Constitution Law Review Digest, COMELEC

G.R. Nos. 83938-40 November 6, 1989

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
HON. HENRY B. BASILLA, SALVACION COLAMBOT, SPOUSES JAIME AND ADORACION
TAYONG and MELCHOR YANSON, respondents.
Facts:
As an aftermath of the May 1987 congressional elections in Masbate, complaints for violations of Section
261 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881) were filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Masbate against the private respondents.
In three (3) separate orders, all dated 6 October 1987, and Identical in tenor save for the names of the
accused respondent Judge Henry Basilla motu proprio dismissed the three (3) informations filed by the
Provincial Fiscal, giving the following justification:
xxx xxx xxx
The record shows that the complainant filed the complaint with the fiscal and not with the COMELEC. The
COMELEC did not investigate the case.
The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines says:
"Sec. 2(6) of Art. IX (C) The Commission on Election shall exercise the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
... ; investigate and, when appropriate prosecute cases of violation of election laws, including acts or
omissions, constituting election frauds offenses, malpractices."
The Omnibus Election Election Code of the Philippines (BP Blg, 881) says:
Sec. 265. Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and
to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the
government; Provided, however, that in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within
four months from his filing, the complaint may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the
Ministry of Justice. for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted. (Sec. 182, 1978, EC; and Sec. 66.
BP 697)
The People moved for reconsideration of respondent Judge's orders, without success.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC could deputize prosecution officers to conduct preliminary investigation of
complaints for alleged violation of election laws and to institute criminal informations.
Ruling:

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Constitution Law Review Digest, COMELEC

We note that while Section 265 of the Code vests "exclusive power" to conduct preliminary
investigation of election offenses and to prosecute the same upon the Comelec, it at the same time
authorizes the Comelec to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the Government.
Section 2 of Article IX-C of the 1 987 Constitution clearly envisage that the Comelec would not be
compelled to carry out all its functions directly and by itself alone:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall.
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumantalities of
the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
xxx xxx xxx
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of
voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violation of election laws, including acts or
omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of
any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.
xxx xxx xxx
The concurrence of the President with the deputation by Comelec of the prosecuting arms of the
Government, was expressed in general terms and in advance in Executive Order No. 134. dated 27 February
1987, entitled "Enabling Act for the Elections for members of Congress on May 11, 1987, and for other
purposes." Executive Order No. 134 provided in pertinent portion as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
See. 11. Prosecution. Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have exclusive power
to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable as provided for in the preceding
section, and to prosecute the same: Provided, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any
complaint within two (2) months from filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the Office the
Fiscal or with the Department for Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.
The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government.

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Constitution Law Review Digest, COMELEC

G.R. Nos. 93419-32 September 18, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
HON. GUALBERTO P. DELGADO, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, Br. 29, Toledo City, ELSIE RAGO
LUMANGTAD, VIVENCIA ABARIDO, AVELINA BUTASLAC, ROSELLANO BUTASLAC,
HAYDELISA LUMANGTAD, SILVESTRE LUMANGTAD, MAXIMO RACAZA, NENA RACAZA,
VICTORIANO/ VICTOR RAGO, EDNA TEJAS, MERCEDITA TEJAS, TEOFISTO TEJAS,
BERNABE TOQUERO, JR., and PEDRO RAFAELA, respondents.

Facts:
Fifteen (15) informations were filed against each of private respondents in the RTC of Toledo
City docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. TCS-1220 to TCS-1234. In three separate
manifestations the Regional Election Director of Region VII was designated by the
COMELEC to handle the prosecution with the authority to assign another COMELEC
prosecutor.
Private respondents, through counsels, then filed motions for reconsiderations and the
suspension of the warrant of arrest with the respondent court on the ground that no
preliminary investigation was conducted. On February 22, 1990 an order was issued by
respondent court directing the COMELEC through the Regional Election Director of Region
VII to conduct a reinvestigation of said cases and to submit his report within ten (10) days
after termination thereof.
The COMELEC Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration and opposition to the motion
for reinvestigation alleging therein that it is only the Supreme Court that may review the
decisions, orders, rulings and resolutions of the COMELEC.
The respondents contend that since the cases were filed in court by the COMELEC as a
public prosecutor, and not in the exercise of its power to decide election contests, the trial
court has authority to order a reinvestigation.
Issue:
Whether or not Regional Trial Court (RTC) has the authority to review the actions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the investigation and prosecution of election
offenses filed in said court.
Ruling:
From the provisions of Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution the powers and functions
of the COMELEC may be classified in this manner
(1) Enforcement of election laws;
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Constitution Law Review Digest, COMELEC

(2) Decision of election contests;

(3) Decision of administrative questions;
(4) Deputizing of law enforcement agencies;
(5) Registration of political parties; and
(6) Improvement of elections.
As provided in Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution, unless otherwise provided by law,
any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
However, under Section 2(6), of Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC may
"investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws,
including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices."
Under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC, through its duly
authorized legal officers, "have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the
same."
Section 268 of the same Code provides that: "The regional trial courts shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation
of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote
which shall be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From
the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases."
From the foregoing provisions of the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear
that aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to decide election
contests and administrative questions, it is also vested the power of a public prosecutor
with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the
prosecution of election offenses punishable under the Code before the competent court.
Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the
preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a
probable cause, files the information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires
jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must
be subject to the approval of the court. The COMELEC cannot conduct a
reinvestigation of the case without the authority of the court or unless so ordered by the
court.

