INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M.

LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO
REYES, respondents.
Arthur D. Lim for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
The President of the Philippines, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in a verbal
directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility
patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. In
compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through
Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of
Instruction 02/2000 (the "LOI") which detailed the manner by which the
joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted.
Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police
Chief of Metro Manila. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed
the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for
the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP
in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President
also declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime
campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period
only, until such time when the situation shall have improved.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP") filed the instant
petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the
Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that the
deployment of marines in Metro Manila is violative of the Constitution
because no emergency situation obtains in Metro Manila as would
justify, even only remotely, the deployment of soldiers for law
enforcement work; hence, said deployment in derogation of Article II,
Section 3 of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court found no merit in the petition. When the President
calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely
vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and

from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be
called upon to overrule the President's wisdom or substitute its own. It
does not, however, prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was
exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of
the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power
to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is
incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President's decision is
totally bereft of factual basis. The petition failed to discharge such
heavy burden as there was no evidence to support the assertion that
there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces nor was
grave abuse committed because the power to call was exercised in
such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian
supremacy over the military. In the performance of the Court's duty of
"purposeful hesitation" before declaring an act of another branch as
unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the President's judgment and to
doubt is to sustain. The Court also ruled that the calling of the Marines
in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian
law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of
joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited
participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself,
which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines'
authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in
charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging
to the PNP. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient
the soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is their responsibility to
direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their
duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render
logistical support to these soldiers. It cannot be properly argued then
that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the
deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the
civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an
"insidious incursion" of the military in the task of law enforcement in
violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
SYLLABUS
1.POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW;
PETITIONER INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES HAS NOT COMPLIED
WITH THE REQUISITES OF LEGAL STANDING IN CASE AT BAR;
PETITIONER HAS NOT SUCCESSFULLY ESTABLISHED A DIRECT AND

PERSONAL INJURY AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE QUESTIONED ACT.

The IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to
uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration,
however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi.
The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law
and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it
with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is
shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the
standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific and
substantial interest in the resolution of the case. Its fundamental
purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to
elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve the
administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by the
deployment of the Marines. It should also be noted that the interest of
the National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone,
absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present
action. To be sure, members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included,
have varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it
has duly authorized the National President to file the petition, has not
shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue
of the questioned governmental act. Indeed, none of its members,
whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury
as a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols. Neither is it
alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil
liberties have been violated by the deployment of the Marines. What
the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed "militarization" of law
enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions
and may cause more harm than good in the long run. Not only is the
presumed "injury" not personal in character, it is likewise too vague,
highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing.
Since petitioner has not successfully established a direct and personal
injury as a consequence of the questioned act, it does not possess the
personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the Marines. This
Court, however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely
no standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the future.
The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it
has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy.
2.ID.; EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT; THE
PRESIDENT DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
CALLING OUT THE MARINES. When the President calls the armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he

necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his

wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text
of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to
overrule the President's wisdom or substitute its own. However, this
does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised
within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the
constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to
determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent
upon the petitioner to show that the President's decision is totally
bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such
heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion that
there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is,
likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was
committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner
as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the
military. In the performance of this Court's duty of purposeful
hesitation" before declaring an act of another branch as
unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the President's judgment. To doubt
is to sustain.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; GROUNDS FOR THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW AND
SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; SAID CONDITIONS ARE
NOT REQUIRED IN THE CASE OF THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO
CALL OUT THE ARMED FORCES. Under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions
must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2)
public safety must require it. These conditions are not required in the
case of the power to call out the Armed Forces. The only criterion is
that "whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call the
armed forces "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion." The implication is that the President is given full discretion
and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to
the two other powers.

4.ID.; ID.; ID.; DETERMINATION OF NECESSITY FOR POWER TO CALL

OUT ARMED FORCES IF SUBJECTED TO UNFETTERED JUDICIAL
SCRUTINY COULD BE A VERITABLE PRESCRIPTION FOR DISASTER, AS
SUCH POWER MAY BE UNDULY STRAITJACKETED BY AN INJUNCTION OR

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER EVERY TIME IT IS EXERCISED. The

