Paper 43

paper 43
To End a War:
Demobilization
and Reintegration
of Paramilitaries
in Colombia
To End a War: Demobilization and Reintegration of

Paramilitaries in Colombia
by Markus Koth
Published by
BICC, Bonn 2005
Bonn International Center for Conversion
Director: Peter J. Croll
An der Elisabethkirche 25
D-53113 Bonn
Germany
Phone: +49-228-911960
Fax:
+49-228-241215
E-mail: [email protected]
Internet: www.bicc.de
To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

List of Contents
Acknowledgements................................................................ 2
List of acronyms and abbreviations ...................................... 3
Executive Summary............................................................... 5
Introduction ........................................................................... 8
History of the Colombian Conflict ........................................ 9
The ELN........................................................................................ 9
The FARC....................................................................................11
M19...............................................................................................13
Paramilitaries ...............................................................................14
Armed forces...............................................................................16
The need for a negotiated solution with the FARC ..............17
President Uribes policy: La Seguridad Democrtica ........18
The Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Problem...... 21
Why do paramilitaries lay down their arms?...........................24
Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DD&R) 25
Collective demobilization of paramilitaries.........................26
Legal framework for collective demobilization......................27
Registration and disarmament ..................................................30
The demobilization process ......................................................31
Security problems .......................................................................31
Results of the demobilization of the paramilitaries ...............33
Reintegration of collectively demobilized paramilitaries.......37
Problems and risks of the DD&R of paramilitaries ..............37
Individual demobilization..........................................................39
Deficits of individual demobilization.......................................40
Reintegration ...............................................................................41
Reintegration of individually demobilized combatants.........42
Reintegration of children...........................................................43
Female fighters............................................................................46
Disabled ex-combatants.............................................................46
The indigenous population........................................................47
Internally displaced persons ......................................................48
International Cooperation ................................................... 49
Organization of American States (OAS).................................49
The United Nations....................................................................50
The International Organization for Migration (IOM)
and the International Labour Organization (ILO) ................51
The European Union .................................................................51
United States................................................................................53
Recommendations............................................................... 55
References............................................................................ 57
1
Markus Koth
The whole idea of Colombia as a functioning nation,critics
argued,was a fiction. (Julia E. Sweig)1
The following paper 43 is a result of a cooperation between the

Colombian foundation Ideas para la Paz, the Universidad de los
Andes, and the Bonn International Center for Conversion
(BICC), which started in 2002 at a conference in Bogota entitled
Voces y opciones del desarme: Enseanzas adquiridas de la
experiencia. As a follow-up of this conference BICC staff visited
the country twice and held various discussions with actors in
Colombia on demobilization and reintegration issues.
This paper gives an update of the demobilization efforts
undertaken until the end of 2004. It is hoped that the discussions
between the Universidad de los Andes, the Foundation Ideas para
la Paz and the relevant actors in the demobilization process will
continue and will make it possible for the researchers to continue
their evaluation and monitoring of this process.
This report by Markus Koth fits well into BICCs
peacebuilding efforts, one of the three main topics of our work
(Arms, Peacebuilding and Conflict). The publication is a
first approximation towards the multi-facetted problem of
demobilization in Columbia where a complex political situation,
described best as a country between war and peace, prevails.
During the Donors conference in Cartagena in February
2005 some critics felt that despite all efforts presently taken with
regards to demobilization there is a real risk that this process will
leave the underlying structures of non-state violent groups intact,
their illegally acquired assets untouched and their abuses
unpunished. However, it should be noted that whichever law will
be passed it will not only apply to the current, but also impact on
future demobilization efforts.
I would like to thank the institutions in Colombia: Programa
de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD), Fundacin
Ideas para la Paz (FIP), Centro de Estudios Socioculturales
(CESO), and the Universidad de los Andes, the interview partners
during the last two assignments of BICC staff to Colombia, and
Markus Koth for the well-written document. My special thanks
go to PD Dr Andreas Heinemann-Grder, theme coordinator at
BICC for peacebuilding for having guided this project from the
start to its completion.
Peter J. Croll
Director, BICC
1 Foreign Affairs, September/October 2002, p. 125)

List of acronyms and abbreviations
AIDS
AK-47
AUC
CAN
CODA
Codhes
CONVIVIR
DAS
DD&R
DEA
ELN
EPL
EU
FARC
FARC-EP
GSP
IACHR
ICBF
IDP
ILO
IO
IOM
IRA
MAPP/OEA
MAS
M-19
MiG 29
NDIC
NGO
OAS
PAHD
SAM
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

Avtomat Kalashnikov 47
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
Comunidad Andina de Naciones
Comit para la Dejacin de Armas
Consultora para los Derechos Humanos y
el Desplazamiento
Cooperativas Comunitarias de Vigilancia
Rural
Departamento Administrativo de
Seguridad
Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration
Drug Enforcement Administration
Ejrcito de Liberacin Nacional
Ejrcito Popular de Liberacin
European Union
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
Colombia
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
Colombia-Ejrcito Popular
Generalized System of Preferences
Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights
Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar
Familiar
Internal Displaced Person
International Labour Organization
International Organization
International Organization for Migration
Irish Republican Army
Misin para Apoyar el Proceso de
Paz/Organisacin de Estados Americanos
Muerte a secuestradores
Movimiento 19 de Abril
Soviet-made jetfighter Mikoyan-Gurevich
29
National Drug Intelligence Center
Non Governmental Organization
Organization of American States
Programa de Atencin Humanitaria al
Desmovilizado
Surface-to-air-missiles
3
Markus Koth
SALSA
SALW
SENA
SUR
UN
UNDP
UNHCR
UNICEF
UN-LiREC
UP
USA
USAID
Small Arms and Light Weapons

Administration
small arms and light weapons
Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje
Sistema nico de Registro
United Nations
United Nations Development Program
United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights
United Nations Childrens Fund
United Nations Regional Center for Peace,
Disarmament and Development in Latin
America and the Caribbean
Unin Patritica
United States of America
United States Agency for International
Development

Executive Summary
The following paper studies the prerequisites and implementation
of the current disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
(DD&R) process of paramilitaries in Colombia. It treats DD&R
as an integral part of the peace process. The report covers
especially the so-called collective demobilization of the rightwing paramilitaries (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia AUC) and
the demobilization of individual fighters. The analysis is based on
a field trip to Colombia in November 2004 as well as on desktop
research. The DD&R process is examined against the backdrop
of prior demobilization experiences in Colombia as well as in
other countries.
The report stresses the need for more technical support in
the implementation of the DD&R process as well as improved
monitoring and an evaluation. The report recommends special
DD&R programs for female and disabled ex-combatants, and a
small arms and light weapons collection program; it also discusses
the impact of international support measures. Finally, it
formulates recommendations geared at participants and
supporters of the DD&R process.
DD&R in Colombia has a huge impact on the intensity of
the violent conflict. Successful demobilization of the
paramilitaries could help to re-establish governmental control of
war-torn regions of Colombia and pacify them. If, as a result of
the demobilization, security is provided for, the state would have
a chance to re-establish its essential functions and institutions and
an economic upswing in these regions could ensue. Successful
DD&R of the paramilitaries could serve additionally as an
incentive for the left-wing guerrilla movement to lay down their
arms. The legal and institutional framework, as well as the
procedure of DD&R concerning the right-wing paramilitaries
might serve as a basis for future demobilization of the guerrillas.
However, a failure of the DD&R process may in turn have
negative repercussions and lead to an intensification of the
conflict. To illustrate this danger the report begins with an
introduction into the history of the Colombian conflict and a
portrayal of its main participants. This account is followed by an
overview of the already accomplished demobilization efforts. The
achievements and flaws of these earlier demobilization activities
are discussed in detail.
The government is pursuing a negotiation strategy with the
paramilitaries. These negotiations should lead to a cessation of the
fighting and the complete demobilization of approximately 18,000
paramilitaries by the end of 2005. Such a demobilization program
5
Markus Koth
was agreed upon in July 2003 with the AUC. Yet the DD&R of
the paramilitaries does not follow any military defeat or stalemate
which would have forced the paramilitaries into negotiations. The
demobilization of the paramilitaries is thus not based on a peace
agreement but is underway while the conflict continues with the
possible danger of combatants taking up their arms and re-joining
active groups. To prevent this from happening two aspects of the
DD&R program are vital: provision of security for the civilian
population within the demobilized regions as well as for excombatants, and successful reintegration efforts. The security
vacuum arising as a result of the paramilitaries demobilization has
to be filled by the government.
Reintegration is not just about giving ex-combatants a
possibility to generate income it has to enable reconciliation
between civil society and ex-combatants. For a sustainable peace
alternative, conflict solution strategies have to be developed.
Some regions subject to demobilization are located on the
Venezuelan border. These regions are very difficult to control and
suitable for cultivating and trafficking drugs. The Colombian
government is not well represented in these borderland regions
which are mostly controlled by different insurgent groups. The
security of these regions population as well as the security of the
paramilitaries has to be assured and a re-conquest of these regions
by the guerrilla has to be prevented. Only if the government is
able to assure lasting confidence in its institutions will security
emerge.
A failure of the DD&R process with the paramilitaries is still
possible. No adequate legal framework for the execution of the
DD&R process exists. The motivations of the paramilitaries to
demobilize are at times dubious, and whether they are really
interested in a peaceful cessation of the conflict remains an open
question. It is possible that the paramilitary machinery is only
being downsized in order to make it more profitable and efficient.
The consequence would result in Mafia-like structures in which
they could keep on pursuing their illegal business. The selfinterest of some paramilitary leaders, who want to prevent their
extradition to the United States, might be another reason for the
will to demobilize. The DD&R process is thus highly ambiguous.
Support from Colombian society is deficient, and
international donors are hesitant. Furthermore, the DD&R
process is not being executed by a single, authoritative institution.
Apart from institutional deficits and a lack of financial support,
the demobilization of individuals is at times perceived as a mere
war tactic.

Successful demobilization and reintegration of paramilitaries
could theoretically offer an incentive for the left-wing guerrilla
movement to lay down their arms as well. Yet the guerrillas,
currently in danger of losing their fight, may reject demobilization
and expect greater gains from an escalation of the conflict. It
remains unknown to what extent the guerrilla movement, and the
FARC in particular, is actually interested in a negotiated solution.
Is the FARC politically motivated or rather working like a Mafia
involved in drug trade and kidnapping whose goal is the
preservation of the status quo?
As of now, the approach of the Uribe government towards
the guerrilla movement resembles a heavy-handed rollback
strategy. The government started a military offensive against it in
early 2004. This military offensive was based on an enlargement
and upgrading of the security forces. The modernization of the
army and police was mostly made possible by the Plan Colombia
and its financial help from the United States. In particular, a new
category of soldiers the peasant soldier was created to win the
governments fight against the guerrillas. Peasant soldiers are
complemented by a network of informers who provide the
government with security-related information. However, the
peasant soldiers may draw the populace even deeper into the
conflict. One therefore has to ask to what extent the military
offensive of the Colombian government contributes to the
cessation of the conflict.
This report argues in favor of conditional external support
for collective demobilization. Preconditions for such support
should be the fulfillment of the requirements of the London
Declaration by the Colombian government and the creation of an
adequate legal and institutional framework. A legal framework
would have to avoid impunity for paramilitaries and must respect
the rights of the victims.
Markus Koth
Introduction
After several unsuccessful peace negotiations during the last
decades, the Colombian government under president Uribe
launched a multi-faceted strategy in 2002 to bring the violent
conflict with the left-wing guerrillas and the right-wing
paramilitaries to an end. The government promoted the
demobilization of individuals and started to negotiate with the
right-wing paramilitaries of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
(AUC) about a collective demobilization. This demobilization
started under difficult conditions, as neither a peace treaty nor a
cease-fire has been negotiated with the different armed groups in
Colombia. While the government started to demobilize some
AUC groups, the fight against the guerrillas, paramilitary entities
that do not belong to the AUC, and with the AUC itself,
continued. Demobilization negotiations with the paramilitaries
started in late 2002. Until early 2005 these negotiations have
resulted in the demobilization of some 3,500 AUC combatants.
However, the disbanding of the paramilitary AUC still remains
problematic.
Previous experiences with the demobilization of the Bloque
Cacique Nutibara in Medelln in 2003 demonstrate the danger of a
shortsighted DD&R process. Many participants of this earlier
demobilization were only recruited by the paramilitaries with the
purpose of showing a willingness to demobilize. Paramilitary
structures were not really disbanded and therefore remained a
danger for the peace process. There still is a legal vacuum, as the
Colombian government has not put in place an adequate
legislative framework to regulate the collective DD&R. For
example, there are no regulations governing how violations of
human rights or humanitarian law, such as kidnapping and
massacres, should be handled.
While the current collective demobilization of the
paramilitaries is widely discussed, demobilization of individuals is
less exposed. Under the presidency of Alvaro Uribe, more than
6,000 members of the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
Colombia), the ELN (Ejrcito de Liberacin Nacional) and the
paramilitaries have surrendered to the government. But this
demobilization still lacks attention and support. Despite of its
dimension and importance the Colombian government considers
it to be mere war tactics. The Colombian government itself
proceeds with the war against the guerillas; it has strengthened the
armed forces in order to be able to launch a new offensive against
the FARC.