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Constitution Law Review Digest, COMELEC

G.R. No. 129417. February 10, 1998

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, petitioner, vs. HON. LORENZO R. SILVA, JR., as Presiding Judge,
RTC, Branches 2 and 3, Balanga, Bataan, HON. BENJAMIN T. VIANZON, as Presiding Judge,
Branch 1, of the same Court, ERASTO TANCIONGCO, and NORMA CASTILLO, respondents.

Facts:
Pursuant to its power under Art. IX-C, 2(6) of the Constitution, the COMELEC
charged private respondents Erasto Tanciongco and Norma Castillo with
violations of 27 of R.A. No. 6646, together with Zenon Uy, in twelve separate
informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bataan.
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuo, who had been designated by the
Commission on Elections to prosecute the cases, filed a comment joining in
private respondents request for Examination of Evidence to Determine the
Existence of Probable Cause; Suspension of Issuance of Warrant of Arrest; and
Dismissal of the Cases.
Judges Silva and Vianzon summarily dismissed the cases against private
respondents.
The COMELEC, by notice of Appeal filed by Jose P. Balbuena of the Comelec
sought to appeal the dismissal of the cases to the Court of Appeals by filing
notices but the judges denied due course to its appeal. The sole basis for the
denials was the fact that the prosecutor, whom the COMELEC had deputized to
prosecute the cases, had earlier taken a contrary stand against the COMELEC.
In his comment to the Notice on Appeal, the Chief State Prosecutor states that he
cannot give his conformity to the Notice of Appeal as it would not be consistent
with his position that he would abide by whatever finding the court may come up
with on the existence of probable cause as against the accused Erasto Tanciongco
and Norma Castillo. Consequently, the notice of appeal filed by Jose P. Balbuena
is unauthorized and without legal effect.
Issue:
Who has authority to decide whether or not to appeal from the orders of dismissal
of the COMELEC or its designated prosecutor?
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Constitution Law Review Digest, COMELEC

Ruling:
The authority to decide whether or not to appeal the dismissal belongs to the
COMELEC. Art. IX-C, 2(6) of the Constitution expressly vests in it the power
and function to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations
of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices. As this Court has held:
In effect the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate
but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws. This means that the
COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases
involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine
probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power is exclusive
with COMELEC.
Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC to prosecute the cases act as its
deputies. They derive their authority from it and not from their offices.
Consequently, it was beyond the power of Chief State Prosecutor Zuo to oppose
the appeal of the COMELEC. For that matter, it was beyond his power, as
COMELEC-designated prosecutor, to leave to the trial courts the determination of
whether there was probable cause for the filing of the cases and, if it found none,
whether the cases should be dismissed. Those cases were filed by the COMELEC
after appropriate preliminary investigation. If the Chief State Prosecutor thought
there was no probable cause for proceeding against private respondents, he should
have discussed the matter with the COMELEC and awaited its instruction. If he
disagreed with the COMELECs findings, he should have sought permission to
withdraw from the cases. But he could not leave the determination of probable
cause to the courts and agree in advance to the dismissal of the cases should the
courts find no probable cause for proceeding with the trial of the accused. It was,
therefore, grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judges to rely on
the manifestation of Chief State Prosecutor Zuo as basis for denying due course
to the notices of appeal filed by the COMELEC.

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Constitution Law Review Digest, COMELEC

G.R. No. 121031. March 26, 1997

ATTY. ROSAURO I. TORRES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VICENTE
RAFAEL A. DE PERALTA, respondents.

Facts:
Mr. Rosauro I. Torres was proclaimed as the fifth winning candidate for Councilor instead of
Mr. Vicente Rafael A. de Peralta who landed in the number eight (8th) position in view of an
error in the computation of totals in the Statement of Votes which was made the basis of the
proclamation.
Municipal Board of Canvassers requested the COMELEC for correction of the number of
votes garnered by petitioner.
The COMELEC set the case for hearing and required them to file their respective answers to
the request letter of the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
Petitioner filed his answer alleging that the subject matter of the letter-petition of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers, which was the correction of votes garnered by him, properly
falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Sec. 251 of the Omnibus
Election Code. On the other hand, private respondent argued for the annulment of the
proclamation of petitioner and prayed for his (private respondent) proclamation as the
winning candidate.
Respondent COMELEC issued the assailed En Banc resolution granting the letter-request of
the Municipal Board of Canvassers for the correction of the number of votes garnered by
petitioner. Respondent COMELEC also ordered the Municipal Board of Canvassers to
reconvene and proclaim private respondent Vicente Rafael A. de Peralta as the eighth
winning councilor of Tanza, Cavite.
The Office of the Solicitor General submits that respondent COMELEC acted beyond the
limits of its power and authority when it ordered the Municipal Board of Canvassers to
reconvene and correct its alleged mistake in counting the votes; that by having done so,
respondent COMELEC had exercised original jurisdiction over a municipal election contest
contrary to what the Constitution mandates; that Art. IX-C, Sec. 2, par 2, of the Constitution
provides that the Commission on Elections shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction,
or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC exercised original jurisdiction over a municipal election contest
contrary to what the Constitution mandates.
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Constitution Law Review Digest, COMELEC