President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to
gather information, some of which may be classified as highly
confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the
power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in
emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass
destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to
prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and
decisively if it were to have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not
farfetched when we consider the present situation in Mindanao, where
the insurgency problem could spill over the other parts of the country.
The determination of the necessity for the calling out power if
subjected to unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a veritable
prescription for disaster, as such power may be unduly straitjacketed
by an injunction or a temporary restraining order every time it is
exercised. Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest
upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full
discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary
to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of such
discretion was gravely abused, the President's exercise of judgment
deserves to be accorded respect from this Court.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MARINES DOES NOT VIOLATE
THE CIVILIAN SUPREMACY CLAUSE NOR DOES IT INFRINGE THE
CIVILIAN CHARACTER OF THE POLICE FORCE. The deployment of the
Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause.
The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of
military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the
Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately
circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the
provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and
bounds of the Marines' authority. It is noteworthy that the local police
forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the
real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police
Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility
patrols. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the
soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is their responsibility to direct
and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to
provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical
support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be

properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian

authority.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW;
THE ACT OF THE PRESIDENT IN SIMPLY CALLING ON THE ARMED
FORCES, AN EXECUTIVE PREROGATIVE, TO ASSIST THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE IN "JOINT VISIBILITY PATROLS" DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION THAT WOULD WARRANT
AN EXERCISE BY THE COURT OF ITS EXTRAORDINARY POWER OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW. The term grave abuse of discretion is long
understood in our jurisprudence as being, and confined to, a capricious
and whimsical or despotic exercise of judgment amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Minus the not-so-unusual exaggerations often
invoked by litigants in the duel of views, the act of the President
in simply calling on the Armed Forces of the Philippines, an executive
prerogative, to assist the Philippine National Police in "joint visibility
patrols" in the metropolis does not, I believe, constitute grave abuse of
discretion that would now warrant an exercise by the Supreme Court of
its extraordinary power as so envisioned by the fundamental law.
HSTAcI

PUNO, J., separate opinion:

1.POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW;
CONDITIONS THAT MUST BE MET BEFORE THE PRESIDENT, AS
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, MAY CALL OUT THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES; SAID CONDITIONS DEFINE THE PARAMETERS OF THE
CALLING OUT POWER AND WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS COMPLIANCE
WITH THE SAID PARAMETERS IS A JUSTIFIABLE ISSUE AND NOT A
POLITICAL QUESTION. It is clear from Section 18, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces of the Philippines, may call out the armed forces subject
to two conditions: (1) whenever it becomes necessary; and (2) to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Undeniably,
these conditions lay down the sine qua requirement for the exercise of
the power and the objective sought to be attained by the exercise of
the power. They define the constitutional parameters of the calling out
power. Whether or not there is compliance with these parameters is a
justiciable issue and is not a political question. I am not unaware that
in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner
Bernas opined that the President's exercise of the "calling out power,"
unlike the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and

the declaration of martial law, is not a justiciable issue but a political

question and therefore not subject to judicial review. It must be borne
in mind, however, that while a member's opinion expressed on the
floor of the Constitutional Convention is valuable, it is not necessarily
expressive of the people's intent. The proceedings of the Convention
are less conclusive on the proper construction of the fundamental law
than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction of a statute,
for in the latter case it is the intent of the legislature the courts seek,
while in the former, courts seek to arrive at the intent of
the people through the discussions and deliberations of their
representatives. The conventional wisdom is that the Constitution does
not derive its force from the convention which framed it, but from the
people who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the people.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; IT MAY BE CONCEDED THAT THE EXERCISE OF THE
CALLING OUT POWER MAY BE A "LESSER POWER" COMPARED TO THE
POWER TO SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS AND THE POWER TO DECLARE MARTIAL LAW, STILL ITS
EXERCISE CANNOT BE LEFT TO ABSOLUTE DISCRETION OF THE CHIEF
EXECUTIVE, AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES, AS ITS
IMPACT ON THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE PROTECTED BY THE
CONSTITUTION CANNOT BE DOWNGRADED. It is true that the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution expressly
gives the Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual bases
used by the President in the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus and the declaration of martial law. It does not follow,
however, that just because the same provision did not grant to this
Court the power to review the exercise of the calling out power by the
President, ergo, this Court cannot pass upon the validity of its exercise.
Given the light of our constitutional history, this express grant of power
merely means that the Court cannot decline the exercise of its power
because of the political question doctrine as it did in the past. In fine,
the express grant simply stresses the mandatory duty of this Court to
check the exercise of the commander-in-chief powers of the President.
It eliminated the discretion of the Court not to wield its power of review
thru the use of the political question doctrine. It may be conceded that
the calling out power may be a "lesser power" compared to the power
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to
declare martial law. Even then, its exercise cannot be left to the
absolute discretion of the Chief Executive as Commander-in-Chief of
the armed forces, as its impact on the rights of our people protected by
the Constitution cannot be downgraded. We cannot hold that acts of

the commander-in-chief cannot be reviewed on the ground that they

have lesser impact on the civil and political rights of our people. The
exercise of the calling out power may be "benign" in the case at bar
but may not be so in future cases.
THaCAI