History of the Colombian Conflict
Colombias armed conflict has it roots in the so-called la violencia
(the violence), a confrontation between the followers of
Colombias two major parties, the conservatives and the liberals.
La violencia lasted from 19481953. It started after the famous
Colombian leftist politician Jorge Eliecer Gaitn expected to
win the presidential elections was killed by the Colombian
oligarchy which feared social change under his presidency. The
subsequent popular revolt was fought by the Conservative Party,
which started a violent offensive against the supporters of the
liberal and the communist party throughout the country. To be
able to defend themselves, the mostly rural population started to
carry arms and built so-called self-defense groups2. When the
violence stopped, allowing a militant turnover by the later dictator
General Rojas Pinilla (19531957), some estimated 200,000
people were dead. Pinilla was able to demobilize parts of the selfdefense groups mostly those, whose ideology was closer to the
liberal party while the majority of the followers of the
communist party remained armed. It was the first demobilization
to take place in Colombia, and it failed, partially because of the
fact that not all combatants laid down their arms. It was followed
by a general amnesty for the combatants. Moreover, the failure
was due to the fact that many of the demobilized men were killed
later on.
The Pinilla government was followed by the National Front,
a coalition between the conservative and the liberal parties, which
organized the division of power within their groups until the mid1970s. Big parts of society were excluded by the national front
and were unable to participate actively in political life. This
exclusionary policy was the reason that the political minority
decided to organize itself in a more effective way. The guerrilla
movement became the symbol for the fight for political
participation.
The ELN
In 1964, the ELN (Ejrcito de Liberacin Nacional) was founded.
The ELN is a guerrilla organization that was ideologically
influenced by the Cuban revolution. One year later, in 1965,
Camilo Torres, a young university preacher, joined the ELN.
Torres preached a revolutionary Christianity and talked about
the duty of each Christian to fight a violent regime, even with
2 For a general overview see Oquist, 1980.
Markus Koth
arms. Although Torres died in 1966, he is still the ELNs greatest
idol.
During the 1980s, some fighters of the ELN participated in a
demobilization that was primarily negotiated with another guerilla
group, the M19. Between 1998 and 2002 the ELN held sporadic
talks with the government when peace negotiations between the
government and the FARC took place under president Andres
Pastrana (19982002). Pastrana, however, did not pay much
attention to the negotiations with the ELN as he had given
priority to a possible demobilization of the FARC. Yet in the
summer of 2004, the Colombian government intended to start
talks with the ELN currently comprising an estimated 3,500
fighters3. For this purpose, the Mexican government was asked to
act as a mediator. Since July 2004, the ELN has been in steady
contact with the government through a mediator from Mexico,
Andres Valencia.
The goal of this mediation is to build a base for further talks.
As a first precondition, the government asked the ELN to declare
a cease-fire. However, the ELN did not react to this request.
Instead, it offered a bilateral cease-fire to reach a general amnesty
for all its members held by the government as political prisoners4.
It also offered that it would reduce and control its use of antipersonnel mines. The government in turn insisted on a one-sided
cease-fire as a precondition for direct negotiations and discarded
the proposal on anti-personnel mines, referring to already-signed
international agreements. As a gesture of good will, the ELN
announced it would clear some minefields in the municipality of
Morales, from the beginning of 5 January 2005 onwards5.
In addition, ELN spokesman Milton Hernandez announced
that the guerillas were willing to participate in a coalition of leftwing organizations in the upcoming elections of May 2006. This
left-wing coalition will be formed by the Frente Social y Poltico, in
which the communist party is involved, and the group Presentes por
el Socialismo, which has a trotzkyite origin, combined with the
social and trade union basis that forms the ELNs foundation in
its operating zones6.
While the FARC tries to enter into bilateral peace talks with
the government, the ELN considers civil society as a potential
partner for future peace negotiations. The association stems from
3 www.ciponline.org/colombia/infocombat.htm
4 www.elnvoces.com/Correo_del_Magdalena/
Cartapresidentedelsenado.html
5 www.eln-voces.com/ (carta a las comunidades de Mico Ahumado)
6 www.alia2.net/article3296.html
10

its traditional relationship with civil society, and could serve as a
springboard for forming a political party. The ELN also
appreciates the assistance of international mediators of the
Group of Friendly States (Spain, France, Norway, Switzerland
and Cuba), for example. The idea to involve mediators might be
taken up and could be the key to further negotiations with the
ELN. However, peace talks should not be overloaded with
expectations.
The FARC
The second still-active Colombian guerrilla group, the FARC-EP
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de ColombiaEjrcito Popular) was
created in 1966. The FARC has its roots in the rural self-defense
groups that were built during la violencia. It belonged to those
groups which formerly had refused to lay down their arms in the
demobilization process that was executed by president Pinilla.
The FARC was formed as a reaction to a massive military
offensive of the government, supported by the US government,
and directed against some villages, which had originally organized
themselves in local self-governed areas. Due to the ongoing
uprisings in other Latin-American regions, especially the Cuban
revolution, those villages were perceived as a security risk.
The FARC was founded as a peasant-based organization
with a Marxist ideology. However, its influence and size grew
during the 1990s due to its increasing income from illegal
activities, mainly kidnapping and drug trafficking. The FARC
today has about 18,000 members7, many of them women and
children. The fact that it generates between US $600 million and
US $1 billion annually is what makes it an independent actor8.
This financial independence is all the more impressive since the
breakdown of the Soviet Union. The failure of the Communist
System destroyed the guerrillas ideological legitimization, and left
the FARC internationally isolated.
First attempts to end the conflict peacefully were made by
the FARC in the mid-1980s when it entered the political scene by
establishing a political party, the Unin Patritica (UP). The reason
for this was a cease-fire signed by the Colombian government
under president Betancur (19821986) and the FARC. Betancur
backed up the process by giving a wide amnesty to political
prisoners and by trying to open negotiations with the guerrillas. In
1986, the Unin Patritica participated in the elections with
7 www.ciponline.org/colombia/infocombat.htm
8 Blumenthal, 2001, p. 145.
11
Markus Koth
considerable success. After these elections, the UP was
confronted with systematic assaults on its members and
supporters, in which nearly 3,000 persons were killed thus
drastically diminishing UPs influence. The government was not
able to guarantee the security of the ex-combatants probably
the most important reason why the transformation from guerilla
group to political party failed.
After this failure, another negotiated effort to stop the
conflict was undertaken under the presidency of Colombias
president Andres Pastrana. He initiated peace talks with the
FARC in 1999, guaranteeing it a safety zone where negotiations
took place. This demilitarized zone was established in the
municipalities of Mesetas, La Uribe, La Macarena and Vista
Hermosa. These areas are located in the south of Colombia and
have a size of 15,000 square miles roughly the size of
Switzerland.
The FARC, however, used the demobilized zone to
reorganize its structure and refill its lines by forcing parts of the
population to join their troops. The conflict went on with high
intensity during the negotiations with the guerrillas continuing
their military attacks. As a result the negotiations came to a halt.
Currently, the relationship between the leftist guerrillas and the
government has reached a dead point. Since the government
started a new military offensive against the FARC, there have
been some timid efforts to start talks. Not even a humanitarian
exchange of 23 imprisoned guerrilleros for some 65 victims of
kidnappings has been carried out. The chance for regular peace
talks further declined when the Colombian government extradited
one of the FARCs leaders, Ricardo Palmera alias Simon Trinidad,
to the United States at the beginning of 2005.
Until now FARC guerrillas have refused to negotiate with
the Uribe government. But with a potential re-election of the
current president this attitude may change9. Re-election may
deprive the insurgent groups of the possibility to sit out the
problems. Future negotiation will depend crucially on whether the
guerrillas are still driven by ideology or if economic interests have
won the upper hand. It remains to be seen whether they really are
interested in serious negotiations with the government or if they
will only be interested in stopping the governments military
offensive to be able to pursue their illegal business. Beneficiaries
of the war economy, drug dealers and the Mafia will try to
prevent an agreement.
9 www.presidencia.gov.co/sne/2004/diciembre/27/08272004.htm
12

It is crucial to what extent the government is willing and able
to guarantee the security of combatants should demobilization
take place in the future. Memories of the FARCs intention to
transform itself into a political party, the Unin Patritica and of
the deadly demobilization experience of the 1950s, are still
present. In order to regain trust the government has proposed the
church as a mediator and released 23 FARC prisoners10.
Irregular troops who have fought a government for decades
will, in case of a peace agreement, not be at ease with the political
and economic system. A peaceful solution of the conflict
therefore might have to be connected with a change in the
constitution. Such a new constitution could eliminate the
democratic deficits of the current one and secure the access of the
guerillas to politics as a political organization11.
M19
During the 1970s, more guerrilla groups established themselves
of which the M19 (Movimiento 19 de Abril), which gained
international attention for its spectacular actions was the most
famous. This group was partly demobilized under president
Betancur (19821986), who, with Decree 2711, created the
Comisin Asesora, which defined the legal requirements of the
demobilization. The Law No. 35 (Ley de Amnista no condicionada y
en pro de la Paz) defined the guerilla organizations as political
actors and created the framework for demobilization activities, in
which nearly 700 members of the FARC, the ELN, the EPL (the
Popular Liberation Army, Ejrcito Popular de Liberacin) and the
M19 participated.
The demobilization under president Betancur was based on a
general amnesty but did not result in a peace treaty12. Law No. 35
also formed the basis of the La Uribe Contract from 1984, in
which the FARC agreed to a cease-fire and announced the
foundation of a political organization, the Unin Patritica13. The
Barca government (19861990) tried in 1988 to revive the efforts
to demobilize the guerillas by starting the Iniciativa para la Paz. The
10 www.elcolombiano.terra.com.co/BancoConocimiento/G/
gobierno_autorizo_contacto and
www.presidencia.gov.co/sne/2004/diciembre/13/04132004.htm
11 Heidrun Zinecker, Kolumbien, wie viel Demokratisierung braucht
der Frieden? in HSFK Report 2/2002.
12 Gabriel Turriago Pieros, Jos Mara Bustamente Mora : Estudios
de los procesos de reinsercion en Colombia 1991-1998 p.1.
Alfaomega, Bogot 2003
13 www.ideaspaz.org/documentacion/detalle.php?id=1507
13
Markus Koth
goal was a national reconciliation process. The M19 decided to
follow this incentive by building a working group for peace and
national reconciliation, which operated in cooperation with the
government. In the end, remaining fractions of the M19 laid
down their arms on 8/9 March 1990.
The legal treatment of the ex-combatants was solved with
the formula forgetting and forgiving in favor of peace (olvido y
perdn en pro de la paz) a formula that allowed for broad
interpretation and, in fact, meant amnesty for political and related
crimes committed by the ex-combatants14. The negotiating parties
had originally decided not to talk about reintegration benefits.
M19s goal was political participation and democratic reform. The
duration, framework and procedure of the reintegration activities
remained unclear. The government was primarily focused on
terminating the conflict and therefore neglected the creation of
suitable reintegration programs. The first national reintegration
office (Oficina Nacional de Reintegracin) opened on 29 April 1991;
thirteen months after the demobilization of the M19 had been
announced. The first reintegration program started on 26
December 1992. As the M19 was mostly interested in political
change, many of its members did not ask for special social or
economic assistance.
Yet, financial assistance proved to be insufficient for social
integration. Almost every small project failed due to the lack of
financing, training or education of its participants and because of
insufficient technical assistance and monitoring of the excombatants projects15. After the demobilization of the M19,
additional demobilization efforts took place under the presidency
of Csar Gaviria (19901994). Seven insurgent groups laid down
their arms, the last one in 1994. Demobilization took place while
the fighting continued.
The FARC and the ELN did not participate in the
negotiations with the M19. The FARC even started a military
offensive in order to gain control in the demobilized zones, which
in turn had a negative impact on the talks.
Paramilitaries
During the 1980s, violent attacks against the guerrillas were
launched by regular government troops, partly supported by a
new actor in the conflict the so-called paramilitaries. The
paramilitaries, groups of armed civilians that fight on the side of
14 Rubio, 2004, p.13.
15 Helfrich-Bernal, 2001, p.120.
14

