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DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2010.00398.

‘We Can’t Whistle It Either’: Legend and


Reality
Cora Diamond

Abstract: There is a famous quip of F.P. Ramsey’s, which is my


second epigraph. According to a widespread legend, the quip is a
criticism of Wittgenstein’s treatment in the Tractatus of what cannot
be said. The remark is indeed Ramsey’s, but he didn’t mean what
he is taken to mean in the legend. His quip, looked at in context,
means something quite different. The legend is sometimes taken to
provide support for a reading of the Tractatus according to which
the nonsensical propositions of the book were intended to convey
what cannot be said. But, since the legend has no basis in reality, it
provides no evidence in favor of any such reading of the Tractatus.
The quip has great interest if it is read in the context of Ramsey’s
discussion of generality; it is closely related to issues of importance
in the development of Wittgenstein’s thought.

Mr. Wittgenstein has perceived that, if we accept this account of truth-


functions as expressing agreement and disagreement with truth-
possibilities [of their arguments], there is no reason why the arguments
to a truth-function should not be infinite in number . . . Mr. Wittgenstein
maintains that all propositions are . . . truth-functions of elementary
propositions. (Ramsey 1925: 7, 9)
But what we can’t say we can’t say, and we can’t whistle it either.
(Ramsey 1929a: 238)

1. Introduction

A legend is a story told and retold, passed on as true, although no one bothers to
check whether there is anything to it. Nowadays there is a website devoted
entirely to evaluating contemporary urban legends, of crocodiles eating golfers in
Florida and Dobermans choking on fingers bitten off burglars. But the legend of
Ramsey’s ‘what we can’t say we can’t say, and we can’t whistle it either’ gets
passed on without question. According to the legend, Ramsey was responding to
Wittgenstein’s general treatment in the Tractatus of what cannot be said, and to
Wittgenstein’s supposedly attempting in the book to convey what cannot be said.

European Journal of Philosophy ]]]:]] ISSN 0966-8373 pp. 1–22 r 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road,
Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

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