 893 F.Supp. 1304, 1312 (D.S.C. 1994)
(applying the HDC defense in a commercial context to hold that: Article Three of the UCC controls
transfers of negotiable instruments, and the mortgage notes are clearly negotiable. If UCC Article Three
should not apply in this case and the holder in due course doctrine is no longer warranted, then any
abolishment of that body of law should come from the legislature, not the court). See also Eggert,
supra note 12, at 560-70 (discussing cases where the HDC doctrine was applied against consumer
mortgage borrowers).

purporting to transfer the alleged Mortgage & note from one entity to another, but also,
the chronology and/or timeline of Plaintiffs documentation of the alleged Mortgage &
Note does not evidence a viable sequence of events that would support Plaintiffs
allegations of Holder in Due Course by a proper transfer of the alleged Mortgage and
Note. Defendant alleges that Plaintiff is attempting through subterfuge, deception,
fraudulent misrepresentation, and outright fraud, to confuse the Courts. But once fully
scrutinized, Plaintiffs documentation clearly demonstrates their lack of Standing to
initiate this suit from its inception (see below Tracking the Mortgage Chronology).
When exhibits are inconsistent with the plaintiff s allegations of material fact as to whom
the real party in interest is, such allegations cancel each other out.
R.C. 1335.04. Ohio law holds that when a mortgage is assigned, moreover, the assignment is
subject to the recording requirements of R.C. 5301.25. Creager v. Anderson (1934), 16 Ohio Law Abs.
400i (interpreting the former statute, G.C. 8543). Thus, with regards to real property, before an entity
assigned an interest in that property would be entitled to receive a distribution from the sale of the
property, their interest therein must have been recorded in accordance with Ohio law. In re Ochmanek,
266 B.R. 114, 120 (Bkrtcy.N.D. Ohio 2000) (citing Pinney v. Merchants National Bank of Defiance, 71
Ohio St. 173, 177 (1904).1

43. Information contained on most of the rest of Plaintiffs alleged transferences of

the alleged Mortgage and Note in their entirety (see below Tracking the Mortgage
Chronology), has only unsigned places for signaturesno datesno
authenticationand no proper indorsements upon them as required by U.C.C,
S.E.C Rules and Regulations and Ohio Revised Code R.C. 1303.21(B).
Consequently, no legal transference took place of the alleged Mortgage and/or
note between Plaintiffs named entities and/or co-conspirators. Plaintiff
demonstrates near total disregard for UCC and SEC Rules and Regulations and
Ohio Revised Code, as they apply to Securities Transfer and documentation. They

22

also demonstrate the sales of securities based on NO underlying Securitized assets

actually held, and/or utter incompetence, and/or criminal intention and execution.
To Defendants belief and knowledge, Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank NA. has
foreclosed on tens of thousands of properties within the borders of Ohio and the
United States using these same tactics and practices on a regular basis (see
attached authorities two)
44. Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, National Association As Trustee For Securitized Asset
Backed Receivables LLC 2006-OP1 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-OP1 is, as its name implies, merely a conduit, and a conduit can never
suffer a loss or injury as is required by the Real Party In Interest Rule. A Conduit
can never suffer a loss or be injured as it must immediately pass gains or
losses to Investors who are (if there are to be any at all) the true injured party
not the Servicer, not the Trustee and not the Pass-Through Trust itself, and as
such, not the Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank NA. Plaintiff fails to satisfy the U.S.
Constitution Article IIIs standing requirements that a plaintiff must show: (a) it
has suffered an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized and actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (b) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant; and (c) it is likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
45. The minimum constitutional requirements for standing are: proof of injury in
fact, causation, and redress ability (Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472). In addition, the
plaintiff must be a proper proponent, and the action a proper vehicle, to vindicate the
rights asserted. [Coyne, 183 F. 3d at 494, quoting Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Commn,
926 F. 2d 573, 576 (6 Cir. 1991)]. To satisfy the requirements of Article III of the United
th

States Constitution, the plaintiff must show he has personally suffered some actual
injury as a result of the illegal conduct of the defendant (emphasis added) (Coyne, 183 F.
3d at 494; Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472). In each of the above-noted complaints, the
named Plaintiff alleges it is the holder and owner of the alleged Note and Mortgage.
However, the attached alleged Note and Mortgage identify the alleged mortgagee and
promisee as other than Defendant John A. Reed, and the original lending institution as
other than the named Plaintiff. When exhibits are inconsistent with the plaintiff s
allegations of material fact as to whom the real party in interest is, such allegations cancel

23

each other out. Once again Plaintiff demonstrates their Lack of Standing to initiate this
foreclosure action.
46. Because Plaintiffs did not demonstrate, nor could they demonstrate, that their
members have suffered or were likely to suffer an injury in fact, they fail to meet Article
III standing requirements. Without standing, the Court did lack subject-matter
jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction may not be waived and may be raised, by a party or sua
sponte by the court, at any time. Without jurisdiction, the court must grant Defendants
Motion and dismiss this case.
47. Further, Plaintiffs wish the Court to believe that it does in fact have
possession of the Original Note and Mortgage. When confronted with request of delivery
of each Black ink ball point pen signed original, Plaintiff brings only a copy (against
EvidR 1002 of Best Evidence) of the Note and a forged Mortgage Document. Upon
inspection of the alleged Original Mortgage Document, and the signature which it
bears, the signature appears to have been placed on the document, or copy & pasted,
using a computer and ink jet printer. This red signature is in direct opposition to every
other document produced by Plaintiff through Discovery, which are all allegedly signed
at the same place and time with a black ink ball point pen and such red signature is in
direct violation of Plaintiffs own Closing Agents explicit instructions that all closing
documents must be signed with a black ink ball point pen. See Exhibit K4c.
48. Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs Counsels lack of due diligence as defined by the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 SEC. 10A (a)(1)(2)(3), was detrimental and
damaging to Defendant as found in Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 SEC. 9(a) (1)
(A)(B)(C), (2), (4), (6)(b)(1)(2)(3), (6)(c),(d)(e), and subsequently, while it may be true

24

that an unrecorded mortgage can be an effective transfer; the assignment must be

executed in writing, from the true holder in Due Course of the alleged Mortgage &
Note prior to filing the Complaint and before the Plaintiff can establish that it has
standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court. Standing is a necessary prerequisite to
establish a courts jurisdiction to hear a case. Cain v. Calhoun (1979), 61 Ohio A.. 2d 240,
242 fn. 2 (citintg State ex rel. Dallman v. Court of Common Pleas (1973), 35 Ohio St.2d
176).
49. Having failed to establish that it holds an interest in the alleged Note and/or
Mortgage, the Plaintiff has failed to show that it suffered an injury in fact; therefore,
Plaintiff does not have standing to bring this action. A person lacking any right or interest
to protect may not invoke the jurisdiction of the court. State ex rel. Dallman v Court of
Common Pleas (1973), 35 Ohio St. 2d 176, 178, 298, N.E.2d 515. Therefore, Plaintiffs
action should be dismissed because this Court lacks jurisdiction.
50. The Lower Courts decision fails to incorporate prior rulings of this Court on
identical issues. In fact, several of Ohios District Court Judges have all ruled on
numerous cases in favor of the Defendants position within the past 16 months (see
authorities 1, 2, 3, 4). This Court should not ignore precedent from this very Court in
nearly identical cases.
51. Mortgage, Note and loan creation documents contain many fraudulent and
actionable misrepresentations and much fraudulent information upon them, to whit;
(A) John L. Reed is represented as the party in interest upon the alleged
subject Mortgage and Note. Lower Courts have held and Plaintiff has agreed
that Defendant John A. Reeds Father, John L. Reed, had no interest or
involvement in the creation of the alleged subject mortgage & note.