Ruling:
Petitioner's contentions must fail. The position of COMELEC is well-taken. Sec. 7, Rule 27,
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides
Sec. 7. Correction of Errors in Tabulation or Tallying of Results by the Board of Canvassers.
(a) where it is clearly shown before proclamation that manifest errors were committed in the
tabulation or tallying of election returns, or certificates of canvass, during the canvassing as
where (1) a copy of the election returns of one precinct or two or more copies of a certificate
of canvass were tabulated more than once, (2) two copies of the election returns or certificate
of canvass were tabulated separately, (3) there was a mistake in the adding or copying of the
figures into the certificate of canvass or into the statement of votes by precinct, or (4) socalled election returns from non-existent precincts were included in the canvass, the board
may motu proprio or upon verified petition by any candidate, political party, organization or
coalition of political parties, after due notice and hearing, correct the errors committed.
In Castromayor v. Comelec we held that although the above provision applies to preproclamation controversies, and even if the proclamation of a winning candidate has already
been made, there is nothing to prevent its application to cases like the one at bar in which the
validity of the proclamation is precisely in question.
It may be argued that because petitioner has already been proclaimed as winning candidate
the remedy of the losing party is an election protest over which the Regional Trial Court and
not the COMELEC nor the Municipal Board of Canvassers has original jurisdiction.
However, as this Court already ruled in Duremdes
It is Duremdes further submission that his proclamation could not be declared null and void
because a pre-proclamation controversy is not proper after a proclamation has been made, the
proper recourse being an election protest. This is on the assumption, however, that there has
been a valid proclamation. Where a proclamation is null and void, the proclamation is no
proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the
COMELEC of the power to declare such nullity and annul the proclamation.
The Statement of Votes is merely a tabulation per precinct of the votes obtained by the
candidates as reflected in the election returns. What is involved in the instant case is simple
arithmetic. In making the correction in the computation the Municipal Board of Canvassers
acted in an administrative capacity under the control and supervision of the COMELEC.
Pursuant to its constitutional function to decide questions affecting elections, the COMELEC
En Banc has authority to resolve any question pertaining to the proceedings of the Municipal
Board of Canvassers.

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Constitution Law Review Digest, COMELEC

G. R. No. 105628 August 6, 1992

RODULFO SARMIENTO, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF VIRAC and JOSE
"CITO" ALBERTO II, respondents.

Facts:
This is among the special civil actions for certiorari jointly resolved, filed under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which seek to set aside the Resolutions of
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the Special Cases.
Petitioners impugn the challenged resolutions above specified as having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion in that, inter alia, the Commission, sitting en
banc, took cognizance of and decided the appeals without first referring them to
any of its Divisions.
Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and
shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of
decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC en banc acted in grave abuse of discretion by taking
cognizance of and deciding the appeals in Special Cases without first referring
them to any of its division.
Ruling:
It is clear from the above-quoted provision of the 1987 Constitution that election
cases include pre-proclamation controversies, and all such cases must first be
heard and decided by a Division of the Commission. The Commission, sitting en
banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance.
In the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, pre-proclamation cases are
classified as Special Cases and, in compliance with the above provision of the
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Constitution Law Review Digest, COMELEC

Constitution, the two (2) Divisions of the Commission are vested with the
authority to hear and decide these Special Cases. Rule 27 thereof governs Special
Cases; specifically, Section 9 of the said Rule provides that appeals from rulings
of the Board of Canvassers are cognizable by any of the Divisions to which they
are assigned and not by the Commission en banc. Said Section reads:
Sec. 9. Appeals from rulings of Board of Canvassers. (a) A party aggrieved by
an oral ruling of the board of canvassers who had stated orally his intent to appeal
said ruling shall, within five days following receipt of a copy of the written ruling
of the board of canvassers, file with the Commission a verified appeal, furnishing
a copy thereof to the board of canvassers and the adverse party.
(b) The appeal filed with the Commission shall be docketed by the Clerk of Court
concerned.
(c) The answer/opposition shall be verified.
(d) The Division to which the case is assigned shall immediately set the case for
hearing.
Indisputably then, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the
abovementioned Special Cases without first referring them to any of its Divisions.
Said resolutions are, therefore, null and void and must be set aside. Consequently,
the appeals are deemed pending before the Commission for proper referral to a
Division.

Digest by Cris T. Casiple