MENDOZA, J., concurring and dissenting:

1.POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW;
JUDGMENT ON THE SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES RAISED BY PETITIONER MUST
AWAIT AN ACTUAL CASE INVOLVING REAL PARTIES WITH "INJURIES" TO
SHOW AS A RESULT OF THE OPERATION OF THE CHALLENGED
EXECUTIVE DECISION. I submit that judgment on the substantive
constitutional issues raised by petitioner must await an actual case
involving real parties with "injuries" to show as a result of the operation
of the challenged executive action. While as an organization for the
advancement of the rule of law petitioner has an interest in upholding
the Constitution, its interest is indistinguishable from the interest of the
rest of the citizenry and falls short of that which is necessary to give
petitioner standing. As I have indicated elsewhere, a citizens' suit
challenging the constitutionality of governmental action requires that
(1) the petitioner must have suffered an "injury in fact" of an actual or
imminent nature; (2) there must be a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action by this Court. The "injury in fact" test
requires more than injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the
party seeking review be himself among those injured. My insistence on
compliance with the standing requirement is grounded in the
conviction that only a party injured by the operation of the
governmental action challenged is in the best position to aid the Court
in determining the precise nature of the problem presented. Many a
time we have adverted to the power of judicial review as an awesome
power not to be exercised save in the most exigent situation. For,
indeed, sound judgment on momentous constitutional questions is not
likely to be reached unless it is the result of a clash of adversary
arguments which only parties with direct and specific interest in the
outcome of the controversy can make. This is true not only when we
strike down a law or official action but also when we uphold it.
ESTDIA

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECT OF MILITARY

PRESENCE IN MALLS AND COMMERCIAL CENTERS, I.E., WHETHER SUCH
PRESENCE IS COERCIVE OR BENIGN. In this case, because of the

absence of parties with real and substantial interest to protect, we do

not have evidence on the effect of military presence in malls and
commercial centers, i.e., whether such presence is coercive or benign.
We do not know whether the presence of so many marines and
policemen scares shoppers, tourists, and peaceful civilians, or whether
it is reassuring to them. To be sure, the deployment of troops to such
places is not like parading them at the Luneta on Independence Day.
Neither is it, however, like calling them out because of actual fighting
or the outbreak of violence. We need to have evidence on these
questions because, under the Constitution, the President's power to
call out the armed forces in order to suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion is subject to the limitation that the exercise of this
power is required in the interest of public safety.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J :
p

At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullity on
constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the Marines) to
join the Philippine National Police (the "PNP") in visibility patrols around
the metropolis.
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like
robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a verbal
directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility
patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The
Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (the "AFP"), the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of
the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and
implement the said order. In compliance with the presidential mandate,
the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay,
formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 1 (the "LOI") which detailed
the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task
Force Tulungan, would be conducted. 2 Task Force Tulungan was placed
under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.

Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the

deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000,
addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief. 3 In the
Memorandum, the President expressed his desire to improve the peace
and order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime
prevention program including increased police patrols. 4 The President
further stated that to heighten police visibility in the metropolis,
augmentation from the AFP is necessary. 5 Invoking his powers as
Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution,
the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of
the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or
lawless violence. 6 Finally, the President declared that the services of
the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature
and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation
shall have improved. 7
The LOI explains the concept of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint
visibility patrols as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2.PURPOSE:
The Joint Implementing Police Visibility Patrols between the PNP
NCRPO and the Philippine Marines partnership in the conduct of
visibility patrols in Metro Manila for the suppression of crime
prevention and other serious threats to national security.
3.SITUATION:
Criminal incidents in Metro Manila have been perpetrated not
only by ordinary criminals but also by organized syndicates
whose members include active and former police/military
personnel whose training, skill, discipline and firepower prove
well-above the present capability of the local police alone to
handle. The deployment of a joint PNP NCRPO-Philippine
Marines in the conduct of police visibility patrol in urban areas
will reduce the incidence of crimes specially those perpetrated
by active or former police/military personnel.
4.MISSION:

