People v. Talo
People v. Talo
People v. Talo
are here," but no one responded. The man dragged Doris towards the
ricefield about 800 meters from their house and there, at knife point, forced
Doris to have sexual intercourse with him. Doris tried to fight back but the
man was too strong for her. Doris noticed that, aside from a knife, the man
had a bolo with him.[3]
As the man rolled to his side after consummating the sexual act, Doris
immediately picked her clothes and ran naked as fast as she could towards
the nearby house of her uncle, Margarito Saguindang, who later brought her
home. Complainant was then accompanied by her parents to the Philippine
National Police (PNP) station where she reported the incident. Complainant
described to SPO2 Jesus Macala her attacker. Seven suspects were
presented to her but none was her assailant. For this reason, the incident
was entered in the police blotter of the PNP, but no complaint was filed in
court.[4]
Complainant and her mother also sought the help of their pastor, Ponciano
Ayop, Sr., who arranged for the medical examination of complainant by Dr.
Daniel Medina, municipal health officer of Clarin.[5] Dr. Medina conducted the
examination at around 2 o'clock that afternoon and later issued the following
report:
PHYSICAL FINDINGS:
-Vagina slightly hyperemic with whitish muco[u]s fluid at base of the
vagina[.] [N]o more hymen found at the vagina.
- 3 cm. l[i]near abrasion at the right lower thigh 2 in numbers.
- 2 cm. hematoma at right postero lateral aspect of the chest posterior
axillary line level 5th rib.
- 1.5 cm. hematoma at left posterior chest at med scapular line level 6th rib.
- 1 cm curvel[i]n[e]ar abrasion at right neck above scapula. . . . .
Conclusions:
1). The above described physical injuries are found in the body of the
subject, the age of which is compatible to the alleged date of infliction. . . . .
Remarks:
5 slides negative for sperm determination . . . .[6]
Dr. Medina testified that the perforation of complainant's hymen could have
been caused by sexual intercourse. As for the mucous found in her genitalia,
he said that although it did not contain any spermatozoa, it was a sign of
recent sexual contact. He stated that the absence of sperm in complainant's
genitalia could be due to the fact that she took a bath after the incident.[7]
With regard to his external examination of complainant, Dr. Medina said that
the injury in her neck was caused by a fingernail and is consistent with
complainant's claim that she was choked. The abrasion on her right thigh, on
the other hand, was caused by a rough but not hard object, while the
hematomas on it and on her chest were caused by a hard object.[8]
On cross-examination, Dr. Medina admitted that, although forcible sexual
intercourse could produce lacerations in the vaginal orifice, he did not find
any in complainant. With regard to the perforation of complainant's hymen,
he stated that the same could be caused by other factors such as riding a
bicycle, horse, or carabao, and that the perforation could have occurred
earlier than May 12, 1995.[9]
Pastor Ayop and his family took complainant to Bukidnon for a vacation
because she was having nightmares, coming back to Clarin after three
weeks, in May 1995.[10]
Then, at around seven o'clock in the morning of May 27, 1995, while Doris
and her friends were walking along the road in Tinaclaan, a neighboring
barangay of Gata Daku, she saw accused-appellant in a nearby ricefield,
distributing seedlings to farm workers. Because accused-appellant was not
facing her, complainant could not clearly make out his features but she could
see that his body build resembled that of her attacker. She asked one of her
companions, a certain Enan Undag, accused-appellant's name.[11]
A week later, on June 3, 1995, at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon, while
complainant and a friend, Grace Endab, were walking along the road in
Tinangay Sur, she again saw accused-appellant coming from the opposite
direction. When accused-appellant saw them, he hurriedly walked past
them. Doris, thoroughly shaken, told Endab, who knew of the rape, that the
man they had just encountered was the one who raped her. The latter
corroborated complainant on this matter.[12]
After consulting Ayop and her parents, Doris, on the following Monday, June
5, 1995, filed a complaint for rape against accused-appellant.[13] She later
amended her complaint to charge accused-appellant with forcible abduction
with rape.
Indeed, apart from his bare assertion that he and complainant were lovers,
accused-appellant has shown no other evidence of such relationship, such as
love letters, photographs, or other tokens of endearment. On the contrary,
complainant stoutly maintained that she had never known accused-appellant
before and that the latter, at knife point, forced her to go with him and
molested her in a ricefield. Complainant's testimony must be quoted to
appreciate her claim:
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PROS. MEDINA:
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down?