the government against groups, have a long history and tradition
in Colombia. The historical predecessors of todays Colombian
paramilitaries, the so-called pjaros (birds), already fought
together with governmental troops during the 1950s. During la
violencia, the conservatives used groups of criminals, the pjaros,
to fight the opposition. After the military turnover of 1953, the
pjaros lost their importance and disappeared for some time
before the paramilitary system was reestablished in the 1960s to
fight the communists. This time, paramilitary actions were even
legitimized by Decree No. 3398 of 1965. The paramilitaries
gained their final juridical legitimization in 1968 when Decree No.
3398 was transformed into the Permanent Law No.4816. This law
did not change until 1989, when the Colombian High Court
declared it illegal and not conforming to the Colombian
constitution.
The paramilitaries, as they are known today, were formed in
1981. On 3 December 1981, flyers were dropped from an airplane
in Cali, one of Colombias biggest cities. These flyers announced
the creation of a militant group named Death to Kidnappers
(Muerte a Secuestradores MAS). It was announced that more than
200 Mafia bosses had created a 2,230 men-strong private army
that would execute everybody who was connected to
kidnappings. This group was created by Fabio Ochoa, one of the
kingpins of the Medelln drug cartel.
From 1985 onwards, the Castao brothers Fidel (a cofounder of the MAS) and Carlos (AUCs longtime political leader)
began to establish the paramilitary structures. The private army
of rich landholders was formed primarily for the reason of selfdefense, but soon started to change into a counterinsurgent
paramilitary organization. The paramilitary network grew fast and
the group started to fight the guerrillas. The strategy of this
organization was to transform the society that supported the
guerrillas, as it was not possible to destroy the guerillas
themselves. As a result, the paramilitaries started to fight civil
society, social movements and their leaders. Over the years, the
paramilitaries became more and more important in the fight
against the guerrillas, so that the state started to collaborate more
intensively with this group, supporting it clandestinely with
weapons and intelligence. In 1995 the institutionalization of the
paramilitaries reached a new level and different units joined forces
and founded the United Self-Defense of Colombia (Autodefensas
Unidas de Colombia AUC) to concentrate their military power17.
16 Blumenthal, 2001, p.150.
17 Fischer, Cubides C. 2000, p.116.
15
Markus Koth
Since then, the paramilitaries have tried to generate a political
profile and establish AUC as an independent political actor. An
important step in this direction has already been taken; AUC
leader Mancuso, who along with many other paramilitaries has
been accused of being responsible for several massacres and
human right violations, spoke in front of the Colombian
Congress in the summer of 200418. AUC is trying to sharpen its
political profile and to constitute a political basis within their
operation areas. AUC therefore regularly publishes
communiqus and policy papers, often with the help of the
Colombian press19. Another strategy to form a basis in their
regions is to fight and displace guerilla supporters and critics of
the paramilitaries, replacing them with their own supporters.
Today, the AUC has an estimated 18,000 fighters20. The
AUC is not only present in many parts of the society, but has also
claimed (through one of its leaders) that some 35 percent of the
Congress members depend on it21. Manipulations of the elections
in favor of the paramilitaries have indeed been reported22. The
AUC operates nationwide and is suspected of controlling large
parts of Colombias drug trade. However, its organization is no
longer a homogenous group.
In December 2002, the AUC announced a cease-fire to fulfill
the governments precondition for starting peace negotiations. As
a result, a concentration zone was set up in Santa Fe de Ralito
in July 2003, where the first negotiations took place and where an
agreement was signed on the demobilization of all paramilitary
units until the end of 2005.
Armed forces
While the government negotiates with the paramilitaries to stop
the conflict, it is enlarging its security forces vis--vis the guerrillas.
Colombias armed forces have increased and have been
modernized significantly during the past years. The
modernization of the armed forces already started under the
administration of Andres Pastrana, who in 1999 received US
$308.8 million in military and police aid from the United States
18 eltiempo.terra.com.co/proyectos/resumenano/resumenpolitica/
noticias2004/ARTICULO-WEB-_NOTA_INT-1928851.html
19 http//www.colombialibre.org/colombialibre/comunicados.asp
20 ciponline.org/colombia/infocombat.htm
21 www.elespectador.com/periodismo_inv/2004/septiembre/
nota4.htm
22 Interview with Gustavo Petro in Berlin on 25.02.2005
16

for that purpose23. Subsequently, the security forces, national
army and police increased to some 353,803 men by December
200424. This is an increase of some 27 percent since the beginning
of the Uribe administration in August 2002 (the then combined
strength of Military Forces and police consisted of 278,796
men)25. However it is still not enough to win the military fight
against the insurgent groups.
With the failed negotiations with the FARC and the start of
the Plan Colombia, the government focused on defeating the
FARC with military means. The Plan Colombia was originally
praised as a great investment plan and was meant as an invitation
for the insurgent groups to participate in the development of
projects in the field of economy, finance, land reform, justice and
human rights. It had a total volume of US $7 billion and
depended heavily on international financial support. While the
Plan Colombia was originally designed as a multifaceted
development plan, the military became more and more important
as a result of pressure by its main financial supporter the United
States. The US government changed the direction of the plan and
concentrated its focus on the fight against drugs.
As both the Clinton and Bush administrations perceived
Colombia as a latent danger for its national security, Colombia
received a total amount of US $1815.2 million in military aid for
the last four years, aimed at modernizing the armed forces.26 Since
11 September 2001, US policy towards the conflict has changed.
The three main irregular actors of the Colombian conflict, namely
the FARC, the ELN and the paramilitaries, were put on a list of
international terrorist groups. The counter-insurgency issue
became more important and the US government modified and
focused its aid on military aspects as well as on training and
consulting the Colombian army.
The need for a negotiated solution with the FARC
Although it might be possible to bring the FARC back to the
negotiation table by attacking them harder, or to end the conflict
by winning the fight, the military offensive by the government
may in fact have some negative repercussions. If the government
concentrates solely on military actions without seriously trying to
23 www.ciponline.org/colombia/aidtable.htm
24 Efectividad de la Poltica de Defensa y Seguridad Democrtica, at:
www.emcolbru.org/RESULTADOSPSD20022003.pdf
25 www..mindefensa.gov.co/politica/documentos/effectiveness_
cdsdp_upto_200312_eng.pdf
26 www.ciponline.org/colombia/aidtable.htm
17
Markus Koth
get back into negotiations, the FARC could try to escalate the
conflict by using more dangerous weapons, especially surface-toair-missiles and by relocating the conflict into the urban centers,
launching attacks on urban infrastructure, military targets and the
civil society. Such actions could be a military alternative for a
decimated guerrilla force that is losing the fight over territory. A
huge military machine would no longer be necessary for the
FARC. It is true that a transformation from a traditional guerrilla
army to a small terror group would be against their ideological
goal to help the society, however, the long military fight has
developed its own war economy and war society, which can not
easily be given up. The probability that the guerrillas would lay
down their arms in a situation of existential crisis must be
considered small. The guerrillas will lay down their arms only if
they can save face.
The government also seems to be moving in the direction of
conflict escalation. New categories of soldiers, the soldados
campesinos (peasant soldiers) and the so-called red de cooperacin
ciudadana (Network of Citizen Cooperation) represent a
dangerous development. Civil society is getting more and more
involved in the conflict by serving as informers and military
collaborators and is thus becoming a possible target of violent
attacks. The military strategy therefore can serve only as a
temporary instrument of pressure on the FARC and the ELN to
bring them back to the negotiation table. The Colombian
government has to create an adequate framework for this to
happen, for example by announcing the possibility of a cease-fire.
The military offensive has to be accompanied by a social and
economic development strategy.
President Uribes policy: La Seguridad Democrtica
To be able to fulfill the Plan Nacional de Desarollo, Colombias plan
to improve the countrys infrastructure and social and economical
development, president Uribe announced that a countrywide
restoration of law and security was his main goal. After the failure
of ex-president Pastranas strategy to achieve a negotiated peace
with the FARC, Uribe won the elections in 2002 with the promise
to act with a heavier hand against the illegal groups.
To achieve security, the government formulated the policy of
seguridad democrtica. Its aim is to improve security by adopting a
multi-faceted approach in addressing one of the states main
problems its historical inability to execute authority on its
territory. The government therefore increased the size of the
18

armed forces, created a network of informants that covers the
whole country and provides the army with information.
In January 2004 the Colombian army started a military
offensive against the FARC. Reportedly some fighting between
the national army and paramilitary groups is also taking place.
Nevertheless, the Colombian military planers came to the
conclusion that a lasting re-conquest of the territory, which was
controlled by the guerrillas for years or in some cases even for
decades, would require a new strategy. To recapture a territory,
the region has to be occupied for a longer period of time. To
effectively fight a guerrilla army it does not suffice to show
military presence once in a while. As the guerrilla army is flexible
and moving fast and as its combatants are not always identifiable,
a lasting presence by the state security forces is unavoidable.
To be victorious, the Uribe government created a new
category of soldiers the soldados campesinos27. These new units
are recruited from the rural population. Local recruitment has the
advantage of reaching people who know the affected population
and the area. It also smoothes over historical differences between
Bogot and the hinterland. As of now, there are 256 peasant
soldier groups of roughly 35 men each. The soldados campesinos
belong to the national army and the marine infantry and receive
basic military training for three months. In addition, the Ministry
of Defense claims that they receive special training on human
rights and on how to interact with the local community. It is
planned that they will operate in their homelands, always
accompanied by regular troops or the national police. The soldados
campesinos stay in military service for eighteen months28. It has
been reported that the peasant soldiers allegedly have a huge
impact on the recent successes of the Colombian military and the
Plan Patriota, as government troops are now able to stay in the
recaptured areas29.
The mobilization of peasant soldiers involves the civil
society more actively in the fighting30. It is questionable whether
the peasant soldiers are trained well enough to fight against
experienced combatants. The peasant soldiers are usually
accompanied by professional soldiers or the police, but this only
27 www.cgfm.mil.co/cgfm.nsf/0/3c3b5f95a989fb678525ce9006d006a?
opendocument
28 www.presidencia.gov.co/cne/2003/junio/16/01162003.htm
29 http//semana.terra.com.co/opencms/opencms/Semana/
articulo.html?id=84559
30 Carta de 2002 para el presidente de la alta comisionada de Naciones
Unidas para los derechos humanos, Mary Robinson
www.hchr.org.co
19
Markus Koth
barely reduces the risks. They fight in areas where the guerrillas
are very strong and the state often not present. The guerrillas can
easily spot out who belongs to these soldiers and attack them at
night when they go back to their homes without weaponry.
Insufficient professionalism may contribute to infringements on
human rights. NGOs report attacks by soldados campesinos on
civilians as well as attacks of the guerrillas on their families31.
Whether the creation of the soldados campesinos is really an
advantage for the fight against irregular groups is not yet clear.
Young men who become such a soldier out of economic
desperation may either decide not to fight the enemy whom they
know much better than the state or may take the extra money the
state offers, while preserving their affiliation to their original
military group. Thus, they could earn income during the daytime
as a soldado campesino and at night as a guerrillero. Infiltration by the
paramilitaries is also a risk that cannot be overlooked. But more
importantly, the creation of units of peasant soldiers brings to
mind the support of past governments for the creation of the
paramilitaries, which are currently subject to demobilization.
Instead of reverting to peasant soldiers, it seems to be more
advisable to professionalize the armed forces.
Another innovation introduced by the government consists
of the creation of the red de cooperantes. This network system is
meant to provide the counter intelligence with information about
the enemy. In December 2004 the government installed a new
24-hour calling line (lnea 146) to receive information by
Colombian individuals. The government recently announced that
it would handle and verify all received information by
guaranteeing confidentiality to each caller32. Yet, human rights
activists point out that the informers take over a military role as
collaborators of the military intelligence, while verification of the
information is difficult. Abuse is possible and has already been
evidenced33. This is even more likely when the informant is paid
for information he provides. According to governmental sources
some 3,210,964 collaborators are already participating in the
program, and the number of participants is still growing34. The
Colombian society may well transform into a spy society.
31
32
33
34
20
Comisin Colombiana de Juristas. 2004, p. 51.

www.presidencia.gov.co/sne/2004/octubre/06/11062004.htm
La semana, 26 August 2002, p.26.
www.presidencia.gov.co/sne/2004/octubre/06/11062004.htm

The Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Problem
The insurgent groups possess many weapons and a lot of
ammunition. To satisfy this demand, the illegal groups do not just
need financial backing, but logistical capacities and a SALW
market where they can be purchased. The illegal armed groups are
involved not just in the drug business but also in arms trafficking.
The actual number of small arms and light weapons circulating in
the country can only be estimated. The broad distribution of
small arms and light weapons (SALW) and the
internationalization of this problem clearly need to be addressed.
Weapons are brought to Colombia through different routes.
Actors from nearly all countries neighboring Colombia participate
in some way in the arms trade business, some as dealers and some
just as traffickers. Most of the illegally traded weapons come from
corrupt employees of the security forces of other Latin-American
countries. In Peru, under the government of Alberto Fujimori,
the intelligence leader Montesinos sold 10,000 second-hand AK47s to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in
199935. Another major part of the weaponry that is available on
Colombias black market is of Central-American origin. Many
weapons belonged to large weapons stocks of Central-American
countries affected by civil war, like Guatemala, Nicaragua and El
Salvador, before they were sold to Colombia.
Colombian paramilitaries managed to buy some 3,000 AK47s and 2.5 million rounds of ammunition from the Nicaraguan
governments stocks which were officially designated for the
Panamanian police36. The OAS later claimed that the deal was
possible because Nicaraguan counterparts did not really check if
the order was legitimate. An arms shipment destined for the
paramilitaries and discovered in December 2004 again came from
Nicaragua. Traffic routes are obviously still active37.
Rumors have spread that the Russian Mafia, too, is linked to
the illegal weapons trade. According to a US Intelligence source,
between 1998 and 2002, illegal airstrips in Russia and the Ukraine
were used to transport arms via Jordania to the demobilized zone
of FARC. In return, Colombian cocaine was supposedly taken to
35 www-ni.laprensa.com.ni/archivo/2002/mayo/09/elmundo/
36 www-ni.laprensa.com.ni/cronologico/2002/abril/23/nacionales/
nacionales-20020423-09.html
37 eltiempo.terra.com.co/coar/ACC_MILITARES/
accionesarmadas/ARTICULO-WEB-_NOTA_INTERIOR1934503.html
21
Markus Koth
Russia38. However, there has not been any independent
confirmation of these rumors.
It is beyond doubt that there is a very active and continuous
weapons trade between Brazil and Colombia. Many airplanes fly
regularly from Brazil the second largest consumer of
Colombian cocaine in the world after the United States to
Colombia, on illegal business. One of the heads of a Brazilian
drug cartel, Luiz Fernando da Costa, regularly delivered arms to
the guerrillas in exchange for drugs39. It is said that currently the
guerrillas are short of ammunition for their AK-47 rifles because
of intensive confrontations with the Colombian army40. It is
assumed that the FARC has started producing ammunition of its
own. Criminals have established workshops where they produce
copies of German Heckler-Koch guns. Some of these workshops
were found in January 2003 by Colombias secret service41. It is
guessed that the guerrillas received help from external experts
both in building illegal weapons plants and for training in the
usage of such weapons. The standards of weapons found are
quite high. The judgment of a Colombian court against three Irish
citizens who illegally spent some time in FARCs demobilized
zone in the year 2002, and who were said to be linked to the Irish
Republican Army (IRA), underlines this assumption42.
The air force of the Colombian military is very important for
the transport of troops, logistical material, and war material. The
air force plays an important role in the governments fight against
the illicit drugs that build the economic basis of the FARC. The
guerrillas trie to buy surface-to-air-missiles (SAMs) to counter the
governments biggest advantage air power. A videotape of the
FARC shows the testing of some homemade SAMs. The alleged
destruction of some 333 SAMs in Nicaragua in the summer of
2004 is seen with suspicion rumors have spread that not all of
these missiles were really destroyed. Although General Csar
Delgadillo, who executed the destruction under international
observation, said that the whole process had been successful,
intelligence sources are afraid that some of these missiles could
have soon thereafter appeared on Central-American black
markets43. Surface-to-air missiles could intensify the level of
conflict dramatically. The use of SAMs by the guerilla forces
38
39
40
41
42
43
22
www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/ NarcsFundedTerrs_Extrems.pdf
www.fiscalia.gov.co/pag/divulga/InfEsp04/armas.doc
McDermott, 2004.
McDermott, 2004.
www.terra.com/actualidad/articulo/html/act188220.htm
www.esmas.com/noticierostelevisa/internacionales/381010.html

would definitely change the configuration of power between the
guerrillas and the governments armed forces.
To be able to address these problems adequately, US
Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, and his Canadian
counterpart proposed in November 2004, at the Conference of
the Defense Ministers of America in Quito/Ecuador, to
transform the Junta Interamericana de Defensa into a coordinating
organ for the fight against drugs and terrorism in America. Brazil
rejected this proposal, as well as the idea to create an interregional special force to fight drug and arms trafficking as well as
illegal passenger trafficking. Instead, a stronger intelligence
partnership was proposed as a key element in the success of any
fight against international crime.
Most of Colombias neighbors announced unilateral actions
to reinforce their borders with Colombia instead. Brazil
announced the reinforcement of one of its frontier brigades and
an enlargement of some military posts on the frontier with
Colombia. Colombia and Peru announced that they are preparing
common rules for the engagement of a binational border patrol.
Due to its dimensions and character, the common border in the
jungle of the Putumayo and the Amazon region is very hard to
control. Nevertheless, these actions may help to reduce the
weapons and drugs trafficking.
Venezuela also announced a strengthening of its border with
Colombia and published a large weapons deal with Russia in
December 2004. There have recently been some tensions
between Colombia and Venezuela over the latters purchase of
100,000 Russian semi-automatic machine guns, 40 helicopters as
well as its interest in Russian MiG29 airplanes, although officially
the Colombian side does not consider this a problem44. Even if
there is no imminent threat by Venezuela, some of the
Venezuelan weapons to be replaced may enter Colombias black
market. The Venezuelan territory has also often served as a save
haven to the irregular troops in recent years. Since Hugo Chvez
became president of Venezuela this retreat of combatants into
Venezuela has expanded even further. The tensions between the
Colombian and Venezuelan governments have increased
following the detention of Rodrigo Granda (FARCs Minister of
Foreign Affairs). Granda had allegedly moved freely on
Venezuelan territory and had a Venezuelan passport45.
44 www.amsterdampost.nl/modules.php?name=News&file=
article&sid=450
45 www.eluniversal.com/2005/01/26/pol_art_26104B.shtml
23
Markus Koth
Regional cooperation is required to fight the production and
trade of illegal drugs, the weapons and persons trafficking as well
as the problem of large numbers of Colombian refugees who are
leaving their country each year to start a new life in Colombias
neighboring countries. If this can not be reached, a spillover of
the Colombian conflict to its neighboring countries could be
possible. Common approaches to arms possession as well as
international regulations on arms trafficking are essential.
International help plays an important role in regard to technical
and financial support for Colombia. This requires institutionalized
communication between the various national agencies and
international actors.
Why do paramilitaries lay down their arms?
One of the most important questions that has to be asked with
regard to collective demobilization is why the AUC has decided
to lay down its arms while the guerrillas have not yet been
destroyed. Why does the AUC declare that it will disarm at a
moment when its influence is seemingly growing, resulting in
increased income from illegal actions such as drugs trafficking?
Why do they want to demobilize while the guerrillas suffer? One
possible explanation is that the paramilitaries have realized that
the opportunity to lay down their arms offers a chance to retain
political and social influence. It might be a good moment for
them, as the current president while governor of Antioquia
(19951997) had already demonstrated his moderate views
about paramilitaries. At that time, he was responsible for the
creation of the security cooperation CONVIVIR (Cooperativas
Comunitarias de Vigilancia Rural). This security cooperation, an
association of civilians, had received weapons from the
government in order to fight the guerrillas.
In addition to this, the illegal groups are faced with a
growing desire for peace in the Colombian society which,
consequently, decreases the acceptance of their actions. The
paramilitaries might have seized the chance to demobilize as long
as their status at the negotiation table was stable and their power
in the regions was strong. This seems all the more reasonable
since the direct and indirect support of the paramilitaries by the
Colombian army has already diminished. Furthermore, the United
States pressures the Colombian armed forces to distance
themselves from the paramilitaries. Another reason for the
demobilization could be the personal interest of some individuals
that are leading the AUC. These leaders hope to prevent their
extradition to the United States from happening by implementing
24

the demobilization of their groups in exchange for impunity. The
Colombian government protects paramilitary commanders,
whom the US wants extradited for drugs trafficking and money
laundering, as long as they participated in negotiations on
demobilization.
The changes within the structures of leadership of some
paramilitary units in recent years demonstrate that many former
commanders of the AUC have been replaced by drug lords. It has
been estimated that kingpins like Francisco Javier Zuluago alias
Gordolindo or Diego Montoya Snchez paid several million US
dollars to ascend to a high military rank within the paramilitary
organizations to benefit from the peace process46. In such cases,
the wish to transfer the economic and personal status from the
conflict to civil life seems to be the main reason for
demonstrating a willingness to lay down ones arms. Ideological
reasons for a continuation of the fighting are waning anyway.
Asked for the main reason why, most demobilized
combatants cite the desire for security for themselves and their
families47. For some, the permanent fear for their lives is a strong
incentive to demobilize. Peer pressure or group dynamics may
also play a role in this decision-making process.
Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DD&R)
The importance of a DD&R program consists of its ability to
generate human security for the ex-combatants and their
communities, as well as of its provision of opportunities for
income generation. A DD&R program is mandatory for a
sustainable peace process as it helps to create political, social and
economic security. Therefore it is crucial to convince excombatants that there are better options to taking up arms again.
This conviction is of special importance in Colombia, since the
DD&R of the paramilitaries does not follow any military defeat
or stalemate which would otherwise have forced them to start
negotiations. The demobilization of the paramilitaries is not based
on a peace agreement, but has to be undertaken while fighting
continues. The possibility is quite high that combatants take up
their arms again and join other still active groups. To prevent this
from happening, the combatants needs, interests and capabilities
have to be taken into account. A successful implementation of
the DD&R program for paramilitaries will not just consist of
46 Rachel Van Dongen: Drugs complicate Colombias peace plan;
found at: www.csmonitor.com, 2 November 2004.
47 Interview with ex-combatants in Bogot on 17 November 2004
25
Markus Koth
measures providing human and economic security for
communities; successfully executed DD&R could also serve the
guerrillas as an example and, as such could help to end the
conflict between the government and the guerrillas.
Demobilization alone does not diminish the root causes of
the conflict. If adequately managed, DD&R can nonetheless help
to assist the peace process by decreasing conflict intensity.
Demobilization, as part of a DD&R process, is a confidencebuilding measure that can support the entire peace process.
The Colombian government therefore started and revived a
set of demobilization programs which strike for different goals.
Wile, according to statements of the deputy Secretary of Defense,
Andrs Peate, the demobilization of individuals is regarded as a
war tactic by the government, as its emphasis is on the retrieval
of information and the weakening of the insurgent groups48
collective demobilization is conceived as a peace instrument.
Collective demobilization of paramilitaries
The only legal basis for the current collective demobilization of
paramilitaries is Law No. 782 of 2002. This law foresees that a
partner for peace negotiations has to be recognized as a political
actor. Since the illegal armed groups were categorized as terrorist
groups in 2001, the legal situation had to be changed to make
negotiations possible. Due to the fact that this categorization was
subsequently dropped, negotiations with so-called terrorist groups
are now also possible.
The collective demobilization is organized and executed by
the Office of the High Commissioner of Peace. He is also the one
who negotiates demobilization with the paramilitaries. The
current collective demobilization process in Colombia is
divided into several parts: Sensitization, preparation,
concentration, demobilization, verification and the beginning of
the reintegration measures. In particular:
Establishment of assembly areas by decree. These areas
operate for 1530 days. Identity cards are issued to the
demobilized in the areas where registration takes place,
interviews are undertaken and weapons handed in and
stored. Additionally, assistance is provided in form of
accommodation, nutrition and clothes, medical assistance,
etc;
48 Interview on 19 November 2004 with the Deputy Secretary of

Defense Andres Peate
26
The reintegration process is administered by the Department

of the Interior. Reintegration programs take place in five
centers: Turbo, Medelln, Ccuta, Montera and Bogot. In
these centers the legal situation of the individuals is clarified,
vocational education starts, medical and psychological
assistance is provided and financial help is admitted.
The Colombian government started negotiations over

demobilization of the AUC under the premise that the AUC
declared a unilateral cease-fire. However, collective
demobilization started even though this precondition was never
really fulfilled49. These violations signaled a serious departure
from the preconditions agreed upon, and international donors
voiced their criticism accordingly. The result is weak international
support and minimal external funding of the DD&R process. The
only positive exception in terms of international support is the
Organization of American States (OAS), which monitors the
whole process. However, the OAS was not able to guarantee the
cease-fire and could not enforce compliance with the agreements.
The greatest problem with the ongoing collective
demobilization is the lack of an adequate legal framework, which
results in uncertainty and skepticism. It is feared that the
paramilitaries could achieve impunity, even though many of them
are responsible for massacres and human right violations.
Legal framework for collective demobilization
One of the most difficult problems facing the Colombian peace
process concerns the creation of an adequate legal framework.
Such a framework would have to respect the rights of the victims
in terms of reparations as well as the right to information about
conflict-related crimes and the prosecution of such. At the same
time, it should provide incentives for the paramilitaries to
participate in the demobilization process and to lay down their
weapons. Although a first version was presented and discussed as
early as in August of 2003, such a framework does still not exist.
The so-called law on Truth, Justice and Reparations (verdad,
justicia y reparacin) still has not passed parliament.
A future law will hopefully make successful demobilization
and reintegration of the paramilitaries possible and, at the same
time offer opportunities for nationwide reconciliation.
The law on Truth, Justice and Reparations will not only have
to meet the expectations of the victims for truth and reparation,
but also uphold the supremacy of the constitution and rule of law.
49 Comisin Colombiana de Juristas. 2004, p. 67.
27
Markus Koth
It has to be formulated in accordance with international
agreements signed by the Colombian government, especially with
the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, as well as with the
regulations of the International Court of Justice. The InterAmerican Court of Human Rights demands the prosecution and
punishment in case of grave human rights violations such as rape
and extra-legal executions, torture, and forced displacement. Such
crimes are subject to obligatory investigation and determination
(Article. 184/263/264 et sqq). Likewise, the right of the victims
to truth, punishment of the perpetrators and compensation for
damages must be specified. The International Court of Justice,
which Colombia belongs to since 5 August 2002, forecloses
impunity for heavy crimes. A general amnesty should therefore be
excluded. A reduction of sentences for serious crimes to a
maximum of 510 years could provide incentives for
demobilization but also demonstrate that a hidden acquittal
(indulto disfrazado) is ruled out. A partial amnesty could be take
place by reducing the maximum term from 40 years foreseen in
the Colombian penal code to 10 years. In what respect, in such a
case, justice is served to the victims and their right to punishment
of the perpetrator, is another matter.
However, it remains unclear to what extent the law on Truth,
Justice and Reparations will be compatible in the end with
international law. The submitted bill foresees that the president
has the final right to decide who is entitled to preferential
treatment and who is not. Judges can only give recommendations,
whereby the separation of powers is clearly suspended. The
reference to the determination of the enforcement location
(Art.15 ley de justicia, reparacin y verdad) also leaves space for
speculations. Theoretically the enforcement location could be
situated abroad, leaving the door open for possible extradition to
the United States. It could also be that a verdict would be
executed and the sentence served in the already existing
concentration zone of the paramilitaries. This was recorded
during a discussion between the Alto Commisionado de Paz,
Carlos Restrepo, and the negotiator of the paramilitaries,
Mancuso50. Even other regions controlled by the paramilitaries
could fall under this definition. With respect to the extradition
issue, no definitive legal decision has been taken. Presently,
extradition orders have been suspended as long as the affected
persons show their good will to contribute to peace. It also
50 http://eltiempo.terra.com.co/coar/NEGOCIACION/
negociacion/ARTICULO-WEB-_NOTA_INTERIOR1915933.html
28