The PNP NCRPO will organize a provisional Task Force to

conduct joint NCRPO-PM visibility patrols to keep Metro Manila
streets crime-free, through a sustained street patrolling to
minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes especially
those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose
members include those that are well-trained, disciplined and
well-armed active or former PNP/Military personnel.
5.CONCEPT IN JOINT VISIBILITY PATROL OPERATIONS:
a.The visibility patrols shall be conducted jointly by the NCRPO
[National Capital Regional Police Office] and the Philippine
Marines to curb criminality in Metro Manila and to preserve the
internal security of the state against insurgents and other
serious threat to national security, although the primary
responsibility over Internal Security Operations still rests upon
the AFP.
b.The principle of integration of efforts shall be applied to
eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes perpetrated by
organized crime syndicates operating in Metro Manila. This
concept requires the military and police to work cohesively and
unify efforts to ensure a focused, effective and holistic
approach in addressing crime prevention. Along this line, the
role of the military and police aside from neutralizing crime
syndicates is to bring a wholesome atmosphere wherein
delivery of basic services to the people and development is
achieved Hand-in-hand with this joint NCRPO-Philippine Marines
visibility patrols, local Police Units are responsible for the
maintenance of peace and order in their locality.
c.To ensure the effective implementation of this project, a
provisional Task Force "TULUNGAN" shall be organized to
provide the mechanism, structure, and procedures for the
integrated planning, coordinating, monitoring and assessing
the security situation.
xxx xxx xxx.

The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento

Circle, North Edsa (SM City), Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM
Megamall, Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA
and Domestic Airport. 9

On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP")

filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the
deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and
unconstitutional, arguing that:
I
THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO
MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IN THAT:
A)NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS
WOULD JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLY REMOTELY, THE
DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
WORK; HENCE, SAID DEPLOYMENT IS IN DEROGATION OF
ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION;
B)SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION
BY THE MILITARY IN A CIVILIAN FUNCTION OF
GOVERNMENT (LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN DEROGATION OF
ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 (4), OF THE CONSTITUTION;
C)SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO
RELY ON THE MILITARY TO PERFORM THE CIVILIAN
FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT.
II
IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE
ADMINISTRATION IS UNWITTINGLY MAKING THE MILITARY MORE
POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULD REALLY BE UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION. 10

Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked

with the bounden duty to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution,
the IBPquestions the validity of the deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
Without granting due course to the petition, the Court in a
Resolution, 11 dated 25 January 2000, required the Solicitor General to
file his Comment on the petition. On 8 February 2000, the Solicitor
General submitted his Comment.
The Solicitor General vigorously defends the constitutionality of the act
of the President in deploying the Marines, contending, among others,

that petitioner has no legal standing; that the question of deployment

of the Marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny since the same
involves a political question; that the organization and conduct of
police visibility patrols, which feature the team-up of one police officer
and one Philippine Marine soldier, does not violate the civilian
supremacy clause in the Constitution.
The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not
petitioner has legal standing; (2) Whether or not the President's factual
determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to
judicial review, and, (3) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces
to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian
character of the PNP.
The petition has no merit.
First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the
requisites of standing to raise the issues in the petition. Second, the
President did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civilian
supremacy clause of the Constitution.
The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can

exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate
case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at
the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis
mota of the case. 12

The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing
in this case.
"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. 13 The term "interest" means a material interest, an
interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. 14 The
gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. 15
In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged
responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from
this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of
its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve
the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not
sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an
interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Based
on the standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific
and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. Its fundamental
purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to
elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve the
administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by the
deployment of the Marines. It should also be noted that the interest of
the National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone,
absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present
action. To be sure, members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included,
have varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it
has duly authorized the National President to file the petition, has not
shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue
of the questioned governmental act. Indeed, none of its members,
whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury
as a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols. Neither is it
alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil
liberties have been violated by the deployment of the Marines. What
the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed "militarization" of law
enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions

and may cause more harm than good in the long run. Not only is the
presumed "injury" not personal in character, it is likewise too vague,
highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing.
Since petitioner has not successfully established a direct and personal
injury as a consequence of the questioned act, it does not possess the
personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the Marines. This
Court, however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely
no standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the future.
The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it
has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy.
Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has
the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the
requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is
involved. 16 In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude
on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft
an issue of transcendental significance to the people. 17 Thus, when the
issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court
may brush aside technicalities of procedure. 18 In this case, a reading
of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues
which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness,
novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order
are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing
tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem,
the legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go
away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court
to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than
later.
The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling
out the Marines.
In the case at bar, the bone of contention concerns the factual
determination of the President of the necessity of calling the armed
forces, particularly the Marines, to aid the PNP in visibility patrols. In
this regard, the IBP admits that the deployment of the military
personnel falls under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President
as stated in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, specifically, the
power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. What the IBP questions, however, is the
basis for the calling of the Marines under the aforestated provision.
According to the IBP, no emergency exists that would justify the need
for the calling of the military to assist the police force. It contends that

no lawless violence, invasion or rebellion exist to warrant the calling of

the Marines. Thus, the IBP prays that this Court "review the sufficiency
of the factual basis for said troop [Marine] deployment." 19
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the issue
pertaining to the necessity of calling the armed forces is not proper for
judicial scrutiny since it involves a political question and the resolution
of factual issues which are beyond the review powers of this Court.
DTAESI

As framed by the parties, the underlying issues are the scope of

presidential powers and limits, and the extent of judicial review. But,
while this Court gives considerable weight to the parties' formulation of
the issues, the resolution of the controversy may warrant a creative
approach that goes beyond the narrow confines of the issues raised.
Thus, while the parties are in agreement that the power exercised by
the President is the power to call out the armed forces, the Court is of
the view that the power involved may be no more than the
maintenance of peace and order and promotion of the general
welfare. 20 For one, the realities on the ground do not show that there
exist a state of warfare, widespread civil unrest or anarchy. Secondly,
the full brunt of the military is not brought upon the citizenry, a point
discussed in the latter part of this decision. In the words of the late
Justice Irene Cortes in Marcos v. Manglapus:
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the
President's powers as protector of the peace. [Rossiter, The
American Presidency]. The power of the President to keep the
peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-inchief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State
against external and internal threats to its existence. The
President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times
of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-today problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring
domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on
the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in
fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way
diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in
the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President
commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow
cannot be said to exclude the President's exercising as
Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the armed
forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and
maintain public order and security.

xxx xxx xxx

21

Nonetheless, even if it is conceded that the power involved is the

President's power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, the resolution of the controversy
will reach a similar result.
We now address the Solicitor General's argument that the issue
involved is not susceptible to review by the judiciary because it
involves a political question, and thus, not justiciable.
As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a
matter which is appropriate for court review. 22 It pertains to issues
which are inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds
recognized by law. Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically
assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases brought before it
even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases
wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are ''political questions." The
reason is that political questions are concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or measure being
assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of the
separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the
workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear
need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.
As Taada v. Cuenco, 23 puts it, political questions refer "to those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of government." Thus, if an issue is clearly identified
by the text of the Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a
particular branch of government or to the people themselves then it is
held to be a political question. In the classic formulation of Justice
Brennan in Baker v. Carr, 24 [p]rominent on the surface of any case
held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment

from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on the one

question.

The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by

providing that "[T]he Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 25 Under this
definition, the Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the
issue involved is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of this
Court to review. When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or
subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed qualifications
or conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is justiciable
the problem being one of legality or validity, not its
wisdom. 26 Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional
boundaries has been given to this Court. 27 When political questions
are involved, the Constitution limits the determination as to whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being
questioned. 28
By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility. 29 Under this definition, a court is without power to directly
decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been
delegated. But while this Court has no power to substitute its judgment
for that of Congress or of the President, it may look into the question of
whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of
discretion. 30 A showing that plenary power is granted either
department of government, may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry,
for the improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise to
justiciable controversy. 31
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a

discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the
intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The
Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President's wisdom
or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of
whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional
limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse
of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President
full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the
armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the
President's decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present
petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to
support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the
armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition
that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was
exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on
civilian supremacy over the military. In the performance of this Court's
duty of purposeful hesitation" 32 before declaring an act of another
branch as unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion
is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the President's judgment.
To doubt is to sustain.
There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow
on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces
and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution, which embodies the powers of the
President as Commander-in-Chief, provides in part:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary,
he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a
period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law.
xxx xxx xxx

The full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual

basis for the exercise of the calling out power is also implied and
further reinforced in the rest of Section 18, Article VII which reads,
thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the
Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may
revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall
not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by
the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public
safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in
or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person
thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within
three days, otherwise he shall be released.

Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such

proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency
of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent
provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President's action
to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out
power in a different category from the power to declare martial law

and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus,
otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped
together the three powers and provided for their revocation and review
without any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where
the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. 33 That
the intent of the Constitution is exactly what its letter says, i.e., that
the power to call is fully discretionary to the President, is extant in the
deliberation of the Constitutional Commission, to wit:
FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference. I may add that
there is a graduated power of the President as Commander-inChief. First, he can call out such Armed Forces as may be
necessary to suppress lawless violence; then he can suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then he can impose
martial law. This is a graduated sequence.
When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law or
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, his
judgment is subject to review. We are making it subject to
review by the Supreme Court and subject to concurrence by the
National Assembly. But when he exercises this lesser power of
calling on the Armed Forces, when he says it is necessary, it is
my opinion that his judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody.
xxx xxx xxx
FR. BERNAS. Let me just add that when we only have imminent
danger, the matter can be handled by the first sentence: "The
President . . . may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." So we feel
that that is sufficient for handling imminent danger.
SAHITC

MR. DE LOS REYES. So actually, if a President feels that there is

imminent danger, the matter can be handled by the First
Sentence: "The President . . . may call out such Armed Forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." So
we feel that that is sufficient for handling imminent danger, of
invasion or rebellion, instead of imposing martial law or
suspending the writ of habeas corpus, he must necessarily
have to call the Armed Forces of the Philippines as their
Commander-in-Chief. Is that the idea?
MR. REGALADO. That does not require any concurrence by the
legislature nor is it subject to judicial review. 34

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned

powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway
and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is
considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the
power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and
suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and
thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by this Court.

Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the

exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there
must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must
require it. These conditions are not required in the case of the power to
call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that "whenever it
becomes necessary," the President may call the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." The
implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide
latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two
other powers.
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the
President acted without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake
an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual
necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and
cannot be objectively established since matters considered for
satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not
always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual
standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information
necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable
for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify,
or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence
upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out
the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast
intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be
classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In
the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be
imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of
human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to

call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be

done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. Such a
scenario is not farfetched when we consider the present situation in
Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill over the other
parts of the country. The determination of the necessity for the calling
out power if subjected to unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a
veritable prescription for disaster, as such power may be unduly
straitjacketed by an injunction or a temporary restraining order every
time it is exercised.
Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the
President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion
to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so
in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was
gravely abused, the President's exercise of judgment deserves to be
accorded respect from this Court.
The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis
for calling the armed forces. In his Memorandum, he categorically
asserted that, [V]iolent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups,
kidnappings and carnappings continue to occur in Metro
Manila . . ." 35 We do not doubt the veracity of the President's
assessment of the situation, especially in the light of present
developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent bombings
perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities,
and other public places. These are among the areas of deployment
described in the LOI 2000. Considering all these facts, we hold that the
President has sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in law
enforcement and in the exercise of this constitutional power.
The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian
supremacy clause nor does it infringe the civilian character of the
police force.
Prescinding from its argument that no emergency situation exists to
justify the calling of the Marines, the IBP asserts that by the
deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is
"militarized" in violation of Section 3, Article II 36 of the Constitution.
We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a
breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in
this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law

enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint

visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited
participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself,
which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines'
authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in
charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging
to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of
the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols. 37 Under the LOI, the
police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol
procedures. 38 It is their responsibility to direct and manage the
deployment of the Marines. 39 It is, likewise, their duty to provide the
necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to
these soldiers. 40 In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued
that military authority is supreme over civilian authority.
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not
unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it
amount to an "insidious incursion" of the military in the task of law
enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the
Constitution. 41
In this regard, it is not correct to say that General Angelo Reyes, Chief
of Staff of the AFP, by his alleged involvement in civilian law
enforcement, has been virtually appointed to a civilian post in
derogation of the aforecited provision. The real authority in these
operations, as stated in the LOI, is lodged with the head of a civilian
institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Such being the case, it
does not matter whether the AFP Chief actually participates in the Task
Force Tulungan since he does not exercise any authority or control over
the same. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as
members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to a civilian position
to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility
patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing
more than assistance required in conducting the patrols. As such, there
can be no "insidious incursion" of the military in civilian affairs nor can
there be a violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the
Constitution.
It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in
various forms persists in Philippine jurisdiction. The Philippine
experience reveals that it is not averse to requesting the assistance of

the military in the implementation and execution of certain

traditionally "civil" functions. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor
General, some of the multifarious activities wherein military aid has
been rendered, exemplifying the activities that bring both the civilian
and the military together in a relationship of cooperation, are:
1.Elections;