25

(B). Option One Underwriters Worksheet, the Universal Residential Loan

Application and the Good Faith Estimate of Settlement Costs are all
misrepresenting Defendants fraudulent income to be $3,300.00 per month
(see exhibit P and Q) 2 separate residential Loan Applications.
Universal Residential Loan Application (see exhibit P) contains
multiple other misrepresentations of information;
(1) year house built is not 1990, it is actually 2000
(2) was sub-contractor, which Defendant has never been
(3) lists a completely blank employment history
(4) lists Defendants base income as $3,300 per month. Defendant, in
years 2001-2005 was only sporadically, part time employed, instead he
was spending the entirety of his working hours gathering materials and
constructing the subject property.
(5) No Interviewers signature

(6) U.S. Citizen? Says NO! Defendant is a natural born U.S. Citizen
(7) Child Support Obligations says NO. Plaintiff had knowledge of
Defendants three child support obligations until 2006. Information
provided by Plaintiff shows 0- obligations despite documents provided
from Plaintiff in Discovery (see Exhibits L1, L2, L3, O Child
Dependants & Defendants Credit Report.) proving Plaintiff had
knowledge. see O.R.C. 1322.07(A),(B),(C),(E),(H)
52. Defendant states that a full scrutinization of Mortgage and Mortgage creation
documentation also clearly shows many violations in regard to Rules & Regulations as
set forth in The Truth In Lending Act (TILA), The Homeowners Equity Protection Act
(HOEPA), The Fair Debt Collections Act (FDCPA), RESPA, Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA), U.C.C., Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ohio Consumer Sales Practices
Act, Ohio Corrupt Activities Act, O.R.C. 1345.0, U.S Constitution Article III, to whit,

Defendants Partial Counterclaims

TILA Violations;

53. Defendant John A. Reed incorporates by reference all of the proceeding and
foregoing allegations in the entirety of Defendants answers & pleadings as in regard to the

26

Complaint and his counterclaims in its and their entirety and from its inception to each and
every violation listed.

54. Under the facts otherwise identified elsewhere within this action and at hand
Defendant did correctly, reasonable and legally rely on the mortgage broker and the
Plaintiff to act fairly with him. Defendant has been harmed by each and every below
counterclaim listed and Plaintiff has patently violated not only the Truth in Lending Act,
at all relevant times, but also the spirit of the Truth and Lending Act . The Plaintiffs
broker, closing agent and the Lender/Bank each, in their own parts, has misled,
obfuscated, shirked from their proper Due Diligence and attempted to confuse Defendant
in their practice and pattern and pursuit of their own unjust enrichment, to whit;
i. The Plaintiff did not provide appropriate disclosure as required
by the Truth in Lending Act in a substantive and technical
manner,
Pursuant to regulations promulgated under Truth in Lending Act, violator
of disclosure requirements is held to standard of strict liability, and
therefore, borrower need not show that creditor in fact deceived borrower
by making substandard disclosures. Truth in Lending Act, Sections 102-186,
as amended, 15 U.S.C. Section 1601-1667(e); Truth in Lending Regulations,
Regulation Z, Section 226,8(b-d), 15 U.S.C. Section 1700 Soils v. Fidelity
Consumer Discount Co., 58 B.R. 983,

Given the ease of Plaintiffs availability to verify Defendants actual income, or

lack thereof, and Defendants lack of ability to alter any documentation it is obvious
by fact that the Plaintiff did alter and falsify Application documentation to reflect
elevated income levels for Defendant thereby falsely representing the material fact
that Defendant was employed when in fact Defendant, had no full time employment
at time of Loan creation, nor had any previous full time employment for a period
extending approximately 4 years prior to mortgage loan creation, and exhibit 9,
Employment Verification clearly shows employment verification was not even
accomplished (if ever!), (which again speaks to due diligence), until June 13, 2005,
some four days AFTER alleged mortgage loan closing and payout date. Such
action once again clearly demonstrates to the Court, Plaintiffs conduct and
character. Plaintiff also claims to have previously sold this same said Mortgage and
Note on June 10th 2005, three days previous to loan verification, to Barclays Bank
representing to same, and at that time, as fact, that the Mortgage and Note had

27

already received review and that the required Due Diligence had already,
previously been performed on it, when it is an undisputable fact, that it had not.
Any false representation of material facts made with knowledge of falsity and with
intent that it shall be acted on by another in entering into contract, and which is so acted
upon, constitutes fraud, and entitles party deceived to avoid contract or recover
damages. Barnsdall Refining Corn. v. Birnam wood Oil Co., 92 F 2d 8

ii. The Plaintiff did fraudulently represent to Defendant a,

witnessed and with witnesses willing to testify to the fact of
it, promise of future refinancing of the same alleged loan to
Defendant after prepayment penalty date had elapsed and
future additions and alterations to property were finalized
(thereby increasing equitable value of property), which
Defendant did complete, as incentive in making the loan and
thereby assuring Defendant of a future income with which to
make future payments attainable,
If any part of the consideration for a promise be illegal, or if there are several
considerations for an unseverable promise one of which is illegal, the promise, whether
written or oral, is wholly void, as it is impossible to say what part or which one of the
considerations induced the promise. Menominee River Co. v. Augustus Spies L & C
Co., 147 Wis 559, 572; 132 NW 1122

iii. The Plaintiff did supply Defendant with blank application

documentation for signature and return, later filing in the
amounts,
It is not necessary for recession of a contract that the party making the
misrepresentation should have known that it was false, but recovery is allowed even
though misrepresentation is innocently made, because it would be unjust to allow one
who made false representations, even innocently, to retain the fruits of a bargain
induced by such representations. Whipp v. Iverson, 43 Wis 2d 166.

iv. The Plaintiff has caused injury to Defendant and did

fraudulently, and with previous knowledge, did alter and/or
change the documentation to reflect that Defendant had an
ability to repay this alleged Note & Mortgage without future
refinancing of same when in fact and to their knowledge he had
none,
Any violation of the Truth in Lending Act, regardless of technical nature, must result
in finding of liability against lender. Truth in Lending Regulations, Regulation Z Section
226.1 et seq., 15 U.S.C. Section 1700; Truth in Lending Act Section 130 (a, e), IS U.S.C.
Section 1640 (a, e). In Re Steinbrecher. 110 BR. 155, 116 A.L.R. Fed. 881.

v. The Plaintiff has caused injury to Defendant and did

fraudulently alter the Loan Documents to represent the real
party of interest to be Defendants Father in an attempt to
obfuscate true ownership to force real holder of property to
face additional burden of Defending his legitimate position at
the time of intentional and pre-ordained foreclosure by
Plaintiff,
The contract is void if it is only in part connected with the illegal transaction and the
promise single or entire. Guardian Agency v. Guardian Mutual. Savings Bank, 227 Wis
550, 279 NW 83.

28

vi. The Plaintiff has caused injury to Defendant and did

fraudulently misrepresent accurate amounts financed,
percentage rates and finance charges on the Truth In Lending
Documents (2 separate ones). (See Exhibit M & N)
Question of whether lenders Truth in Lending Act disclosures are inaccurate,
misleading or confusing ordinarily will be for fact finder; however, where confusing,
misleading and inaccurate character of disputed disclosure is so clear that it cannot
reasonably be disputed, summary judgment for plaintiff is appropriate. Truth in
Lending Act Section 102 et seq; Truth in Lending Regulations, Regulation Z, Section
226.1 et seq., 15 U.S.C. Section 1700. Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co. 503 F,
Supp 246, appeal dismissed 672 F.2d 903, appeal after remand 680 F.2d 927, certiorari
granted, vacated 103 S.Ct, 400, 459 U.S. 56, 74 L.Ed.2d 225, on remand 699 E2d 642.

vii. Plaintiffs closing Agent did rush Defendant through the

closing process with a claim of being late to catch her
plane, thus depriving Defendant of any available time to
review closing documents.
Once a creditor violates the Truth In Lending Act, no matter how technical
violation appears, unless one of statutory defenses applies, Court has no
discretion in imposing liability. Truth in Lending Act, Sections 102-186 as
amended, 15 U.S.C. Section 1601-1667e. Solis v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co.
58 BR, 983.

