Peking and the Brezhnev Doctrine

Author(s): Kenneth W. Rea

Source: Asian Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Sep. - Oct., 1975), pp. 22-30
Published by: Heldref Publications
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Peking

and

the

Brezhnev

Doctrine

KENNETH W. REA

HE

INVASION of

Czechoslovakiaby WarsawPact forces in

August 1968 producedsharpreactionsaroundthe world.The Western
nations, led by the United States, were quick to denouncethe event,
whichwas so reminiscentof the Hungarianinvasionof the mid-1950s.
The Brezhnevdoctrine, which was used to justify the invasion, also
constituteda threat to other Communistcountriesseeking greaterindependencefrom Moscow. Among them was the People'sRepublicof
China. The intense ideological debate that characterizedthe SinoSoviet schism in the early 1960s mushroomedafter Czechoslovakia
to the brink of a full militaryconfrontation.China refusedto accept
the Soviet contentionthat Moscow had the right to intervenein any
countrywheresocialismmightbe threatened.
China's initial response was a massive propagandacampaign
againstthe Brezhnevdoctrine.The first major declarationcame from
Premier Chou En-lai on August 23. Speaking to a banquet at the
Rumanian Embassy, he charged the Soviet Union with practicing
"Fascistpolitics, great power chauvinism,nationalegoism, and socialimperialism."He equatedthe invasion with Hitler in the 1930s, and
with the Americaninterventionin Vietnam. On this and subsequent
occasions, Chou virtuallycalled upon the Czechoslovakand Russian
peoples to rebel againsttheir leaders and establishthe dictatorshipof
the proletariat.Socialistcountries,he argued,should bolster their defensesto thwartsimilarSovietintervention.1
In supportof Chou'sstatements, the invasionwas condemnedby the Eighth CentralCommittee
of the CCP on October 31. 2

The Chinese rejectedthe Soviet argumentthat the invasionwas

necessaryin order to protect Socialist gains and strengthenthe So1 New China News Agency, August 23, 1968; September 30, 1968.
2 Ibid., November 1, 1968.

22

Pekingand the BrezhnevDoctrine

23

cialist commonwealth.The commonwealthespoused by the Soviet

Union was comparedto Japan's "GreaterEast Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere,"Hitler's"New Order"in Europe,and America's"FreeWorld
Community."The Soviet Union was practicing"socialismin words,
imperialismin deeds."3The Socialistunitythat existedduringthe early
1950s had been destroyedby the revisionismof Soviet leaders. Socialist gains, whetherin the Soviet Union or in Czechoslovakia,had
long been forfeitedby their leaders,and could only be regainedby the
masses.4 While criticizing Dubcek's capitulation to Moscow, the
Chinese sought to place the burden of responsibilityon Soviet ideological leadership.Dubcek, they maintained,was merely emulating
policies alreadypracticedin Moscow. The disputebetweenBrezhnev
and Dubcek was comparedto a quarrelbetween dogs of the same
breed; and moreover, the revisionismof the Soviet Union was far
greaterand more dangerousthan that practicedby Czechoslovakia.5
Developmentsin both countriessupportedMao's assertionthat a Socialist countrywould become revisionistif the dictatorshipof the proletariatand class strugglewereforgotten."
In his writings, Mao has emphasizedthe existence of contradictions within Socialist countries.Such contradictionsoften develop
betweenthe people and their leadersbecause the latter isolate themselves from the masses.In their analysisof developmentsin the Soviet
Union and Czechoslovakia,the Chinese maintained that the basic
contradictionin both countrieswas between the bourgeoisieand the
proletariat.Only by applyingMao's theory of mass struggleand the
mass line could the people expose revisionistswho had gained leadership positions. The mass struggle which had engulfed China since
1965 could be emulatedby othersto drivethe revisionistsfrom office.
Until such a struggle was waged in the Soviet Union, the Russian
leadershipwould continueto practiceimperialismunderthe guise of
"proletarianinternationalism."7
Lin Piao, "Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China," The
Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Documents) (Peking: Foreign
Language Press, 1969), pp. 89-90.
4NewChina News Agency, September 9, 1968. During the Hungarian crisis, Communist
China supported Soviet intervention on the belief that its own security was linked with continued Socialist unity. By 1968, Socialist unity as directed by Moscow was considered a threat
to China's security.
5 Ibid., September 2, 1968.
6 Lin Piao, loc. cit., pp. 22-23.
7 Ibid., p. 83.
3