42

2.Administration of the Philippine National Red Cross;

43

3.Relief and rescue operations during calamities and

disasters; 44
4.Amateur sports promotion and development;
5.Development of the culture and the arts;
6.Conservation of natural resources;

45

46

47

7.Implementation of the agrarian reform program;

8.Enforcement of customs laws;

48

49

9.Composite civilian-military law enforcement activities;

10.Conduct of licensure examinations;

50

51

11.Conduct of nationwide tests for elementary and high

school students; 52
12.Anti-drug enforcement activities;
13.Sanitary inspections;

53

54

14.Conduct of census work;

55

15.Administration of the Civil Aeronautics Board;

56

16.Assistance in installation of weather forecasting

devices; 57
17.Peace and order policy formulation in local government
units. 58

This unquestionably constitutes a gloss on executive power resulting

from a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of Congress and, yet, never before questioned. 59 What we
have here is mutual support and cooperation between the military and
civilian authorities, not derogation of civilian supremacy.
In the United States, where a long tradition of suspicion and hostility
towards the use of military force for domestic purposes has
persisted, 60 and whose Constitution, unlike ours, does not expressly
provide for the power to call, the use of military personnel by civilian
law enforcement officers is allowed under circumstances similar to
those surrounding the present deployment of the Philippine
Marines. Under the Posse Comitatus Act 61 of the US, the use of the
military in civilian law enforcement is generally prohibited, except in
certain allowable circumstances. A provision of the Act states:
1385.Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses
any part of the Army or the Air Force as posse comitatus or
otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 62

To determine whether there is a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act in

the use of military personnel, the US courts 63 apply the following
standards, to wit:
Were Army or Air Force personnel used by the civilian law
enforcement officers at Wounded Knee in such a manner that
the military personnel subjected the citizens to the exercise of
military power which was regulatory, proscriptive, or
compulsory 64 in nature, either presently or prospectively?

xxx xxx xxx

When this concept is transplanted into the present legal
context, we take it to mean that military involvement, even
when not expressly authorized by the Constitution or a
statute, does not violate the Posse Comitatus Act unless it
actually regulates, forbids or compels some conduct on the

part of those claiming relief. A mere threat of some future

injury would be insufficient. (italics supplied)

Even if the Court were to apply the above rigid standards to the
present case to determine whether there is permissible use of the
military in civilian law enforcement, the conclusion is inevitable that no
violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution is
committed. On this point, the Court agrees with the observation of the
Solicitor General:
3.The designation of tasks in Annex A 65 does not constitute the
exercise of regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory military
power. First, the soldiers do not control or direct the operation.
This is evident from Nos. 6, 66 8(k) 67 and 9(a) 68 of Annex A.
These soldiers, second, also have no power to prohibit or
condemn. In No. 9(d) 69 of Annex A, all arrested persons are
brought to the nearest police stations for proper disposition.
And last, these soldiers apply no coercive force. The materials
or equipment issued to them, as shown in No. 8(c) 70 of Annex
A, are all low impact and defensive in character. The conclusion
is that there being no exercise of regulatory, proscriptive or
compulsory military power, the deployment of a handful of
Philippine Marines constitutes no impermissible use of military
power for civilian law enforcement. 71

It appears that the present petition is anchored on fear that once the
armed forces are deployed, the military will gain ascendancy, and thus
place in peril our cherished liberties. Such apprehensions, however, are
unfounded. The power to call the armed forces is just that calling out
the armed forces. Unless, petitioner IBP can show, which it has not,
that in the deployment of the Marines, the President has violated the
fundamental law, exceeded his authority or jeopardized the civil
liberties of the people, this Court is not inclined to overrule the
President's determination of the factual basis for the calling of the
Marines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
One last point. Since the institution of the joint visibility patrol in
January, 2000, not a single citizen has complained that his political or
civil rights have been violated as a result of the deployment of the
Marines. It was precisely to safeguard peace, tranquility and the civil
liberties of the people that the joint visibility patrol was conceived.
Freedom and democracy will be in full bloom only when people feel

secure in their homes and in the streets, not when the shadows of
violence and anarchy constantly lurk in their midst.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, YnaresSantiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno and Vitug, JJ., see separate opinion.
Mendoza, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, J., join in the opinion of J. Mendoza.
Bellosillo, J., on official leave.
Panganiban, J., concurs in the result.