Home Owners Equity Protection Act

HOEPA Violations
55. In General -The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994
(HOEPA or the Act) amended TILA by adding Section 129 of TILA, 15 U.S.C.
1639, and has been implemented by Sections 226.31 and 226.32 of Regulation Z.
12 C.F.R. 226.31 and 226.32. HOEPA was implemented to specifically curb
the predatory lending practices of certain sub-prime lenders. Generally, the Act
provides added protections to borrowers who obtain more high-cost loans in the
sub-prime market.
56. In the course of offering and extending credit to Defendant, Wells
Fargo Bank through their assigns, specifically Option One Mortgage Co., and
H&R Block mortgage Corp. (now defunct) has caused injury to Defendant and
have violated HOEPA regulations by engaging in asset-based lending and
including loan terms prohibited by HOEPA. Specifically:
29

A. Plaintiff has caused injury to Defendant and has violated the

requirements of HOEPA and Regulation Z by engaging in a pattern or
practice of extending such credit to a borrower based solely on the borrowers
collateral rather than considering the borrowers current and expected income,
current obligations, and employment status to determine whether the borrower is
able to make the scheduled payments to repay the obligation, in violation of
Section 129(h) of TILA, 15 U.S.C. 1639(h), and Section 226.32(e)(1) of
Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. 226.32(e)(1), 226.34;
was passed to prevent unsophisticated consumer from being misled
as to total cost of financing. Truth in Lending Act, Section 102, 15 U.S.C. Section
1601. Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount. 680 F.2d 927, certiorari granted,
vacated 103 S.Ct. 400, 459 U.S. 56, 74 L.Ed.2d 225, on remand 699 F.2d 642.
Truth in Lending Act

2. Purpose of Truth in Lending Act is for customers to be able to make informed

decisions. Truth in Lending Act Section 102, 15 U.S.C. Section 1601. Griggs v.
Provident Consumer Discount Co. 680 F.2d 927, certiorari granted, vacated 103
S.Ct. 400, 459 U.S. 56, 74 L.Ed,2d 225, on remand 699 F,2d 642,
B. Plaintiff has caused injury to Defendant and has violated the
requirements of HOEPA and Regulation Z by including a prohibited prepayment
penalty provision, in violation of Section 129 of TILA, 15 U.S.C. 1639,
and Section 226.32(d)(6) of Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. 226.32(d)(6);
C. Plaintiff has caused injury to Defendant and did violate the
requirements of HOEPA and Regulation Z by misleading Defendant in the real
costs of alleged Mortgage and Note as is evidenced by lower courts own
representation of erroneous and fraudulent amounts referenced in Decision, Order
and Judgment Entry Finding In Favor Of Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank (page 2) and
purporting the entire loan amount totaling $93,445.92 which is $6,554.08 less
than alleged mortgage amount. If the courts cant figure it out, how then can they
expect the Defendant to?
D. Plaintiff has caused injury to Defendant and has violated the
requirements of HOEPA and Regulation Z by including a prohibited increased
interest rate after default provision, in violation of Section 129(d) of TILA, 15

30

U.S.C. 1639, and Section 226.32(d)(6) of Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R.

226.32(d)(6); and
E. Plaintiff has caused injury to Defendant and violated the requirements
of HOEPA and Regulation Z by failing to provide Defendant required
disclosure documented under Section 1639 (a) Disclosures(1)(A) &
(B), (2) Annual percentage rate(B), (b) Time of disclosures(1), (2)(A),
(3) Modifications, (c) No Prepayment penalty(1)(A)(B), (2)(A)(i)(ii),
(B), (D), (d), (e), (f), (h), (j), (k?), Section 1639(d), and
Pursuant to regulations promulgated under Truth in Lending Act, violator of
disclosure requirements is held to standard of strict liability, and therefore, borrower
need not show that creditor in fact deceived by making substandard disclosures.
TILA, Sections 102-186, as amended, 15 U.S.C. Section 1601-1667(e); Truth in
Lending Regulations, Regulation Z, Section 226,8(b-d), 15 U.S.C. Section 1700 Soils v.
Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 58 B.R. 983,

F. Plaintiff did violate and cause to initiate HOEPA protection rights and
Defendants rights by requiring Defendant to pay an annual percentage
rate at consummation which did exceed an interest rate more than 8
percentage points for fist lien loansbased on the yield on Treasury
securities having comparable periods of maturity.as is required
by Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R Section 226.32 (a)(1)(i)(ii), (see
exhibitR)
G. Plaintiff failed in their requirements under rules (1)to provide
Defendant proper documentation as required,(2) ,(3),(4) in providing
Defendant any and all proper notices as is required. (d)(1),(2),(4),(5),
(6),(7)(i)(ii)(iii)(iv) .
H. Plaintiff did violate Defendants rights by charging discount points in
violation of State maximum limitation requirement of 2% by charging
Defendant 3%.
Violations of the Ohio RICO Act
Ohio RICO, R.C. 2923.32
57. Defendant John A. Reed incorporates by reference all of the proceeding and
foregoing allegations in the entirety of Defendants answers & pleadings as in regard to
the Complaint in its entirety and from its inception.
58. Defendant John A. Reed alleges that:
A. Wells Fargo Bank NA., acting as trustee for holders of mortgages and
mortgage-backed securities, has filed thousands of foreclosure actions

31

under false pretenses, without standing and without complying with Ohio
law.
B. Defendant alleges an improper taking of their real property through the
Plaintiff use of intentional nondisclosure, material misrepresentation, and
the creation of fraudulent loan documents in violation of the RICO Statute,
and continuing injury and damages including the auction of their home
and future overpayment of fraudulent charges.
C. These activities are a pattern of corrupt and illegal activity and in violation
of Ohio RICO law.
59. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., has received millions, maybe Billions of dollars in
distributions from the sale of foreclosed properties without possessing properly perfected
and recorded assignments/transferences of the mortgages. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. s
pattern and practice of seeking and obtaining foreclosure judgments in state and federal
courts without a duly perfected and recorded assignment, without a true and accurate
evidence of a chain of assignment/transference of these alleged notes and mortgages, and
without the right to engage in the trust business in Ohio constitutes a false, deceptive
and/or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of a debt; a
violation of the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act as is referenced within the
above two quotes, 15 USC Sec 1692e. 51. In addition, this suit alleges Wells Fargo Bank
NA has failed to comply with Ohio requirements for a trust company or national bank to
do business in Ohio. That the two named Ohio foreclosure law firms have also violated
the FDCPA and RICO by acting on behalf of Wells Fargo Bank NA in the foreclosure
process.

32

60. Defendant John A. Reed is seeking unspecified actual and statutory damages,
including treble damages under Ohio RICO law, as well as attorneys fees and costs.
Defendant John A. Reed also seeks the appointment of a receiver to recover from Wells
Fargo Bank NA all charges it has collected from Defendant John A. Reed and any
interests in real property it acquired illegally, and to collect fees that Wells Fargo Bank
NA.s law firms obtained from illegal foreclosures.
61. The suit also names two Ohio foreclosure law firms as defendants: Plunkett
Cooney 300 E. Broad St., Columbus, Ohio 43235 & Lerner Sampson &
Rothfuss P.O. Box 5480, Cincinnati, Ohio 45201.
62. The action stems from foreclosure of Defendant John A. Reeds property
located at 7940 Guilford Dr., Dayton, Ohio 45414 whose alleged mortgage had been
allegedly sold, securitized, divided and then pooled without Defendants permission.
63. Ohio RICO states that No person, through a corrupt pattern of corrupt
activity shall acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in, or control of,
any real property. R.C 2923.32(A)(2).
64. Corrupt Activity includes engaging in a violation of section 2921.03 of the
Revised Code which states No person, knowingly and by filing, recording, or
otherwise using a materially false or fraudulent writing in a wanton or reckless
manner, shall attempt to influence . a public servant in the discharge of the persons
duty.
65. Defendant states the Plaintiff has violated Section 2921.03 by knowingly
filing complaints which do allege Wells Fargo Banks ownership of promissory notes and
mortgages when in fact it does not own the alleged notes or mortgages, and by knowingly
filing multiple complaints (see authorities 1, 2, 4, 5) as trustee in reckless
disregard of the fact that Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank was not authorized to engage in such

33

activities both as trustee in Ohio and for lack of standing. These filings were made in a
wanton and reckless manner in an attempt to influence state and federal judges and
judicial officers in Ohio to enter judgments against Defendant(s) on the alleged mortgage
and Note, including for principal, interest, late fees, penalties, costs and attorney fees,
and to foreclose on Defendants property in a wanton attempt at unjust enrichment.
66. The Plaintiffs conduct constitutes a pattern of corrupt activity, because they
have maintained more than two lawsuits under the fraudulent and misleading
circumstances described in the foregoing paragraphs. On information and belief, the
defendants have filed hundreds of foreclosure complaints in violation of R.C. 2923.32
see see authorities 1, 2, 4, 5.
69. Through the filing of foreclosure actions under false pretense and in violation
of U.S. Law, U.C.C., SEC and Ohio Law, and/or any other applicable and\or Local Laws,
Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, with the active assistance and participation of the plaintiff
law firms herein named, has acquired an interest in real property, including obtaining a
foreclosure action against Defendants property.
70. As a result of Plaintiff and Plaintiffs Counsels conduct, the Defendant has
been injured in many various ways, including loss of time to conduct Defendants
Profession of choice due to Defendants lack of ability to obtain knowledgeable and
available Legal Counsel and Defendants forced placement into Defending himself pro
se, through penalties and court costs and attorney fees charged against their account(s) on
lawsuit(s) filed under false and misleading circumstances, and from other incidental and
consequential costs and expenses attendant to the defending of his property.
71. Section 2923.34 of the Revised Code entitles Defendant John A. Reed who

