Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111610, February 27, 2002
Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111610, February 27, 2002
Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111610, February 27, 2002
retired with him. In other words, he had lost entirely his power and authority to act on all cases assigned to him prior to
his retirement. In the instant case, therefore, Judge Icasiano, Jr. could not validly promulgate the decision of another
judge, Judge Diosomito, who has long retired from the service. The decision dated November 8, 1985 of Judge
Diosomito, as promulgated by Judge Icasiano, Jr., in Criminal Case No. 2335 of the Municipal Trial Court of
Naic, Cavite is a void judgment.
A void judgment never acquires finality. Hence, while admittedly, the petitioner in the case at bar failed to appeal timely
the aforementioned decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, it cannot be deemed to have become final and
executory. In contemplation of law, that void decision is deemed nonexistent. Thus, there was no effective or operative
judgment to appeal from. In Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System vs. Sison, this Court held that:
xxx [A] void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or
declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of the consequences
of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair
or create rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to those who seek to enforce. All
proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. In other words, a void judgment is
regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there were no judgment. It, accordingly, leaves the
parties litigants in the same position they were in before the trial.
Thus, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor of any obligation. All acts performed
pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of
execution based on it is void: x x x it may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at
sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.
Admittedly, petitioner made possible the failure of the prior petition for review (G.R No. 97812) before this Court to
proceed by reason of its late filing as well as his choices of remedial measures. However, oft-repeated is the dictum that
courts should not place undue importance on technicalities, when by so doing, substantial justice is sacrificed. Rules of
procedure are intended to promote, not defeat, substantial justice. It is within the power of this Court to temper rigid rules
of procedure in favor of substantial justice. While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully observed, courts
should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. If the rules are
intended to ensure the proper and orderly conduct of litigation, it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the
attainment of justice and the protection of substantive rights of the parties. Thus, the relaxation of procedural rules, or
saving a particular case from the operation of technicalities when substantial justice requires it, as in the case at bar,
should no longer be subject to cavil.