remains to be discussed whether the time the paramilitaries have
already spent in the concentration zone of Santa Fe de Ralito
could be credited. A number of points are still unclear, such as
the period of probation (as suggested in one of the drafts of the
law on Truth, Justice and Reparations), the cancellation of the
parole period on the one hand as well as the remuneration of the
victims on the other hand, even though it appears that the last
draft includes several improvements.51
One reason why the law on Truth, Justice and Reparations,
which aims at an adequate definition of collective demobilization,
does not yet exist is that it became part of the negotiations
between the High Commissioner of Peace, Restrepo, and the
paramilitaries. The paramilitaries insist repeatedly on their right to
participate in the formulation of the legal framework.
The creation of an adequate legal framework is ultimately the
legislators duty. Therefore, a decision by the parliament would
have enhanced the claims of the executive in negotiations with
the paramilitaries. It probably would have prevented such
problems. As a result of this legal vacuum, the entire process is in
danger of failing. The paramilitaries have already announced that
they will abandon the negotiations if an adequate legal framework
is not created.
Currently, all participants of the paramilitary groups who are
suspected of having committed serious crimes have to stay in the
concentration zone of Santa Fe de Ralito. They await judgment
on a final legal framework and their own punishment. This
naturally creates tensions among the participants of the DD&R
process. The concentration zone of Santa Fe de Ralito was built
against the will of its citizens, who expressed concerns about
violent attacks by the paramilitaries. Some paramilitaries left the
concentration zone without permission, although they were
suspected of being violators of human rights and as such would
have had to stay in this zone. Combatants who leave the zone
lose all their entitlements and are liable to normal jurisdiction in
case they are captured. All this undermines the trust of potential
international donors and the Colombian society at large.
It would be advisable that the international community
contributes to the observation of international standards and
victims rights. Should the Colombian government not adopt
proper legislation on its own, the international community may
have to put pressure on the Colombian government. If such
pressure failed, the international community could step back from
its commitments of support.
51 For further reading see: Ambos, 2004.
29
Markus Koth
Registration and disarmament
The disarmament process started with the definition of a target
group. The fact that proven drug cartel leaders were members of
paramilitary units and as such included in the target group led
to criticism from the United States, which had asked that some of
these individuals be extradited. The disarmament begins with the
registration of participants and weapons in the concentration
zones. It is a positive sign that the assembly areas where the
disarmament takes place only exist for a maximum of 30 days.
This diminishes possible security risks and prompts the
immediate start of reintegration measures.
The lack of knowledge about the number of combatants to
be demobilized hampers planning. Additionally, it leaves space for
abuse as people can join the paramilitary groups only with the
purpose of receiving benefits. Therefore, an effective registration
and verification process is the key to finding out who really is an
ex-paramilitary and who is entitled to access to the reintegration
program. An additional cooperation with the leaders of each
paramilitary group on information about the number of members
that is supposed to participate would ease the preparations.
Negative experiences with earlier demobilization, such as in
Nutibara/Medelln in November 2003 when the paramilitaries
recruited young men in Medelln with the only purpose of letting
them participate in the demobilization process afterwards should
be avoided. As a result it is said that only 30 percent of all
demobilized men were actually former paramilitaries52. Such an
abuse of the DD&R program has to be prevented.
The government keeps each weapon that was handed in by
ex-combatants. Officials examine those weapons in order to find
possible connections to crimes53. The value of such investigations
might be questionable, as the owner of the weapon is not
automatically the perpetrator. When a weapon is still usable, it is
passed on to the military. It would be preferable if the weaponry
was destroyed, as to avoid its potential disappearance. It would
also enhance the chances that future weapons collection
programs are successful because civilians would not have to fear
reutilization. However, the collection of small arms, ammunition,
explosives and communication technology already diminishes the
52 www.elheraldo.com.co/anteriores/04-10-31/nacionales/noti11.htm
53 Interview on 17 November 2004 in the Ministry of Defense with
Coronel Forero, Coordinator of the Programe Atencin
Humanitaria al Desmovilizado (PAHD)
30

intensity of the conflict and makes it more difficult for the various
groups to rearm.
The demobilization process
During the demobilization process ex-combatants receive
identification documents. At the same time, important
information is gathered for their successful reintegration into civil
society. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) was
involved in the creation of the questionnaire that is used for this
purpose. IOM additionally provides technical assistance in
preparing identity cards for the paramilitaries.
Many of the ex-combatants who did not immediately return
to their hometowns reportedly spent the money they had received
for their weapon as well as other financial support on alcohol. To
prevent abuse of material aid that diminishes the effectiveness of
the reintegration and enlarges the security problems, alternatives
to financial support should be considered.
In order to minimize misuse of reintegration funding money
could be sent to a bank account or assistance could be provided
in form of material aid or credit notes. A transaction of the
financial aid to the ex-combatants partner could also be
considered. This would assure that assistance would benefit the
partner and family of the demobilized as well. To assure that excombatants actually return to their hometowns, payable
transactions could be executed in the respective home regions or
they could be linked to the transport of the demobilized to their
hometowns.
Security problems
The fact that ex-combatants stay in the region where they were
demobilized causes security threats for the population of the
region as well as for the demobilized combatants. A direct
transport of the ex-combatants to their hometowns and to the
places of their ultimate reintegration would be advisable.
In September 2004, some paramilitary groups were
demobilized in strategically important areas. The region of
Catatumbo is ideal for the trafficking and cultivation of drugs as
it lies directly on the Venezuelan border, in an area that is very
difficult to control and has an advantageous climate. Additionally,
the Colombian government is not strongly represented in the
region, which is controlled by various insurgent groups and their
followers. There is a very low police and military presence, and
the insurgent groups not only form the regional security sector
31
Markus Koth
but also control jurisprudence and the administrations. The fact
that the paramilitary and other militant groups are not just present
as military groups but also as executive bodies complicates the
fight against their influence. To pacify and to make those regions
recover, non-military efforts will also be necessary.
In some of the most important areas of the department of
Santander, the paramilitaries had started to build up logistical
networks that protect their influence on all illegal business. These
Mafia-like networks form the basis for the survival of the
paramilitary structures. It is therefore not enough to demobilize
the active paramilitary troops; all paramilitary structures should be
subject to dissolution in order to undercut the paramilitaries
financial and organizational background.
There is widespread skepticism among the population of
Santander and other affected regions that the state might not be
able to guarantee the security in the area. Skepticism grows as the
guerillas that are operating close to the affected zones could try to
recapture the drug cultivation and zones controlled by the
paramilitaries. This could happen as soon as these decide to lay
down their arms. That the guerrillas actually are interested in
recapturing this zone was already mentioned by some of their
leaders54. It is therefore important to prevent that guerillas take
advantage of the sudden change in the balance of military power.
To prevent the guerrillas from becoming a powerful player
again, some local politicians have already asked for military
support. The government pledged to fulfill their wishes and wants
to send more troops55. It is important to guarantee the security of
civilians and of the demobilized ex-combatants in order to
achieve a sustained pacification of the whole region. If security is
established, the state has a chance to re-establish its essential
functions and institutions.
For a certain amount of time, private security agencies could
take over control of the demobilized zones, offering security for
international and national companies, landowners, and private
persons. In the area of Catatumbo, an increasing demand for
private security has already been reported56. Yet, a simple
renaming of paramilitary groups into security companies or a shift
of the security problem towards private security agencies has to
54 http://sigob.presidencia.gov.co/snol/
noticia_anterior.asp?ID=120491
55 http://eltiempo.terra.com.co/coar/ANALISIS/analisis/
ARTICULO-WEB-_NOTA_INTERIOR-1975658.html
56 Fundacin Seguridad & Democracia: La Desmovilizacin del
Bloque Bananero de las AUC, p. 4, Bogot 2004.
32

be avoided. In any case, national standards for a certification of
these security agencies have to be implemented and controlled by
a national superintendence.
Some paramilitaries have offered additional proposals on
how to handle the security problem in the affected zones. In
October 2004, the paramilitary negotiator and ex-M19 member
Carlos Alonso Lucio suggested the integration of all paramilitary
fighters into the regular Colombian army after a short training
period57. During this period they should be educated in
democracy and rule of law. Paramilitaries believe that this
would prevent a long economic reintegration process and would
guarantee the security of the population in the affected regions.
The proposal implies that paramilitary knowledge of and
experience in operating in this region would be useful to the
military. Yet this self-interested proposal involves plenty of new
problems, among them the implicit quest for a plain amnesty. An
inclusion of the paramilitaries would make the military lose its
credibility and also inhibit further negotiations with the guerillas.
The government therefore rejected Lucios idea. Law does
acutally not allow demobilized ex-combatants to become part of
the regular army58. However, it is questionable whether this
prohibition can actually be enforced.
Lucio also offered that the paramilitaries eradicate their drug
plantations in collaboration with and under supervision of the US
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The paramilitaries
announced that they would be prepared to finance the entire
eradication process and would work on the cultivation of
alternative products. The paramilitaries also offered to build
several prisons and reintegration camps for adolescent excombatants. Such proposals makes one think of the times when
the infamous Colombian drug baron Pablo Escobar (19491993)
built his own prison. Respective plans simply lack credibility.
Results of the demobilization of the paramilitaries
Since September 2003, the paramilitary groups of Calima,
Catatumbo, Bananero, Cundinamarca, Sur de Magdalena, Isla de
San Fernando, and Sur Oeste Antioqueo have laid down their
arms, as well as the group Cacique Nutibara and the Autodefensas
Campesinos de Ortega, which do not belong to the AUC. This
57 semana.terra.com.co/opencms/opencms/Semana/
articulo.html?id=82490
58 Interview on 17 November 2004 in the Ministry of Defense with
Coronel Forero, Coordinator of the program Atencin
Humanitaria al Desmovilizado (PAHD)
33
Markus Koth
amounts to a total of 3,674 paramilitaries who handed in 3,983
weapons by the end of January 2005. Most of these demobilized
combatants are paramilitaries who participated in the collective
demobilization. The majority is between 18 and 35 years old,
male and has not received a higher education.
Note: Results of socio-economic questionnaire