While I was still standing up, he removed my
pants, when I was lying down, he removed my
blouse.
All the while, when he was removing your
pants, panty and blouse, what did you do?
I slapped him.
You mean to say, you fought him?
Yes, sir.
Now, when he successfully removed all your
clothes and you were already down, what did he
do next?
He lowered his brief.
And what did he do to you?
Then, he raped me.
....
You mean to say, he placed his penis inside your
vagina?
Yes, sir.
Did his penis penetrate your vagina?
Yes, sir.
You mean to say, his penis stayed inside your
vagina?
Yes, sir.
....
At that time, did you fight him?
Yes, sir.
How did you fight him?
I kicked him.
When you kicked him, what did he do?
Again, he attempted to stop me.[32]
It is settled that a rape victim is not required to resist her attacker unto
death.[33] Force, as an element of rape, need not be irresistible; it need only
be present, and so long as it brings about the desired result, all
considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the
point.[34]Indeed, physical resistance need not be established in rape when,
as in this case, intimidation was exercised upon the victim and she
submitted to the rapist's lust because of fear for her life or for her personal
safety.[35] .
The findings of the medical examination conducted by Dr. Medina a day after
the incident confirm complainant's claim that she had been forced to have
sexual intercourse by accused-appellant. Dr. Medina found abrasions on her
neck and right thigh as well as hematomas on her chest, in addition to the
complete perforation of her hymen. These clearly establish that accusedappellant employed force and intimidation to make complainant submit to
him.
Finally, complainant's conduct after she had been abused negates any
probability that she and accused-appellant had consented sexual
intercourse. After accused-appellant had finished ravishing her, she ran
away naked. She fled to the house of her uncle to whom she reported what
had happened to her. This is not the natural reaction of one who had
engaged in consensual sex. It has been observed that the conduct of a
woman following the alleged assault is of utmost importance as it tends to
establish the truth or falsity of her claim.[36]
Second. In a complete turnabout from his theory that he and complainant
were lovers, accused-appellant contends that complainant's failure to file the
criminal complaint renders her claim of abduction with rape suspect.[37]
This contention has no merit, either. Complainant filed this case less than
three weeks after the incident. The delay was due to the fact that accusedappellant's identity was not ascertained until June 3, 1995 when complainant
came face to face with accused-appellant and learned that his name was
Erlindo Talo.
While it is true that Cesar Saguindang, complainant's father, testified that
accused-appellant had been delivering rice to their house for a period of
three years, there is no evidence to show that complainant knew accusedappellant. Accused-appellant himself testified that he stayed in Cebu City for
sometime to study college, went back to Data Daku, Clarin, Misamis
Occidental in 1982, and decided to work on the farm. It was probably then
that he delivered rice for the barangay captain of Gata Daku, Japay. At that
time, complainant was only eight years old. Furthermore, complainant
studied at the Clarin National High School in the poblacion of Clarin and went
to Iligan City for her college education. It is probable, therefore, she really
did not know accused-appellant.
Moreover, the delay in the identification of accused-appellant was due
mainly to the failure of the Gata Daku police, specifically of SPO2 Jesus
Macala, to include accused-appellant in the lineup of suspects presented to
complainant on May 12, 1995. Macala admitted that complainant's
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In the event of conviction in cases of complex crimes, the penalty for the
most serious crime should be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period.[43] Forcible abduction is punishable by reclusion
temporal,[44] while rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua, unless it is
committed with the use of deadly weapon, in which case the penalty
isreclusion perpetua to death.[45] Thus, in this case, it is the penalty for rape
which should be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
However, the use of deadly weapon, being a qualifying circumstance, must
be alleged in the information, otherwise it should be treated only as a
generic aggravating circumstance and the lower penalty (reclusion perpetua)
should be imposed.[46]
In the case at bar, the information alleged that "armed with a bolo and
hunting knife, and by means of force, violence, intimidation and threats,"
accused-appellant, "did then and there . . . with lewd and unchaste designs .