34

has established the elements of Ohio RICO violation to an order divesting Wells Fargo
Bank NA of its interest in Defendants real property and to actual damages Defendant has
sustained, which may be tripled if proved by clear and convincing evidence, and to costs
and reasonable attorney fees.
72. The Defendant further states, and does move the Court, pursuant to sec.
2929.34(B)(1) of the Ohio RICO Statute, to order Wells Fargo Bank NA
divestiture in any interest in Defendants real property and also moves the
court, pursuant to sec. 2929.34(D) of the Statute, for an order of injunctive
relief and a temporary injunction.
73. It is without dispute or issue that a claim under the Ohio RICO statute was not
presented by Defendant John A. Reed or litigated in the civil-court foreclosure
action, because of Plaintiffs misrepresentation of both true owner AND of
true maker of mortgage and note, Defendant could have not brought such
claim in civil court. Defendants have properly brought the claim as part of
their Appellate action herein pursuant to the doctrine of Pendent or
Supplemental jurisdiction, 28 USC sec. 1367(a). The Ohio RICO statute is a
state law, which authorizes the specific relief requested by the Defendant. As
such, Defendants claims which attack the foreclosure are not barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Smith v Encore Credit 4:08-cv-1462 USDC, N. Oh.
W. Dist Judge McHargh
74. Wherefore, because the Plaintiffs exhibits attached to their pleading are
inconsistent with Plaintiffs allegations as to ownership of the subject note and mortgage,
those allegations are neutralized and Plaintiffs complaint is rendered objectionable.
Plaintiff has failed to establish itself as the real party in interest and court did lack subject
matter jurisdiction to hear same. Defendant John A. Reed does request this Court to (1)
dismiss this case with prejudice in its entirety, (2) sustain Defendants expressed
defamation and libel charges, stated elsewhere within this pleading, (3) award Defendant
any actual and punitive monetary reward the Court deems fit and proper for loss of
employment (since foreclosure inception in perpetuity) in his stated profession, any and
all amounts render able under TILA, HOEPA and RICO charges stated above, plus an
award for emotional, physical and psychological pain & suffering as well as any and all

35

costs associated with the defense of this suit, and (4) order Plaintiff, with prejudice, to
immediately cause to be released its alleged mortgage and/or any interest it may have or
have obtained against the subject property and return the property in whole to Defendant
John A. Reed with damages, and award any and all cost and Legal Fees (in their entirety)
that Plaintiffs Attys should/would have collected in the case to Defendant.
75. Defendant reserves the rights to bring charges under each and every other
violation and actionable issue found, acts such as those already discovered within
RESPA, The Ohio Corrupt Activities Act, the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, FTC,
FDCPA, FDRA, U.C.C., O.R.C 1345, Article III, and all others as they become apparent
and, more importantly at this time, space will allow.
76. Finally, I sincerely thank Your Honor for his/her time and patience in
reviewing this lengthy document and I ask you humbly and respectfully, not only for
justice for myself, but for the necessary sanctions and/or injunctions and/or other actions
that would serve to prevent further predatory practices, such as those used against me, to
be utilized against other unsuspecting home owners. Your Honor, Im nobody special, but
I have lived though this before. Another financial Institution came after me 24 years ago,
I searched for knowledgeable legal help then. I couldnt find any then either. They not
only stripped me of all my processions (9 houses Id personally rehabbed including my
own of 19 years), they then continued to ruin my Credit for another 11 years after I filed
bankruptcy. I know whats coming. I came out here destitute, moved here onto a vacant
lot that had been for sale for over 15 years, nobody wanted it. I moved into a 60 year old
rat, raccoon and spider infested shed and if it werent for an old childhood friend, Id
have starved and been dead long ago. It got cold and they were building McMansions
close by and I started dumpster-diving for insulation and found lots. In the next 5 years
Id built most of this house, 99% of it out of the dumpsters. I worked every job I could
find, still, my electric (and the well) has been turned off too many times. And still, I
raised this property to its highest and best use.
Respectfully,
36

John A. Reed pro se

7940 Guilford Dr.
Dayton, Ohio 45414
937-890-2576
[email protected]

37

Exhibits

Exhibit A Assignment from Option One to Wells Fargo plaintiffs exhibit 11

3/7/2008
Exhibit B Corporation Assignment of Open End Mortgage 1st Assignment from
H&R Block to Option One plaintiffs exhibit 10
6/9/2005
Exhibit C Allonge from Option One to Blank plaintiffs exhibit 8

6/9/2005

Exhibit D Allonge from H&R Block to Option One plaintiffs exhibit 7

Exhibit F 2nd Assignment from H&R Block to Opt One
plaintiffs exhibit 10

6/9/2005

10/27/2005

Exhibit E EXECUTION COPY Purchase Price and Terms Agreement

plaintiffs exhibit 25 6/10/2005
E2 EC/PP&TA signature page
Exhibit G EXECUTION COPY FLOW AMENDED AND RESTATED
MORTGAGE LOAN PURCHASE AND WARRANTIES AGREEMENT
plaintiffs exhibit 26 8/15/2005
Exhibit G2 (ECFAARMLPAWA) Due Diligence Statement
Exhibit G3 (ECFAARMLPAWA) Validity of Mortgage Documents & Ownership
Exhibit G4 (ECFAARMLPAWA) Origination Due Diligence
Exhibit G5 (ECFAARMLPAWA) Signatory page 1
Exhibit G6 (ECFAARMLPAWA) Signatory page 2
Exhibit G7 (ECFAARMLPAWA) Signatory page 3
Exhibit H Execution Copy Assignment and Conveyance
Exhibit H2 Execution Copy Assignment and Conveyance Signature page 1
Exhibit H3 Execution Copy Assignment and Conveyance Signature Page 3
Exhibit H4 Execution Copy Assignment and Conveyance Signature page 4
Exhibit I Barclays Bank Bill of Sale
Exhibit J Pooling and Servicing Agreement Sec. 2.03

Exhibit K Kristy Canizio the Lady of many hats signature Exhibits

1. Allonge from Option One to Blank (Investor)
2. Allonge from H&R Block to Option One
3. Corporation Assignment of Open End Mortgage
4. Instructions to Closing Agent
b. Instructions to Closing Agent
c. Instructions to Closing Agent
5. HMDA Audit Sheet
6. Data Integrity Audit
7. Data Integrity Audit
8. Wiring Instructions
9. Employment Verification
Exhibit L1 Child Support
L2 Child Support
L3 Child Support
Exhibit M TILA Statement 1
Exhibit N 2nd TILA Statement
Exhibit O Credit report
Exhibit P Universal Residential Loan Application 1
Exhibit Q Universal Residential Loan Application 2
Exhibit R Federal Reserve Statistical Interest Rate Re3lease 7/5/05
Exhibit S Loan Disbursement Worksheet 1
Exhibit T Loan Disbursement Worksheet 2

Exhibit U Itemization of Amount Financed

Exhibit V Good Faith Estimate of Settlement Costs # 1
Exhibit W Good Faith Estimate of Settlement Costs # 1

Exhibit A Assignment from Option One to Wells Fargo

for more examples of Ms. Topaka Loves Signatures see Exhibit *****
for more examples of Notary Banaszewskis Signature see Exhibit *****

Exhibit K Kristy 9 Employment Verification

Kristy 3

Exhibit B Assignment from H&R Block to Option One 6/9/2005

Kristy 1 Exhibit C Allonge from Option One to Blank

Kristy 2

Exhibit D Allonge from H&R Block to Option One

Kristy3

Exhibit E Corporation Assignment of Open-End Mortgage

Exhibit F 2nd Assignment from H&R Block to Option One

Exhibit E Purchase Price & Terms Agreement

Exhibit E2 Purchase Price & Terms Agreement signature page

Exhibit G EXECUTION COPY FLOW AMENDED AND RESTATED

MORTGAGE LOAN PURCHASE AND WARRANTIES AGREEMENT
(ECFAARMLPAWA)