Source: http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/noticias/2005/enero/
ene_26_05b.htm
Most of the demobilized never received any vocational training

before they entered the irregular groups. 8 percent of all
participants of the collective demobilization were disabled.
Asked what they expected first of all, the demobilized wished to
reunite with their families.
34
99
56
43
39
61
90
5
64
10
61
56
15
59
40
7
52
23
12
7
2
96
66
32
41
56
81
12
52
8
59
50
13
59
48
13
35
28
8
5
7
Male
Under 30
Over 30
Single
Open relationship/
married
Family
Alone
5 or more
Cundinamarca
Banaeros
Category
10 or more
Any children
Children
legitimate
Illiterate
Without elementary
School degree degree
With elementary
degree
Received
Formation
formation?
What did you Employee
do before?
Temporal worker
Family business
Finca owner
Own business
Who did you

live with
Number of
family
members
Civil state
Age
Variable
Sex
65
9
9
7
2
11
66
34
13
68
66
17
84
9
51
57
100
64
32
40
95
26
9
7
7
12
50
49
10
52
35
12
97
2
72
63
99
79
20
36
Percentage
Sur de Magdalena
Catatumbo
45
17
11
11
9
14
56
42
4
61
47
11
84
12
47
46
96
66
34
53
Calima
40
23
6
5
8
17
66
34
10
68
53
7
92
5
56
60
97
64
36
38
Crdoba
35
36
2
2
69
86
5
1
66
23
23
57
20
89
4
20
67
44
7
8
75
80
8
2
65
27
20
46
32
83
6
12
42
50
50
38
0
4
100
19
40
15
40
83
11
0
64
96
2
7
74
29
0
6
98
23
53
34
23
94
1
0
76
80
3
0
74
47
6
4
84
34
48
48
16
83
6
1
95
76
6
2
74
27
3
8
92
33
49
50
18
82
8
3
92
76
6
6
*Sistema de Identificacin de Beneficiarios (SISBEN) is a proxy means test index widely used to select beneficiaries of social programs in Colombia since 1994. It
serves as an indicator of households economic well being and was based on a cross-section sample of Colombian households collected in 1993. The
SISBEN index is a function of a set of variables related to the consumption of durable goods, human capital endowments and current income.
The expectations do not exclude one another
Student
Without a job
Occupation Do you have any
occupation?
None
Residence
Properties
Bank account
Reunite with family
Expectations* Look for a secure
place
Employee
Micro-enterprise on
Working
expectations my own
Micro-enterprise
with companion
Who are you Family
going to live
Alone
with?
Disabled
Interviewed by
Health
SISBEN*
No access to health
system
Markus Koth

Reintegration of collectively cemobilized paramilitaries
The collective reintegration of ex-combatants, where they
receive education in their hometowns or other regions of their
request is characterized by decentralization. The vocational
training is executed by the Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje
(SENA). Before the vocational training starts, the demobilized
eyx-combatants receive a special course in which leadership,
communication, teamwork and social values are taught.
For future evaluation and monitoring, the Colombian
government created seven Centros de referencia. Six of them are
located in the cities of Ccuta, Montera, Bogot, Buga, Turbo,
and Medelln, and one will be mobile to visit ex-combatants who
live in the periphery. These centers are monitoring the
reintegration process and supervise the ex-combatants59. The
localization of these centers has been chosen in accordance with
the preferred places of return of the ex-combatants. The
government also installed a free hotline number so that all excombatants can call to ask questions related to their
demobilization process.
One of the main problems of the governments reintegration
program consists of the necessity to decentralize the program.
Until the end of 2004, nearly all reintegration measures had been
implemented in Bogot. These programs now have to be
transferred to other regions in the country. However,
decentralization requires an appropriate communication network
that did not exist until the end of 2004. At present there is a lack
of regional capacities and financing. From demobilization
experiences in other countries, one can see that it is favorable
when national and international organizations and NGOs should
get involved and when the principle is observed to build
reintegration upon the self-interest of the ex-combatants; that is
demand should determine supply as much as possible. In contrast
to this, 90 percent of all participants in a SENA course for
individually demobilized combatants, visited by the author in
Bogot in November 2004, could not imagine working for a
single day in the profession they were being taught.
Problems and risks of the DD&R of paramilitaries
There are different bodies that organize and implement the
DD&R process; child soldiers are attended to by the Ministry of
59 www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/desmovilizaciones/2004/
index_centro.htm
37
Markus Koth
Family, the individually demobilized combatants are first attended
to by the Ministry of Defense, the collective demobilization is
managed by the Office of the High Commissioner of Peace, and
the overall reintegration process is managed by the Ministry of
the Interior. The financing of all programs depends on the
Ministry of Finance. To avoid organizational, communicational
and bureaucratic problems, a planning, coordinating and
implementing body is required.
Collective demobilization runs the risk of combatants
deciding to re-join other violent groups. This risk may grow if
combatants do not feel an improvement of their security and
economic situation as a tangible result of demobilization and
reintegration. As the AUC possesses huge economic resources, it
would be easy for its leaders to recruit new troops. To prevent a
re-joining of irregular troops, the basic economic needs of the excombatants have to be met. The demobilization of the guerilla
group EPL may serve as a negative example. When their personal
status did not improve following demobilization, a considerable
number of ex-combatants decided to take up their arms again and
to re-join.
Next to economic security, human security in the
demobilized zones is of prime importance. Confidence in security
is not only a key issue in the demobilization of the paramilitaries
but also in the possible disarmament of civil society. If people feel
that they no longer need their weapons they may decide to hand
them in. Unless a secure environment can be created and
maintained, the DD&R process will fail. Another possible
negative scenario for collective demobilization is that of a simple
replacement of the leadership of some units by new leaders that
try to go on with illegal actions. It is still a definite possibility that
existing structures are just renamed or transformed into Mafialike organized crime. Through the demobilization of surplus
fighters, paramilitary groups could even become more flexible
and efficient. By giving up the counterinsurgency cause,
transformation of the paramilitaries into more clandestine groups
is possible. It will therefore be crucial not just to demobilize the
combatants, but also to dissolve the paramilitary structures,
destroy their sources of financing, and to undermine their
political and economic support.
Even in the best case of successful demobilization of all
eleven groups that announced their participation in the DD&R
process, expectations with respect to an improvement of the
security situation should not be overly optimistic. New conflicts
will arise in the course of the transfer of power from the
paramilitaries to the Colombian state. Irritation and fights will
38

emerge due to a temporary vacuum of power and the new
distribution of illegal resources and positions within their
structures. Paramilitaries will probably not be able to change their
conflict behavior immediately. National and international NGOs
should therefore design post-conflict programs and training
modules that target a change in paramilitary behavior patterns.
Disarmament programs for civil society and educational
campaigns on small arms should be reconsidered.
Individual demobilization
During the 1990s, President Cesar Gaviria Trujillo (19901994)
introduced the demobilization of individuals with an incentive
package for defection from the paramilitaries or guerillas. With
the Decree No. 1385 of 1994, in combination with the Comit
Operativo para la Dejacin de Armas (CODA) 60., a legal framework
was created. Under Cesar Gaviria,individual demobilization was
understood as a tactic to weaken irregular groups. Above all, it
was seen as an instrument to obtain intelligence information
about the insurgents. After various collective demobilizations
during the 1990s, hardly any success was expected from individual
demobilization. Therefore it was not promoted very much.
Under Gavirias successors, Ernesto Samper and Andrs
Pastrana, individual demobilization made little progress; even
though Pastrana created an important component with the
Programa de Atencin Humanitaria al Desmovilizado (PAHD), which
is still valid for demobilization61. In 1997, the legal framework was
modified with the introduction of the Law No. 418, which
governed the demobilization (modified in 1999 by Law No. 548
and in 2002 by Law No. 782)62. Rights of admission and benefits
of the program were defined by Decree No. 128 of 2003, which
divided the process into two parts: demobilization and
reintegration63.
Combatants who want to demobilize individually have to
surrender to an official authority, which is defined by Decree
No.128. This authority has to inform the Public Attorneys Office
and the closest military garrison immediately. From the moment
of surrender onwards, the Ministry of Defense is in charge of the
60 www.mininteriorjusticia.gov.co/pagina5_subdetalle.asp?
doc=115&pag=451&cat=22
61 www.ideaspaz.org/proyecto03/boletines/boletin06.htm
62 www.secretariasenado.gov.co/leyes/L0418_97.htm;
www.secretariasenado.gov.co/leyes/L0782002.htm.
63 www.mininteriorjusticia.gov.co/pagina5_subdetalle.asp?
doc=115&pag=450&cat=22
39
Markus Koth
combatant; it grants security, accommodation, nutrition, and
clothes to the combatant. The combatant delivers his weaponry
to the department in charge and is interviewed by the military.
This interview ought to assure his membership to an illegal group
and his (or her) right to participate in the demobilization and
reintegration process. The interview also aims at collecting
intelligence information about the insurgent groups. Such
information is being paid for (Decree No. 128 Art. 9).
If all eligibility criteria are met, the demobilized combatant
receives a certificate by the Comit Operativo para la Dejacin de
Armas (CODA) which serves as a permission to enter the
Department of Interior reintegration program (Decree No. 1385
Art.10). The CODA records the circumstances of the
demobilization and delivers legal applications of the demobilized
that are granted to him to the Department of Interior, which in
turn has to decide about the possible mitigation of a sentence or
the closure of proceedings. The Department of the Interior is
responsible for the reintegration of individually demobilized
combatants as well as for the reintegration of larger groups.
Since 2002, paramilitaries are also admitted to the program.
Due to a massive information campaign launched by the
government and the increased military pressure on the irregular
groups, the number of participants in the individual
demobilization has risen from 1,100 (19992002) to 6,335 fighters
(20022004). Out of these participants, 5,444 are male and 891
are female, 3,250 belonged to the FARC, 1,996 belonged to the
paramilitaries and 889 to the ELN, while 200 participants
belonged to other dissident groups. 19 percent (or 1,187 of the
demobilized) were underage combatants64.
Deficits of individual demobilization
The perception of the individual demobilization as a war tactic
contains risks with regard to an appropriate treatment of the
combatants who are willing to participate in the demobilization.
Moreover, legal problems due to contradictory formulations in
the Decree No. 128 (Art. 13 and 23), increase the chance of
impunity for the demobilized. As the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights objected against these formulations, the legal
treatment of the demobilized became even more complicated65.
64 www.fuerzasmilitares.mil.co/cgfm.nsf/1b56ba58ffde6d5e0525
6b3600494681/3F360A03BC25DDE785256F93005C8BBC/$file/
estadisticas%20desmovilizados.pdf
65 http://www.Cidh.oas.org/countyrep/Colombia04sp/informe4.htm
40

During the past two years, approximately 400 people have
tried to enter the demobilization program illegitimately. These
people claimed to be members of illegal groups to gain admission
to the reintegration programs and their benefits.
In the course of the interviews the demobilized are asked for
intelligence information that could help the government in their
fight against the insurgent groups. In Decree No. 128, article No.
9, which offers financial aid for any helpful information, the legal
background for these actions was established. The fact that the
information is paid for implies the danger of abuse.
Reintegration
Starting in 1994, the Red de Solidaridad Social (social solidarity
network) was initially responsible for the reintegration of excombatants66. Decree No. 2546 of 1999 put the Direccin General
(general board of directors) within the Ministry of the Interior in
charge of the reintegration process of all individually or
collectively demobilized combatants. Article 4 of Decree No. 128
of 2003 determines that the Ministry of Defense has to guarantee
the first assistance to ex-combatants through the grupo de atencin
humanitaria. Chapter V of the same decree determines that
children and adolescents have to be attended to by the Instituto
Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (ICBF). The aim of the program is
make ex-combatants adapt to civil society through humanitarian
assistance, personal security, education, and vocational training
the latter being of prime importance for him to start a new civil
livelihood.
After demobilization, the ex-combatant receives a
certification from the Comit Operativo para la Dejacin de las Armas
(CODA). If the certification declares that the beneficiary is an excombatant, he or she gets access to the reintegration program.
Spouses, partners, parents, siblings and children also have access
to certain benefits. Assistance is provided for up to two years and
can be granted only once. Assistance is provided in form of
humanitarian aid and health care, including family members.
Psychological assistance is offered too.
Vocational training starts with a general inquiry, the so-called
modulo sero, to determine the knowledge, the talents, and the
expectations of the ex-combatants. This inquiry is obligatory for
all ex-combatants and should determine the education needs,
66 www.dnp.gov.co/ArchivosWeb/Direccion_Inversiones_
Finanzas/BPIN/legislacion_bancos_de_proyectos/Decreto_1225_1
997_Reglamenta_parcialmente_Ley_368_1997.doc
41
Markus Koth
which shall in turn constitute the basis for the reintegration
measures. The modulo sero was introduced with the start of the
collective demobilization that took place in November 2004.
Afterwards, the ex-combatant can choose between different
education possibilities; for example, basic education, graduation,
university education or professional training. A literacy program is
also available.
The Servicio Nacional de Apredizaje (SENA), or national
education center, an institution which operates nationwide and is
open for the public too, is in charge of the vocational training.
Reintegration of individually demobilized combatants
In contrast to collective reintegration which is decentralized,
nearly all reintegration programs for individually demobilized
combatants take place in Bogot. After entering the reintegration
program of the Ministry of the Interior, the ex-combatants move
to so-called albergues (hostels) where security is granted and
where they receive a monthly personal hygiene kit, alimentation,
clothes and transport. There are a total of 40 albergues which are
managed by private persons who, until November 2004, did not
undergo any special sensitization in advance. After the
demobilized combatants spent at least three months in one of the
albergues they can move to a hogar independiente (independent
home), where they can stay with their family. Here they receive
1.5 times the minimum salary, plus half of the minimum salary for
each additional member of the family. Hogares acompaados
(accompanied homes) are reserved for persons who have left the
programs of the Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar but still
have the right to attend governmental reintegration programs. In
these homes they are accompanied by a special tutor. The excombatants are not specifically guarded but are instructed on how
to behave and act to prevent violent attacks.
The transfer of ex-combatants from the Ministry of Defense
to the Ministry of the Interior is far from smooth. Ex-combatants
suffer from a lack of information and object to not having a
contact person for their problems. They also report contradictory
statements by the participating institutions on the scope of
reintegration assistance. Ex-combatants complain at times of
having been supplied with wrong information. Their negative
reports may diminish the willingness of other combatants to
demobilize.
The reintegration programs have to more appropriately
address the security needs of ex-combatants. They repeatedly
report personal danger due to threats by their former groups. If
42

