Divino B.

Miag-ao First Year LlB

Persons and Family Relations

Atty. Jansyl Lovan P. Tumanda
FINALS CASE DIGEST

Marcelo Castillo, Jr. vs. Macaria Pasco

G.R. No. L-16857 May 29, 1964

SUMMARY OF FACTS:

In this case, a fishpond is the bone of contention by the petitioners headed by Marcello
Castillo Jr. on one hand and Macaria Pasco, his mother. Petitioners contend that the fishpond
in question was acquired during the marriage of Marcelo Castillo Sr. and Macaria Pasco thus,
should be considered conjugal for its having been acquired during coverture. The CA found
that the fishpond was acquired thru Macarias own money being a woman of means even before
she married Marcelo Castillo, Sr.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE:

Whether or not the fishpond is a property solely owned by Maria Pasco.

SUPREME COURTS DECISION

It is not gain said that under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that was the applicable
law in 1932, the property acquired for onerous consideration during the marriage was deemed
conjugal or separate property depending on the source of the funds employed for its
acquisition. Thus, Article 1396 of said Code provided:
ART. 1396. The following is separate property spouse:

1
2
3
4. That bought with money belonging exclusively to the wife or to the husband.

On the other hand, Article 1401, prescribed that:

ART. 1401. To the conjugal property belong:

1. Property acquired for valuable consideration during the marriage at

the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition is made for the
partnership or for one of the spouses only.

As the litigated fishpond was purchased partly with paraphernal funds and partly with
money of the conjugal partnership, justice requires that the property be held to belong to both
patrimonies in common, in proportion to the contributions of each to the total purchase price
of P6,000. An undivided one-sixth (1/6) should be deemed paraphernalia and the remaining
five-sixths (5/6) held property of the conjugal partnership of spouses Marcelo Castillo and
Macaria Pasco.

It follows from the foregoing that, as the fishpond was undivided property of the widow
and the conjugal partnership with her late husband, the heirs of the latter, appellants herein,
were entitled to ask for partition thereof and liquidation of its proceeds. The ultimate interest of
each party must be resolved after due hearing, taking into account (a) the widow's one-sixth
direct share; (b) her half of the community property; (e) her successional rights to a part of the
husband's share pursuant to the governing law of succession when the husband died; and (d)
the widow's right to reimbursement for any amounts advanced by her in paying the mortgage
debt as aforesaid. All these details must be settled after proper trial.

WHEREFORE, the dismissal of the original complaint is hereby revoked and set aside,
and the records are ordered remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings
conformable to this opinion.

Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez vs. Hon. Gregorio Lantin

G.R. No. L-22320 May 22, 1968

SUMMARY OF FACTS

Petitioner Damaso P. Perez (Damaso for brevity) owed to respondent Ricardo P. Hermoso
(Ricardo for brevity) for the latters failure to pay his purchases of leather materials used in his
shoe manufacturing business. As a result Ricardo commenced a civil case in the Court of First
Instance of Manila (Branch VII presided by the respondent Judge) against the petitioner
Damaso. The petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at some stages
alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of a
simple money judgment by repeatedly invoking Article 160 of the New Civil Code which
provides that "All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE

Whether or not the shares of stocks is conjugal property that cannot be levied in order to pay
for a spouses indebtedness.

SUPREME COURTS DECISION

After a thorough review of the record, we hold that the respondent Judge acted correctly in
refusing to quash the writ in dispute.
xxx

xxx

xxx

It bears emphasis that in CA-G.R. 29962-R, Damaso Perez practically asserted exclusive
ownership of the levied shares; although he challenged the legality and propriety of the levy
with respect to its excessive coverage, he never raised the question of the conjugal nature of the
levied shares. Having represented himself before the court a quo and in the Court of Appeals as
the exclusive owner of the shares in dispute, he is now precluded from asserting that the levied
shares are conjugal assets, an assertion that he should have advanced with expected alacrity
when he first question the legality of the levy.

Coming now to the other petitioner, Mrs. Perez, although she was not a party in CAG.R. 29962-R, the judgment therein similarly binds her for she stands in privity with her
husband. Moreover, she cannot feign utter ignorance of the affairs of her husband as to justify
her delay in questioning the legality of the levy on the ground aforestated in civil case 7532,
which case was commenced only on January 22, 1963, 17 months after the original levy was
made on August 23, 1961.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is dismissed, and the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued is hereby dissolved. Treble costs are assessed against the petitioners, which
shall be paid by their counsel.