Exhibit G2 (ECFAARMLPAWA) Due Diligence Statement

Exhibit G3 (ECFAARMLPAWA) Validity of Mortgage Documents & Ownership

Exhibit G4 (ECFAARMLPAWA) Origination Due Diligence

Exhibit G5 (ECFAARMLPAWA) Signatory page 1

Exhibit G6 (ECFAARMLPAWA) Signatory page 2

Exhibit G7 (ECFAARMLPAWA) Signatory page 3

Exhibit H Execution Copy Assignment and Conveyance

Exhibit H2 Execution Copy Assignment and Conveyance

Signature page 1

Exhibit H3 Execution Copy Assignment and Conveyance

Signature Page 3

Exhibit H4 Execution Copy Assignment and Conveyance

Signature page 4

Exhibit I Barclays Bank Bill of Sale

Exhibit J
Pooling & Servicing Agreement 2.03

Exhibit K4. Instructions to Closing Agent

Exhibit K4b. Instructions to Closing Agent

Exhibit K4c. Instructions to Closing Agent

Exhibit K5. HMDA Audit Sheet

Kristi Canizio 6

Exhibit K6 Data Integrity Sheet

Kristy Canizio 7 Exhibit K7 Data Integrity Audit

Kristy Canizio 8 Exhibit K8 Wiring Instructions

Kristy Canizio 9 Exhibit K9 Employment Verification

Child Support 1 Exhibit L1

Child Support 1 Exhibit L2

Child Support 1 Exhibit L3

Exhibit M TILA Statement #1

Exhibit N TILA Statement #2

Exhibit O Credit Report

Exhibit P Universal Residential Loan Application 1

Exhibit Q Universal Residential Loan Application 2

Exhibit R
Federal Reserve Statistical Interest Rate Release

Exhibit S Loan Disbursement Worksheet 1

Exhibit T Loan Disbursement Worksheet 2

Exhibit U Itemization of Amount Financed

Exhibit V Good Faith Estimate of Settlement Costs # 1 page 1

Exhibit V Good Faith Estimate of Settlement Costs # 1 page 2

Exhibit W Good Faith Estimate of Settlement Costs # 2

Exhibit W Good Faith Estimate of Settlement Costs # 2 page 2

Authorities One
On Standing & Due Process

Civ. R. 17A
Article III, Section (4)(B) of the Ohio Constitution
Shealy v. Campbell (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 23, 24.
Dallman v. Court of Common Pleas (1973), 35 Ohio St.2d 176, 298 N.E.2d 515
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472
Coyne, 183 F. 3d at 494,
Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Commn, 926 F. 2d 573, 576 (6th Cir. 1991)
Cain v. Calhoun (1979), 61 Ohio A.. 2d 240, 242 fn. 2
State ex rel. Dallman v. Court of Common Pleas (1973), 35 Ohio St.2d 176).
Northland Ins. Co. v. Illuminating Co., 11th Dist. Nos. 2002-A-0058 and 2002-A-0066, 2004Ohio-1529, at 17
Travelers Indemn. Co. v. R. L. Smith Co. (Apr. 13, 2001), 11th Dist. No. 2000-L-014
Discover Bank v. Brockmeier, 12th Dist. No. CA2006-07-078, 2007-Ohio-1552, at 7
Highland Holiday Subdivision (1971), 27 Ohio App.2d 237, 240, 273 N.E.2d 903
First Union Natl. Bank v. Hufford (2001), 146 Ohio App.3d 673, 677, 679-680
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Byrd, 178 Ohio App.3d 285, 2008-Ohio-4603
Jurisdiction
State ex rel. Dallman v Court of Common Pleas (1973), 35 Ohio St. 2d 176, 178, 298, N.E.2d
515
Patton v. Diemer (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 68, 70, 518 N.E.2d 941

Authorities2
Previous Ohio Judgments on Lack of Standing only;
Cain v. Calhoun (1979), 61 Ohio A.. 2d 240, 242 fn. 2 (citintg State ex rel. Dallman v. Court of
Common Pleas (1973), 35 Ohio St.2d 176).
US Court of Appeals, 1st Appellate Dist. Of Ohio, Hamilton Co. Appeal No. C-070889
JUDGE: DINKELACKER
Since plaintiff-appellant Wells Fargo was not a real party in interest at the time it filed suit in this
foreclosure action, the trial court properly dismissed the case.
7th District Court of Appeals of Ohio, Mahoning County DLJ Mtge. Capital, Inc. v. Parsons,
2008-Ohio-1177 Decided on March 13, 2008
Cole v. Am. Industries & Resources Corp. (1998), 128 Ohio App.3d 546, 552, 715 N.E.2d 1179
DLJ Mtge. Capital, Inc. v. Parsons, 2008-Ohio-1177

Seperating and distinguishing between standing and Diversity;

US District Court of SW Ohio, W. Div.
07CV049, 07CV085, 07CV138, 07CV237, 07CV240, 07CV246, 07CV248, 07CV257,
07CV286, 07CV304, 07CV312, 07CV317, ,07CV343, 07CV353, 07CV360, 07CV386, 07CV389,

07CV390, 07CV433. JUDGE: THOMAS M. ROSE

Federal courts have only the power authorized by Article III of the United States
Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto. Bender v. Williamsport Area School
District, 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). As a result, a plaintiff must have constitutional standing in order for
a federal court to have jurisdiction. Id.
This Court is well aware that entities who hold valid notes are entitled to receive timely
payments in accordance with the notes. And, if they do not receive timely payments, the entities have
the right to seek foreclosure on the accompanying mortgages. However, with regard the enforcement of
standing and other jurisdictional requirements pertaining to foreclosure actions, this Court is in full
agreement with Judge Christopher A Boyko of the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio who recently stressed that the judicial integrity of the United States District Court is
Priceless.
JUDGE: THOMAS M. ROSE

Based on Article III requirements and standing, US District Court, N. Ohio, E. Div.
07CV2282, 07CV2532, 07CV2560, 07CV2602, 07CV2631, 07CV2638, 07CV2681,
07CV2695, 07CV2920, 07CV2930, 07CV2949, 07CV2950, 07CV3000, 07CV3029
JUDGE CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO
There is no doubt every decision made by a financial institution in the foreclosure process is
driven by money. And the [*9] legal work which flows from winning the financial institution's
favor is highly lucrative. There is nothing improper or wrong with financial institutions or law
firms making a profit -- to the contrary , they should be rewarded for sound business and legal
practices. However, unchallenged by underfinanced opponents, the institutions worry less about
jurisdictional requirements and more about maximizing returns. Unlike the focus of financial
institutions, the federal courts must act as gatekeepers, assuring that only those who meet
diversity and standing requirements are allowed to pass through. Counsel for the institutions are
not without legal argument to support their position, but their arguments fall woefully short of
justifying their premature filings, and utterly fail to satisfy their standing and jurisdictional
burdens. The institutions seem to adopt the attitude that since they have been doing this for so
long, unchallenged, this practice equates with legal compliance. Finally put to the test, their weak legal
arguments compel the Court to stop them at the gate.
The Court will illustrate in simple terms its decision: "Fluidity of the market" -- "X" dollars, "contractual
arrangements [*10] between institutions and counsel" -- "X" dollars, "purchasing mortgages in bulk and
securitizing" -- "X" dollars, "rush to file, slow to record after judgment" -- "X" dollars, "the jurisdictional integrity of
United States District Court" -- "Priceless."
JUDGE CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO

With Diversity but ruled for of lack of standing

US District Court of Ohio, S.D.,E. Div
07-cv-166, 07-cv-190, 07-cv-226, 07-cv-279, 07-cv-423, 07-cv-534, 07-cv-536, 07-cv-642, 07cv-706, 07-cv-727, 07-cv-731, 07-cv-963, 07-cv-1047, 07-cv-1119, 07-cv-1150
JUDGE: John D.
Holschuh Dec. 27, 2007
Weighing the evidence presented, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not established that they
in fact owned the notes and mortgages in question at the time these respective complaints were filed.
Because Plaintiffs apparently did not own the notes and mortgages at the time the complaints were
filed, Plaintiffs suffered no injury in fact from the debtors' default. Plaintiffs thus do not have standing

to bring these actions, and these cases should be dismissed for lack of standing. JUDGE : John D.
Holschuh