the security needs can not be addressed some may quit the
reintegration program. There is a lack of accommodation in the
hostels due to the increasing number of participants in the
program. By the end of November 2004 no monitoring or
evaluation mechanism was in existence67.
While demobilization of adults and children is essentially
identical, there are some differences with regard to the sequences
and contents of the reintegration programs.
Reintegration of children
The Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (ICBF) is in charge of
the reintegration of children. It is assisted by the national agency
Defensora del Pueblo and international organizations like the
Organization for Migration and the US Agency for International
Development (USAID). The goal of the reintegration program
for children is to keep them out of the conflict and to help them
to enter into a civilian life and protect their rights as children. An
attempt is made to repatriate children back to their families
homes. All adolescents under 18 years old who have been
involved as members of illegal groups in war actions have access
to the programs of the ICBF. Adolescents have access to the
programs regardless of whether they turned themselves in or were
captured.
Reintegration consists of the following elements:
Prevention which is implemented by the ICBF throughout
the country. These programs give the adolescent prospects
for the future and keep them out of the conflict.
Attention adolescents receive protection in transitional
homes (hogares tutores) for a period of up to 45 days as well
as through centros de atencin (attention centers) where they
receive psychological assistance, education, and vocational
training for 812 months.
Finally there are casas juveniles (youth houses) where the
adolescent is prepared within the scope of the ongoing
programs for self-reliance until he or she reaches the age of
18. Afterwards the adolescent has the right to enter the
reintegration program of the Ministry of the Interior in case
he/she fulfills the requirements of CODA.
67 Interview with Juan David Angel, Program director of the

reintegration program of the Ministry of Interior and Justice, 18
November 2004.
43
Markus Koth
There is also a component for family protection. In hogares

tutores 12 children stay in families to re-learn social and
general life skills68.
Numbers of demobilized children (19992004)

Month
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Total
January
13
35
62
125
February
17
24
21
50
114
March
15
31
37
42
126
April
31
47
49
135
May
19
18
40
53
66
196
June
28
33
104
46
218
July
25
32
96
57
215
August
17
32
63
40
153
September
15
29
71
93
212
October
11
39
80
77
208
November
25
37
60
36
174
December
40
12
54
59
66
234
TOTAL
10
100
196
394
726
684
2110
Source: Sistema de Informatin ICBF-OIM; Cut off date: 31 December 2004
72 percent of all demobilized children were male, 28 percent were

female. 1,155 children belonged to the FARC, 607 children to the
paramilitaries, and 271 to the ELN. The rest belonged to other
dissident groups or had no contact with any of the mentioned
groups.
One main problem in the reintegration of children consists
of high security risks in certain parts of the country. It is often
impossible to reunite the children with their families, as these
children are often not permitted by the guerrillas or the
paramilitaries to leave their regions. Underage combatants with
children and children with AIDS pose another serious challenge.
Special programs for adolescents with children do exist but are
not yet sufficient. Some children quit the reintegration programs
because they have to feed their families and depend on the salary
the insurgent groups pay them. At the same time, the insurgent
68 Interview with Luzmila Cardona of the ICBF on 17 November
2004.
44

groups try to retain children by offering them money, alcohol or
force them into prostitution.
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
GRUPO ARMADO
FARC
AUC
ELN
OTROS
Sin Contacto
1155
607
271
39
38
Source: Sistema de Informatin ICBF-OIM; Cut off date: 31 December 2004
The ICBF program still does not include evaluation and

monitoring components, thus the effectiveness of the projects
cannot be monitored, and it is therefore not clear what happens
to adolescents after they have left the programs. Monitoring and
evaluation thus has to be institutionalized. Coordination between
the different national and international agencies involved should
be a key element of such an output orientation.
The numbers of children who directly participated in the
armed conflict varies between 11,000 to 14,000 children69. The
number of children affected by displacement and physical and/or
psychological force could be as high as some 1.5 million70.
Children and adolescents are mostly disregarded in the peace
processes and reintegration programs even though they make up
a considerable part of the total number of combatants. Of the
estimated overall number of child soldiers, 2,200 are estimated to
belong to the AUC, 7,400 to FARC, and 1,480 to the ELN71.
Olara Otunnu, Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral for Children and Armed Conflict, stressed in New York
69 Youll learn not to cry, at:
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/ colombia0903;
La infancia amenazada www.unicef.es/contenidos/250/
sowc05_sp.pdf.
70 El tiempo, 10 December 2004.
71 Youll learn not to cry, at:
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/colombia0903/
45
Markus Koth
on 20 January 2004 the necessity of protecting and rehabilitating
war-affected children72. This includes the consideration of child
soldiers in DD&R programs. Child soldiers were often forced to
join the illegal groups and they could become victims again if
reintegration programs do not assist them. Reintegration can be
seen as compensation for a lost childhood and youth as well as
for the traumatic experiences that the children had to suffer
during the conflict.
Female fighters
As members of the armed groups, women were also involved in
the conflict. Female fighters were mainly recruited by the FARC,
where one-third of the combatants were estimated to be
women73. Women may have taken on new roles and authority by
having joined armed groups or by having provided for their
children themselves and may not want to give up this new selfreliance. Women are often victims of the conflict too as victims
of sexual abuse or as sex slaves within the insurgent groups;
unfortuately, they are often not recognized as victims of sexual
violence. Women are also affected by the conflict as forced
combatants, as mothers, partners, and relatives who suffered the
loss of a family member and often have to support their families
on their own. Despite of the fact that some participated in the
fighting, they often are not respected as fighters. 74 percent of the
displaced persons are women and children. Unfortunately, there
does not yet exist any special demobilization and reintegration
program for women.
Disabled ex-combatants
Eight percent of the ex-combatants are handicapped in need of
special treatment74. Many of those handicapped are victims of
mines. Minefields have to be cleared and agreements on the
reduction and control of antipersonnel mines should be signed.
Special reintegration programs have to be established that focus
on the needs of disabled ex-combatants. However, it is often
difficult to establish whether a person is handicapped as a result
of the conflict or from an accident that happened prior to joining
the conflict. Victims have to register in their hometowns, but due
72 http://dominio.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/
2d476bcd3a5886fa8525e220053845d?
73 www.womenwarpeace.org/issues/ddr/ddr.htm
74 www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/desmovilizaciones/2004/
balance.htm
46

to their membership in a military organization the previous status
can often not be proven.
The indigenous population
The rights of Colombias indigenous population were defined in
1993 when the new constitution was adopted. However, the
institutions are not strong enough and the state does not make
sufficient efforts to guarantee indigenous rights. As a result, the
estimated 750,000 indigenous people, who live in some 80
communities throughout the country, suffer from human right
violations committed by actors from all parties to the conflict.
The demilitarized and neutral zones which the indigenous
people live in are regularly penetrated by armed groups. The
traditional indigenous authorities are not respected by these
groups, which try to impose their law on the native communities.
The indigenous leaders are often killed and the communities are
at times forced to leave their home regions. If these regions are of
interest to the armed groups, this risk increases. Between 2000
and 2002, nearly 150 indigenous people, mostly community
leaders, were killed75.
Insurgent groups are moving more and more into neutral
zones to cultivate the coca plant. They move to indigenous
territories because fumigation (= eradication of illegal coca crops
by spraying poisonous chemicals) is prohibited there at least in
theory. The irregular groups are not just interested in expanding
the area of cultivable land for their illicit crops but they are also
interested in appropriating the indigenous territory. Due to the
high number of assassinations and displacements in some regions,
Rodolfo Stavenhagen, special rapporteur on the situation of
human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples,
announced in his report to the Commission on Human Rights
that some native communities are in danger of extinction76. As
most indigenous people who are forced to leave their traditional
settlement areas move to other rural regions and do not register
as internally displaced persons (IDPs), it can be assumed that the
real number of affected persons is higher than estimated.
Nine percent of the reported violations of indigenous rights
are ascribed to the Colombian armed forces. The soldados
campesinos and the network of informers also have a negative
impact on the native population. These assistant soldiers are
75 Callejon
con
salida
at
www.pnud.org.co/2003/full/
capitulo_5.pdf. 2004, p. 16.
76 http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G05/101/60/
PDF/G0510160.pdf?OpenElement.
47
Markus Koth
reported to have attacked indigenous people or to have arrested
some of them on falsified grounds. The indigenous peoples
would be directly affected if Law No. 48 of 1993, which exempts
them from military service, was modified as intended. Males
would have to serve regardless of the ethnic background77. It has
been suggested that the government stop the obligatory military
service for indigenous people. Indigenous peoples should not
only be protected their representatives may actually have an
active role to play in the peace talks, too. Furthermore, all armed
groups should respect the neutrality of the demobilized zones. If
necessary these zones should be monitored and controlled by
international observers.
Internally displaced persons
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are one of Colombias main
problems. In 2004 alone, more than 200,000 persons were forced
to leave their homes and became internally displaced persons.
Between January 1995 and December 2004, some 1,568,596
persons were registered in the Sistema nico de Registro (SUR) a
governmental institution that deals with IDPs78. The independent
organization Consultora para los Derechos Humanos y el
Desplazamiento (Codhes) that in their figures includes those IDPs
who did not register in the government institution SUR, reported
for the same period some 2,590,041 IDPs79. The IDPs fled
temporarily in fear of repression by illegal groups or as a result of
ongoing fights between armed groups. Other reasons include a
reaction to economic pressure resulting from fumigation.
It became the war strategy of the paramilitaries to fight the
populations supporting the guerrillas as they realized that they
could not destroy the guerrillas itself, at least with weapons only.
The paramilitaries also use forced displacement to consolidate
their power in some regions by replacing the enemies supporters
with their own sympathizers. The guerrillas in turn used violence
to force people to stay in their regions. The guerillas do not
permit people to leave because they do not want to lose their
regional infrastructure. It was reported, for example, that some
1,400 members of the community of Aquitania, Antioquia had to
stay in their village against their will80. Another reason for the high
77 Comisin Colombiana de Juristas. 2004, p. 51.
78 www.red.gov.co/Download/Files/Registro_SUR/
Registro_SUR_Feb_08_2005/Registro_SUR_Feb_08_web_Acumul
ado.htm
79 www.codhes.org.co/cifra/GraficoTendencias1985_2004.jpg
80 www.codhes.org.co/dbreves2.php?breve=217
48

number of internally displaced persons is the ongoing military
offensive against the FARC.
The result of the large displacements is a high concentration
of territory in the hands of few groups while a large number of
peasants and refugees have to abandon their farms, etc. and thus
are deprived of their livelihoods. It is therefore important to give
the IDPs a possibility to reclaim their property. If the rights of
the nearly three million displaced persons are not respected while
special programs are offered to the perpetrators of violence,
national reconciliation will be impossible. Land reform, financial
assistance, and special reintegration programs or reintegration
programs for ex-combatants should include IDPs.
International Cooperation
Organization of American States (OAS)
The Organization of American States (OAS) posseses a long
tradition and high legitimacy in the region it is particularly well
placed to observe compliance with international legal standards.
On 23 January 2004, the OAS signed an agreement with the
Colombian government on how to monitor the peace process81.
The promotion and defense of human rights as well as the
strengthening of the judiciary system and the recovering of trust
and security throughout the country are further goals. The
mission is planned to last three years. The OAS installed nine
regional offices and networks in the most affected areas to
observe and facilitate demobilization of the paramilitaries. The
mission consists of eight international and six national
cooperators. The main goal of OAS mission is to monitor the
demobilization process of the paramilitaries. Until now the OAS
has not been able to guarantee the announced cease-fire. One
reason seems obvious the number of observers needs to be
higher.
The OAS monitors the disarmament, the security and the
general situation within the demobilization zone. This includes
the situation of the paramilitaries as well as that of the inhabitants
of this zone. Subsequently the organization assists the excombatants too, by helping them to reincorporate into working
life and civil society. Juridical support for ex-combatants is also
offered where requested.
81 216.239.59.104/search?q=cache:li-he47I4lsJ:www.oas.org/
documents/OEA-Colombia/inf-colombia051104e.pdf
+OAS+23+january+2004+colombia&hl=de&ie=UTF-8
49
Markus Koth
The OAS, represented through the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights (IACHR), monitors the situation
within the demobilization zone and other directly affected areas,
predominantly concentrating on the situation of vulnerable
groups. The situation of the indigenous population in Santa Marta
as well as the situation of children and women is taken into
special account. To observe a wide territory, the OAS works as an
intermediary between international and national NGOs and the
Colombian government.
The IACHR criticizes the human rights situation in different
regions of Colombia, underlining the extraordinary importance of
a clear legal framework. Paramilitaries who are accused of crimes
against humanity should not be immune against prosecution. The
OAS additionally calls for an improvement of victims rights. The
IACHR stresses as well that the draft law on Truth, Justice and
Reparations (verdad, justicia y reparacin) (see above) should focus
more on the real needs and on the indemnification of victims
rather than on the rights of the perpetrators.
The United Nations
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is working
together with the Colombian government on the reduction of
poverty and the promotion of democratic governance. The UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) plays an
important role in documenting the human rights situation within
Colombia. He also developed a list of recommendations that
served as a basis for the EU in the London talks with the
Colombian government. This donor meeting took place on 10
July 2003 with representatives of 24 governments. A stronger
involvement of the international community in the current
demobilization process of the paramilitaries was discussed and
the Colombian government asked to respond to the UNHCRs
recommendations, especially with respect to the human rights
situation.
To improve the situation of children, UNICEF is working
together with the ICBF on reintegration programs for child
combatants. The United Nations Regional Center for Peace,
Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the
Caribbean (UN-LiREC) additionally plays a role in the fight
against illegal weapons trafficking. It trains law enforcement
officials on the small arms problem and promotes the Small Arms
and Light Weapons Administration (SALSA) System. This webbased computer system was developed with the aim of providing
50