24

Asian Affairs

Internationalism,as interpretedby Peking, did not demand or

assumethe loss of national independenceor territorialintegrity.The
Chinese thus renewed their charge that Moscow was using internationalismto subvertthe independenceof Socialist states. The chief
instrumentsof subversionwere COMECONand the WarsawPact.8In
an editorialattackon the WarsawPact, People'sDaily chargedthat it
enabled Moscow "to manipulatethe East Europeancountriespolitically and militarily,and to push (its) social-imperialistpolicy of aggression."9A memberof the WarsawPact has no guaranteethat its
sovereigntyand territorialintegritywill be respected.In reality, the
Soviet Union was attemptingto create an internationaldictatorship
by limiting the sovereigntyof other states.
The concept of limited sovereigntyembodied in the Brezhnev
doctrinewas repugnantto the Chinese, and revivedmemoriesof the
semicolonial status that had been forced upon China in the 19th
century by the Western powers, including Tsarist Russia. It also
challenged China's view of the proper relations that should subsist
betweenSocialiststates.Mao has consistentlyarguedagainstthe patriarchal relationshipthat Soviet leaders were attemptingto establish.
Duringthe Sino-Sovietpolemicsof 1963, Peking declared:"'
The relationsamong fraternalparties should under no circumstancesbe like the relationsbetweena leadingPartyand
the led, and much less like the relations between a patriarchal father and his son . . . What we desire is merely the

independentand equal statusof the fraternalparties.

Speakingat the Ninth Party Congressin April 1969, Lin Piao reiterated China'sposition that relationsbetween Socialist states must "be
built on the principleof equality and noninterferencein each other's
internalaffairs."He also emphasizedthe Maoist belief that the people
shouldsettle their own domesticstruggles."Lin's speech indicatedthe
concern of Chinese leaders that the Soviet Union would try to
interveneovertly in China's affairs.
8lenmin lihpao, August 23, 1968; September 12, 1968; January 9, 1969; New China News
Agency, November 9, 1968; February 5, 1968.
9 Jenmin lihpao, September 12, 1968.
o10"The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and
Ourselves," in The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement
(Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965), pp. 102-103.
11Lin Piao, loc. cit., p. 97.

Pekingand the BrezhnevDoctrine

25

While launchinga verbal attack on the Brezhnevdoctrine and

its application,the Chinese also became alarmed about their own
security and that of China's European ally, Albania. Their anxiety
was increasedby the build-upof Sovietforcesalong the borderand the
installationof missiles in Outer Mongolia. The intrusion of Soviet
military aircraft into Chinese airspace sharply increased after the
invasion of Czechoslovakia.On August 26 and September5, 1968,
respectively,China lodged official complaintsagainst these "provocations"and the treatmentof ChineseEmbassypersonnelin Czechoslovakia.12
China's concern for its own security and for the safety of Albania was reflectedin top-level militarymeetings held in Peking in
earlyOctober.Chinesenewspaperscarriednumerouseditorialsemphasizing the "militantsolidarity"between the two countries,which was
furtherevidencedby Huang Yung-sheng'svisit to Albania in December. Accordingto one report,Huang concludeda defense pact allowing Chinato establishand operatemissile and naval bases in Albania.
It was also duringHuang'svisit that the Chinesedetonateda hydrogen
bomb, and stressedits importancefor both China and Albania.'3This
was in line with Chou'spromiseto assist countrieswilling to oppose
social-imperialism.Calling for a "united front" against the Soviet
Union, Peking praisedAlbania'sdecision to withdrawfrom the Warsaw Pact and called upon other East Europeannationsto follow this
positiveexample."'China now began to cultivatebetterrelationswith
Rumaniaand Yugoslavia,whichwere also threatenedby the Brezhnev
doctrine. In an effort to divert Soviet attention away from China,
Pekingalso beganto reviseits attitudetowardthe EuropeanEconomic
Communityand the maintenanceof a strong NATO,'5 althoughthe
Chinese leadership doubtless recognized the limitations of these
policies.
The ominousimplicationsof the Brezhnevdoctrineforced Mao
2lNew China News Agency, September 16, 1968; September 30, 1968; Denver Post, April
28, 1968. The Soviet Union denied these charges. See "Protest Against Hostile Action of
Chinese Authorities," Pravda, November 1, 1968, in Current Digest of Soviet Press, vol. 20,
no. 43 (November 20, 1968), p. 17.
1aNew China News Agency, September 28, 1968; October 2, 1968; December 2, 1968;
December 31, 1968.
MIbid., September 28, 1968.
5 Dick Wilson, "China and the European Community," China Quarterly, No. 56 (OctoberDecember 1973), pp. 647-666.