Lack of Standing Positions Held

Against Wells Fargo Bank NA. In Bold
Dismissals Due To Plaintiff's Failure To Show Standing
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Nashe; Filed 10/1/2007; Case No. 1:2007cv02994;
Disposed 12/3/2007; Judge James S. GWIN
Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Ivy; Filed 8/10/2007; Case No. 1:2007cv02453; Disposed
12/3/2007; Judge James S. GWIN
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Mays; Filed 11/6/2007; Case No. 1:2007cv02334;
Disposed 12/3/2007; Judge James S. GWIN
Ameriquest Funding II REO Subsidiary LLC v. Bat; Filed 9/10/2007; Case No. 1:2007cv02726;
Disposed 12/3/2007; Judge Patricia A. GAUGHAN
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Awad; Filed 9/6/2007; Case No. 5:2007cv01703;
Disposed 12/4/2007; Judge David D. DOWD, Jr.
Wells Fargo Bank, N A v. Ernest; Filed 11/2/2007; Case No. 1:2007cv03419; Disposed
12/4/2007; Judge David D. DOWD, Jr.
Washington Mutual Bank v. Clark; Filed 10/15/2007; Case No. 5:2007cv03177; Disposed 12/4/2007;
Judge David D. DOWD, Jr.
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Bradford; Filed 7/17/2007; Case No. 1:2007cv02144;
Disposed 12/5/2007; Judge Dan Aaron POLSTER
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. DeFrati; Filed 10/23/2007; Case No. 1:2007cv03276;
Disposed 12/10/2007; Judge Christopher A. BOYKO
LaSalle Bank National Association v. Lyons; Filed 9/10/2007; Case No. 1:2007cv02733; Disposed
12/11/2007; Judge James S. GWIN
CitiMortgage, Inc. v. North; Filed 10/30/2007; Case No. 5:2007cv03376; Disposed 12/12/2007;
Judge David D. DOWD, Jr.
MidFirst Bank v. Deem; Filed 10/22/2007; Case No. 5:2007cv03260; Disposed 12/12/2007; Judge
David D. DOWD, Jr.
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Squires; Filed 10/8/2007; Case No. 5:2007cv03076;
Disposed 12/12/2007; Judge David D. DOWD, Jr.
DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc. v. Harper; Filed 10/5/2007; Case No. 1:2007cv03052; Disposed
12/12/2007; Judge David D. DOWD, Jr.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Banfield; Filed 7/26/2007; Case No. 5:2007cv02272; Disposed
12/12/2007; Judge David D. DOWD, Jr.
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Black; Filed 10/8/2007; Case No. 1:2007cv03074;
Disposed 12/12/2007; Judge David D. DOWD, Jr.
CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Stout; Filed 10/23/2007; Case No. 5:2007cv03280; Disposed 12/12/2007;
Judge David D. DOWD, Jr.
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Lewis; Filed 9/24/2007; Case No. 1:2007cv02903;
Disposed 12/12/2007; Judge Lesley WELLS
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. McFarla; Filed 7/10/2007; Case No. 1:2007cv02042;
Disposed 12/12/2007; Judge Lesley WELLS
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Jones; Filed 4/23/2007; Case No. 1:2007cv01186;
Disposed 12/12/2007; Judge Lesley WELLS
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Henders; Filed 10/8/2007; Case No. 1:2007cv03069;
Disposed 12/20/2007; Judge Sara LIOI
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Jackson; Filed 9/12/2007; Case No. 1:2007cv02753;
Disposed 12/20/2007; Judge Sara LIOI
HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc. v. Hilty; Filed 3/30/2007; Case No. 2:2007cv00279; Disposed
12/27/2007; Judge John D. HOLSCHUH

EMC Mortgage Corporation v. Washington; Filed 3/16/2007; Case No. 2:2007cv00226; Disposed
12/27/2007; Judge John D. HOLSCHUH
GreenPoint Mortgage Funding v. Cook; Filed 2/27/2007; Case No. 2:2007cv00166; Disposed
12/27/2007; Judge John D. HOLSCHUH
Household Realty Corporation v. McCord; Filed 11/6/2007; Case No. 2:2007cv01150; Disposed
12/27/2007; Judge John D. HOLSCHUH
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Raines; Filed 10/26/2007; Case No.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Byrd, 178 Ohio App.3d 285, 2008-Ohio-4603
2:2007cv01119; Disposed 12/27/2007; Judge John D. HOLSCHUH
Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas v. Glass; Filed 9/21/2007; Case No. 2:2007cv00963;
Disposed 12/27/2007; Judge John D. HOLSCHUH
Option One Mortgage Corporation v. Merrit; Filed 6/6/2007; Case No. 2:2007cv00536; Disposed
12/27/2007; Judge John D. HOLSCHUH
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Hall; Filed 7/30/2007; Case No. 2:2007cv00731; Disposed
12/27/2007; Judge John D. HOLSCHUH
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Muse; Filed 7/27/2007; Case No. 2:2007cv00727; Disposed
12/27/2007; Judge John D. HOLSCHUH
LaSalle Bank National Association v. Claypoole; Filed 7/24/2007; Case No. 2:2007cv00706; Disposed
12/27/2007; Judge John D. HOLSCHUH
Hudson City Savings Bank, FSB v. Castleberry; Filed 7/6/2007; Case No. 2:2007cv00642; Disposed
12/27/2007; Judge John D. HOLSCHUH
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Clossman; Filed 6/6/2007; Case No. 2:2007cv00534; Disposed
12/27/2007; Judge John D. HOLSCHUH
NovaStar Mortgage, Inc. v. Nelson; Filed 5/11/2007; Case No. 2:2007cv00423; Disposed
12/27/2007; Judge John D. HOLSCHUH
HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc. v. King; Filed 10/11/2007; Case No. 2:2007cv01047; Disposed
12/27/2007; Judge John D. HOLSCHUH
[NOTE: The PACER Case Name Index truncates the parties names after 50 characters. If the
Defendant's name looks peculiar or truncated, please see the case shown by Case Number and Filing
Date.]

Authorities 3
Party In Interest Case Law
Shealy v. Campbell (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 23, 24. The purpose behind the real-party-in-interest
requirement is " 'to enable the defendant to avail himself of evidence and defenses that the defendant
has against the real party in interest, and to assure him finality of the judgment, and that he will be
protected against another suit brought by the real party at interest on the same matter.' " Id. at 24-25,
quoting In reHighland Holiday Subdivision (1971), 27 Ohio App.2d 237, 240.
In foreclosure actions, the real party in interest is the current holder of the note and mortgage.
Chase Manhattan Mtge. Corp. v. Smith, Hamilton App. No. C-061069, 2007-Ohio-5874, at 18;
Kramer v. Millott (Sept. 23, 1994), Erie App. No. E-94-5 (because the plaintiff did not prove
that she was the holder of the note and mortgage, she did not establish herself as a real party in
interest).
A party who fails to establish itself as the current holder is not entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. First Union Natl. Bank v. Hufford (2001), 146 Ohio App.3d 673, 677, 679-680.

Thus, in Hufford, the Third District No. 07AP-615 5 Court of Appeals reversed a grant of
summary judgment where a purported mortgagee failed to produce sufficient evidence explaining or
demonstrating its right to the note and mortgage at issue. In that case, the record contained only
"inferences and bald assertions" and no "clear statement or documentation" proving that the original
holder of the note and mortgage transferred its interest to the appellee. Id. at 678. The failure to prove
who was the real party in interest created a genuine issue of material fact that precluded summary
judgment. Id. at 679-680. Similarly, in Washington Mut. Bank, F.A. v. Green (2004), 156 Ohio App.3d
461, the Seventh District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's finding of summary judgment
where the plaintiff failed to prove that it was the holder of the note and mortgage. There, the defendant
executed a note and mortgage in favor of Check 'n Go Mortgage Services, not Washington Mutual
Bank, F.A. Although Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. submitted an affidavit alleging an interest in the
note and mortgage, it did not state how or when it acquired that interest. Id. at 467. The court
concluded that this lack of evidence defeated the purpose of Civ.R. 17(A) by exposing the defendant to
the danger that multiple "holders" would seek foreclosure based upon the same note and mortgage. Id.