Jose Modequillo vs. Hon. Augusto V. Breva

G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990

SUMMARY OF FACTS

Petitioner Jose Modequillo was the defendant in CA-G.R. CV No. 09218 case entitled
"Francisco Salinas, et al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al. whose decision ordered Jose Modequillo to
pay by way of compensation and other damages for the death of plaintiffs son. The said
judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City to satisfy the said judgment on the goods and chattels of the
defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay.

A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by Petitioner alleging
therein that the residential land located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built
since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution,

forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities
mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the
family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code.

In an order dated August 26, 1988, the trial court denied the motion. A motion for
reconsideration thereof was filed by defendant and this was denied for lack of merit on
September 2, 1988.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE

Is the family home of Petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment
aforecited.

SUPREME COURTS DECISION

No. The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at
the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising
therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions
from execution provided in the Family Code.

As to the agricultural land subject of the execution, the trial court correctly ruled that
the levy to be made by the sheriff shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the
land.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to

costs.

Joey D. Briones vs. Maricel P. Miguel

G.R. No. 156343. October 18, 2004

SUMMARY OF FACTS

Petitioner Joey D. Briones had an illegitimate son by Loreta P. Miguel in the latters
custody. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is
presently residing in Japan. In the school year 2000-2001, the petitioner enrolled him at the
nursery school of Blessed Angels L.A. School, Inc. in Caloocan City, where he finished the
nursery course.

As alleged by Petitioner, respondents came to the house of the petitioner in Caloocan

City on the pretext that they were visiting the minor child and requested that they be allowed to
bring the said child for recreation at a mall. They promised him that they will bring him back
in the afternoon, to which the petitioner agreed. However, the respondents did not bring him
back as promised by them. After efforts to recover custody of the child proved futile, Petitioner
filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca
Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE

Whether or not Petitioner, as the natural father, should have custody of the child.

SUPREME COURTS DECISION

Obviously, Michael is a natural (illegitimate, under the Family Code) child, as there is
nothing in the records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal impediment to
marry at the time of his birth. Both acknowledge that Michael is their son. As earlier
explained and pursuant to Article 176, parental authority over him resides in his mother,
Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his fathers recognition of him.

David v. Court of Appeals held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father
could be a ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child. The
law explicitly confers to the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it follows
that only if she defaults can the father assume custody and authority over the minor. Of
course, the putative father may adopt his own illegitimate child; in such a case, the child shall
be considered a legitimate child of the adoptive parent.

There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of and having sole
parental authority over the minor, is entitled to have custody of him. She has the right to keep
him in her company. She cannot be deprived of that right, and she may not even renounce or
transfer it except in the cases authorized by law.

Dionesio Naldoza vs. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-55538

March 15, 1982

SUMMARY OF FACTS

Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto who were born on October 23, 1970 and July 22,
1973, respectively were children of Dionesio Divinagracia and Zosima Naldoza. Dionesio left
Zosima after he was confronted about his previous marriage with another woman and never
came back to their conjugal home. Dionesio was rumoured to have allegedly swindled a
congressman and two other persons thereby earning the moniker swindler. Desirous of
erasing the discomfiting link between her two minor children and their father, Zosima filed a
petition wherein she prayed that the surname of her two children be changed from Divinagracia
to Naldoza, her surname. After due publication and hearing, the trial court dismissed the
petition.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE

Whether Dionesio Divinagracia, Jr., and Bombi Roberto Divinagracia should be allowed to
discontinue using their father's surname and should use only their mother's surname.

SUPREME COURTS DECISION

The minors Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto, who are presumably legitimate, are
supposed to bear principally the surname Divinagracia, their father's surname (Art. 364, Civil
Code).

To allow them, at their mother's behest, to bear only their mother's surname (which
they are entitled to use together with their father's surname) and to discard altogether their
father's surname thus removing the prima-facie evidence of their paternal provenance or
ancestry, is a serious matter in which, ordinarily, the minors and their father should be
consulted. The mother's desire should not be the sole consideration.

The change of name is allowed only when there are proper and reasonable causes for
such change (Sec. 5, Rule 103, Rules of Court). Where, as in this case, the petitioners are
minors, the courts should take into account whether the change of name would redound their
welfare or would prejudice them.

We hold that the trial court did not err in denying the petition for change of name. The
reasons adduced for eliminating the father's surname are not substantial enough to justify the
petition. To allow the change of surname would cause confusion as to the minors' parentage
and might create the impression that the minors are illegitimate since they would carry the
maternal surname only. That would be inconsistent with their legitimate status as indicated in
their birth records (Exh. C and D).