26

Asian Affairs

to end the CulturalRevolution. The Chinese feared that the Soviet

action in Czechoslovakiawas a prelude to similar interventionin
China. If Dubcek's policies were a threat to socialism, then Mao's
would, of course,fall into the same category.Mao seems to have been
concernedthat Moscow would interveneto restore Liu Shao-ch'ito
power. AlthoughLiu had been the main target of the CulturalRevolution, he had been able to retain his officesin the Party and government. In the aftermathof the Czechoslovakianinvasion, Mao hastily
called the TwelfthEnlargedPlenumof the Eighth CentralCommittee
to discuss the internationalsituation and Liu's removal from office.
In his address,Mao assertedthat China had more to fear from the
Soviet Union that from the United States, althoughthe communique
issuedat the close of the sessionmaintainedthat the United Stateshad
tacitlyapprovedSovietactionsin Czechoslovakia.'6
Peking'sconcerndeepenedwhen Sino-Sovietforces clashedalong
the Ussuri River in March 1969. The Chinese leadership quickly
acted to defuse the explosive border issue by emphasizingthat it
shouldbe settledthroughnegotiations."7
Chineseleaderswatchedwith
considerableanxiety as the InternationalConferenceof Communist
and WorkersParties convened in Moscow in June, and they must
have been greatly relievedwhen Brezhnevfailed to obtain a blanket
indictmentof the Maoists. The possibilityof overt Soviet interference
in Chinese affairs was thereby significantlyreduced. Brezhnev next
called for the creation of an Asian "collective security system,"'s
which implied that Moscow would now attemptto establish its own
Chinese containmentpolicy. To counterthis new development,China
launched a diplomaticoffensiveof its own, and in particularsought
better relationswith the United States.
II

The Nixon Administrationwas responsiveto China'sdesireto upgrade

its limited and irregularcontacts with Washingtonwith more meaningful relations.Even before his election, PresidentNixon's attitude
towardChina and its role in Asia had changedfrom earlieryears. In
16Peking Review, no. 44 (November 1, 1968), Supplement, p. viii; Far Eastern Economic
Review, (January 30, 1969), p. 175.
17Lin Piao, loc. cit., p. 91.
18See Oton Ambroz, "The Moscow Summit Conference," East Europe, vol. 19, nos. 8-9
(August-September1969), p. 16.

Pekingand the BrezhnevDoctrine

27

a 1967 article, he pointed out the need to recognize the "realityof

China,"and to help bring the PRC into the family of nations.'"US
governmentspecialistswere also convincedthat the time was propitious
for a changein policy towardthe mainland.
In the aftermathof the Czechoslovakianinvasion, the Chinese
Foreign Ministryannouncedits willingnessto improverelationswith
the United States, and even to sign a coexistence treaty. Moscow
quickly denouncedthis new departureas "a deal being concocted at
the expense of the Socialist commonwealth."20
The threatinherentin
this Soviet response was apparentlysufficientto prompt Peking to
cancel talks with the United States that were scheduledto convene
shortly in Warsaw. But as the possibility of Soviet military action
againstChina dissipatedafter the Moscow conferencein the Summer
of 1969, Peking felt that the time was right to seek an improvement
in its relationswith the UnitedStates.
Mao's decision to opt for better relationswith the United States
was undoubtedlydifficultin the light of past history;nor did it meet
with universalsupportwithin the Party. The decision producedideological confusion, and contributedto the schism between Mao and
Lin Piao, the heir apparent.Lin refusedto supportMao's "revolutionary diplomacy,"and reportedlyfavored the alternativeof reducing
tensionswith the SovietUnion. Peking has admittedthat "bitteropposition" developed among those who questionedthe ideological basis
for a detentewith the United States;and the emphasiswhich continues
to be placed on explainingthe detente in ideological terms indicates
the degreeto which this feeling permeatedthe Party.
Opponentsof the detentesaid that it was similarto the relationship that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union.2
The difference,accordingto Chou En-lai, was that the Chinese initiative was a "necessarycompromise,"unlike the "sinistercompromise"
of the two imperialistnations. Quotingfrom Lenin, Chou maintained
that "one must learn to distinguishbetween a man who gave the
banditsmoney and firearmsin orderto lessen the damagethey can do
19Richard M. Nixon, "Asia After Vietnam," Foreign Aflairs, vol. 46, no. 1 (October 1967),
p. 121.
20 Izvestia, December 1968, in Current Digest of Soviet Press, vol. 20, no. 49 (December 25,
1969), p. 18.
21 "Reference Materials Concerning Education on Situation, No. 43," in Chinese Communist
Internal Politics and Foreign Policy (Taipei: Institute of InternationalRelations, 1974), p. 133.