Authorities 4
Previous Ohio Cases Ruled against Wells Fargo Bank N.A. for Lack of Standing
Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Ivy; Filed 8/10/2007; Case No. 1:2007cv02453; Disposed 12/3/2007; Judge
James S. GWIN
Wells Fargo Bank, N A v. Ernest; Filed 11/2/2007; Case No. 1:2007cv03419; Disposed 12/4/2007;
Judge David D. DOWD, Jr.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Banfield; Filed 7/26/2007; Case No. 5:2007cv02272; Disposed 12/12/2007;
Judge David D. DOWD, Jr.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Raines; Filed 10/26/2007; Case No.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Byrd, 178 Ohio App.3d 285, 2008-Ohio-4603
2:2007cv01119; Disposed 12/27/2007; Judge John D. HOLSCHUH
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Muse; Filed 7/27/2007; Case No. 2:2007cv00727; Disposed 12/27/2007;
Judge John D. HOLSCHUH
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Clossman; Filed 6/6/2007; Case No. 2:2007cv00534; Disposed
12/27/2007; Judge John D. HOLSCHUH

Authorities 5
Previous Sanctions Against Wells Fargo Bank N.A.
US Bankruptcy Court, Dist. Of Mass., Case No. 02-46025-JBR Adversary Proceeding. No. 044517 and No. 07-4109 Lack of Standing no mention of diversity,
The seek to bind the Debtor to one standard and themselves to a much lower one. Moreover the
attorneys and law firms argument that notes and mortgages frequently change hands
multiple times, often with written documentation executed later, which they offer as
explanation as to why it reasonable for them to rely on the representations of their
clients should provide little shelter when they insist that the Debtor should have known
better than to take their pleadings literally. This Court will not countenance creditors and
creditors attorneys holding themselves to a different and clearly lower standard than

what they expect of the Debtor. It will not tolerate a lenders or sevicers disregard for
the rules that govern litigation, including contested matters, in the federal courts. It is the
creditors responsibility to keep a borrower and the Court informed as to who owns the
nte and mortgage and is servicing the loan, not the borrowers or the Courts
responsibility to ferret out the truth.
Wells Fargo Bank sanction amt. $250,000.00 Dated April 25, 2008
JUDGE: JOEL B. ROSENTHAL
On July 31, a civil jury in Montgomery County, Maryland, Kimberly Thomas v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., Civ. No. 279370-V, rendered a verdict for $1,250,000 in damages ($250,000 compensatory
and $1,000,000 punitive) against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., for defrauding a home buyer who was
seeking a mortgage loan. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., made an excessive loan at a higher than promised
interest rate to Ms. Kimberly Thomas. In the course of the loan approval, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., was
found to have engaged in fraudulent activity by misrepresenting income and assets of Ms. Thomas in
order to justify a loan that she could not afford and could not repay in order to earn a commission on
the transaction.
In conducting its deliberations, the jury was provided evidence from which it could find that Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., did not comply with its own consumer mortgage loan policies, its own ethical
standards and requirements and abused its position with respect to commonly used banking practices
governing loan standards in the consumer area.

Authorities 6
Negotiable instruments
Buckeye Federal Sav. & Loan Assn v. Garlinger (1991), 62 Ohio St. 3d 312, 315 (stating
promissory notes are negotiable instruments under R.C 1303.3(A).
R.C 1303.3(A),(B),(C),(E),(H)
R.C. 1303.21(B).
R.C. 1303.22
R.C. 1335.04 Ohio law holds that when a mortgage is assigned, moreover, the assignment is subject to the
recording requirements of R.C. 5301.25.

R.C. 5301.01
R.C. 5301.25
R.C. 5309.79
U.C.C 3-201 & Article III
U.C.C. - 3-203 (b)

S.E.C. true sale obligations

Creager v. Anderson (1934), 16 Ohio Law Abs. 400
Ochmanek, 266 B.R. 114, 120 (Bkrtcy.N.D. Ohio 2000)
Pinney v. Merchants National Bank of Defiance, 71 Ohio St. 173, 177 (1904).1

Due Diligence
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 SEC. 10A (a)(1)(2)(3)

Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 SEC. 9(a) (1)(A)(B)(C), (2), (4),6)(b)(1)(2)(3), (6)(c),(d)
(e)
Others

Authorties 7
Handwriting Analysis
Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,v. No. 01-4953 PATRICK LEROY CRISP

Federal Code, Rules & Regulations

U.C.C. - 3-203 (b) Transfer of an instrument, whether or not the transfer is a negotiation,
vests in the transferee any right of the transferor to enforce the instrument, including any right as a
holder in due course, but the transferee cannot acquire rights of a holder in due course by a transfer,
directly or indirectly, from a holder in due course if the transferee engaged in fraud or illegality
affecting the instrument.
As stated in Buckeye Federal Sav. & Loan Assn v. Garlinger (1991), 62 Ohio St. 3d 312, 315
(stating promissory notes are negotiable instruments under R.C 1303.3(A)
According to Ohio Revised Code, in order for a negotiable instrument to be properly
transferred, it must be negotiated. R.C. 1303.21(B). Negotiation includes not only the physical
transfer of the instrument but also the indorsement, U.C.C 3-201, by the holder to transferee, which
of course, must be in writing. Id.; R.C. 1303.22.
section 3-305(b) of the Revised Article Three of the Uniform Commercial Code

Securities Exchange Act of 1934

SEC. 10A (a)(1)(2)(3),
SEC. 9(a) (1)(A)(B)(C), (2), (4), (6)(b)(1)(2)(3), (6)(c),(d)(e),
Ohio Revised Code
R.C 1303.3(A)
R.C. 1303.21(B).
R.C. 1303.22
Civ. Rule 17(A)
CivR 1002

U.S. Statute of Frauds

US Law of Contracts
Civ. Rule 17A

Authorities A

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF VOID JUDGMENTS

Void judgments are those rendered by a court which lacked jurisdiction, either of the subject matter or
the parties, Wahl v. Round Valley Bank 38 Ariz. 411, 300 P. 955 (1931); Tube City Mining & Milling Co. v.
Otterson, 16 Ariz. 305, 146 P. 203 (1914); and Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 2d 278
(1940).
A void judgment which includes judgment entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction over the parties or
the subject matter, or lacks inherent power to enter the particular judgment, or an order procured by fraud, can be
attacked at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally, provided that the party is properly before the
court, Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 ( C.A. 7 Ill. 1999).
A void judgment is one which, from its inception, was a complete nullity and without legal effect,
Lubben v. Selevtive Service System Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645, 14 A.L.R. Fed. 298 (C.A. 1 Mass. 1972).
A void judgment is one which from the beginning was complete nullity and without any legal effect,
Hobbs v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 485 F.Supp. 456 (M.D. Fla. 1980).
Void judgment is one that, from its inception, is complete nullity and without legal effect, Holstein v.
City of Chicago, 803 F.Supp. 205, reconsideration denied 149 F.R.D. 147, affirmed 29 F.3d 1145 (N.D. Ill 1992).
Void judgment is one where court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction or entry of order
violated due process, U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5 - Triad Energy Corp. v. McNell 110 F.R.D. 382 (S.D.N.Y.
1986).
Judgment is a void judgment if court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or
of the parties, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 60(b)(4), 28
U.S.C.A., U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5 - Klugh v. U.S., 620 F.Supp. 892 (D.S.C. 1985).
A void judgment is one which, from its inception, was, was a complete nullity and without legal effect,
Rubin v. Johns, 109 F.R.D. 174 (D. Virgin Islands 1985).
A void judgment is one which, from its inception, is and forever continues to be absolutely null, without
legal efficacy, ineffectual to bind the parties or to support a right, of no legal force and effect whatever, and
incapable of enforcement in any manner or to any degree - Loyd v. Director, Dept. of Public Safety, 480 So. 2d
577 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985).
A judgment shown by evidence to be invalid for want of jurisdiction is a void judgment or at all events
has all attributes of a void judgment, City of Los Angeles v. Morgan, 234 P.2d 319 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1951).
Void judgment which is subject to collateral attack, is simulated judgment devoid of any potency
because of jurisdictional defects, Ward v. Terriere, 386 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1963).
A void judgment is a simulated judgment devoid of any potency because of jurisdictional defects only, in
the court rendering it and defect of jurisdiction may relate to a party or parties, the subject matter, the cause of
action, the question to be determined, or relief to be granted, Davidson Chevrolet, Inc. v. City and County of
Denver, 330 P.2d 1116, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 609, 359 U.S. 926, 3 L.Ed. 2d 629 (Colo. 1958).
Void judgment is one entered by court without jurisdiction of parties or subject matter or that lacks
inherent power to make or enter particular order involved and such a judgment may be attacked at any time,