a platform to increase coordination and cooperation among
partners in Latin American and the Caribbean region.
UN special adviser James LeMoyne, who has worked as
mediator between the FARC and the Colombian government
since 2001, announced his resignation in April 2005. The
government and the guerrillas had come to the conclusion that
peace talks are currently futile. The Colombian government insists
on a unilateral cease-fire to start negotiations while the FARC
demands for itself a neutral zone, a kind of save haven.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the International
Labour Organization (ILO)
The International Organization for Migration and the
International Labour Organization work in the field of the
reintegration of conflict-affected children. The IOM office in
Colombia backs the governments efforts through the promotion
of initiatives that aim at a strengthening of civil society and, above
all, ethnic minorities, victim organizations and human rights
organizations. IOM assists the Colombian government actively
through consulting, the allocation of experts, and training in the
areas of conflict resolution and leadership. IOM trains so-called
consejeros de paz local experts in conflict resolution and
promotion of peace and created the so-called Centros de
Convivencia Ciudadana. These Centers shall promote the peaceful
co-existence of citizens and offer incentives for the strengthening
of governance. The IOM also supports different programs for
child combatants, and developed a program for the insertion of
demobilized adolescents in the labor market. Finally, IOM was
involved in developing a questionnaire on the demobilization
process and provided technical assistance in the preparation of
identity cards for the paramilitaries.
The European Union
The European Union and the Colombian government met in
London in 2003, when the EU declared its solidarity with the
Colombian government. In the London Declaration of July 2003,
recommendations of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights (UNHCHR) were announced, including the
recommendation to publish a plan of action on human rights with
a timetable for implementation82. These recommendations have
not yet been implemented and the relationship between Colombia
and the European Union subsequently suffered in 2004. Instead
82 usofficeoncolombia.org/documents/londondeclarationmemo.htm
51
Markus Koth
of fulfilling the London Recommendations Colombias
government is looking for a military solution with the guerillas.
The creation of soldados campesinos and the red de informantes is
heavily criticized by the European Union. The European Union is
also skeptical of the Plan Colombia and the European Commission
is therefore not willing to support it financially. The Iraq war
worsened EU-Colombian relations even further while most of
the European countries had criticized the US government for its
war against Iraq, Colombia followed the US government.
Following the change of government in Spain, the new President
Zapatero stopped the delivery of 3242 tanks to Colombia83.
While Colombia is asking for some direct bilateral technical
and financial support for the ongoing demobilization process
with the paramilitaries, the European Union combines its
willingness to help with some preconditions. The European
Union links its support to further integration of the Andean
region. Furthermore, the EU announced its support for
Colombian efforts conditional on fulfilling the human rights
requirements formulated by the High Commissioner of Peace of
the United Nations Office in Colombia. To revitalize its
relationship with the EU, it is important that Colombia
demonstrate a willingness to meet the European Unions human
rights requirements. Colombia should fulfill the list of 27
recommendations set by the UNHCR in London in 2003.
The lack of transparency and the unclear legal situation
regarding the demobilization of the paramilitaries are additional
reasons for the reluctance of the European Union. A sign of
improvement might be seen in the agreement of the European
Union and the Colombian government during their meeting in
Brussels on 13 December 2004. In this agreement, the European
Union reaffirmed its will to accompany the Colombian peace
process. The EU said that it is willing to facilitate the
reestablishment of national unity and justice. The fight against
terrorism and the reformation of social cohesion are additional
concerns of the EU.
The EU may exert more influence on the design of the new
Plan Colombia the focus of which should be less on military
aspects and more on the recognition of human, childrens, and
womens rights. At a later stage, the European Union could
extend its assistance as a mediator. The European Commission
already supports the Colombian peace process through so-called
laboratorios de paz (Peace Laboratories). These peace laboratories
are comprehensive programs aimed at supporting peace initiatives
83 www.colombiaweek.org/20041004.html
52

on the local level. There is one peace laboratory in Magdalena
Medio. A second peace laboratory was set up in 2003 to cover the
regions of Norte Santander, Oriente Antioqueo and Macizo.
The EU announced in April 2001 at a meeting with the
Colombian government that it would support Colombia with
330 million. 140 million are planned to be transferred to
Colombia between 2001 and 2006 through technical aid delivered
by the European Commission84. It is the largest sum for a single
country in Latin America. Additionally the EU supports
Colombia through special trade benefits. The Commission
recently submitted its project for the renewal of the Generalized
System of Preferences (the GSP) that should enable to maintain
and even increase the preferential trade treatment enjoyed by
Colombian exports to the EU. The EU Commission should
proceed with financing the peace laboratories and try to expand
them. These laboratories could play an important role in the
promotion of civil conflict resolution and in the promotion of
democratic structures within the conflict-affected regions. An
evaluation about already executed programs is planned to be
carried out.
United States
Development aid and military assistance makes the United States
the biggest donor in Colombia; Colombia at the same time is the
third-largest recipient of US military aid in the world after Israel
and Egypt. Apart from this assistance, the United States may play
a more constructive role in the peace process as well. The Plan
Colombia was launched by former Colombian president Andres
Pastrana, who conceived it as a countrywide economic and social
support program. Since President Clinton (19932001) signed the
Plan Colombia on 13 July 2000, the United States provided more
than US $3.7 billion in assistance until the end of 2004. For 2005,
President Bush has requested US $574.15 million in military and
police aid and US $150 million in social and economic aid for
Colombia85.
Military aid not only focuses on financial help but also on
training assistance. The number of active American troops in
Colombia rose to 800 men. The main goals of the Plan Colombia
are to fight drug cultivation and strengthen the rule of law on
Colombian territory. Successes of this program, such as the
84 europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/ferrero/2004/
sp04_508.htm
85 ciponline.org/colombia/aidtable.htm
53
Markus Koth
number of destroyed coca fields and the reduction of available
cocaine in the United States can be felt directly in the United
States.
However, as announced by the National Drug Intelligence
Center (NDIC) in one of its latest reports, the availability of
cocaine remains quite stable. Compared to the tremendous
eradication and fumigation efforts sponsored by the US
government the results are sobering86. At the same time, the
negative impact of fumigation becomes visible. The fumigation of
both illegal and legal crops in 2003 forced some 27,000
Colombians to leave their homes87. The negative impact on the
environment and human health is not yet fully established. As a
result of the fumigation, drug cultivators are expanding their
cultivation into the more inaccessible regions, or national parks
and reservations, knowing that aerial herbicide spraying is
prohibited there. In 2003, 116,000 hectares of coca were
eradicated by aerial spraying. Compared to the 160,000 hectares
that were cultivated in 1999, the 86,000 hectares that were
cultivated in 2003 represent a 40 percent reduction88. Obviously,
the cultivation of coca has in many cases just been transferred to
other Colombian regions or neighboring countries.
As part of alternative development, USAID is supporting the
improvement of infrastructure in Colombias rural areas to build a
market for crops. These infrastructure programs include the
building of streets, municipal buildings, water systems and
schools, etc. Other programs managed by USAID concentrate on
strengthening Colombias democracy. These projects are targeted
at an improvement of Colombias juridical system, the
empowerment of local governance and the protection of human
rights. USAID is also working on programs with IDPs and child
soldiers. A recent request to USAID related to the support and
design of a demobilization and reintegration program for adult
combatants is under review. However, as paramilitaries are
categorized as terrorists, an approval seems unlikely due to legal
problems. However, the United States already supports the
demobilization of paramilitaries with US $3 million. Due to its
direct and indirect involvement in the counterinsurgency, it is
impossible for the United States to play an active role as a
mediator. At the same time it is obvious that US interests can not
be ignored. The extradition orders of the US government
covering paramilitary and guerrilla leaders that are accused of
86 usofficeoncolombia.org/documents/pcfour.pdf
87 usofficeoncolombia.org/documents/pcfour.pdf
88 www.unodc.org/pdf/colombia/colombia_coca_survey_2003.pdf
54

drug trafficking and money laundering have to be taken into
account. It is questionable to what extent the Colombian
government will be able to make independent decisions on these
extradition requests.
As the Plan Colombia will be reshaped, a new definition of the
subject of cooperation and assistance should be considered. The
United States should use its influence on the Colombian army and
connect further military aid to the complete cut of relations
between the army and the paramilitaries. The United States
should also consider reintroducing the so-called Clinton ban to
stop illegal arms trafficking to Colombia.
Recommendations
The Colombian government has to create an adequate legal

framework for the implementation of the demobilization
programs. This framework has to define the eligibility
criteria, the procedure, and scope of the reintegration
measures. Such a legal framework has to guarantee the
prosecution of serious crimes that were committed by
demobilized paramilitaries.
Colombian civil society has been affected directly and
indirectly by the conflict. Large numbers of people died,
many became victims of physical and psychological violence.
Others were kidnapped or had to flee. Their situation has to
be included in the design of reintegration and reconciliation
programs. Chances for an integral and sustainable peace
depend on an acknowledgement of the needs of war-affected
groups as well as a satisfaction of their right to truth and
compensation.
Successful reintegration depends on an adequate institutional
framework. One single coordination and decision-making
body is required to manage the different implementing
organs.
As the success of the demobilization depends largely on
successful reintegration, measures should be fostered in this
regard. Solid funding, monitoring of the programs and
continuous assistance to ex-combatants, even after they have
finished the official programs, is essential. The design of the
programs has to focus on the requirements of the excombatants and the receiving society. Participants of the
individual demobilization have to be treated equally.
An integral strategy is required for pacification. Negotiations
should not just involve the insurgent groups but groups
55
Markus Koth
56
affected by the war too including ethnic minorities,

womens organizations, human rights associations,
organizations dealing with displaced persons, as well as
victim groups, trade unions and international NGOs.
A requirement for the success of the DD&R process in
Colombia is a sustainable security environment within the
demobilized zones. Militarization of civil society has to be
avoided, as does infiltration of the military or the private
security sector by former combatants. Connections between
the military and the paramilitaries should be cut effectively.
Paramilitary structures have to be dismantled and their
networks must be disrupted.
Sensitization to the needs and perspectives of vulnerable
groups (children, women, the displaced and disabled) has to
be included into the DD&R programs. Next to the
reintegration programs for children, special DD&R
programs for women and disabled persons have to be
launched.
Transparency is a prerequisite for stronger international
participation. Donors should be more incorporated in the
planning and execution of the DD&R process.
After years of civil war and armed conflict a diffusion of
violence can be observed in Colombia. DD&R programs
should therefore be accompanied by weapons collection
programs for the civil society at large.
Regular program evaluations could help to reduce errors and
mistakes, adapt future demobilization programs and identify
preconditions for a possible demobilization of the guerrillas.

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To End a War: Demobilization and Reintegration of

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

The whole idea of Colombia as a functioning nation,critics

argued,was a fiction. (Julia E. Sweig)1

The following paper 43 is a result of a cooperation between the

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

Small Arms and Light Weapons

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

Comisin Colombiana de Juristas. 2004, p. 51.

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

48 Interview on 19 November 2004 with the Deputy Secretary of

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

The reintegration process is administered by the Department

The Colombian government started negotiations over

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

Note: Results of socio-economic questionnaire

Most of the demobilized never received any vocational training

Who did you

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

The expectations do not exclude one another

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

67 Interview with Juan David Angel, Program director of the

There is also a component for family protection. In hogares

Numbers of demobilized children (19992004)

Source: Sistema de Informatin ICBF-OIM; Cut off date: 31 December 2004

72 percent of all demobilized children were male, 28 percent were

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

Source: Sistema de Informatin ICBF-OIM; Cut off date: 31 December 2004

The ICBF program still does not include evaluation and

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

The Colombian government has to create an adequate legal

affected by the war too including ethnic minorities,

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

To End a War: D&R of Paramilitaries in Colombia

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