. . take and carry away complainant" and that, "upon reaching the ricefield,
by means of force, violence, intimidation and threats," he had carnal
knowledge of her. The allegation of the use of deadly weapon thus refers not
to the rape but to the crime of forcible abduction. We have affirmed
convictions for forcible abduction with rape qualified by the use of deadly
weapon in cases where the use of deadly weapon was alleged in the
information with respect to the crime of forcible abduction,[47] or with
respect to the complex crime of forcible abduction and rape,[48] or to the
portion referring to the crime of rape.[49] Accordingly, to justify the
imposition of the death penalty in this case, the use of deadly weapon
should be alleged with respect to the rape or with respect to both the
forcible abduction and rape. Since, in this case, this qualifying circumstance
was alleged only with respect to the commission of the forcible abduction, it
cannot be taken to qualify the crime of rape. The use of a deadly weapon
can be appreciated only as a generic aggravating circumstance.
The trial court correctly appreciated other generic aggravating
circumstances, namely, dwelling and nighttime. Dwelling was correctly taken
into account as an aggravating circumstance as the evidence shows that
complainant was forcibly taken from the house of her parents. Such was the
ruling in People v. Lacanieta,[50] where, similar to the case at bar, the
complainant was forcibly taken from her house, brought to a nearby
barangay, and then raped by the accused.
The aggravating circumstance of nighttime was also correctly held to be
present. Accused-appellant sought the cover of darkness to facilitate the
commission of the crime. In People v. Grefiel,[51] it was held that forcible
[1]
[2]
Records, p.1.
[3]
TSN (Doris Saguindang), pp. 15-16, 18, 20-24, 29-36, Nov. 23, 1995;
TSN, pp. 4, 8, 16-17, 19, Dec. 6, 1995.
[4]
TSN (Doris Saguindang), pp. 36-38, Nov. 23, 1995; pp. 16, 28, Dec. 6,
1995; TSN (Jesus Macala), pp. 3-5, 7, 9, Jan. 22, 1996.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
Id., p. 9.
[10]
[11]
[12]
TSN (Doris Saguindang), pp. 44-48, March 11, 1996; TSN (Grace
Endab), pp. 24-26, Dec. 11, 1995.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
TSN (Otelo Londera), pp. 17-20, 26, Feb., 8, 1996; TSN (Buena Narbay),
pp. 4-6, 11, Feb. 9, 1996; TSN (Laureano Basaya), pp. 4-7, Feb. 8, 1996.
[22]
TSN (Celso Fuentes), pp. 13-15, March 7, 1996; TSN (Angel Saldaa),
pp. 3-4, March 6, 1996; TSN (Flaviano Narbay), pp. 4-8, March 7, 1996.
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
TSN (Antonina Mutia), pp. 4-6, 10, 12-13, 19, March 11, 1996.
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
TSN (Doris Saguindang), pp. 15 & 18, Nov. 23, 1995; pp. 14-15, Dec. 6,
1995.
[32]
TSN (Doris Saguindang), pp. 28-34, Nov. 23, 1995; pp. 18-19, Dec. 6,
1995.
[33]
People v. Igdanes, 272 SCRA 113 (1997); People v. Gumahob, 265 SCRA
84 (1996).
[34]
[35]
People v. Napiot, 311 SCRA 772 (1999); People v. Prades, 293 SCRA 411
(1998).
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
People v. Magalantay, 304 SCRA 272 (1999); People v. Oliver, 303 SCRA
72 (1999).
[41]
People v. Berzuela, G.R. No. 132078, Sept. 25, 2000; People v. Payot,
308 SCRA 43 (1999).
[42]
[43]
[44]
[45]
[46]
[47]
See People v. Jose, 71 SCRA 273 (1976); People v. Angeles, 222 SCRA
451 (1993); People v. Lacanieta, supra.
[48]
See People v. Rivera, 245 SCRA 421 (1995); People v. Famador, 113
SCRA 310 (1982).
[49]
[50]
Supra.
[51]
[52]
[53]
People v. Baid, G.R. No. 129667, July 31, 2000; People v. Dreu, G.R. No.
126282, June 20, 2000; People v. Licanda, G.R. No. 134084, May 4, 2000.
[54]
See People v. Santos, G.R. Nos. 131103 & 143472, June 29, 2000.