either directly or collaterally, People v. Wade, 506 N.W.2d 954 (Ill. 1987).
Void judgment may be defined as one in which rendering court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, lacked
personal jurisdiction or acted in manner inconsistent with due process of law Eckel v. MacNeal, 628 N.E. 2d 741
(Ill. App. Dist. 1993).
Void judgment is one entered by court without jurisdiction of parties or subject matter or that lacks
inherent power to make or enter particular order involved; such judgment may be attacked at any time, either
directly or collaterally People v. Sales, 551 N.E.2d 1359 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1990).
Res judicata consequences will not be applied to a void judgment which is one which, from its inception,
is a complete nullity and without legal effect, Allcock v. Allcock, 437 N.E. 2d 392 (Ill. App. 3 Dist. 1982).
Void judgment is one which, from its inception is complete nullity and without legal effect In re
Marriage of Parks, 630 N.E. 2d 509 (Ill.App. 5 Dist. 1994).
Void judgment is one entered by court that lacks the inherent power to make or enter the particular order
involved, and it may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally; such a judgment would be a nullity.
People v. Rolland, 581 N.E.2d 907, (Ill.App. 4 Dist. 1991).
Void judgment under federal law is one in which rendering court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
dispute or jurisdiction over parties, or acted in manner inconsistent with due process of law or otherwise acted
unconstitutionally in entering judgment, U.S.C.A. Const. Amed. 5, Hays v. Louisiana Dock Co., 452 n.e.2D 1383
(Ill. App. 5 Dist. 1983).
A void judgment has no effect whatsoever and is incapable of confirmation or ratification, Lucas v.
Estate of Stavos, 609 N. E. 2d 1114, rehearing denied, and transfer denied (Ind. App. 1 dist. 1993).
Void judgment is one that from its inception is a complete nullity and without legal effect Stidham V.
Whelchel, 698 N.E.2d 1152 (Ind. 1998).
Relief from void judgment is available when trial court lacked either personal or subject matter
jurisdiction, Dusenberry v. Dusenberry, 625 N.E. 2d 458 (Ind.App. 1 Dist. 1993).
Void judgment is one rendered by court which lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction or acted in
manner inconsistent with due process, U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 5, 14 Matter of Marriage of Hampshire, 869
P.2d 58 ( Kan. 1997).
Judgment is void if court that rendered it lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction; void judgment is
nullity and may be vacated at any time, Matter of Marriage of Welliver, 869 P.2d 653 (Kan. 1994).
A void judgment is one rendered by a court which lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction or acted
in a manner inconsistent with due process. In re Estate of Wells, 983 P.2d 279, (Kan. App. 1999).
Void judgment is one rendered in absence of jurisdiction over subject matter or parties, 310 N.W. 2d
502, (Minn. 1981).
A void judgment is one rendered in absence of jurisdiction over subject matter or parties, Lange v.
Johnson, 204 N.W.2d 205 (Minn. 1973).
A void judgment is one which has merely semblance, without some essential element, as when court
purporting to render is has no jurisdiction, Mills v. Richardson, 81 S.E. 2d 409, (N.C. 1954).

A void judgment is one which has a mere semblance, but is lacking in some of the essential elements
which would authorize the court to proceed to judgment, Henderson v. Henderson, 59 S.E. 2d 227, (N.C. 1950).
Void judgment is one entered by court without jurisdiction to enter such judgment, State v. Blankenship,
675 N.E. 2d 1303, (Ohio App. 9 Dist. 1996).
Void judgment, such as may be vacated at any time is one whose invalidity appears on face of judgment
roll, Graff v. Kelly, 814 P.2d 489 (Okl. 1991).
A void judgment is one that is void on face of judgment roll, Capital Federal Savings Bank v. Bewley,
795 P.2d 1051 (Okl. 1990).
A void judgment is one in which the judgment is facially invalid because the court lacked jurisdiction or
authority to render the judgment, State v. Richie, 20 S.W.3d 624 (Tenn. 2000).
Void judgment is one which shows upon face of record want of jurisdiction in court assuming to render
judgment, and want of jurisdiction may be either of person, subject matter generally, particular question to be
decided or relief assumed to be given, State ex rel. Dawson v. Bomar, 354 S.W. 2d 763, certiorari denied, (Tenn.
1962).
A void judgment is one which shows upon face of record a want of jurisdiction in court assuming to
render the judgment, Underwood v. Brown, 244 S.W. 2d 168 (Tenn. 1951).
A void judgment is one which shows on face of record the want of jurisdiction in court assuming to
render judgment, which want of jurisdiction may be either of the person, or of the subject matter generally, or of
the particular question attempted to decided or relief assumed to be given, Richardson v. Mitchell, 237 S.W. 2d
577, (Tenn.Ct. App. 1950).
Void judgment is one which has no legal force or effect whatever, it is an absolute nullity, its invalidity
may be asserted by any person whose rights are affected at any time and at any place and it need not be attacked
directly but may be attacked collaterally whenever and wherever it is interposed, City of Lufkin v. McVicker, 510
S.W. 2d 141 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1973).
A void judgment, insofar as it purports to be pronouncement of court, is an absolute nullity, Thompson v.
Thompson, 238 S.W.2d 218 (Tex.Civ.App. - Waco 1951).
A void judgment is one that has been procured by extrinsic or collateral fraud, or entered by court that
did to have jurisdiction over subject matter or the parties, Rook v. Rook, 353 S.E. 2d 756, (Va. 1987).
A void judgment is a judgment, decree, or order entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction of the parties
or of the subject matter, or which lacks the inherent power to make or enter the particular order involved, State
ex rel. Turner v. Briggs, 971 P.2d 581 (Wash. App. Div. 1999).
A void judgment or order is one that is entered by a court lacking jurisdiction over the parties or the
subject matter, or lacking the inherent power to enter the particular order or judgment, or where the order was
procured by fraud, In re Adoption of E.L., 733 N.E.2d 846, (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 2000).
Void judgments are those rendered by court which lacked jurisdiction, either of subject matter or parties,
Cockerham v. Zikratch, 619 P.2d 739 (Ariz. 1980).
Void judgments generally fall into two classifications, that is, judgments where there is want of
jurisdiction of person or subject matter, and judgments procured through fraud, and such judgments may be
attacked directly or collaterally, Irving v. Rodriquez, 169 N.E.2d 145, (Ill.app. 2 Dist. 1960).

Invalidity need to appear on face of judgment alone that judgment or order may be said to be
intrinsically void or void on its face, if lack of jurisdiction appears from the record, Crockett Oil Co. v. Effie, 374
S.W.2d 154 ( Mo.App. 1964).
Decision is void on the face of the judgment roll when from four corners of that roll, it may be
determined that at least one of three elements of jurisdiction was absent: (1) jurisdiction over parties, (2)
jurisdiction over subject matter, or (3) jurisdictional power to pronounce particular judgment hat was rendered, B
& C Investments, Inc. v. F & M Nat. Bank & Trust, 903 P.2d 339 (Okla. App. Div. 3, 1995).
Void order may be attacked, either directly or collaterally, at any time, In re Estate of Steinfield, 630
N.E.2d 801, certiorari denied, See also Steinfeld v. Hoddick, 513 U.S. 809, (Ill. 1994).
Void order which is one entered by court which lacks jurisdiction over parties or subject matter, or lacks
inherent power to enter judgment, or order procured by fraud, can be attacked at any time, in any court, either
directly or collaterally, provided that party is properly before court, People ex rel. Brzica v. Village of Lake
Barrington, 644 N.E.2d 66 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1994).
While voidable orders are readily appealable and must be attacked directly, void order may be
circumvented by collateral attack or remedied by mandamus, Sanchez v. Hester, 911 S.W.2d 173, (Tex.App. Corpus Christi 1995).
Arizona courts give great weight to federal courts' interpretations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
governing motion for relief from judgment in interpreting identical text of Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure,
Estate of Page v. Litzenburg, 852 P.2d 128, review denied (Ariz.App. Div. 1, 1998).
When rule providing for relief from void judgments is applicable, relief is not discretionary matter, but is
mandatory, Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, (Colo. 1994).
Judgments entered where court lacked either subject matter or personal jurisdiction, or that were
otherwise entered in violation of due process of law, must be set aside, Jaffe and Asher v. Van Brunt,
S.D.N.Y.1994. 158 F.R.D. 278.
A "void judgment" as we all know, grounds no rights, forms no defense to actions taken there under, and
is vulnerable to any manner of collateral attack (thus here, by ). No statute of limitations or repose runs on its
holdings, the matters thought to be settled thereby are not res judicata, and years later, when the memories may
have grown dim and rights long been regarded as vested, any disgruntled litigant may reopen the old wound and
once more probe its depths. And it is then as though trial and adjudication had never been. 10/13/58 FRITTS v.
KRUGH. SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN, 92 N.W.2d 604, 354 Mich. 97. On certiorari this Court may not
review questions of fact. Brown v. Blanchard, 39 Mich 790. It is not at liberty to determine disputed facts (Hyde
v. Nelson, 11 Mich 353), nor to review the weight of the evidence. Linn v. Roberts, 15 Mich 443; Lynch v.
People, 16 Mich 472. Certiorari is an appropriate remedy to get rid of a void judgment, one which there is no
evidence to sustain. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Hunt, 39 Mich 469.