28

Asian Affairs

and facilitatetheir captureand execution, and a man who gives bandits moneyandfirearmsin orderto sharein the loot."22Pekingadmitted
that its tactics in dealingwith the United States had changed,but insisted that the principleof struggleremainedthe same. Nixon's visit
to China was in line with the Maoist dictumof "exploitingcontradictions, winningover the majority,opposingthe minority,and destroying
them one. by one." The Sino-Americandetente has, accordingto the
betweenthe two imperialistnations,
Maoists,fostered"contradictions"
and complicatedthe decisionmakingprocessin the Soviet Union.23
Whileboth the UnitedStatesand the SovietUnion are considered
to be imperialistic,only the latter is seen as aggressivetoward China
at the present time. The detente simply means that China's "contradictions"with the United States are no longer given top priority.But
coexistencedoes not mean an end to struggle."Socialistcountriesare
able to coexist peacefullywith the imperialistcountriesat particular
times through struggle and through struggle alone; what is more,
sharp complex struggles continue under conditions of peaceful coexistence."24
The detentewith the United Stateswas necessaryin order
that China could concentrate on the principal enemy---the Soviet
Union. Imperialistnations, accordingto the Maoist belief, should be
classifiedas either primaryor secondaryenemies, dependingon their
policies toward China. The current view of the United States as a
secondaryenemy is similarto that taken towardthe Kuomintangon
two previous occasions. The first compromisewith the Kuomintang
came with the United Front (1923-27), when the Party treated the
warlordsand imperialistsas the primaryenemies.At the end of 1936,
the Party elevated the Japanese to that position and downgraded
"contradictions"
with the Kuomintang.
In periodsof compromise,the CCP has taken advantageof the
opportunityto strengthenitself and broadenits base of support.The
new detente affords China similar advantages.Thus, the tributary
appearanceof PresidentNixon's visit carried enormousimplications
for Asian internationalrelations;and the visit greatly assisted China
22Chou En-lai, "Report to the Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China,"
Peking Review, nos. 35-36 (September 7, 1973), p. 23.
23 "Reference Materials ConcerningEducation on Situation, No. 43," loc. cit., p. 136.
24Red Flag, April 30, 1965.

Pekingand the BrezhnevDoctrine

29

in gaining formal diplomaticrecognitionfrom numerouscountriesat

the expenseof Taiwan. The legitimacythat accompaniedsuch recognition also strengthenedPeking'sclaim over Taiwan. In the Shanghai
Communique,the United States acknowledgedthat "all Chinese on
either side of the Taiwan Straitmaintainthere is but one China, and
that Taiwan is a part of China."25Peking could readilyinterpretthis
statementas tantamountto recognizingits claim to the island. What
remainedto be solved was merely the time and nature of a final
solution. The existence of Liaison Officesin Washingtonand Peking
also reinforces the belief that the liberation of Taiwan is making
progress;and in their approachto the Chinese on Taiwan, Peking
has used the ShanghaiCommuniqueand the existenceof the Liaison
Offices to indicate the foolhardinessof dependingupon the United
States.
III
The Brezhnevdoctrine proved to be a catalyst promptingChina to
abandonits self-imposedislation and become an active memberof the
internationalcommunity.It was seen as a direct threat to Maoist ascendancyin China and, indeed,to China'snationalsecurity.The avalanche of criticismfrom Peking in responseto the doctrinereflected
the importancethat the Chineseregime attachesto ideologicalleadership. By exposingMoscow's ideological corruption,Peking hoped to
prove the validity of Mao's thought. But while they were obviously
deeply concerned over the ideological implicationsof the doctrine,
China'sleaders were perhapseven more alarmedby what they consideredto be a threat to China'sindependence.Thus the naturalresponsewas to seek detentewith the United States.
From the Maoist perspective,the detente has been successfulin
betweenthe United States,the Soviet Union,
creating"contradictions"
and Japan.It has strengthenedChina'spositionin internationalaffairs,
reducedthe possibilityof a Soviet invasion,and opened new avenues
for acquiringmuch-neededtechnology.It is impossibleto know how
long the United Stateswill be relegatedto the positionof a secondary
enemy. The detente has had the approvalof both Mao and Chou,
25 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 66, no. 1708 (March 20, 1972), pp. 437-438.

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Asian Affairs

both of whom will, however,probablyfade from the political scene

in the next few years. During his visit to the United Nations, Teng
Hsiao-p'ingreportedlyassuredSecretaryof State Kissingerthat SinoAmericanrelationswere not in jeopardy.This is understandable,inasmuch as the factors that promptedthe detente still prevail. China's
deep feelings of insecuritywill be a majorfactor in the continuation
of the Sino-Americandetente.